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Game Theory 2

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32 views8 pages

Game Theory 2

Uploaded by

fernando8morea
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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GAME THEORY 088976 -

Exam: January 29, 2024

SURNAME NAME PERSON CODE SIGNATURE

Prof. Giovanni Valente


INSTRUCTIONS

• Write down the solutions in the blank spaces below the exercises.

• Use only a blue or black pen.

• The use of calculators or notes is not allowed.

• Available time: i hour and 30 minutes

• WRITE CLEARLY: if your answer cannot be read, it will not be ac


cepted!

Space reserved to the instructor

r~sercise i Esercise 2 . Esercise 3 Esercise 4 Esercise 5 Total

i
EXERCISE 1. Consider the following bimatrix game

((1,1) (3,2) ~
((2,2) (0,1) ),
\~ (0,0) (1,2) J
1. (2 pt) Determine the Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

2. (9 pt) Find a Nash equilibrium such that (p, 1 — p, 0) is an equilibrium


strategy for the first player for some p.

3. (2 pt) Calculate the expected utility provided by such equilibrium to


the first player.

?u~E 21L\~~~ (2~~ ~ (~~a)

~t

T~-~ ! Jt~JC~ ~

‘3 J

‘53
a
EXERCISE 2. Let a game with N = {1, 2, 3} players be such that
v({i}) = O for all i, v({1, 2}) v({1, 3}) = 1, v({2, 3}) = 4, and v(N) = 4.

1. (2 pt) Find the core of the game.

2. (3 pt) Find the nucleolus.

3. (2 pt) Compute the Shapley values.

~≤Xz~ X~3; #~

~ ~J~JCL~OLOS

~ (o~2~2~

V,~t.4Q~ ~—.— i
EXERCISE 3. Given the following game between two players in exten
sive form:

A B

I’
(1,1)
D

(0,1) (2,2)

1. (2 pt) Use backward induetion to solve the game.

S~cò t~~t:~ 7~L4ys

IS Cz,
EXERCISE 4. Given the zero sum game described by the following
matrix:

(4 i. a~
2 5 a)’

1. (2 pt) Find the conservative values for both players with respect to real
values of a.

2. (1 pt) Determine for which values of a there are equilibria in pure


strategies.

3. (3 pt) Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for a> 3.

q~2
CcL

?~R~ EQcjlLi~~jA

~ co~~ ~
A c~\ff)( C~~oN ~

~ ~AS~ E~OIL\~UM (c~~~) (~ ~ ) o))


EXERCISE 5. THEORY QUESTIONS

1. Cooperative games: (a) State the definition of simple games and ex


plain its content (4 pt). (b) Write down the conditions under which a
coalition is a minimal winning coalition in a simple game (2 pt).
2. Nash model: (a) Formulate the definition of Best Response Multi
funetion BR(x, y) for a two-player game and provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for (E, ~) to be a Nash equilibrium (~ pt).

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