BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF
Criminal Appeal No ....... /2024

STATE OF DIMRHI.........................................................................APPELLANT
Versus
SURESH ........................................................................................ RESPONDENT

APPEAL FILED UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

INDIANA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF THE DIVISION

BENCH OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..........................................................................................................3
CASE LAWS REFERRED...........................................................................................................3
LEGISLATION REFERRED .......................................................................................................4
BOOKS REFERRED/LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED ........................................................4
WEBSITES REFERRED .............................................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................................................5
STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................6
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ............................................................................................................7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ....................................................................................................8
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................................9
1. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from
liability of murder? .......................................................................................................................9
2. Whether Navita’s dying declaration is legally admissible evidence to support the murder
charge? ........................................................................................................................................12
3. Whether Forensic evidence reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence? .................15
PRAYER .......................................................................................................................................19

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S. No. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

1 AIR All India Reporter
2 Hon’Ble Honorable
3 Art. Article
4 v. versus
5 INS Indiana Nyaya Sanhita,2023
6 ISA Indiana Sakshya
Adhiniyam,2023
7 SC Supreme Court
10 SCC Supreme Court Cases
11 SCR Supreme Court Reports
12 SCW Supreme Court Weekly
13 ibid ibidem
14 Pg. Page
15 S. Section

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS REFERRED
Sr No. Cases Referred At
1 Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker 9
v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC
1563
2 Surendra Mishra v. State of 9
Jharkhand, AIR 2011 SC 627
3 Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union, 10, 17
AIR 1977 SC 608
4 Bapu Gajraj Singh v. State of 10
Rajasthan, 2007 SCW 3808
5 State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram, 10
AIR 2012 SC 1
6 Hari Singh Gond v. State of 10
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 31
7 Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya 11
Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1089
8 Shikhari Behra v. State of Orissa, 11
AIR 2002 SC 3059
9 Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of 11
Maharashtra, (2012) 12 SCC 565
10 Kishore v. State of Madhya 12
Pradesh, (2002) 6 SCC 710
11 Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, 13
12 P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of 13
Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 342
13 K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public 13
Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618
14 Bhagwan Das v. State of 13
Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 589
15 Gopal Singh v. State of Madhya 14
Pradesh, (1972) 1 SCC 519
16 Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 14
AIR 2001 SC 1814
17 Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of 14
Bihar, AIR 1998 4 SCC 517
18 State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, 14, 17
AIR 1999 2 SCC 465
19 Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare 15
v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998
SCC 638
20 Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, 15
AIR 1983 1 SCC 221

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 21 Mohan v. State of Madhya 16
Pradesh, AIR 2003 8 SCC 696
22 Ram Chandra v. State of Uttar 16
Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381
23 State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, 16
AIR 2000 SC 2264
24 Ramanand v. State of Himachal 16
Pradesh, AIR 1981 3 SCC 458
25 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State 17
of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622
26 State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, AIR 17
1996 SC 3035
27 Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa, 17
AIR 1987 SC 2131
28 State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, 18
AIR 2014 SC 2989

LEGISLATION REFERRED
• The Constitution of India,1950
• The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023
• The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,2023

BOOKS REFERRED/LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED

• Hari Singh Gour, Indian Penal Code (15th Edition, Volume 1)
• Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code (35th Edition)
• Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (27th Edition)
• Avtar Singh, Principles of The Law of Evidence (24th Edition)
• SCC ONLINE
• AIR ONLINE
WEBSITES REFERRED
1. https://blog.ipleaders.in
2. https://indiankanoon.org/
3. https://ili.ac.in/
4. https://www.scobserver.in

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appellant has approached this Hon’ble Court by invoking its jurisdiction under Article 134
of the Constitution of Indiana, which empowers the Supreme Court to hear appeals in criminal
cases involving significant legal questions or cases of acquittal in serious offenses.
Article 134 of the Constitution of Indiana provides;
“Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a
criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court-
(a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death;
or
(b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and
has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death; or
(c) certifies under article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court:
Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made
in that behalf under clause (1) of article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may
establish or require.
(2) Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court any further powers to entertain and hear
appeals from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in
the territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such law.”

