Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Report Part Title: D-DAY:

Report Title: The European Campaign:
Report Subtitle: Its Origins and Conduct
Report Author(s): Samuel J. Newland and Clayton K.S. Chun
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (2011)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12096.9

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 CHAPTER 4

D-DAY:
PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of the Allied Expedi-

tionary Force. You are about to embark on the great
crusade towards which we have striven these many
months.1

Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 6, 1944

A cross-channel attack to initiate the European

Campaign remained the linchpin of American strategy
for taking the war to Germany and defeating its armies
in the field. This approach remained the centerpiece of
Allied strategy despite the feared casualty rate from a
dedicated German resistance, and the fact that the nei-
ther the British allies nor U.S. President Franklin Roo-
sevelt would support an early implementation of this
plan as originally proposed in mid-1942. Thus, Ameri-
can and British military leaders had to delay the inva-
sion from 1943 until the spring of 1944. Participants
at the January 1943 Casablanca conference reaffirmed
the commitment to this event, even though in some of
the meetings Admiral Ernest King continued to press
for greater emphasis on Pacific operations.2 At Casa-
blanca, a significant decision was made: the necessity
of establishing a joint Anglo-American planning staff,
to be located in London. In actuality, the first signifi-
cant Allied planning group had been the Allied Force
Headquarters (AFHQ) commanded by then Lieuten-
ant General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a dual-hatted
role, Eisenhower had been responsible for conducting
the Operation TORCH invasion and, at the same time,
he commanded the European Theater of Operations,

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United States Army (ETOUSA), a headquarters that
was responsible for all American forces stationed in
Great Britain. While Eisenhower was absorbed with
command of Operation TORCH, it was necessary for
him to have a deputy to actually run the British opera-
tions. Once Operation TORCH had succeeded, Eisen-
hower’s span of responsibility increased considerably.
He split these two functions, retaining command of
AFHQ while delegating the actual control of ETOUSA
to Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews.
Another important strategic decision from the Cas-
ablanca conference was the role of strategic airpower
in the European Campaign. Even prior to Casablanca,
Allied leaders determined that a necessary preparato-
ry phase for a successful European ground campaign
was “the heaviest possible air offensive against the
German war effort.”3 Beyond this general statement,
a number of questions remained. For example, what
were the priorities of such an offensive? Would it be
directly coordinated with ground forces operations or
would it be a largely independent operation? Finally,
what would be the level of coordination between the
AAF and the RAF, and whose tactics would be used to
pursue this air offensive? British Prime Minister Win-
ston Churchill’s support settled the latter issue: The
RAF would have the ability to pursue its nighttime
area bombing campaign, while the AAF would pur-
sue its controversial daylight precision bombing cam-
paign.4 Air operations emanating from Britain would
be under the overall control of the RAF, but each air
force would have the latitude to pursue the bombing
campaign, using its own nationally determined tac-
tics. General targeting concepts were agreed upon.
Since no Allied ground troops were on the main body
of the continent, the preparatory phase for the cam-

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paign would be independent of, and not coordinated
with, ground forces. At the same time, per agreements
between General George Marshall and RAF Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the air emphasis would
switch to the support of ground operations when the
invasion started.5
The necessity to appoint a staff clearly tasked to
focus on planning for an invasion, rather than provide
this function as an additional duty, was evident, given
the size and importance of the task. The establishment
of a new allied command was initially a slow process
at least in part due to the vague nature of its charter
at Casablanca. Nonetheless, the process of putting to-
gether a staff started in early 1943. Allied leadership
appointed Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan
as the commander. A highly respected British offi-
cer, Morgan’s task was to build a planning staff that
would lay the foundation for the cross-channel attack.
Morgan’s actual title was Chief of Staff to the Supreme
Allied Commander (COSSAC). American and British
leaders had not appointed a supreme commander
for the campaign yet, but in his role as Chief of Staff,
Morgan had the responsibility of planning the actual
attack.6 Morgan arrived in March 1943 and received
a less than an enthusiastic overview of his duties:
Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Al-
anbrooke gave the overview, summarized Morgan’s
task, and concluded with the statement, “Well, there it
is. It won’t work, but you must bloody well make it.”7

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Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Frederick Morgan was one of the original planners

for a cross channel attack. He is shown here (on the
left) with Admiral Sir Harold Burrough in May 1945
in Reims, France.

As Morgan formed his staff, his goal was to achieve

a good balance by using both British and American
officers. He believed that the supreme commander
would be British and thus had the basic command
structure set up on a British model with a British Chief
of Staff. Under this command umbrella, he envisioned
having British, Canadian, and American headquarters
that would handle the administrative work for their
respective armies. Morgan had an American, Briga-
dier General Ray W. Barker, as his Deputy Chief of
Staff. For air operations, he secured the services of
American Carl Spaatz and from the Royal Air Force,

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Air Marshal Arthur Travers Harris, as well as Air
Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory. While
both Britain and the United States had ample repre-
sentation in airpower, on the Navy side the primary
planner was initially Commodore John Hughes-Hal-
let. Hughes-Hallet’s experience included being a plan-
ner for the Dieppe raid, not exactly a comforting fact.
Despite limited naval assets, Morgan and his staff had
the task of planning for a major cross-channel attack.
At the same time, they were to have a contingency
plan available to rush troops to Europe if it seemed
likely that the German army was weakening or disin-
tegrating, and thus the Allies might conduct a landing
with limited resistance.8
Morgan and his staff, though they were operating
with limited personnel, worked diligently on the enor-
mous task that faced them. Morgan regarded the COS-
SAC role as that of a coordinating body which was in
fact ”. . . the embryo of the future Supreme Headquar-
ters Staff.”9 One of the key tasks for COSSAC was to
determine where the invasion would take place. To
accomplish this task, he gave his American contingent
the task of researching the possibility of landing the
assault force on Normandy, while the British staffers
were to look at the advantages and disadvantages of
Pas de Calais. The choice was in many respects dif-
ficult. Both staffs assumed the Germans would have
heavy defenses at both landing sites. They thought
Calais would have more defenses than the Normandy
region. Calais, however, had a certain number of ad-
vantages. It was closer to Great Britain and led to ex-
cellent terrain for mobile warfare. Furthermore, Calais
was on a direct route to Northern Germany, the path
had a good east-west road network that led straight
to the strategic prize, Berlin. Calais, with its proxim-

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ity to Britain, was an obvious choice to the Allies, but
to the Germans as well. Normandy also had a good
road network leading inland. Both proposed landing
areas had beaches that were acceptable for amphibi-
ous landings. Normandy, though obviously further
from Germany, offered one significant advantage: If
the Allies made successful landings near the Cotentin
Peninsula, and American and British forces occupied
the Peninsula, then the Allies would have a suitable
port, Cherbourg.10
In the end, there were few significant advantages
of one site over the other. Thus, additional staff work
was necessary to develop a recommendation that
COSSAC could forward to the upper echelons of com-
mand. The staff thinking was crystallized in a confer-
ence held by Admiral of the Fleet Louis Mountbatten,
who invited Morgan to what has become known as the
“Rattle Conference.” This joint and Allied conference,
almost an old world gentlemen’s party, was charac-
terized by both serious meetings and by innumerable
social occasions and outings. Attendees included 20
general officers, 11 air marshals and air commodores,
and 8 admirals. Attendees came from American, Ca-
nadian, and, of course, British services. Mountbatten
enthusiastically chaired the meetings which included
a myriad of social events. The group reached a final
consensus: the location for the cross-channel attack
would be Normandy.11
These ranking officers had worked through this
planning process; higher authorities would approve
the final decision, the actual landing site. It would be
a decision by the highest-level officials at the next Al-
lied conference scheduled for Quebec in August 1943.
Even here, after 2 years of meetings between repre-
sentatives of the American and British governments,

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there was still some friction on the issue of when a
cross-channel attack would occur. The British pref-
erence was still to delay until peripheral operations
could wear down the German strength through ac-
tions such as the CBO or operations in Italy and the
Mediterranean. By 1943, the Soviet Army’s resistance
to the Germans created increased numbers of casu-
alties throughout the Wehrmacht, another factor that
weakened Berlin’s strength. Casablanca participants
had agreed to conduct detailed planning for the “sec-
ond front” which, of course, resulted in the creation of
COSSAC.12
Some thorny problems remained for the Western
Allies, despite their excellent record of ironing out
national differences. At the Arcadia conference in De-
cember 1941, attendees had agreed that a single Allied
commander would be appointed for each theater of
operations. In keeping with prior agreements, once
COSSAC began to operate in 1943, its plan called for
the invasion force to consist of three divisions, two of
which were to be British (and supported by a single
airborne division).13 Since the majority of the force
proposed for the invasion was British, it followed that
the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
would come from that nation. 14
Those familiar with amphibious operations would
quickly recognize that this was, at best, a conserva-
tive number of divisions for such an undertaking.
Conversely, Morgan and his staff faced significant
resource constraints such as the availability of land-
ing craft, men, and supplies. British senior political
and military leaders were also cognizant of the real-
ity facing the island nation. Planning an amphibious
operation, a direct assault against prepared German
defensive positions, brought back ghosts from the

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past. British leaders recalled the specters from World
War I; Gallipoli and the Somme. Adding to the prob-
lems posed by those unpleasant memories, there was
a physical limit to what Britain could contribute on
the ground. The British had been fighting German ag-
gression since September 1939, and by the end of 1941,
with the addition of the Italian and Japanese foes,
Britain and its Commonwealth nations had reached
their limit of the supply of additional divisions. Sim-
ply, they were running out of men. As the buildup of
forces and supplies continued, it became increasingly
evident that the preponderance of the invasion force
would have to be Soldiers in the service of the United
States Army.
Churchill had originally promised the position of
Supreme Commander to Field Marshal Alanbrooke.
The invasion force’s national composition, however,
logically caused reconsideration. Given the increasing
number of American units in the landings, it seemed
obvious that an American would become the Supreme
Commander. Churchill and Roosevelt recognized
this in August 1943 at Quebec when they agreed that
the changing circumstances meant that an American
would have to be in command. Before the conference
was completed, Churchill informed Alanbrooke that
the command of the Expeditionary Force was going to
go to an American, General George C. Marshall. This
decision was a good one for the Alliance, but likely
fueled Alanbrooke’s dislike of many American senior
leaders. 15
The choice for the Supreme Commander, agreed
to by Churchill and Roosevelt, was Marshall, but
other decisions resulted. When Marshall assumed
this command, Roosevelt planned for Eisenhower to
take Marshall’s position as U.S. Army Chief of Staff.

