ILLUSIONS

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

BY

JAMES SULLY
AUTHOROF "SENSATIONAND INTUITION," " PESSIMISM,"ETC.

THIRD EDITION

LONDON

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1887
{The rights of translation andoj"reproduction are reserved)"
THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SERIES.

VOL. xxxiv.
 PREFACE.

THEpresentvolumelakesa widesurveyof the field

of error,embracingin its view not only the illusions
of sense dealt with in treatises on physiological optics,
etc., but also other errors familiarly known as illusions,
and resembling the former in their structure and mode
of origin. I have throughout endeavouredto keep
to a strictly scientific treatment, that is to say, the
description and classification of acknowledged errors,
and the explanation of these by a reference to their
psychicaland physicalconditions. At the sametime,
I wasnot able, at the close of my exposition, to avoid
pointing out how- the psychology leads on to the
philosophy of the subject. Some of the chapters
werefirst roughly sketchedout in articles published
in magazinesand reviews; but thesehave been not
only greatly enlarged,but, to a considerableextent,
rewritten.
J. S.
ffampstead,April, 1881.
 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE STUDY OF ILLUSION.

Vulgar idea of Illusion, 1, 2; Psychological treatment of subject, 3, 4;

definition of Illusion, 4-7; Philosophic extension of idea, 7, 8.

CHAPTER II.

THE CLASSIFICATION" OF ILLUSIONS.

Popular and Scientific conceptionsof Mind, 9, 10; Illusion and Halluci-

nation, 11-13 ; varieties of Immediate Knowledge, 13-16; fourfold
division of Illusions, 16-18.

CHAPTER III.
ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION : GENERAL.

Psychologyof Perception:-The Psychological analysis of Perception, 19,

20; Sensationand its discrimination, etc., 20, 21 ; interpretation of
Sensation,22, 23; construction of material object, 23, 24; recogni-
tion of object, specific and individual, 24-27; Preperception and
Perception, 27-31; Physiological conditions of Perception, 31-33 ;
Yisual and other Sense-perception, 33, 34.
Illusions of Perception:-Illusion of Perception defined, 35-38 j sources
of Sense-illusion,38-40 : (a) confusion of Sense-impression,40-44 ;
(b) misinterpretation of Sense-impression,44; Passive and Active
misinterpretation, 44-46; Passive Illusions as organically and extra-
organically conditioned, 46-49.
viii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.
ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION-continued.

A PassiveIllusions (a) as determinedby the Organism.

Results of Limits of Sensibility:-Eelation of quantity of Sensation to
that of Stimulus, 50-52 ; coalescenceof simultaneous Sensations,
52-55 ; after-effect of Stimulation, 55, 56; effects of prolonged
Stimulation, 56-58 ; Specific Energy of Nerves, 58, 59; localization
of Sensation,59-62; Subjective Sensations,62-64.
Resultsof Variation of Sensibility :-Eise and fall of Sensibility, 64-67;
Parsesthesia,67, 68 ; rationale of organically conditioned Illusions,
68, 69.

CHAPTER V.

ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION-continued.

A. PassiveIllusions (b) as determinedly the Environment.

Exceptional
Relationof Stimulusto Organ:-Displacementof organ,etc.,'
70-72.
'ExceptionalArrangement of Circumstancesin the Environment:-Mis-
interpretation of the direction and movement of objects, 72-75;
misperception of Distance, 75, 76; Illusions of depth, relief, and
solidity in Art, 77-81 ; Illusions connectedwith the perception of
objects through transparent coloured media, 82-84; visual trans-
formation of concave into convex form, 84-86 ; false recognition of
objects, 86, 87; inattention to Sense-impressionin Recognition,
87-91; suggestion taking the direction of familiar recurring ex-
periences,91, 92.

CHAPTER VI.

ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION-continued.

B. Active Illusions.

Preperceptionand Illusion, 93-95.

Voluntary Preperception:-Choice of interpretation in the caseof visible
movement,95, 96; and in the caseof fiat projectionsof form,
96-98; capricious interpretation of obscureimpressions,99, 100,
Invol/mtary'Preperception:-Effects of permanentPredisposition,101,102;
effects of partial temporary Preadjustment, 102-105; complete Pre-
 CONTENTS. ix

adjustment or Expectation, 106-109; subordination of Sense-impres-

sion to Preperception, 109-111 j transition from Illusion to Halluci-
nation, 111, 112; rudimentary Hallucinations, 112-114; developed
Hallucinations, 114-116; Hallucination in normal life, 116, 117;
Hallucinations of insanity, 118-120 ; gradual development of Sense-
illusions, and continuity of normal and abnormal life; 120-123;
Sanity and Insanity distinguished, 123-126.

CHAPTEB YII.

BEEAMS.

Mystery of sleep,127,128; theories of Dreams,128, 129; scientific

explanation of Dreams, 129, 130.
Bleep and Dreaming:-Condition of organism during sleep, 131, 132;
Are the nervouscentres ever wholly inactive during sleep? 132-134;
nature of cerebral activity involved in Dreams, 134-136; psychical
conditions of Dreams, 136-138.
The Dream as Illusion:-External Sense-impressionsas excitants of
Dream-images,139-143; internal " subjective" stimuli in the sense-
organs, 143-145; organic sensations, 145-147; how sensations are
exaggeratedin Dream-interpretation, 147-151.
The Dream as Hallucination:-Eesults of direct central stimulation
151-153 ; indirect central stimulation and association, 153-155.
The Form and Structure of Dreams:-The incoherence of Dreams ex-
plained,156-161; coherence
andunity of Dreamas effected(a) by
coalescenceand transformation of images,161-163; (b) by aground-
toneof feeling,164-168; (c) by the play of associative dispositions,
168-172; (ti) by the activities of selectiveattention stimulatedby
the rational impulse to connect and to arrange, 172-176; examples
of Dreams, 176-179; limits of intelligence and rational activity in
Dreams, 180-182; Dreaming and mental disease,182, 183; After-
dreams and Apparitions, 183-185.
NOTE.--The Hypnotic Condition, 185-188.

CHAPTEB VIII.

ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

Illusionsof Introspectiondefined,189-192; questionof the possibility

of illusory Introspection, 192-194; incomplete grasp of internal
feelings as such, 194-196; misobservationof internal feelings : Pas-
 CONTENTS.

sive Illusions, 196-199; Active Illusions, 199-202; malobservaiion of

subjective states, 202-205; Illusory Introspection in psychologyand
philosophy, 205-208; value of the Introspective method, 208-211.

CHAPTER IX,
OTHEB QUASI-PBESENTATIVE ILLUSIONS I ERItuES OF INSIGHT.

Emotion and Perception, 212 ; -Esthetic Intuition, 213; Subjective Im-

pressionsof beauty misinterpreted, 213-216; analogousEmotional
Intuitions, 216, 217; Insight, its nature, 217-220 5 PassiveIllusions
of Insight, 220-222; Active Illusions of Insight: projection of indi.
vidaal feelings,222-224; the poetic transformation of nature, 224-
226; specialpredispositions as falsifying Insight, 226-228; value of
faculty of Insight, 228-230.

CHAPTER X.

ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

Yulgar confidencein Memory, 231-2335 definition of Memory, 233-235;

Psychology of Memory, 235-237; Physiology of Memory, 237, 238 ;
Memory as localization in the past, 238-241; Illusions of Memory
classified, 241-245.
(1) Illusions of Time-Perspective:-
(a) Definite Localization of events: constant errors in retrospective
estimate of time, 245-249; varying errors: estimate of duration
during a period, 249-251; variations in retrospective estimate of
duration, 251-256.
(b) Indefinite Localization: effect of vividness of mnemonic image
on the apparent distance of events, 256-258; isolated public events,
258, 259 ; active element in errors of Localization, 259-261.
(2) Distortions of Memory:-Transformation of past through forgetful-
ness, 261-264; confusion of distinct recollections, 264-266; Active
Illusion: influenceof present imaginative activity, 266-269; exagge-
ration in recollections of remote experiences, 269, 270; action of
present feeling in transforming past, 270, 271.
(3) Hallucinations of Memory:-Their nature, 271-273; past dreamstaken
for external experiences,273-277; past waking imagination taken
for external reality, 277-280; recollection of prenatal ancestral
experience,280, 281; filling up gaps in recollection, 281-283.
 CONTENTS/ xl

Illusions connectedwith Personal Identity:-Illusions of Memory and

Senseof identity, 283, 284; idea of permanent self, how built up,
285-287; disturbancesof senseof identity, 287-290; fallibility and
trustworthiness of Memory, 290-292.
NOTE.-Momentai'y Illusions of Self-consciousness,293.

CHAPTEB XL

ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

Belief as Immediate or Intuitive, 294-296; simple and compound Belief,

296.
A. SimpleIllusory Belief:-
(1) Expectation: its nature, 297, 298; Is Expectation ever intuitive ?
298; Expectation and Inference from the past, 299-301j Expec-
tation of new kinds of experience,301, 302; Permanent Expecta-
tions of remote events, 302 j misrepresentation of future duration,
302-305; Imaginative transformation of future, 305-307.
(2) Quasi-Expectations: anticipation of extra-personal experiences,
307, 308; Eetrospective Beliefs, 308-312.
B. CompoundIllusory Belief;-
(1) Representationsof permanent things : their structure, 312; our
representationsof others as illusory, 312-315 ; our representation,
of ourselves as illusory, 315 j Illusion of self-esteem, 316-318;
genesis of illusory opinion of self, 318-322; Illusion in our repre-
sentations of classes of things, 322, 323; and in our views of the
world as a whole, 323, 324:; tendency of belief towards divergence,
325; and towards convergence, 326> 327.

CHAPTEB XIL

BESULTS.

JRangeof Illusion, 328-330,* nature and causes of Illusion in general,

331-334; Illusion identical with ^Fallacy,334 ; Illusion as abnormal,
336, 337; question of common error, 337-339; evolutionist's con-
ception of error as maladaptation, 339-344; common intuitions
tested only by philosophy, 344; assumptionsof sciencerespecting
external reality, etc., 344-346 ; philosophic investigation of these
assumptions,346-348; connectionbetween scientific and philosophies
consideration of Illusion, 348-350; correction of Illusion and its
 'CONTENTS.

implications, 351, 352; Fundamental Intnitions and modern psycho-

logy, 352; psychologyaspositive scienceand as philosophy,353-355;
points of resemblancebetween acknowledgedIllusions and Funda-
mental Intuitions, 355, 356j question of origin, and question of
validity,, 356, 357 j attitude of scientific mind towards philosophic
scepticism, 357-360; Persistent Intuitions must be taken as true,
360, 361.
 ILLUSIONS.

CHAPTEE I.

THE STUDY OF ILLUSION.

COMMON sense,knowing nothing of fine distinctions,

is wont to draw a sharp line between the region of
illusion and that of sane intelligence. To be the
victim of an illusion is, in the popular judgment, to
be excluded from the category of rational men. The
term at once calls up images of stunted figures with
ill-developed brains, half-witted creatures, hardly dis-
tinguishable from the admittedly insane. And this
way of thinking of illusion andits subjectsis strength-
ened by one of the characteristic sentiments of our
age. The nineteenth century intelligence plumes
itself on having got at the bottom, of mediaeval visions
and church miracles, and it is wont to commiserate
the feebleminds that are still subjectto these self-
deceptions.
Accordingto this view,illusion is somethingessen-
tially abnormaland allied to insanity. And it would
seemto follow that its nature and origin can be best
2 THE STUDY OF ILLUSION.

studied by thosewhosespecialityit is to observethe

phenomenaof abnormallife. Scientificprocedurehas
in the main conformed to this distinction of common
sense. The phenomenaof illusion have ordinarily been
investigated by alienists, that is to say, physicians who
are brought face to face with their most striking forms
in the mentally deranged.
"While there are very good reasons for this treat-
ment of illusion as a branch of mental pathology,
it is by no means certain that it can be a complete
and exhaustive one. Notwithstanding the flattering
supposition
of commonsense,
that illusion is essentially
an incident in abnormal life, the careful observer knows
well enough that the case is far otherwise.
There is, indeed, a view of our race diametrically
opposedto the flattering opinion referred to above,
namely, the humiliating judgment that all men
habitually err, or that illusion is. to be regardedas
the natural condition of mortals. This idea has found
expression,not only in the cynical exclamationof the
misanthropist that most men are fools, but also in the
cry of despairthat sometimesbreaksfrom the weary
searcherafter absolute truth, and from the poet when
impressedwith the unreality of his early ideals.
"Without adopting this very disparaging opinion
of the intellectual condition of mankind, we must
recognize the fact that most men are sometimes
liable to illusion. Hardly anybody is always con-
sistently sober and rational in his perceptions and
beliefs. A momentary fatigue of the nerves,a little
mental excitement, a relaxation of the effort of atten-
tion by which we continually take our bearings with
 POPULAR IDEA OF ILLUSION.

respectto the real world about us, will producejust

the same kind of confusion of reality and phantasm.
which we observe in the insane. To give but an
example: the play of fancy which leadsto a detection.
of animal and other forms in clouds, is known to be an
occupationof the insane,and is rightly madeuseof by
Shakespeareas a mark of incipient mental aberration
in Hamlet; and yet this very same occupation is quite
natural to children, and to imaginative adults when they
chooseto throw the reins on the neck of their phantasy.
Our luminous circle of rational perception is surrounded
by a misty penumbra of illusion. Common sense
itself may be said to admit this, since the greatest
stickler for the enlightenment of our age will be found
in practice to accusemost of his acquaintanceat
some time or another of falling into illusion.
If illusion thus has its roots in ordinary mental life,
the study of it would seemto belong to the physiology
as much as to the pathology of mind. We may even
go further, and say that in the analysisand explana-
tion of illusion the psychologistmay be expectedto
do more than the physician. If, on the one hand, the
latter hasthe great privilege of observingthe pheno-.
mena in their highest intensity, on the other hand, tho
formerhas the advantageof being familiar with tho
normalintellectual processwhich all illusion simulates
or caricatures. To this it must be added that the
physician is naturally disposedto look at illusion
mainly, if not exclusively,on its practical side, that
is, as a concomitant and symptom of cerebral disease,
which it is needful to be able to recognize. The
psychologist'hasa different interest in the subject,
4 THE STUDY OF ILLUSION.

"beingspecially concernedto understandthe mental

antecedents of illusion and its relation to accurate
perceptionand belief. It is pretty evident, indeed,.
that the]phenomenaof illusion form a region common
to the psychologistand the mental pathologist,and
that the completeelucidationof the subjectwill need
the co-operation
of the two classesof investigator.
In the presentvolumean attemptwill be madeto
work out the psychological side of the subject; that
is to say, illusions will be viewed in their relation to
the process of just and accurate perception. In the
carrying out of this plan our principal attention will
be given to the manifestations
of the illusory impulse-
in normal life. At the same time, though no special
acquaintance
with the pathologyof the subjectwill be
laid claim to, frequent referenceswill be made to the
illusions of the insane. Indeed, it will be found that
the two groups of phenomena-the illusions of the
normal and of the abnormal condition--are so similar,,
and pass into one another by such insensible grada-
tions, that it is impossibleto discussthe one apart
from the other. The view of illusion which will be
adopted in this work is that it constitutes a kind of
borderlandbetweenperfectlysaneand vigorousmental
life and dementia.
And here at once there forces itself on our atten-
tion the question,What exactlyis to be understoodby
the,term "illusion"? In scientific workstreating of
the pathology of the subject, the word is confined to
what are specially known as illusions of the senses,
that is to say, to false or illusory perceptions. And
there is very good reasonfor this limitation, since such
 WHAT IS ILLUSION? 5

illusions of the sensesare the most palpable and

strikingsymptoms of mentaldisease.In additionto
this,it mustbe allowedthat,to the ordinaryreader,
the termfirst of all callsup this sameideaof a decep-
tion of the senses.
At the sametime,popularusagehas long since
extended the term so as to include under it errors
which do not counterfeitactual perceptions.We
commonlyspeakof a man being under an illusion
respectinghimselfwhenhe has a ridiculouslyexag-
geratedviewof his ownimportance,and in a similar
way of a personbeing in a state of illusion with
xespect
to the pastwhen,throughfrailty of memory,:
he picturesit quite otherwisethan it is certainly:
known to have been.
It will be found,I think, that there is a very good
reasonfor this popular extensionof the term. The
errors just alluded to have this in common with
illusions of sense, that they simulate the form of
immediate or self-evidentcognition. An idea held
respectingourselvesor respecting our past history
doesnot dependon any other piece of knowledge; in
otherwords,is not adoptedas the result of a process
of reasoning. What I believe with referenceto my
past history, sofar as I can myself recall it, I believe
instantaneouslyand immediately, without the inter-
vention of any premise or reason. Similarly, our
notions of ourselvesare, for the most part, obtained
.apartfrom any processof inference. The view which
a mantakesof his owncharacteror claimson society
he is popularly supposedto receive intuitively by a
.mereact of internal observation.Suchbeliefsmay
6 THE STUDY OF ILLUSION.

not, indeed,have all the overpoweringforce which

belongsto illusory perceptions,for the intuition of
somethingby the sensesis commonlylookedon asthe
most immediate and irresistible kind of knowledge*
Still, they must be said to come very near illusions of
sensein the degree of their self-evident certainty.
Taking this view of illusion, we may -provisionally
define it as any speciesof error which counterfeits the
form of immediate, self-evident, or intuitive knowledge,
whether as sense-perceptionor otherwise. Whenever
a thing is believed on its own evidence and not as a
conclusion from, something else, and the thing then
believed is demonstrably wrong, there is an illusion.
The term would thus appearto coverall varietiesof
error which are not recognizedas fallacies or false
inferences. If for the presentwe roughly divide all
our knowledgeinto the two regions of primary or
intuitive, and"secondaryor inferential knowledge,we
seethat illusion is false or spuriousknowledgeof the
first kind, fallacy false or spuriousknowledgeof the
secondkind. At the sametime, it is to be remembered
that this division is only a very rough one. As will
appear in the courseof our investigation,the same
error may be called either a fallacy or an illusion,
according as we are thinking of its original mode of
production or of the form which it finally assumes;
and a thorough-going psychological analysis of error
may discoverthat thesetwo classesareat bottom very
similar.
As we proceed,we shall, I think, find an ample
justification for our definition. We shall see that
such illusions as those respectingourselvesor the
 DEFINITION OF ILLUSION. 7

pastariseby very much the samemental processes

as
those which are discoverable In the production of
illusory perceptions; and thus a completepsychology
of the one class will, at the same time, contain the
explanationof the other classes.
The reader is doubtlessawarethat philosophers
have still further extended the idea of illusion by
seekingto bring under it beliefs which the common
senseof mankind has always adopted and never begun
to suspect. Thus,accordingto the idealist, the popu-
lar notion (the existence of which Berkeley, however,
denied)of an externalworld, existing in itself and in
no wise dependenton our perceptionsof it, resolves
itself into a grand illusion of sense.
At the close of our study of illusions we shall
return to this point. We shall there inquire into the
connection betweenthose illusions which are popularly
recognized as such, and those which first come into
view or appear to do so (for we must not yet assume
that thereare such)after a certain kind of philosophic
reflection. And some attempt will be made to de-
termine roughly how far the processof dissolving these
substantial beliefs of mankind into airy phantasms
may venture to go.
For the present,however,these so-calledillusions
in philosophywill be ignored. It is plain that illusion
exists only in antithesisto real knowledge. This last
must be assumedas something above all question.
And a roughand provisional,
thoughfor our purpose
sufficientlyaccurate,demarcationof the regionsof the
real and the illusory seemsto coincidewith the lino
which common sense draws between what all normal
8 THE STUDY OF ILLUSION.

men agreein holding and what the individual holds,

whether temporarilyor permanently,in contradiction
to this. For our.present purposethe real is' that
which is true for all. Thus, though physicalscience
maytell us that there is nothing corresponding
to our
sensations of colour In the world of matter and motion
which it conceivesas surroundingus; yet, inasmuch
as to all. men endowed with the normal colour-sense
the samematerial objectsappearto have the same
colour, we may speak of any such perception as
practically true, marking it off from those plainly
illusory perceptionswhich are due to somesubjective
cause,as,for example,fatigue of the retina.
To sum. up: in treating of illusions we shall
assume, what scienceas distinguishedfrom philosophy
is bound to assume,namely, that human experience is
consistent;that men'sperceptionsand beliefsfall into
a consensus.From,this point of view illusion is seen
to arise through someexceptional feature in the situa-
tion or condition of the individual, which, for the
time, breaksthe chain of intellectual solidarity which
underordinarycircumstances bindsthe singlemember
to the collective body. Whether the common ex-
periencewhich menthus obtainis rightly interpreted
Is a question which does not concern us here. " For our
present purpose, which is the determination and
explanationof Illusion as popularly understood,it is
sufficientthat there is this generalconsensus
of belief,
and this may provisionally be regardedas at least
practically true.
 CHAPTER XL

THE CLASSIFICATION OF ILLUSIONS.

IF illusion is the simulation of immediate knowledge,

the most obviousmode of classifying illusions would
appearto be accordingto the variety of the knowledge
which they simulate.
Now,the popular psychologythat floats about in
the ordinary forms of languagehas long since dis-
tinguished certain kinds of unreasoned or uninferred
knowledge. Of these the two best known are per-
ception and memory. When I see an object before
me, or when I recall an event in my past experience,
I am supposedto grasp a pieceof knowledgedirectly,
to know something immediately, and not through the
medium -of something else. Yet I know differently in
the two cases. In the first I know by what is called a
preservativeprocess,namely,that of sense-perception;
in the secondI know by a representativeprocess,
namely, that of reproduction, or on the evidence of
memory. In the one casethe object of cognition is
present to my perceptive faculties ; in the other it *
is recalledby the powerof memory. " :
Scientificpsychologytends,no doubt,to breakdown
tsomeof thesepopulardistinctions. Just asthe zoologist
10 THE CLASSIFICATION OF ILLUSIONS.

sometimesgroups together varieties of animals which

the unscientific eye would never think of connecting,so
the psychologistmay analyzementaloperationswhich
appearwidely dissimilar to the popular mind, and
reduce them to one fundamental process. Thus recent
psychology draws no sharp distinction between per-
ception and recollection. It finds in both very much
the sameelements,though combined in a different way
Strictly speaking,indeed, perceptionmust be defined
as a presentative-representative operation. To the
psychologist it conies to very much the same thing
whether, for example, on a visit to Switzerland, our
ininds are occupied in perceiving the distance of a
mountain or in rememberingsome pleasant excursion
which we made to it on a former visit. In both cases
there is a reinstatement of the past, a reproduction
of earlier experience,a process of adding to a present
impressiona productof imagination-taking this word
in its widest sense. In both cases the same laws of
reproductionor association
are illustrated.
Just as a deep and exhaustive analysisof the
intellectual operations thus tends to identify their
various forms as they are distinguished by the popular
mind, so a thorough investigation of the flaws in these
operations,
that is to say,the counterfeitsof knowledge,
will probablyleadto an identificationof the essential
mentalprocesswhich underliesthem. It is apparent,
for example, that, whether a man projectssome figment
of his imagination into the external world,giving it,,
presentmaterial reality, or whether (if I may be
allowed the term) he retrojectsit into the dim region
of-the past,and takes it for a reality that has been
 POPULAR. AND SCIENTIFIC CLASSIFICATION. 11

he is committing
substantially
the sameb^4|gl[L
The source of the illusion in both casesis one ancT
the same.
It might seemto follow from this that a scientific
discussionof the subject would overlook the obvious
distinctionbetweenillusions of perceptionand thoseof
memory; that it would attend simply to differencesin
the mode of origination of the illusion, whatever its
external form. Our next step, then, would appear to
be to determine these differences in the mode of pro-
duction.
That there are differencesin the origin and source
of illusion is a fact which hasbeenfully recognizedby
thosewriterswho havemadea specialstudy of sense-
illusions. By these the term illusion is commonly
employedin a narrow, technical sense,and opposed
to hallucination. An illusion, it is said, must always
have its starting-point in some actual impression,
whereas a hallucination has no such basis. Thus it is
an illusion when a man, under the action of terror,
takesa stumpof a tree, whitened by the moon'srays,
for a ghost. It is a hallucinationwhenan imaginative
person so vividly pictures to himself the form, of
some absent friend that, for the moment, he fancies
himself actually beholding him. Illusion is thus a
partial displacementof externalfact by a fiction of tho
imagination,while hallucinationis a total displacement.
This distinction, which has been adoptedby tho
majority of recent alienists,1 is a valuable one, and
1 A history of the distinction is given by Briorro do Boismont, in
his work On Illusions (translated by E. T. Hulme, 1859). Ho says
that Arnold (1806) first defined hallucination, and distinguished it
12 THE CLASSIFICATION OF ILLUSIONS.

mustnot "belost sight of here. It wouldseern, from

a psychological point of view,to be an importantcir-
cumstance in thegenesis of a falseperception
whether
the intellectualprocess setsout fromwithin or from
without. And it will be found., moreover, that this
distinctionmaybe applied to all the varietiesof error
whichI propose
to consider.Thus,for example,
it will
be seenfurther on that a false recollection may set out
either from the idea of someactual past occurrenceor
from a presentproductof the imagination.
It is to be observed,however, that the line of
separationbetweenillusion and hallucination,as thus
denned,is a very narrow one. In by far the largest
numberof hallucinationsit is impossibleto provethat
there is no modicum of external agency co-operating
in the production of the effect. It is presumable,
indeed, that many, if not all, hallucinations have such
a basisof fact. Thus,the madmanwho projects his
internal thoughts outwardsin the shapeof external
voicesmay, for aught we know,be promptedto do so
in part by faint impressionscorning from the ear,the
resultof thoseslight stimulationsto which the organ
is alwaysexposed, evenin profoundsilence,and which
in his caseassume an exaggeratedintensity. And even
if it is clearly made out that there are hallucinations
in the strict sense,
that is to say,falseperceptions
which are wholly due to internal causes,it must be
conceded
that illusionshades
off*into hallucination
by
stepswhich it is impossiblefor scienceto mark. In
from illusion. Esquirol,in his work,DesMaladiesMentales (1838),
maybosaid to havefixed' the distinction. (SeeHunt's translation,
1845,p. 111.)
 ILLUSION AND HALLUCINATION. 13

many casesit must be left an open questionwhether

the error is to be classed as an illusion or as a hallu-
cination.1
For these reasons,I think it best not to make the
distinction between illusion and hallucination the
leading principle of my classification. However im-
portant psychologically,it doesnot lend itself to this
purpose. The distinction must be kept in view and
illustrated as far as possible. Accordingly, while in
generalfollowing popular usageand employing tlio
term illusion as the generic name,I shall, when con-
venient, recognize the narrow and technical sense of
the term as answering to a species co-ordinate with
hallucination.
Departing,then, from wliat might seemthe ideally
best order of exposition, I propose,after all, to set
out with the simplepopularschemeof facultiesalready
referred to. Even if they are, psychologically con-
sidered,identical operations,perception and memory
are in generalsufficiently marked off by a speciality
in the form of the operation. Thus, while memoryis
the reproductionof somethingwith a specialreference
of.consciousnessto its pastexistence,perceptionis tho
reproductionof somethingwith a special referenceto
its presentexistenceas a part of the presentedobject.^
In other words, though largely representative when
viewed as to its origin, perception is presentativein
relation to the object which is supposedto be io>
1 This fact hasbeen fully recognized by writers on tho pathology
of tho subject; for example, Griesinger, Mental Pathologyand Thera-
peutics(London,1867),p. 84;' Baillarger, article, "Des Hallucina-
tions," in the M&moiresde VAcad&mwlioyale de Mifdecine, torn. xii.
p. 273, etc.; "Wundt,PhysiologischePsycliologie,p. 653.
14 THE CLASSIFICATION" OF ILLUSIONS.