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Suresh and Navita, citizens of the Democratic Republic of Indiana and residents of Dimrhi, were
married in 2015. Initially, their relationship was stable, but after the birth of their daughter,
Jenny, in 2017, Suresh’s behavior became increasingly violent. Navita took Suresh to a
psychiatrist, who diagnosed him with Bipolar Mood Disorder and prescribed treatment, but
Suresh’s aggression persisted.

On 5th December 2017 at 11am, loud noise of fighting, crying and shouting was coming from
the house of Suresh. Manish, a neighbor, found Navita unconscious, bleeding, and injured, with
Suresh hiding a 7-inch axe in the garden. Manish then called the Police and Navita was taken
to government hospital. On 6th December, 2017 Navita gained consciousness and gave her
statement in which she accused Suresh for attacking her with an axe. On 8th December Navita
died because of the injury in her lower abdomen which proved fatal. Suresh who was already
under arrest was charged with Section 302 of the IPC. Suresh pleaded that he was suffering
from bipolar disorder at the time of the offence hence he must be given an exception u/s 84 of
the IPC.

Suresh was found guilty of intentional murder of Navita and convicted under S.302 IPC and
sentenced to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment by the Sessions Court. The accused feeling
aggrieved by the said judgment preferred an appeal before the High Court of Dimrhi and
accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court acquitted the accused from the charge of murder on having
found that the accused at the time of committing crime was suffering from both legal and
medical insanity.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from liability
of murder?
2. Whether deceased dying declaration legally admissible evidence in order to support the murder
charges ?
3. Whether Forensic evidence reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that there exists no sufficient
ground so as to exonerate the accused from the liability of murder.
The appellant humbly submits that Suresh does not meet the criteria for legal insanity
under S. 84 of IPC. To qualify for this defense, the accused must lack the ability to
understand the nature or wrongfulness of their actions, which Suresh’s behavior does not
demonstrate. His post-offense actions, including hiding the weapon, reveal a
consciousness of guilt, indicating he was aware of his actions. Additionally, while Suresh
has a history of Bipolar Mood Disorder, he was under treatment and had an
understanding of his condition, making him responsible for managing his behavior. His
ability to recall details of the incident further contradicts the claim of legal insanity, as
this awareness is inconsistent with the total cognitive impairment required by law.
Therefore, the appellant contends that Suresh does not qualify for exoneration on grounds
of legal insanity and should be held accountable for his actions.

2.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that deceased dying declaration
is legally admissible evidence which supports the murder charge.
The appellant humbly submits that Navita’s dying declaration is both legally admissible
and reliable under S. 26 of the ISA. Made while she was in a mentally sound state, the
declaration directly implicates Suresh and provides a clear account of the attack leading
to her death. Dying declarations are highly credible, and there is no requirement for
corroboration unless doubt exists, which is absent here. Furthermore, Navita had no
motive to falsely implicate Suresh, and her statement aligns with the forensic evidence
and eyewitness accounts, making it a vital and trustworthy piece of evidence to support
the charge of murder.