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Eisenhower had impressed many American and Brit-
ish leaders with his work on American war plans and
at several Allied Conferences. Problems, however,
emerged with Marshall as the selected commander,
at least in Roosevelt’s mind. Marshall’s competence
was beyond question and he had earned this combat
command. The President initially seemed willing to
reward Marshall with this coveted command, but at
the same time, he seemed uncomfortable with a Wash-
ington without him. Thus, in the weeks that followed
the pivotal Quebec conference, the President did not
make any announcement concerning who would
command the growing American force in Great Brit-
ain. However, military staffs entertained the widely
rumored belief that it would be Marshall. In the late
fall and early winter meetings, at Tunis, Tunisia, and
Tehran, Iran, Roosevelt seemed to intentionally spend
time with Eisenhower, in a sense sizing him up before
he made the final decision.
There are many speculative reasons as to why
Eisenhower received the command, rather than Mar-
shall. As Chief of Staff, Marshall had learned to navi-
gate through the political minefields in the nation’s
capital, but he was brusque and cold with people,
even trusted subordinates, something that Eisenhow-
er could easily attest. Thus, the President could talk to
“Ike,” but Marshall did not want anyone to call him
“George.” When later asked by his son, James, why he
appointed Eisenhower instead of Marshall, the Presi-
dent stated, “Eisenhower is the best politician among
the military men. He is a natural leader who can con-
vince other men to follow him, and this is what we
need in his position more than any other quality.”16
Churchill, when asked for his opinion by Roosevelt
about nominating Eisenhower vice Marshall stated,

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“. . . that we had also the warmest regards for General
Eisenhower and would trust our fortunes to his direc-
tion with hearty good will.”17 On December 7, 1943,
Roosevelt met with Eisenhower at Tunis and simply
stated, “Well, Ike, you are going to command OVER-
LORD.” Eisenhower’s response was simply, “Mr.
President, I realize such an appointment involved dif-
ficult decisions. I hope you will not be disappointed.”18
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man who had limited
command experience and who had no combat ex-
perience in World War I, was now set to command
the largest amphibious operation in World War II or,
for that matter, in all of history! This operation was
also against an army that the Allies regarded as their
most serious adversary. Choosing an officer with such
limited combat experience made Eisenhower’s ap-
pointment curious to some. Ike however, had shown
many excellent leadership qualities and had gained
the confidence of both Marshall and the President
through his performances as Chief of the War Plans
Division, commander of ETOUSA, and Commander
of Operation TORCH. The press announced he official
appointment on Christmas Eve, 1943. In the time that
elapsed between his appointment and the official an-
nouncement, Eisenhower worked to provide a smooth
disengagement from his duties in the Mediterranean.
He was aware of the basic concepts of Operation
OVERLORD and he had been briefed on the OVER-
LORD plan (as developed by COSSAC) to include the
strength of the force and the intended landing site—
Normandy. From the onset, he was dissatisfied with
the lack of combat power in the invasion force. Simply,
three divisions on a small frontage would be insuffi-
cient for a successful invasion. He immediately called
for a larger force. Although Roosevelt and Churchill

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appointed him in December, his official tasking for
this new assignment came on February 14, 1944. He
was to complete the following:

TO SUPREME COMMANDER
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
12 February 1944

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Com-

mander of the forces placed under your orders for op-
erations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your
title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expedition-
ary Force.

2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in

conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake
operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the de-
struction of her armed forces. The date for entering the
Continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate
Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be
directed towards securing an area that will facilitate
both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be

prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of
favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the
enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Con-
tinent with such forces as you have available at the
time; a general plan for this operation when approved
will be furnished for your assistance. 19

Once appointed as Supreme Commander, Eisen-

hower exercised his prerogative and began to put
together a list of people he wanted for his key staff.
His understanding of political sensibilities was evi-
dent from the onset because, even though he wanted
General Sir Harold Alexander on his staff due to their
excellent working relationship in the Mediterranean,

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he recognized that this was clearly a British decision.
In spite of Eisenhower’s preference, Churchill gave
him the Commander of the British 8th Army, Field
Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, hero of El Ala-
mein. When assigned to Eisenhower’s staff, “Monty”
became Commander of the British 21st Army Group
and Commander of all Allied ground troops until a
lodgment was secured. Once Allied forces seized the
lodgment, Eisenhower planned to take personal com-
mand of all ground troops in France. That he desired
to work with Montgomery, who could be, to say the
least, difficult, was evident as early as December 27,
1943. At that time, Eisenhower called for a meeting
with Montgomery to discuss Operation OVERLORD.
They quickly concurred that they had to strengthen
the COSSAC plan since three divisions were insuffi-
cient. In addition, the planned front was too narrow,
a factor that would allow the Germans to concentrate
their efforts much more effectively. Ike’s first meeting
with his British subordinate was an unqualified suc-
cess.
Eisenhower’s staff selection continued to show an
excellent grasp of joint and combined arms command.
Beginning in 1942, his experience in working with
the British allies, through his dual-hated command of
AFHQ and ETOUSA, made him familiar with the Brit-
ish political terrain and many of the principals. His
deputy Supreme Commander was Air Chief Marshall
Arthur W. Tedder, and Eisenhower used a British mil-
itary aide, Lieutenant Colonel James Gault. His Chief
of Staff was an American officer whom he had come
to trust in the Mediterranean, Major General Walter
Bedell Smith. Eisenhower also absorbed the COSSAC
organization into his staff to include Morgan. Mor-
gan’s experience in the initial planning of the opera-

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 tion made him a logical choice for one of the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower designated a British Offi-
cer, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsey, for the position
of the Allied commander for naval forces. The Allied
Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces, Air Marshal Sir
Trafford Leigh-Mallory was also British. See Figure 1
for the SHAEF Chain of Command.
SUPREME COMMANDER
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S.
ENGINEER DIVISION
DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER Maj. Gen. H.B.W. Hughes, UK
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, UK Brig. Gen. Beverley G. Dunn, U.S.

SIGNAL DIVISION
CHIEF OF STAFF Maj. Gen. C.H.H. Vulliamy, UK
Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, UK Brig. Gen. F. H. Lanahan, U.S.
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF
Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, UK
Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M. Gale, UK ADJUTANT GENERAL
Air Vice Marshal James M. Robb, UK Col Emil C. Boehnke, U.S.

G-1 HEADQUARTERS
Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, U.S. COMMANDANT
Brig J.N. Bosville, UK Col Robert Q. Brown, U.S.
Maj. H.J. Rothwell, U.K.

G-2 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Maj. Gen. K.W. D. Strong, UK DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts, U.S. Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, U.S.

G-3
Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, U.S. MEDICAL DIVISION
Maj. Gen. J.F.M. Whiteley, UK Maj. Gen. Albert W. Kenner, U.S.
Brig. E. A. Sutton, UK

G-4
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Crawford, U.S. PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Maj. Gen. N.C.D. Brownjohn, UK Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Davis, U.S.

G-5
Lt. Gen. A. E. Grasett, UK
Brig. Gen. J.C. Holmes, U.S. AIR DEFENCE DIVISION
Maj. Gen. A. M. Cameron, UK

Figure 4-1. The SHAEF Chain of Command.

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Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied

Commander and his British deputy,
Sir Arthur Tedder.