mediately present to the mind at the moment.1

Hence the convenienceof recognizingthe popular
classification,and of making it, our starting-point in
the present case. *
All knowledgewhich has any appearance of being
directly reached,immediate,or self-evident,that is
to say, of not "beinginferred from other knowledge,
may be divided into four principalvarieties: Internal
Perceptionor Introspectionof the mind's ownfeelings;
External Perception; Memory; and Belief, in sofar as
it simulates the form of direct knowledge. The first
is illustrated in a man's consciousnessof a present
feeling of pain or pleasure. The secondand the third
kinds have already been spoken of, and are too familiar
to require illustration. It is only needful to remark
here that, under perception, or rather in close con-
junctionwith it, I purposedealingwith the knowledge
of other'sfeelings,in so far as this assumesthe aspect
of immediate knowledge. The term belief is here
used to include expectations and any other kinds of
conviction that do not fall under one of the other
heads. An instance of a seemingly immediate belief
would be a prophetic prevision of a coming disaster,
or a man'sunreasoned
persuasion
as to his own powers
of performing a difficult task.
It is, indeed, said by many thinkers that there are
no legitimateimmediatebeliefs; that all our expecta-
tionsandotherconvictionsaboutthings,in sofar asthey
are sound,must reposeon other genuinelyimmediate
1 I here touch on the distinction between the psychological and
the philosophical
view of perception,to be broughtout more fully
by-and-by.
 VARIETIES OF IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE. 15

knowledge, more particularly sense-perceptionand

memory. This difficult question need not be discussed
here. It is allowed by all that there is a multitude of
beliefs which we hold tenaciously and on which we
are ready to act, which, to the mature mind, wear the
appearanceof intuitive truths, owing their cogency to
nothing beyond themselves. A man's belief in his
own merits, howeverifc may have been first obtained, is
as immediately assured to him as his recognition of a
real object in the act of sense-perception.It may be
added that many of our every-day working beliefs
about the world in which we live, though presumably
derived from memory and perception, tend to lose all
traces of their origin, and to simulate the aspect of
intuitions. Thus the proposition that logicians are in
the habit of pressing on our attention, that " Men are
mortal," seems,on the face of.it, to common senseto be
something very like a self-evident truth, not depend-
ing on any particular factsof experience.
In calling these four forms of cognition immediate,
I mustnot, however,be supposed to be placingthem on
the samelogical level. It is plain, indeed,to a reflec-
tive mind that, though each may be called immediate
in this superficialsense,
thereareperceptibledifferences
in the degree of their immediacy. Thus it is manifest,
after a moment'sreflection,that expectation,so far
as it is just, is not primarily immediate in the sense
in which purely presentativeknowledgeis so,sinceit
can be shown to follow from something else. So a
general proposition,though through familiarity and
innumerableillustrationsit hasacquired a self-evident
character,is seenwith a very little inspectionto be
16 THE CLASSIFICATION OF ILLUSIONS.

lessfundamentallyand essentiallyso than the proposi-

tion, " I am now feeling pain;" and it will be found
that even with respect to memory, when the remem-
bered event is at all remote, the process of cognition
approximates to a mediate operation, namely, one of
inference. What the relative values of these different
kinds of immediate knowledge are is a point which
will haveto be touchedon at the end of our study.
Here it must suffice to warn the reader against the
suppositionthat this valueis assumed
to be identical.
It might seemat a first glanceto follow from this
four-fold scheme of immediate or quasi-immediate
knowledgethat there are four varieties of illusion.
And this is true in the sense that these four heads
cover all the main varieties of illusion. If there are
only four varietiesof knowledgewhich can lay any
claim to be .considered immediate, it must be that
everyillusion will simulate the form of one of these
varieties, and so be referable to the corresponding
division.
But thoughthereare conceivablythesefour species
of illusion, it doesnot follow that there are any actual
instances of each class forthcoming. This we cannot
determine till we have investigated the nature and
origin of illusory error. For example,it might be
found that introspection,or the immediateinspection
of our own feelingsor mentalstates,doesnot supply
the conditions necessary to the production of such
error. And, indeed, it is probable that most persons,
antecedentlyto inquiry, would be disposedto say that
to fall into error in the observation
of what is actually
goingon in our ownminds is impossible.
 VARIETIES OF ILLUSION. 17

With the exceptionof this first division,however,

this schememay easily be seen to answerto actual
phenomena. That there are illusions of perception is
obvious, since it is to the errors of sensethat the term
illusion has most frequently been confined. It is
hardly less evident that there are illusions of memory.
The peculiar difficulty of distinguishing betweena
past real event and a mere phantom of the imagina-
tion, illustrated in the exclamation, " I either saw it
or dreamtit," sufficiently showsthat memoryis liable
to be imposedon. Finally, it is agreedon by all that
the beliefs we are wont to regard as self-evidentare
sometimeserroneous. When, for example, an imagina-
tive woman says she knows,by mere intuition, that
somethinginteresting is going to happen, say the
arrival of a favourite friend, she is plainly running
the risk of being self-deluded. So, too, a man's esti-
mate of himself, however valid for him, may turn out
to be flagrantly false.
In the following discussionof the subjectI shall
depart from the above order in so far as to set out with
illusions of sense-perception.These are well ascer-
tained, forming, indeed, the best-marked variety.
And the explanationof thesehas been carried much
further than that of the others. Hence,accordingto
the rule to proceed from the known to the unknown,
there will be an obvious convenience in examining
these first of all. After having done this, we shall be
in a position to inquire whether there is anything
analogousin the region of introspection or internal
perception. Our study of the errors of sense-per-
ception will, moreover,prove tlie best preparationfor
c
18 THE CLASSIFICATION OF ILLUSIONS,

an Inquiry into the nature and mode of productionof

the remainingtwo varieties.1
I would add that, in close connection with the
first division,illusions of perception,I shall treat the
subtle and complicatedphenomenaof dreams. Al-
though containingelementswhich ought, accordingto
strictness,to be brought underone of the other heads,
they are,astheir commonappellation,"visions," shows,
largely simulationsof external, and more especially
visual, perception.
Dreams are no doubt sharply marked off from
illusions of sense-perception
by a number of special
circumstances. Indeed, it may be thought that they
cannot be adequately treated in a work that aims
primarily at investigating the illusions of normal life,
and should rather be left to those who make the
pathologicalside of the subjecttheir special study.
Yet it may, perhaps,be said that in a wide sense
dreams are a feature of normal life. And, however
this be,they havequite enoughin commonwith other
illusions of perception to justify us in dealing with
them in close connection with these.

1 It might e\en beurged that the order hereadoptedis scientifically

the hest, sincesense-perception
is the earliest form of knowledge,
introspected facts being known only in relation to perceived facts.
But if the mind's knowledge of its own statesls thus later in time, it i
earlier in the logical order, that is to say, it iM;he most strictly pre-
sentative form, of knowledge.
 . CHAPTER III. .

ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION : GENERAL.

THE errors with which we shall be concerned in this

chapterarethosewhich are commonlydenotedby the
term illusion, that is to say, those of sense. They
are sometimescalled deceptionsof the senses;but
this is a somewhatlooseexpression,suggestingthat
we can be deceived as to sensationitself, though, as we
shall seelater on, this is only true in a very restricted
meaning of the phrase. To speak correctly, sense-
illusionsmust be said to arise by a simulation of the
form of just and accurate perceptions. Accordingly,
we shall most frequentlyspeakof them as illusions of
perception.
In order to investigate the nature of any kind of
error, it is needful to understand the kind of know-
ledge it imitates, and so we must begin our inquiry
into the nature of illusions of senseby a brief account
of the psychologyof perception; and, in doing this,
we shall proceed best by regarding this operation
in its mostcompleteform, namely,that of visual per-
qeption.
I may observethat in this analysisof perceptionI
shall endeavourto keep to known facts, namely,the
20 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

psychicalphenomena
or eventswhichcan be seenby
the methodsof scientificpsychologyto enterinto the
mental content called the percept. I do not now
inquirewhethersuchan analysiscanhelpusto under-
standall that is meantby perception. This point will
have to be touched later on. Here it is enough to say
that, whateverour philosophyof perceptionmay be,
we must acceptthe psychologicalfact that the con-
cretementalstate in the act of perceptionis built up
out of elements,
the history of whichcan be tracedby
the methods of mental science.

Psychology
of Perception.
Confining ourselvesfor the present to the mental,
as distinguishedfrom the physical,side of the opera-
tion, we soonfind that perceptionis not so simplea
matter as it might at first seemto be. When a man
on a hot clay looks at a running streamand " sees"
the -delicious coolness, it is not difficult to show that
he is really performing an act of mental synthesis,
or imaginativeconstruction. To the sense-impression1
which his eye now gives him, he adds something
which past experience has bequeathed to his mind.
In perception, the material of sensation is acted on
by the mind, which embodiesin its presentattitude
all the results of its past growth. Let us look at this
process
of synthesisa little moreclosely.
Whena sensationarisesin the mind, it may,under
1 Here and elsewhereI use the word " impression" for tho -whole
complex of sensation which is present at the moment. It may,1
perhaps,not be unnecessaryto add that, in employing this term, I am
making no assumption about the independent existence of external
objects. -
 PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION. 21

certaincircumstances,go unattendedto. In that case

there is no perception. The sensationfloats in the
dim outerregionsof consciousness as a vaguefeeling,
the real nature and history of which are unknown.
This remark applies not only to the undefinedbxlily
sensationsthat are always oscillating about the
threshold of obscure consciousness,
but to the higher
sensationsconnectedwith the specialorgans of per-
ception. The student in optics soonmakesthe start-
ling discovery that his field of vision has all through
his life been hauntedwith weird shapeswhich have
nevertroubled the serenity of his mind just because
they have never been distinctly attended to.
The immediateresult of this processof directing
the keen glanceof attention to a sensationis to give
it greater force and distinctness. By attending to it we
discriminateit from other feelings present and past,
and classify it with like sensationspreviously received.
Thus, if I receive a visual impression of the colour
orange,the first consequenceof attending to it is to
mark it off from other colour-impressions, including
those of red and yellow. And in recognizing the
peculiar quality of the impression by applying to it
the term orange, I obviously connect it with other
similar sensationscalled by the same name. If a sen-
sation is perfectly new, there cannot, of course,be this
processof classifying, and in this casethe closely
relatedoperationof discriminating it from other sen-
sations is less exactly performed. But it is hardly
necessaryto remark that, in the mind of the adult,
under ordinary circumstances,
no perfectly newsensa-
tion ever occurs.
22. ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

"When tile sensation,or complex sensation.,is

thus definedand recognized,there follows the process
of interpretation,by which I meanthe taking up of
the impressionas an elementinto the complexmental
state known as a percept. Without going into the
philosophicalquestionof whatthis processof synthesis
exactly means, I may observe that, by common eon-
sent, it takes place to a large extent by help of a
reproductionof sensationsof various kinds experi-
encedin the past. That is to say,the details in this
act of combination are drawn from the store of mental
recollectionsto whichthe growingmind is ever adding.
In other words,the perceptarisesthrough a fusion o^
an actual sensationwith mental representations or
" images" of sensation.1Every elementof the object
that wethus take up in the act of perception,or put
into the percept,as its actualsize,distance,and so on,
will be found to make itself known to ms through
mentalimagesor revivalsof pastexperiences, such as
thosewe havein handling the object,moving to and
from it, etc. It follows that if this is an essential
ingredientin the act of perception,the processclosely
resemblesan act of inference; and, indeed, Helmholtz
distinctly calls the perceptionof distancean uncon-
1 Psychological usage has now pretty well substituted the term
stimage" for a idea," in orderto indicate an in dividual (as distinguished
from a general) representation of a,sensation or percept. It might,
perhaps,be desirable to go further in this processof differentiating
language, and to distinguish between a sensational image, e.g. the
representationof a colour, and a perceptional image, as the represen-
tation of a coloured object. It may be well to add that, in speaking
of a fusion of an image and a sensation,I do not mean that the former
exists apart for a single instant. The term "fusion" is used figura-
tively to describethe union of the two sides or aspectsof a complete
percept.
 PERCEPTION AS INTERPRETATION. 23

scious inference or a mechanically performed act of

judgment.
I have hinted that these recovered sensations
include the feelingswe experiencein connectionwith
muscularactivity, asin moving our limbs, resisting or
lifting heavy bodies,and walking to a distant object.
Modern psychology refers the eye's instantaneous
recognition of the most important elements of an
object (its essentialor "primary" qualities) to a rein-
statement of such simple experiences as these. It is,
indeed,thesereproductionswhich are supposedto con-
stitute the substantial background of our percepts.
Another thing worth noting with respectto this
processof filling up a sense-impression
is that it draws
on past sensationsof the eye itself. Thus, when I
look at the figure of an acquaintance from behind,
my reproductivevisual imagination supplies a repre-
sentation of the impressions I am wont to receive
when the more interesting aspect of the object, the
front view, is present to my visual sense.1
We may distinguish betweendifferent stepsin the
full act of visual recognition. First of all comes the
constructionof a material object of a particular figure
and size,and at a particular distance; that is to say,
the recognitionof a tangible thing having certain
simplespace-properties,and holding a certain relation.
to otherobjects,
and moreespeciallyourownbody,ia
space. This is the bareperceptionof an object,which
alwaystakesplaceevenin the caseof perfectlynew
1 This impulseto fill in visual elementsnot actually presentis
strikingly illustrated in people'sdifficulty in recognizingthe gap ia
the field of visionansweringto the insensitive" blind" spot ou tho
retina. (SeeHclmholtz,Pliysiologuclw Optik,p. 573,ct se#)
24 ILLUSIONS OF PEECEPTION.

objects,providedthey are seenwith any degreeof

distinctness. It is to be added that the reference of a
sensationof light or colourto suchan objectinvolves
the inclusionof a quality answeringto the sensation,
as brightness,or blue colour,in the thing thus intuited.
This part of the processof filling in, which is the
most instantaneous,automatic, and unconscious, may
besupposed
to answerto the mostconstantand there-
fore the most deeply organized connections of ex-
perience; for, speakinggenerally,we never have an
impression of colour, except when there are circum-
stancespresentwhich are fitted to yield us those
simple muscular and tactual experiencesthrough
which the ideas of a particular form, size, etc., are
pretty certainlyobtained.
The secondstep in this processof presentative
constructionis the recognitionof an object as one ol
a classof things,for example,oranges,having certain
specialqualities,as a particulartaste. In this stepthe
connections of experience are lessdeeplyorganized,and
so weareableto someextent,by reflection,to recognize
it asa kind of intellectual workingup of the materials
suppliedus by the past. It is to be noted that this
process of recognitioninvolvesa compoundoperation
of classifyingimpressionsas distinguishedfrom that
simpleoperationby which a singleimpression,suchas
a particularcolour,is known. Thusthe recognitionot
suchan objectasan orangetakesplaceby a rapid
classingof a multitude of passivesensations
of colour,
light, and shade,and thoseactive or muscularsensa-
tionswhichare supposed
to enterinto thevisualper-
captionof form.
 PERCEPTION AS RECOGNITION. 25

A still less automatic step in the processof visual

recognition
is that of identifyingindividualobjects,as
WestminsterAbbey, or a friend, John Smith. The
amountof experiencethat is here reproducedmay be
very large,as in the caseof recognizinga personwith
whom we have had a long and intimate acquaintance.
If the recognition of an object as one of a class,
for example,an orange,involvesa compoundprocess
of classingimpressions,that of an individual object
involvesa still morecomplicatedprocess. The identifi-
cation of a friend, simple as this operation may at first
appear,
reallytakesplaceby a rapidclassingof all the
salient characteristic features which serve as the visible
marksof that particular person.
It is to be noted that each kind of recognition,
specificand individual, takes placeby a consciousness
of likeness amid unlikeness. It is obvious that a new
individual objecthascharactersnot sharedin by other
objectspreviously inspected. Thus, we at onceclass
a man with a dark-brownskin, wearing a particular
garb,as a Hindoo,though he may differ in a host of
particularsfrom the other Hindoos that we have ob-
served. In thus instantly recognizing him as a
Hindoo, we must, it is plain, attend to the points of
similarity, and overlook for the instant the points of
dissimilarity. In the case of individual identification,
the samething happens. Strictly speaking,no object
everappearsexactly the sameto us on two occasions.
Apart from changes in the objectitself,especiallyin the
caseof living beings,there arevarying effectsof illumi-
nation,of positionin relationto the eye,of distance,and
soon,whichverydistinctlyaffectthevisualimpression
26 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

at different times. Tet the fact of our instantly recog'

nizing a familiar object in spite of these fluctuations
of appearance, provesthat we are able to overlook a
very considerable amount of diversity when a certain
amount of likeness is present.
It is further to be observedthat in these last stages
of perceptionwe approachthe boundaryline between
perceptionand inference. To recognizean object as
one of a class is often a matter of conscious reflection
and judgment,evenwhen the classis constitutedby
obvious material qualities which the sensesmay be
supposedto apprehend immediately. Still more
clearly does perception pass into inference when the
class is constituted by less obvious qualities, which
requirea carefuland prolongedprocessof recollection,
discrimination, and comparison, for their recognition.
Thus, to recognizea man by certain marksof gesture
andmanneras a military man or a Frenchman,though
popularly called a perception,is much more of an
unfolded process of conscious inference. And what
appliesto specificrecognitionappliesstill moreforcibly
to individual recognition, which is often a matter of
very delicateconsciouscomparisonandjudgment. To
say wherethe line should be drawnherebetweenper-
ception and observation on the one hand, and inference
onthe other,is clearlyimpossible. Our wholestudy of
the illusions of perception will serve to show that the
oneshadesoff into the other too gradually to allow of
our drawing a hard and fast line between them.
Finally, it is to be noted that these last stagesof
perception bring us near the boundary line which
separatesobjectiveexperienceascommonanduniversal^
 PEECEPTION AND INFERENCE. 27

and subjectiveor variableexperienceasconfinedto one

or to a few. In the bringing of the objectundera certain
classof objectsthere is clearlyroomfor greatervariety
o±individual perception. For example,the ability to
recognizea man asa Frenchmanturns on a specialkind
of previousexperience. And this transition from the
commonor universal to the individual experienceis seen
yet more plainly in the caseof individual recognition.
To identify an object, say a particular person,com-
monly presupposes someprevious experienceor know-
ledgeof this object,and the existencein the past of
somespecialrelation of the recognizerto the recog-
nized, if only that of an observer. In fact, it is evident
that in this mode of recognition we have the transition
from commonperceptionto individual recollection.1
While we may thus distinguish different steps in
the processof visual recognition, we may make a
further distinction, marking off a passive and an active
stagein the process. The one may be calledthe stage
of preperception, the other that of perceptionproper.2
In the first the mind holds itself in a passive
attitude, except in so far as the energiesof external
attention are involved. The impressionheroawakens
the mental imageswhich answerto past experiences
according to the well-known laws of association. The
interpretative imagewhich is to transformtho impres-
1 This relation will be more fully discussed under the head of
" Memory."
2 I adopt this distinction from Dr. J. Hughlings Jackson. See
his articles, " On AiFections of Speechfrom Diseasesof tho Brain," in
Brain, Nos. iii. and vii The secondstagemight convenientlybo
namedapperception, but for the specialphilosophicalassociations
of
the term:
28 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

sipn into a perceptis now being formed by a mere

processof suggestion.
When the imageis thus formed,the mind may be
said to enterupon a moreactive stage,in which it noav
views the impressionthrough the image, or applies
this as a kind of mould or framework to the impres-
sion. This appearsto involve an intensificationof the
mental image, transforming it from a representative
to a presentative mental state, making it approxi-
mate somewhat ta the full intensity of the sensation.
In many of our instantaneous perceptions these two
stagesare indistinguishable to consciousness. Thus, in
most cases,the recognition of size, distance, etc., takes
place so rapidly that it is impossible to detect the
two phases here separated. But in- the classification
of an object, or the identification of an individual
thing, there is often an appreciableinterval between
the first reception of the impressionand the final
stageof completerecognition. And here it is easyto
distinguishthe two stagesof preperceptionand per-
ception. The interpretative image is slowly built up
by the operationof suggestion,at the closeof which
the impressionis suddenlyillumined as by a flashof
light,andtakesa definite,
precise
shape. JJ
Now, it is to be noted that the processof preper-
ception will be greatly aided by any circumstancethat
facilitatesthe constructionof the particular interpre-
tative image required, Thus, the more frequently a
similar processof perception has been performedin
the past, the more ready will the mind be to fall into
the particular way of interpreting the impression. As
G. EL Lewes well remarks, " The artist sees details
 PREPEKCEPTION. 29

where to other eyes there is a vague or confused mass;

the naturalist sees an animal where the ordinary eye
only seesa form."l This is but one illustration of the
seeminglyuniversalmentallaw, that what is repeatedly
done will be done more and more easily.
The processof preperceptionmay be shortened,not
only by meansof a permanentdispositionto frame the
required interpretative scheme,the residuum of past
like processes,but also by means of any temporary dis-
position pointing in the same direction. If, for
example,the mind of a naturalist hasjust beenoccu-
pied about a certain classof bird, that is to say,if he
has been dwelling on the mental image of this bird, he
will recognizeone at a distancemore quickly than
he would otherwisehavedone. Sucha simplemental
operationas the recognitionof one of the lesscommon
flowers, say a particular orchid, will vary in duration
accordingaswe haveor havenot beenrecentlyforming
an image of this flower. The obviousexplanationof
this is that the mental imageof an object bearsa very
closeresemblance to the correspondingpercept,differ-
ing from it, indeed,in degree only, that is to say,
through the fact that it involves no actual sensation.
Here againwe seeillustrated a general psychological
law, namely,that what the mind has recently done,
it tends(within certainlimits) to go on doing.
It is to be noticed,further, that the perceptionof a
singleobject or event is rarely an isolated act of tho
mind. We recognizeand understandthe things that
1 Problemsof Life and Mind, third scries, p. 107. This writer
employstbe word "preperception" to denote this effect of previous
perception.
30 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

surround us through their relations one to another.

Sometimesthe adjacent circumstancesand events
suggesta definite expectationof the new impression.
Thus, for example,the soundof a gun heard during
a walk in the country is instantly interpreted by help
of suggestionsdue to the previousappearance of the
sportsman,and the act of raising the gun to. his
shoulder. It maybe addedthat the verbal suggestions
of others act very much like the suggestionsof ex-
ternal circumstances. If I am told that a gun is going
to be fired, my mind is preparedfor it just as though
I sawthe sportsman.1
More frequently the effect of such surrounding
circumstancesis to give an air of familiarity to the new
impression, to shorten the interval in which the re-
quired interpretative image is forthcoming. Thus,
when travelling in Italy, the visual impression answer-
ing to a ruined temple or a bareheaded friar is con-
strued much morerapidly than it would be elsewhere,
becauseof the attitude of mind due to the surrounding
circumstances. In all such cases the processof pre-
perceptionconnected
with agiven impressionis effected
more or less completely by the suggestions of other
and related impressions.
It followsfromall that has beenjust said that our
minds are never in exactly the same state of readiness
with respect to a particular processof perceptional
interpretation. Sometimesthe meaning of an im-
pressionflasheson us at once,and the stageof pre-
1 Such verbal suggestion, moreover, acting through a sense-
impression,lias something of that vividness of effect which belongsto
all excitation of mental imagesby external stimuli.
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PERCEPTION". 31

perceptionbecomesevanescent. At other times the

sameimpressionwill fail for an appreciableinterval
to divulge its meaning. These differencesare, no
doubt, clue in part to variations in the state of attention
at the moment; but they depend as well on fluctua-
tions in the degreeof the mind's readiness to look at
the impression in the required way.
In order to completethis slight analysisof percep-
tion, we must look for a moment at its physical side,
that is to say,at the nervousactionswhich are known
or supposed with somedegreeof probability to accom-
pany it.
The productionof the sensationis knownto depend
on a certain external process,namely, the action of
some stimulus, as light, on the sense-organ,which
stimulus has its point of departurein the object,such
as it is conceivedby physical science. The sensation
ariseswhenthe nervousprocessis transmitted through
the nerves to the conscious centre, often spoken of as
the sensorium,the exact seat of which is still a matter
of some debate.
The intensification of the sensation by the reaction
of attention is supposedto dependon somereinforce-
ment of the nervous excitation in the sensory centre
proceedingfrom,the motor regions,which are hypo-
thetically regarded as the centre of attention.1 The
classificationof the impression,again,is pretty certainly
correlatedwith the physical fact that the central ex-
citation calls into activity elementswhich havealready
beenexcitedin the sameway.
The nervouscounterpartof the final stageof per-
1 SeeWundt, Physiologische
Psychologie,
p. 723.
32 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

ception,the synthesisof the sensationand the

mentalrepresentation,
is not clearlyascertained.A
sensationclearly resembles
a mental imagein quality.
It is mostobviouslymarkedoff from the imageby its
greater vividness or intensity. Agreeably to this view,
it is now held by a numberof eminentphysiologists
and psychologiststhat the nervousprocessunderlying
a sensationoccupiesthe samecentral region as that
which underlies the corresponding image. According
to this theory, the two processesdiffer in their degree
of energy only, this differencebeing connectedwith
the fact that the former involves, while the latter does
not involve, the peripheral region of the nervous
system. Accepting this view as on the whole well
founded,I shall speakof an ideational,or rather an
imaginationaljand a sensationalnervousprocess,and
not of an icleational and a sensational centre.1
The specialforce that belongsto the representative
elementin a percept,as comparedwith that of a ptiro
tcperceptional " image,2is probably connected with the
fact that, in the case of actual perception, the nervous
processunderlying the act of imaginative construction
is organicallyunited to the initial sensationalprocess,
ol which indeed it may be regarded as a continuation.
For the physicalcounterpartof the two stagesin the
1 For a confirmation of the view adopted in the text, see
Professor Bain, The Sensesand the Intellect, Part II. ch. i. sec. 8;
HerbertSpencer, Principlesof Psychology, vol.i. p. 234,et passim;Dr.
Ferrier, TheFunctionsof theBrain, p. 258,et seq.; Professor Wumlt,
op,cit.j pp. 644,615; G. II. Lowes,Problems of Life andMind,vol. v.
p. 445, et seq. For an oppositeview, seo Dr, Carpenter,Mental
Physiology, fourthedit., p. 220,etc.; Dr. Maudsloy,ThePhysiology of
Mind, ch. v. p. 259, etc.
2 Seenote,p. 22.
 SEAT OF SENSATION AND IMAGE. 33

interpretativepart of perception,distinguished as the

passivestageof preperceptioa,and the active stageof
perceptionproper,we may, in the absenceof certain
knowledge,fall back on the hypothesisput forward
by Dr. J. Hughlings Jackson,in the articles in Brain
already referred to, namely, that the former answers
to an action of the right hemisphereof the brain, the
latter to a subsequentaction of the left hemisphere.
The expeditingof the processof preperceptionin those
caseswhereit hasfrequently been performedbefore,is
clearly an illustration of the organic law that every
function is improvedby exercise. And the temporary
dispositionto performthe processdue to recent imagi-
nativeactivity, is explainedat onceon the physicalside
by the suppositionthat an actual perceptionand a per-
ceptional image involve the activity of the same
nervous tracts. For, assuming this to be the case,
it follows, -from a well-known organic law, that a
recent excitation would leave a temporary disposition
in theseparticular structuresto resumethat particular
mode of activity.
What has here been said about visual perception
will apply, mutatismutandis,to other kinds. Although
the eye is the organ of perception par excellence,
our
other sensesare also avenues by which we intuit and
recognizeobjects. Thus touch, especially when it is
finely developed as it is in the blind, gives an imme-
diate knowledge of objects-a more immediate know-
ledge, indeed, of their fundamental properties than
sight. What makes the eye so vastly superior to the
organof touch as an instrument of perception,is first
of all the rangeof its action,taking in simultaneously
D
31 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

a large numberof impressionsfrom objects at a dis-

tance as well as near; and secondly, though this may
seemparadoxical,the fact that it gives us so much
indirectly, that is, by way of associationand sugges-
tion. This is the interestingside of visual perception,
that, owing to the vast complex of distinguishable
sensations of light and colourof variousqualities and
intensities, together with the muscular sensations at-
tendingthe varying positionsof the organ,the eyeis
ableto recognizeat anyinstant a wholeexternal world
with its fundamentalpropertiesand relations. The
ear comesnext to the eye in this respect,but only
after a long interval, since its sensations(even in the
caseof musical combinations) do not simultaneously
orderthemselves
in an indefinitely large group of dis-
tinguishable elements,and sinceeven the comparatively
few sensationswhich it is capableof simultaneously
receiving, being altogether passive-that is to say,
having no muscular accompaniments-impart but
little and vague information respectingthe external
order. It is plain, then, that in the study of illusion,
wherethe indirectly known elementsare the thing to
be considered, the eye, and after this the ear, will
mostly engage our attention.1
1 Touch gives much by way of interpretation only when an
individual object,for example a man's hat, is recognized by aid of this
.sensealone, in which case the perception distinctly involves the
reproduction of a complete visual percept. I may add that tlio
organ of smell comes next to that of hearing, with respect both to
the range and clefinitonessof its simultaneous sensations,and to the
amount of information furnished by these. A rough senseof distance
ASwell as of direction is clearly obtainable by moans of this organ.
There seems to mo no reason why an animal endowed with fine
olfactory sensibility, and capableof an analytic separation of sense-
 VISUAL AND OTHER PERCEPTION. 35