3.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that forensic evidence is admissible
and reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence.
The appellant humbly submits that the forensic evidence, particularly the recovery of
Suresh’s fingerprints on the axe, is reliable and determinative in establishing his guilt.
Admissible under S. 39 of the ISA, the forensic findings provide objective proof linking
Suresh to the crime and corroborate other evidence, such as Navita’s dying declaration
and eyewitness testimony. Additionally, Suresh’s act of hiding the weapon demonstrates
consciousness of guilt, further strengthening the appellant’s case. The scientific
credibility and uncontested nature of the forensic evidence make it a decisive factor in
proving Suresh’s culpability.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from
liability of murder?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that there exists no sufficient ground so as to
exonerate the accused from the liability of murder which the appellant will be proving on the
following grounds;
1. The Standard for Legal Insanity under S. 84 of IPC provides;
“Act of a person of unsound mind- Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the
time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act,
or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. This is known as the defense of legal
insanity.”
For an insanity defense to be valid, it is not enough to show that the accused has a mental illness.
The defense must demonstrate that, at the precise time of committing the offense, the accused
was unable to comprehend the nature or the wrongfulness of their actions. This standard requires
a complete cognitive impairment affecting the ability to understand the act itself.
In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat,1 the Supreme Court held that the
defense has the burden to prove insanity, beyond reasonable doubt. However, a diagnosis of
mental illness alone is insufficient. The defense must show that the accused was incapable of
understanding the nature of the act at the time it occurred.
Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand,2 the Court emphasized that medical insanity (a history of
mental illness) does not automatically translate into legal insanity. The accused must have been
unaware of the act's nature or its wrongfulness at the time of the offense to qualify for the
insanity defense. The accused bears the responsibility of proving legal insanity and the onus can
be discharged by demonstrating their conduct with reference to their medical condition.
In Suresh’s case, although he was diagnosed with Bipolar Mood Disorder, the defense has failed
to establish that he was legally insane at the time of the offense. There is no conclusive evidence
that Suresh was unaware of the nature or wrongfulness of his actions when he attacked Navita.
Thus, his mental disorder does not meet the threshold for legal insanity.
2. Actions of the Accused Post-Offense Indicate Awareness of Wrongfulness
Suresh’s actions immediately after the attack demonstrate an awareness of the wrongfulness of
his conduct, undermining the claim of legal insanity. The appellant points to Suresh’s attempts to
hide the weapon as evidence of consciousness of mens rea which is one of the prerequisites of
Murder under S.101 of INS.

1 AIR 1964 SC 1563

2 AIR 2011 SC 627

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In Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union3, the Court held that post-offense conduct, such as attempting
to hide evidence or fleeing the scene, is indicative of awareness and intent, suggesting that the
accused understood their actions and the consequences.
Bapu Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan4, the Supreme Court observed that an accused’s
actions following an offense, if rational and purposeful, weaken the claim of insanity, as such
behavior indicates an understanding of the situation.
After the attack, Suresh tried to hide the axe, a clear indication that he understood the
implications of his actions. This behavior shows that he was aware of the wrongful nature of his
conduct, contradicting any claim of legal insanity under S.84
3. Lack of Evidence Establishing Legal Insanity at the Time of the Offense
S.104 of Indian Evidence Act places the burden of proving legal insanity on the defense. This
requires the defense to show that Suresh was so impaired by his disorder that he was incapable of
understanding his actions at the crime’s moment. S.108 of ISA provides;
“Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions. - When a person is accused
of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any
of the General Exceptions in the INS, 2023 or within any special exception or proviso contained
in any other part of the said Sanhita, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the
Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.”
In State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram5, the Court reaffirmed that a history of mental illness alone
does not satisfy the legal standard for insanity. The accused must demonstrate that their mental
state at the time of the offense rendered them incapable of knowing what they were doing or that
it was wrong.
In Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya Pradesh6, it was held that to establish legal insanity, the
defense must prove that the accused was unaware of their actions at the time of the crime. The
Court emphasized that behavior suggesting awareness of wrongdoing negates the defense of
insanity.
The defense has not provided sufficient evidence that Suresh was legally insane at the time of the
crime. While he may have had a mental disorder, there is no indication that he was unaware of
his actions. His behavior at the scene and subsequent attempts to conceal the weapon further
demonstrate an understanding of his actions, failing to meet the criteria for legal insanity under
S. 22 of INS.