Working with Allies, even English-speaking ones

with a common purpose, could be and was often an
arduous task. In some respects, one of Eisenhower’s
consistent problems was British Prime Minister Win-
ston Churchill. The two men shared a good deal of mu-
tual respect, and Churchill seemed proud that he was
“half American.”20 The problem was that Churchill,
despite his long political career, was also a trained
and experienced military leader. He was a graduate of
Sandhurst, and a man who would have undoubtedly
relished his own command.21 Throughout the war,
Churchill frequently sought to interject his strategic
concepts into those proposed by his reluctant subor-

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dinate commanders or his American Allies. From the
Prime Minister’s active mind came a litany of periph-
eral strategies and ideas including potential invasions
of Italy, Greece, Rhodes, and Norway. Eisenhower
recognized this potential problem of interference by
the Prime Minister as early as 1942, but he also recog-
nized the importance of a strong working relationship
with the British. Ike, as the Supreme Commander, had
one major advantage; Churchill liked him and the two
men genuinely respected each other and shared some
common interests. Thus, in innumerable meetings,
conferences, and private get-togethers, Eisenhower
was cordial despite some irritations. Though Churchill
frequently interjected his pet strategies, Eisenhower
never lost sight of the goal he and Marshall had agreed
to in 1942. Eisenhower worked on scheduling and
launching, as soon as feasible, a cross-channel attack.
He accepted few distractions to the task which he had
planned for and which the Combined Chiefs of Staff
had tasked to him on February 12, 1944.
With the task clearly specified, and the location of
the attack already agreed to, Eisenhower’s immediate
objective was to accelerate the buildup of men and
materiel to stage the invasion. First, it was imperative
to decide what the size of the invasion force would be
since COSSAC’s plan had been deemed insufficient.
American and British invaders were to assault a well-
defended coast with no flanks to turn and no way to
maneuver for advantage. As an additional problem,
for an invasion of the magnitude envisioned by the
Allies, the invading force needed a port to provide a
logistical base for the lodgment and sustained opera-
tions. Typically, defending forces can protect a port
better than open beach areas like stretches of the Nor-
mandy coast.22 The Allies would need time to seize a
port.

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 In an excellent example of inter-Allied coopera-
tion, Montgomery took control of the planning for the
invasion and the subsequent seizure of the Normandy
peninsula. Montgomery’s plan called for five divisions
for the landings. Adding to the strength of the ground
forces was the plan to drop three airborne divisions,
making the total assault force eight divisions.23 In ad-
dition, the new Operation OVERLORD plan enlarged
the landing area, because the ill-fated Dieppe opera-
tion was a perfect example of how the enemy could
concentrate against a force that landed on too narrow
a front.
Another problem that concerned Eisenhower and
Montgomery was the additional resources needed
for Operation ANVIL. Allied leaders at the Tehran
conference in November 1943 finalized planning for
Operation OVERLORD and called for a secondary
attack against southern France, Operation ANVIL,
later known as Operation DRAGOON. Planners in-
tended the latter operation to be a three, then later a
two-division assault. Properly executed, this would
place the Germans in a pincer movement from the
north and south of France, severely stressing their re-
sources. As an added bonus, when Marseilles fell into
Allied hands, the addition of this port would improve
the supply situation for the advancing Allied armies.
Conversely, when the original COSSAC plan had been
strengthened by adding two additional ground divi-
sions and two airborne divisions, this meant that the
resources necessary to conduct two separate but sup-
porting invasions had increased considerably. Despite
the increased demands, Eisenhower believed that Op-
erations OVERLORD and ANVIL were complemen-
tary and supporting operations. He was unwilling
to drop Operation ANVIL to strengthen Operation

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OVERLORD, although his British peers consistently
stressed that ANVIL was a questionable operation.
Military leaders had to support adequately the
Operations ANVIL or OVERLORD landings with
a strong commitment of air and naval assets. From
the onset, however, there was resistance from the
AAF to switch its priorities from its strategic based
CBO to supporting ground units. Beginning with the
Casablanca conference in January 1943, the senior
leadership had agreed that an important part of wear-
ing down Hitler’s military might was the CBO. At
the same time, the method by which the command-
ers were to conduct the campaign to erode German
strength was contentious. For some British officers,
including the Prime Minister, this air campaign, the
efforts of the Soviet Army, and peripheral operations
by the Western Allies would all contribute to wear-
ing down the German national leadership and mili-
tary. This attrition would allow a successful landing
against a weakened German Army. In the opinion of
both AAF General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz and RAF Air
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, an opinion shared by
many of their colleagues, an air campaign could bring
the Germans to their knees.24 Spaatz and Harris were
not in total agreement on how to wage the campaign,
since Harris believed in conducting area bombings
at night, and the American approach was daylight
precision strikes. Ultimately, however, the CBO by
the RAF and AAF was complementary. The two air
arms conducted a round-the-clock effort with the Brit-
ish hitting major German cities during the night and
their American peers conducting “precision” daylight
attacks against German industrial targets during the
day. AAF planners did undercut the effectiveness of
their tactic by too quickly switching targets, hitting

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the ball bearing industry, the aircraft industry and
then shifting to the petroleum facilities with a desire
to cripple the German synthetic fuel industry. Day-
light precision bombing could have been much more
effective if it had consistently maintained focus on a
single vital German industry. Although British and
American air power advocates had differing opinions
on how to wage their air campaigns, both were loath
to shift away from the agreed upon strategic bomb-
ing campaign to targets in support of the proposed
ground campaign. Despite their desire to focus on
their designated targets, Eisenhower was determined.
In his opinion, a critical element to the success of Op-
eration OVERLORD was dedicated air support from
both the strategic and tactical air forces.
Eisenhower’s concept was not simply using stra-
tegic air assets for tactical close support. It included
interdiction, focusing the heavy bombers on targets
that would have direct and indirect effects on the tac-
tical battlefield. Key to the success of the Allied inva-
sion was the ability to stop the Germans from moving
reinforcements and supplies to the Normandy area
once Allied landings began. Thus, he backed the so-
called Transportation Plan, which fighter command-
er, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Leigh-Mallory had
developed to destroy rail and surface transportation
networks.25 RAF staff planners designed the actions
to bring the German transportation system to a halt.
Fighters and bombers were to freeze German trans-
portation assets all over northern Europe and espe-
cially near Normandy. Eisenhower gave his prelimi-
nary approval of this plan, which called for targeting
101 rail centers in France and Belgium, on February 1,
and gave it final approval on March 26, 1944.26 With
strong support from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and

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despite strong objections from Allied air leaders, from
April until September 1944 the strategic bomber force
would be temporarily placed under Eisenhower’s di-
rect command to support tactical air operations.
Prior to this handover of strategic air to Eisenhow-
er’s control, the Allied air forces had already achieved
a significant accomplishment in preparation for the
Allied landings. In the 5 months prior to D-Day, the
Allies were successful in achieving an extremely im-
portant prerequisite for a successful landing, aerial
superiority over the Luftwaffe. This was by no means
an easy task, because Luftwaffe fighters had managed
to exact significant casualties on Allied air forces
throughout 1943. The pace of air raids over occupied
Europe increased in intensity before D-Day. Allied
fighters intentionally drew the Luftwaffe’s interceptors
skyward in the latter’s attempt to stop the destruction
wrought by massive day and night attacks. Despite
the extensive experience of German pilots, the AAF
and RAF outclassed the Luftwaffe in terms of aircraft.
By the fall of 1943, the P-47 Thunderbolt had been
fitted with drop tanks, increasing its range, and in
December of 1943, the P-51 Mustang entered service.
Both aircraft had significant advantages over the ag-
ing German airframes, both in terms of armament and
performance. From January to June 1944, 2,262 Ger-
man pilots were killed. In March, 56 percent of the
available German fighters were lost. Germany could
not sustain these losses, and it was virtually impos-
sible to replace destroyed and damaged airframes and
pilots, given the increasing pressure on the German
armed forces.27

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Source: U.S. Air Force.

The P-51 Mustang was the ultimate piston-driven

fighter developed in World War II. Its speed, arma-
ment, and range allowed the AAF to deliver a death
blow to the Luftwaffe.

The issue of naval support for Operation OVER-

LORD was something new. Marshall had two Pacific
theater veterans experienced in the problems associat-
ed with amphibious landings assigned to Eisenhower’s
command. Major General J. Lawton “Lightning Joe”
Collins had commanded the 25th Infantry Division on
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, but sought from Mar-
shall a corps command. Marshall had Collins assigned
to the European theater and given command of the
U.S. VIIth Corps. The War Department also assigned
Major General Charles H. “Pete” Corlett to the Euro-
pean theater in April 1944 to Command the U.S. XIXth
Corps. Corlett had extensive Pacific experience, hav-
ing commanded the 7th Infantry Division in the land-

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ings on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Col-
lin’s memoirs do not indicate any irritation regarding
his acceptance into the “European fraternity.” In fact,
he stated, “Though a newcomer to the theater, I was
greeted warmly and accepted as an equal by those who
had served in North Africa and the Mediterranean.”28
Conversely, Corlett, who had led successful landings
on opposed beaches at Attu Island off the coast of the
Aleutian Islands of Alaska and the Kwajalein Atoll,
claimed that Eisenhower and Omar Bradley did not
deem the lessons learned from his experiences in the
Pacific relevant. According to Corlett, “anything that
had happened in the Pacific was strictly bush league
stuff.”29 Whether General Corlett’s criticism is valid or
not, Bradley’s irritation with the competing priorities
of the Pacific theater is evident in his own postwar
memoir where he states:

. . . I found it difficult to understand why this single

most decisive attack of the entire war should have to
compete with the Pacific for its minimum means [He
refers to the supply of landing craft]. Naval bombard-
ment support had been rationed to OVERLORD on an
equally tightfisted basis. And while I knew nothing of
the Navy’s commitment to the Pacific war, I was irri-
tated by this disposition of the Navy to look on OVER-
LORD as a European stepchild.30

Williamson Murray and Allan Millet also noted a

failure of the OVERLORD planners to learn from the
Pacific experience:

The most significant lesson from the Pacific that Brad-

ley and his senior planners passed up was the impor-
tance of naval gunfire support for the troops storming
the beach. As a result of Bradley’s obtuseness, U.S.
troops at Omaha and Utah beaches would receive di-

