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Properties
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Stanford Encyclopedia Properties (also called ‘attributes,’ ‘qualities,’ ‘features,’ ‘characteristics,’

‘types’) are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other
of Philosophy words, attributed to them. For example, if we say that that thing over there
is an apple and is red, we are presumably attributing the properties red and
apple to it. Thus, properties can be characterized as predicables. Relations,
e.g., loving and between, can also be viewed as predicables and more
generally can be treated in many respects on a par with properties. Indeed,
they may even be viewed as kinds of properties. Accordingly, this entry
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
will discuss both properties and relations.
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Questions about the nature and existence of properties are nearly as old as
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philosophy itself. Interest in properties has ebbed and flowed over the
Library of Congress Catalog Data centuries, but they are now undergoing a resurgence. The last few decades
ISSN: 1095-5054
have seen a great deal of interesting work on properties, and this entry will
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content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the Philosophers who argue that properties exist almost always do so because
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, they think properties are needed to solve certain philosophical problems,
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . and their views about the nature of properties are strongly influenced by
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discussion here will be devoted to the tasks properties have been
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Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
Properties In §1 we introduce some distinctions and terminology that will be useful
Copyright c 2014 by the authors in subsequent discussion. In §2 we clarify how properties can be appealed
Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia
to in providing ontological explanations. §3 contains a discussion of
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1
 Properties Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia

traditional attempts to use properties to explain phenomena in 7. Kinds of Properties

metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. §4 focuses on the 7.1 First-order vs. Higher-order Properties
three areas where contemporary philosophers have offered the most 7.2 Self-instantiation and Typed Properties
detailed accounts based on properties: philosophy of mathematics, the 7.3 Untyped Properties
semantics of natural languages, and topics in a more nebulous area that 7.4 Relations
might be called naturalistic ontology. We then turn to issues about the 7.5 Propositions
nature of properties, including their existence conditions (§5), their 7.6 Structured vs. Unstructured Properties
identity conditions (§6), and the various sorts of properties there might be 7.7 Instantiation
(§7). §8 provides an introductory, informal discussion of formal theories 7.8 Sortal vs. non-sortal Properties
of properties. 7.9 Genus and Species
7.10 Determinables and Determinates
1. Distinctions and Terminology 7.11 Natural Kinds
1.1 Properties: Basic Ideas 7.12 Purely Qualitative Properties
1.2 Talking about Properties 7.13 Essential Properties and Internal Relations
2. Why Think that Properties Exist? 7.14 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties
2.1 Recourse to Properties in Ontological Explanations 7.15 Primary vs. Secondary Properties
2.2 Some Crucial Problems 7.16 Supervenient and Emergent Properties
3. Traditional Explanations: An Unscientific Survey 7.17 Linguistic Types
3.1 Resemblance and Recurrence 7.18 Categorical Properties vs. Causal Powers
3.2 Recognition of New and Novel Instances 8. Formal Theories of Properties
3.3 The Meaning of General Terms Bibliography
4. What have you done for us lately? Recent Explanations Academic Tools
4.1 Mathematics Other Internet Resources
4.2 Semantics and Logical Form Related Entries
4.3 Naturalistic Ontology
4.4 Lessons about Properties
5. Existence Conditions 1. Distinctions and Terminology
5.1 Minimalism
5.2 Maximalism 1.1 Properties: Basic Ideas
5.3 Centrism
5.4 Dualitarianism Not all philosophers acknowledge properties in their ontological inventory
6. Identity Conditions and even those who agree that properties exist often disagree about which

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properties there are. This means that it is difficult to find wholly 1.1.1 Predication and exemplification
uncontroversial examples of properties. For example, someone might
claim that apple is a natural kind and that natural kinds are not properties We have talked above in a way that might give the impression that
(Summerford 2003). predication is an activity that we perform, e.g., when we say or think that a
certain apple is red. Although some philosophers might think of it in this
Once properties are accepted, however, one would typically say that they way, predication is typically viewed as a special link that connects a
characterize objects or, conversely, that objects instantiate or exemplify property to a thing in a way that gives rise to a proposition, understood as
them (as we shall see in more detail in the next section). To illustrate, if a complex featuring the property and the thing as constituents with
apple is recognized as a property, it is a property that characterizes all different roles: the latter occurs as logical subject or argument, as is often
apples. said, and the former as attributed to such an argument. A proposition is
also typically viewed as a mind-independent entity that exists whether we
A fundamental question about properties—second only in importance to think of it or not and that may be true or false. If true (the predication is
the question whether there are any—is whether they are universals or veridical), the argument instantiates (exemplifies) the property and is
particulars. To say that properties are universals is to say that the selfsame called an instance of that property. For example, if there is a red apple, the
property can be instantiated by numerically distinct things, at least in proposition in which the apple occurs as logical subject and the property
typical cases. (Exceptions are unexemplifiable properties, e.g., round and red as attributed to it is veridical; the apple thus exemplifies this property
square, and properties that can only be exemplified by a single thing, e.g., and is an instance of it. It is often assumed nowadays that, when an object
identical to Socrates.) On this view it is possible for two different apples exemplifies a property, there is a further (complex) entity, a state of
to exemplify exactly the same color, a single universal. The competing affairs, having the property (or perhaps some counterpart of it in the
view is that properties are just as much individuals or particulars as natural world; see §5.4) and the object as constituents (Armstrong 1997);
concrete things such as apples and desks. No matter how similar the colors states of affairs are typically taken to fulfill the theoretical roles of
of two apples, their colors are numerically distinct properties, the redness truthmakers (the entities that make true propositions true) and causal relata
of the first apple and the redness of the second. Such individualized (the entities connected by causal relations). Not all philosophers, however,
properties are variously known as ‘perfect particulars,’ ‘abstract distinguish between propositions and states of affairs; Russell (1903)
particulars,’ ‘quality instances,’ ‘moments,’ and ‘tropes.’ Tropes have acknowledges only propositions and, for a recent example, so does Gaskin
various attractions and liabilities, but since they are the topic of another (2008).
entry, here we will construe properties as universals and limit ourselves to
a few clarificatory remarks on tropes in §1.1.2. We thus presuppose a Properties are also often characterized as exemplifiables. But this
fundamental distinction between universals and particulars. This is terminology must be handled with care, because of the controversial issue
typically accepted by supporters of universals, but is not uncontroversial of the existence of properties that cannot be instantiated, e.g., round and
(MacBride 2005). square. Other matters of controversy are whether properties can exist at all
without being exemplified and whether some properties can be

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exemplified by other properties (in the way, perhaps, that redness 1997 and Maurin 2002). In order to better clarify how differently they see
exemplifies the property of being a color). There is almost universal matters, we may take advantage of the notion of state of affairs that we
consensus, however, on the idea that only properties can be predicated and have just introduced. Both parties may agree, say, that there are two red
exemplified. For example, ordinary objects like apples and chairs cannot apples, a and b. They will immediately disagree, however, for the
be predicated of, and are not exemplified by, anything. universalist will add (a) that there are two distinct states of affairs, that a is
red and that b is red, (b) that the former has a and the universal red as
It is typically assumed that there is just one kind of predication and we constituents, and (c) that the latter also has the universal red as constituent
will stick to this view here. It should be noted, however, that according to (and differs from the former only by having b rather than a as additional
some philosophers who have revived Meinong's account of nonexistent constituent). The tropist will rejoinder that there are no such states of
objects, there are two modes of predication, sometimes characterized as affairs and universals and rather urge that there are entities such as the
‘external’ and ‘internal’ (Castañeda 1972; Rapaport 1978; Zalta 1983). redness of a and the redness of b, i.e., two distinct tropes. Tropes are
Zalta (1983) traces back the distinction to Mally and uses understood as simple entities, but the little exchange that we have just
‘exemplification’ to characterize the former and ‘encoding’ to characterize imagined suggests that they are meant to play a theoretical role analogous
the latter. Roughly, the idea is that a Meinongian object such as the to the one that the universalist would invoke for complex entities, i.e.,
winged horse is, in Zalta's terminology, an abstract object that encodes the states of affairs. Hence, tropists typically claim that tropes can be causal
properties winged and horse, but does not exemplify them; such properties relata (Williams 1953) and truthmakers (Mulligan, Simons and Smith
can only be exemplified by concrete objects such as birds and horses in 1984).
the spatiotemporal realm. These concrete objects do not encode properties
at all, they can only exemplify them. In contrast, abstract objects can That tropes, in spite of their simplicity, can play the role of states of
exemplify some properties, e.g., abstract or thought by someone. Other affairs, depends on the fact that universals combine two theoretical roles,
Meinongians have kept predication univocal and have rather invoked a only one of which is fulfilled by tropes. On the one hand, universals are
distinction between two kinds of properties: ‘nuclear,’ such as red and characterizers, inasmuch as they characterize concrete objects. On the
round and ‘extra-nuclear’ such as existent and thought by someone other hand, they are also unifiers, to the extent that different concrete
(Parsons 1980). objects may be characterized by the very same universal, which is thus
somehow shared by all of them; when this is the case, there is, according
1.1.2 Universals vs. Tropes to the universalist, an objective similarity among the different objects (see
§3.1). In contrast, tropes are only characterizers, for they cannot be shared
Although, according to some philosophers, universals and tropes may by distinct concrete objects. Given its dependency on one specific object,
coexist in one ontological framework (Lowe 2006), nowadays they are say, the apple a, a trope can do the work of a state of affairs with a as
typically seen as alternatives, with the typical supporter of universals constituent. But for tropes to play this role, the tropist will have to pay a
(‘universalist’) trying to do without tropes and the typical supporter of price and introduce additional theoretical machinery to account for
tropes (‘tropist’) trying to dispense with universals (see, e.g., Armstrong objective similarities among concrete objects. To this end, she will

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typically resort to the idea that there are objective resemblances among For example, the predicates ‘red’ and ‘smaller than’ are monadic and
tropes, which can then be grouped together in resemblance classes. These dyadic, respectively.
resemblance classes play the role of unifiers for the tropist. Hence, from
the tropist's point of view ‘property’ is ambiguous, since it may stand for Relations generate a few special problems of their own, but for the most
the characterizers (tropes) or for the unifiers (resemblance classes) (in the part properties and relations raise the same philosophical issues. For
terminology of §6.4 of the entry on mental causation). Similarly, relations can also be considered predicable and exemplifiable entities,
‘exemplification’ and related words may be regarded as ambiguous insofar although, at least in typical cases, they are attributed simultaneously not to
as they can be used either to indicate that an object exemplifies a certain single objects, but to a plurality of objects. These objects can be said to
trope or to indicate that the object relates to a certain resemblance class by jointly instantiate the relation in question, if the attribution is veridical (in
virtue of exemplifying a trope in that class. which case, one may add, the objects, i.e., the relata, and the relation are
constituents of a state of affairs). Thus, except where otherwise noted or
The disagreement between the universalist and the tropist is operative at a where the context indicates otherwise, we will use ‘property’ as a generic
very basic ontological level. One may wonder however whether term to cover both monadic (one-place, nonrelational) properties and
divergencies at this foundational layer have some impact on more specific (polyadic, multi-place) relations (i.e., properties of degree higher than
philosophical issues and indeed it has been claimed that this is the case in one).
philosophy of mind, in particular as regards mental causation and the
tenability of reductive physicalism (Robb 1997; §6.4 of the entry on 1.1.4 Properties vs. Sets
mental causation; Gozzano & Orilia 2008).
Properties are often compared to sets and sometimes even assimilated to
1.1.3 Properties and Relations them. Just as properties can have instances, sets can have members, and it
is typically assumed that, given a property, there is a corresponding set,
Properties are usually distinguished from relations. For example, a specific called the extension of the property, having as members exactly those
shade of red or a rest mass of 3 kilograms is a property, while being things that exemplify the property. But it is important to note a
smaller than or between are typically regarded as relations. Relations are fundamental difference between the two. Sets have clear-cut identity
usually taken to have a ‘degree’ (‘adicity’, ‘arity’), which depends on the conditions: they are identical when they have exactly the same members.
number of objects that they can relate, or, to put it otherwise (somewhat In contrast, the identity conditions of properties are a matter of dispute.
metaphorically), on the number of ‘places’ they come with. They are thus Everyone who believes there are properties at all, however, agrees that
called ‘dyadic’ (‘two-place’), ‘triadic’ (‘three-place’), and so forth, numerically distinct properties can have exactly the same instances
depending on their degree. For example, being smaller than and between without being identical. Even if it turns out that exactly the same things
are usually viewed as dyadic (of degree 2) and triadic (of degree 3), exemplify a given shade of green and circularity, these two properties are
respectively. In line with this classification, properties can be called still distinct. For these reasons sets are called extensional and properties
‘monadic’ (of degree 1). This terminology is also applied to predicates. are often said to be intensional entities. Precisely because of their