So much it seemed needful to say about the

mechanism of perception, in order to understand the
slight disturbancesof this mechanism,that manifest
themselves in sense-illusion. It may be added that
our study of these illusions will help still further to
elucidate the exact nature of perception. Normal
mental life, as a whole, at once illustrates, and is
illustrated by, abnormal. And while we needa rough
provisionaltheory of accurateperception in order to
explain illusory perceptionat all, the investigation of
this latter cannot fail to verify and even render more
completethe theory which it thus temporarily adopts.
Illusions of Percept-ion.
With this brief psychologicalanalysisof perception
to help us, let us now passto the considerationof the
errorsincident to the process,with a view to classify
them according to their psychological nature and
origin.
And here there naturally arises the question,How
shall we define an illusion of perception ? When
trying to fix the definition of illusion in general, I
practically disposedof this question. Nevertheless,as
the point appearsto me to be of someimportance,I
shall reproduce and expand one or two of the con-
siderations then brought forward.
elements, should not gain a rough perception of an external order
much morecompletethan our auditory perception, which is necessarily
so fragmentary. This supposition appears,indeed, to be the necessary
"complementto the idea first broached, so far as I am aware, by
Professor Orooni Robertson, that to such animals, visual perception
consistsin a reference to a system of muscular feelings defined and
bounded by strong olfactory sensations, rather than by tactual sen-
sations as in our case.
36' ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

It is said by certain philosophersthat perception,

as a whole, is an illusion, inasmuch as it involves
the fiction of a real thing independentof mind, yet
somehowpresentto it in the act of sense-perception.
But this is a questionfor philosophy,not for science.
Science, including psychology, assumesthat in per-
ception there is something real, without inquiring
what it may consistof, or what its meaningmaybe.
And though in the foregoing analysis of perception,
viewed as a complex mental phenomenonor psychical
process, I havearguedthat a perceptgets its concrete
filling up out of elementsof consciousexperienceor
sensations,I have been careful not to contend that the
particularelementsof feeling thus representedarethe
object of perception or the thing perceived. It may
be that what we mean by a single object with its
assemblage of qualities is much more than any
number of such sensations; and it must be confessed
that, on the face of it, it seems to be much more.
And however this be, the question, What is meant by
object; and is the common persuasionof the existence
of such an entity in the act of perception accurate or
illusory ? must be handed over to philosophy.
While in the following examination of sense-illu-
sionswe put out of sight what certain philosophers
say about the illusorinessof perceptionas a whole,we
shall alsodowell to leaveout of accountwhat physical
scienceis sometimes
supposed
to tell us respecting
a
constantelementof illusion in perception. The phy-
sicist,by reducing all externalchangesto "modesof
motion," appears to leave no xoora in his world-
mechanismfor the secondaryqualities of bodies,such
 ILLUSION OF PERCEPTION DEFINED. 87

as light and heat, as popularly conceived. Yet, while

allowingthis, I think we may still regard the attribu-
tion of qualities like colourto objectsas in the main
correct and answeringto a real fact. When a person
saysan objectis red, he is understoodby everybodyas
affirming somethingwhich is true or false,something
therefore which either involves an external fact or is
illusory. It would involve an external fact whenever
the particular sensation which he receives is the re-
sult of a physical action (ether vibrations of a certain
order), which would produce a like sensation in any-
body else in the same situation and endowed with the
normal retinal sensibility. On the other hand, an
illusory attribution of colour would imply that there
is no correspondingphysical agency at work in the
case,but that the sensation is connected with excep-
tional individual conditions, as, for example,altered
retinal sensibility.
We arenow,perhaps,in a positionto frame a rough
definition of an illusion of perception as popularly
understood. A large number of such phenomenamay
be describedas consistingin the formationof percepts
or quasi-perceptsin the minds of individuals under
external circumstanceswhich would not give rise to
similar perceptsin the caseof other people.
A little consideration, howevei*,will show that this
is not an adequate definition of what is ordinarily
understoodby an illusion of sense. There are special
circumstanceswhich are fitted to excite a momentary
illusion in all minds. The optical illusions due to the
reflection and refraction of light are not peculiar to
the individual, but arise in all minds under precisely
similar external conditions.
38 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

It is plain that the illusoriness

of a perceptionis
in these cases determined in relation to the sense-
impressions of other momentsand situations,or to
what are presumablybetter perceptsthan the present
one. Sometimes this involves an appeal from one
sense to another. Thus, there is the process of veri-
fication of sight by touch, for example,in the case
of optical images,a mode of perceptionwhich,as we
have seen,gives a more direct cognition of external
quality. Conversely,there may occasionallybe a
reference from touch to sight, when it is a question
of discriminating two points lying very close to one
another. Finally, the same sense may correct itself,
as when the illusion of the stereoscopeis corrected by
afterwards looking at the two separatepictures.
We may thus roughly definean illusion of percep-
tion as consistingin the formationof a quasi-percept
which is peculiar to an individual, or Avhich is con-
tradicted by another and presumably more accurate
percept. Or, if we take the meaning of the word
common to include both the universal as contrasted
with the individual experience,and the permanent.
constant, or average, as distinguished from the mo-
mentary and variable percept, we may still briefly
describean illusion of perceptionas a deviationfrom
the commonor collectiveexperience.
Sourcesof Sense-Illusion.
Understandingsense-illusionin this way, let us
glanceback at the processof perceptionin its several
stages or aspects,with the object of discovering what
room occurs for illusion.
 HOW SENSE-ILLUSION ARISES. 39

It appearsat first as if the preliminary stages-

the reception,discrimination,and classificationof an
impression-would not offerthe slightest openingfor
error. This part of the mechanism of perception
seemsto work so regularly and so smoothly that one
can hardly conceivea fault in the process. Never-
theless/a little consideration will show that even hero
all does not go on with unerring precision.
Let us supposethat the very first step is wanting-
distinct attention to an impression. It is easy to see
that this will favour illusion by leading to a confusion
of the impression. Thus the timid man will more
readily fall into the illusion of ghost-seeing than a
cool-headed observant man, because he is less attentive
to the actual impression of the moment. This in-
attention to the sense-impression will be found to
be a great co-operating factor in the production of
illusions.
But if the sensation is properly attended to, can
there be error through a misapprehensionof what is
actually in the mind at the moment ? To say that
there can may sound paradoxical, and yet in a sense
this is demonstrable. I do not mean that there is
an observant mind behind and distinct from the
sensation,
and failing to observeit accuratelythrough
a kind of mental short-sightedness. What I mean is
that the usualpsychicaleffect of the incomingnervous
process may to some extent be counteracted by a
powerful reaction of the centres. In the courseof our
study of illusions, wreshall learn that it is possible
for the quality of an impression,as, for example, of
a sensation of colour, to be appreciably modified
40 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

when there is a strong tendencyto regard it in one

particular way*
Postponingthe considerationof these,we may say
that certainillusionsappearclearlyto take their start
from an error in the processof classifyingor identi-
fying a presentimpression. On the physical side,we
may say that the first stages of the nervous process,
the due excitation of the sensorycentre in accordance
with the form of the incoming stimulation and the
central reaction involved in the recognition of the
sensation,are incomplete. These are so limited and
comparativelyunimportant a class,that it will be
well to dispose of them, at once.

Confusionof the Sense-Impression.

The most interesting caseof such an error is where
the impression is unfamiliar and novel in character.
I have already remarked that in the mental life of
the adult perfectly new sensations never occur. At
the same time, comparatively novel impressionssome-
times arise. Parts of the sensitivesurfaceof the body
which rarely undergo stimulation are sometimesacted
on, and at other times they receive partially new
modesof stimulation. In such casesit is plain that
the processof classingthe sensationor recognizing
it is not completed. It is found that whenever this
happensthereis a tendencyto exaggerate the intensity
of the sensation. The very fact of unfainiliarity seems
to give to the sensation a certain exciting character.
As something new and strange, it for the instant
slightly agitatesand discomposes the mind. Being-
unableto classifyit with its like, we naturally magnify
 NOVEL SENSE-IMPKESSIONS. 41

its intensity, and so tend to ascribe it to a dispro-

portionatelylarge cause.
For instance,a light bandageworn about the body
at a part usually free from pressureis liable to be
conceivedas a weighty mass. The odd senseof a
big cavity in the mouth, which we experiencejust
after the loss of a tooth, is probably another illus-
tration of this principle. And a third examplemay
alsobe suppliedfrom the recollection of the dentist's
patient, namely,the absurdimaginationwhich he
tends to form as to what is actually going on in his
mouth when a tooth is being bored by a modern
rotating drill. It may be found that the sameprin-
ciple helps to accountfor the exaggeratedimportance
which we attach to the impressions of our dreams.
It is evident that all indistinct impressions are
liable to be wrongly classed. Sensationsansweringto
a given colour or form, are,whenfaint, easily confused
with other sensations,and so an opening occurs for
illusion. Thus, the impressions received from distant
objectsare frequently misinterpreted,and, as wreshall
seeby-and-by,it is in this region of hazy impression
that imagination is wont to play its most startling
pranks.
It is to be observed that the illusions arising from
wrong classificationwill be more frequent in the case
of those senseswhere discrimination is low. Thus, it
is much easier in a general way to confuse two
sensations of smell than two sensations of colour.
Hencethe great sourceof such errorsis to be found
in that mass of obscure sensation which is connected
with the organicprocesses,
asdigestion,respiration,etc.,
42 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

together with thosevarying tactual and motorfeelings.

which result from what is called the subjective stimu-
lation of the tactual nerves, and from changes in the
position and condition of the muscles. Lying com-
monly in what is known as the sub-conscious region
of mind, undiscriminated,vague.,and ill-defined, these
sensations,
whentliey cometo be speciallyattendedto,.
readily get misapprehended, and so lead to illusion,
both in waking life and in sleep. I shall have
occasion to illustrate this later on.
With these sensations, the result of stimulations-
coming from remote parts of the organism, may be
classed the ocular impressions which we receive in
indirect vision. When the eye is not fixed on an
object,the impression,involving the activity of some-
peripheralregion of the retina, is comparativelyindis-
tinct. This will bemuchmorethe casewhenthe object
lies at a distancefor which the eye is not at the time
accommodated. And in these circumstances,when we
happento turn our attention to the impression,we-
easily misapprehend it, and so fall into illusion. Thus,
it has been remarked by Sir David Brewster, in his
LettersonNatural Magic(letter vii.), that whenlooking
through a window at some object beyond, we easily
supposea fly on the window-pane to be a larger object,.
as a bird, at a greaterdistance.1
1 It may be said,perhaps,that the exceptionaldirection of attention,
by giving an unusual intensity to the impression,causesits to exagge-
rate it just as in the case of a novel sensation. An effort of attention
directed to any of our vague bodily sensations easily leads us to-
magnify its cause. A similar confusion may arise even in direct
vision, when the objects are looked at in a dim light, through a want
of proper accommodation. (See Sir D. Brewster, op. cit.j letter i)
 INDISTINCT SENSE-IMPKESSIONS. 43

While thesecasesof a confusionor a wrongclassi-

fication of the sensationare pretty well made out, there
are other illusions or quasi-illusionsrespectingwhich
it is doubtful whether they should be brought under
this head. For example, it was found by Weber,
that when the legs of a pair of compassesare at a
certain small distanceapart they will be felt as two
by someparts of the tactual surfaceof the body,but
only as one by other parts. How are we to regard
this discrepancy? Must we say that in the latter case
there are two sensations,only that, being so similar.,
they are confusedone with another? There seems
some reason for so doing, in the fact that, by a re-
peated exerciseof attention to the experiment, they
may afterwardsbe recognizedas two.
We here come on the puzzling question, How much
in the character of the sensationmust be regarded
as the necessaryresult of the particular mode of nervous
stimulation at the moment, together with the laws of
sensibility, and how much must be put clownto the
reaction of the mind in the shape of attention and
discrimination? For our presentpurposewe may say
that, whenever a deliberate effort of attention does
not suffice to alter the character of a sensation, this
may be pretty safely regardedas a net result of the
nervous process,and any error arising may be referred
to the later stages of the processof perception. Thus,
for example, the taking of the two points of a pair of
compasses
for one,wherethe closestattention doesnot
discover the error, is best regarded as arising, not from
a confusionof the sense-impression,
but from a wrong
interpretation of a sensation,occasioned by an over-
44 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION".

looking of the limits of local discriminative sensi-

bility.

Misinterpretation
of theSense-Impression.
Enough has been said, perhaps,aboutthoseerrors
of perceptionwhich havetheir root in the initial pro-
cess of sensation. We may now pass to the far more
importantclassof illusionswhicharerelatedto the later
stagesof perception,that is to say,the processof inter-
preting the sense-impression. Speakinggenerally,one
may describean illusion of perceptionas a misinter-
pretation. The wrong kind of interpretative mental
image gets combinedwith the impression,or, if with
Helmholtz we regard perception as a processof "un-
conscious inference," we may say that these illusions
involve an unconscious fallacious conclusion. Or,
looking at the physical side of the operation,it may
be said that the central course taken by the nervous
processdoesnot correspondto the external relations
of the moment.
As soon as we inspect these illusions of inter-
pretation, we see that they fall into two divisions,
accordingas they are connectedwith the processof
suggestion,that is to say, the formation of the inter-
pretative image so far as determined by links of
association with the actual impression, or with an in-
dependentprocessof preperception as explainedabove.
Thus, for example,wefall into the illusion of hearing-
two voiceswhenour shoutis echoedback,just because
the secondauditory impressionirresistibly calls up
the imageof a secondshouter. On the other hand,a
man experiencesthe illusion of seeing spectresof
 PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ILLUSIONS. 45

familiar "objectsjust after exciting his imagination

over a ghost-story,becausethe mind is strongly pre-
disposedto frame this kind of percept. The first
class of illusions arises from without, the sense-im-
pressionbeing the starting-point, and the processof
preperceptionbeing controlled by this. The second
class arises rather from within, from an independent or
spontaneous
activity of the imagination. In the one
casethe mind is comparatively passive ; in the other
it is active, energetically reacting on the impression,
and impatiently anticipating the result of the normal
processof preperception. Hence I shall, for brevity's
sake,commonlyspeak of them as Passiveand Active
Illusions.1
I may, perhaps,illustrate these two classesof illusion
by the simile of an interpreter poring over an old
manuscript. The first would be due to some
peculiarity in the documentmisleadinghis judgment,
the secondto some caprice or preconceived notion in
the interpreter's mind.
It is not difficult to define conjecturally the
physiological conditions of these two large classes of
illusion. On the physical side, an illusion of sense,
like a just perception,is the result of a fusion of the
nervous process answering to a sensation with a
nervous process answering to a mental image. In
the caseof passiveillusions, this fusion may be said
to take place in consequence of some point of con-
nection between the two. The existence of such a
connectionappearsto be involved in the very fact of
1 They might alsobe distinguishedas objectiveand subjective
illusions,or asillusionsa posterioriand illusionsa priori.
46 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

suggestion,andmay be saidto bethe organicresult

of frequentconjunctions
of thetwopartsof thenervous
operationin ourpasthistory. In the caseof active
illusions, however,which spring rather from the in-
dependentenergy of a particular mode of the
imagination,this point of organic connectionis not
the only or eventhe main thing. In many cases,as
we shall see,there is only a faint shade of resem-
blancebetweenthe presentimpressionand the mental
image with which it is overlaid. The illusions de-
pendenton vivid, expectationthus answermuch less
to an objectiveconjunctionof pastexperiencesthan to
a capricious subjective conjunction of mental images.
Here, then, the fusion of nervous processesmust have
another cause. And it is not difficult to assign such a
cause. The antecedent activity of imagination doubt-
lessinvolvesasits organicresult a powerfultemporary
dispositionin the nervousstructuresconcernedto go on
acting. In other words, they remain in a state of sub-
excitation,which can be raisedto full excitation by a
slight additional force. The more powerful this dis-
positionin the centresinvolved in the act of imagina-
tion, the less the additional force of external stimulus
required to excite them to full activity.
Consideringthe first division, passiveillusions, a
little further, we shall seethat they may be broken
up into two sub-classes, accordingto the causesof the
errors. In a generalway weassume that the impression
always answersto some quality of the object which
is perceived,andvarieswith this; that, for example,our
sensationof. colour invariably representsthe quality
of external colour which we attribute to the object.
 CONDITIONS OF PASSIVE ILLUSION. 47

Or, to expressit physically,we assumethat the ex-

ternal force acting on the sense-organinvariably
produces
the sameeffect,and that the effect always
varies with the external cause. But this assumption,
though true in the main,is not perfectly correct. It
supposes
that the organicconditions
areconstant,
and
that the organicprocessfaithfully reflectsthe external
operation. Neither of these suppositionsis strictly
true. Although in generalwe may abstractfrom,the
organismandview the relationbetweenthe external
fact and the mental impression as direct, we cannot
-alwaysdo so.
This being so,it is possiblefor errorsof perception
to arise through peculiarities of the nervous organi-
zation itself. Thus, as I have just observed,sensibility
has its limits, and these limits are the starting-point
in a certain classof widely shared or commonillusions.
An example of this variety is the taking of the two
points of a pair of compasses
for one by the hand,
already referred to. Again, the condition of the ner-
vous structures varies indefinitely, so that one and the
same stimulus may, in the case of two individuals, or
of the same individual at different times, produce
widely unlike modesof sensation. Such variations
are clearly fitted to lead to gross individual errors as
to the external cause of the sensation. Of this sort
is the illusory senseof temperaturewhich we often
experiencethrough a special state of the organ em-
ployed.
While there are these errorsof interpretationdue
to some peculiarity of the organization, there are
others which involve no such peculiarity, but arise
48 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

through the special characteror exceptionalconfor-

mation of the environment at the moment. Of this*
order are the illusions connected with the reflection of
light and sound. We may, perhaps,distinguish the
first sub-classas organically conditioned illusions, and
the second as extra-organically determined illusions.
It may be addedthat the latter areroughly describable
as commonillusions. They thus answer in a measure
to the first variety of organically conditioned illusions,.
namely,thoseconnectedwith the limits of sensibility.
On the other hand, the active illusions, being es-
sentially individual or subjective,may be said to
correspondto the other variety of this class-those
connectedwith variations of sensibility.
Our schemeof sense-illusionsis now complete.
First of all, we shall take up the passive illusions,
beginningwith thosewhich are conditionedby special
circumstances in the organism. After that we shall
illustrate those which depend on peculiar circumstances
in the environment. And finally, we shall separately
consider what I have called the active illusions of
sense.

It is to be observed that these illusions of per-

ception properly so called,namely,the errors arising
from a wrong interpretation of an impression, and,
not from a confusion of one impression with another
are chiefly illustrated in the region of the two higher
senses,sight and hearing. For it is here, as we
have seen,that the interpretative imagination has
most work to do in evolving complete percepts of
material, tangible objects,having certain relationsin
space,out of a limited and homogeneous class of
 SCHEME OF SENSE ILLUSIONS. 49

sensations,namely, those of light and colour, and of

sound. As I havebeforeobserved,tactual perception,
in sofar as it is the recognition of an object of a certain
size,hardness,and distance from our body, involves the
least degreeof interpretation, and so offers little room
for error; it is only when tactual perception amounts to
the recognition of an individual object, clothed with
secondary
as well as primary qualities,that an opening
for palpable error occurs.
With respect, however, to the first sub-class of
these illusions,,namely, those arising from organic
peculiaritieswhich give a twist, so to speak, to the
sensation, no very marked contrast between the
differentsensespresentsitself. So that in illustrating
this groupwe shall be pretty equally concernedwith
the various modes of perception connected with the
different senses.
It may be said oncefor all that in thus marking
off from one another certain groups of illusion, I am
not unmindful of the fact that these divisions answer
to no very sharp natural distinctions. In fact, it will
be found that one classgradually passesinto the other,
and that the different characteristicshere separated
often combine in a most perplexing way. All that is
claimed for this classification is that it is a convenient
modeof mappingoutthe subject.
*
 CHAPTER IV.

ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION-continued.

A. PassiveIllusions(a) as determined
ly the Organism.
IN dealing with the illusions which are related to
certain peculiaritiesin the nervousorganismand the
laws of sensibility, I shall commencewith those which
are connectedwith certain limits of sensibility.

Limits of Sensibility.
To begin with, it is knownthat the sensationdoes
not always answerto the external stimulus in its degree
or intensity. Thus, a certain amount of stimulation
is necessarybefore any sensationarises. And this will,
of course,be greater when there is little or no attention
directed to the impression, that is to say, no co-opera-
ting central reaction. Thus it happensthat slight
stimuli go overlooked, and here illusion may have its
starting-point. The most familiar example of such
slight errors is that of movement. When we are look-
ing at objects,our ocularmusclesare apt to execute
very slight movements which escapeour notice. Hence
we tend,undercertain circumstances, to carry overthe
retinal resultof the movement,that is to say, the in>
 EELATION OF STIMULUS TO SENSATION. 51

pression
producedby a shifting of the partsof the retinal
image to new nervous elements, to the object itself,
and so to transform a "subjective" into an "objective"
movement. In a very interesting work on apparentor
illusory movements,
ProfessorHoppe has fully investi-
gated the facts of such slight movements, and endea-
voured to specify their causes.1
Again, evenwhenthe stimulus is sufficientto pro-
ducea consciousimpression,the degreeof the feeling
may not represent the degree of the stimulus. To
takea very inconspicuous case,it is found by Eechner
that a given increaseof forcein the stimulus produces
a lessamountof differencein the resulting sensations
when the original stimulus is a powerful one than
when it is a feeble one. It follows from this, that
differences in the degree of our sensations do not
exactly correspondto objective differences. For
example,we tend to magnify the differencesof light
amongobjects,all of which arefeebly illuminated, that
is to say,to seethem much more removedfrom one
anotherin point of brightness than when they are
more strongly illuminated. Helmholtz relates that,
owing to this tendency,he has occasionallycaught
himself, on a dark night, entertaining the illusion that
1 Die Schein-Bewegungen, von Professor Dr. J. I. Hoppe (1879);
c/. an ingenious article on " Optical Illusions of Motion," by Professor
Silvanus P. Thompson,in Brain, October, 1880. These illusions fre-
quently involve the co-operationof somepreconception or expectation.
For example, the apparent movementof a train when wo are watching
it and expecting it to move, involves both an element of senae-
impression and of imagination. It is possible that the illusion of
table-turning rests on the samebasis, the table-turner being unaware
of the fact of exerting a certain amount of muscular force, and vividly
expecting a movementof the object.
52 ILLUSIONS OF PEECEPTION.

the comparativelybright objects visible in twilight

were self-luminous.1
Again, thereare limits to the consciousseparation
of sensationswhich are received together, and this fact
gives rise to illusion. In general, the number of
distinguishable sensations answers to the number of
external causes; but this is not always the case,and
here we naturally fall into the error of mistaking the
number of the stimuli. Reference has already been
made to this fact in connection with the question
whether consciousness can be mistaken as to the
character of a present feeling.
The case of confusing two impressions when the
sensoryfibres involved are very near one another, has
alreadybeenalluded to. Both in touch and in sight
we always take two or more points for one when they
are only separated
by an interval that falls below the
limits of local discrimination. It seems to follow
from this that our perception of the world as a con-
tinuum, made.up of points perfectly continuousone
with another may, for what we know, be illusory.
Supposingthe universeto consistof atoms separated
by very fineintervals,then it is demonstrablethat it
wouldappearto our sensibilityas a continuum,just as
it does now.2
Two or more simultaneous sensations are indis-

1 PhysiologiscJieOptik, p. 316.
2 It is plain that this supposed
errorcouldonly be broughtunder
our definition of illusion by extending the latter, so as to include
sense-perceptionswhich are contradicted by reasonemploying idealized
elements
of sense-impression,
which,as Leweshasshown(Problems
of
Life and Mind, i. p. 260), make up the " extra-sensible world" of
science.
 COALESCENCE OF SENSATIONS. 53

tinguishablefrom one another.,not only when they

have nearly the samelocal origin, but under other
circumstances. The blending of partial sensations of
tone in a &Zan<7-sensation,
and the coalescencein certain
casesof the impressionsreceivedby way of the two
retinas,are examplesof "this. It is not quite cer-
tain what determines this fusion of two simultaneous
feelings. It may be said generallythat it is favoured
by similarity betweenthe sensations;1by a compara-
tive feeblenessof one of the feelings; by the fact of
habitual concomitance, the two sensations occurring
rarely, if ever, in isolation; and by the presenceof a
mentaldispositionto view them as answeringto one
external object. These considerations help us to ex-
plain the coalescence
of the retinal impressionsand its
limits, the fusion of partial tones, and so on.2
It is plain that this fusion of sensations,whatever
its exact conditions may be, gives rise to error or
wrong interpretation of the sense-impression. Thus, to
take the points of two legs of a pair of compassesfor
one point is clearly an illusion of perception. Here
is another and less familiar example. Very cold and
smooth surfaces,as those of metal, often appear to be
wet. I never feel sure, after wiping the blades of my
skates,that they are perfectly dry, sincethey always
1 An ingenious writer, M. Binet, has tried to prove that the fusion
of homogeneoussensations,having little difference of local colour, is
an illustration of this principle. (See the Revue Philosophise,
September,1880.)
2 Even the fusion of elementary sensations of colour, on the
hypothesis of Young and Helmholtz, in a seemingly simple sensation
may be explained to some extent by these circumstances,more espe-
cially the identity of local interpretation.
54 ILLUSIONS OF PEKCEPTIOlSr.

