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Conventionality of Simultaneity
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Stanford Encyclopedia In his first paper on the special theory of relativity, Einstein indicated that
the question of whether or not two spatially separated events were
of Philosophy simultaneous did not necessarily have a definite answer, but instead
depended on the adoption of a convention for its resolution. Some later
writers have argued that Einstein's choice of a convention is, in fact, the
only possible choice within the framework of special relativistic physics,
while others have maintained that alternative choices, although perhaps
less convenient, are indeed possible.
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor
1. The Conventionality Thesis
Editorial Board
2. Phenomenological Counterarguments
http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html
3. Transport of Clocks
Library of Congress Catalog Data 4. Malament's Theorem
ISSN: 1095-5054
5. Other Considerations
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1. The Conventionality Thesis
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Copyright c 2011 by the publisher
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The debate about the conventionality of simultaneity is usually carried on
Center for the Study of Language and Information within the framework of the special theory of relativity. Even prior to the
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 advent of that theory, however, questions had been raised (see, e.g.,
Conventionality of Simultaneity Poincaré 1898) as to whether simultaneity was absolute; i.e., whether there
Copyright c 2014 by the author
Allen Janis
was a unique event at location A that was simultaneous with a given event
at location B. In his first paper on relativity, Einstein (1905) asserted that
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 Conventionality of Simultaneity Allen Janis

it was necessary to make an assumption in order to be able to compare the The thesis that the choice of standard synchrony is a convention, rather
times of occurrence of events at spatially separated locations (Einstein than one necessitated by facts about the physical universe (within the
1905, 38–40 of the Dover translation or 125–127 of the Princeton framework of the special theory of relativity), has been argued particularly
translation; but note Scribner 1963, for correction of an error in the Dover by Reichenbach (see, for example, Reichenbach 1958, 123–135) and
translation). His assumption, which defined what is usually called standard Grünbaum (see, for example, Grünbaum 1973, 342–368). They argue that
synchrony, can be described in terms of the following idealized thought the only nonconventional basis for claiming that two distinct events are
experiment, where the spatial locations A and B are fixed locations in not simultaneous would be the possibility of a causal influence connecting
some particular, but arbitrary, inertial (i.e., unaccelerated) frame of the events. In the pre-Einsteinian view of the universe, there was no reason
reference: Let a light ray, traveling in vacuum, leave A at time t1 (as to rule out the possibility of arbitrarily fast causal influences, which would
measured by a clock at rest there), and arrive at B coincident with the then be able to single out a unique event at A that would be simultaneous
event E at B. Let the ray be instantaneously reflected back to A, arriving at with E. In an Einsteinian universe, however, no causal influence can travel
time t2. Then standard synchrony is defined by saying that E is faster than the speed of light in vacuum, so from the point of view of
simultaneous with the event at A that occurred at time (t1 + t2)/2. This Reichenbach and Grünbaum, any event at A whose time of occurrence is
definition is equivalent to the requirement that the one-way speeds of the in the open interval between t1 and t2 could be defined to be simultaneous
ray be the same on the two segments of its round-trip journey between A with E. In terms of the ε-notation introduced by Reichenbach, any event at
and B. A occurring at a time t1 + ε(t2 − t1), where 0 < ε < 1, could be
simultaneous with E. That is, the conventionality thesis asserts that any
It is interesting to note (as pointed out by Jammer (2006, 49), in his particular choice of ε within its stated range is a matter of convention,
comprehensive survey of virtually all aspects of simultaneity) that including the choice ε=1/2 (which corresponds to standard synchrony). If
something closely analogous to Einstein's definition of standard ε differs from 1/2, the one-way speeds of a light ray would differ (in an ε-
simultaneity was used more than 1500 years earlier by St. Augustine in his dependent fashion) on the two segments of its round-trip journey between
Confessions (written in 397 CE). He was arguing against astrology by A and B. If, more generally, we consider light traveling on an arbitrary
telling a story of two women, one rich and one poor, who gave birth closed path in three-dimensional space, then (as shown by Minguzzi 2002,
simultaneously but whose children had quite different lives in spite of 155–156) the freedom of choice in the one-way speeds of light amounts to
having identical horoscopes. His method of determining that the births, at the choice of an arbitrary scalar field (although two scalar fields that differ
different locations, were simultaneous was to have a messenger leave each only by an additive constant would give the same assignment of one-way
birth site at the moment of birth and travel to the other, presumably with speeds).