3 AIR 1977 SC 608

4 2007 SCW 3808, 2007 (8) SCC 66
5 AIR 2012 SC 1
6 AIR 2009 SC 31

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4. Suresh’s Prior Knowledge of His Condition and Responsibility for Treatment
The appellant argues that Suresh’s prior diagnosis of Bipolar Mood Disorder and his engagement
with treatment indicate an awareness of his condition and an understanding of his responsibility
to manage it. His decision not to consistently follow medical advice or take necessary
precautions to control his behavior shows negligence, not legal insanity. Legal insanity under S.
84 of IPC cannot apply to individuals who are aware of their mental health issues and are
actively managing their symptoms.
In Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh7, the Court held that a history of mental illness does not
justify criminal acts if the individual had the capacity to manage their behavior, particularly if the
accused was aware of their condition and failed to take appropriate measures.
In Shikhari Behra v. State of Orissa8,The Supreme Court emphasized that knowing one's
condition and failing to seek proper treatment or precautions negates a claim of legal insanity
since it implies the accused was aware of the potential for violent outbursts and bore
responsibility for managing it.
Suresh had been under the care of a psychiatrist and was advised to take medication and control
his anger. His ongoing treatment shows he was aware of his mental condition and its potential
consequences. The appellant argues that this awareness and failure to manage his symptoms
responsibly suggest he was not legally insane at the time of the crime, as he understood the need
to control his behavior.
5. Suresh’s Ability to Recall the Incident Contradicts Legal Insanity
Suresh’s ability to remember certain details of the incident, such as finding Navita lying on the
floor and his actions surrounding the weapon, contradicts the requirements for legal insanity.
Legal insanity under S. 84 of IPC requires that the accused be so mentally impaired at the time
of the offense that they are unable to comprehend their actions or form memories related to them.
Suresh’s selective memory suggests that he was aware and conscious during the act, which
weakens his claim to an insanity defense.
In Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of Maharashtra9, the Court stated that an accused’s ability to
recall details of the crime indicates that they were in a conscious state, undermining the defense
of legal insanity, which requires complete detachment from reality during the offense.
In Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh10, the Supreme Court found that partial or selective
memory of the incident suggests cognitive awareness and understanding of actions, which is
inconsistent with the standard required for legal insanity.
Suresh recalled specific aspects of the incident, including finding Navita on the floor and the axe
in his hand. This selective memory indicates that he was partially aware of his actions,

7 AIR 1970 SC 1089

8 AIR 2002 SC 3059
9 (2018) 12 SCC 565
10 (2011) 4 SCC 584

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 inconsistent with the complete cognitive detachment required for a successful insanity defense.
The appellant argues that this awareness further undermines his claim to legal insanity under S.
22 of INS.
Therefore, in light of the abovementioned grounds, the appellant contends that the legal standard
for insanity under S. 22 of INS has not been met in Suresh’s case. His diagnosis of Bipolar Mood
Disorder does not automatically qualify as legal insanity. The appellant points to Suresh’s actions
after the attack, such as hiding the weapon, as clear indicators of his awareness of wrongdoing,
which undermines his insanity defense. Further, the defense has not met its burden to prove that
Suresh was incapable of understanding his actions at the time of the offense. Therefore, the
appellant contends that sufficient grounds for legal insanity do not exist, and Suresh should be
held liable for the murder.

2. Whether deceased dying declaration legally admissible evidence in order to support the
murder charges ?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that Navita’s dying declaration is legally
admissible evidence which supports the murder charge which the appellant proves on the
following grounds;
1. Admissibility of Dying Declaration under S. 32 of Indian Evidence Act
S. 32(a) of the IEA, states that statements made by a person as to the cause of their death or the
circumstances leading to their death are admissible in court when the person who made the
statement is unavailable due to death.
S. 32(a) of the IEA, provides;
“Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is
relevant.- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who
cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot
be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case
appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases,
namely:—
(a) when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that
person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made
them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever
may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question;”
Dying declarations are considered highly trustworthy, as they are made in extremis, or "in the
shadow of death," where the declarant is presumed to be truthful, given the seriousness of their
condition.