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intensional nature properties were dismissed by Quine (1956) as ‘creatures Philosophers do not have a settled idiom for talking about properties.
of darkness’ and just a few decades ago many philosophers concurred with Often they make do with a simple distinction between singular terms and
him. But philosophers now widely invoke properties without guilt or predicates. Singular terms are words and phrases that can occupy subject
shame. positions in sentences and that purport to denote or refer to a single thing.
Examples include proper names like ‘Bill Clinton’ and ‘Chicago,’ definite
1.1.5 Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism descriptions like ‘the first female Supreme Court Justice’ and indexicals or
demonstratives like ‘I’ or ‘that.’ Predicates, by contrast, can be true of
The deepest question about properties is whether there are any. Textbooks things and are usually taken to express, or (as some friends of properties
feature a triumvirate of answers: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism. may say) denote, a property. Expressions such as ‘is a philosopher,’ ‘is
There are many species of each view, but the rough distinctions come to wise,’ ‘walks,’ ‘loves’ and the like are typically considered predicates.
this. Realists hold that there are universal properties, understood as mind- When we represent a sentence like ‘Quine is a philosopher’ in a standard
independent entities. Nominalists deny this (though some hold that there formal language as ‘P(q),’ we absorb the entire expression ‘is a
are tropes). And conceptualists urge that words (like ‘honesty’) which philosopher’ into the predicate ‘P’. There is dispute over whether ‘is a
might seem to refer to properties really refer to concepts, understood as philosopher’ as a whole expresses a property or it is rather ‘philosopher’
mind-dependent entities. Nominalism and conceptualism often come by itself that does. Frege viewed the meanings of predicates as
together and often are assimilated to the extent that they both involve a ‘unsaturated,’ as somehow endowed with ‘holes’ that have to be filled by
non-realist stance about universals. Such a stance is typically coupled with meanings of singular terms to generate thoughts. Philosophers who are
an attempt to reduce universals to other entities such as sets or classes of influenced by Frege in this respect tend to prefer the former option. Others
their instances or, as Lewis (1986) has proposed, to sets of all their are more inclined to prefer the latter and regard the copula ‘is’ as the
possible instances. The former option suffers from notorious problems expression of an exemplification link (Strawson 1959; Bergmann 1960).
(Armstrong 1978). The latter can hardly be disentangled from Lewis's For these philosophers it might be more appropriate to consider
realism about possible worlds; it is thus unpalatable to most philosophers ‘philosopher’ and ‘wise’ as predicates. It will be convenient for us to use
and affected by its own technical problems (Egan 2004). ‘predicate’ for expressions of both kinds and view all of them as ways of
expressing properties.
A few contemporary philosophers have defended conceptualism (cf.
Cocchiarella 1986, ch. 3; 2007), and recent empirical work on concepts Predicates can be nominalized by means of appropriate suffixes such as ‘-
bears on it, but it is not a common view nowadays. Nominalism has many ity’ or ‘-ness,’ or via gerundive or infinitive phrases. Nominalization
supporters, but the pros and cons of its various forms are treated generates singular terms that at least prima facie denote properties. For
extensively in other entries (e.g., nominalism in metaphysics and tropes). example, ‘triangular’ and ‘is triangular’ can be turned into ‘triangularity’
We will then focus on realism here (but see §5.1). and ‘being triangular’; ‘drunk’ and ‘is drunk’ into ‘drunkness,’ ‘being
drunk’ or ‘to be drunk’; ‘gives’ and ‘gives a kiss to Mary’ into ‘giving’
1.2 Talking about Properties
and ‘to give a kiss to Mary’ (some think that ‘being F’ and ‘F-ness’ stand

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for different kinds of property (Levinson 1991), but we will not pursue 2.1 Recourse to Properties in Ontological Explanations
this line here). It seems also possible to have definite descriptions and
perhaps even indexicals that refer to properties. If Mary happens to prefer Properties are typically introduced to help explain or account for
wisdom to any other property ‘Mary's favorite property’ seemingly refers phenomena of philosophical interest, especially in doing ontology. The
to wisdom. Moreover, though more controversially, if someone points to a existence of properties, we are told, would explain qualitative recurrence
red object while saying: ‘that shade of red is a beautiful color,’ then the or help account for our ability to agree about the instances of general
demonstrative ‘that shade of red’ denotes a property (Heal 1997). terms like ‘red.’ In the terminologies of bygone eras, properties save the
phenomena; they afford a fundamentum in re for things like the
Frege (1892) and Russell (1903) had different opinions regarding the applicability of general terms. Nowadays philosophers make a similar
ontological import of nominalization. According to the former, point when they argue that some phenomenon holds because of or in
nominalized predicates stand for a ‘correlate’ of the unsaturated entity that virtue of this or that property, that a property is its foundation or ground,
the predicate stands for (in Frege's terminology they are a ‘concept or that a property is the truthmaker for a sentence about it. These
correlate’ and a ‘concept,’ respectively). According to the latter, who expressions signify explanations (for a defense of the legitimacy of
speaks of ‘inextricable difficulties’ in Frege's view (Russell 1903, 45), ontological explanations, cf. Swoyer 1999; for qualms about an
they stand for exactly the same entity. Mutatis mutandis, they had the explanatory recourse to properties, see Quine 1961, 10; Quinton 1973,
same difference of opinion regarding singular terms such as ‘Mary's 295).
favorite property.’ There is some prima facie grammatical evidence in
favor of Frege's view: it is perfectly grammatical to say ‘Monica is honest’ In seeking explanations in ontology (as in other disciplines) we must
or ‘Honesty is a virtue,’ but your old English teacher will cringe if you say frequently weigh tradeoffs between various desiderata, e.g., between
‘Honest is a virtue’ or ‘Monica is honesty.’ But it is not clear that simplicity and comprehensiveness, and even between different kinds of
ontological conclusions can be drawn from grammar here or that other simplicity. But one tradeoff is so pervasive that it deserves a name, and we
compelling reasons can be found (see Parsons 1986 for a good will call it the fundamental ontological tradeoff. The fundamental
discussion); moreover, it would be desirable to avoid multiplying entities ontological tradeoff reflects the perennial tension between explanatory
and semantic relations beyond necessity (distinguishing properties and power and epistemic risk, between a rich, lavish ontology that promises to
their correlates on the one hand and denoting and expressing on the other explain a great deal and a more modest ontology that promises
hand). And so here we will be fairly cavalier about property terms, using epistemological security. The more machinery we postulate, the more we
terms such as ‘honesty’ and ‘honest’ indifferently to refer to (express) the might hope to explain—but the harder it is to believe in the existence of all
same property. It should be noted, however, that some philosophers still the machinery. As we shall see in the following, the inevitability of this
support Frege's view or at least take it very seriously (see Cocchiarella tradeoff keeps playing a crucial role in current discussions of properties.
1986 and Landini 2008).
2.2 Some Crucial Problems
2. Why Think that Properties Exist?

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Any explanation that appeals to properties must be prepared to confront think, may show that the very notion of a Form is incoherent (Parmenides,
perennial objections to them. What are perhaps the three most pressing 132ff). But it is not clear why we should hold that all properties exemplify
ones were somehow evoked by Plato (worrying about his own doctrines) themselves (Armstrong 1978, 71). For instance, why should we think that
in the Parmenides. honesty itself is honest? Russell's paradox, however, raises more serious
worries about self-exemplification and no satisfactory account of
First, it appears that a universal property can be in two completely properties can ignore it.
different places (i.e., in two different instances) at the same time, but
ordinary things can never be separated from themselves in this way. There Third, the very idea of a property's being instantiated seems to generate an
are scattered individuals (like the former British Empire), but they have infinite regress that bears some analogy to the one exhibited in Plato's
different spatial parts in different places. Properties, by contrast, do not third man argument. It is known as Bradley's regress. Many critics have
seem to have spatial parts; indeed, they are sometimes said to be wholly- charged that it is vicious and the debate on this issue is still running.
present in each of their instances. But how could a single thing be wholly
present in widely separated locations? 3. Traditional Explanations: An Unscientific Survey
This conundrum has worried some philosophers so much that they have The above difficulties leave the situation murkier than we would wish.
opted for an ontology of tropes in order to avoid it, but realists have two Nevertheless, properties keep being invoked to explain a very wide range
lines of reply (both of which commit us to fairly definite views about the of phenomena. Insofar as each of the explanations is plausible, it serves as
nature of properties). One response is that properties are not located in part of a cumulative case for the existence of properties. To fix ideas, we
their instances (or anywhere else), so they are never located in two places will note several of the most common explanations philosophers have
at once. The other response is that this objection wrongly judges properties asked properties to provide (for a longer list see Swoyer 1999, §3).
by standards that are only appropriate for individuals. Properties are a very
different sort of entity, and they can exist in more than one place at the 3.1 Resemblance and Recurrence
same time without needing spatial parts to do so.
There are objective similarities or groupings in the world. Some things are
Second, there are perplexities raised by self-exemplification. Surely, some alike in certain ways. They have the same color or shape or size; they are
properties seem to exemplify themselves. For example, if properties are protons or lemons or central processing units. A puzzle, sometimes called
abstract objects, then the property of being abstract should itself exemplify the problem of the one over the many, asks for an account of this.
the property of being abstract. In various passages throughout his Possession of a common property (e.g., a given shade of yellow) or a
dialogues Plato however appears to hold that all properties exemplify common constellation of properties (e.g., those essential to lemons) has
themselves, when he claims that Forms (which are often taken to be his often been cited to explain such resemblance. Similarly, different groups
version of properties) participate in themselves. This claim serves as a of things, e.g., Bill and Hillary, George and Barbara, can be related in
premise in what is known as his third man argument which, he seems to similar ways, and the postulation of a relation (here being married to) that