seemmore or less damp to my hand. What is the

reasonof this ? Helmholtz explainsthe phenomenon
by saying that the feeling we call by the name of
wetness is a compound sensation consisting of one of
temperature and one of touch proper. These sen-
sations occurring together So frequently, blend into
one, and so we infer, according to the general instinc-
tive tendency already noticed, that there is one
specificquality answeringto the feeling. And since
the feeling is nearly always producedby surfaces
moistened by cold liquid, we refer it to this circum-
stance,and speak of it as a feeling of wetness. Hence,
when the particular conjunction of sensationsarises
apartfrom this external circumstance,
we erroneously
infer its presence.1
The most interesting case of illusion connected
with the fusion of simultaneous sensations, is that of
single vision, or the deeply organizedhabit of com-
bining the sensationsof what are called the corre-
spondingpoints of the two retinas. This coalescence
of two sensations is so far erroneous since it makes us
overlookthe existenceof two distinctexternalagencies
acting on differentparts of the sensitivesurfaceof the
body. And this is the more striking in the caseof
1 The perception of lustre as a single quality seemsto illustrate
a like error. There is good reason to supposethat this impression
arises through a difference of brightness in the two retinal images
due to the regularly reflected light. And so when this inequality
of retinal impression is imitated, as it may easily be by combining a
black and a white surface in a stereoscope, we imagine that we are
looking at one lustrous surface. (See Helmholtz, Pliysiologisclie
Optih,p. 782,etc.,and Popularewissensdiaftliche
Vortrage,
2tesHeft,
p. 80.)
 AFTER-SENSATION. 55

looking at solid objects,since liere it is demonstrable

that the forces acting on the two" retinas are not
perfectlysimilar. Nevertheless,
such,a coalescence
plainly answersto the fact that theseexternalagencies
usuallyariseia one andthe sameobject,and this unity
of the object is, of course,the all-important thing to
be sure of.
This habit may, however, beget palpable illusion
in another way. In certain exceptional cases the
coalescencedoes not take place, as when I look at a
distant objectand hold a pencil just beforemy eyes.1
And in this case the organized tendency to take one
visualimpressionfor one object assertsits force,and I
tend to fall into the illusion of seeing two separate
pencils. If I do not wholly lapseinto the error, it is
becausemy experiencehas made me vaguely aware
that double images under these circumstancesanswer
to one object, and that if there were really two pencils
presentI shouldhavefour visual impressions.
Once more, it is a law of sensory stimulation that
an impressionpersistsfor an appreciabletime after
the cessation of the action of the stimulus. This
" after sensation" will clearly lead to illusion, in so far
as we tend to think of the stimulus as still at work.
It forms, indeed, as will be seen by-and-by, the
simplest and lowest stage of hallucination. Some-
times this becomesthe first stageof a palpable error.
After listening to a child crying for sometime the ear
1 The conditions of tlio production of these double imageshave
been accurately determined by Helmholtz, who shows that tlio
coalescenceof impressions takes place whenever the object is so
situated in the field of vision as to make it practically necessarythat
it should be recognized as one.
5t) , ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

easilydeceivesitself into supposingthat tlie noiseis

continued when it lias actually ceased. Again, after
taking a bandagefrom a finger, the tingling and
other sensationsdue to the pressure sometimes per-
sist for a good time, in which casethey easily give
rise to an illusion that the finger is still bound,
It follows from this fact of the reverberation of the
nervous structures after the removal of a stimulus, that
whenever two discontinuous stimulations follow one
another rapidly enough^ they will appear continuous.
This fact is a fruitful source of optical illusion. The
appearance of a blending of the stripes of colours
on a rotating disc or top5 of the formation of a ring of
light by swinging round a piece of burning wood, and
the illusion of the toy known as the thauniatrope, or
wheel of life, all depend on this persistenceof retinal
impression. Many of the startling effectsof sleight of
hand are undoubtedlydue in part to this principle.
If two successive actions or sets of circumstances to
whichthe attentionof the spectatoris speciallydirected
follow one another by a very narrow interval of time,
they easily appearcontinuous, so that there seems
absolutely no time for the introduction of an inter-
mediate step.1
There is anotherlimit to sensibilitywhich is in a
manner the opposite to the one just named. It is a
1 These illusions are, of course,due in part to inattention, since
close critical scrutiny is often sufficient to dispel them. They are
also largely promotedby a preconceptionthat the event is going to
happenin a particular way. But of this more further on. I may add
that the late Professor Clifford has argued ingeniously against the
idea of the world being a continuum, by extending this idea of the
wheel of life. (SeeLecturesand Essays,i. p. 112,
 PROLONGED STIMULATION. 57

law of nervous stimulation that a continued activity of

any structureresults.in less and less psychic result,
and that when a stimulus is always at work it ceases
in time to have any appreciable effect. The common
illustration of this law is drawn from the region of
sound. A constant noise, as of a mill, ceasesto pro-
duce any conscious sensation. This fact, it is plain,
may easily become the commencementof an illusion.
Not only maywe mistakea measureof noisefor perfect
silence,1we may misconceive the real nature of ex-
ternal circumstancesby overlooking some continuous
impression.
Curious illustrations of this effect are found in
optical illusions, namely, the errors we make re-
specting the movement of stationary objects after
continuedmovementof the eyes. When,for example,
in a railway carriage we have for some time been
following the (apparent) movement of objects, as trees,
etc., and turn our eyes to an apparently stationary
object, as the carpet of the compartment, this seemsto
move in the contrary direction to that of the trees.
Helmholtz's explanation of this illusion is that when
wesuppose that weare fixing our eyeon the carpet we
arereally continuing to move it over the surface by
reasonof the organictendency,alreadyspokenof, to go
on doing anything that has been done. But since wo
are unaware of this prolonged series of ocular move-
ments,the muscular feelings having becomefaint, we
take the impressionproducedby the slidiDg of the
1 It is supposedthat in the case of every sense-organthere is
always someminimum forcesof stimulus at work, the eflect of which
on our consciousness is niL
58 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

picture over the retina to be the result of a movement

of the object1
Another limit to our sensibility, which needsto be
just touchedon here,is known by the nameof the
specificenergyof the nerves. Oneand the samenerve-
fibre always reacts in a precisely similar way, whatever
the nature of the stimulus. Thus, when the optic nerve
is stimulated in any manner, whether by light, me-
chanical pressure,or an electric current, the same
effect,a sensationof light, follows.2 In a usualway, a
given classof nerve-fibreis only stimulated by one
kind of stimulus. Thus, the retina, in ordinary circum-
stances,is stimulated by light. Owing to this fact,
there has arisen a deeply organizedhabit of translating
the impressionin one particular way. Thus, I in-
stinctively regard a sensationreceived by meansof
the optic nerveas onecausedby light.
Accordingly, whenevercircumstancesarise in which
a like sensationis produced by another kind of stimu-
lus, we fall into illusion. The phosphenes,or circles of
light which areseenwhenthe hinder part of the eye-
1 See Helmholtz, Phy&iologisclieOptiJ^ p. 603. Helmlioltz's ex-
planation is criticised by Dr. Hoppe, in the work already referred to
(sec. vii), though. I cannot see that his own theory of these move-
mentsis essentially different. The apparent movementof objects in
vertigo, or giddiness,is probably due to the loss, through a physical
cause,of the impressionsmade by the pressureof the fluid contents of
the ear on the auditory fibres, by which the senseof equilibrium and
of rotation is usually received. (See Ferrier, Functions of tlie Brain,
pp. GO,61.)
2 I do not needhere to go into the question whether, as Johannes
Miiller assumed,this is an original attribute of nerve-structure, or
whether, as Wundt suggests,it is due simply to the fact that certain
Idnc^ of nervous fibre have, in the course of evolution, been slowly
adaptedto one kind of stimulus.
 SPECIFIC ENERGY OF NEBVES. 59

ball is pressed,may be said to be illusory in so far as

we speakof them as perceptionsof light, thus referring
them to the external physical agency which usually
causes them. The same remark applies to those
" subjective sensations."as they are called, which are
known to have as their physical cause subjective
stimuli, consisting, in the case of sight, in varying
conditions of the peripheral organ?as increased blood-
pressure. Strictly speaking,such simple feelings as
these appear to be, involve an ingredient of false per-
ception: in saying that we perceivelight at all, we go
beyondthe pure sensation,interpreting this wrongly.
Very closely connectedwith this limitation of our
sensibility is another which refers to the consciousness
of the local seat, or origin of the impression. This
has so far its basis in the sensation itself as it is well
known that (within the limits of local discrimination.,
referred to above) sensationshave a particular a local"
colour,which varies in the case of each of the nervous
fibres by the stimulation of which they arise.1 But
though this much is known through a differencein
the sensibility,nothing more is known. Nothing can
certainly be ascertained by a mere inspection of the
sensation as to the distance the nervous process has
travelled, whether from, the peripheral termination of
the fibre or from someintermediate point.
In a general way, we refer our sensationsto the
peripheralendingsof the nervesconcerned,according
to what physiologists have called " the law of eccen-
1 I here refer to what is commonly supposed to "be tlio vague
innate difference of sensation according to the local origin, before this
is renderedprecise,and added to by experienceand association.
60 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

tricity." Thus I am said to feel the pain causedby

a braise in the foot in the member itself. This applies
also to some of the sensationsof the special senses.
Thus, impressionsof taste are clearly localizedin the
corresponding peripheralterminations.
With respectto the senseof smell,and still more
to thoseof hearingand sight, wherethe impressionis
usually causedby an object at a distancefrom the
peripheralorgan,our attention to this external cause
leads us to overlook in part the " bodily seat" of the
sensation. Yet even here we are dimly aware that
the sensationis received by way of a particular part of
the sensitive surface, that is to say, by a particular
sense-organ.Thus,thoughreferring an odourto a dis-
tant flower,weperceivethat the sensationof odourhas
its bodily origin in the nose. And evenin the caseof
hearingand sight, we vaguelyrefer the impressions,as
such,to the appropriatesense-organ.Thereis, indeed,
in these cases a double local reference, a faint one to
the peripheralorganwhich is actedon, and a moredis-
tinct oneto the objector the forcein the environment
which acts on this.
Now, it may be said that the act of localization is
in itself distinctly illusory, since it is known that the
Sensation first arises in connection with the excitation
of the sensorycentre,and not of the peripheralfibre.1
1 The illusory character of this simple mode of perception is seen
best, perhaps,in the curioushabit into which we fall of referring
a sensationof contact or discomfort to the edgeof the teeth, the hair,
and the other insentient structures, and evento anything customarily
attached to the sentient surface, as dress, a pen, graving tool, etc.
On these curious illusions, seeLotze, Mihroltosmus,third edit., vol. ii.
p. 202, etc. ; Taine, De VIntelligence, lorn. ii. p. S3,et seg.
 LOCALIZATION OF IMPRESSION. 61

Yet it must at least be allowed that this localization of

sensation answers to the important fact that, under
usual circumstances, the agencyproducing the sensa-
tion is appliedat this particular point of the organism,
the knowledgeof which point is supposedby modern
psychologiststo have been very slowly learnt by the
individual and the race, through countless experiments
with the moving organ of touch, assisted by the eye.
Similarly, the reference of the impression, in the
caseof hearing and sight, to an object in the environ-
ment,though,as we have seen,from onepoint of view
illusory, clearly answersto a fact of our habitual ex-
perience; for in an immense preponderanceof casesat
leasta visualor auditory impressiondoesarisethrough
the action on the sense-organof a force (ether or air
waves)proceeding from a distant object.
In some circumstances, however, even this element
of practical truth disappears, and the localization of
the impression,both within and without the organism,
becomesaltogether illusory. This result is involved in
the illusions, already spoken of, which arise from the
instinctivetendencyto refer sensationsto the ordinary
kind of stimulus. Thus, when a feeling resulting
from a disturbancein the optic nerve is interpreted
as one of external light vaguelyfelt to be acting oft
the eye,or one resulting from someactionset up
in the auditor}7 fibre as a sensation of external sound
vaguely felt to be entering the ear,we seethat the
error of localizationis a consequence
of the other error
already characterized.
As I have already observed, an excitation of a
nerve at any other point than the peripheral termi-
62 ILLUSIONS OF PEECEPTION.

nation,occursbut rarely in normal life. Onefamiliar

instance is the stimulation of the nerve running to
the hand and fingers,by a sharp blow on the elbow
over which it passes. As everybodyknows,this gives
rise to a senseof pain at the extremities of the nerve.
The most common illustration of such errors of locali-
zation is found in subjectivesensations,
such as the
impressionwe sometimeshave of somethingcreeping
over the skin, of a disagreeable taste in the mouth,
of luminous spotsfloating acrossthe field of vision,
and so on. The exact physiologicalseat of theseis
often a matter of conjecture only; yet it may safely
be said that in many instances the nervous excitation
originates at somepoint considerably short of its peri-
pheral extremity : in which case there occurs the
illusion of referring the impressions to the peripheral
sense-organ,and to an external force acting on this.
The most striking instances of these errors of
localization are found in abnormal circumstances.
It is well known that a man who has lost a leg
refers all sensationsarising from a stimulation of the
truncated fibres to his lost foot, and in some caseshas
even to convince himself of the non-existence of his
lost member by sight or touch. Patients often de-
scribe these experiencesin very odd language. " If,"
says one of Dr. Weir Mitchell's patients, " I should
say I am more sure of the leg which ain't than the
one which air, I guessI should be about correct."l

1 Quoted by G-.H. Lewes, Problemsof Life and Hind, third

series,p. 335. These illusions are supposedto involve an excitation
of the nerve-fibres (whether sensory or motor) which run to the
musclesand yield the so-calledmuscular sensations.
 ILLUSORY LOCALIZATION. G3

There is good reason for supposing that this source

of error plays a prominent part in the illusions of the
insane. Diseasedcentres may be accompaniedby
disordered peripheral structures, and so subjective
sensation may frequently be the starting-point of the
wildest illusions. Thus, a patient's horror of poison
may haveits first origin in somesubjectivegustatory
sensation. Similarly, subjectivetactual sensationsmay
give rise to grossillusions,as whena patient " feels"
his body attackedby foul and destructivecreatures.
It may be well to remark that this mistaken in-
terpretationof the seator origin of subjectivesensation
is closely related to hallucination. In so far as the
error involves the ascription of the sensation to a
force external to the sense-organ,,this part of the
mental processmust, when there is no such force
present,be viewedas hallucinatory. Thus, the feeling
of somethingcreepingoverthe skin is an hallucination
in the sensethat it implies the ideaof an object ex-
ternal to the skin. Similarly, the projection of an
ocular impressiondue to retinal disturbanceinto tho
external field of vision, may rightly be named an hallu-
cination. But the case is not always so clear as this.
Thus, for example,when a gustatory sensationis the
result of an alteredconditionof the saliva, it may be
said that the error is as much an illusion as an hallu-
cination.1

In a wide sense,again, all errors connectedwith

1 It is brought out by Griesingci (Joe.tit.) and the other writers
on the pathology of illusion already quoted, that in the case of
subjective sensationsof touch, taste, and smell, no sharp line can be
drawn between illusion and hallucination.
64 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

those subjective sensationswhich arise from a stimu-

lation of the peripheralregionsof the nerve may be
called illusions rather than hallucinations. Or, if they
must be called halluci nations, they may be dis-
tinguished as " peripheral " from those " central "
hallucinations which arise through an internal auto-
matic excitation of the sensory centre. It is plain
from this that the region of subjective sensationis an
ambiguousregion, where illusion and hallucination mix
and becomeconfused. To this point I shall have
occasionto return by-and-by.
I have now probably said enough respectingthe
illusions that arise through the fact of there being
fixed limits to our sensibility. The rationaleof these
illusions Is that whenever the limit is reached, we tend
to ignore it and to interpret the impressionin the
customary way.

Variationsof Sensibility.
We will now pass to a number of illusions which
dependon somethingvariable in the condition of our
sensibility, or somemore or less exceptionalorganic
circumstance. These variations may be momentary
and transient or comparativelypermanent. The illu-
sion arisesin eachcasefrom our ignoring the variation,
and treatinga given sensationunderall circumstances
as answering to one objective cause,
First of all, the variation of organic state may-
affectour mentalrepresentationof the strengthof the
stimulusor external cause. Herethe fluctuation may
be a temporary or a permanent one. The first caseis
illustrated in the familiar exampleof taking a room
 HYPEE^ESTHESIA AND ANESTHESIA. 65

to 'be brighter than it is when emerging from a dark

one. Another striking example is that of our sense
of the temperature of objects, which is known to be
strictly relative to a previous sensation, or more cor-
rectly to the momentary condition of the organ. Yet,
though everyintelligent personknowsthis, the deeply
rooted habit of making sensation the measure of
objectivequality assertsits sway,and frequently leads
us into illusion. The well-known experiment of first
plunging one handin cold water,the other in hot, and
then dipping them both in tepid,is a startling example
of this organizedtendency. For here we are strongly
disposedto acceptthe palpable contradictionthat the
same water is at once warm and cool.
Far more important than these temporary fluctu-
ations of sensibility are the permanent alterations.
Excessivefatigue, want of propernutrition, and certain
poisonsare well knownto be causesof such changes.
They appearmost commonlyunder two forms,exalted
sensibility,or hypersesthesia,
and depressed sensibility,
or anaesthesia. In these conditions flagrant errors are
made as to the real magnitude of the causesof the
sensations. These variations inay occur in normal life
to someextent. In fairly goodhealth we experienceat
times strangeexaltationsof tactual sensibility, so that
a very slight stimulus*suchas the contact of the bed-
clothes, becomesgreatly exaggerated.
In diseased states of the nervous system these
variationsof sensibility becomemuch more striking.
The patient who has hypercesthesia fears to touch a
perfectly smoothsurface,or he takes a knock at the
doorto be a clapof thunder. The hypochondriacmay,
(56 ILLUSIONS OF PEEOEPTION.

through an increaseof organic sensibility,translate

organicsensations
asthe effectof someliving creature
gnawing at his vitals. Again, states of ansesthesia
lead to odd illusions among the insane. The common
suppositionthat the body is dead, or made of wood
or of glass,is clearly referablein part to loweredsensi-
bility of the organism.1
It is worth adding, perhaps, that these variations
in sensibility give rise not only to sensory but also to
motor illusions. To take a homely instance,the last
miles of a long walk seemmuch longer than the first,
not only becausethe senseof fatigue leading us to
dwell on the transition of time tends to magnify the
apparentduration,but because
the fatiguedmusclesand
connected nerves yield a new set of sensationswhich
constitute an exaggerated standard of measurement.
A number of optical illusions illustrate the same
thing. Our visual senseof directionis determinedin
part by the feelings accompanying the action of the
ocular muscles, and so is closely connected with the
perception of movement,which has already been
touched on. If an ocular muscle is partially para-
lyzedit takesa much greater" effort" to effecta given
extent of movement than when the muscle is sound.
Hence any movementperformedby the eye seems
exaggerated. Hence,too, in this conditionobjectsare
seen in a wrong direction; for the patient reasons
that they are where they would seernto be if he had
executeda wider movementthan he really has. This
may easily be proved by asking him to try to seize
1 For a fuller account of these pathological disturbances of
sensibility, seeGriesinger; also Dr. A. Mayer, Die SinnestiiuscJiunyen.
 PAR2ESTHESIA. 67

tlie objectwith,his hand* The effectis exaggerated

whencompleteparalysis sets in, and no actual move-
ment occurs in obedience to the impulse from
within.1
Variations in the condition of the nerve affect not
only the degree,but also the quality of the sensation,
and this fact gives rise to a new kind of illusion.
The curious phenomenaof colour-contrastillustrate
momentary alterations of sensibility. When, after
looking at a green colour for a time, I turn my eye
to a grey surfaceand seethis of the complementary
rose-red hue, the effect is supposed to be due to a
temporaryfatigueof the retina in relationto those
ingredients
of the total light in the second
casewhich
answerto the partial light in the first (the greenrays).2
These momentary modifications of sensibility are

1 Helmlioltz, op. cif., p. GOO,

et seq* These facts seemto point to the
conclusionthat at least some of the feelings by which we know that
weareexpendingmuscularenergyareconnected
with the initial stage
of the outgoing nervous process in the motor centres. In other
pathologicalconditionsthe senseof weightby the musclesof the arms
is similarly confused.
2 Wundt (PhysiologischePsychologic,p, 053) would exclude from
illusions all those errors of sense-perceptionwhich have their foun-
dation in the normal structure and function of the organs of sense.
TliUP, he would exclude the effects of colour-contrast, e.g. the
apparent modification of two colours in. juxtaposition towards their
common boundary, which probably arises (according to E. Hering)
from some mutual influence of the temporary state of activity of
adjacent retinal elements. To me, however, these appear to be
illusions, since they may be brought under the head of wrong inter-
pretationsof sense-impressions.
When we see a grey patch as
rose-red,as though it were so independently of the action of the com-
plementarylight previouslyor simultaneously,that is to say, as
though it would appear rose-red to an eye independently of this
action, we surely misinterpret.
68 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

of no practical significance,being almost instantly

corrected. -Other modifications are more permanent.
It was found by Hiinly that when the retina is over-
excitableeverystimulusis raisedin the spectrumscale
of colours. Thus, violet becomes red. An exactly
oppositeeffectis observedwhen the retina is torpid,1
Certain poisonsare knownto affectthe quality of the
colour-impression. Thus, santonin, when taken in any
quantity, makes all colourlessobjects look yellow.
Severepathologicaldisturbancesareknownto involve,
in addition to hypercesthesia
and anaesthesia,,what,has
been called parsesthesia,
that is to say, that condition
in which the quality of sensationis greatly changed,
Thus, for example, to one in this state all food appears
to have a metallic taste, and so on.
If we now glance back at the variousgroups of
illusions just illustrated, we find that they all have
this feature in common:they dependon the general
mental law that when we have to do with the unfre-
quent, the unimportant, and therefore unattended to,
and the exceptional,we employ the ordinary, the
familiar, and the well-known as our standard. Thus,
whether we are dealing with sensationsthat fall below
the ordinarylimits of our mental experience,
or with
those which arise in some exceptional state of the
organism, we carry the habits formed in the much
wider region of average every-day perception with us.
In a word, illusion in these casesalways arisesthrough
what may, figuratively at least, be described as the
application of a rule, valid for the majority of cases.,
to an exceptional case.
1 Quoted by G. II Lewes.,loc. ctt., p. 257*
 ILLUSION AND HABIT. 69

In the varieties of illusion just considered, tlie

circumstance that gives the peculiarity to the case
thus wrongly interpreted has been referred to the
organism. In the illusions to which we now pass,it
will be referred to the environment At the same
time,it is plain that there is no very sharp distinction
betweenthe two classes. Thus,the visual illusion pro-
ducedby pressingthe eyeball might be regardednot
only as the result of the organic law of the "specific
energy " of the nerves,but, with almost equal appro-
priateness,as the consequence of an exceptionalstate
of things in the environment,,namely, the pressure
of a body on the retina. As I have already observed,
the classificationhere adoptedis to be viewedsimply
as a rough expedientfor securing somethinglike a
systematicreviewof the phenomena.
 CHAPTER V.

ILLUSIOKS OF PERCEPTION-continued.

A. PassiveIllusions (&) as determinedly the

Environment.

IN the following groups of illusion we may look away

from nervous processes and organic disturbances,
regardingthe effect of any external stimulusas cha-
racteristic, that is, as clearly marked off from the
effects of other stimuli, and as constant for the same
stimulus. The source of the illusion will be looked
for in something exceptional in the external circum-
stances,wherebyone object or condition of an object
imitates the effect of another object or condition, to
which,owingto a large preponderance
of experience,
we at once refer it.

ExceptionalEelationof Stimulusto Organ*

A transition from the precedingto the following
elass of illusions is to be met with in those errors
which arise from a very exceptionalrelation between
fchestimulus and the organ of sense. Such a state
of things is naturally interpreted by help of more
commonand familiar relations, and so error arises.
 DISPLACEMENT OF ORGAN". 71

For example, we may grossly misinterpret the

intensity of a stimulus under certain circumstances.
Thus, when a man crunches a biscuit, he lias an un-
comfortable feeling that the noise as of all the struc-
tures of his head being violently smashedis the same
to otherears,and he may evenact on his illusory per-
ception,by keeping at a respectful distancefrom all
observers. And even though he be a physiologist,
and knows that the force of sensation in this case is
due to the propagationof vibrations to the auditory
centre by other channels than the usual one of the ear,
the deeplyorganizedimpulseto measurethe strength
of an external stimulus by the intensity of the sensa-
tion asserts its force.
Again, if we turn to the processof perceptional
construction properly so called, the reference of the
sensationto a material object lying in a certain direc-
tion, etc., we find a similar transitional form of illusion.
The most interesting case of this in visual perception
is that of a disturbanceor displacementof the organ
by external force. For example, an illusory sense of
direction arises by the simple action of closing one
eye, say the left, and pressing the other eyeball with
oneof the fingersa little outwards,that is to the right.
The result of this movement is, of course, to transfer
the retinal picture to new nervous elements further
to the right. And since, in this instance,the dis-
placementis not producedin the ordinary way by
the activity of the ocular muscle making itself known
by certain feelings of movement, it is disregarded
altogether,and the direction of the objectsis judged
asthough the eyewerestationary.
72' ILLUSIONS OF PEBOEPTION.