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In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra11 the Supreme Court held that a dying declaration is
admissible if it inspires confidence, regardless of whether it was recorded by a magistrate. As
long as the declarant was mentally sound and aware, the declaration is valid and does not require
corroboration.
P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka12, affirmed that the mental condition of the declarant at
the time of making the statement is crucial. If found to be sound and coherent, the declaration
has high evidentiary value and can form the sole basis of conviction.
Navita’s statement, recorded by PW1 (SHO Rajesh) while she was mentally sound, clearly
implicates Suresh as her attacker. The defense has not disputed her mental state at the time, and
there is no evidence suggesting that she was incoherent. Therefore, the dying declaration satisfies
the criteria for admissibility under S. 32 of IEA.
2. Reliability of the Dying Declaration as Evidence of Guilt
Navita’s dying declaration provides direct evidence linking Suresh to the offense, describing both
the cause of her injuries and the circumstances of the attack. The appellant contends that this
statement, which identifies Suresh as her attacker, holds significant probative value and should
be regarded as credible.
In K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor13, the Court held that a dying declaration, if
found reliable, does not need corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction. Its
credibility depends on the circumstances under which it was made and the coherence of the
declarant.
In Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan14, the Supreme Court ruled that the sanctity of a dying
declaration lies in its immediacy to the event and the declarant's trustworthiness. Provided there
are no reasons to doubt its truthfulness, it is adequate to establish guilt.
Navita’s declaration meets the standards of reliability as she was in a coherent state and
immediately named Suresh as her attacker. Given that she had no motive to falsely accuse her
husband, her statement is highly reliable and is sufficient to support the murder charge against
Suresh.
3. No Requirement for Corroboration of a Dying Declaration
S. 32 of the IEA does not mandate corroboration of a dying declaration. If the court finds the
declaration credible, it can serve as sole evidence for conviction.

11 (2002) 6 SCC 710

12 (2003) 6 SCC 342
13 (1976) 3 SCC 618
14 AIR 1957 SC 589

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In Gopal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh15, the Court emphasized that a dying declaration, if
believed to be true, does not require further corroboration to support a conviction. This is
especially pertinent when there is no evidence of the declarant's mental instability.
In Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan16, it was held that the court can rely solely on a dying
declaration for conviction if it is unambiguous, consistent, and credible. In this case, the Supreme
Court held that a person would not die with the lie on his lips because he had to meet the
supreme power of this world, that is, God. The court further observed that the sense of imminent
death produces in men’s minds the same feeling as that of a righteous man under oath; therefore,
the chances of falsehood are totally nullified.
Navita’s dying declaration is coherent and consistent, providing a clear account of the events
leading to her death. This statement can therefore stand on its own to support the charge, as
corroboration is not legally necessary.
4. Corroborative Evidence Supporting the Dying Declaration
While corroboration is not legally required, the appellant has presented additional evidence that
aligns with Navita’s statement, including:
o Forensic evidence linking Suresh to the crime, with his fingerprints found on the murder
weapon.
o Eyewitness testimony from PW3 (Manish), who witnessed Suresh attempting to hide the
axe and saw Navita injured at the scene.
In Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar17, the Supreme Court held that when corroborative
evidence is present alongside a dying declaration, it further strengthens the reliability and impact
of the declaration in proving guilt.
In State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram18, it was held that forensic evidence that supports a dying
declaration was seen as strengthening the appellant’s case, even though corroboration is not
legally required.
The forensic evidence and eyewitness account corroborate Navita’s dying declaration,
reinforcing her statement and eliminating any doubts regarding its accuracy.
5. Absence of Any Motive to Fabricate the Dying Declaration Strengthens its Credibility
The appellant argues that Navita, being in a critical state and on the verge of death, had no reason
to fabricate her statement or falsely implicate her husband, Suresh. In the absence of any motive
to lie, Navita’s declaration is further strengthened in its reliability and admissibility as truthful
evidence. The circumstances in which dying declarations are typically made imply sincerity,
especially when there is no evidence suggesting a reason for false implication.