equal speeds. Since the messengers met at the midpoint, the births must
have been simultaneous. Jammer comments that this “may well be It might be argued that the definition of standard synchrony makes use
regarded as probably the earliest recorded example of an operational only of the relation of equality (of the one-way speeds of light in different
definition of distant simultaneity.” directions), so that simplicity dictates its choice rather than a choice that
requires the specification of a particular value for a parameter. Grünbaum

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(1973, 356) rejects this argument on the grounds that, since the equality of law of conservation of momentum in the example mentioned above.
the one-way speeds of light is a convention, this choice does not simplify Indeed, all of special relativity has been reformulated (in an unfamiliar
the postulational basis of the theory but only gives a symbolically simpler form) in terms of nonstandard synchronies (Winnie 1970a and 1970b).
representation. Since the proposed synchronization procedure can itself be described in
terms of a nonstandard synchrony, the scheme cannot describe a sequence
2. Phenomenological Counterarguments of events that is incompatible with nonstandard synchrony. A comparison
of the two descriptions makes clear what hidden assumptions in the
Many of the arguments against the conventionality thesis make use of scheme are equivalent to standard synchrony. Nevertheless, editors of
particular physical phenomena, together with the laws of physics, to respected journals continue to accept, from time to time, papers purporting
establish simultaneity (or, equivalently, to measure the one-way speed of to measure one-way light speeds; see, for example, Greaves et al. (2009).
light). Salmon (1977), for example, discusses a number of such schemes Application of the procedure just described shows where their errors lie.
and argues that each makes use of a nontrivial convention. For instance,
one such scheme uses the law of conservation of momentum to conclude 3. Transport of Clocks
that two particles of equal mass, initially located halfway between A and B
and then separated by an explosion, must arrive at A and B simultaneously. A phenomenological scheme that deserves special mention, because of the
Salmon (1977, 273) argues, however, that the standard formulation of the amount of attention it has received over the course of many years, is to
law of conservation of momentum makes use of the concept of one-way define synchrony by the use of clocks transported between locations A and
velocities, which cannot be measured without the use of (something B in the limit of zero velocity. Eddington (1924, 15) discusses this method
equivalent to) synchronized clocks at the two ends of the spatial interval of synchrony, and notes that it leads to the same results as those obtained
that is traversed; thus, it is a circular argument to use conservation of by the use of electromagnetic signals (the method that has been referred to
momentum to define simultaneity. here as standard synchrony). He comments on both of these methods as
follows (1924, 15–16): “We can scarcely consider that either of these
It has been argued (see, for example, Janis 1983, 103–105, and Norton methods of comparing time at different places is an essential part of our
1986, 119) that all such schemes for establishing convention-free primitive notion of time in the same way that measurement at one place by
synchrony must fail. The argument can be summarized as follows: a cyclic mechanism is; therefore they are best regarded as conventional.”
Suppose that clocks are set in standard synchrony, and consider the
detailed space-time description of the proposed synchronization procedure One objection to the use of the slow-transport scheme to synchronize
that would be obtained with the use of such clocks. Next suppose that the clocks is that, until the clocks are synchronized, there is no way of
clocks are reset in some nonstandard fashion (consistent with the causal measuring the one-way velocity of the transported clock. Bridgman (1962,
order of events), and consider the description of the same sequence of 26) uses the “self-measured” velocity, determined by using the transported
events that would be obtained with the use of the reset clocks. In such a clock to measure the time interval, to avoid this problem. Using this
description, familiar laws may take unfamiliar forms, as in the case of the meaning of velocity, he suggests (1962, 64–67) a modified procedure that

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is equivalent to Eddington's, but does not require having started in the A number of responses to these views of Ellis and Bowman (see, for
infinite past. Bridgman would transport a number of clocks from A to B at example, Grünbaum et al. 1969; Winnie 1970b, 223–228; and Redhead
various velocities; the readings of these clocks at B would differ. He 1993, 111–113) argue that nontrivial conventions are implicit in the choice
would then pick one clock, say the one whose velocity was the smallest, to synchronize clocks by the slow-transport method. For example,
and find the differences between its reading and the readings of the other Grünbaum (Grünbaum et al. 1969, 5–43) argues that it is a nontrivial
clocks. Finally, he would plot these differences against the velocities of convention to equate the time interval measured by the infinitely slowly
the corresponding clocks, and extrapolate to zero velocity. Like moving clock traveling from A to B with the interval measured by the
Eddington, Bridgman does not see this scheme as contradicting the clock remaining at A and in standard synchrony with that at B, and the
conventionality thesis. He says (1962, 66), “What becomes of Einstein's conclusion of van Fraassen (Grünbaum et al. 1969, 73) is, “Ellis and
insistence that his method for setting distant clocks — that is, choosing the Bowman have not proved that the standard simultaneity relation is
value 1/2 for ε — constituted a ‘definition’ of distant simultaneity? It nonconventional, which it is not, but have succeeded in exhibiting some
seems to me that Einstein's remark is by no means invalidated.” alternative conventions which also yield that simultaneity relation.”