A somewhat similar illusion as to direction occurs

in auditory perception. The senseof direction by the
ear is known to be due in part to the action of the
auricle, or projecting part of the ear. . This collects
the air-waves, and so adds to the intensity of the
sounds, especially those coining from in front, and
thus assistsin the estimationof direction. This being
so, if an artificial auricle is placed in front of the ears;
if, for example,the two handsare each bent into a
sort of auricle, and placed in front of the ears, the
back of the hand being in front, the sense of direction
(as well as of distance) is confused. Thus, sounds
really travelling from a point in front of the head will
appearto comefrom behind it.
Again, the perceptionof the unity of an object is
liable to be falsifiedby the introductionof exceptional
circumstancesinto the sense-organ. This is illustrated
in the well-knownexperimentof crossingtwo fingers,
saythe third and fourth,and placing a marble or other
small roundobjectbetweenthem. Under ordinarycir-
cumstances,the two lateral surfaces(that is, the outer
surfaces
of thetwofingers)nowpressed
by themarble,
can only be acted on simultaneouslyby two objects
having convex surfaces. Consequently,we cannot
help feeling the presenceof two objectsin this ex-
ceptionalinstance. The illusion is analogousto. that
of the stereoscope,
to be spokenof presently.
Exceptional External Arrangements.
Passingnow to thosecaseswherethe exceptional
circumstanceis altogether exterior to the organ,we
find a familiar example in the illusions connectedwith.
 DIRECTION AND MOVEMENT. 73

the action of well-known physical forces, as the re-

fraction of light, and the reflection of light and
sound. A stick half-immersed in water always looks
broken,howeverwell we may know that the appear-
ance is due to the bending of the rays of light.
Similarly, an echo always soundsas though it came
from someobject in the direction in which the air-
wavesfinally travel to the ear,though we are perfectly
sure that these undulations have taken a circuitous
course. It is hardly necessaryto remind the reader
that the deeply organizedtendency to mistake the
direction of the visible or audible object in these cases
hasfrom remoteagesbeen made useof as.a meansof
populardelusion. Thus, wearetold by Sir D. Brewster,
in his entertaining Letters on Natural Magic (letter
iv.), that the concavemirror wasprobablyused as the
instrument for bringing the gods before the people.
The throwing of the images formed by such mirrors
upon smokeor against fire, so as to make them more
distinct, seemsto have been a favourite device in the
ancient art of necromancy.
Closely connectedwith these illusions of direction
with respectto resting objects, are those into which we
are apt to fall respectingthe movementsof objects.
What looks like the movement of somethingacross
the field of vision is madeknownto us either by the
feeling of the ocular muscles,if the eye follows the
object, or through the sequenceof locally distinct
retinal impressions,if the eye is stationary. Now,
either of these effects may result, not only from the
actual movementof the object in a particular direc-
tion, but from our own movementin an opposite
74 ILLUSIONS OF PEKCEPTIOK

direction; or, again,from our both moving in the first

direction, the object more rapidly than ourselves; or,
finally, from our both moving in an opposite direction
to this, ourselvesmore rapidly than the object. There
is thus always a variety of conceivableexplanations,
and the action of past experience and association
shows itself very plainly in the determination of the
direction of interpretation. Thus, it is our instinctive
tendency to take apparent movement for real move-
ment, except when the fact of our own movement-is
clearly present to consciousness,
as when we are walk-
ing, or when we are sitting behind a horse whose
movement we see. And so when the sense of our own
movementbecomes indistinct, as in a railway carriage,
wenaturally drift into the illusion that objects,suchas
trees,telegraphposts,and so on, are moving,whenthey
are perfectly still. "Underthe samecircumstances, we
are apt to supposethat a train which is just shooting
aheadof us is moving slowly.
Similar uncertainties arise with respect to the
relative movementof two objects,the eye being sup-
posedto be fixed in space. When two objectsseem
to passone another,it may be that they are both
moving in contrary directions,or that one only is
moving, or finally, that both are moving in the same
direction, the one faster than the other. Experience
and habit hereagainsuggestthe interpretationwhich
is most easy, and not unfrequently produce illusion.
Thus,whenwe watchcloudsscuddingover the faceof
the moon, the latter seems moving rather than the
former,and the illusion only disappearswhenwe fix
the eye on the moon and recognizethat it is really
 ILLUSIONS OF DISTANCE. 75

stationary.The probablereason of this is, asWtmdt

suggests, that experience hasmadeit far easierfor us
to think of smallobjectslike themoonmovingrapidly,
than of large masses
like the clouds.1
The perception
of distance,
still morethan that of
direction,is liable to be illusory. Indeed, the visual
recognition
of distance,
togetherwith that of solidity,
hasbeen the greatregion for the study of " the decep-
tions of the senses/5 Without treating the subject
fully here,I shall try to describebriefly the nature
and sourceof these illusions.2
Confining ourselvesfirst of all to near objects,we
know that the smaller differences of distance in these
casesare,if the eyesare at rest, perceivedby meansof
the dissimilarpicturesprojectedon the two retinas; or
if theymove,by this means,togetherwith the muscular
feelingsthat accompanydifferent degreesof converg-
ence of the two eyes. This was demonstrated by the
famousexperimentsof Wheatstone. Thus, by means
of the now familiar stereoscope,he was able to produce
a perfect illusion of relief. The stereoscope
may be

1 The subject of the perception of movement is too intricate to be

dealt with fully here. I have only touched on it so far as necessaryto
illustrate our general principle. For a fuller treatment of the
subject, seethe ^ork of Dr. Hoppe, already referred to.
2 The perception of magnitude is closely connectedwith that of
distance,and is similarly apt to take an illusory form. I need only
refer to the well-known simple optical contrivancesfor increasing the
apparent magnitude of objects. I ought, perhaps,to add that I do not
professto give a completeaccountof optical illusions here, but only to
selecta few prominent varieties,with a view to illustrate general prin-
ciples of illusion. For a fuller account of the various mechanical
arrangementsfor producingoptical illusion, I must refer the reader to
the writings of Sir D. Brewster and Helmholtz.
76 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

saidto introducean.exceptionalstateof things into the

spectator'senvironment. It imitates, by meansof two
flat drawings,the dissimilar retinal pictures projected
by a singlesolidrecedingobject,and the lensesthrough
which the eyes look are so constructedas to compel
them to convergeas though looking on a single object
And so powerful is the tendency to interpret this im-
pression as one of solidity, that even though we are
aware of the presence of the stereoscopic apparatus,
we cannothelp seeingthe two drawingsas a single
solid object.
In the caseof more remote objects,there is no
dissimilarityof the retinal picturesor feelingsof con-
vergenceto assist the eye in determining distance.
Hereits judgment,whichnow becomes more of a pro-
cessof consciousinference,is determined by a number
of circumstanceswhich, through experience and asso-
ciation,have becomethe signsof differencesof depth
in space. Amongthesearethe degreeof indistinctness
of the impression,the apparentor retinal magnitude(if
the objectis a familiar one),,the relationsof linear per-
spective,asthe interruptionof the outline of far objects
by that of nearobjects,and so on. In a process so com-
plicatedthereis clearlyampleroomfor error,andwrong
estimates of distance whenever unusual circumstances
arepresentarefamiliar to all. Thus,the inexperienced
English tourist, whenin the clear atmosphere of Swit-
zerland,wherethe impressions from distant objectsare
more distinct than at home, naturally falls into the
illusion that the mountainsaremuch nearerthan they
are, and so fails to realize their true altitude*
 JUDGING DISTANCE. 77

Illusions of Art.
The imitation of solidity and depth by art is a
curious and interesting illustration of the mode of
production of illusion. Here we are not, of course,
concerned with the question how far illusion is desir-
able in art, but only with its capabilities of Illusory
presentment; which capabilities, it may be added,
have been fully illustrated in the history of art. The
full treatmentof this subjectwould form a chapterin
itself; here I can only touch on its main features.
Pictorial art working on a flat surface cannot, it is
plain, imitate the stereoscope,and producea perfect
senseof solidity. Yet it managesto producea pretty
strong illusion. It illustrates in a striking manner
the ease with which the eye conceives relations of
depth or relief and solidity. If, for example, on
a carpet,wall-paper,or dress,bright lines arelaid on a
dark colouras ground,weeasily imaginethat they are
advancing. The reasonof this seemsto be that in our
daily experienceadvancingsurfacescatch and reflect
the light, whereas
retiring surfacesare in shadow.1
The sameprinciple is illustrated in one of the
means used by the artist to produce a strong sense
of relief, namely, the cast shadow. A circle drawn
with chalk with a powerful cast shadow on one side
1 Painters are well aware that the colours at the red end of the

spectrumareapt to appearas advancing,while thoseof the violet end

are known as retiring. The appearanceof relief given by a gilded
patternon a dark blueas ground,is in part referableto the principle
just referredto. In addition,it appearsto involvea differencein the
action of the musclesof accommodationin the successiveadaptations
of the eye to the most refrangible and the least refrangible rays,
(SeeBriioke,Die Fhysiologw
tier Farlen,sec.17.)
78 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION".

will, without any shadingor modellingof the form,ap-

pear to stand out from the paper, thus:.

FIG. 1.

The reason is that the presence of such a shadow so

forcibly suggeststo the mind that the objectis a pro-
minent one intervening between the light and the
shaded surface.1
Evenwithout differencesof light and shade,by a
mere arrangementof lines,wemay producea powerful
senseof relief or solidity. A striking example of
this is the way in which two intersecting lines some-
times appearto recedefrom the eye,as the lines a a',
"blf} in the next drawing,which seemto belong to a
regular pattern on the ground, at which the eye is
looking from above and obliquely.
b'

1 Helmlioltz tells us (Popullire iDissenscliaftlicIieVortrage, 3tes

Heft, p. 61) that even in a stereoscopic
arrangementtlie presence
of a wrong cast shadow sufficed to disturb the illusion.
 AET AND BELIEF. 79

Again, the correct delineation of the projection of a

regular geometrical figure, as a cube, suffices to give
the eye a senseof relief. This effect is found to be
the more striking in proportion to the familiarity of
the form. The following drawing of a long box-shaped
solid at once seemsto stand out to the eye.

FIG. 3.

This habitual interpretation of the flat in art as

answering to objects in relief, or having depth, can
only be understood when it is remembered that our
daily experience gives us myriads of instances in
which the effect of such flat representations answers
to solid receding forms. That is to say, in the case
of all distant objects, in the perception of which the
dissimilarity of the retinal pictures and the feeling
of convergencetake no part, we have to interpret
solidity, and relations of nearer and further, by such
signs as linear perspective and cast shadow. On
the other hand, it is only in the artificial life
of indoors, on our picture-covered walls, that we ex-
perience such effects without discovering corresponding
realities. Hence a deeply organizedhabit of taking
theseimpressionsas answeringto the solid and not to
the flat. If our experiencehad been quite different;
80 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

if, for example,wehad been brought np in an empty

room,amid paintedwalls,and had beenexcludedfrom
the sight of the world of recedingobjectsoutside,we
might easily haveformed an exactly oppositehabit of
taking the actual mountains,trees,etc.,of the distant
sceneto be pictureslaid on a flat surface.
It follows from this that, with respectto the distant
parts of a scene,pictorial art possesses
the meansof
perfect imitation; and here we see that a complete
illusory effect is obtainable. I need but to refer to
the well-known devicesof linear and aerial perspective,
by which this result is secured.1 The value of these
means of producing illusion at the command of the
painter, may be illustrated by the following fact, which
I borrow from Helinholtz. If you placetwo piecesof

FIG. 4.

cardboard which correspond to portions of one form at

the sides and in front of a third piece, in the way
representedabove,so as just to allow the eye to follow
the contourof this last, andthen look at this arrange-
1 Among the means of giving a vivid senseof depth to a picture,
emphasizedby Helmholtz, is diminishing magnitude. It is obvious
that tho perceptions of real magnitude and distance are mutually
involved. "When,for example, a picture representsa receding series
of objects, as animals, trees, or buildings, the sense of the third
dimension, is rendered much more clear.
 PICTORIAL DELUSION. 81

ment from a point at somelittle distancewith, oneeye,

you easilysupposethat it stands in front of the side
pieces. The explanationof the illusion is that this
particular arrangement powerfully suggeststhat the
outline of the whole figure, of which the two side
piecesare parts, is broken by an intervening object.
Owing to the force of these and other suggestions,
it is easyfor the spectator,when attending to the back-
ground of a landscapepainting, to give himself up
for a momentto the pleasantdelusionthat he is looking
at an actual receding scene.
In connectionwith pictorial delusion,I may refer
to the well-known fact, that the eye in a portrait
seemsto follow the spectator,or that a gun, with its
muzzle pointing straight outwards,appearsto turn as
the spectatormoves.1 Thesetricks of art have puzzled
many people,yet their effect is easily understood,and
has been very clearly explained by Sir D. Brewster, in
the work alreadyreferred to (letter v.)« They depend
on the fact that a painting, beinga flat projectiononly
and not a solid, continues to present the front view of
an object which it representswherever the spectator
happensto stand. Were the eye in the portrait a real
eye, a side movement of the spectator would, it is
evident,causehim to see less of the pupil and more
of the side of the eyeball, and he would only con-
tinue to see the full pupil when the eye followed
him. We regardthe eyein the picture as a real eye
having relief, and judge accordingly.
1 A striking example of this was given in a painting, by Andsell,
of a sportsmanin the act of shooting, exhibited in the Royal Academy
in 1879.

G
82 ILLUSIONS OF PEKCEPTION.

We may fall into similar illusionsrespecting

dis-
tancein auditoryperception.A changeof wind,an
unusualstillnessin the air, is quite sufficientto produce
the sensethat soundingobjectsare nearerthan they
actuallyare. The art of the ventriloquistmanifestly
aimsat producingthiskind of illusion. By imitating
the dull effect of a.distant voice, he is able to excite
in the mindsof his audiencea powerfulconvictionthat
the soundsproceedfrom a distant point. There is
little doubt that ventriloquism has played*a- con-
spicuouspart in the arts of divination and magic.
Misconceptionof Local Arrangement.
Let us now passto a classof illusions closely related
to those having to do with distance,but involving some
specialkind of circumstancewhich-powerfullysuggests
a particular arrangement in space. One of the most
striking examplesof these is the erroneouslocalization
of a quality in space,that is to say, the reference of it
to an object nearer,or- further off than the right one.
Thus, when we look through a piece of yellow glass at
a dull, wintry landscape,we are disposedto imagine
that weare looking at a sunnysceneof preternatural
warmth. A moment's reflection would tell us that the
yellow tint, with which the objects appear to be
suffused,coniesfrom the presenceof the glass; yet, in
spite of this, the illusion persistswith a curiousforce.
The explanation is, of course, that the circumstances
are exceptional,that in a vast majority of casesthe
impressionof colour belongsto.the object and not to
an intervening medium,1and that consequentlywe
1 Tills is at least true of all near objects.
 OBJECTS AND COLOUKED MEDIA. 83

tend to ignoretlie glass,and to*refer tlie colour to-the

objectsthemselves.
When, however, tlie fact of the existence of .**
coloured medium is distinctly present to* the mind, we
easily learn to allow for this,<and' to recognizeone
colouredsurfacecorrectlythrougha recognizedmedium.
Thus,weappearto ourselvesto seethe reflectedimages
of the wall, etc.,of a room,in a bright mahoganytable,
not suffusedwith a reddishyellow tint, as they actually
are-and may be seen to be by the simple device
of looking at a small bit of the imagethrough a tube,
but in their ordinarycolour. We may be said to fall
into illusion here in so far as we overlook the exact
quality of the impressionactually made on the eye.
This point will be touched on presently. Here I am
concernedto showthat this habit of allowingfor the
coloured medium may, in its turn, occasionally lead to
plain and palpableillusion.
The most striking example of this error is to be met
with- among the curious phenomenaof colour-contrast
alreadyreferredto. In manyof thesecasesthe appear-
ance of the contrasting colour is, as I have observed,
due to a temporary modification of the nervoussub-
stance. Yet it is found that this organic factor does
not wholly accountfor the phenomena. For example,
Meyer madethe following experiment. He covereda
piece of green paper by a sheetof thin transparent
whitepaper. The colourof this doublesurfacewas,of
course,a pale green. He then introduced a scrap of
grey paper betweenthe two sheets, and found that, in-
stead of looking whitish as it really was,it looked rose-
red. Whatever the colour of the under sheet the grey
84 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

scraptook the complementaryhue. If, however, the

pieceof grey paperis put outsidethe thin sheet,it
looksgrey; andwhatis mostremarkable is that when
a secondpieceis put outside,the scrapinsideno longer
wearsthe complementary hue.
There is here evidently something more than a
changeof organic conditions; there is an action of
experienceand suggestion. The reasonof our seeing
the scrap rose-redin one caseand neutral grey in
another, is that in the first instance we vividly repre-
sent to ourselvesthat we are looking at it through a
greenishveil (whichis,of course,a part of the illusion) ;
for rose-redseen through a greenish medium would, as
a matter of fact, be light grey, as this scrap is. Even
if we allow that there always exists after an impression
of colour a temporary organic disposition to see the
complementaryhue,this doesnot sufficeas an expla-
nation of these cases; we have to conclude further that
imagination,led by the nsual run of our experience,
is here a co-operant factor, and helps to determine
whether the complementary tint shall be seenor not.

Misinterpretation of Form.
More complex and circumscribed associationstake
part in thoseerrorswhich we occasionallycommit re-
specting
theparticularformofobjects.Thishasalready
beentouchedon in dealing with artistic illusion. The
dispositionof the eye to attribute solidity to a flat
drawing is the more powerful in proportion to the
familiarityof theform. Thus,anoutlinedrawingof a
building is apt to standout with specialforce.
Anothercuriousillustrationof this is the pheno-
 CONVERSION OF CONCA.VE POEM. 85

menon known as the conversion of the concave mould or

matrix of a medal into the corresponding convex relief.
If, saysHelmholtz,the mouldof a medalbeilluminated
by a light falling obliquely so as to producestrong
shadows, and if weregard this with one eye,we easily
fall into the illusion that it is the original raised
design, illuminated from the oppositeside. As a matter
of fact, the visual impression produced by a concave
form with the light falling on one side, very closely
resemblesthat produced by a correspondingconvex
form with the light falling on the other side. At the
sametime, it is found that the opposite mode of con-
version, that is to say, the transformation of the raised
into the depressed
form,though occurringoccasionally,
is much less frequent. Now, it may be asked, why
should we tend to transform the concave into the con-
vex, rather than the convex into the concave? The
reader may easily anticipate the answer from what
has been said about the deeply fixed tendency of
the eye to solidify a plane surface. We arerendered
much morefamiliar, both by nature and by art, with
raised(cameo)design than with depresseddesign(in-
taglio), and we instinctively interpret the less familiar
form by the more familiar. This explanationappears
to be borne out by the fact emphasizedby Schroeder
that the illusion is much more powerful if the design
is that of somewell-known object, as the human head
or figure, or an animal form, or leaves.1

* * Helmholtzremarks(pp.cit, p. 628)that the difficulty of seeing

the convex cast as coucave is probably due to the presenceof the
cast shadow. This has, no doubt, some effect: yet the consideration
urged in the text appearsto me to be the most important one.
,86 ILLUSION OF EEKCEPTION.

Another illustration of this kind of illusion recently

"occurredin my own experience. Nearly oppositeto
my windowcamea narrowspacebetweentwo detached
Chouses.This was,of course,,darker than the front of
the houses,and the receding parallel lines of the bricks
"appearedto cross this marrow vertical shaft obliquely.
I could neverlook at this without seeingit asa convex
"column,roundwhichthe parallel lines woundobliquely.
'Otherssaw it as I did, though not alwayswith the
-sameoverpoweringeffect. I can only account for this
illusion by help of the generaltendencyof the eye to
solidify impressionsdrawnfrom the flat, togetherwith
the effect of special types of experience, more par-
ticularly the perception of cylindrical forms in trees,
columns, etc.
It may be added that a somewhat similar illustra-
tion of the action of specialtypes of experienceon the
perceptionof individual form may be foundin the
regionof hearing. The powerfuldispositionto -take
the finely graduatedcadencesof soundproducedby
the wind for the utterances of a human voice, is due
to the fact that this particular form and arrangement
of sound has deeply impresseditself on our minds, in
connection with numberless utterances of human
feeling.
Illusions of Recognition*
As a last illustration of comparativelypassive
illusions, I may refer to the errors which we occasion-
ally commit in recognizingobjects. As I havealready
observed,the processof full and clear recognition,
specificand individual,involvesa classingof a number
 FALSE BECOGNITIOlSr. 87

of distinct aspectsof the object,suchas colour,form,

etc. Accordingly, when in a perfectly calm state of
mind we fall into illusion with respectto any object
plainly visible, it must be through some accidental
resemblance betweenthe object and the other object or
class of objects with which we identify it. In tKe
case of individual identification such illusions are, of
course,comparatively rare, since here there are in-
volved so many characteristic differences. On the
other hand, in the case of specific recognition there is
ample room for error, especially in those kinds of more
subtle recognition to which I have already referred.
To "recognize" a person as a Frenchman or a military
man, for example,is often an erroneousprocess. Logi-
cians have included this kind of error under what
they call "fallacies of observation."
Errors of recognition, both specific and individual,
are,of course,moreeasyin the caseof distant objectsor
objectsotherwiseindistinctly seen. It is noticeablein
thesecasesthat, even when perfectly cool and free
from emotional excitement, we tend to interpret such
indistinct impressionsaccording to certain favourite
typesof experience,as the humanfaceand figure. Our
interpretative imagination easily seestraces of the
human form in cloud, rock, or tree-stump.
Again, evenwhen there is no error of recognition,
in the senseof confusingoneobject with other objects,
there may be partial illusion. I have remarked that
the processof recognizingan objectcommonlyinvolves
an overlooking of points of diversity in the object, or
aspectof the object, nowpresent. And sometimesthis
inattentionto what is actuallypresentincludesan error
88 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

as to the actual visual sensationof the moment. Thus,

for example,whenI look at a sheetof white paperin
a feeblylit room,I seemto seeits whiteness. If, how-
ever,I bring it near the window,and let the sunfall
on a part of it, I at oncerecognizethat what I have
Beenseeingis not white,but a decidedgrey. Similarly,
when I look at a brick viaduct a mile or two off, I
appearto myself to recognizeits redness. In fact,
however, the impression of colour which I receive from
the object is not that of brick-red at all, but a much
lessdecidedtint; which I mayeasilyproveby bending
my head downwardsand letting the sceneimage itself
on the retina in an unusual way, in which case the
recognitionof the object as a viaduct being less dis-
tinct, I am better able to attend to the exact shade of
the colour.
Nowhere is this inattention to the sensation of the
moment exhibited in so striking a manner as in
pictorial art. A picture of Meissoniermay give the
eyea representation of a scenein which the objects,as
the human figures and horses,have a distinctness that
belongsto near objects,but an apparentmagnitude
that belongs to distant objects. So again, it is found
that the degreeof luminosity or brightnessof a pic-
torial representationdiffersin generalenormouslyfrom
that of the actual objects. Thus,accordingto the cal-
culationsof Helmholtz,1a picture representinga Be-
douin'swhite raimentin blinding sunshine,will, when
seenin a fairly lit gallery, have a degree of lumi-
nosity reaching only to about one-thirtieth of that
of the actual object. On the other hand,a painting
1 Popularewisscnschafttiche
Vortrage,
StesHeft, pp. 71,72.
 SENSATION OVERPOWERED BY SUGGESTION. 89

representingmarble ruins illuminated by moonlight,

will, under the same conditions of illumination, have a
luminosity amounting to as much as from ten to twenty
thousandtimes that of the object. Yet the spectator
doesnot notice these stupendousdiscrepancies.The
representation,in spite of its vast difference,at once
carriesthe rnind on to the actuality, and the spectator
may even appearto himself, in momentsof complete
absorption,to be looking at the actual scene.
The truly startling part of these illusions is, that
the direct result of sensorystimulation appearsto be
actually displacedby a mental image. Thus, in the
caseof Meyer'sexperiment,of looking at the distant
viaduct,and of recognizingan artistic representation,
imagination seemsin a measureto take the place of
sensation,or to blind the mind to what is actually
before it.
The mystery of the process,however,greatly dis-
appearswhen it is rememberedthat what we call a
conscious" sensation" is really compoundedof a result
of sensorystimulationand a result of centralreaction,
of a purely passiveimpressionand the mental activity
involved in attending to this and classing it.1 This
being so, a sensationmay be modified by anything
exceptionalin the mode of central reaction of the
moment. Now, in all the cases just considered, we
have one common feature, a powerful suggestion of
the presenceof a particular object or local arrange-
ment. This suggestion,taking the form of a vivid
mental image, dominates and overpowers the passive
1 See, on this point, some excellent remarks by G, H. Lewes,
Problemsof Life and Mind, third series, vol. ii. p. 275.
90 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

impression. Thus,in Meyer'sexperiment,the mindIs

possessedby the suppositionthat we arelooking at the
grey spotthrough a greenishmedium. So in the case
of the distant viaduct, we are under the mastery of the
idea that what we see in the distance is a red brick
structure. Oncemore, in the instanceof looking at
the picture,the spectator'simaginationis enchainedby
the vivid representation of the object for which the
picture stands,as the marble ruins in the moonlight or
the Bedouin in the desert.
It may be well to add that this mental uncertainty
as to the exact nature of a present impression is neces-
sitated by the very conditionsof accurateperception.
If, as I havesaid,all recognition-takesplaceby over-
looking points of diversity, the mind must, in courseof
time, acquire a habit of not attending to the exact
quality of sense-impressionsin all caseswhere the
interpretation seems plain and obvious. Or, to use
Helruholtz'swords,our sensations
are,in a generalway,
of interest to us only as signs of things, and if we are
sure of the thing, we readily overlook the precise nature
of the impression. In short, we get into the way
of attending only to what is essential, .constant, and
characteristic in objects, and disregarding what is
variable and accidental:1 Thus, we attend, in the first
place,to the form of objects,the most constantand
characteristic element..of all, being comparatively
1 To someextent{this applies io'the changesof apparent magni-
tude due to altered position. Thus, we do not attend to the reduction
of the height of a small object which weare wont to.handle,when it is
placed far belowthe level of--the eye. And hence the error people
make in judging of tbe point in the wall or skirting which a hat will
reachwhen placed on the ground.
 ^RECOGNITION AS INATTENTION. $1

inattentive to colour, which varies with distance,atmo-

spheric" changes,and mode of illumination. So we
attendto the relative-magnitudeof objectsrather than
to the absolute,and -to the relative intensities of light
and shaderather than to the absolute; for in so doing
we are noting what is constant -for all distances and
modesof illumination, and overlooking-what is variable.
And the successof pictorial art depends on the ob-
servanceof this law of perception*
These remarks at once point out the limits of these
illusions. In normal "circumstances, an act of imagi-
.nation, however vivid, cannot create the semblance of
a -sensationwhich is altogether absent; it can only
slightly modify the actual impressionby interfering
with that processof comparisonand' classification
which enters into all definite determination of sensa-
tional quality.
Another .great fact that has come to light in the
investigationof theseillusionsis that oft-recurringand
familiar types of experienceleave permanentdisposi-
tions in the mind. As I said -whendescribingthe pro-
cessof perception,what hasbeen frequently perceived
is perceivedmore and more readily. It follows from
this that the mind will be habitually disposed to form
the correspondingmental images, and to interpret
impressionsby help of these. The range of artistic
suggestiondependson this. A clever draughtsman
can indicate a face by a few rough touches, and .this
is due to the fact that the spectator's mind is so
familiarized,through recurring experienceand special
interest, with the object, that it is ready >toconstruct
the .requisitemental image,at the slightest external
92 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

suggestion. And liencethe risk of hasty and illusory

interpretation.
These observations naturally conduct us to the
consideration of the second great group of sense-
illusions, which I have marked off as active illusions,
where the action of a pre-existing intellectual dis-
position becomesmuch more clearly marked, and
assumesthe form of a free imaginative transformation
of reality.
 CHAPTER VI.

ILLUSIONS OF PEECEPTION-continued*

B. Active Illusions.

WHENgiving an accountof the mechanismof percep-

tion, I spokeof an independentaction of the imagina-
tion which tendsto anticipatethe processof suggestion
from without. Thus, when expecting a particular
friend, I recognizehis form much more readily than.
when my mind has not been preoccupied with his
image.
A little consideration will show that this process
must be highly favourable to illusion. To begin
with, even if the preperceptionbe correct, that is
to say, if it answer to the perception, the mere fact
of vivid expectation will affect the exact moment of
the completed act of perception. And recent experi-
mentshowsthat in certaincasessucha previousactivity
of expectantattention may even lead to the illusory
belief that the perceptiontakesplacebeforeit actually
does.1

1 I refer to the experiments made by Exner,"Wundt, and others, in

determining the time elapsing between the giving of a signal to a
94 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

A morepalpablesourceof error residesin the risk

of the formationof an inappropriatepreperception.If
a wrong mental,imagehappensto have been formed
and vividly entertained,and if the actual impression
fits in to a certain extent with this independently
formedpreperception,' we may have a fusion of the
two which exactly simulatesthe form of a complete
percept. Thus,for example,in the casejust supposed,
if anotherperson,bearing someresemblanceto our
expectedfriend, chancesto come into view, we may
probablystumbleinto the error of. taking one person
for another.

