Furqan Soub Real
Furqan Soub Real
THE STATE........................(APPELLANT)
V.
RAMESH………………………..
(RESPONDENT)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LEGISLATION 5
CASES REFERRED 5
BOOKS REFERRED 6
LEGAL DATABASES 6
IMPORTANT DEFINATIONS 7
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 8
ISSUE RAISED 11
ISSUE CONCERNED 12
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 13
PLEADINGS 14-17
1. Whether there exist common intention between the accused Ramesh and Mahesh ? 14
2. Whether the state is justified for seeking permission for addition of charge u/s 366 of IPC? 17
PRAYER 18
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AC Appeal Cases
Art. Article
Edn. Edition
Guj Gujrat
Hon’ble Honorable
Jul July
Ors. Others
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r/w Read with
S Section
SC Supreme Court
Sec. Section
V. Versus
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATION
CASES REFERRED
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BOOKS REFERRED
LEGAL DATABASES
WWW.YOURARTICLELIBRARY.COM
WWW.LEGALSERVICEINDIA.COM
WWW.INDIANKANOON.ORG
WWW.LAWRATO.COM
WWW.MANUPATRA.COM
WWW.INDIANCASELAWS.ORG
WWW.INDLAW.COM
WWW.JUDIC.NIC.IN
WWW.LEXISNEXIS.COM
WWW.SCCONLINE.CO.IN
WWW.WESTLAW.COM
WWW.NCBI.NLM.NIH.GOV
IMPORTANT DEIFINITION:
1. The appellant for the purpose of this memorandum shall be the State.
2. The respondents for the purpose of all the issue shall be Ramesh .
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Article 132 and 134 of
the Constitution of India,1950.
The respondents have appeared to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in response to the
petitions filed by the petitioners.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Court the facts of the case are
summarized as follows:
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10) That on 23rd March 2013 when Ramesh and Mahesh saw Reema passing on a lonely road,
they approached Reema to accompany them to the temple so that they can get married. On
Reema’s refusal, Mahesh carrying the bottle of acid threatened Reema.
11) That when chaos was created, Mahesh accidentally spilled acid on Reema.
12) That the Session Court convicted Ramesh under Section 326 A r/w Section 34 of IPC,
1860 and sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. He was also asked to pay
compensation to Reema to the sum of Rs. 200000/- to be paid immediately. He was also
awarded rigorous imprisonment for 2 years under section 345D, IPC, 1860. Both the
sentences were to run concurrently.
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ISSUE RAISED
ISSUE I
ISSUE II
ISSUE III
ISSUE IV
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ISSUE CONCERNED
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SUMMARY OF PLEADING
WHETHER THERE EXIST COMMON INTENTION BETWEEN
RAMESH AND MAHESH AS PER THE SECTION 34 OF IPC, 1860?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there existed no
common intention between Ramesh and Mahesh as per Section 34 of IPC, 1860 as,
(3.1) Ramesh had no intention of committing such an act and he did not agree to that
and, (3.2) the act was not done in furtherance of the common intention under
Section 34 which is important to attract the Section.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the present matter has already
been tried before the Sessions Court. The Magistrate, at the time of committal
proceedings under Section 209, CrPC did not charge the accused with Section 366,
IPC, 1860, and the State is not justified for seeking permission for addition of
charge U/S 366 of IPC as the late framing of the charge would cause prejudice to
the accused and no injustice would be caused to the complainant by refusal.
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PLEADING
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there existed no
common intention between Ramesh and Mahesh as per the Section 34 of the IPC,
1860.
The Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states; “When a criminal act is
done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.”1
The essential ingredients of Sec. 34 of IPC as stated and restated by law Courts
in plethora of cases are:
This provision is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. It
lays down the principle of joint liability. To charge a person under this section, it
must be shown that he shared a common intention with another person or persons to
commit a crime and subsequently the crime was perpetrated.3The Apex Court held
in a case4, that in the case of Sec. 34 it is well established that a common intention
presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can
be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done
in furtherance of the common intention of them all.
1
Section 34, Indiana Penal Code. Mepa Dana, (1959) Bom LR 269.
2
Shaik China Brahmam v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 610.
3
Garib Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 1286.
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4
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216
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To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of the
accused was known to the rest of them and was shared by them. The test to decide if
the intention of one of them is common is to see whether the intention of one was
known to the other and was shared by that other. In drawing the inference the true rule
of law which is to be applied is the rule which requires that guilt is not to be inferred
unless that is the only inference which follows from the circumstances of the case and
no other innocuous inference can be drawn.5
Each can individually cause a separate fatal blow. Yet, there may not exist a
common intention if there was no prior meeting of the mind. In such a case, each
would be individually liable for the injuries, he causes.6
It is humbly submitted that the accused Ramesh is being dragged into the picture
for no justifiable cause and for no fault, participation or involvement of his in the
alleged act in question. It is submitted that neither the accused had any intention
with Mahesh nor did he act in concert with Mahesh to commit such act.
‘Common intention’ implies a pre- concerted plan and acting in concert pursuant
to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the
act in point of time, which need not be a long gap.7
There was no evidence that prior to the incident there was any common intention
shared by both the accused. The said intention did not develop at the time of the
incident as well and therefore, it was held that Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code
cannot be resorted to hold accused guilty of any crime.8
5
Oswal Danji v. State, (1960) 1 Guj LR 145.
6
Nandu & Dhaneshwar Naik v. The State, 1976 CriLJ 250.
7
Ramchander & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan, 1970 CrLJ 653.
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8
Veer Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (1) A.C.R. 294 (All.).
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THE ACT WAS NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION
9
State of Bihar v. Lala Mahto A.I.R 1955 pat. 161.
10
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1492.
11
AIR 1994 SC 1452.
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II. WHETHER THE STATE IS JUSTIFIED FOR SEEKING
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the present matter has already
been tried before the Sessions Court. The Magistrate, at the time of committal
proceedings under Section 209, CrPC did not charge the accused with Section 366,
IPC, 1860.
It is further submitted that the High Court having inherent power to do so, did not
find any ground to add a charge under Section 366, IPC against the accused.
The late framing of a charge would cause prejudice to the accused and no injustice
would be caused to the complainant by refusal.13
It is to be noted that the High Court has acquitted the accused from all the charges
and has dismissed the appeal of the State. When the accused was discharged of all
the charges and no charge existed against him, an application by prosecution under
Sec 216, CrPC was not maintainable.14 The addition of a new charge will amount to
re-opening of the trail and will dissipate the valuable time of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
Hence, it is humbly requested from the Hon’ble Court not to maintain the
permission of the State to add a charge under Sec 366, IPC against the accused.
12
T.J.Edward v. C.A. Victor Immanuel, 2002 Cr LJ 1670 (ker).
13
Uma Dutta v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Cr LJ 2302: AIR 1990 SC 2158.
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14
Sohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Cr LJ 2302: AIR 1990 SC 2158.
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PRAYER
1. To declare that Mr. Ramesh is not guilty of the crime of causing grievous hurt by use of
acid and Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc
2. To declare that the High Court’s acquittal order of Mr. Ramesh should be reserved.
AND/OR
PASS ANY ORDER THAT THIS HON‟BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE
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