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the members of each group jointly instantiate is often cited to explain this metaphysical weight to the distinction between expressing (predicates) and
similarity. Finally, having different properties, e.g., different colors, is referring (singular terms), questions about the meanings (now often known
often said to explain qualitative differences. A desire to explain qualitative as the ‘semantic values’) of singular terms like ‘honesty’ and ‘hunger’ and
similarity and qualitative difference has been a traditional motivation for ‘being in love’ may be even more pressing. Since the chief task of singular
realism with respect to universals, and it continues to motivate many terms is to refer to things, the semantic values of ‘honesty,’ ‘hunger’ and
realists today (e.g., Butchvarov 1966; Aaron 1967, ch. 9; Armstrong 1984, the like are presumably the things they refer to. But what could a word
250). like ‘honesty’ refer to? If there are properties, it could refer to the property
honesty.
3.2 Recognition of New and Novel Instances
4. What Have you Done for Us Lately? Recent
Many organisms easily recognize and classify newly encountered objects
as yellow or round or lemons or rocks, they can recognize that one new
Explanations
thing is larger than a second, and so on. Some philosophers have urged
In addition to the traditional ones discussed above, there are other tasks for
that this ability is based partly on the fact that the novel instances have a
which properties have been invoked. Especially well known is the old and
property that the organism has encountered before—the old and new cases
venerable attempt, known as bundle theory, to reduce particulars to
share a common property—and that the creature is somehow attuned to
properties linked together by an appropriate relation, which Russell (1948,
recognize it.
Pt. IV, ch. 8) called compresence. In spite of well-known problems (Van
3.3 The Meaning of General Terms Cleve 1985) this view keeps having supporters (Casullo 1988). More
recently, it has also been proposed that possible worlds can be reduced to
Our ability to use general terms (like ‘yellow,’ ‘lemon,’ ‘heavier than,’ properties (Forrest 1986) or that fictional characters can be viewed as
and ‘between’) provides a linguistic counterpart to the epistemological properties (Orilia 2006).
phenomenon of recognition and to the metaphysical problem of the One
Leaving these issues aside, we shall however concentrate on three areas
over the Many. Most general terms apply to some things but not to others,
where properties are often invoked today: philosophy of mathematics,
and in many cases competent speakers have little trouble knowing when
semantics (the theory of meaning), and naturalistic ontology. These areas
they apply and when they do not. Philosophers have often argued that
are useful to consider, because if properties can explain things of interest
possession of a common property (like redness), together with certain
to philosophers who don't specialize in metaphysics, things like
linguistic conventions, explains why general terms apply to the things that
mathematical truth or the nature of natural laws, then properties will seem
they do. For example, Plato noted that ‘we are in the habit of postulating
more interesting. Unlike the substantial forms derided by early modern
one unique Form for each plurality of objects to which we apply a
philosophers as dormitive virtues, properties will pay their way by doing
common name’ (Republic, 596A; see also Phaedo, 78e; Timaeus, 52a;
interesting and important work.
Parmenides, 13; and Russell 1912, 93). At least for those who attach

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4.1 Mathematics reduced to logic (Bealer 1982; Cocchiarella 1986a; Orilia 2000). Logicism
of course raises the difficult issue of what exactly counts as logic and not
Philosophers of mathematics have focused much of their attention on all identificationists embrace it (Pollard and Martin 1986). In any case,
number theory (arithmetic). Number theory is just the theory of the natural once numbers are identified with properties, we can explain various things
numbers, 0, 1, 2, …, and the familiar operations (like addition and of philosophical interest about truths of arithmetic. They can be
multiplication) on them. Many sentences of arithmetic, e.g. ‘7 + 5 = 12,’ objectively true, because they describe an objective realm of mind-
certainly seem to be true, but such truths present various philosophical independent properties. Moreover, given that the properties identified with
puzzles and philosophers have tried to explain how they could have the numbers are ones that exist necessarily, and that they necessarily stand in
features they seem to have, in particular that they are objective, necessary their arithmetical relations, the truths of arithmetic will be necessarily true,
and knowable a priori. as one should expect.

Most attempts to use properties to explain these features are versions of However, taken alone, property-based identificationism does not explain
identificationism, the reductionist strategy that identifies numbers with mathematical knowledge and substantive auxiliary hypotheses about
things that initially seem to be different. This approach is familiar from the human cognitive faculties are presumably needed. Identificationists
original versions of identificationism, where numbers were identified with typically propose to identify numbers with putative objects that lie outside
sets, but it is straightforward to adapt this earlier work to identify numbers the spatio-temporal, causal order. As argued by Benacerraf (1973),
with properties rather than with sets. however, since we are physical organisms living in a spatio-temporal
world, it is not clear how we can interact causally (or in any other
The most compelling defense of the use of properties in the philosophy of
discernible way) with abstract, causally inert things so as to have
mathematics urges that, when we step back and consider the big picture,
epistemic access to them. A few philosophers, e.g., Linsky & Zalta (1995),
we see that a rich-enough stock of properties can do all the work of sets
have taken this problem seriously and proposed solutions that do not
and numbers (or that we can use them to define sets and numbers) and that
involve mysterious cognitive faculties. Others have even argued that
properties can do further things that sets simply cannot. For example, it
certain universals can play the role of sense-data and should thus be
has been argued that properties can be used to give accounts of the
considered objects of perception (Forrest 2005). Philosophers remain
semantics of English or explain the nature of natural laws. The appeal of
divided on this issue, but it is safe to say that if the problem of epistemic
sets, in short, results from a metaphysical myopia, but, once we adopt a
access cannot be overcome, it in turn undermines identificationist attempts
larger view of things, we find that properties provide the best global,
to use properties to explain arithmetic truth. Here we face the fundamental
overall explanation.
ontological tradeoff: A richer ontology offers to explain many things that
The identification of numbers with properties has sometimes been offered might otherwise be mysterious. But in the view of many philosophers, it
in an attempt to resurrect logicism, roughly the thesis, championed by engenders epistemological mysteries of its own.
Frege and Russell, that classical mathematics, or at least arithmetic, can be
Some recent accounts identify numbers with properties that seem less

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other-worldly than those invoked by mainstream identificationists such as objects of the appropriate sort.
those mentioned above. For example, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990) argue
that rational numbers are higher-order relations—ratios—among certain Structuralist accounts avoid Benacerraf's problem. They may also make
kinds of first-order relations. the epistemology of mathematics slightly less puzzling, since many
structural or pattern-like properties can be instantiated in the things we
The gravest threats to identificationism are posed by what might be called perceive (we perceive such properties when we recognize a melody played
the Benacerraf problem. As Benacerraf (1965) noted, if there is one way in different keys, for example). But they cannot deliver explanations of the
to identify the natural numbers with sets, there are countless ways, e.g., truth conditions and logical forms of arithmetical sentences that are as
Frege's, Zermelo's, von Neumann's, etc. There is a similar arbitrariness in straightforward as those provided by identificationist accounts since they
any particular identification of numbers with properties (as the fact that don't offer us any objects to serve as the referents of the numerals.
different property theorists identify numbers with different properties
shows). Authors who defend such accounts are aware of these difficulties 4.2 Semantics and Logical Form
and some have proposed various responses to them, but the problems are
Language and logic have long been an important source of data for
serious and no solutions are generally accepted.
ontologists. Many philosophers have contented themselves with fairly
There are also several non-identificationist accounts of mathematical truth informal appeals to various features of language to support their claim that
that make use of properties. properties exist, but in the last two decades some philosophers (along with
a few linguists and even computer scientists) have employed properties as
Linsky and Zalta (1995) develop a novel account of mathematical truth parts of detailed accounts of the semantics of large fragments of natural
(further developed in Zalta 1999; 2000). It is based on Zalta's (1983; 1988) languages like English or Choctaw, and some of these accounts contain
theory of abstract objects, a theory designed to explain a wide range of the most detailed formal theories of properties ever devised. Some
phenomena, which is particularly relevant here because it is developed property theorists are motivated almost exclusively by a desire to give a
alongside a rich formal account of properties. semantic account of natural language (e.g., Chierchia and Turner 1988),
others hold that this is but one of several motivations for developing an
Structuralists (often inspired by Benacerraf 1965) argue that any omega-
account of properties (e.g., Bealer 1982; Zalta 1988) (but it should be
sequence (roughly, any sequence of discrete entities structurally analogous
noted that still others, e.g., Jubien 1989; Armstrong 1997; Mellor 1991,
to the series 0, 1, 2, …) can play the role of the natural numbers (cf.
180ff doubt that properties have any serious role to play in semantics at
Resnik 1997). They claim that it's the structure that such sequences have
all).
in common, rather than the particular entities that happen to populate
them, that is important for mathematics. And one way to develop this idea The basic idea that motivates this work is the following. If we allow for a
is to think of the property of being an omega-sequence as a very complex rich-enough stock of properties, we can provide a semantic value for every
relational property that could be instantiated by actual sequences of predicate and abstract singular term of English (or at least for those that

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could have a semantic value without leading to paradox) and thus account complex predicates: ‘Tom is a boring but honest brother of Sam’ is
for many linguistic phenomena. straightforwardly construed as containing a compound predicate, ‘is a
boring but honest brother of Sam,’ that is predicated of the noun
We explain the meanings of general terms like ‘honest’ by claiming that ‘Tom’ (and that could be predicated of other nouns too, e.g.,
they denote (or express) properties (like honesty), that a sentence like ‘Wilbur’). Other constructions are very naturally interpreted as
‘Tom is honest’ has the logical form of a simple subject-predicate complex singular terms (as in ‘Being a boring but honest brother of
sentence, and that it is true just in case the individual denoted by ‘Tom’ is Sam is no bed of roses’). Furthermore, these complex expressions are
in the extension of the property denoted (or expressed) by the predicate related to simpler expressions in systematic ways. For example, ‘Tom
‘honest,’ which requires that there be a property expressed by this is a boring but not dishonest brother of Sam’ should entail ‘Tom is
predicate (see Hochberg 1968 for a good discussion of related issues). not dishonest.’
2. English is full of intensional or intentional idioms like ‘necessarily,’
We can also argue that abstract singular terms like ‘honesty’ denote the
‘believes’ and ‘imagines’ that cannot be handled by any extensional
property that the associated predicate (‘honest’) denotes or expresses, that
semantics.
sentences like ‘Honesty is a virtue’ have the simple logical form of a
subject-predicate sentence, and that the sentence is true exactly when the In recent years a number of philosophers (e.g., Bealer 1982; 1994;
word ‘honesty’ denotes a property that is in the extension of the property Cocchiarella 1986; 2007; Zalta 1983; 1988; Chierchia & Turner 1988;
denoted by the verb phrase ‘is a virtue.’ Menzel 1993; Orilia 2000) have developed intricate accounts of properties
that deal with these phenomena. They include formal languages whose
Once we take these steps, it is also straightforward to explain the validity
semantics provide systematic ways of forming “compound” properties
of arguments such as ‘Clinton is self-indulgent; therefore, there is at least
(e.g., loving Darla) to serve as semantic values of complex predicates
one vice that Clinton has’: The logical form of the premise is that of a
(‘loves Darla’) or complex singular terms (‘loving Darla’). Moreover, they
simple subject-predicate sentence and the logical form of the conclusion is
appeal to propositions, which they treat as zero-place properties, to deal
that of an existential quantification with a standard objectual quantifier. If
with intensional and intentional idioms. For this to be done properly,
the first sentence is true, then ‘self-indulgent’ expresses a property, and
properties must be very finely individuated, probably as finely
this property (which can be assumed to have the property of being a vice)
individuated as the linguistic expressions that denote or express them. For
satisfies the open sentence ‘Clinton is X.’ Hence, just as in standard first-
example, Tom's grasp of logic may be so tenuous that he believes of
order logic, the existential quantification is true.
Ortcutt that he is a spy and an auditor for the IRS but doubts that he is an
There are some more complex phenomena that cannot be accounted for by auditor for the IRS and a spy. This is sometimes taken to suggest that
simply including properties in one's ontological inventory. They include being a spy and an auditor for the IRS is distinct from the (necessarily
the following: coextensive) property being an auditor for the IRS and a spy. To be sure,
few people are guilty of such blatant lapses, but we can certainly make
1. Various English constructions are quite naturally interpreted as mistakes when necessarily coextensive properties are described in more