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 rect support from only 2 battleships, 4 light cruisers,
and 18 destroyers. By comparison, at Kwajalein the
7th Infantry Division alone had attacked with the sup-
port of 7 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, and 18 destroy-
ers over a far longer bombardment period.31

The necessity for having strong fire support for the

landings was recognized by Operation OVERLORD
planners, but the plan counted on the effectiveness of
using strategic air assets to suppress German defenses
rather than an extensive bombardment by naval gun-
fire.32 Apparently, Allied leadership had convinced
themselves of bomber accuracy claimed by air power
advocates, that pinpoint daylight bombing could de-
stroy German defenses. The experience of June 6, 1944,
failed to validate these claims.
One problem that the COSSAC staff seemed to
agree on was the shortage of landing craft. Marshall
in his report on the period 1943-1945 stated:

Here [planning for the cross channel attack] the West-

ern Allies faced a shortage which was to plague us
to the final day of the War in Europe—the shortage
of assault craft, LST’s, LCI’s, and smaller vessels. . . .
[A]ll the resources in England and the U.S. were
searched for vessels and barges that could be em-
ployed in the Channel. Outboard motors and marine
engines in pleasure craft in the U.S. were appropriated
for this purpose.33

The problem of how to procure the necessary

number of landing craft for the invasion was no small
task. As Eisenhower and his staff were planning for
the cross-channel attack, the war in the Pacific and in
the Mediterranean had been consuming enormous
amounts of naval assets. For example, in 1943 alone,
American military forces were involved in the Solo-

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mon Islands campaign, the retaking of the Aleutians,
and the landings on Sicily and Italy. Shortly after
Eisenhower took command, the stress on the landing
craft supply was further complicated by the amphibi-
ous assault at Anzio, Italy, on January 22, 1944. When
the United States entered the war, it had little experi-
ence with such things as landing craft. The British had
already developed the Landing Ship Tank (LST) and
the Landing Craft Tank (LCT). Both of these were ef-
fective for vehicles, but what the Allies needed was
the development of a suitable craft that could be mass-
produced and used for landing troops in amphibious
operations.
The answer came from a New Orleans, Louisiana,
entrepreneur named Andrew Higgins. Higgins had
developed shallow draft boats for the oil industry and
was familiar with small boat design and construction.
Higgins developed a plywood landing craft with a
readily deployable front ramp, which was ideal for
landing troops. He also developed a mass production
capability that permitted him to manufacture some
20,000 of these craft during the war. Eisenhower once
asked historian Stephen Ambrose if he knew Higgins,
and when the latter responded no, Ike said, “That’s too
bad, he is the man who won the war for us.”34 While
acknowledging the contribution of Andrew Higgins,
the conflicting demands for “Higgins Boats” was an
important factor that caused Eisenhower to delay the
invasion of the continent from his original date of ear-
ly May to early June 1944.
The Higgins Boat, or landing craft vehicle, per-
sonnel (LCVP) was an excellent technical solution for
transport and landing soldiers on the beaches. Despite
the clever design of this craft and of the LSTs and
LCTs, however, the essential problem for Allied Plan-

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ners was the shortage of landing craft, particularly
LSTs. The Pacific demanded landing craft; Anzio con-
sumed some of the supply; and the expansion of the
OVERLORD operation called for more. Obviously,
with each amphibious landing there were losses due
to accidents and enemy fire. Eisenhower faced a quan-
dary. In his area of responsibility, he needed landing
craft for two separate invasions, Operations OVER-
LORD and ANVIL, and the demand outstripped avail-
able supply. In addition, America’s British allies were
not supportive on the secondary invasion, Operation
ANVIL. A front already existed in the Mediterranean,
the Italian Campaign, and the addition of yet a third
front was problematic. This operation would stress
German capabilities; but it would stress Allied forces
as well. To conduct Operation ANVIL, Allied com-
manders would need to pull out experienced troops
from Italy and would have to withdraw landing craft
used for Anzio.35 A debate between Washington and
London raged during the first 3 months of 1944 as to
whether the Allies should retain, reduce, or postpone
Operation ANVIL. The British were highly skepti-
cal of ANVIL’s necessity and its probability of suc-
cess. Eisenhower negotiated the issue with the British
Chiefs of Staff. On March 22, 1944, with mounting
evidence of limited resources to conduct two simulta-
neous invasions, Operation ANVIL was postponed. 36
Aside from the landing craft issue, another major
problem for the proposed amphibious operation was
the issue of supplying the landing forces. Operation
BOLERO, the original buildup of men and supplies
for the landings in northern France, was in many re-
spects an accomplishment of great magnitude. The
British, Canadian, and American military landing
on Normandy Beach owes its success to Operation

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BOLERO. While acknowledging that the United States
had the industrial and agricultural capacity to supply
the Allied armies, two significant problems existed:
The landing site initially chosen by COSSAC, Nor-
mandy, did not have immediate port access to pro-
vide logistical capability. Granted, the plan called for
the seizure of the Cotentin port of Cherbourg, but how
would the initial invasion force and the follow-on forc-
es be supplied until the peninsula could be secured
and the port opened.37 The enormity of the problem
was highlighted by Eisenhower who noted that “on
D-Day and D-Day+1 [we planned] to land 20,000 ve-
hicles and 176,000 personnel. The vehicles included
1,500 tanks, 5,000 other tracked fighting vehicles, 3,000
guns of all types, and 10,500 other vehicles from jeeps
to bulldozers.”38
For the landings and the development of a secure
lodgment, the amphibious assault phase, which was
code-named Operation NEPTUNE, planners endorsed
an innovative solution. Drawing from concepts devel-
oped in World War I, the Allies explored the idea of
constructing giant portable harbors. Engineers could
build these harbors, and naval forces would then tow
them to the Normandy coast. These so-called “mulber-
ries,” essentially artificial harbors and docks, would
provide a location where smaller vessels could bring
in supplies and unload them.39 As the plan evolved,
engineers and logisticians augmented the concept of
mulberries with another structure, “phoenixes.” These
devices were towering hollow concrete caissons that,
together with the mulberries and intentionally sunken
vessels, essentially created artificial harbors. The task
to create these artificial harbors was monumental. For
example, the phoenixes, designed for ship crews to
sink and create a breakwater, consisted of some 146

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caissons. Building the phoenixes required 330,000 cu-
bic yards of concrete and 31,000 tons of steel.40
Mulberries could alleviate the immediate supply
issue, but the Allied armies were mechanized units
and became the largest consumer of fuel in the Eu-
ropean Campaign. Thus, as an important part of the
process, planners had to address the problem of how
to supply the enormous amounts of fuel necessary
for the Allied breakout and pursuit phase. Planners
were equally innovative in solving this problem. At-
tributed to Lord Louis Mountbatten as early as 1942,
a program called pipe line under the ocean (PLUTO),
was initiated. However, since the Germans controlled
the French coast, the construction of a pipeline could
not really get underway until the Allies secured a
lodgment. Engineers did not complete PLUTO until
August 12, over 2 months after D-Day. This was fortu-
itous, though, since the completion of the pipeline was
in time to fuel the pursuit of retreating German forces
in the area during August.
While one must give Allied planners credit for
their innovations that enhanced logistical support for
the landing sites, they were unable to provide for the
demands of future operations. These innovations alle-
viated the immediate problems, but the Allied plan for
the European Campaign failed to resolve the problem
of supplying the armies in motion. The plan to drive
westward, take the Cotentin Peninsula, and secure the
port of Cherbourg (according to the plan, D-Day +15),
was only a partial solution, since Cherbourg lacked
the necessary capacity to adequately supply the Allied
armies. Taking Cherbourg was also a curious move
considering that it required the Allies to attack in the
opposite direction of the goal, Germany, and the main
body of the German Army. Allied commanders faced

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further complications about the supply problem since
they had to clear the entire Brittany Peninsula in order
to gain the port of Brest before turning the full Allied
might eastward toward Germany.
While the port situation was a problem that was
never actually solved, the massing of supplies for
the invasion was an unqualified success. The British
Isles, in particular south eastern Britain, became a gi-
gantic warehouse for the Allied armed forces. Allied
military leaders made great strides between 1943 and
mid-1944 to create this situation. Over 60,000 U.S. en-
gineers and 75,000 British workers built six and a half
million square feet of covered storage and shops and
requisitioned an additional 13,500,000 square feet of
storage for Allied supplies. The Allies also used an-
other 43,500,000 square feet of open storage for the
necessary buildup. In these facilities, as well as many
others, were 450,000 tons of ammunition, 175,000 tons
of fuel oils and lubricants, and parking locations for
50,000 vehicles.41
The U.S. Army’s Service of Supply task was to
funnel enormous amounts of supplies into British fa-
cilities. General Brehon Somervell was responsible for
ensuring that American forces had sufficient supplies
in the various theaters around the world. His com-
mander in Britain was Lieutenant General John C. H.
Lee, an old friend from Somervell’s World War I days.
Eisenhower inherited Lee. Somervell had appointed
Lee to command the American supply effort for Eu-
rope in 1942, long before Eisenhower’s assumption
of command. The success of Operation BOLERO, the
buildup for the invasion, was likely in spite of its com-
mander, rather than due to him. Lee was unpopular
in Eisenhower’s command because he was pompous
and self-righteous, whose religiosity caused him to