Winnie (1970b), using his reformulation of special relativity in terms of
Ellis and Bowman (1967) take a different point of view. Their means of arbitrary synchrony, shows explicitly that synchrony by slow-clock
synchronizing clocks by slow transport (1967, 129–130) is again transport agrees with synchrony by the standard light-signal method when
somewhat different from, but equivalent to, those already mentioned. They both are described in terms of an arbitrary value of ε within the range 0 < ε
would place clocks at A and B with arbitrary settings. They would then < 1, and argues that Ellis and Bowman err in having assumed the ε=1/2
place a third clock at A and synchronize it with the one already there. Next form of the time-dilation formula in their arguments. He concludes
they would move this third clock to B with a velocity they refer to as the (Winnie 1970b, 228) that “it is not possible that the method of slow-
“intervening ‘velocity’”, determined by using the clocks in place at A and transport, or any other synchrony method, could, within the framework of
B to measure the time interval. They would repeat this procedure with the nonconventional ingredients of the Special Theory, result in fixing any
decreasing velocities and extrapolate to find the zero-velocity limit of the particular value of ε to the exclusion of any other particular values.”
difference between the readings of the clock at B and the transported Redhead (1993) also argues that slow transport of clocks fails to give a
clock. Finally, they would set the clock at B back by this limiting amount. convention-free definition of simultaneity. He says (1993, 112), “There is
On the basis of their analysis of this procedure, they argue that, although no absolute factual sense in the term ‘slow.’ If we estimate ‘slow’ relative
consistent nonstandard synchronization appears to be possible, there are to a moving frame Kʹ′, then slow-clock-transport will pick out standard
good physical reasons (assuming the correctness of empirical predictions synchrony in Kʹ′, but this …corresponds to nonstandard synchrony in K.”
of the special theory of relativity) for preferring standard synchrony. Their
conclusion (as summarized in the abstract of their 1967, 116) is, “The An alternative clock-transport scheme, which avoids the issue of slowness,
thesis of the conventionality of distant simultaneity espoused particularly is to have the clock move from A to B and back again (along straight paths
by Reichenbach and Grünbaum is thus either trivialized or refuted.” in each direction) with the same self-measured speed throughout the round
trip (Mamone Capria 2001, 812–813; as Mamone Capria notes, his

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scheme is similar to those proposed by Brehme 1985, 57–58, and 1988, about simultaneity of the causal theorists of time was false. He showed
811–812). If the moving clock leaves A at time t1 (as measured by a clock that the standard simultaneity relation was the only nontrivial simultaneity
at rest there), arrives at B coincident with the event E at B, and arrives relation definable in terms of the causal structure of a Minkowski
back at A at the time t2, then standard synchrony is obtained by saying that spacetime of special relativity.”
E is simultaneous with the event at A that occurred at the time (t1 + t2)/2.
It would seem that this transport scheme is sufficiently similar to the slow- Other commentators disagree with such arguments, however. Grünbaum
transport scheme that it could engender much the same debate, apart from (2010) has written a detailed critique of Malament's paper. He first cites
those aspects of the debate that focussed specifically on the issue of Malament's need to postulate that S is an equivalence relation as a
slowness. weakness in the argument, a view also endorsed by Redhead (1993, 114).