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complicated ways (such errors are routine in mathematics and logic). Some philosophers have construed intensions as providing a reduction of
properties to intensions (properties are nothing over and above functions
On the plausible (though not inevitable) assumption that the structure of from the class of possible worlds to classes of objects). This view keeps
many of our thoughts is similar to the structure of the sentences we use to having supporters (see, e.g., Egan 2004). Given what we noted above,
describe the contents of those thoughts (‘Sam thinks Tom is boring but not however, it seems much better to view properties (including relations, and
dishonest’), we might also hope to use properties in an account of mental perhaps propositions) as irreducible entities.
content that would in many ways parallel an account of the semantics of
the more intensional fragments of English. Current property-based semantic theories do not accommodate vagueness.
This is a serious shortcoming, because vague predicates (like ‘bald’) and
The only serious alternative to the use of properties in formal semantics vague nominalizations (like ‘baldness’) are the rule rather than the
treats the semantic values of noun phrases and verb phrases as intensions. exception. Recent empirical work on concepts reinforces the point that
Intensions are functions that assign sets to predicates at each possible many concepts (and, with them, predicates) have a graded membership
world (or related set-theoretic devices that encode the same information). and goes on to stress the importance of phenomena like typicality. On
On such accounts, for example, the semantic value of ‘red’ is the function most current psychological accounts, concepts involve features and
that maps each possible world to the set of things in that world that are similarity relations. Since features (e.g., having feathers, having a beak)
red. Montague (1974) and linguists and philosophers inspired by his work are properties, there is no reason why current property theories could not
have devised systems based on this idea that have great elegance and be emended and extended to make contact with such accounts, and it
power. Nevertheless, finely individuated properties are more useful in seems likely that this will be a fruitful line of inquiry in the future (see
semantics than intensions because intensions are still too coarse-grained to Margolis & Laurence 1999 for a useful selection of papers on concepts).
explain many semantic phenomena involving intensional idioms. For
example, semantic accounts that employ intensions would most naturally 4.3 Naturalistic Ontology
treat ‘lasted a fortnight’ and ‘lasted two weeks’ as having the same
meaning (since they have the same intension), which makes it difficult for In recent years properties have played a central role in philosophical
such accounts to explain how ‘Tom believes the battle lasted two weeks, accounts of scientific realism, measurement, causation, dispositions, and
but does not believe that it lasted a fortnight’ could be true. Furthermore, natural laws. This is a less unified set of concerns than those encountered
intensions are unlikely to be able to perform tasks in areas outside in the previous two subsections, but it is still a clearly recognizable area,
semantics (like naturalistic ontology) that properties may be able to do. It and we will call it naturalistic ontology. Let us see how properties enter
is natural, for example, to suppose that things have the capacities that they the picture in this field.
do (e.g., the capacity to exert a force on a distant object) because of the
Even quite modest and selective versions of scientific realism are most
properties they possess (e.g., gravitational mass). But it seems most
easily developed with the aid of properties. Most importantly, this is so
unlikely that huge set-theoretic intensions would be able to explain things
because claims that appear to quantify over properties are common in
like this.

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science, as these examples show: explanations often proceed by citing properties of the things involved in
causal interactions. For example, electrons repel one another in the way
1. If one organism is fitter than a conspecific, then there is at least one that they do because they have the same charge.
property the first organism has that gives it a greater propensity to
reproduce than the second. In naturalistic ontology we often hear claims that one sort of thing is
2. There are many inherited characteristics, but there are no acquired reducible to a second or (more frequently nowadays) that one sort of thing
characteristics that are inherited. supervenes on another. Such claims make the best sense if we take them to
3. Properties and relations measured on an interval scale are invariant involve properties. For example the claim that the psychological realm
under positive linear transformations, but this isn't true of all supervenes on the physical realm involves mental and physical properties.
properties and relations measured on ordinal scales.
4. In a Newtonian world all fundamental properties are invariant under Some philosophers of science, most notably Feyerabend and Kuhn, argue
Galilean transformations, whereas the fundamental properties in a that theoretical terms such as ‘mass’ draw their meaning from the theories
special-relativistic world are those that are invariant under Lorentz within which they occur. Hence, they conclude, a change in theory causes
transformation. a shift in the meanings of all of its constituent terms, and so different
theories simply talk about different things, they are ‘incommensurable.’
No one has any idea how to paraphrase most of these claims in a non- The common realist rejoinder is that the reference of terms can remain the
quantificational idiom, and they certainly seem to assert (or deny) the same even when the surrounding theory shifts. But for this response to
existence of various sorts of properties. The claim that this is in fact work a theoretical term must refer to something, and the most plausible
precisely what they do explains how they can be meaningful and, in many candidate for this is a property.
cases, true.
Various features of measurement in science are most easily explained by
Many important properties invoked in science, like being a simple invoking properties. For example, estimates of the magnitude of
harmonic oscillator, being a gene, being an edge detector, or being a measurement error are typically reported along with measurement results.
belief, are often thought to be functional properties. To say that something Such talk makes little sense unless there is a fact about what a correct
exemplifies a functional property is, roughly, to say that there are certain measurement would be. But the very notion of correct measurement seems
properties that it exemplifies and that together they allow it to play a to imply that objects exemplify magnitude properties such as rest mass of
certain causal role. For example, DNA molecules have certain properties 4kg. Moreover, nowadays measurement units are often specified directly
that allow them to transmit genetic information in pretty much the way in terms of properties. For instance, we now specify the meter in terms of
described by Mendel's laws. Here again, we have quantifications over something that can in principle be instantiated anywhere in the world, e.g.,
properties that seem unavoidable. as the length equal to a certain number of wavelengths (in a vacuum) of a
particular color of light emitted by krypton 86 atoms (Mundy 1987;
Much explanation in science is causal explanation, and causal Swoyer 1987).

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Some philosophers have employed properties in reductive accounts of and accidentally true generalizations. N-relation theories were originally
causation (cf. Tooley 1987; Fales 1990). It would take us too far afield to devised to avoid perceived shortcomings of these earlier accounts, such as
explore this work here, but it is worth noting that it is never a single, their failure to account for the modal force and the objective character of
undifferentiated amorphous blob of an object (or blob of an event) that natural laws. Many laws seem to necessitate some things and to preclude
makes things happen. It is an object (or event) with properties. others. Pauli's exclusion principle requires that two fermions occupy
Furthermore, how it affects things depends on what these properties are. different quantum states and the laws of thermodynamics show the
The liquid in the glass causes the litmus paper to turn blue because the impossibility of perpetual motion machines. But, N-relation theorists
liquid is an alkaline (and not because the liquid also happens to be blue). insist, since regularity theorists forswear everything modal, they can never
This suggests that at least some properties are causal powers. account for the modal aspects of laws. Moreover, according to N-relation
theories, laws are objective because the N-relation relates those properties
Properties have played a central role in several recent accounts of natural it does quite independently of our language and thought (in the case of
laws. This is particularly evident in what we will call N-relation theories, properties that don't specifically involve our language or thought). By
according to which a natural law is a second-order relation of nomic contrast, the epistemic and pragmatic features used by regularity theorists
necessitation (N, for short) holding among two or more first-order to demarcate laws from accidental generalizations are too anthropocentric
properties. Hence the logical form of a statement of a simple law is not to account for the objectivity of laws.
‘All Fs are Gs’; in the case of a law involving two first-order properties, it
is a second-order atomic sentence of the form ‘N(F,G)’ (see, e.g., N-relation theories are not without difficulties (Van Fraassen 1989). First,
Armstrong 1978a; 1983; Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977). it is not clear how to extend N-relation accounts to deal with several
important kinds of laws, most prominently conservation laws and
In the more exact sciences the relevant first-order properties (our Fs and symmetry principles. Second, even in the case of laws that can be coaxed
Gs) will typically be determinate magnitudes like a kinetic energy of 1.6 × (or crammed) into the N-relation scheme, the account involves a highly
10−2 joule or a force of 1 newton or an electrical resistance of 12.3 ohms idealized notion whose connection to the things that go by the name ‘law’
(rather than mass or force or resistance simpliciter). Hence the laws in labs and research centers is rather remote (attempts to remove this gap
specified by an equation are really infinite families of specific laws. For typically rely on Cartwright 1983; 1989). However, if N-relation accounts
instance, Newton's second law tells us that each specific, determinate mass are on the right track, there is a reasonably rich realm of properties that is
m (a scalar, and so a monadic property) and total impressed force f (a structured by one or more nomic relations.
vector, and so a relational property) stand in the N-relation to the
appropriate relation (vector) of acceleration a (= f/m). The work discussed in this subsection suggests that properties include
determinate physical magnitudes like mass of 3.7 kg and electrical
The dominant accounts of laws during much of the last century were resistance of 7 ohms. Furthermore, such properties typically form families
regularity theories, according to which laws are simply contingent of ordered determinates (e.g., the family of determinate masses) that have
regularities and there is no metaphysical difference between genuine laws a definite algebraic structure (Mundy 1987; Swoyer 1987). It also suggests

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that a fundamental feature of at least many properties is that they confer What properties are there? Under what conditions does a property exist?
causal capacities on their instances. Work on naturalistic ontology doesn't These questions can hardly be disentangled from the issue of the identity
entail detailed answers to every question about the nature of properties, conditions for properties, to be discussed in the next section. Before
but it does suggest answers to some of them. turning to it, it will be useful to look at the array of views about the
existence conditions of properties as a continuum, with claims that the
4.4 Lessons About Properties realm of properties is sparse over on the right (conservative) end and
claims that it is abundant over on the left (liberal) end. Here we are
The material covered in the three previous subsections offers us some
following Lewis's (1986) well-known terminology, which acknowledges a
insights on the nature of properties. One can notice a fundamental way in
sparse and an abundant conception of properties. We will focus on three
which the general conception of properties that emerges from naturalistic
views in this continuum, the two extreme ones and another that holds a
ontology differs from many of the conceptions discussed in relation to
middle ground. We will then turn to a hybrid view that tries to combine
mathematics and semantics. On those earlier conceptions at least many
the two ends of the spectrum by admitting two radically distinct kinds of
properties are causally inert, other-worldly, abstract entities that exist
property.
outside space and time; they are timeless, necessary beings, and since we
cannot come into causal contact with them, our knowledge of them is 5.1 Minimalism
problematic. By contrast, the view that emerges from much of the work in
naturalistic ontology treats properties as contingent beings that are According to minimalist conceptions of properties, the realm of properties
intimately related to the causal, spatio-temporal order, and we learn what is sparsely populated. This is a comparative claim (it is more thinly
properties there are and what they are like through empirical investigation. populated than many realists suppose) rather than a claim about
Such properties are not much like meanings or concepts, and so it is cardinality. Indeed, a minimalist could hold that there is a large infinite
possible to discover that a property conceived of in one way (e.g., the number of properties, say, that there are at least as many properties as real
property of being water) is identical with a property conceived in some numbers. This would be a natural view, for example, for a philosopher
quite different way (e.g., the property of being an aggregate of molecules who thought that each value of a physical magnitude is a separate property
of H2O). It might be misleading to call such properties ‘concrete’ (the and that field theories of such properties as gravitational potentials are
standard antonym of the slippery word ‘abstract’), but it isn't quite right to correct in their claim that the field intensity drops off continuously as we
call them ‘abstract’ either. Indeed, the stark dichotomy between abstract move away from the source of the field.
and concrete is probably too simple to be useful here. This conflict
between different conceptions of properties is somehow reflected in the The best-known contemporary exponent of minimalism is David
different views about the existence and identity conditions for properties, Armstrong (e.g., 1978; 1978a; 1984; 1997), though it has also been
which will be discussed in the next two sections. defended by others (e.g., Swoyer 1996). Specific reductionist motivations
(e.g., a commitment to physicalism) can lead to minimalism, but here we
5. Existence Conditions will focus on more general motivations. These motivations typically

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involve some combination of the view that everything that exists at all Philosophers who subscribe to the strong principle of instantiation are
exists in space and time (or space-time), a desire for epistemic security, almost certain to hold that properties are contingent beings. It is a
and a distrust of modal notions like necessity. Hence, a minimalist is likely contingent matter just which individuals exist and what properties they
to subscribe to at least most of the following four principles. happen to exemplify, so it is a contingent matter what properties there are.