On the physical side,,we may, agreeablyto the

hypothesismentionedabove,expressthis result by
sayingthat,,owing to a partial identity in the nervous
processesinvolved in the anticipatoryimageand the
impression,the twotend to run oneinto the other,,con-
stituting one continuous process.
Therearedifferentwaysin whichthis independent
activity of the imaginationmayfalsify our perceptions.
Thus,we may voluntarily chooseto entertaina certain
imagefor the moment,and to look at the impression
in a particularway,andwithin certainlimits suchcapri-
ciousselectionof an interpretation'is effectualin giving
a specialsignificanceto an impression. Or the process
of independentpreperception may go on apart from our
volitions, and perhaps in spite of these, in which case
the illusion hassomethingof the irresistiblenecessity
personand the execution of a movementin response. u It is found,"
says "Wundt," by these experiments that the exact moment at which
a sense-impression
is perceiveddepends
onthe amountof preparatory
self-accommodation of attention." (SeeWuudt, PliysiologinchePsycho-
logie,ch. xix., especiallyp. 735. et seq.)
 BBE-PEBCEPTION AND ILLUSION. 95

of a passiveillusion. Let- us considerseparatelyeach

mode of production.
Voluntary Selectionof Interpretation,-*
The action of a*capriciousexerciseof the imagina-
tion in relation to an impression is illustrated in those
caseswhere experienceand suggestionoffer,to the
interpreting mind an uncertain sound,that is to say,
where the presentsense-signsare ambiguous. Here
we obviouslyhave a choiceof interpretation. And it
is found that,, in these cases,what we see depends
very much on what we wish to see. The interpre-
tation adoptedis still,., in a sense,the-result of sug-
gestion,,but of one particular suggestionwhich, the
fancy of the moment determines. Or, to put it
anotherway, the caprice of the moment causesthe
attention to focus itself in a particular manner, to
direct itself specially to certain aspects and relations of
objects.
The eye's interpretation of movement, ali%eady
referredto, obviouslyoffersa wide field for this play of
selective imagination. When looking out of the win-
dowof a railway carriage,I can at will picture to my
mind the trees and telegraph postsas moving objects.
Sometimesthe true interpretationis so uncertainthat
the least inclination to view the phenomenonin one
way determines the result. This is illustrated in a
curiousobservation
of Sinsteden.One evening,on
approachinga windmill obliquely from oneside,which
under these circumstanceshe saw only as a dark
silhouetteagainst a bright sky, he noticed that the
sails appearedto go, now in one direction, novr in
96 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

another,accordingas he imagined himself looking at

the front or at the back of the windmill.1
In the interpretation of geometricaldrawings,as
those of crystals, there is, as I have observed,a general
tendency to ^iew the flat delineation as answering to a
raisedobject,or a body in relief, accordingto the com-
mon run of our experience. Yet there are caseswhere
experienceis lessdecided,and where,consequently,
we
may regard any particular line as advancing or reced-
ing. And it is found that when we vividly imagine
that the drawing is that of a convex or concavesurface?
we seeit to be so, with all the force of a complete per-
ception. The least disposition to seeit in the other
way will suffice to reverse the interpretation. Thus,
in the following drawing, the reader can easily see at

FIG. 5.

will somethingansweringto a truncated pyramid, or

to the interior of a cooking vessel.
Similarly, in the accompanyingfigure of a trans-
parent solid, I can at will select either of the two
surfaces
which approximatelyface the eye and regard
1 Quoted by Helmholtz, op. cit., p. 626.
 YISUAL SELECTION OP FORM. 97

it as the nearer,the other appearing as the hinder

surfacelookedat through the body.

"FIG. G.

Again, in the next drawing,taken from Sehroeder,

onemay,by an effort of will, seethe diagonalstep-like
pattern,eitherastheview from aboveof the edgeof
an advancing piece of wall at a, or as the view from
belowof the edgeof an advancing(overhanging)piece
of wall at &

FIG. 7.

Theselast drawingsare not in true perspectiveon

either of the suppositions adopted,wherefore the choice
is easier. But even when an outline form is in per-
spective,a strenuouseffort of imagination may suffice
to bring about a conversionof the appearance.Thus,
if the readerwill look at the drawing of the box-liko
solid (Fig. 3, p. 79), he will find that, after a trial or
98 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION

two, he succeedsin seeingit as a concave

figure repre-
senting the coyerand two sidesof a box as lookedat
from within.1
Many of my readers,probably,share in my power
of variouslyinterpreting the relative positionof bands
or stripes on fabrics such as wall-papers,according
to wish. I find that it is possible to view now this
stripe or set of stripesas standing out in relief upon
the othersas a ground,nowtheseothersas advancing
out of the first as a background. The difficulty- of
selecting either interpretation at will becomes greater,
of course,in thosecaseswherethere is a powerfulsug-
gestion of someparticular local arrangement,as,for
example, the caseof patterns much brighter than the
ground, and especially of such as representknown
objects,as flowers. Yet evenhere a strong effort of
imaginationwill often sufficeto bring abouta conver-
sion of the first appearance.
A somewhat similar choice of interpretation offers
itself in looking at elaboratedecorative patterns.
When we strongly imagine any number of details to be
elementsof one figure, they seemto becomeso; and a
given detail positively appearsto alter in character
according as it is viewed as an element of a more or '
less complex figure.

1 "When the drawing, by its adherenceto the laws of perspective,

doesnot powerfully determine the eye to see it in one way rather than
in the other (as in Figs. 5 to 7), the disposition to seethe one form
rather than the other points to differencesin the frequency of the
original forms in our daily experience. At the sametime, it is to "bo
observedthat, after looking at the drawing for a time under eacli
aspect,the suggestionnow of the one and now of the other forcesitself
on the mind in a curious and unaccountableway.
 FANCIFUL INTEKPKETATION. 99

Theseexamplesshowwhat force belongsto a vivid

.preconception,
if this happensto fit only very roughly
the impression of the moment, that is to say, if the
interpretative image is one of the possible suggestions
of the impression. The play of imagination takes a
wider range in those caseswhere the impression is very
indefinite in character,.easilyallowing of a considerable
variety of imaginative interpretation.
I referred at the beginning of this account of sense-
illusions to the readiness with which the mind deceives
itself with respect to the nature and causesof the vague
sensationswhich usually form the dim background of
our mental life. A personof lively imagination,by
trying to view thesein a particular way, andby selec-
tively attending to those aspectsof the sensationwhich
answer to the caprice of the moment, may give a
variety of interpretations to one and the same set of
sensations. For example, it is very easy to get con-
fused with respect to those tactual and motor feelings
which inform us of the position of our bodily members.
And so, when lying in bed, and attending to the sen-
sations connectedwith the legs, we may easily delude
ourselves into supposing that these members are
arrangedin a most eccentricfashion. Similarly, by
giving specialheedto the sensations arising in connec-
tion with the conditionof the skin at any part,we may
amuseourselves with the strangest fancies as to what
is going on in these regions.
Again, when any object of visual perception is
indistinct or indefinite in form, there is plainly an
openingfor this capriciousplay of fancy in transform-
ing the actual. This is illustrated in the well-known
TOO ILLUSIONS OF PEBCEPTION'.

pastimeof discoveringfamiliar forms, such as those

of the human head and animals, in distant rocks and
clouds, and of seeing pictures in the fire, and so on.
The indistinct and indefinite shapesof tbe massesof
rock, cloud, or glowing coal, offer an excellent field for
creativefancy,andja personof lively imaginationwill
discoverendlessforms in what, to an unimaginative
eye,is a formlesswaste. JohannesMiiller relatesthat,
whena child, he used to spendhours in discovering
the outlines of forms in the partly blackened and
cracked stucco of the housethat stood opposite to his
own.1 Here it is plain that, while experience and
association are not wholly absent, but place certain
wide limits on this processof castle-building, the spon-
taneous activity of the percipient mind is the great
determining force.
So much as to the influence of a perfectly unfet-
tered voluntary attentionon the determinationof the
stageof preperception,and,through this, of the result-
ing interpretation. Let us nowpassto casesin which
this directionof preperceptionfollowsnot the capriceof
the moment,but the leading of somefixed predisposi-
tion in the interpreter'smind. In thesecasesattention
is no longer free,but fettered,only it is now fettered
rather from within than from without; that is to say,
the dominatingpreperceptionis muchmorethe result
of anindependentbent of the imaginationthan of some
suggestionforcedon the mind by the actualimpression
of the moment.

1 Ueberdie phantastischenGestcJitserscJieinungen^
p. 45,
 VISION AND BENT OF IMAGINATION. I'Ol'

Involuntary Mental Pre&djustment*.

If we glance back at the examples-ofcapricious-
selectionjust noticed,we shall seethat they are really
limited not only by the character of the impression
of the time, but also by the mental habits of the
spectator. That is to say, we find that his fancy
runs in certain definite directions, and takes certain
habitual forms. It has already been observed that
the percipient mind has very different attitudes with
respectto variouskinds of impression. Towardssome
it holds itself at a distance, while towards others it
at once bears itself familiarly; the former are such as
answerto its previoushabit and bent of imagination,
the latter such as do not so answer.
This bent of the interpretative imagination assumes,
as wehavealreadyseen,two forms,that of a compara-
tively permanent disposition, and that of a temporary
stateof expectationor mentalpreparedness.Illusion
may arise in connection with either of these forms.
Let us illustrate both varieties, beginning with those
which are due to a lasting mental disposition.
It is impossible here to specify all the causes of
illusion residing in organized tendencies of the mindo
The wholepast mental life, with its particular shade
of experience, its ruling emotions, and its habitual
direction of fancy, servesto give a particular colour
to new impressions, and so to favour illusion. There
is a " personalequation" in perceptionas in belief-
an amount of erroneous deviation from the common
averageview of external things, which is the outcome
of individual temperamentand habits of mind. Thus,
102 ILLUSIONS 'OF PERCEPTION.

a naturally timid man will be in generaldisposedto

see ugly and fearful objectswhere a perfectly un-
biased mind perceivesnothing of the kind; and the
forms which these objects of dread will assumeare de-
termined by the .character of his past experience,and
by the customarydirection of his imagination.
In -perfectly-healthy states of mind this influence
of temperamentand .mentalhabit on the perception
of externalobjectsis, of course,very limited ; it shows
itself more distinctly, as we shall see, in modifying
the estimate of things in relation to the cestheticand
other feelings. This appliesto the mythical poetical
way of .looking -at nature-a part of our subject to
which we shall have to return later on. m

Passing .now from the effect of such permanent

disposition^ let -us look at the more striking results
of temporary expectancy of mind.
When'touchingon the influenceof such a tempo-
rary rmentalattitude in the processof correct per-
ception,I remarkedthat this readinessof mind might
assume an indefinite or a definite form. We will
examinethe effect of eachkind in the production of
illusion.

.Action of Bui-Expectation.
First of all, then, our minds may at the particular
momentbe disposedto entertainany one of a vaguely
circumscribed group of images. Thus, to return to
the examplealreadyreferred to, whenin Italy, weare
in a state of readinessto frame any of the images
that we have learnt to associatewith this country.
AVemaynot be distinctly anticipating any one kind
 TEMPORAET'BENT OF IMAGINATION. 103

of object,but are neverthelessin a condition of su,l->

expeetation with referenceto a large numberof objects.
Accordingly,whenan impressionoccurswhich answers
only very roughly to one of the associatedimages,
there is a tendencyto superimposethe image on the
impression. In this way illusion arises. Thus, a man,
whenstrolling in a cathedral,will be apt to take any
kind of faint hollow sound for the soft tones of an
organ.
The dispositionto anticipatefact and reality in this
way will be all the stronger if, as usually happens,
the mental images thus lying ready for use have an
emotional colouring. Emotion is the great disturber
of all intellectual operations. It effects marvellous
things, as we shall presently see,in the region of
illusory belief,and its influenceis very marked in the
seeminglycoolerregion of external perception. The
effect of any emotionalexcitement appearsto be to
give a preternatural vividness and persistence to the
ideas answeringto it, that is to say, the ideas which are
its excitants, or which are otherwise associated with
it. Owing to this circumstance, when the mind is
under the temporary,swayof any feeling, as, for ex-
ample,fear,there will be a specialreadinessto interpret
objectsby help of imagescongruentwith the emotion.
Thus, a man under the control of fear will be ready
to seeany kind of fear-inspiringobject wheneverthere
is any resemblanceto such in the things actually
presentto his vision. The stateof awewhich the sur-
rounding circumstances of a spiritualist seance
inspires
producesa general"readinessof mind to perceivewhat
is strange,mysterious,and apparentlymiraculous*
 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

It is worth,noting, perhaps,that those delightful

half-illusions which imitative art seeks to produce are
greatly favouredby such a temporaryattitude of the
interpreting imagination. In the theatre,for example,
we are preparedfor realizing the semblanceof life
that is to be unfolded before us. We come knowing
that what is to be performed aims at representing a
real action or actual series of events. We not impro-
bably work ourselves into a slightly excited state in
anticipation of such a representation. More than this,
as the play progresses,the realization- of what has
gone before producesa strong disposition to believe in,
the reality of what is to follow. And this effect is pro-
portionate to the degree of coherence and continuity
in the action. In this way, there is a cumulative
effect on the mind. If the action is good, the illusion,
as every play-goer knows, is most completetowards
the end.
Were it not for all this mental preparation, the illu-
sorycharacterof the performance
would be too patent
to view, and our enjoyment would suffer. A man is
often awareof this when cominginto a theatreduring
the progress of a piece before his mind accommodates
itself to the meaning of the play. And the same
thing is recognizablein the fact that the frequenter
of the theatre has his susceptibility to histrionic
delusionincreasedby acquiring a habit of looking out
for the meaning of the performance. Persons who
first seea play, unlessthey be of exceptionalimagina-
tion and have thought much about the theatre-as
CharlotteBronte,for instance-hardly feel the illusion
at all. At least,this is true of the opera,wherethe
 fE$ ADJUSTMENT IN ABT ILLUSION. 105'

departurefrom reality is so striking that

pressioncan hardly fail to Be a ludicrous one,till^ttre
habit of taking the-performancefor whatit is intended
to be is fully formed,1
A similar effect of intellectual preadjustmentis
observablein. the fainter degreesof illusion produced
by pictorial art. Here the undeceiving circumstances,
the flat surface, the surroundings,- and so on, would
sometimes be quite sufficient to prevent the least
degreeof illusion, were it not that the spectator comes
! preparedto seea representationof somereal object.
\This is our state of mind when we enter a picture
gallery or approachwhat we recognizeas a picture
on the wall of a room. A savagewouldnot " realize"
a slight sketchas soonas oneaccustomedto pictorial
representation,and ready to perform the required in-
terpretative act.2
So much as to the effect of an indefinite state of
sub-expectationin misleading our perceptions. Let
us now glanceat the resultsof definite preimagination,
including what aregenerallyknown as expectations.
1 Another side of histrionic illusion, the reading of the imitated
feelings into the actors'"minds, will be dealt with in a later chapter.
2 In a finishedpainting of any size tins preparationis hardly
necessary. In these cases,in spite of the great deviations from truth
in pictorial representationalready touched on, the amount of essential
agreement is so large and so powerful in its effect that even an
intelligent animal will experience an illusion. Mr. Romanessends
me an interesting account of a dog, that had never been accustomed
to pictures, having been put into a state of great excitement by the
introduction of a portrait? into a room, on a level with his eye. It is
not at all improbable that the lower animals, evenwhen sane,are fre-
quently the subjectsof slight illusion. That animals dream is a. fact
which is observedas long,ago as the age of Lucretius.
106 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

Effects of Vivid Expectation.

Such expectationsmay grow out of somepresent
objectivefacts, which serveas signsof the expected
event; or they may arise by way of verbal suggestion;
or, finally, they may be due to internal spontaneous
imagination.
In the first place,then, the expectationsmay grow
out of previous perceptions, while, nevertheless, the
direction of the expectation may be a wrong one.
Herethe interpreting imagination is, in a large sense,
under the control of externalsuggestion,though,with
respect to the particular impression that is miscon-
strued, it may be regarded as acting independeutly
and spontaneously.
Illustrations of this effect in producing illusion
will easily occur to the reader. If I happen to have
heard that a particular person has b;jen a soldier
or clergyman, I tend to see the marks of the class
in this person, and sometimes find that this process
of recognition is altogether illusory. Again, let us
supposethat a person is expecting a friend by a
particular train. A passengerstepsout of the train
bearing a superficial resemblanceto his friend; in
consequence of which he falls into the error of false
identification.
The delusionsof the conjurordependon a similar
principle. The performertells his audiencethat he is
aboutto do a certainthing, for example,take a number
of animalsout of a small box which is incapableof
holding them. The hearers, intent on what has been
saidj vividly representto themselvesthe action de-
 DELUSIONS OF THE OONJUEOE. 107

scribed. And in this way their attention "becomes

bribed, so to speak,beforehand, and fails to notice the
inconspicuous movements which, wonld at once clear
up the mystery. Similarly with respectto the illusions
which overtake people at spiritualist seanees. The in-
tensity of the expectation of a particular kind of object
excludes calm attention to what really happens,and
the slightest impressionswhich answer to signs of the
object anticipated are instantly seizedby the mind and
worked up into illusory perceptions.
It is to be noted that even when the impression
cannotbe made to tally exactly with the expectation^
the force of the latter often effects a grotesquecon-
fusionof the perception. If, for example,a man goes
into a familiar room in the dark in order to fetch
something,and for a moment forgets the particular
doorby whichhe has entered,his definite expectation
of finding things in a certain order may blend with the
order of impressionsexperienced,producing for the
moment a onost.comical illusion as to the actual state
of things.
When the degree of expectation is unusually great,
it may sufficeto produce something like the counterfeit
of a real sensation. This happenswhen the present
circumstances are powerfully suggestive of an im-
mediate event .The effect is all the more powerful,
moreover, in those cases where the object or event
expected is interesting or exciting, since here the
mentalimagegains in vividnessthrough the emotional
excitement attending it. Thus, if I am watching a
train off and know from all the signs that it is just
about to start, I easily delude myself into the coa-
108 ILLUSIONS OF PEEGEPTIOK.

viction that It has begun to start, when it is really

still.1 An intensedegreeof expectationmay,in such
cases,producesomethingindistinguishable
from an
actual sensation. This effect is seen in such common
experiences as that the sight of food makesthe mouth
of a hungry man water; that the appearanceof a
surgical instrument producesa nascent sensationof
pain; and that a threatening movement,giving a
vivid anticipation of tickling, begetsa feeling which
closelyapproximates to the result of actualtickling.
Oneor twovery striking instancesof suchimagined
sensations are given by Dr. Carpenter.2Here is one.
An officer who superintended the exhuming of a coffin
rendered necessary through a suspicion of- crime,
declared that he already experienced the odour of
decomposition, though it was afterwards found that
the coffin wasempty.3
It is, of course,,
often difficult to say,in such eases
as these,howfar elementsof actualsensation co-operate
in the production of the illusions. Thus, in the case
just mentioned,the odourof the earth may havebeen
the starting-pointin the illusion. In manycases,how-
ever, an imaginative mind appearsto be capableof
1 This kind of illusion is probably facilitated by the fact that the
eyeis often performing slight movementswithout any clear conscious-
nessof them. Seewhat wassaid about the limits of sensibility, p. 50.
2 Mental Physiology,fourth edit., p. 158.
3 In personsof very lively imagination the mere representationof
an object or event may suffice to bring about such a semblanceof
aensation. Thus, M. Taine (op. tit., vol. i. p. 94) vouchesfor the
assertion that "one of the most exact and lucid of modernnovelists,"
when working out in his imagination the poisoning of one of his
fictitious characters, liad so vivid a gustatory sensationof'arsenic that
he was attacked by a violent fit of indigestion.
 GEOSSEE ACTIVE ILLUSIONS. 109

transforminga vivid expectationinto a nascentstage

of sensation. Thus, a mother thinking of her sick
child in an adjoining room,.and keenly on the alert
for its voice, will now and again fancy she really
hearsit whenothershearnothing at all.

Transition to Hallucination*

It is plain that in these casesillusion approaches

to hallucination. Imagination,instead -of waiting on
sensation,usurpsits placeand imitates its appearance.
Such a " subjective" sensationproducedby a powerful

expectationmight, perhaps,by a stretchof language,

be regarded as an illusion, in the narrow sense,in so
far as it depends on the suggestive force of a com-
plete set of external circumstances; on the other
hand, it is clearly an hallucination in so far as it is the
production of the semblanceof an external impres-
sion without any external agency correspondingto
this.
In the dlassof illusory expectations just considered
the immediately present environment still plays a part,
though a muchless direct part than that observable
in the first large group of illusions. We will now pass
to a second mode of illusory expectation, where
imagination is still more detachedfrom,the present
surroundings.
A common instance of this kind of expectation is
the so-called " intuition," or presentiment; that some-
thing is going to happen,which expectationhas no
basis in fact. It does not matter whether the expecta-
tion has arisen by way of another's words or by way
110 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

of personalinclinations. A strong wish for a thing

will, in an exalted state of mind, beget a vivid
anticipation of it. This subject will be touched on
againunder the Illusions of Belief, Here I am con-
cerned to point out that such presentiments are fertile
sources of sense-illusion. The history of Church
miracles, visions,,and the like amply illustrates the
effectof a vivid anticipation in falsifying the percep-
tions of external things.
In personsof a lively imagination any recent
occupationof the mind with a certain kind of mental
imagemay sufficeto beget somethingequivalentto a
powerful mode of expectation. For example,we are
told by Dr. Tuke that on one occasion a lady, whose
imagination had been dwelling on the subject of
drinking fountains, "thought she saw in a road a newly
erectedfountain,and evendistinguishedan inscription
upon it, namely, 'If any man thirst, let him come
unto Me, and drink.' She afterwards found that what
she had actually seenwasonly a few scatteredstones."I
In many casesthere seeinsto be a temporary preter-
natural activity of the imagination in certain directions,
of which no very obvious explanation is discoverable.
Thus,we sometimes
find our minds dwelling on some
absent friend, without being able to give any reason
for this mental preoccupation. And in this way arise
strong temporaryleaningsto illusory perception. It
may be said,indeed,that all unwontedactivity of the
imagination, however it arises, has as its immediate
result a temporary mode of expectation, definite or
1 Mentioned by Dr. Carpenter (Mental Physiology,p. 207), wliero
other curious examplesare to be found.
 ACTIVE ILLUSION AND HALLUCINATION. Ill

Indefinite, which easily confusesour perceptionsof

external things.
In proportion as this pre-existing imaginative
impulse becomes more powerful, the amount of actual
impression necessary to transform, the mental image
into an illusory perception becomesless; and,.what is
more important, this transformation of the internal
imageinvolvesa larger and larger displacementof the
actual impression of the moment. A man whosemind
is at the time strongly possessed
by onekind of image,
.will tend to project this outwards with hardly any
regard to the actual external circumstances.
This stateof things is most completelyillustrated
in manyof the grosserillusionsof the insane. Thus,
whena patient takesany small objects,as pebbles,for
gold and silver, under the influence of the dominant
idea of being a millionaire, it is obvious that external
suggestionhasverylittle to do with the self-deception.
The confusions into which the patient often falls with
respect to the personsbefore him. show the same state
of mind; for in many cases there is no discoverable
individual resemblance between the person actually
present and the person for whom he is taken.
It is evident that when illusion reaches this stage,
it is scarcely distinguishable from what is specially
known as hallucination. As I have remarked in
setting out, illusion and hallucination shadeone into
the other much too gradually for us to draw any sharp
line of demarcation between them. And here we see
that hallucination differs from illusion only in the pro-
portion in which the causesare present. When the
internal imaginativeimpulsereachesa certainstrength,
112 ILLUSIONS OF PEKOEPTION.

it becomes self-sufficient, or independent of any ex-

ternal impression.
This intimate relation between the extreme form
of active illusion and hallucination may be seen,too,
by examiningthe physical conditionsof each. As I
have already remarked,active illusion has for its
physiologicalt>asisa state of sub-excitation,or an
exceptionalcondition of irritability in the structures
engagedin the act of interpretativeimagination. The
greaterthe degreeof this irritability, the less-willbe
the force -of external stimulation needed to produce
the effect of excitation, and the more energetic will
be the degreeof this excitation. Moreover,it is plain
that this increase in the strength of the -excitation
will involve an extension of the area of excitation
till, by-and-by, the peripheral regions of the nervous
system may be involved just as in the -caseof external
stimulation. This accountsfor the gradualdisplace-
ment of the impressionof the momentby the mental
image. It follows that when the irritability reaches
a certain degree, the amount of -external stimulus
neededmay becomea vanishingquantity, or the state
of sub-excitationmay of itself develop into one of
full activity.