Grünbaum's main argument, however, is based on an earlier argument by
4. Malament's Theorem Janis (1983, 107–109) that Malament's theorem leads to a unique (but
different) synchrony relative to any inertial observer, that this latitude is
An entirely different sort of argument against the conventionality thesis the same as that in introducing Reichenbach's ε, and thus Malament's
has been given by Malament (1977), who argues that standard synchrony theorem should carry neither more nor less weight against the
is the only simultaneity relation that can be defined, relative to a given conventionality thesis than the argument (mentioned above in the last
inertial frame, from the relation of (symmetric) causal connectibility. Let paragraph of the first section of this article) that standard synchrony is the
this relation be represented by κ, let the statement that events p and q are simplest choice. Grünbaum concludes “that Malament's remarkable proof
simultaneous be represented by S(p,q), and let the given inertial frame be has not undermined my thesis that, in the STR, relative simultaneity is
specified by the world line, O, of some inertial observer. Then Malament's conventional, as contrasted with its non-conventionality in the Newtonian
uniqueness theorem shows that if S is definable from κ and O, if it is an world, which I have articulated! Thus, I do not need to retract the actual
equivalence relation, if points p on O and q not on O exist such that S(p,q) claim I made in 1963…” Somewhat similar arguments are given by
holds, and if S is not the universal relation (which holds for all points), Redhead (1993, 114) and by Debs and Redhead (2007, 87–92).
then S is the relation of standard synchrony.
Havas (1987, 444) says, “What Malament has shown, in fact, is that in
Some commentators have taken Malament's theorem to have settled the Minkowski space-time … one can always introduce time-orthogonal
debate on the side of nonconventionality. For example, Torretti (1983, coordinates … , an obvious and well-known result which implies ε=1/2.”
229) says, “Malament proved that simultaneity by standard synchronism In a comprehensive review of the problem of the conventionality of
in an inertial frame F is the only non-universal equivalence between simultaneity, Anderson, Vetharaniam, and Stedman (1998, 124–125)
events at different points of F that is definable (‘in any sense of claim that Malament's proof is erroneous. Although they appear to be
“definable” no matter how weak’) in terms of causal connectibility alone, wrong in this claim, the nature of their error highlights the fact that
for a given F”; and Norton (Salmon et al. 1992, 222) says, “Contrary to Malament's proof, which uses the time-symmetric relation κ, would not be
most expectations, [Malament] was able to prove that the central claim valid if a temporal orientation were introduced into space-time (see, for

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example, Spirtes 1981, Ch. VI, Sec. F; and Stein 1991, 153n). simultaneity relations: any space-like or light-like conic hypersurface of
an event on O defines a simultaneity relation for that event relative to O,
Sarkar and Stachel (1999) argue that there is no physical warrant for the and then, by translations, for any event on O.” However he then goes on to
requirement that a simultaneity relation be invariant under temporal argue against the assumption that an observer, represented by O, would
reflections. Dropping that requirement, they show that Malament's other remain inertial forever, and ultimately concludes not only that standard
criteria for a simultaneity relation are then also satisfied if we fix some simultaneity cannot be defined but that the only two simultaneity relations
arbitrary event in space-time and say either that any pair of events on its that can be defined relative to an event are those determined by its future
backward null cone are simultaneous or, alternatively, that any pair of and past light cones.