5.1.1 The Principle of Instantiation 5.1.3 The Empirical Conception of Properties

The principle of instantiation says that there are no uninstantiated A natural consequence of the view that properties are contingent beings is
properties. For properties: to be is to be exemplified. Taken alone, the that questions about which properties exist are empirical. There are no
principle of instantiation doesn't enforce a strong version of minimalism, logical or conceptual or any other a priori methods to determine which
since it might be that a wide array of properties are exemplified. For properties exist.
example, someone who thinks that numbers or individual essences or
other abstract objects exist would doubtlessly think that a vast number of 5.1.4 Properties are Coarse-grained
properties are exemplified. So it is useful to distinguish two versions of
the principle of instantiation. Those who hold that properties are very finely individuated will be
inclined to hold that the realm of properties is fairly bountiful. For
Weak Instantiation: All properties are instantiated; there are no example, if the relation of loving and the converse of its converse (and the
uninstantiated properties. converse of the converse of that, and so on) are distinct, then properties
will be plentiful. Minimalists, by contrast, are more likely to hold that
Strong Instantiation: All properties are instantiated by things that exist in properties are coarse-grained (see §6 Identity Conditions): they are
space and time (or, if properties can themselves instantiate properties, each identical just in case they necessarily have the same instances or just in
property is part of a descending chain of instantiations that bottoms out in case they bestow the same causal powers on their instances.
individuals in space and time).
The strong principle of instantiation opens the door to the claim that
Armstrong (1978) holds that properties enjoy a timeless sort of existence; properties are literally located in their instances. This is a version of the
if a property is ever instantiated, then it always exists. A more rigorous medieval doctrine of universalia in rebus, which was contrasted with the
minimalism holds that properties are mortal; a property only exists when it picture of universalia ante rem, the view that properties are transcendent
is exemplified. This account has an admirable purity about it, but it is hard beings that exist apart from their instances. With properties firmly rooted
pressed to explain very much; for example, if laws are relations among here in the spatio-temporal world, it may seem less mysterious how we
properties, then a law would seem to come and go as the properties could learn about them, talk about them, and use them to provide
involved do. illuminating explanations. For it isn't some weird, other-worldly entity that
explains why this apple is red; it is something in the apple, some aspect of
5.1.2 Properties are Contingent Beings

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it, that accounts for this. It is easier, however, to think of monadic the principle of plenitude alone does not guarantee maximalism. One can
properties as located in their instances than it is to view relations in this endorse the former while holding that all sorts of properties are
way (this may be why Aristotle and the moderate realists of the Middle instantiated, and one can endorse the latter by holding that very few
Ages understood relations in terms of accidents that inhere in single things properties are possible (an actualist who subscribes to the strong principle
(see the entry on medieval theories of relations). Nevertheless, the general of instantiation might hold this). So, to get to the maximalist end of the
feeling that transcendent properties couldn't explain anything about their spectrum, we need to add the claim that a vast array of properties is
instances has figured prominently in many debates over properties. possible. This can be achieved by means of various formal principles, e.g.,
a strong comprehension principle (as in Zalta 1988) or axioms ensuring
Minimalists must pay a price for their epistemic security (there's no very finely-individuated properties (as in Bealer 1982, 65, or Menzel
escaping the fundamental ontological tradeoff). They will have little hope 1986, 38)(see §8).
of finding enough properties for a semantic account of even a modest
fragment of any natural language and they will be hard pressed (though Maximalist accounts are often propounded by philosophers who want to
Armstrong 1997 does try) to use properties to account for phenomena in explain meaning and mental content, but, since such accounts postulate so
the philosophy of mathematics. Minimalists may not be greatly bothered many properties, maximalists have the resources to also offer accounts of
by this, however, for many of them are primarily concerned with issues in other things (e.g., phenomena in the foundations of mathematics), and
naturalistic ontology. Moreover, they might perhaps agree that there are many do. Indeed, the great strength of maximalism is that its enormously
concepts, understood as mind-dependent entities, and let them play the rich ontology offers the resources to explain all sorts of things.
theoretical role assigned by maximalists to properties in dealing with
semantics and mathematics (e.g., along the lines proposed in Cocchiarella Epistemology is the Achilles heel of maximalism. At least some
2007). philosophers find it difficult to see how our minds could make epistemic
contact (and how our words could make semantic contact) with entities
5.2 Maximalism lying outside the spatio-temporal, causal order. But maximalism has its
advantages. Those maximalists who are untroubled by epistemic angst
At the other, left, end of the spectrum we find maximalist conceptions of typically remain maximalists. By contrast, philosophers who begin as
properties. Borrowing a term from Arthur Lovejoy, maximalists argue that minimalists sometimes feel pressure to move to a richer conception of
properties obey a principle of plenitude. Every property that could properties, either to extend their explanations to cover more phenomena
possibly exist does exist. For properties: To be is to be possible (Linsky & or, sometimes, even just to adequately explain the things they started out
Zalta 1995; cf. Jubien 1989). If one accepts the view that properties are trying to explain (e.g., Armstrong's more recent work is somewhat less
necessary beings, then it is a simple modal fact that if a property is minimalist than his earliest work).
possible it is necessary and, hence, actual.
5.3 Centrism
Just as the principle of instantiation alone does not guarantee minimalism,

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There is a large middle ground between extreme minimalism and extreme do both kinds of jobs. The minimalist is likely to conclude that it is a
maximalism. For example, several philosophers primarily concerned with mistake to employ properties in semantics. But less squeamish
physical ontology have urged that a limited number of uninstantiated philosophers may instead conclude that there are (at least) two different
properties are needed to account for features of measurement (Mundy sorts of property-like entities. This dualitarian view, as we may call it (to
1987), vectors (Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, 77), or natural laws (Tooley avoid using the inflationed word ‘dualism’), is developed most explicitly
1987). These approaches can, like minimalism, treat properties as in Bealer 1982, where two kinds of properties are admitted: the type I
contingent, fairly coarsely individuated, and too sparse to satisfy any properties, also called concepts, are the fine-grained properties that can
general comprehension principles (e.g., they may deny that there are function as meanings and as constituents of mental contents; the type II
negative or disjunctive properties). One can also arrive at a centrist properties, also called qualities or connections, are the coarse-grained
position by endorsing a comprehension principle, but adding that it only properties required by naturalistic ontology (it should be noted that Bealer
guarantees the existence of properties built up from an sparse initial stock does not use ‘concept’ to mean the mind-dependent entities typically
of simple properties (cf. Bealer 1994, 167). Another option is to hold that postulated by conceptualists; his concepts are mind-independent
all the properties there are are those that can be possibly exemplified, universals and he even suggests (p. 186) that simple concepts can be
where the possibility in question is causal or nomic possibility identified with qualities and connections). Orilia 1999 has followed
(Cocchiarella 2007, ch. 12). Bealer's dualitarian approach and adopted the same terminology. A form
of dualitarianism can perhaps also be attributed to Lewis when he
Being moderate isn't always easy, and it can be difficult to stake out a distinguishes between the sparse and the abundant conception of
position in the center that doesn't appear arbitrary. Once any uninstantiated properties (see his 1986, p. 60).
properties are admitted, we are in much the same epistemological boat as
the maximalist. No doubt the minimalist will see this as a reason to reject Dualitarianism might look like a happy hybrid, but it won't satisfy
any uninstantiated properties, while the maximalist (who believes that everyone: minimalists (and some centrists) will reject the view that there
epistemological problems can be overcome) will see it as a reason to admit are any type I or abundant properties.
as many of them as possible.
6. Identity Conditions
5.4 Dualitarianism
What are the identity conditions for properties? An answer would give us
The contrast between the different perspectives on properties brought to necessary and sufficient conditions for the properties x and y to be one and
light in §4 gives us some reason to think that accounts in different fields the same property. In other words, it would tell us how finely individuated
(e.g., semantics and natural ontology) may call for entities with different properties are. We find a spectrum of options on this matter.
identity conditions; for example, semantics requires very finely
individuated properties, whereas naturalist ontology may need more Infra-coarse: Properties with the same extension are the same
coarsely individuated ones. If this is so, then no single kind of entity could properties. This claim might perhaps be associated with Frege, if one

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identifies his referents of predicates (‘concepts’) with properties. But simpler ones by means of operations such as negation, conjunction,
all contemporary property theories reject this view. etc. A natural way to proceed in this approach is to develop an
account of the analysis of a property and to hold that properties are
Medium coarse: Properties are identical just in case they necessarily identical just in case they have the same analysis (cf. Bealer's (1982)
have the same extension (the precise import of this condition depends account of type I properties; Menzel 1993). This view seems to offer
on which notion of necessity is at play). This seems to transpose the the kind of properties needed in semantics, once one realizes that
identity conditions for sets into an appropriately intensional key, and properties conceived of as intensions are not fine-grained enough to
this is precisely how identity conditions for properties work in account, e.g., for belief sentences. The ultra-fine-grained properties
accounts that treat them as intensions (as functions from possible are then often called ‘hyperintensional.’ Suited as they may be for
worlds to sets of objects therein) (Montague 1974). Bealer also views semantics, hyperintensional properties however also raise certain
this as the identity condition for his type II properties. Although difficult questions. For example, what is the difference between the
necessary coextension may be the most-discussed candidate identity property being red and square and the distinct property being square
condition for properties, many realists reject it because it doesn't and red, and what allows us to link the right complex predicate (say
comport well with the explanations they want to develop. On the one ‘is red and square’) to the right property (being red and square)
hand, this proposal is in tension with the idea that necessarily rather than to the wrong one (being square and red)? If properties
coextensive properties may be distinct since they can confer different literally had parts corresponding to the parts of the linguistic
causal powers on their instances (Sober 1982 contains a strong expression, an answer could be forthcoming, but few philosophers
argument that this can happen, though the jury is probably still out on are willing to admit this. We will return briefly to such matters in §8.
this issue). On the other hand, in semantics we need properties that
are individuated much more finely than the necessary-coextension An alternative way to offer identity conditions for properties is available
condition allows. to those philosophers who admit two modes of predication (see § 1.1).
This alternative has been developed by Zalta (1983; 1988). On this
Medium Fine: Properties are identical just in case they confer the account, two properties are identical just in case they are encoded by the
same causal or, more generally, the same nomological powers on same abstract objects. Thus, properties that necessarily have the same
their instances. This view has been endorsed by various philosophers encoding extensions are identical, but properties that necessarily have the
who work primarily in scientific ontology (see §7.18). same exemplification extensions may be distinct. To see the difference,
note that the property of being a round square and the property of being a
Ultra-fine: Properties are individuated almost as finely as the
round triangle necessarily have the same exemplification extension. This
linguistic expressions that express them. Thus, for example, even red
approach has the virtue of expressing the identity conditions for properties
and square and square and red are different properties. This
in terms of one of their most fundamental features, namely that they are
conception is typically developed in the context of a rich formal
predicable entities. The price is that it requires us to hold that there are two
theory of properties that allows for complex properties built up from
modes of predication and abstract objects. Moreover, since abstract

