Introduction:

India undertook its first nuclear explosion in May

1974. The Nuclear Doctrine of India is based on
the principle that India will only use a nuclear
weapon in retaliation to a country's attempt of
attacking India, its states or its army with a
nuclear weapon.

Historical Background:
Nuclear programme of India was initiated in the
late 1940s under the guidance of Homi J. Bhabha.
India wanted to generate atomic energy for
peaceful purposes. Nehru was against nuclear
weapons so he pleaded with the superpowers for
comprehensive nuclear disarmament. However,
the nuclear arsenal kept rising.

Key Developments:
Here are some key developments in India’s
nuclear policy:

Nuclear test in 1998: Pokhran II was a group of

2 nuclear tests conducted in 1998. Two stage
thermonuclear device with fusion boosted
primary, intended for missile warhead; test
design yield 45 kt, with a 200 kt deployed yield.
It marked a shift from its earlier stance of
pursuing nuclear weapons only for development.

Nuclear doctrine: The Nuclear Doctrine of India

is based on the principle that India will only use a
nuclear weapon in retaliation to a country's
attempt of attacking India, its states or its army
with a nuclear weapon. Indian will not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states.

1974 Pokhran Test (Smiling Buddha):

Smiling Buddha (MEA designation: Pokhran-I)
was the code name of India's first
successful nuclear weapon test on 18 May 1974.
The nuclear fission type bomb was detonated in
the Pokhran Test Range of the Indian
Army in Rajasthan. The bomb was built by
scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research
Centre (BARC) headed by Raja Ramanna, in
assistance with the Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO) headed by B.
D. Nag Chaudhuri under the supervision of
the Atomic Energy Commission headed by Homi
Sethna. A CIRUS nuclear reactor given
by Canada and heavy water (used as a neutron
moderator) supplied by the United States were
used in the production of nuclear material for the
bomb. The preparations for the test and the
detonation was conducted in extreme secrecy
with very few people outside the team of
scientists being aware of the test.

1998 Pokhran Tests (Operation Shakti):

Pokhran-II (Operation Shakti) was a series of
five nuclear weapon tests conducted by India in
May 1998. The bombs were detonated at
the Indian Army's Pokhran Test
Range in Rajasthan. he tests achieved their main
objective of giving India the capability to
build fission and thermonuclear weapons with
yields up to 200 kilotons. Then chairman of
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission described
each one of the explosions to be equivalent to
several tests carried out over the years by
various nations. The Indian
government convened a press conference to
announce the tests and declared India as a full-
fledged nuclear state. As a consequence of the
tests, United Nations Security Council Resolution
1172 was enacted and economic sanctions were
imposed by a number of countries
including Japan and the United States.

Indian’s Position on Non-Proliferation:

The treaty was drawn, drafted and negotiated by
the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament,
an UN-sponsored organisation based in
Switzerland. As per the stance of the Indian
Government, the treaty in its current form is
unfair as it, virtually, states that the 5 victorious
nations of World War II have the right to possess
nuclear weapons while condemning the rest of
the nations who don’t have the weapons, to be
subservient to the whims and fancies of the
nations who do. In short, the treaty divides the
world into nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.

India and the International Nuclear order:

Acquiring nuclear weapons has not had any
tangible effect on India’s diplomatic relations in
South Asia, and the extended South East Asian
region. With Pakistan, for instance, it was unable
to prevent the war in 1999, nor a considerable
number of terrorist attacks. Ceasefire violations
too continue unabated. With China, there has
been a fractious relationship especially with
regard to border skirmishes and standoffs. There
is also considerable anxiety in New Delhi about
the growing Chinese influence in its immediate
neighbourhood – Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
Balancing China is a long-term foreign policy
objective for India. In its quest for legitimacy as a
nuclear weapons power, India has aspired to be a
benevolent—perhaps even benign—nuclear
weapons state. It has thus sought to keep away
from compellent threats, and the threat of use of
nuclear weapons to attain foreign policy
objectives. To be clear, this is a good thing, and
does not need to be a constraint for Indian
foreign policy leverage. Given that India
considers nuclear weapons as tools of deterrence
and not of warfighting, there is little scope for it
to interfere in the business of its neighbours and
threaten nuclear retribution – again, a good
thing. However, India does have a China problem
and it needs to be able to leverage its increased
military capacity indirectly in order to balance
China in its immediate region.

Challenges and Criticisms:

Challenges:
Slow implementation: India’s nuclear triad,
which is a military force structure that includes
land-launched missiles, submarines and aircraft
is still being developed. For example, the
commissioning of India’s second nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarine has been delayed.

Nuclear test Ban Treaty: In particular, (1) the

capacity of the United States to maintain
confidence in the safety and reliability of its
nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear-
testing. (2) The nuclear-test detection
capabilities of the international monitoring
system (with and without augmentation by
national systems and instrumentation in use of
scientific purposes, and taking into account the
possibilities for decoupling nuclear explosions
from surrounding geologic media) and. (3) the
additions to their nuclear-weapons capabilities
that other countries could achieve through
nuclear testing at yield levels that might escape
detection, and the effect of such additions on the
security of the United States.

Criticisms:
Creditability: Some say that India’s “massive
retaliation” policy is not credible, especially
against a tactical nuclear strike on Indian forces.
Others say that India’s deterrence is not strong
enough to convince adversaries that India has
the political and military will to respond.

Non- Proliferation Treaty: India always

considered the NPT as discriminatory and had
refused to sign it. India has opposed the
international treaties aimed at non-proliferation
since they were selectively applicable to the non-
nuclear powers and legitimized the monopoly of
the five nuclear weapons powers.

Conclusion:
India’s nuclear policy have evolved gradually
rather than dramatically. This is unlikely to
change. Indian leaders and the political and
administrative system are cautious and risk-
averse. And India faces no existential insecurities
and is indeed a fairly confident and secure state
that dominates its region. Thus, there is little
domestic political or international reasons to
expect rapid changes in India’s nuclear policy.