events on its forward null cone are simultaneous. They show further that,
among the relations satisfying these requirements, standard synchrony is Giulini (2001, 653) argues that it is too strong a requirement to ask that a
the unique such relation that is independent of the position of an observer simultaneity relation be invariant under causal transformations (such as
and the half-null-cone relations are the unique such relations that are scale transformations) that are not physical symmetries, which Malament
independent of the motion of an observer. If the backward-cone relation as well as Sarkar and Stachel do. Using “Aut” to refer to the appropriate
were chosen, then simultaneous events would be those seen invariance group and “nontrivial” to refer to an equivalence relation on
simultaneously by an observer at the cone's vertex. As Sarkar and Stachel spacetime that is neither one in which all points are in the same
(1999, 209) note, Einstein (1905, 39 of the Dover translation or 126 of the equivalence class nor one in which each point is in a different equivalence
Princeton translation) considered this possibility and rejected it because of class, Giulini (2001, 657–658) defines two types of simultaneity: Absolute
its dependence on the position of the observer. Since the half-null-cone simultaneity is a nontrivial Aut-invariant equivalence relation on
relations define causally connectible events to be simultaneous, it would spacetime such that each equivalence class intersects any physically
seem that they would also be rejected by adherents of the views of realizable timelike trajectory in at most one point, and simultaneity
Reichenbach and Grünbaum. relative to some structure X in spacetime (for Malament, X is the world
line of an inertial observer) is a nontrivial AutX-invariant equivalence
Ben-Yami (2006) also argues against Malament's requirement of relation on spacetime such that each equivalence class intersects any
invariance under temporal reflections, but for different reasons than those physically realizable timelike trajectory in at most one point, where AutX
of Sarkar and Stachel. Ben-Yami (2006, 461) takes his fundamental causal is the subgroup of Aut that preserves X. First taking Aut to be the
relation to be the following: “If event e1 is a cause of event e2, then e2 inhomogeneous (i.e., including translations) Galilean transformations,
does not precede e1.” He thus allows events to be simultaneous with their Giulini (2001, 660–662) shows that standard Galilean (i.e., pre-relativistic)
causes, and consequently the range of Reichenbach's ε is extended to simultaneity is the unique absolute simultaneity relation. Then taking Aut
include both 0 and 1. Ben-Yami's causal relation is not time-symmetric, to be the inhomogeneous Lorentz transformations (also known as the
which is his reason for rejecting the requirement of invariance under Poincaré transformations), Giulini (2001, 664–666) shows that there is no
temporal reflections. He concludes (Ben-Yami 2006, 469-470) that, with absolute simultaneity relation and that standard Einsteinian synchrony is
his modified causal relation, there are “infinitely many possible the unique relative simultaneity when X is taken to be a foliation of

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spacetime by straight lines (thus, like Malament, singling out a specific returned to that observer at an earlier time, thus leading to possible causal
inertial frame, but in a way that is different from Malament's choice of X). anomalies.

5. Other Considerations A claim that no value of ε other than 1/2 is mathematically possible has
been put forward by Zangari (1994). He argues that spin-1/2 particles
Since the conventionality thesis rests upon the existence of a fastest causal (e.g., electrons) must be represented mathematically by what are known as
signal, the existence of arbitrarily fast causal signals would undermine the complex spinors, and that the transformation properties of these spinors
thesis. If we leave aside the question of causality, for the moment, the are not consistent with the introduction of nonstandard coordinates
possibility of particles (called tachyons) moving with arbitrarily high (corresponding to values of ε other than 1/2). Gunn and Vetharaniam
velocities is consistent with the mathematical formalism of special (1995), however, present a derivation of the Dirac equation (the
relativity (see, for example, Feinberg 1967). Just as the speed of light in fundamental equation describing spin-1/2 particles) using coordinates that
vacuum is an upper limit to the possible speeds of ordinary particles are consistent with arbitrary synchrony. They argue that Zangari
(sometimes called bradyons), it would be a lower limit to the speeds of mistakenly required a particular representation of space-time points as the
tachyons. When a transformation is made to a different inertial frame of only one consistent with the spinorial description of spin-1/2 particles.
reference, the speeds of both bradyons and tachyons change (the speed of
Another argument for standard synchrony has been given by Ohanian
light in vacuum being the only invariant speed). At any instant, the speed
(2004), who bases his considerations on the laws of dynamics. He argues
of a bradyon can be transformed to zero and the speed of a tachyon can be
that a nonstandard choice of synchrony introduces pseudoforces into
transformed to an infinite value. The statement that a bradyon is moving
Newton's second law, which must hold in the low-velocity limit of special
forward in time remains true in every inertial frame (if it is true in one),
relativity; that is, it is only with standard synchrony that net force and
but this is not so for tachyons. Feinberg (1967) argues that this does not
acceleration will be proportional. Macdonald (2005) defends the
lead to violations of causality through the exchange of tachyons between
conventionality thesis against this argument in a fashion analagous to the
two uniformly moving observers because of ambiguities in the
argument used by Salmon (mentioned above in the first paragraph of the
interpretation of the behavior of tachyon emitters and absorbers, whose
second section of this article) against the use of the law of conservation of
roles can change from one to the other under the transformation between
momentum to define simultaneity: Macdonald says, in effect, that it is a
inertial frames. He claims to resolve putative causal anomalies by
convention to require Newton's laws to take their standard form.