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objects are identified via the properties that they encode, one may suspect parallel in higher-order logics, wherein predicate variables of different
that there is some dangerous circularity in providing identity conditions orders can be bound by quantifiers.
for properties in terms of abstract objects (Greimann 2003). An appeal to
Gupta and Belnap's theory of circular definitions may be of interest here. Realists differ over which niches in this proposed hierarchy of orders are
occupied. Proponents of the empirical conception of properties will hold
7. Kinds of Properties that it is an empirical question whether there are second- or fourth- or
fifty-seventh-order properties. The issue for them is likely to be whether
Most realists agree that there are various sorts of properties, and in this putative higher-order properties confer any causal powers over and above
section we will review the main kinds of properties they have proposed. those already conferred by lower-order properties. But it is also possible to
But many realists are also selective; they believe that some, but not all, of have less empirically motivated views about which parts of the hierarchy
these kinds of properties exist. Indeed, almost none of the putative kinds are occupied.
of properties discussed here is accepted by all realists, but to avoid
Elementarism (Bergmann 1968) is the view that there are first-order
constant qualifications (like ‘putative kind of property’) we will present
properties but no properties of any higher order. There are first-order
each sort of property as though it were unproblematic.
properties like various shades of red, but there is no higher-order property
7.1 First-order vs. Higher-order Properties (like being a color) that such properties share nor are they related by any
higher-order relations (like being darker than).
The first set of issues we will examine involve the most fundamental
logical or structural features of properties. We will begin with a picture of Elementarism has sometimes been defended by appealing to something
a hierarchy of properties arranged according to order (or level). First-order like Russell's principle of acquaintance, understood as the tenet that only
properties and relations are those that can only be instantiated by things with which we are acquainted should be thought to exist, together
individuals. For example, redness can be instantiated by apples and with the claim that we are acquainted with first-order properties but not
cherries and being married to can be jointly instantiated by Bill and with those of any higher orders. To the extent that first-order properties
Hillary, but no properties can be red or married. It is natural to suppose, are able to perform all of the tasks that properties are called on to do,
however, that at least many first-order properties and relations can elementarism could also be defended on grounds of parsimony. But it is
themselves have properties and relations. For example, redness might be now widely acknowledged, even by minimalists, that at the very least
thought to exemplify the property of being a color and being married to some higher-order relations are needed to confer structure on first-order
might be thought to exemplify the property of being a symmetrical properties.
relation. Once we think of second-order properties, it is natural to wonder
7.2 Self-instantiation and Typed Properties
whether there are third-order properties (properties of second- or, perhaps
in cumulative fashion, of second- and first-order properties), and so on up In May of 1901 Russell discovered his famous paradox. If every
through ever-higher orders. This metaphysical picture finds a formal predicative expression determines or corresponds to a property, then the

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expressions ‘is a property that does not instantiate itself’ should do so. Several recent accounts are thus type-free and treat properties as entities
This raises the question: does this property instantiate itself? Suppose that that can exemplify themselves. From this perspective, the picture of a
it does. Then it is a property that does not instantiate itself; so if it does hierarchy of levels is fundamentally misguided, if it is interpreted too
instantiate itself, it doesn't instantiate itself. Now suppose that it does not rigidly; there are simply properties (which can be exemplified—in many
instantiate itself. Then it is one of those properties that do not instantiate cases by other properties, even by themselves) and individuals (which
themselves; so it does instantiate itself. Such a property, which instantiates cannot be exemplified). One challenge here is to develop formal accounts
itself if and only if it does not instantiate itself, appears to defy the laws of that allow as much self-exemplification as possible without teetering over
logic, at least classical logic. This and related paradoxes led Russell to the brink into paradox (see §8).
introduce a theory of types which institutes a total ban on self-
exemplification by a strict segregation of properties into levels that he 7.4 Relations
called ‘types’ (cf. Copi 1971). Actually his account involves a distinction
What we now usually regard as genuine multi-place relations were not
of types and orders and is thus more complex and restrictive than this.
recognized as such by philosophers for quite a long time, or so it seems.
More details can be found in the entry on Russell's paradox (for a detailed
Apparently, Aristotle and the Scholastics found no place for genuine
reconstruction of how Russell reacted to the paradox, cf. Landini 1998).
irreducible relations in their ontology (see the entry on medieval theories
7.3 Untyped Properties of relations) and Leibniz is usually viewed as a philosopher who, in line
with this tradition, tries to show effectively how relations can be reduced
Type theory has never gained unanimous consensus and its many to monadic properties (Mugnai 1992). An accurate analysis of Leibniz's
problematic aspects are well-known (see, e.g., Fitch 1952, Appendix C; technical use of expressions such as ‘insofar as’ (‘quatenus’) and ‘by the
Bealer 1989). Just to mention a few, the type-theoretical hierarchy same token’ (‘et eo ipso’) in sentences such as ‘Paris loves and by the
imposed on properties appears to be highly artificial and multiplies same token Helen is beloved’ suggests, however, that he did acknowledge
properties ad infinitum (e.g., since presumably properties are abstract, for somehow the existence of irreducibly relational facts (Orilia 2000a). Be
any property P of type n, there is an abstractness of type n+1 that P this as it may, it was not before the second half of the 19th century (with
exemplifies). Moreover, many cases of self-exemplification are innocuous the work of De Morgan, Schroeder, Peirce and, somewhat later, Russell)
and common (at least for realists who are not minimalists or conservative that irreducible relations began to be generally acknowledged. Some
centrists). For example, the property of being a property is itself a philosophers still hold that relations are reducible to properties in that they
property, so it exemplifies itself. There also seem to be transcendental supervene on the monadic properties of their relata in a very strong sense
relations. A transcendental relation like thinks about is one that can relate that shows that relations are not actually real (some trope theorists hold
quite different types of things: Hans can think about Vienna and he can this view; it is defended at length in Fisk 1972). But no one has been able
think about triangularity. But typed theories cannot accommodate to show that all relations do supervene on monadic properties, and there
transcendental properties without several epicycles. are strong reasons for thinking that at least some sorts of relations, e.g.,
spatio-temporal ones, do not. The view that there are relations but no

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monadic properties, or at least that the former have ontological priority positions of the very same loving relation are differently occupied (by
over the latter, has also been considered. It is sometimes attributed, with Abelard and Eloise in one case and by Eloise and Abelard in the other
very little textual support, to Peirce. More recently, it has been defended in case). Fine goes on to propose and endorse an alternative, ‘anti-
different forms by Dipert 1997 and by various authors in the context of positionalist’ standpoint, according to which, relations have neither
ontic structural realism (see, e.g., French & Ladyman 2003, Esfeld 2003 direction nor positions. The idea is to explain the difference between
and §6 of the entry on structural realism). This view is far, however, from Abelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves Abelard by comparing them to
having gained some consensus (Ainsworth 2010). In sum, all in all most similar pairs, such as Romeo loves Juliet and Juliet loves Romeo: Abelard
contemporary realists hold that there are both genuine monadic properties loves Eloise is ‘completed’ by Abelard and Eloise just like Romeo loves
and genuine relations. Juliet is completed by Romeo and Juliet, whereas Eloise loves Abelard is
‘completed’ by Eloise and Abelard just like Juliet loves Romeo is
Relations, however, pose a special problem, that of explaining from a very completed by Juliet and Romeo. This approach thus appeals to a relation
general, ontological, point of view the nature of the difference between of ‘co-mannered completion,’ which in turn is defined by Fine in terms of
states of affairs, such as Abelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves Abelard, a relation of mutual ‘substitution’ of constituents of states of affairs.
that at least prima facie involve exactly the same constituents, namely a MacBride (2007) has attacked Fine's theory on various counts. In
non-symmetric relation and two other items (loving, Abelard, and Eloise, particular he has advanced the suspicion that his approach is circular, since
in our example). Such states of affairs are often said to differ in ‘relational it ultimately appeals to a relation, mutual substitution, in a way that
order’ and the problem then is that of characterizing what this relational involves an unexplained appeal to relational order (but see Fine 2007 for a
order amounts to. Russell (1903, §218) attributed an enormous importance reply and Leo 2008 for an exploration of the formal details of Fine's
to this issue and has attacked it repeatedly. In spite of this, until a few approach). An alternative to the three views discussed by Fine can be
years ago, only a small number of other philosophers have confronted it found, if one admits that there are ontological counterparts of the linguists'
systematically (e.g., Bergmann 1992; Hochberg 1987) and their efforts thematic roles, e.g., ‘agent,’ ‘patient,’ ‘beneficiary,’ and the like. Once
have been pretty much neglected. However, Fine (2000) has forcefully such counterparts, *agent*, *patient*, etc., are available, we can describe
brought the issue on the agenda of ontologists and proposed a novel the difference between Romeo loves Juliet and Juliet loves Romeo, by
approach that has received some attention. Fine identifies a standard and a saying that in the former Romeo has the role *agent* and Juliet the role
positionalist view (analogous to two views defended by Russell at *patient*, whereas it is the other way around in the former (Orilia 2011).
different times (1903; 1984)). According to the former, relations are
intrinsically endowed with a ‘direction,’ which allows us to distinguish, In standard first-order logic predicates come with a fixed degree and in
e.g., loving and being loved: Abelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves line with this relations are usually taken to have a fixed degree themselves
Abelard differ, because they involve two relations that differ in direction (on abundant conceptions of properties, there are relations of every finite
(e.g., the former involves loving and the latter being loved). According to number of argument places, but on sparse conceptions it is an empirical
the latter, relations have different ‘positions’ that can somehow host relata: question whether there are relations of any particular degree). In contrast
Abelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves Abelard differ, because the two with this, however, many natural language predicates appear to be