Hallucinations*

I do not propose to go very fully into the de-

scription and explanation of hallucinations here, since
they fall to a large extent under the category of
distinctly pathologicalphenomena.Yet our study of
illusionswould not be completewithout a glance at
this part of the subject.
 RUDIMENTARY HALLUCINATIONS. 113

Hallucination,by which I mean the projection of

a mental image outwards when there is no external
agency answeringto it, assumesone of two fairly
distinct forms: it may present itself either as a sem-
blance of an external impressionwith the minimum
amount of interpretation, or as a counterfeit of a
completelydevelopedpercept. Thus, a visual hallu-
cination may assume the aspect of a sensation of
light or colour which we vaguely refer to a certain
region of the external world, or of a vision of some
recognizableobject. All of us frequently have in-
complete visual and auditory hallucinations of the
first order, whereas the complete hallucinations of
the second order are comparatively rare. The first
I shall call rudimentary,the seconddeveloped,hallu-
cinations.
Budimentary hallucinations may have either a
peripheral or a central origin. They may first of all
have their starting-point in those subjective sensations
which, as we have seen, are connected with certain
processesset up in the peripheralregions of the ner-
vous system. Or, secondly,they may originate in a
certainpreternaturalactivity of the sensorycentres,or
" sensorium," in what has been called by German
physiologistsan automatic excitation of the central
structures, which activity may probably diffuse itself
downwards to the peripheral regions of the nerves.
Baillarger would call hallucinations of the former
class " psycho-sensorial,"those of the latter class
purely " psychical,"hallucinations.1
1 See AnnalesMedico-rsyclwlogiques,torn. vi. p. 16?, etc.; torn. vii.
p. 1, etc*
I
114 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

It is often a matter of great difficulty to determine

which,part of the nervoussystemis originally concerned
in these rudimentary hallucinations. It is probable
that in normal life they are most frequently due to
peripheraldisturbance. And it seemsreasonableto
supposethat wherethe hallucination remainsin this
initial stageof a very incompletelyinterpreted visual
or auditory impression, whether in normal or abnormal
life, its real physiological source is the periphery.
For the automatic excitation of the centres would
pretty certainlyissuein the semblance
of somedefinite,
familiar variety of sense-impressionwhich, moreover,
as a part of a complexstateknownas a percept,would
instantly present itself as a completely formed quasi-
percept. In truth, we may pretty safelyargue that if
it is the centre which is directly thrown into a state
of activity, it will be thrown into the usual complex,
that is to say,perceptional,modeof activity.
Let us now turn to hallucinations properly so
called,that is to say,completelydevelopedquasi-per-
cepts. Thesecommonlyassumethe form of visual or
auditory hallucinations. Like the incompletehalluci-
nations, they mayhave their starting-point either in
some disturbancein the peripheral regions of the
nervoussystem or in the automatic activity of the
"centralstructures:or, to usethe languageof Baillarger,
wemay saythat they are either "psycho-sensorial"or
purely "psychical." A subjective visual sensation,
arising from certain conditions in the retina and con-
nected portions of the optic nerve, may by chance
resemblea familiar impression,and so be at once
interpretedas an effectof a particular external object.
 DEVELOPED HALLUCINATIONS. 115

Morefrequently,however,tlie automaticactivity of tlie

centresmust be regarded,either in part or altogether,
as the physiologicalcauseof the phenomenon. This
is clearly the casewhen, on the subjectiveside, the
hallucinationanswersto a precedingenergeticactivity
of the imagination,as in the caseof the visionary and
the monomaniac. Sometimes,however^as we have seen,
the hallucinatory percept answers to previous pro-
longedacts of perception,leaving a kind of reverbera-
tion in the structures concerned; and in this case it is
obviouslyimpossibleto saywhetherthe peripheral or
central regions (if either) have most to do with the
hallucination.1
The classifications of the causes of hallucination to
be met with in the worksof pathologists,bear out the
distinction just drawn. Griesingertells us (op. cit.9
pp. 94, 95) that the generalcausesof hallucination
are: (1) Local diseaseof the organof sense;(2) a state
of deep exhaustioneither of mind or of body; (3)
morbid emotional states, such as fear; (4) outward calm
and stillnessbetweensleepingand waking; and (5) the
action of certain poisons, as haschisch, opium, bella-
donna. The first cause points pretty distinctly to a
peripheralorigin, whereasthe others appearto refer
mainly, if not exclusively, to central derangements,
11 have already touched on the resonance of a sense-impression.
when the stimulus has ceasedto act (see p. 55). The remarks in the
text hold goodof all such after-impressions,in sofar as they take the
form of fully developed percepts. A goodexample is the recurrence
of the images of microscopicpreparations, to which the anatomist is
liable. (SeeLewes, Problemsof Life and Mind, third series,vol. ii. p.
299.) Since a complete hallucination is supposedto involve the peri-
pheral regions of the nerve, the mere fact of shutting the eye would
not, it is clear,serve as a test of the origin of the illusion.
116 . ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

Excessivefatigue appearsto predisposethe central

structures to an abnormal kind of activity, and the same
effect may be brought about by emotional agitation and
by the action of poisons. The fourth, casementioned
here, absence of external stimulation, wouldnaturally
raise the nervous structures to an exceptional pitch of
excitability. Such,a condition would, moreover,prove
favourable to hallucination by blurring the distinction
betweenmental image and actual impression.

Hallucinations of Normal Life.

In normal life, perfect hallucinations, in the strict

senseas distinct from illusions, are comparatively rare.
Fully developedpersistenthallucinations,as thoseof
Nicolai, the Berlin bookseller, and of Mrs. A , the
lady cited by Sir D. Brewster, in his Letters on Natural
Magic, point to the presence of incipient nervous
disorder. In healthy life, on the other hand, while
everybody is familiar with subjective sensationssuch as
flying spots, phosphenes,ringing in the ears, few fall
into the error of seeing or hearing distinct recognizable
objects in the absenceof all external impressions. In
the lives of eminent men we read of such phenomenaas
very occasionalevents. Malebranche, for example, is
said to have heard the voice of God calling him.
Descartes says that, after a long confinement, he was
followed by an invisible person, calling him to pursue
his search for truth. Dr. Johnson narrates that he
onceheardhis absentmother calling him. Byron tells,
us that he wassometimes visited by spectres. Goethe
recordsthat he once saw an exact counterpart of him-
 HALLUCINATION IN SANITY. 117

self comingtowardshim. Sir Walter Scott is saidta

haveseena phantom,of the deadByron. It is possible
that all of us are liable to momentary hallucinations at
times of exceptionalnervousexhaustion,though they
are too fugitive to excite our attention.
When not brought on by exhaustion or artificial
means,the hallucinationsof the sanehavetheir origin
in a preternatural power of imagination. It is well
known that this power can be greatly improved by
attention and cultivation. Goethe used to exercise him-
self in watching for ocular spectra, and could at will
transform these subjective sensationsinto definite forms,
such asflowers ; and JohannesMiiller found he had the
samepower.1 Storiesare told of portrait painterswho
could summon visual images of their sitters with a
vividness equal to that of reality, and serving all the
purposes
of their art. Mr. G-alton's
interestinginquiries
into the power of " visualizing " would appear to prove
that many people can at will sport on the confines of
the phantomworld of hallucination. There is good
reason to think that imaginative children tend to con-
fuse mental images and percepts.2
1 That subjective sensation may become the starting-point in
complete hallucination is shown in a curious instance given by
Lazarus, and quoted by Taine, cp. cit, vol. i. p. 122, et se%.The
Germanpsychologistrelates that, on one occasionin Switzerland, after
gazing for sometime on a chain of snow-peaks,he saw an apparition of
an.absent friend, looking like a corpse. He goes on to explain that
this phantom was the product of an image of recollection which some-
how managedto combineitself with the (positive) after-image left by
the impressionof the snow-surface.
2 For an account of Mr, Galton's researches,see Mind, No. xix.
Compare,however, Professor Bain's judicious observations on these
118 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

The Hallucinations of Insanity.

The hallucinations of the insane are but a fuller
manifestation of forces that we see at work in normal
life. Their characteristicis that they simulate the form
of distinctly presentobjects,the existenceof which is
not instantly contradictedby the actual surroundings
of the moment.1 The hallucinations have their origin
partly in subjective sensations,which are probably
connectedwith peripheral disturbances,partly and
principally in central derangements.2 These include
profoundemotional changes,which affect the ruling
mental tone, and exert a powerful influence on the
course of the mental images. The hallucinations of
insanity are due to a projection of mental images
which have, owing to certain circumstances, gained a
preternaturalpersistenceand vividness. Sometimesit
is the imagesthat havebeen dwelt on with passionate
longingbeforethe disease,
sometimesthosewhichhave
grownmost.habitualthrough the modeof daily occupa-
results in the next number of Mind. The liability of children to take
imagesfor percepts,is illustrated by the experiences
related in a
curious little work, Visions, by E. H. Clarke, M.D. (Boston, U.S.,
1878), pp. 17, 4G,and 212.
1 A commonway of describing the relation of the hallucinatory to
real objects,is to say that the former appearpartly to cover and hide
the latter.
2 Griesinger remarks that the forms of the hallucinations of the
insane rarely depend on sense-disturbancesalone. Though these are
often the starting-point, it is the whole mental complexion of -the
time which gives the direction to the imagination. The common
experience of seeing rats and mice running about during a fit of
delirium tremensvery well illustrates the co-operation of peripheral
impressionsnot usually attended to, and possibly magnified by the
morbid state of sensibility of the time (in this caseflying spots,muscse
volitantes),with emotional conditions. (See Gricsinger, loc. cit., p. 96.>
 HALLUCINATION IN INSANITY. 119

tion,1 and sometimes those connected with some

incident at or near the time of the commencement of
the disease.
In mental disease,auditor}1-hallucinations play a
part no less conspicuousthan visual.2 Patients fre-
quently complainof having their thoughts spoken to
them, and it is not uncommonfor them to imagine
that they are addressedby a number of voices at the
same time.3
Theseauditory hallucinations offer a good oppor-
tunity for studying the gradual growth of centrally
originating hallucinations. In the early stagesof the
disease,the patient partly distinguisheshis represen-
tative from his presentative sounds. Thus, he talks of
sermonsbeingcomposedto him in his head. He calls
these " internal voices," or a voices of the soul." It

1 Wundt (PhysiologischePsychologic,p. 652) tells us of an insane

woodmanwho sawlogs of wood on all hands in front of the real objects.
2 It is stated by Baillarger (Memoires de VAcadc'mie Royale da
Medicine, torn. xii. p. 273, etc.) that while visual hallucinations arc
more frequent than auditory in healthy life, the reverse relation holds
in disease. At the same time, Gricsingcr remarks (loc. cit., p. 98)
that visual hallucinations are rather more common than auditory in
diseasealso. This is what we should expect from tho number of
subjective sensationsconnected with the peripheral organ of vision.
The greater relative frequency of auditory hallucinations in disease,
if madeout, would seemto depend on the close connection between.
articulate soundsand the higher centres of intelligence, which centres
are naturally the first to be thrown out of working order. It is
possible,moreover,that auditory hallucinations are quite as common
as visual in states of comparative health, though more easily over-
looked. ProfessorHuxley relates that ho is liable to auditory thougli
not to visual hallucinations. (See Elementary Lessonsin Physiology,
p. 267.)
3 SeeBaillarger, Memoiresde VAcad&nieEoyale de Mddicinej torn.
xii. p. 273, et sec[.
120 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

is only whenthe diseasegainsgroundand the central

irritability increasesthat theseaudible thoughts become
distinctly projected as external soundsinto more or
less definite regionsof the environment. And it is
exceedinglycuriousto notice the different directions
which patients give to these sounds,referring them
now to a quarter above the head,nowto a region below
the floor, and so on.1

Eange of Sense-Illusions.
And now let us glance back to see the path we
havetraversed. We set out with an account of per-
fectly normal perception,and found,evenhere,in the
projectionof our sensationsof colour, sound,etc.,into
the environment or to the extremities of the organism,
somethingwhich, from the point of view of physical
science,easily wearsthe appearanceof an ingredient
of illusion.
"Waivingthis,however,and taking the wordillusion
as commonlyunderstood, we find that it beginswhen
the elementof imagination no longer answersto a
presentreality or externalfact in anysenseof this ex-
pression. In its loweststagesillusion closelycounter-
feits correct perception in the balance of the direct
factor,sensation,
andthe indirectfactor,mentalrepro-
duction or imagination. The degree of illusion in-
creasesin proportionas the imaginativeelementgains
1 SeeBaillarger,AnnalesMedico-PsycJiologiques,
tern.vi. p. 1GS
et seq.; also torn. xii. p. 273, et seq. CompareGriesinger, op. cit. In a
curious work entitled Du Demonde Socrate(Paris, 1856), M. Lelut'
seeks to prove that tlie philosopher's admonitory voice was an inci-
pient auditory hallnciuation symptomic of a nascent stage of mental
alienation.
 SCALE OF SENSE-ILLUSION. 121

in force relatively to the present impression; till, in

the wild illusions of the insane, the amount of actual
impressionbecomesevanescent. When this point is
reached,the act of imaginationshowsitself as a purely
creative process,or an hallucination.
While we may thus trace the progressof illusion
towards hallucination by means of the gradual increase
in force and extent of the imaginative, or indirect, as
opposedto the sensuous,
or direct, elementin percep-
tion, we have found a second starting-point for this
movement in the mechanism of sensation, involving, as
it does, the occasional production of "subjective sen-
sations." Such sensations constitute a border-land
between the regions of illusion in the narrow sense>
and hallucination. In their simplest and least de-
veloped form they may be regarded,at least in the
caseof hearing and sight, as partly hallucinatory; and
they serve as a natural basis for the construction of
'Complete
hallucinations,or hallucinatory percepts.
In these different ways,then, the slight, scarcely
noticeableillusionsof normal life lead up to the most
startling hallucinations of abnormal life. From the
two poles of the higher centres of attention and
imaginationon the one side,and the lower regions of
nervousactioninvolved,in sensationon the other side,
issueforceswhich may, under certain circumstances,
developinto full hallucinatorypercepts. Thusclosely
is healthy attached to morbid mental life. There
seems to be no sudden break between our most sober
every-day recognitions of familiar objects and the
wildesthallucinations
of the demented.As we pass
from the former to the latter, we find that there is
122 ILLUSIONS OP PERCEPTION.

neyeranyabrupttransition,neveranyadditionof per-
fectly newelements,
but only that the old elements
gooncombining in evernewproportions.
The connectionbetweenthe illusory side of our life-
andinsanitymaybe seenin anotherway. All illusion
has as its negative condition an interruption of the
higher intellectual processes,
the due control of our
mental representations by reflectionand reason. In
the case of passiveillusions, the error arises from our
inability to subordinate the suggestion made by some
feature of the presentimpressionto the result of a
fuller inspectionof the object beforeus, or of a wider
reflection on the past. In other words, our minds are
dominated by the partial and the particular, to the
exclusion of the total or the general. In active
illusions, again, the powers of judgment and reflection,
including those of calm perception itself, temporarily
vacate their throne in favour of imagination. And
this same suspension of the higher intellectual
functions, the stupefaction of judgment and reflection
made more complete and permanent, is just what
characterizesinsanity.
We may,perhaps,expressthis point of connection
betweenthe illusions of normal life and insanity by
help of a physiological hypothesis. If the nervous-
systemhas beenslowlybuilt up, during the courseof
humanhistory,into its presentcomplexform,it follows
that those nervous structures and connections which
have to do with the higher intellectual processes,
or
which representthe larger and moregeneralrelations.
of our experience,have been most recently evolved.
Consequently,
theywouldbetheleastdeeplyorganized,.
 CONTINUITY OF SANE AND INSANE LIFE. 123

and so the least stable ; that is to say, the most liable

to be thrown Jiorsde combat. This is what happens
temporarilyin the caseof the-sane,when the mind is
held fast by an illusion. And, in statesof insanity,wo
see the processof nervous dissolution beginning with
these same nervous structures, and so taking the
reverseorder of the process of evolution.1 And thus,
we may say that throughout the mental life of the
most sane of us, these higher and more delicately
balanced structures are constantly in danger of being
reduced to that state of inefficiency, which in its full
manifestation is mental disease.
Doesthis way of putting the subject seemalarm-
ing ? Is it an appalling thought that our normal
mental life is thus intimately related to insanity, and
graduatesaway into it by such fine transitions? A
moment's reflection will show that the case is not so
bad as it seems. It is well to remind ourselves that
the brain is a delicately adjusted organ, which very
easily gets disturbed, and that the best of us are liable
to become the victims of absurd illusion if we habitu-
ally allow our imaginations to be overheated,whether
by furious passionor by excessiveindulgencein the
pleasuresof day-dreaming,or in the intoxicating mys-
teries of spiritualist seances. But if we take care to
keep our headscool and avoid unhealthy degreesof
mentalexcitement,weneednot be very anxiouson the
groundof our liability to this kind of error. As I have
triedto show,
ourmostfrequentillusionsarenecessarily
connectedwith somethingexceptional,either in tho
>l Tbis is Tvellbroughtout by Dr. J. HughlingsJackson,in llio
papersin 7.lraintalready referred to.
124 ILLUSIONS OF PERCEPTION.

organismor in the environment. That is to say, it

is of the nature of illusion in healthy conditions of
body and inind to be somethingvery occasionaland
relatively unimportant. Our perceptionsmay be re-
gardedasthe reactionof the mind on the impressions
borne in from the external world, or as a process of
adjustmentof internal mental relations to external
physical relations. If this processis, in the main, a
right one, we need not greatly trouble, because it is
not invariably so. We should accept the occasional
failure of the intellectual mechanism,as an inseparable
accompaniment of its general efficiency.
To this it must be added that many of the illusions
described above can hardly be called casesof non-
adaptationat all, since they have no relation to the
practical needsof life, and consequentlyare, in a
general way, unattended to. In other cases,again,
namely, where the precise nature of a present sen-
sation, being practically an unimportant matter, is
usually unattendedto, as in the instantaneousrecog-
nition of objects by the eye under changesof illumi-
nation,etc.,the illusion is rather a part of the process
of adaptation, since it is much more important to
recognizethe permanentobject signified by the sen-
sation than the precisenature of the present sensational
" sign " itself.
Finally, it should never be forgotten that in nor-
mal statesof mind there is alwaysthe possibility of
rectifying an illusion. What distinguishesabnormal
from normal mentallife is the persistentoccupationof
the inind by certain ideas, so that there is no room for
the salutary corrective effect of reflection on the actual
 SANE LIFE MAEKBD OFF FROM INSANE. 125

impressionof the moment, by which we are wont to

" orientate/' or take our bearings as to the position of
things about us. In sleep,and in certain artificially
producedstates.,much the samething presentsitself.
Images becomerealities just becausethey are not
instantly recognizedas such by a reference to the
actual surroundings of the moment. But in normal
waking life this powerof correction remainswith us.
We maynot exerciseit, it is true, and thus the illusion
will tend to become more or less persistent and recur-
ring; for the samelaw appliesto true and to falseper-
ception: repetition makes the processeasier. But it
we only chooseto exert ourselves,we can always keep
our illusions in a nascent or imperfectly developed
stage. This applies not only to those half-illusions
into which we voluntarily fall, but also to the rnoro
irresistible passive illusions, and those arising from an
over-excited imagination. Even personssubject to hal-
lucinations, like Nicolai of Berlin, learn to recognize
the unreal character of these phantasms. On this
point the following bit of autobiographyfrom the pen
of Coleridgethrows an interesting light. "A lady
(he writes) onceaskedme if I believedin ghostsand
apparitions. I answeredwith truth and simplicity,
No, madam,I haveseenfar too many myself."l How-
everirresistible our sense-illusionsmay be, so long as
we are under the sway of particular impressionsor
mental images,we can, when resolved to do so, un-
1 Friend,vol. i. p. 248. The story is referredto by Sir W. Scotfc
in
Ms Demonologyand Witchcraft.
126 ILLUSIONS OF PEECEPTION.

deceiveourselvesby carefully attendingto the actual

state of things about us. And in many cases,when
once the correction is made, the illusion seems an
impossibility. By no effort of imagination are we
able to throw ourselvesback into the illusory mental
condition. So long as this power of dispelling the
illusion remains with us, we need not be alarmed at
the number and variety of the momentarymisappre-
hensions to which we are liable.
 CHAPTER VII.

DREAMS.

THEphenomenaof dreamsmay well seemat first-sight

to form a world of their own, having no discoverable
links of connection with the other facts of human
experience. First of all, there is the mystery of sleep,
which quietly shuts all the avenues of sense and so
isolates the mind from contact with the world outside.
To gazeat the motionlessfaceof a sleepertemporarily
rapt from the life of sight, sound,and movement-
which, being common to all, binds us together in
mutual recognition and social action-has always some-
thing awe-inspiring. This external inaction, this
torpor of senseand muscle,how unlike to the familiar
waking life, with its quick responsiveness
and its over-
flowing energy! And then, if we look at dreamsfrom
the inside, we seem to find but the reverse face of
the mystery. How inexpressiblystrangedoesthe late
night-dreamseemto a personon waking! He feelshe
has been seeing and hearing things no less real than
thoseof waking life; but things which belong to an
unfamiliarworld, an order of sightsand a sequenceof
eventsquite unlike those of waking experience;and
128 DREAMS.

he askshimselfin his perplexitywherethat once-

visitedregionreallylies, or by what magicpowerit
wassuddenly and for a moment created for his vision,
In truth, the verynameof dreamsuggests
something
remoteand mysterious,and whenwrewant to characterize
someimpressionor scenewhich by its passingstrange-
nessfilled us with wonder, we naturally call it dream-
like,

Theoriesof Dreams.
The earliest theories respecting dreams illustrate
very clearly this perception of the remoteness of
dream-life from waking experience. By the simple
mind of primitive man this dream-world is regarded
as similar in its nature or structure to our common
world, only lying remote from this. The savagecon-
ceives that when he falls asleep,his secondself leaves
his familiar body and journeys forth to unfamiliar
regions,whereit meetsthe departedsecondselvesof
his dead ancestors, and so on. From, this point of
view, the experienceof the night, though equal in
reality to that of the day, is passedin a wholly dis-
connectedregion.1
A second and more thoughtful view of dreams,
marking a higher grade <?f intellectual culture, is
that these visions of the night are symbolic pictures
unfolded to the inner eye of the soul by somesuper-
natural being. The dream-experience is now, in a
sense,less real than it was before, since the phantasms
that wear the guise of objective realities are simply
1 SeeE, B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, oh. xi.; cf. Herbert Spencer,
"Principlesof Sociology,ch. x.
 HISTORY OF DEE AM THEOEIES. 129

Imagesspreadout to the spirit's gaze,or the direct

utterance of a divine message. Still, this mysterious
contact of the mind with the supernatural is regarded
asa fact,and sothe dreamassumes the appearance of a
higher order of experience. Its one point of attach-
ment to the experienceof waking life lies in its
symbolicfunction; for the commonform which this
supernaturalview assumesis that the dream is a dim
prevision of corningevents. Artemidorus, the great
authority on dream interpretation (oneiroeritics) for
the ancient world, actually defines a dream as "a
motionor fiction of the soul in a diverse form signify-
ing either goodor evil to come;" and evena logician
like Porphyry ascribesdreamsto the influence of a
gooddemon,who therebywarnsus of the evils which.
another and bad demon is preparing for us. The same
modeof viewing dreamsis quite commonto-day, and
manywho pride themselveson a certain intellectual
culture, and who imagine themselves to be free from
the weaknessof superstition, are apt to talk of dreams
as of something mysterious, if not distinctly ominous.
Nor is it surprising that phenomena which at first
sight look so wild and lawless,should still pass for
miraculous interruptions of the natural order of events.1
Yet, in spite of this obviousand impressiveelement
<>fthe mysteriousin dream-life,the scientific impulse
to illuminate the less known by the better known has
long sincebegunto play on this obscuresubject.
Even in the ancient world a writer might here and
1 For a fuller accountof the differentmodesof dream-interpre-
tation, seemy article " Dream,"in the ninth edition of the Encyclo-
paediaBritannica.
130 DEEAMS.

there be found, like Democritus or Aristotle, who was

bold enoughto put forward a natural and physical
explanationof dreams. But it has been the work of
modernscienceto provide somethinglike an approxi-
mate solution of the problem. The careful study of
mental life in its intimate union with bodily opera-
tions, and the comparison of dream-combinationswitJb.
other products of the imagination, normal as well as
morbid,havegradually helped to dissolvea goodpart
of the mystery which oncehung like an opaquemist
about the subject. In this way,our dream-operations
have been found to have a much closer connection
with our waking experiencesthan could be supposed
on a superficial view. The materials of our dreams
are seen, when closely examined, to be drawn from
our waking experience. Our waking consciousness
acts in numberless ways on our dreams, and these
againin unsuspected waysinfluenceourwakingmental
life.1 Not only so,it is found that the quaint chaotic
play of imagesin dreamsillustrates mental processes
and laws which are distinctly observablein waking
thought. Thus, for example,the apparent objective
reality of thesevisionshasbeenaccountedfor, without
the need of resorting to any supernatural agency,in the
light of a vast assemblageof facts gatheredfrom
the by-ways, so to speak, of waking mental life. I
need hardly add that I refer to the illusions of sense
dealt with in the foregoing chapters.
Dreams are to a large extent the semblance of
1 For a fuller account of the reaction of dreams on waking con-
sciousness,see Paul Radestock, Bclilaf und Traum, The subject is
touched on later, under the Illusions of Memory.
 PHYSIOLOGY OF SLEEP* 131

externalperceptions.Otherpsychicalphenomena,
as
self-reflection, emotional activity, and so on, appear
in dream-life,but they do so in closeconnectionwith
thesequasi-perceptions.
The name"vision,'5given
by old writers to dreams,sufficiently points out this
close affinity of the mental phenomena to sense-per-
ception; and so far as science is concerned,they
must be regarded as a peculiar variety of sense-
illusion. Hence the appropriatenessof studying them
in close connection with the illusions of perception
of the waking state. Though marked off by the
presenceof very exceptionalphysiological conditions,
they are largely intelligible by help of these physio-
logical and psychologicalprinciples which we have
just beenconsidering.
The State of Sleep.
The physiological explanation of dreams must,
it is plain, set out with an accountof the condition of
the organismknown as sleep. While there is here
much that is uncertain,there are somethings which
are fairly well known. Eecent physiological observa-
tion has gone to prove that during sleep all the
activities of the organism are appreciably lowered.
Thus,for example,accordingto Testa, the pulse falls
by about one-fifth. This loweringof the organicfunc-
tions appears,under ordinary circumstances,to increase
towardsmidnight, afterwhich there is a gradualrising.
The nervoussystemsharesin this generaldepression
of the vital activities. The circulation being slower,
the processof reparation and nutrition of the nerves is
retarded,andsotheir degreeof excitability diminished.
132 BREAMS.

This-is clearly seenin the condition of the peripheral

regions of the nervoussystem,including the sense-
organs,which appearto be but very slightly acted on
by their customarystimuli.
The nervous centres must participate- IB this
lethargy of the system. In other words,the activity of
the central substance is lowered, and the result of this
is plainly seenin what is usually thought of as the
characteristic feature of sleep, namely, a transition
from vigorous mental activity or intense and clear
consciousness,to comparative inactivity or faint and
obscure consciousness. The cause of this condition of
the centresis supposedto be the sameas that of the
torpidity of all the other organsin sleep,namely,the
retardation of the circulation. But, though there is no
doubt as to this, the questionof the proximatephysio-
logical conditionsof sleepis still far frombeingsettled.
Whether during sleep the blood-vesselsof the brain are
fuller or less full than during waking,is still a moot
point. Also the qualitative condition of the blood in
the cerebral vessels is still a matter of discussion.1
Sincethe effectof sleepis to lowercentralactivity,
the question naturally occurs whether the nervous
centres are ever rendered inactive to such an extent as
to interrupt the continuity of our consciouslife. This
question has been discussedfrom the point of view of
the metaphysician, of the psychologist,
and of the phy-
siologist, and in no caseis perfect unanimity to be
found. The metaphysical question, whether the soul
as a spiritual substance
is capableof being wholly in-
1 For an account of the latest physiological hypothesesas to the
proximate causeof sleep, seeRadestock,op. cit., appendix.
 IS SLEEP EVER DREAMLESS? 133

active, or whether it is not in what seem the moments

of profoundestunconsciousnesspartially awake-the
questionso warmly discussedby the Cartesians,Leib-
nitz, etc.-need not detain us here.
Of more interest to us are the psychologicaland
the physiological discussions. The former seeks to
settlethe questionby help of introspectionandmemory.
On the oneside,it is urged against the theory of un-
broken mental activity, that we remember so little of
the loweredconsciousness
of sleep.1 To this it is replied
that our forgetfulness of the contents of dream-con-
sciousness,even if this were unbroken, would be fully
accountedfor by the great dissimilarity betweendream-
ing and waking mental life. It is urged, moreover,
on this sidethat a suddenrousing of a man from sleep
alwaysdiscovershim in the act of dreaming,and that
this goesto provethe uniform connectionof dreaming
and sleeping. This argument,again,may be met by
the assertion that our sense of the duration of our
dreamsis found to be grosslyerroneous; that, owingto
the rapid succession of the images,the realization of
which wouldinvolve a long duration, we enormously
exaggeratethe length of dreams in retrospection.2
From this it is arguedthat the dreamwhichis recalled
on our being suddenly awakenedmay have had its
whole courseduring the transition state of waking*
Again, the fact that a man may resolve,on going to
sleep,to wakeat a certain hour,hasoften beencited in
1 Plutarch, Locke, and others give instances of peoplewho never
dreamt. Leasing assertedof himself that he never knew what it \vaa
to dream.
2 The error touched on here will be fully dealt with under
Illusions of Memory.
134 DEEAMS.

proof of the persistenceof a degreeof mental activity

evenin perfectly soundsleep. The force of this con-
sideration,however,hasbeenexplainedawayby saying
that the anticipation of rising at an unusual hour
necessarily produces a slight amount of mental dis-
quietude, which is quite sufficientto prevent sound
sleep,andthereforeto exposethe sleeperto the rousing
action of faint external stimuli.
While the purely psychological method is thus
wholly inadequate to solve the question, physiological
reasoningappearsalso to be not perfectly conclusive.
Many physiologists, not unnaturally desirous of up-
setting what they regardas a gratuitous metaphysical
hypothesis,havepronouncedin favour of anabsolutely
dreamlessor unconscioussleep. Eroni the physio-
logical point of view, there is no mystery in a totally
suspendedmental activity. On the other hand, there
is muchto be said on the oppositeside,and perhaps
it may be contendedthat the purely physiological
evidence rather points to the conclusion that central
activity, however diminished during sleep, always
retains a minimum degree of intensity. At least, one
would be disposed to argue in this way from the
analogy of the condition of the other functions of the
organism during sleep. Possibly this modicum of
positive evidencemaymore than outweighany slight
presumptionagainstthe doctrine of unbroken mental
activity drawn from the negative circumstance that we
remember so little of our dream-life.1
Such being the state of physiologicalknowledge
1 For a very full, fair, and thoughtful discussion of this whole
question,seeRadnatock,
op.cit., ch.iv.
 STATE OF NEBVE-STBUCTUEES IN SLEEP. 135

respecting
the immediateconditionsof sleep,we can-
not look for any certain information on the nature of
that residual mode of cerebral activity which manifests
itself subjectivelyin dreams.It is evident,indeed,
that this questioncanonly be fully answeredwhenthe
conditionof the brain as a wholeduring sleepis under-
stood. Meanwhile we must be content with vague
hypotheses.
It may be said,for onething, that during sleepthe
nervous substance as a whole is less irritable than
during waking hours. That is to say, a greater amount
of stimulusis neededto produceany consciousresult.1
This appears plainly enough in the case of the
peripheralsense-organs. Although these are not, as it
is often supposed,wholly inactive during sleep, they
certainly require a more potent external stimulus to
rouse them to action. And what applies to the
peripheral regions applies to the centres. In truth,
it is clearly impossibleto distinguish between the
diminishedirritability of the peripheral and that of
the central structures.