15 (1972) 1 SCC 519

16 AIR 2001 SC 1814
17 AIR 1998 4 SCC 517
18 AIR 1999 2 SCC 465

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In Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra19, the Court held that in cases
where the deceased has no motive to falsely implicate the accused, the dying declaration is
considered more reliable, as it is presumed that individuals in such circumstances speak the truth.
In Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar20, the Supreme Court highlighted that the absence of any
animosity or reason to lie enhances the credibility of a dying declaration, making it sufficient to
establish guilt if found truthful and untainted.
Navita’s dying declaration directly identifies Suresh as her attacker, with no evidence or
indication of any motive on her part to fabricate her statement. Given their marital relationship
and her critical condition, Navita had no reason to lie or falsely accuse Suresh, reinforcing the
credibility and reliability of her declaration. This absence of motive further supports the
appellant’s argument that her statement should be accepted as truthful and admissible under S. 32
of the IEA, making it sufficient to substantiate the murder charge against Suresh.
Therefore, in light of the abovementioned grounds, the appellant contends that, Navita’s dying
declaration is both legally admissible and reliable, as it fulfills all requirements under S. 32 of the
IEA. The defense has not questioned Navita’s mental state at the time, and the declaration was
clear and consistent, implicating Suresh in her injuries. Further the mentioned precedents,
supports that a credible dying declaration needs no corroboration and can form the sole basis of
conviction. However, in this case, additional corroborative evidence, such as forensic findings
and eyewitness testimony, further substantiates Navita’s statement, solidifying the case against
Suresh.

3. Whether Forensic evidence reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that forensic evidence is admissible and reliably
determinant evidence to prove the offence which the appellant establishes on following grounds;
1. Reliability and Admissibility of Forensic Evidence under S. 39 of the IEA
S. 39 of the ISA, allows for the admissibility of expert evidence, including forensic analysis, in
cases where specialized knowledge is required to understand the evidence or determine facts in
issue. It reads as;
“Opinions of experts. -(1) When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law or
of science or art, or any other field, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the
opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or any
other field, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts
and such persons are called experts.”
Forensic evidence is considered reliable and admissible when it is provided by qualified experts,
and when the methods used to obtain and analyze the evidence meet scientific standards.

19 AIR 1998 7 SCC 638

20 AIR 1983 1 SCC 221

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In Mohan v. State of Madhya Pradesh21, the Supreme Court held that forensic evidence is
credible and admissible as expert evidence, provided that it is based on scientific techniques and
properly validated methods.
In Ram Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh22, the Court emphasized the importance of expert
forensic testimony in establishing facts where scientific evaluation is essential, giving significant
weight to forensic evidence in criminal trials.
The forensic evidence in this case, particularly the recovery of Suresh’s fingerprints on the
murder weapon (the axe), is admissible under S. 39 ISA. It was collected and analyzed by
experts following standard protocols, making it a reliable piece of evidence that directly connects
Suresh to the crime.
2. Forensic Evidence as Corroboration of Guilt
Forensic evidence provides independent corroboration of Navita’s dying declaration and PW3’s
testimony, both of which implicate Suresh in the crime. This reinforces the credibility of the
appellant’s case.
In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh23, the Court held that forensic evidence, such as fingerprints on
a weapon, provides objective proof linking the accused to the crime and is especially persuasive
when corroborating other evidence.
In Ramanand v. State of Himachal Pradesh24, the Supreme Court ruled that forensic evidence
serves as a strong corroborative element, particularly when it aligns with other testimonies or
confessions, thus strengthening the appellant's case.
In the present case, the fingerprints on the axe provide objective corroboration of both Navita’s
dying declaration and the eyewitness testimony from PW3. This forensic link leaves little doubt
about Suresh’s presence at the scene and his involvement in the assault.
3. Forensic Evidence Establishing Consciousness of Guilt
The forensic evidence, coupled with Suresh’s actions following the assault, establishes a
consciousness of guilt, thereby weakening any claim to an insanity defense. The fingerprints on
the axe, combined with Suresh’s attempt to hide it, show that he was aware of his actions and
their wrongfulness.
In Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union of 25, the Court held that when forensic evidence is coupled
with actions suggesting consciousness of guilt (such as concealing the weapon), it indicates that
the accused was aware of their actions, undermining claims of lack of mental capacity or legal
insanity.