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be nicknamed “Jesus Christ himself Lee” by his many
detractors.42 Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith,
said of Lee, “He didn’t know much about supply or-
ganization,” and found him to be a “stuffed shirt,” one
of the “crosses that we had to bear.”43 From Eisenhow-
er’s assumption of command until the end of the cam-
paign, accountability for materials remained a serious
problem in Lee’s command, in part due to misman-
agement and in part due to the thriving black market.
The problem within Lee’s command would finally
climax after the campaign was underway, with scan-
dals in black marketeering in Paris, France. Despite
all of these problems, Eisenhower never attempted to
relieve Lee due to the latter’s strong political connec-
tions in Washington.44 In the end, the American sup-
ply system was robust enough to make up for Lee’s in-
eptitude and the inappropriate funneling of supplies
into the black market.
Though logistics would emerge as one of the short-
comings in planning for the European Campaign, the
deception campaign was completely the opposite; it
was a resounding success. A robust deception plan
was necessary because the Germans were preparing
for the invasion with increasing seriousness. As early
as the end of 1941, the Germans began constructing
defenses along the Atlantic coast of France, recogniz-
ing the likelihood that the Allies would try to invade
the continent. They had also created a high command
element in the west to coordinate the defense of West-
ern Europe. Yet for all practical purposes, the Ger-
man defense in the west did not truly begin to take
shape until 1943. Prior to late 1943, the Germans had
created a series of bunkers and strong points, but a
systematic defense of the most likely landing zones,
from Calais to the tip of the Brittany Peninsula, was

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not well developed.45 The catalyst for renewed Ger-
man preparation occurred when on October 25, 1943,
Hitler’s commander in chief in the West (or OB West),
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, submitted
an assessment of German defenses for Hitler’s consid-
eration. Rundstedt stated with certainty that the Al-
lies would invade the continent and predicted that the
first landing would come at Calais, followed by Nor-
mandy. Direct and brutally frank, Rundstedt noted
that to defend these most likely landing areas, Ger-
many would need much more than just strong points;
rather it would need a defense in depth with adequate
mobile reserves for counterattacks.
Critics did not meet Rundstedt’s assessment with
the scorn and derision as so often happened when
officers gave Hitler unfavorable reports. Instead, the
Führer ordered that increasing assets be provided
for the defense in the west.46 In addition to provid-
ing more assets to the west, Hitler provided Rund-
stedt another asset, a new subordinate commander.
Hitler appointed Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel
as Commander, Army Group B, with responsibility
for the garrison in the Netherlands and the 15th and
17th Armies that were positioned in Normandy and
in the vicinity of Pas de Calais. Despite their differ-
ent backgrounds and styles of command, Rundstedt
and Rommel surprisingly worked well together. Rom-
mel surveyed the defenses in his command and was
disturbed by the overall German unpreparedness. He
tackled this problem with the same energy that had
given him his reputation as commander of the Afrika
Korps. Rommel estimated that, in addition to the forti-
fications or strong points built, engineers would need
to create extensive minefields to slow any invasion
force to allow time for a counterattack. As a credit to

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his energy and that of his engineers, between October
1943 and May 1944, German military and civilian la-
bor scattered over four million mines along the French
coast.47 In addition to the mines, Rommel also had im-
provised obstacles installed both on the beaches that
were potential landing sites and in the open fields
where gliders could land troops. After observing the
existing gun emplacements, he ordered many of them
further strengthened and had additional positions
built.

Source: Author's Collection.

A USAF reconnaissance photo taken at first light on

May 19, 1944 (and at low tide) showing Rommel’s
obstacles designed to rip the bottoms out of Allied
landing craft.

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 Rommel firmly believed that the only way to de-
feat the Allied invasion was to stop it on the beaches.
To do this, the Wehrmacht needed two capabilities: a
strong and mutually supportive system of fortifica-
tions, and a strong mobile reserve. Positioning ar-
mored units close to the coast as a mobile reserve was
imperative. Those reserve forces would rush forward
to push the Allied troops back into the sea. Rommel,
who had personally witnessed the growing Allied
airpower in North Africa, was totally convinced that
unless reinforcements, especially armored units, were
close to the coast Allied air supremacy would make
it impossible to get to the invading force in time. His
strategy was countered by the commander of armored
forces in the west, General der Panzertruppen Leo Geyr
von Schweppenburg, who believed that the armored
reserves had to be kept far to the rear and thus out
the reach of tactical air and naval gunfire.48 Because
of these two different philosophies on how armored
units should respond to the coming Allied invasion,
there was considerable friction between Rommel,
Rundstedt, and Schweppenburg. Instead of exercising
firm command over the three respected officers with
a clearcut decision directing where they would locate
mobile reserves, Hitler and Rundstedt allowed the
controversy to simmer and in the end essentially split
the control of armored units in France, rather than
assigning firm command authority over armored re-
serves. Events would show that Rommel was correct.
Rommel was convinced that the invasion was go-
ing to hit in the Calais vicinity and that it would come
at high tide.49 Thus, German defenders spent a consid-
erable amount of energy focused on this region. After
all, it was close to Britain, and it led to the best terrain

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for mobility and the most direct route to Berlin. The
commander of Kriegsmarine in the West, Admiral The-
odor Krancke, placed the likely invasion site further
west but could not decide with any degree of certain-
ty where it might occur. Hitler vacillated on exactly
where the landings would occur, but he was certain
that the invasion would come soon.50
All of this demonstrates that from late 1943 to early
1944, the Germans knew the Allied invasion was com-
ing. They were planning for the day an Allied armada
would appear somewhere off the coast of France. The
only remaining questions were when and where the
Allies would land. Since the coming invasion was no
surprise, it was crucial for the Allies to devise a plan
that would deceive the Germans about the time and
place of the invasion. American and British military of-
ficers created a deception plan called Operation FOR-
TITUDE. Its overall objective was to convince Hitler
and his high command that Operation OVERLORD
was going to occur at locations where it was not, and
at the same time, convince them that landing activities
in the Normandy vicinity were actually a feint. Opera-
tion FORTITUDE used a number of methodologies to
accomplish a classic deception. False information was
fed through the former German agents to the Abwehr,
the German military intelligence service. Allied com-
mands created ghost divisions, complete with shoul-
der patches, to convince the Germans that many new
divisions were poised for the invasion. Radio opera-
tors transmitted false radio traffic regarding equip-
ment supplies and men to convince the Germans that
many more units existed than actually did. In Scot-
land, an Operation FORTITUDE plan focused its at-
tention on convincing the Germans, through a stream
of messages, that Allied commanders were prepared

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to invade Norway. In the southern part of Britain, Op-
eration FORTITUDE used phony message traffic, in-
flated rubber tanks, landing craft, and dummy aircraft
to show the supposed buildup in the area opposite
Pas de Calais. The most disturbing threat projected to
the Germans was the existence of a First Army Group
(FUSAG), commanded by General George S. Patton,
which seemed poised to strike the Pas de Calais area.
Of course, Allied leaders had scheduled a command
under Patton for activation, but Patton was not to be a
part of the invasion force. Rather, Eisenhower sched-
uled it as an element for exploitation, once the land-
ings were successful and breakouts from the beach-
head were executed.
As military leaders consider future operations
against the nation’s adversaries, they should care-
fully consider the significance of Operation FORTI-
TUDE. The campaign was one of the finest examples
in modern warfare of the importance of designing and
executing a well-planned deception plan. The use of
multiple assets from all services, both the intelligence
services and the combat arms, convinced the key Ger-
man commander on the ground that the invasion
would come near Pas de Calais.51 Thus, the deception
plan was a success in convincing the Germans of the
wrong location for the invasion. The bomber offen-
sive, whose targeting pattern was deliberately diffuse,
made it difficult for the Germans to ascertain the exact
focus of the Allied air preparations. These activities
enhanced the deception.
When American and British forces launched the
invasion, Allied landing forces were under the com-
mand of Field Marshal Montgomery, the commander
of the 21st Army Group. The 21st was composed of the
U.S. First Army commanded by Lieutenant General

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Omar N. Bradley, and the British Second Army com-
manded by Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey.
The three airborne divisions for the invasion had key
missions. The U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions
would land behind Utah Beach and shield the rear of
the landing zone from the expected German counter-
attack. The British 6th Airborne Division’s scheduled
drop was in the vicinity of Caen where it was to stop
expected reinforcements from the German Fifteenth
Army that would likely hit British landing forces.
Bradley and his U.S. VIIth Corps would land on Utah
Beach, and the U.S. Vth Corps would hit the beach on
a sector known as Omaha Beach.

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

American Assault Troops Landing on Omaha

Beach, D-Day, June 6, 1944.

