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India's Nuclear Doctrine

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26 views5 pages

India's Nuclear Doctrine

Uploaded by

Debjit Dutta
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Recently, the Defence Minister of India said that the future of India’s ‘No First
Use’ (NFU) policy on nuclear weapons depended on “circumstances”.

About: India’s Nuclear Doctrine


This statement has raised apprehensions on the likely revision of India’s NFU
policy and nuclear doctrine.

What is Nuclear Doctrine?


• A nuclear doctrine states how a nuclear weapon state would employ its
nuclear weapons both during peace and war.
• It guides the state’s response during the war when deterrence fails.

Historical Background
• India embarked on the path of nuclear weapons development after
its face-off with China in the 1962 war, followed by China carrying out
nuclear tests in 1964 and in the subsequent years.
• In 1974, under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India conducted its first
nuclear tests, Pokhran-I, dubbed as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”.
• India has refused to sign international treaties like Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on
grounds that it is discriminatory.

CTBT

• CTBT is the Treaty banning all nuclear explosions – everywhere, by


everyone.
• The Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September
1996, but has not entered into force, as eight specific states have not
ratified the treaty.

NPT
• NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology.
• To promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
• To further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament.
• China exploded its first weapon in 1964, and India did so in 1974.
Between those dates, in 1970 the NPT came into effect. Under its terms,
China became recognised as one of the world’s five ‘weapon states’, and
India was excluded from such status.

• Despite more than two decades of international pressure that followed


to make India abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, India again
carried out a test in May 1998, Pokhran-II, involving a fission device, a
low-yield device, and a thermonuclear device.

• After the 1998 nuclear test when India declared itself a nuclear weapon
state, it also enunciated a doctrine of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons.
• The NFU promise thus went together with credible minimum deterrence
(CMD).
• India’s Nuclear Doctrine was formally adopted on January 4, 2003.
• It is based on staggering and punitive retaliation, in case deterrence
failed.

India’s nuclear doctrine


It has had three primary components:

• No First Use
• India will only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on
Indian territory, or Indian forces.
• A caveat is made about their possible use in response to a chemical or
biological attack.
• Massive Retaliation
• India’s response to a first strike will be massive, to cause
‘unacceptable damage’.
• While the doctrine doesn’t explicitly espouse a counter-value
strategy (civilian targets), the wording implies the same.
• Credible Minimum Deterrence
• The number and capabilities of India’s nuclear weapons and delivery
systems should merely be sufficient to ensure intolerable retaliation,
also keeping in mind first-strike survival of its relatively meagre
arsenal.

Advantages of NFU Policy


• The no-first-use policy is premised upon an assured second-strike
capability, that survives the first strike and retains sufficient warheads
to launch massive retaliation upon the adversary.
• It minimises the probability of nuclear use and chances of reacting to a
false alarm are nullified.
• It presents an opportunity for cooperation with China to work jointly
towards a Global No First Use (GNFU) order.
• India’s image as a responsible nuclear power is central to its nuclear
diplomacy. Nuclear restraint has allowed India to get accepted in the
global mainstream.
• NFU doctrine is cheaper to implement; for India, which has many
economic targets to achieve, this is a very important factor.

Disadvantages of NFU Policy


• To Compensate for Conventional Inferiority.
• Nuclear weapons are often seen as an antidote to conventional
inferiority (whether real or perceived).
• The inferior party will seek to deter a conventional attack by
threatening a nuclear response.
• Introduces an element of nuclear risk to any war contemplated by the
superior state.

• It is hard for the potential attacker to confidently calculate that it can


achieve victory at an acceptable cost when there is a possibility of
nuclear escalation.

Implications of abandoning NFU for India


• It will damage India’s status as a responsible nuclear power.
• Upset regional balance: Abrogate India’s commitment to the universal
goal of nuclear disarmament and upset the regional balance in the sub-
continent.
• Could harm India’s chances for NSG: India is now a member of most of
the technology denial regimes such as the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is also actively
pursuing full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Revoking the
‘no first use’ pledge would harm India’s nuclear image worldwide.
• Nuclear pre-emption is a costly policy as it requires massive
investment not only in weapons and delivery systems but
also intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure.
• The first use of nuclear weapons would require a massive increase in
India’s nuclear delivery capabilities. India is yet to induct the Multiple
Re-entry Vehicle (MRV) technology in its missiles, which is fundamental
to eliminating hardened nuclear targets.

Way Forward

• All doctrines need periodic reviews and India’s case is no exception.


• Given how rapidly India’s strategic environment is evolving, it is
imperative to think clearly about all matters strategically.
• But if Indian policymakers do indeed feel the need to review the nation’s
nuclear doctrine, they should be cognizant of the costs involved in doing
so.
• A sound policy debate can only ensue if the costs and benefits of a
purported policy shift are discussed and debated widely.

NSG:

• The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier


countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for
nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.
• The NSG Guidelines also contain the so-called “Non-Proliferation
Principle,” adopted in 1994, whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other
provisions in the NSG Guidelines, authorises a transfer only when
satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
The Non-Proliferation Principle seeks to cover the rare but important cases
where adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not
by itself be a guarantee that a State will consistently share the objectives of
the Treaty or that it will remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations.

MTCR:

• Established in April 1987, the voluntary Missile Technology Control


Regime (MTCR) aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other
unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological,
and nuclear attacks.
• The regime urges its 35 members, to restrict their exports of missiles
and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at
least 300 kilometers or delivering any type of weapon of mass
destruction.

Wassenaar Arrangement:

• The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute


to regional and international security and stability, by promoting
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing
destabilising accumulations.
• The aim is also to prevent the acquisition of these items by terrorists.

Note: India is not a member of NSG but member of rest two. China is member
of NSG but not the other 2.

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