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multigrade or variably polyadic; they can be true of various numbers of of property and many contemporary philosophers who focus on physical
things. For example, the predicate ‘robbed a bank together’ is true of ontology or philosophy of mathematics do not regard propositions as a
Bonnie and Clyde, Ma Barker and her two boys, Patti Hearst and three kind of property (many of them doubt that there are any such things). But
members of the Symbionese Liberation Army, and so on. Multigrade those who work on the semantics of natural language often postulate the
predicates are very common (e.g., ‘work well together,’ ‘conspired to existence of propositions, noting that we can think of them as a limiting
commit murder,’ ‘are lovers’). Moreover, there is a kind of inference, case of a property. Consider a two-place property like loves and think of
called ‘argument deletion,’ that also suggests that many predicates that plugging one of its open places up with Darla to obtain the one-place
prima facie could be assigned a certain fixed degree are in fact multigrade. property loves Darla. If we can do this, it is sometimes argued, then we
For example, ‘John is eating a cake’ suggests that ‘is eating’ is dyadic, but can plug the remaining (last) open place up with Sam to get the zero-place
since, by argument deletion, it entails ‘John is eating,’ one could at least property, or proposition, that Sam loves Darla.
tentatively conclude that ‘eating’ is also monadic and thus multigrade.
Often one can resist the conclusion that there are multigrade predicates by 7.6 Structured vs. Unstructured Properties
resorting to one stratagem or another. For example, it could be said that
Some philosophers (e.g., Grossman 1983, §§58–61) argue that all
‘John is eating’ is simply short for ‘John is eating something.’ But it seems
properties are simple. Others argue that there is a distinction between
hard to find a systematic and convincing strategy that allows us to
simple properties and compound properties, that some compound
maintain that natural language predicates have a fixed degree. This has
properties exist, and that they have a structure that involves or
motivated the construction of logical languages that feature multigrade
incorporates simpler properties. More on this issue can be found in the
predicates in order to provide a more appropriate formal account of natural
section on formal theories of properties. Lewis (1986a) has argued that the
language (Gandy 1976; Graves 1993; Orilia 2000a; the latter two show
very idea of a structured property is incoherent, but recently Wetzel (2009)
that this can be done by appealing to thematic roles). Although any leap
has tackled Lewis's perplexities and has put the notion of a structured
from language to ontology must be handled with care, all this suggests that
property on more solid grounds by formally characterizing what it means
relations, or at least some of them, are variably polyadic. Turning to
for a property to ‘occur’ within another property.
naturalistic ontology, some support for this conclusion comes from the
ingenious treatment of measurement in Mundy (1990), which is based on 7.7 Instantiation
multigrade relations. In sum, it seems that a truly flexible account of
properties should abandon not only the restrictive hierarchy of types but If instantiation or exemplification is just another run-of-the-mill relation, it
also the constraint that all properties come with a fixed number of appears to lead to an infinite regress. This is often known as Bradley's
argument places. regress, although it is not clear to what extent Bradley himself had this
particular regress in mind (for references to analogous regresses prior to
7.5 Propositions Bradley's, see Gaskin 2008, ch. 5, §70). One construal of the regress that
has passed into the literature goes like this. Suppose that the individual a
In ancient and medieval times propositions were not seen as a special kind

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has the property F. For a to instantiate F it must be linked to F by a At this point it is natural to resort to metaphors like Frege's claim that
(dyadic) relation of instantiation, I1. But this requires a further (triadic) properties have gaps that can be filled by objects or the early
relation of instantiation, I2, that connects I1, F and a, and so on without Wittgenstein's suggestion (if we read him as a realist about properties) that
end. At each stage a further connecting relation is required, and thus it objects and properties can be hooked together like links in a chain.
seems that nothing ever gets connected to anything else. This regress has Although most realists about properties nowadays still tend to adopt one
traditionally been regarded as vicious (see, e.g., Bergmann 1960), or another of these strategies, Vallicella (2002) has offered a penetrating
although philosophers such as Meinong (1978), Russell (1903, §55) and criticism of them. His basic point is that, if a has property F, we need an
Armstrong (1997, 18–19) have argued that it is not. This disagreement ontological explanation of why F and a happen to be connected in such a
may perhaps be avoided if we distinguish an ‘internalist’ and an way that a has F as one of its properties (unless F is a property that a has
‘externalist’ version of the regress (in the terminology of Orilia 2006a). In necessarily). But none of these strategies can provide this explanation. For
the former, at each stage we postulate a new constituent of the state of example, the appeal to gaps is pointless: F has a gap whether or not it is
affairs, s, that exists insofar as a has the property F, and there is filled in by a (for example, it could be filled in by another object), and
viciousness because s can never be appropriately characterized. In the thus the gap cannot explain the fact that a has F as one of its properties.
latter, at each stage we postulate a new, distinct, state of affairs, whose
existence is required by the existence of the state of affairs of the previous 7.8 Sortal vs. non-sortal Properties
stage. This amounts to admitting infinite explanatory and metaphysical
Some properties, typically expressed by count nouns like ‘table’ and ‘cat,’
dependence chains, but, since no decisive arguments against such chains
provide counting principles, or principles of identity, in the sense that they
exist, the externalist regress should not be viewed as vicious (Orilia 2006a,
allow us to count objects. For example, the properties of being a table and
§7). An extensive defense of a similar approach can be found in Gaskin
being a cat are properties of this kind; there are definite facts of the matter
2008.
as to how many tables are in the kitchen and how many cats are on those
A typical line for those convinced that the regress is vicious has consisted tables. They have been called sortal properties (by Strawson) and
in proposing that instantiation is not a relation, at least not a normal one. particularizing properties (by Armstrong), but the ideas involved here
Some philosophers hold that it is a sui generis linkage that hooks things up have a long history. Strawson borrows the word ‘sortal’ from Locke, and
without intermediaries. Strawson (1959), following W. E. Johnson, calls it at least some sortal properties correspond closely to Aristotle's secondary
a non-relational tie and Bergmann (1960) calls it a nexus. Broad likened substances. There seem to be also sortal properties of events, e.g.,
instantiation to metaphysical glue, noting that when we glue two sheets of intervention and bombing.
paper together we don't need additional glue, or mortar, or some other
Sortal properties are naturally contrasted with characterizing properties,
adhesive to bind the glue to the paper (Broad 1933, 85). Glue just sticks.
typically expressed by adjectives like ‘red’ and ‘triangular.’
And instantiation just relates. It is metaphysically self-adhesive. An
Characterizing properties, like redness and triangularity, do not divide the
alternative line has been to claim that there is no such thing as
world up into a definite number of things. To the extent that a property
instantiation at all and that talk of it is just a misleading figure of speech.

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like redness allows us to count red things, it is because we are relying on Cambridge philosopher W. E. Johnson. Properties like color and shape are
the umbrella count noun ‘thing’ to help with the count. Sortal properties determinables, while more specific versions of these properties (like
may also be contrasted with mass properties, like water, gold, and redness and octagonality) are determinates. Similarly, rest mass and rest
furniture. They apply to stuff and thus, like characterizing properties, do mass of 3 kilograms are a determinable and a determinate, respectively.
not divide the world up into definite numbers of things. Like the distinction between genus and species, the distinction between
determinables and determinates is a relative one; redness is a determinate
7.9 Genus and Species with respect to color but a determinable with respect to specific shades of
red. But determinates are not definable in terms of a determinable and a
Although the notions of genus and species play a relatively small role in
differentia; indeed, they are not conjunctive properties of any obvious sort.
contemporary metaphysics, they figured prominently in Aristotle's
The distinction between determinables and determinates has played a
philosophy and in the many centuries of work inspired by it. When we
larger role in recent metaphysics than the more venerable distinction
construe these notions as properties (rather than as linguistic expressions),
between genus and species. See the entry on determinates vs.
a genus is a general property and a species is a more specific subtype of it.
determinables for more details.
The distinction is typically thought to be a relative one: being a mammal is
a species relative to the genus being an animal, but it is a genus relative to 7.11 Natural Kinds
the species being a donkey. It has usually been assumed that in such chains
there is a top-most, absolute genus, and a bottom-most, absolute species. Though not all view natural kinds as properties, for many philosophers
they are important properties that carve nature at its joints. Paradigms
It was traditionally supposed that a species could be uniquely specified or include the property of being a specific sort of elementary particle (e.g.,
defined in terms of a genus and a differentia. For example, the property the property of being a neutron), chemical elements (e.g., the property of
being a human is completely determined by the properties being an being gold), and biological species (e.g., the property of being a jackal).
animal (genus) and being rational (differentia). It is difficult, by today's Natural kinds are often contrasted with artificial kinds (e.g., being a
lights, to draw a principled distinction between genera and differentiae, central processing unit). The chief issue here is whether there are any
but the idea that species properties are compound, conjunctive properties natural kinds or whether our classifications are primarily a matter of
remains a natural one. For example, the property of being a human might cultural and linguistic conventions that represent just one of many ways of
be identified with the conjunctive property being an animal and being classifying things (so that joints are a result of the way that we happen to
rational. But it is now rarely assumed, as it was for many centuries, that carve things up).
all compound properties are conjunctive.
In recent years a good deal of work has been done on the ontology of
7.10 Determinables and Determinates natural kinds and the semantics of natural kind terms (involving such
issues as whether they are rigid designators), as can be seen from the entry
The concepts of determinables and determinates were popularized by the
on natural kinds.

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7.12 Purely Qualitative Properties Hillary are married, but they might not have been, so this relation between
them is external. By contrast, some philosophers have suggested that the
Some properties involve or incorporate particulars. The properties of being relation being a biological parent of is an internal relation. In every world
identical with Harry and being in love with Harry involve Harry. Even in which Bill and his daughter Chelsea both exist, Bill is her father. If this
those who think that lots of properties exist necessarily often believe that is correct, then the relational property being a child of Bill is essential to
non-qualitative properties like these are contingent; they depend upon Chelsea, but being the father of Chelsea is not essential to Bill (he and
Harry, and they only exist in circumstances in which he exists. By Hillary might never have met, in which case they would not have had
contrast, purely qualitative properties (like being a unit negative charge or Chelsea).
being in love) do not involve individuals in this way. The distinction
between properties that are purely qualitative and those that are not is 7.14 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties
usually easy to draw in practice, but a precise characterization of it is
elusive. Some properties are instantiated by individuals because of the relations
they bear to other things. For example, the property being married is
7.13 Essential Properties and Internal Relations instantiated by Bill Clinton because he is married to Hillary Clinton. Such
properties are sometimes called extrinsic or relational properties. Objects
A (monadic) property is an essential property of an individual just in case have them because of their relations to other things. By contrast, intrinsic
that individual has the property in every possible circumstance in which or non-relational properties are properties that a thing has quite
the individual exists. Essential properties are contrasted with accidental independently of its relationships to other things. See the entry on intrinsic
properties, properties that things just happen, quite contingently, to have vs. extrinsic properties for details.
(see the entry on essential vs. accidental properties). My car is red, but it
could have been blue (had I painted it), so its color is an accidental 7.15 Primary vs. Secondary Properties
property. In contrast, it is sometimes suggested, natural kinds provide
examples of essential properties. For example, being human is an essential The distinction between primary and secondary properties goes back to the
property of Saul Kripke. According to some philosophers, there are also Greek atomists. It lay dormant for centuries, but was revived by Galileo,
individual essences, essential properties that characterize individuals Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and others during the seventeenth century.
univocally (Plantinga 1974). Locke's influence is so pervasive that such properties still often go under
the names he gave them, primary and secondary qualities. The intuitive
Internal relations are usually understood as the relational analogues of idea is that primary properties are objective features of the world; on many
essential (monadic) properties. For example, if a bears the relation R to b, accounts they are also fundamental properties that explain why things
then R internally relates a to b just in case a bears this relation to b in have the other properties that they do. Early lists of kinds of primary
every possible circumstance in which they both exist. Relations that are properties included shape, size, and (once Newton's influence was
not internal, that contingently link their relata, are external. Bill and absorbed) mass. Today we might add charge, spin or the four-vectors of