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 The invasion of the northwest coast of France was a
monumental achievement for the Allied forces. From
the onset, they sought to conduct an amphibious in-
vasion that was, in terms of its mass, unprecedented.
In 1 day’s time, June 6, 1944, Allied leaders intended
to land 150,000 men and massive amounts of equip-
ment on the continent. To do this, it was necessary
to employ over 800 vessels to transport the soldiers
and supplies to the area of the assault. Additionally,
the number of transport aircraft necessary to drop
the airborne divisions was great. According to the
Supreme Commander’s report, the U.S. IXth Troop
Carrier Command alone dedicated 1,662 aircraft and
512 gliders to this effort.52 Since the Germans had lib-
erally strewn the Channel with mines, the Allied na-
vies needed 287 minesweepers to clear these deadly
obstacles. Maritime commanders also required a vast
armada of warships, landing craft of various types,
and small smaller coastal vessels of over 7,000 ships.
Despite superb planning, D-Day had a number of
significant shortfalls. Giving Eisenhower control of
the strategic bomber forces in the weeks immediately
prior to the invasion was a key decision. Strategic air
was literally able to strangle the German transporta-
tion system in occupied France and virtually prohib-
ited the rapid transportation of reserves to the Nor-
mandy area. By June 1944, the French railway system
barely functioned; the interdiction campaign had
succeeded. At the same time, the use of strategic air
to support ground forces proved to be highly ineffec-
tive. Two problems contributed to this ineffectiveness:
First, the aircraft used by the American 8th Air Force
were designed for strategic campaigns like the CBO
and were built to operate effectively at high altitudes.

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The famed B-17 had a service ceiling of 35,800 feet,
and the B-24 could operate at 28,000 feet. Despite all
claims of that time and since the war, at that height
even the fabled Norden bomb-sight was incapable
in delivering precision bomb loads. Further compli-
cating the problem on D-Day, scattered clouds were
present as low as 2,000 feet, and at 20,000 feet solid
cloud cover existed, totally obscuring the battlefield.
American bombers belonging to the 8th Air Force had
to target by instruments, and this was even more inac-
curate than observed runs.
American military leaders sent 329 B-24 bombers
to drop 13,000 bombs to soften up the defenses near
Omaha Beach before the invasion. This ordnance,
however, failed to hit German defenses and, in fact,
fell as far inland as 3 miles.53 The bomber preparation
of Omaha Beach was a total failure, and German de-
fenses on Omaha Beach were intact as American troops
came ashore. At Utah Beach, the bombers were a little
more effective because the IXth Bomber Command
was using B-26 medium bombers. Wisely, in prepara-
tion for supporting the invasion, maintenance crews
removed Norden bombsights from the bombers and
installed the more effective low-level altitude sights.54
Even though the preparatory bombing on Utah Beach
was more effective, even here about one-third of the
bombs fell seaward, and some of the pilots were un-
able to locate their targets due to the overcast.55 From
the beginning of the European Campaign, senior Al-
lied leadership used a questionable tactic; employing
strategic aircraft for tactical purposes, a purpose for
which they were never intended. Allied military lead-
ers would repeatedly return to this questionable use
of strategic bombers throughout the European Cam-
paign, often producing debatable results.

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 The air force was not the only service whose prep-
aration of the battlefield was lacking. The American
and British navies did not have sufficient “battlewag-
ons” that could lay down a heavy carpet of fire to
soften German defenses. Insufficient naval forces also
translated to inadequate fire support for the invading
troops.
At Omaha Beach, where bomber preparation had
accomplished little except to inflict damage on French
agriculture, all too many things went wrong. Plan-
ners had recognized that infantry directly assaulting
well-prepared defenses would need armor to support
them. Thus, ground force officers planned to employ
amphibious tanks to support the infantry. On D-Day,
however, of the 32 tanks modified for amphibious use,
29 sank, partly due to the weather but largely due to the
Navy’s decision to launch them over 6,000 yards from
shore.56 Six-wheeled amphibious trucks (DUKWs)
were a partial answer. Crews loaded the DUKWs with
105mm artillery pieces to allow troops to have artil-
lery support, but heavy seas and German guns meant
that the two artillery battalions that were supposed to
support the 116th Infantry on Omaha Beach lost 16 of
their 24 artillery pieces in a matter of minutes.57 The
Navy also launched many of the Higgins boats some
16 to 20 kilometers off shore, too far from the beach.
The infantrymen then had to endure a lengthy and
perilous journey through heavy seas and under heavy
enemy fire. When sailors dropped the ramps, many
American Soldiers went into water up to their necks
or at least their armpits, and many drowned. Once
unloaded, this led to a dash over about 300 yards of
tidal sand because landings occurred at low tide, and
then another 100 yards of beach. In short, infantrymen
at Omaha Beach had a literal gauntlet of fire to run

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through before they could begin their arduous task of
tackling the German defenses.
Royal Army leadership offered to American plan-
ners additional equipment designed to tackle German
defenses. Montgomery had ordered Major General Sir
Percy Hobart to offer one-third of their special equip-
ment to the Americans. Hobart commanded the Brit-
ish 79th Division, elements of which accompanied
the assault units going ashore on D-Day. Hobart’s
79th had special Sherman tanks called “Crabs” which
engineers equipped with flailing chain arms to ex-
plode mines. The British also had “Crocodiles,” tanks
equipped with flamethrowers, to overcome German
pillboxes and fortifications. Additionally, the 79th had
Armored Vehicle Royal Engineers, multi-purposed
vehicles based on the Churchill Mark IV chassis and
mounting a mortar designed to destroy fortifications,
as well as a bridging device to cross ravines. Despite
the offer to share these novel “gadgets” to help un-
ravel German defenses, Bradley and his staff were not
interested.58
A major contributing factor to the near failure on
Omaha Beach was a significant intelligence oversight.
In the final stages of Allied preparations for the land-
ings, American intelligence staffs had identified the
German 716th Division as the defenders of the Omaha
Beach sector. The 716th was not a highly rated divi-
sion in terms of its combat power. However, the 716th
was not the primary adversary of American troops at
Omaha Beach. The 352nd Division that had moved
into this sector was a much more competent division.
Thus, on D-Day there were elements of two German
Divisions near the landing site. Although not all of
the 352nd Division was positioned for defense of the
beach, it gave American troops an extremely difficult

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time and, had the full division been manning the de-
fenses, it could have been catastrophic.59 Small unit
and individual soldier courage and initiative on the
beaches ultimately compensated for these shortfalls.
Despite heavy casualties, Omaha Beach became a suc-
cess.60
In the other landing zones, the experience was
quite different for both the British and the Americans.
For example, on Juno Beach, the 3rd Canadian Divi-
sion was the assault force and suffered the misfortune
of coming in late and at higher tide, making the Ger-
man obstacles more effective and exacting a heavy toll
of landing craft. Despite initial determined German
resistance, however, the Canadians were able to break
through the German defenses and move inland to a
depth of 10 kilometers on the first day. On Gold Beach,
the results were similar. There the Royal Navy gave
the Germans a heavy shelling, but the Germans still
succeeded in putting up a heavy resistance until the
determined British landing force punched through the
crust of coastal defense and actually advanced to the
outskirts of the city of Bayeux. The remaining beach,
code named Sword, also had the luxury of a heavier na-
val bombardment that successfully suppressed some
of the German fortifications. British assault forces did
have to contend with several major fortifications, as
well as accurate artillery fire originating from the rear
of the German mainline of defense. Still, they were
able to establish a firm foothold, link up with British
airborne elements, and prepare to move on Caen. By
day’s end, the British and Canadian troops had a firm
hold on their beaches.
Of the two American beaches, only Utah was an
unqualified success. On Utah Beach, the medium
bombers had been more accurate than their heavy

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cousins at Omaha Beach. Another assist from the air
came when elements of the 101st Airborne Division
were successful in destroying some of the German
artillery positions that could have exacted heavy ca-
sualties on the Utah Beach assault forces.61 A notable
mistake, landing 4th Infantry Division troops about
two kilometers south of their assigned landing area,
turned to an advantage since German defenses were
weaker in that area.
Another significant problem that emerged on D-
Day was the dispersion of the American paratroopers
and glider forces. The Allies had decided to drop three
airborne divisions at night, rather than at first light.
When the transports began taking off, the weather was
cloudy, and it was dark. German ground fire over the
landing sites was intense in many areas, and the dark-
ness, poor weather, and inexperienced pilots caused
many of the airborne units to miss their assigned
drop zones completely. In fact, the paratroopers of the
American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were
widely scattered, robbing the airborne units of their
ability to concentrate and quickly accomplish their as-
signed missions. While poor drops could have been a
major problem, ironically, these errors in dropping the
paratroopers were, in the end, an advantage. Poorly
executed drops totally confused the Germans because
they were simply unable to determine the paratroop-
er’s areas of concentration and thus their mission.
Despite the errors and the usual fog of war, D-Day
was an unqualified success. An objective and detailed
analysis of what happened on the various beaches on
that day would provide numerous examples of hero-
ism, initiative, and leadership, but while praising the
ground forces for what they had accomplished, read-
ers should remember that this was a joint accomplish-

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ment. In the years preceding D-Day, the Allied navies
had effectively neutered the German Navy. By 1944,
for all practical purposes Germany no longer had a
surface fleet; their remaining ships were kept close
in port for fear of venturing to sea and meeting with
virtual destruction. The last foray of a German capital
ship, the Scharnhorst, had ended in disaster, and the
Allies bottled up what was left of the miniscule Ger-
man fleet. Even the U-boat menace, which had caused
the Allies many anxious months in 1941-42, had di-
minished considerably. By 1944, improved air and
naval tactics and the cracking of the Kriegsmarine’s
Enigma code through ULTRA meant that U-boats
had become the hunted, not the hunters. German E-
boats and patrol torpedo craft, which had caused so
much consternation and casualties at Slapton Sands,
Devon, England, were largely absent at Normandy in
part due to heavy seas and in part to the hesitancy
of Admiral Theodor Krancke to commit them. Thus,
naval supremacy meant that the Allies were able to
muster their invasion fleet and transport men and
supplies across the Channel with no opposition. The
German Navy’s only significant effort on D-Day was
when four E-boats made a run on the invasion fleet
and sank a Norwegian destroyer. Other than this brief
foray, the Kriegsmarine was conspicuously absent.62
The Allies had achieved naval supremacy.
Command of the air was another important factor
for D-Day and the days following the actual invasion.
Granted, the use of heavy bombers had been relatively
ineffective for direct support of the landings, but the
CBO that followed the “Transportation Plan” was an
unqualified success. The French/German transporta-
tion network was so badly damaged that the German
reserves, so necessary to defeat the invasion on the