21 AIR 2003 8 SCC 696

22 AIR 1957 SC 381
23 AIR 2000 SC 2264
24 AIR 1981 3 SCC 458
25 Ibid., 10

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In State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram26, the Court emphasized that forensic evidence of fingerprints
or DNA on a weapon used in the crime, especially when the accused attempts to hide the
weapon, indicates deliberate action and an understanding of wrongdoing.
Suresh’s fingerprints on the murder weapon, and his subsequent attempt to hide it, confirm his
awareness of the crime and show intent. This indicates that he was fully conscious of his actions
and is therefore responsible for them, further reinforcing the appellant’s argument against the
insanity defense.
4. The Determinative Nature of Forensic Evidence in Criminal Convictions
Forensic evidence, due to its scientific basis, provides objective and determinative proof of the
accused’s involvement in a crime, and is often decisive in cases lacking direct witnesses.
In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra27, the Supreme Court held that forensic
evidence is critical in proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when it directly links
the accused to the crime.
In State of Rajasthan v. Kishore28, the Court highlighted that forensic evidence, such as
fingerprints and other scientific findings, can form the primary basis of conviction if it clearly
links the accused to the crime.
The presence of Suresh’s fingerprints on the axe provides a direct link between him and the
assault on Navita. As scientific evidence, it is reliable and determinative in proving his guilt,
especially since it corroborates other evidence in the case.
5. Limited Scope for Rebuttal of Forensic Evidence
Given the accuracy and objectivity of forensic techniques, rebutting forensic evidence requires a
credible alternative explanation or substantial proof of procedural error, neither of which has
been presented by the defense.
In Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa29, the Court ruled that forensic evidence is highly reliable,
and the defense must provide substantial proof to dispute its findings, such as evidence of
contamination or procedural irregularities.
State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai30, established that when forensic evidence is obtained through
standard scientific procedures, it is difficult for the defense to challenge its credibility unless
there is clear proof of mishandling or tampering.
The defense has not presented any credible evidence to challenge the integrity of the forensic
findings. The fingerprints on the axe were collected and analyzed by qualified professionals
under strict procedural standards, making the evidence both reliable and uncontested.

26 Ibid., 14
27 AIR 1984 SC 1622
28 AIR 1996 SC 3035
29 AIR 1987 SC 2131
30 AIR 2014 SC 2989

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Therefore, in light of the above mentioned grounds and precedents the appellant contends that,
the forensic evidence in this case is both admissible and reliable, fulfilling the criteria under S.
45 of the IEA. This evidence, particularly the fingerprints on the murder weapon, directly links
Suresh to the crime and independently corroborates the dying declaration and eyewitness
testimony. The mentioned cases also supports the use of forensic evidence as determinative
proof of guilt. Additionally, Suresh’s attempt to hide the weapon with his fingerprints on it
suggests a consciousness of guilt, which undermines his insanity defense. The appellant
concludes that the
forensic evidence is reliable and determinative in proving Suresh’s involvement in Navita’s
murder.

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 PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND
AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS HUMBLY PRAYED THAT THIS HON'BLE COURT MAY BE
PLEASED:

1. Set Aside the High Court’s Acquittal: Overturn the High Court of Dimrhi’s acquittal of
the accused, Suresh, in Criminal Appeal No. 875/2024, and uphold the original
conviction pronounced by the trial court under S. 302 OF IPC for the offense of murder,
as there exist no sufficient grounds to exonerate the accused on the basis of legal insanity.
2. Declare Legal Insanity Defense Inapplicable: Hold that the defense of legal insanity
under S. 84 of the IPC does not apply to the present case.
3. Affirm the Validity of the Dying Declaration: Recognize Navita’s dying declaration as
legally admissible evidence under S. 32 of the IEA, which holds strong probative value
and provides direct and compelling testimony implicating the accused in the assault that
led to her death.
4. Uphold the Reliability of Forensic Evidence: Accept the forensic evidence, including
the recovery of the murder weapon bearing the accused’s fingerprints, as corroborative
proof of Suresh’s guilt and as a credible source of physical evidence substantiating the
appellant’s case.

OR PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT
MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE APPELLANTS SHALL, AS IN DUTY BOUND,
EVER PRAY.

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