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special relativity. By contrast, secondary properties somehow depend on things we can say about a property are what powers (capacities) it confers
the mind; standard lists of secondary properties include colors, tastes, on its instances. For example, the things we know about determinate
sounds, and smells. charges have to do with the active and passive powers they confer on
particles that instantiate them, their effects on the electromagnetic fields
7.16 Supervenient and Emergent Properties surrounding them, and the like. In the light of examples such as this, some
philosophers have urged that all properties are causal powers and that
Supervenience is sometimes taken to be a relationship between two
properties are identical just in case they confer the same powers on their
fragments of language (e.g., between psychological vocabulary and
instances (e.g., Achinstein 1974; Armstrong 1978, ch. 16; Shoemaker
physical vocabulary), but it is increasingly viewed as a relationship
1984, chs. 10–11; Hawthorne 2001). Others, however, insist that there
between pairs of families of properties. To say that psychological
must be categorical properties irreducible to powers, for otherwise the
properties supervene on physical properties, for example, is to say that,
very distinction between having a power (which might not be exercised)
necessarily, everything that has any psychological properties also has
and manifesting it is lost (Ellis 2001; Molnar 2003). This view is of course
physical properties and any two things that have exactly the same physical
in need of an account of the relationship between powers and
properties will have exactly the same psychological properties. There are
manifestations. An attempt based on an N-relation theory of natural laws
no differences in psychological properties without some difference in
is sketched in Armstrong 2005. The ‘identity theory,’ according to which
physical properties. Supervenient properties are sometimes distinguished
the dispositionality and qualitativity of a property are identical (Martin
from emergent properties.
1997; Heil 2003), may perhaps be viewed as a compromise (note,
7.17 Linguistic Types however, that properties are viewed in these works as tropes).

It is commonplace to contrast linguistic types and tokens. For example, the 8. Formal Theories of Properties
word ‘dog,’ qua abstract repeatable entity, is a type, but any concrete
written or oral realization of it is a token. Though not everybody agrees, Formal property theories are formal systems that aim at formulating
linguistic types are quite naturally viewed as properties whose instances ‘general noncontingent laws that deal with properties’ (Bealer & Mönnich
are linguistic tokens. For a recent defense of this view, see Wetzel 2009. 1989, 133). They thus allow for terms corresponding to properties, in
particular variables that are meant to range over properties and that can be
7.18 Categorical Properties vs. Causal Powers quantified over. This can be achieved in two ways. Either (option 1;
Cocchiarella 1986) the terms standing for properties are predicates or
In naturalistic ontology, one can see two conceptions of properties at play: (option 2; cf. Bealer 1982) such terms are subject terms that can be linked
properties as powers or dispositions to act or being acted upon, and to other subject terms by a special predicate that is meant to express a
properties as categorical or manifest qualities, mere ways in which objects predication relation (let us use ‘pred’) pretty much as in standard set
happen to be. It seems clear that having a property often amounts to theory a special predicate, ‘∈’, is used to express the membership relation.
having a certain causal power and in some cases the only informative

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 Properties Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia

To illustrate, given the former option, an assertion such as ‘there is a xi in A with ti (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), provided ti is free for xi in A.) For example,
property that both John and Mary have’ can be rendered as ‘∃P(P(j) & given this principle, [λx(R(x) & S(x))](j) is the case if and only if R(j) &
P(m))’. Given the second option, it can be rendered as ‘∃x(pred(x,j) & S(j) is also the case, as it should be.
pred(x,m))’. (The two options can somehow be combined as in Menzel
1986; see Menzel 1993 for further discussion). Standard second-order logic allows for predicate variables bound by
quantifiers. Hence, to the extent that these variables are taken to range
Whatever option one follows, in spelling out such theories one typically over properties, this system could be seen as a formal theory of properties.
postulates a rich realm of properties. Traditionally, this is done by a so- It is not, however, of a particularly interesting kind, because it does not
called comprehension principle which, intuitively, asserts that, for any allow for subject terms that stand for properties. This is a serious
well-formed formula (‘wff’) A, with n free variables, x1, …, xn, there is a limitation if one thinks that there is a realm of properties whose laws one
corresponding n-adic property. Following option 1, it goes as follows: is trying to explore. Standard higher order logics beyon the second order
obviate this limitation by allowing for predicates in subject position,
(CP) ∃Rn∀x1…∀xn(Rn(x1,…,xn)↔A). provided that the predicates that are predicated of them belong to a higher
type. This presupposes a grammar in which predicates are assigned types
Alternatively, one can use a variable-binding operator, λ, that, given an
of increasing levels, which can be taken to mean that the properties
open wff, generates a term (called a ‘lambda abstract’) that is meant to
themselves, for which the predicates stand for, are arranged in a hierarchy
stand for a property. This way to proceed is more flexible and is followed
of types. Thus, such logics appropriate one version or another of the type
in the most recent versions of property theory. We will thus stick to it in
theory concocted by Russell to tame his own paradox and related
the following. To illustrate, we can apply ‘λ’ to the open formula, ‘R(x) &
conundrums. If a predicate can be predicated of another predicate only if
S(x)’ to form the one-place complex predicate ‘[λx(R(x) & S(x))]’; if ‘R’
the former is of a type higher than the latter, then self-predication is
denotes being red and ‘S’ denotes being square, then this complex
banished and Russell's paradox cannot even be formulated. Following this
predicate denotes the compound, conjunctive property being red and
line, we can construct a type-theoretical formal property theory. The
square. Similarly, we can apply the operator to the open formula
simple theory of type, as presented, e.g., in Copi 1971, can be seen as a
‘∃y(L(x,y))’ to form the one-place predicate ‘[λx∃y(L(x,y))]’; if ‘L’ stands
prototypical version of such a property theory (if we neglect the principle
for loves, this complex predicate denotes the compound property loving
of extensionality assumed by Copi). A type-theoretical approach is also
someone (whereas ‘[λy∃x(L(x,y))]’ would denote being loved by someone).
followed in the property theory embedded in Zalta's (1983) theory of
To ensure that lambda abstracts designate the intended property, one
abstract objects.
should assume a ‘principle of lambda conversion.’ Given option 1, it can
be stated thus: However, for reasons sketched in §7.3, type theory is hardly satisfactory.
Accordingly, many type-free versions of property theory have been
(λ-conv) [λx1…xnA](t1, …, tn) ↔ A(x1/t1, …, xn/tn).
developed over the years. Of course, without type-theoretical constraints,
A(x1/t1, …, xn/tn) is the wff resulting from simultaneously replacing each given (λ-conv) and classical logic (CL), paradoxes such as Russell's

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 Properties Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia

immediately follow (to see this, consider this instance of (λ-conv): [λx proposed to read the axioms of a standard set theory such as ZFC, minus
~x(x)]([λx ~x(x)]) ↔ ~[λx ~x(x)]([λx ~x(x)])). In formal systems where extensionality, as if they were about properties rather than sets (Schock
abstract singular terms or predicates may (but need not) denote properties 1969; Bealer 1982; Jubien 1989). The problem with this is that these
(cf. Swoyer 1998), formal counterparts of (complex) predicates like ‘being axioms, understood as talking about sets, can be motivated by the iterative
a property that does not exemplify itself’ (formally, ‘[λx ~x(x)]’) could conception of sets, but they seem rather ad hoc when understood as talking
exist in the object language without denoting properties; from this about properties (Cocchiarella 1985). An alternative can be found in
perspective, Russell's paradox would merely show that such predicates do Cocchiarella 1986, where (λ-conv) is circumscribed by adapting to
not stand for properties. But we would like to have general criteria to properties the notion of stratification used by Quine for sets. This
decide when a predicate stands for a property and when it does not. approach is however subject to a version of Russell's paradox derivable
Moreover, one may wonder what gives these predicates any significance from contingent but intuitively possible facts (Orilia 1996) and to a
at all if they do not stand for properties. There are then motivations for paradox of hyperintensionality (Bozon 2004) (see Landini 2009 and
building type-free property theories in which all predicates stand for Cocchiarella 2009 for a discussion of both). Orilia 2000 has proposed
properties. We can distinguish two main strands of them: those that another strategy for circumscribing (λ-conv), based on applying to
weaken CL and those that circumscribe (λ-conv) (some of the proposals to exemplification Gupta's and Belnap's theory of circular definitions.
be mentioned below are formulated in relation to set theory, but can be
easily translated into proposals for property theory). Independently of the paradoxes (Bealer & Mönnich 1989, 198 ff.), there is
the issue of providing identity conditions for properties, specifying when it
An early example of the former approach was offered in a 1937 paper by is the case that two properties are identical. If one thinks of properties as
the Russian logician D. A. Bochvar (Bochvar 1981), where the principle meanings of natural language predicates and tries to account for
of excluded middle is sacrificed as a consequence of the adoption of what intensional contexts, one will be inclined to assume rather fine-grained
is now known as Kleene's weak three-valued scheme. An interesting identity conditions, possibly even allowing that [λx(R(x) & S(x))] and
recent attempt based on giving up excluded middle is Field 2004. A rather [λx(S(x) & R(x))] are distinct. Presumably it will be at least maintained
radical alternative proposal is to embrace a paraconsistent logic and give that two notational variants such as ‘[λx(R(x) & S(x))]’ and ‘[λy(R(y) &
up the principle of non-contradiction (Priest 2006). A different way of S(y))]’ stand for the same property. On the other hand, if one thinks of
giving up classical logic is followed by Fitch, Prawitz and Tennant, who in properties as causally operative entities in the physical world, one will
practice give up the transitivity of logical consequence (see Rogerson want to provide rather coarse-grained identity conditions. For instance,
2007, for a recent analysis of these attempts). The problem with all these one might at least require that [λx A] and [λx B] are the same property if it
approaches is whether their underlying logic is strong enough for all the is physically necessary that ∀x(A ↔ B). Bealer 1982 tries to combine the
intended applications of property theory, in particular to natural language two approaches (see also Bealer & Mönnich 1989).
semantics and the foundations of mathematics.
Formal systems of property theory are often provided with an algebraic
As for the second strand (based on circumcribing (λ-conv)), it has been semantics that associates primitive predicative terms of the language with

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 Properties Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia

‘basic’ properties and the lambda abstracts with complex properties Universals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
obtained from the basic ones by means of operations that generate new –––, 1978a, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. II. A Theory of
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d, respectively, then the property PLUG1(R,d) will be denoted by the Aaron, Richard, 1967, A Theory of Universals 2nd/ed., Oxford: Clarendon
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Theory which includes a definition of analyticity, a one-level
This way of talking certainly suggests that there are complex, structured semantic method, and a derivation of intensional logic, set theory and
properties that really have ‘parts’ or constituents pretty much like the modal logic, Ph.D. Dissertations, University of California, Berkeley.
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Zalta, Edward N., 1983, Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic abstract objects | determinates vs. determinables | essential vs. accidental
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Francesco Orilia has become a coauthor on this entry and has revised the
Metaphysics,” Erkenntnis, 53: 219–265.
previous version of this entry by Chris Swoyer. His update was first
published in July 2011. Laura Celani helped in updating the bibliography.
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Other Internet Resources

‘The World of Universals,’ Bertrand Russell, Problems of
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‘The Theory of Abstract Objects,’ by Edward N. Zalta, Metaphysics
Research Lab, Stanford University.

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