adopting the convention that each observer describes the motion of each
tachyon interacting with that observer's apparatus in such a way as to Many of the arguments against conventionality involve viewing the
make the tachyon move forward in time. However, all of Feinberg's preferred simultaneity relation as an equivalence relation that is invariant
examples involve motion in only one spatial dimension. Pirani (1970) has under an appropriate transformation group. Mamone Capria (2012) has
given an explicit two-dimensional example in which Feinberg's examined the interpretation of simultaneity as an invariant equivalence
convention is satisfied but a tachyon signal is emitted by an observer and relation in great detail, and argues that it does not have any bearing on the

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question of whether or not simultaneity is conventional in special Anderson, R., I. Vetharaniam, and G. Stedman, 1998. “Conventionality of
relativity. Synchronisation, Gauge Dependence and Test Theories of
Relativity,” Physics Reports, 295: 93–180.
A vigorous defense of conventionality has been offered by Rynasiewicz Augustine, St., Confessions, translated by E.J. Sheed, Indianapolis:
(2012). He argues that his approach “has the merit of nailing the exact Hackett Publishing Co., 2nd edition, 2006.
sense in which simultaneity is conventional. It is conventional in precisely Ben-Yami, H., 2006. “Causality and Temporal Order in Special
the same sense in which the gauge freedom that arises in the general Relativity,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57: 459–
theory of relativity makes the choice between diffeomorphically related 479.
models conventional.” He begins by showing that any choice of a Brehme, R., 1985. “Response to ‘The Conventionality of
simultaneity relation is equivalent to a choice of a velocity in the equation Synchronization’,” American Journal of Physics, 53: 56–59.
for local time in H.A. Lorentz's Versuch theory (Lorentz 1895). Then, Brehme, R., 1988. “On the Physical Reality of the Isotropic Speed of
beginning with Minkowski space with the standard Minkowski metric, he Light,” American Journal of Physics, 56: 811–813.
introduces a diffeomorphism in which each point is mapped to a point Bridgman, P., 1962. A Sophisticate's Primer of Relativity. Middletown:
with the same spatial coordinates, but the temporal coordinate is that of a Wesleyan University Press.
Lorentzian local time expressed in terms of the velocity as a parameter. Debs, T. and M. Redhead, 2007. Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention:
This mapping is not an isometry, for the light cones are tilted, which Symmetry in Physical Science, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
corresponds to anisotropic light propagation. He proceeds to argue, using University Press.
the hole argument (see, for example, Earman and Norton 1987) as an Earman, J. and J. Norton, (1987). “What Price Spacetime Substantivalism?
analogy, that this parametric freedom is just like the gauge freedom of The Hole Story,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38:
general relativity. As the tilting of the light cones, if projected into a single 515–525.
spatial dimension, would be equivalent to a choice of Reichenbach's ε, it Eddington, A., 1924. The Mathematical Theory of Relativity, 2nd edition,
seems that Rynasiewicz's argument is a generalization and more Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
completely argued version of the argument given by Janis that is Einstein, A., 1905. “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper,” Annalen der
mentioned above in the third paragraph of Section 4. Physik, 17: 891–921. English translations in The Principle of
Relativity, New York: Dover, 1952, pp. 35–65; and in J. Stachel (ed.),
The debate about conventionality of simultaneity seems far from settled,
Einstein's Miraculous Year, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
although some proponents on both sides of the argument might disagree
1998, pp. 123–160.
with that statement. The reader wishing to pursue the matter further should
Ellis, B. and P. Bowman, 1967. “Conventionality in Distant Simultaneity,”
consult the sources listed below as well as additional references cited in
Philosophy of Science, 34: 116–136.
those sources.
Feinberg, G., 1967. “Possibility of Faster-Than-Light Particles,” Physical
Review, 159: 1089–1105.
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