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beaches, could not counterattack immediately against
the invasion force. Of the elite units that could have
helped German defenders contest the control of the
beaches, only the 12th SS “Hitler Jugend” Division was
able to move up rapidly, but it did not get into action
until June 7, at which time the Canadians had a firm
foothold on their assigned beach. The 17th Panzer
Grenadier Division had to move by road and, due to
Allied air dominance, it took them 5 days to cover 200
miles.
Importantly, German fighter aircraft were not
major factors in any defensive operations against the
invasion fleet and the beaches in part due to the attri-
tion of pilots and aircraft in the first 6 months of 1944.
In addition, Luftwaffe commanders had recalled many
German fighters to protect the Reich from the Allied
bombing raids. Only a handful of fighter aircraft were
available when the landings occurred, making the
task for Germany’s Jagdkorps II extremely difficult, if
not impossible. The classic example of fighter short-
ages was the case of the famous German ace Lieuten-
ant Colonel Josef Priller. Priller had watched, in dis-
may, as 124 aircraft from his 26th Jagdgeschwader were
moved from the vicinity of Lille, France, on June 5.
On the next day when the invasion forces appeared,
he had two fighter aircraft available. Nonetheless, his
higher command ordered him to take his “squadron”
and attack the beaches.63 In comparison, over a 24-
hour period, the Allied air forces flew 14,000 sorties
to support the landing forces. Allied tactical air forces
could rely on 2,434 fighters and fighter-bombers and
some 700 light and medium bombers for the Norman-
dy landings.64 Allied control of the air over the coast of
France was complete.

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 D-Day, the invasion of the continent of Europe,
was without question an unqualified success. In 1 day
alone, the Allies had landed eight divisions and three
armored brigades on German occupied France. Bro-
ken down by nationality, over 75,100 British and Cana-
dian troops and 57,500 American Soldiers had landed
on the European continent from the sea. In addition,
23,000 airborne troops had also dropped into France.
Through the efforts of all three branches of service and
the combined efforts of two nations, Eisenhower, and
his joint and Allied staff had successfully completed
the first part of their assigned task. Allied forces had “.
. . entered the continent of Europe.” The Allied armies
were now poised to undertake the second and equally
important part of the task, to “undertake operations
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of
her armed forces . . .”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, as quoted in Jane Penrose, ed., The

D-Day Companion: Leading Historians Explore History’s Greatest Am-
phibious Assault, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2004, p. 13.

2. According to Alanbrooke’s diaries, on January 14, King

proposed more emphasis on the Pacific, and again on January 18
was described as being “wrapped up in the war of the Pacific at
the expense of everything else.” Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke,
War Diaries, 1939-1945, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds.,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001, pp. 359, 361.
King’s position, as described by Albert Wedemeyer, who was
present at this conference, was that the Japanese were capable
of holding their gains in the Pacific. With the United States only
committing 15 percent of its resources to the Pacific war, the dan-
ger existed that the Japanese could shift their operations toward
Australia or India. Albert Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p. 177.

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 3. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, New York: Hough-
ton Mifflin, 1950, p. 692.

4. Churchill, in his multivolume history of the war, was quick

to point out that he had a luncheon with General Ira Eaker, the
U.S. 8th Air Force Commander who vigorously defended the U.S.
concept of daylight precision bombing with “Flying Fortresses.”
Churchill, however, did not, endorse this idea; he merely ceased
to oppose it. Ibid., p. 680.

5. Maurice Mattloff, “Strategic Planning For Coalition War-

fare,” in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., U.S. Army in World War II,
Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1959, p.
29.

6. Morgan, in briefing his staff on the duties of COSSAC,

pointed out that he was to develop plans, but he did not want his
organization to become just a planning staff. In his opinion, “The
term ‘planning staff’ has come to have the most sinister mean-
ing—it implies the production of nothing but paper. What we
must contrive to do somehow is to produce, not only paper, but
ACTION.” Historical Sub-Section, Supreme Headquarters, Al-
lied Expeditionary Force, “History of COSSAC, Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander,” N.P. May, 1944, p. 4. (Henceforth
“History of COSSAC.”)

7. Alanbrooke, War Diaries, p. 395.

8. The number of plans or variations of plans produced by

COSSAC are admirable. Operations COCKADE, TINDALL,
RANKIN, WADHAM, and STARKEY were other plans or sub
plans that were considered. “History of COSSAC,” p. A-8.

9. From the first meeting of the COSSAC Staff on April 17,

1943, as quoted in Gordon A. Harrison, “The European Theater of
Operations: Cross Channel Attack,“ in Kent Roberts Greenfield,
ed., U.S. Army in World War II, Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Military History, 1951, p. 51

10. Note, however, that one major obstacle to Allied progress

in the exploitation phase seems to have escaped the planners. In
Normandy, the bocage, the century-old system of hedges and

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berms, posed a significant obstacle to Allied breakout and pur-
suit. The other obvious problem was that since Allied armies were
moving east and needed logistical support, it made seizing port
cities in the opposite direction rather illogical.

11. Duncan Anderson, “Remember this is an Invasion,” in

Jane Penrose, ed., The D-Day Companion: Leading historians explore
history’s greatest amphibious assault, London, UK: Osprey Publish-
ing Co, 2004, p. 37.

12. Although Churchill agreed to the need to expeditiously

plan for the cross-channel attack, at the same time he had inserted
in the minutes of the conference the requirement for a staff study
on the feasibility of an invasion of Norway as an alternative. The
peripheral strategy, the indirect or pecking away at the periphery,
did not die easily. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The
Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Bloomington, IN: The
University of Indiana Press, 1981, p. 33.

13. COSSAC’s plan called for three divisions the first day, five
divisions on D+2, and a total of nine divisions on D+8. Cherbourg
was the only sizable port near the landings, but as Allied strength
grew to 25-30 divisions and Cherbourg was in Allied hands, it
was insufficient to support a force of this size. Robert W. Oakley
and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945,
Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1968, p.
182.

14. COSSAC did the original planning for Operation OVER-

LORD under Morgan’s direction. His plan assumed that the com-
mander would be British, thus the chain of command structure
was more suited to British concepts. When an American Army
was on the continent, a British Army Group would exercise field
command until either the Brittany peninsula was liberated or an
American Army Group could be formed. Harrison, “The Euro-
pean Theater of Operations: Cross Channel Attack,“ p. 107.

15. Alanbrooke, War Diaries, p. 441. Alanbrooke found Mar-

shall to be “. . . a pleasant and easy man to get on with, rather over-
filled with his own importance. But I should not put him down as
a great man.”(p. 246). Of Eisenhower, he said, “ I’m afraid Eisen-
hower as a general is hopeless. He submerges himself in politics

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and neglects his military duties, partly I’m afraid, because he
knows little if anything about military matters.”( p. 351). Eisen-
hower, despite Alanbrooke’s comments, some of which reached
the British press, tended to take the high ground and avoid com-
menting negatively about a fellow senior officer.

16. This was as reported by James Roosevelt in My Parents: A

Differing View, Chicago, IL: The Playboy Press, 1976, p. 176.

17. Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring, Boston, MA:

Houghton Mifflin, 1951, p. 418.

18. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York:

Doubleday & Company, 1948, p. 207.

19. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report by The Supreme Commander

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied
Expeditionary Force, 6 June, 1944 to 8 May, 1945, Washington, DC:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994, reprint of 1946, p. v.

20. Sir Winston’s mother, Jennie Jerome, was an American

and, interestingly enough, his grandmother, Clara Hall, was one-
quarter Iroquois Indian.

21. Churchill entered the Royal Military Academy at Sand-

hurst in 1893 as a Cavalry Cadet. He completed his studies there
in 1894. He saw service in the Boer War, and, at the onset of World
War I, he was First Lord of the Admiralty, by that time having
transitioned to political life. He returned to military life during
World War I, serving as a lieutenant colonel commanding the 6th
battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers.

22. The port problem was never actually solved. The construc-
tion of artificial ports, the now famous mulberries, resolved the
problem for the initial landings, but supplies to support the ad-
vancing Allied Expeditionary Force were consistently a problem
until the Allies opened the port of Antwerp in November 1944.

23. Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy, New York: Konecky

and Konecky, 1994, pp. 62-104. Note, however, that even though
Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed to a considerable increase in
strength in the invasion force, Monty repeatedly opposed Opera-

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tion ANVIL that Eisenhower promoted as a critical part in weak-
ening German defenses.

24. Max Hastings, Bomber Command, New York: Dial Press/J

Wade, 1979, p. 327. There was a conviction on the part of Spaatz
and Harris that Germany was “already tottering on the edge of
collapse from bombing.” Thus, why should the Allies conduct the
Operation OVERLORD landing when strategic air had, in fact,
brought the Germans to their knees? Apparently, neither Spaatz
nor Harris knew or wanted to acknowledge that German indus-
trial production actually increased beginning in 1943 and peaked
in the first half of 1944.

25. Leigh-Mallory was the head of this bombing committee,

but the actual plan was developed by Solly Zuckerman, a one time
Professor of anatomy! The concept was bitterly opposed by lead-
ing American and British Airmen and, interestingly enough, by
Winston Churchill. Churchill found the plan to bomb rail centers
throughout France to be inhumane, due to the number of French
casualties that would result. Conversely, Charles DeGaulle, when
briefed on the plan, accepted these casualties as necessary to de-
feat the Germans.

26. Edward Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land
Battle in Three American Wars, Washington, DC: Center for Air
Force History, 1994, pp. 223-230.

27. Richard Hallion, D-Day 1944: Air Power Over the Beaches
and Beyond, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1994, p. 2.

28. J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography, Novato

CA: The Presidio Press, 1994, p. 181.

29. Charles H. Corlett, Cowboy Pete: The Autobiography of Major

General Charles H. Corlett, Santa Fe, NM: Sleeping Fox Publisher,
1974, p. 88.

30. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldiers Story, New York: Henry Holt

and Company, 1951, pp. 220-221. Not directly stated in Bradley’s
comments but certainly an issue, was the difficulty in prying capi-
tal American ships dedicated for Pacific operations from Admiral
King’s firm grip.

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 31. Williamson Murray and Alan Millet, A War to be Won:
Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2000, p. 419.

32. This concept predates Operation OVERLORD; it can be

found in COSSAC documents. The COSSAC wartime history
mentions the use of two R-class battleships which were to supple-
ment air bombardment in neutralizing the German batteries and
mentions the need for diverting a considerable proportion of the
heavy bomber effort from strategic targets to objectives related
immediately to cross-channel operations. “History of COSSAC,”
p. 19.

33. George C. Marshall, Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of

the U.S. Army To The Secretary of War, July 31, 1943-June 30, 1945,
Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1996, p.
113.

34. Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic

Battle of World War II, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 45.

35. Churchill and General Sir Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wil-

son were opposed to Operation ANVIL because of its effect on
the Italian campaign. Italy, despite being a part of the so-called
“soft underbelly,” was a tough battlefield for the Allies. With the
failure of Anzio to provide a breakthrough, the British were deter-
mined not to let American plans weaken this theater any further.
Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 510-514.

36. Ever critical of American leadership, Alanbrooke could

only comment, “ I now hope that at last all may be well and that
the American Chiefs of Staff will at last see some wisdom.” Alan-
brooke, War Diaries, 1939-1945, p. 533.

37. One author notes that the plan ultimately called for 29
divisions to be landed in the lodgment area and that, even with
the capture of Cherbourg, there were insufficient port facilities to
support a force of this size. See Harrison, “The European Theater
of Operations: Cross Channel Attack,” p. 73.

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 38. Eisenhower, Report by The Supreme Commander to the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expedi-
tionary Force, p. 11.

39. Allied officers seriously discussed the issue of artificial

harbors at the LARGS conference held June 29-July 4, 1943. Partic-
ipants talked about the mulberries, including the floating concrete
caissons called phoenixes, and the possibility of using sunken
ships as part of the breakwaters. “History of COSSAC,” p. A-40.

40. Andrew Gordon, “The Greatest Military Armada Ever

Launched,” in Penrose, ed., The D-Day Companion, p. 133.

41. Duncan Anderson, “Remember this is an Invasion,” in

Ibid., p. 45.

42. Even Omar Bradley, who was generous on the profes-

sional capabilities of Lee, had to admit, “[Lee] suffered from an
unfortunate pomposity that caused others to underrate his skills.”
He also had to admit that Lee, known for his love of creature com-
forts, undoubtedly negatively affected supply operations when
he moved his entire headquarters forward to Paris on August 30,
1944. At that time, there was a supply crisis for the Allied forces
pushing the German forces back to their prewar borders. Lee and
his headquarters also took sumptuous quarters in Paris, which
Eisenhower thought should be reserved for troops on furlough.
Bradley, pp. 405-406.

43. Walter Bedell Smith, as Interviewed by Forest Pogue, Mili-

tary History Institute, Carlisle, PA.

44. Lee’s connections were considerable. He not only was

well-respected by Sommervell, he also was thought well of by
Marshall himself. Thus, despite his many failures and downright
foolish actions, Bedell Smith could not talk Eisenhower into re-
lieving him. Patton was clear in his opinion, calling Lee “a pomp-
ous little son-of-a-bitch only interested in his own self advertise-
ment.” See Carlo D’Este, Chap. 3, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life, New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002, pp. 483-484, 590-592.

45. According to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Hitler took per-

sonal interest in the construction of these fortifications, specify-
ing that ports should receive first priority. He also had a map

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produced showing completed fortifications, under construction
and projected fortifications. Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Invasion and
Normandy Campaign, Foreign Military Studies, MS# A-913, U.S.
Army Europe, Historical Division, 1945, pp. 1,2.

46. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939-1945,

Novato, CA: The Presidio Press, 1964, p. 400-402. Warlimont notes
that on November 3, 1943, a German Army (OKW) directive be-
gan the process of shifting some of the thinking from the struggle
against Bolshevism to the defense in the west. On December 28,
Hitler ordered that there would be no additional transfers of men
and equipment from the Western Front to the Eastern without his
express permission.

47. This number of mines, while substantial, was actually

short of what Rommel wanted. He had proposed a series of mine-
fields several kilometers wide and five to six miles inland. As in-
terpreted by the general in command of engineer troops for Army
Group B, Rommel’s mining plans would actually call for 200 mil-
lion mines for the French coast. B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel
Papers, London, UK: Collins Press, 1953, p. 455.

48. Schweppenburg wanted a large armored reserve based in

the environs of Paris, believing that the Allies might make a deep
airborne drop to seize Paris, a possibility that Rommel logically
dismissed. Ibid., pp. 468-469.

49. In discussion with his close associate, General Fritz Bayer-

lein, Rommel stated, “The focus of the enemy landing operation
will probably be directed against the Fifteenth Army’s sector [The
Pas de Calais], because it is from this sector that much of our long-
range attack on England and central London will be launched.”
General Fritz Bayerlein, as quoted in Ibid., p. 453.

50. Hitler in an address on March 20, 1944, to the Commanders

in Chief in the West stated, “It is evident that the Anglo-American
landing in the west will and must come. . . . The most suitable and
hence the most threatened areas are the two west coast peninsu-
las, Cherbourg and Brest, which are very tempting and offer the
best possibilities for the formation of a bridgehead.” Ibid., p. 465.

186

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 51. As an interesting side light, Carlo D’Este noted in his ex-
cellent work on D-Day that Sir Basil Liddell Hart thought that
Rundstedt was more deceived by his own logic because, as a clas-
sically trained German General Staff Officer, the logical strategy
for the Allies would have been to attack near and take Calais,
thereby giving them the best terrain and a port. At the same time,
D’Este acknowledges that Operation FORTITUDE undoubtedly
strengthened this preconception. D’Este, Decision in Normandy, p.
117.

52. The British 38th and 46th Groups dedicated 733 aircraft
and 355 gliders for their part of the effort. Eisenhower, Report by
The Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Opera-
tions in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, p. 22.

53. Harrison, “The European Theater of Operations: Cross

Channel Attack,” pp. 300-301.

54. Goeffrey Paret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in

World War II, New York: Random House, 1993, pp. 304-305.

55. Harrison, “The European Theater of Operations: Cross

Channel Attack,” p. 301.

56. In contrast, on Utah Beach, 28 of the 32 Amphibious tanks

made it ashore where they were extremely important in provid-
ing supporting fire to the infantrymen that were attempting to
consolidate their foothold. Williamson Murray, “A Visitor to Hell:
On the Beaches,” in Penrose, ed., The D-Day Companion, p. 156.

57. Flint Whitlock, The Fighting First: The Untold Story Of the
Big Red One on D-DAY, Boulder, CO: The Westview Press, 2004,
p. 141.

58. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, p. 79.

59. As bad as it was on Omaha Beach, it could have been much

worse. Fortunately for the G.I.s, only part of the 352nd was man-
ning the German defenses. The division commander had retained
the rest of the division further inland.

187

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 60. As Omar Bradley later noted, “ Although Omaha had
squeezed through a crisis, she was still on the danger list. With
neither depth, artillery, or tanks, we might easily be dislodged
from our precarious footing and thrown back into the channel by
counterattacks.” Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 273-274.

61. Perhaps the best known action of the 101st Airborne Di-
vision in support of Utah Beach assault troops occurred with
Lieutenant Richard Winters, Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th
Parachute Infantry Regiment. Winters and a handful of his men
assaulted a German artillery battery at Brecourt Farm that was
sited on the landing area and would have caused considerable
casualties, had it been allowed to operate. See Stephen Ambrose,
Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne From
Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1992, pp. 77-83.

62. Fifteen additional E-Boats did weigh anchor and head for
the invasion fleet, but they turned back because of the rough seas.

63. Priller and his wingman, both with severe hangovers from
the previous night, obeyed orders and made a single pass over
the beaches at about 50 feet and then headed for the clouds. Both
survived this exercise in futility.

64. Hallion, D-Day 1944, p. 7.

188

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