At first sight it seemscontradictoryto the above

to say that stimuli which have little effect on the
centresof consciousnessduring waking life producean
appreciableresult in sleep. Nevertheless,it will bo
found that this is the case. Thusorganicprocesses
which scarcely make themselves known to the mind in
a wakingstate,maybe shownto be the originatorsof
manyof our dreams.Thisfact canonly be explained
onthephysicalsidebysayingthat thespecialcerebral
1 This maybe technicallyexpressed by saying that tho Jiininal
intensity(Schwelle)is raisedduring sleep.
136 DKEAMS.

activities engagedin an act of attention are greatly

liberated during sleepby the comparativequiescence
of the external senses. These activities, by co-operat-
ing with the faint results of the stimuli comingfrom
the internal organs, serve very materially to increase
their effect.
Finally, it is to be observed that, while the centres
thus respondwith diminished energy to peripheral
stimuli, external and internal, they undergo a direct,
or u automatic," mode of excitation, being roused into

activity independently of an incoming nervous im-

pulse. This automatic stimulation has been plausibly
referred to the action of the products of decomposition
accumulating in the cerebral blood-vessels.1It is pos-
sible that there is something in the nature of this
stimulation to account for the force and vividness of its
conscious
results,that is to say,of dreams.
The Dream State.

Let us now turn to the psychic side of these con-

ditions, that is to say, to the general character of the
mental states known as dreams. It is plain that the
closing of the avenuesof the external senses,which is
the accompaniment of sleep, will make an immense
difference in the mental events of the time. Instead
of drawing its knowledgefrom without, noting its
bearings in relation to the environment, the mind will
now be given over to the play of internal imagination.
The activity of fancy will, it is plain, beunrestricted by
collision with external fact. The internal mental life
will expand in free picturesque movement.
1 SeeTVundt,PUydologischePsychologie,
pp. 188-191.
 NATURE OF DKEAM-ACTIVITY. 1ST

To saythat in sleep the mind is given over to its

ownimaginings,
is to saythat the mentallife in these
circumstanceswill reflect the individual temperament
and mental history. For the play of imagination at
any time followsthe lines of our past experiencemore
closelythan wouldat first appear,and being coloured1
with emotion,will reflect the predominantemotional
impulsesof the individual mind. Hence the saying
of Heraclitus, that, while in waking we all have a com-
mon world, in sleep we have each a world of our own.
This play of imagination in sleep is furthered by
the peculiar attitude of attention. When asleep the
voluntary guidanceof attentionceases;its direction is
to a large extent determinedby the contentsof the
mind at the moment. Instead of holding the images
and ideas, and combining them according to some
rational end, the attention relaxes its energies and
succumbs to the force of imagination. And thus, in
sleep,just as in the conditionof reverie or day-dream-
ing, there is an abandonment of the fancy to its own
wild ways.
It followsthat the dream-statewill not appearto
the mind asoneof fancy, but as one of actual percep-
tion, and of contactwith presentreality. Dreams are
clearlyillusory,and,unlike the illusions of waking life,
are complete and persistent.1 And the reasonof this
ought nowto be clear. First of all, the mind during
sleepwantswhat M. Taine callsthe correctiveof a pre-
1 There is, indeed, sometimes an undertone of critical reflection,
which is sufficient to produce a feeling of uncertainty and bewilder-
ment, and in very rare casesto amount to a vague consciousness that
the mental experienceis a dream.
138 DEEAMS.

sent sensation. When awakeunder ordinary circum-

stances,any momentaryillusion is at oncesetright by
a new act of orientation. The superior vividness of the
external impression cannot leave us in any doubt,
when calm and self-possessed,whether our mental
images answer to present realities or not. On the
other hand, when asleep, this reference to a fixed
objective standard is clearly impossible. Secondly,we
may fairly argue that the mental images of sleep
approximate in character to external impressions. This
they do to some extent in point of intensity, for, in
spite of the diminished excitability of the centres, the
mode of stimulation which occurs in sleep may, as I
have hinted, involve an energetic cerebral action.
And, however this be, it is plain that the image
will gain a preternaturalforce through the greatly
narrowedrangeof attention. When the mind of the
sleeper is wholly possessedby an image or group of
images, and the attention kept tied down to these,
there is a maximum reinforcementof the images.
But this is not all. When the attention is thus held
captive by the image, it approximates in character to
an externalimpressionin anotherway. In our waking
state, when our powers of volition are intact, the
externalimpressionis characterizedby its fixity or its
obdurate resistanceto our wishes. On the other hand,
the mental image is fluent, accommodating, and dis-
appearsand reappears
accordingto the direction of our
volitions. In sleep, through the suspension of the
higher voluntary powerof attention,the mentalimage
seems to lord it over our minds just as the actual
impressionof waking life.
 DREAM AS SENSE-ILLUSION, 139

This much may suffice, perhaps, by way of a

generaldescriptionof the sleepingand dreamingstate.
Other points will make themselves known after we
have studied the contents and structure of dreams in
detail.
Dreamsarecommonlyclassified(e.g.by Wundt) with
hallucinations, and this rightly, since, as their common
appellationof " vision" suggests,they arefor the most
part the semblance of perceptsin the absenceof ex-
ternal impressions. At the sametime, recent research
goesto showthat in many dreamssomethinganswer-
ing to the " externalimpression" in wakingperception
is the starting-point. Consequently,in order to be
as accurateas possible,I shall divide dreamsinto
illusions (in the narrow sense)and hallucinations.
D rea m-Illusio us.

By dream-illusionsI mean those dreamswhich set

out from someperipheral nervous stimulation, internal
or external. That the organic processes of digestion,
respiration,etc.,act as stimuli to the centresin sleep
is well known. Thus, David Hartley assignsas the
secondgreat sourceof dreams"states of the body."1
But it is not so well known to what an extent our
dreams may be influenced by stimuli acting on the
exterior sense-organs.Let us first glance at the
action of such external stimuli.

Action of External Stimuli.

During sleepthe eyesare closed,and consequently
the action of external light on the retina impeded.
1 Observationson Man, Part I. ch. iii, sec.5.
140 DEEAMS.

Yet it is found that even under these circumstances

any very bright light suddenlyintroducedis capable
of stimulatingthe optic fibres,andof affectingconscious-
ness. The most common form of this is the effect of
bright moonlight,and of the early sun'srays. Krauss
tells a funny story of his having once,when twenty-six
years old, caught himself, on waking, in the act of
stretching out his arms towards what his dream-fancy
had pictured as the image of his mistress. When
fully awake, this image resolved itself into the full
moon.1 It is not improbable, as Eadestock remarks,
that the rays of the sun or moon are answerable for
manyof the dreamsof celestialglory which personsof
a highly religioustemperamentaresaid to experience.
External sounds, when not sufficient to rouse the
sleeper,easilyincorporatethemselvesinto his dreams.
The ticking of a watch, the stroke of a clock, the hum
of an insect, the song of a bird, the patter of rain, are
common stimuli to the dream-phantasy. M. Alf.
Maury tells us,in his interesting accountof the series
of experimentsto which he submittedhimself in order
to ascertain the result of external stimulation on the
mind during sleep,that when a pair of tweezerswas
made to vibrate near his ear, he dreamt of bells, the
tocsin, and the events of June, 1848.2 Most of us,
probably,have gone through the experienceof im-
politely falling asleepwhen someone was readingto
us, and of having dream-images suggested by the
sounds that were still indistinctly heard. Schemer
givesan amusingcaseof a youth whowaspermittedto
1 Quoted by Badestock, op. cit., p. 110.
2 Le Sommeilet les Reves,p. 132, et seq.
 ACTION OF EXTERNAL STIMULI. 141

whisperhis nameinto the ear of his obduratemistress,

the consequence
of which was that the lady contracted
a habit of dreaming about him, which led to a felicitous
changeof feeling-on her part.1
The two lower senses, smell and taste, seem to
play a less-importantpart in the productionof dream-
illusions. Eadestock says that the odour of flowers
in a room easily leads to visual images of hot-houses,
perfumeryshops,and so on; and it is probablethat
the contents of the mouth may occasionally act as a
stimulus to the organ of taste, and so give rise to
corresponding
dreams.As B/adestock
observes,
these
lower sensationsdo not commonly make known their
quality to the sleeper'smind. They becometrans-
formedat onceinto visual,insteadof into olfactory or
gustatorypercepts. That is to say,the dreamerdoes
not imaginehimselfsmelling or tasting, but seeingan
object.
The contact of objects1
with the tactual organ is
oneof the bestrecognizedcausesof dreams. M. Maury
found that whenhis lips weretickled, his dream-fancy
interpretedthe impressionas of a pitch plasterbeing
torn off his face. An unusual pressure on any part
of the body, as, for example, from contact with a
fellow-sleeper,is known to give rise to a well-marked
variety of dream. Our own limbs may even appear
as foreign bodies to our dream-imagination,when
through pressurethey becomepartly paralyzed. Thus,
on one occasion,I awoke from a miserable dream, in
which I felt sure I was grasping somebody's
hand in
1 Das Leben des Traumes,p. 369. Other instancesare related by
Beattie and Abercrombie.
142 DEEAMS.

bed,and I was-racked
by terrifying conjecturesasto whc
it might be. When fully awake, I discovered that I
had beenlying on my right side,and claspingthe wrist
of the right arm (which had beenrenderedinsensible
by the pressureof the body) with the left hand.
In close connectionwith these stimuli of pressure
are those of muscular movement, whether unimpeded
or impeded. We need not enter into the difficult
question how far the "muscular sense" is connected
with the activity of the motor nerves,and how far with
sensoryfibres attached to the muscular or the adjacent
tissues. Suffice it to say that an actual movement, a
resistance to an attempted movement, or a mere clis-
disposition to movement, whether consequent on a
surplus of motor energy or on a sensationof discomfort
or fatigue in the part to be moved,somehow
or other
makes itself known to our minds, even when we are
deprivedof the assistance of vision. And thesefeel-
ingsof movement,impeded-orunimpeded,are common
initial impulsesin our dream-experiences.It is quite
a mistaketo supposethat dreamsare built up out of
the purely passivesensationsof sight and hearing. A
close observationwill show that in nearly every dream
weimagineourselveseither movingamong the objects
we perceiveor striving to move when someweighty
obstacle obstructs us. All of us are familiar with the
commonformsof nightmare,in which we strive hope-
lessly to flee from some menacing evil, and this dream-
experience,it may be presumed,frequently comesfrom
a feelingof strain in the muscles,due to an awkward
dispositionof the limbs during sleep. The common
dream-illusionof falling downa vast abyssis plausibly
 SUBJECTIVE STIMULATION OF NEKVES. 143

referredby Wundt to an involuntary extensionof the

foot of the sleeper.

Action of Internal Stimuli.

Let us now passfrom the action of stimuli lying
outside the organism,to that of stimuli lying within
the peripheral regions of the sense-organs.I have
already spoken of the influence of subjective sen-
sations of sight, hearing, etc., on the illusions of
waking life, and it is now to be added that these sen-
sations play an important part in our dream-life.
JohannesMiiller lays great prominenceon the part
taken by ocular spectrain the production of dreams.
As he observes,the apparent rays of light, light-
patches,mists of light, and so on, due to changesof
blood-pressurein the retina, only manifest themselves
clearlywhenthe eyesareclosedand the morepowerful
effect of the external stimulus cut off. These sub-
jective spectra come into prominencein the sleepy
condition, giving rise to what M. Maury calls "hal-
lucinations hypnagogiques," and which he regards
(after Gruithuisen) as the chaosout of which the dream-
cosmos is evolved.1 They are pretty certainly the
starting-point in those picturesque dreamsin which
figure a number of bright objects,such as beautiful
birds,butterflies,flowers,or angels.
That the visual imagesof our sleepdooften involve
the peripheralregionsof the organof sight, seemsto
be proved by the singular fact that they sometimes
persistafter waking. Spinozaand JeanPaul Richter
1Le Sommeil
et lesReves,
p. 42, et seq.
 DBEAMS.

both experienced this survival of dream-images.Still

more pertinent is the fact that the effectsof retinal
fatigue are producibleby dream-images.The physio-
logist Gruithuisenhad a dream,in which the principal
feature was a violet flame, and which left behind it,
after waking,for an appreciableduration, a comple-
mentaryimageof a yellow spot.1
Subjective auditory sensationsappear to be much
less frequentcausesof dream-illusions
than correspond-
ing visual sensations.Yet the rushing,roaring sound
causedby the circulation of the blood in the ear is,
probably,a not uncommonstarting-point in dreams.
With respect to subjective sensations of smell and
taste, there is little to be said. On the other hand,
subjectivesensations
due to varying conditionsin the
skin are a very frequent exciting cause of dreams.
Variationsin the state of tensionof the skin, brought
aboutby alterationof position,changesin the charac-
ter of the circulation, the irradiation of heat to the
skin or the loss of the same,chemical changes,-
these are known to give rise to a number of familiar
sensations,includingthoseof tickling, itching, burning,
creeping,andso on; andthe effectsof thesesensations
are distinctly traceablein our dreams. For example,
the exposure of a part of the body through a loss of
the bed-clothesis a frequent excitant of distressing
dreams. A cold foot suggeststhat the sleeperis walk-
ing over snow or ice. On the other hand, if the cold
foot happensto touch a warmpart of the body,the
1 Beitragesur Physiognosie
und Heautognosie,p. 256. For other
casesseeH. Meyer,Physiologie
derNervenfaser,
p. 309;andStriimpeli,
Die Natur und Entstehungder Trtiume, p. 125.
 INFLUENCE OF OKGANIC SENSATIONS. 145

dreain-fancyconstructsimagesof walking on burning

lava, and so on.
These sensationsof the skin naturally conduct us
to the organicsensations
as a whole; that is to say,the
feelingsconnectedwith the varying condition of the
bodily organs. Theseinclude the feelingswhich arise
in connectionwith the processesof digestion, respiration,
and circulation, and the condition of various organs
accordingto their stateof nutrition, etc. During our
waking life theseorganicfeelingscoalescefor the most
part, forming as the "vital sense" an obscureback-
groundfor our clear discriminative consciousness,and
only comeforward into this region when very excep-
tional in character, as when respiration or digestion is
impeded,or whenwe makea specialeffort of attention
to singlethem out.1 Whenwe areasleep,,
however,and
the avenues of external perception are closed, they
assumegreater prominenceand distinctness. The
centres,no longer called upon to react on stimuli coming
from without the organism, are free to react on stimuli
comingfrom its hidden recesses.So important a part,
indeed, do these organic feelings take in the dream-
drarna,that somewriters are disposedto regard them
as the great, if not the exclusive, cause of dreams.
Thus, Schopenhauerheld that the excitants of dreams
are impressionsreceived from the internal regionsof
the organismthroughthe sympatheticnervoussystem.2
1 A very clear and full account of these organic sensations,or
commonsensations,lias recently appearedfrom the pen of A. Horwicz
in the Vierteljalirsschrift
fur wissenschaftliche
Philosophic,
iv. Jahrgang
3tes Heft.
2 Schopenhaueruses this hypothesis in order to account for the-
apparent reality of dream-illusions. He thinks these internal sensa-
L
146 DEEAMS.

It is hardly necessary,
perhaps,to give manyillus-
trations of the effect of such organic sensationson our
dreams. Among the most common provocativesof
dreams are sensationsconnected with a difficulty in
breathing,due to the closenessof the air or to the
pressureof the Tbed-clothes
on the mouth. J. Bonier
investigated the influence of these circumstances by
coveringwith the bed-clothesthe mouth and a part of
the nostrils of personswho were soundasleep. This
wasfollowedby a protractionof the act of breathing,a
reddeningof the face,effortsto throwoff the clothes,etc.
On being roused,the sleepertestified that he had ex-
perienceda nightmare,in whicha horrid animalseemed
to be weighinghim down.1 Irregularity of the heart's
actionis also a frequent causeof dreams. It is not
improbable that the familiar dream-experienceof flying
arisesfromdisturbances
of therespiratoryandcirculatory
movements.

Again, the effectsof indigestion,and moreparticu-

larly stomachicderangement,on dreamsare too well
known .to require illustration. It may be enough to
allude to the famous dream which Hood traces to an
excessiveindulgence at supper. It is known that the
varying conditionof the organsof secretioninfluences
our dream-fancyin a number of ways.
Finally, it is to be observedthat an injury done to
any part of the organismis apt to give rise to appro-
tions mny be transformed by thetl intuitive function " of the brain (by
means of the "forms" of space,time, etc.) into quasi-realities, just as
well as the subjective sensationsof light, sound,etc., which arise in
the organsof sensein the absenceof external stimuli. (See Venuch
uberdas Geistersehen:Werhe,vol. v. p. 244,
1 Das Alpdruclten,pp. 8, 9, 27.
 EXAGGEBATION OF SENSATION. 147

priate dream-images.In this way,very slight disturb-

anceswhich would hardly affect waking consciousness
may make themselvesfelt during sleep. Thus, for
example,an incipient toothachehas been known to
suggest that the teeth are being extracted.1
It is worth observingthat the interpretation of
these various orders of sensations by the imagination
of the dreamer takes very different forms according
to the person'scharacter,previous experience,ruling
emotions,and so on. This is what is meant by saying
that during sleepeveryman has a world of his own,
whereas,when awake, he sharesin the common world of
perception.
Dreain-Exaggeration.
It Is to be noticed, further, that this interpretation
of sensation
during sleepis uniformly a process
of exag-
geration.2 The exciting causes of the feeling of dis-
comfort, for example, are always absurdly magnified.
The reasonof this seemsto be that, owing to the con-
dition of the mind during sleep,the nature of the
sensation is not clearly recognizable. Even in the
caseof familiar external impressions,such as the sound
of the striking of a clock, there appearsto be wanting
that simple processof reaction by which, in a waking
condition of the attention, a sense-impressionis instantly
discriminated and classed. In sleep, as in the artifi-
1 It is this fact which justifies writers in assigning a prognostic
character to dreams.
2 A part of the apparent exaggeration in our dream-experiences
may beretrospective,and due to the effect of the impressionof wonder
which they leave behind them. (See Striimpell, Die Natur und
Eutsteliungder Truume.)
148 BREAMS.

cially inducedhypnotic condition,the slighter differ-

ences of quality among sensations are not clearly
recognized. The activity of the higher centres,which
are concerned in the finer processesof discrimination
and deification, being greatly reduced, the impres-
sion may be said to come before consciousnessas
something novel and unfamiliar. And just as we saw
that in waking life novel sensationsagitate the mind,
and so lead to an exaggerated mode of interpretation;
so here we see that what is unfamiliar disturbs the
mind, rendering it incapable of calm attention and
just interpretation.
This failure to recognize the real nature of an
impression is seen most conspicuously in the case of
the organicsensations. As I have remarked, these con-
stitute for the most part, in waking life, an undiscrimi-
nated massof obscurefeeling, of which we are only
conscious as the mental tone of the hour. And in the
fewinstancesin whichwe do attendto them separately,
whether through their exceptional intensity or in con-
sequenceof an extraordinary effort of discriminative
attention, we can only be said to perceive them, that is,
recognizetheir local origin, very vaguely. Hence, when
asleep,these sensationsget very oddly misinterpreted.
The localization of a bodily sensationin waking life
meansthe combination of a tactual and a visual image
with the sensation. Thus, rny recognition of a twinge
of toothacheas coming from a certain tooth, involves
representationsof the active and passive sensations
which touching and looking at the tooth would yield
me. That is to say, the feeling instantly calls up
a compound,mental image exactly answeringto a
 DBEAM-SYMBOLISM. 149

visual percept. This holds good in dream-interpre-

tation too; the interpretation is effected by meansof
a visual image. But sincethe feeling is only very
vaguelyrecognized,this visual imagedoesnot answer
to the bodily part concerned. Instead of this, the
fancy of the dreamer constructssome visual image
which bearsa vagueresemblance to the properone,and
is generally,
if not always,an exaggeration
of this in
point of extensivemagnitude,etc. For example, a
sensationarising from pressureon the bladder,being
dimly connected
with the presence
of a fluid, calls up
an imageof a flood,and so on.
This mode of dream-interpretationhas by some
writers been erected into the typical mode, under the
name of dream-symbolism. Thus Schemer,in his
interestingthough somewhatfanciful work, Das Leben
des Traumes,contends that the various regions of the
bodyregularly disclosethemselvesto the dream-fancy
underthe symbolof a building or group of buildings;
a pain in the head calling up, for example,the image
of spiderson the ceiling,intestinal sensationsexciting
animageof a narrowalley,andsoon. Suchtheoriesare
clearlyan exaggerationof the fact that the localization
of our bodily sensationsduring sleep is necessarily
imperfect.1
In many casesthe image called up bears on its
objective side no discoverable resemblance to that of
the bodily regionorthe exciting causeof the sensation.
Here the explanationmust be looked for in the sub-
jective side of the sensationand mentalimage,that is
to say, in their emotional quality, as pleasurableor
1 Cf. Kadcstock,op. cit., pp. 131,132.
150 DBEAMS.

painful, distressing,quieting, etc. It is to be observed,

indeed,that in natural sleep,asin the conditionknown
as hypnotism,while differencesof specificquality in
the sense-impressions are lost, the broad differenceof
the pleasurable
andthe painfulis neverlost. It is,in
fact,the subjectiveemotionalsideof the sensationthat
uniformly forcesitself into consciousness.This being
so,it followsthat, speakinggenerally,the sensations
of
sleep,both external and internal, or organic,will be
interpreted by what G-. H. Lewes has called "an
analogy of feeling;" that is to say, by meansof a
mentalimagehavingsomekindredemotionalcharacter
or colouring.
Now, the analogy betweenthe higher emotional
andthe bodily statesis a very closeone. A sensation
of obstruction in breathing has its exact analogue in
a state of mental embarrassment,a sensationof itching
its counterpart in mental impatience, and so on. And
since these emotional experiencesare deeper and
fuller than the sensations,the tendency to exaggerate
the nature and causesof these last would naturally
lead to an interpretation of them by help of these
experiences.In addition to this, the predominance
of
visual imagery in sleep would aid this transformation
of a bodily sensation into an emotional experience,
since visual perceptions have, as their accompaniments
of pleasureand pain,not sensations,
but emotions.1
1 I was on one occasion able to observe this processgoing on in
the transition from waking to sleeping. I partly fell asleepwhen
suffering from toothache. Instantly the successivethrobs of pain
transformedthemselvesinto a sequence of visible movements,which
I can only vaguely describe as the forward strides of somemenacing
"
adversary. .
 CENTRAL DREAM-EXCITANTS. 151

Since in this vague interpretation of bodily

sensationthe actual impressionis obscured,and not
taken up as an integral part into the percept,it is
evident that we cannot, strictly speaking, call the
process
animitationof an act of perception,
that is to
say, an illusion. And since,moreover,the visual
image by which the sensationis thus displaced
appearsas a presentobject,it would, of course,be
allowableto speakof this as an hallucination. This
substitutionof a more or less analogousvisual image
for that appropriateto the sensation
forms,indeed,a
transition from dream-illusion,properly so called, to
dream-hallucination.

Dream-Hallucinations.

On the physicalside, these hallucinationsanswer

to cerebral excitations which are central or automatic,
not dependingon movementstransmitted from the
peripheryof the nervoussystem. Of thesestimula-
tions someappearto be direct, and due to unknown
influences exerted by the state of nutrition of the
cerebral elements,or the action of the contents of the
blood-vessels on these elements.

Effectsof Direct CentralStimulation.

That such action doesprompt a large number of
dream-images may be regardedas fairly certain. First
of all, it seemsimpossibleto accountfor all the images
of dream-fancy as secondaryphenomenaconnectedby
links of association with the foregoingclassesof sensa-
tion. However fine and invisible many of the threads
which hold togetherour ideasmay be,they will hardly
152 DBEAMS.

explainthe profusionand picturesquevarietyof dream-

imagery. Secondly,we are able in certain casesto
infer with a fair amount of certainty that a dream-
image is due to suchcentral stimulation. The common
occurrence that we dream of the more stirring events,
the anxietiesand enjoymentsof the precedingday,
appears to show that when the cerebral elements are
predisposed to a certain kind of activity, as they are
after having beenengagedfor sometime in this par-
ticular work, they are liable to be excited by some
stimulus brought directly to bear on them during
sleep. And if this is so, it is not improbable that
many of the apparently forgotten images of persons
and placeswhichreturn with suchvividnessin dreams
are excited by a mode of stimulation which is for the
greaterpart confinedto sleep. I say " for the greater
part," because
evenin our indolent,listlessmomentsof
wakingexistencesuchseeminglyforgottenideassome-
times return as though by a spontaneousmovement
of their own and by no discoverableplay of association.
It may be well to add that this immediate revival
of impressions
previouslyreceivedby the brain includes
not only the actual perceptions of waking life, but also
the ideas derived from others, the ideal fancies supplied
by works of fiction, and even the images which our un-
aided waking fancy is wont to shapefor itself. Our daily
conjecturesas to the future, the communications to us
by others of their thoughts, hopes, and fears,-these
give rise to numberless vague fugitive images, any
oneof which may becomedistinctly revived in sleep.1
1 Even the " unconsciousimpressions" of waking hours, that is to
say, those impressionswhich are so fugitive as to leave no psychical
 REVIVAL OF IMAGES IN DREAMS. 153

This throws light on the curious fact that we often

dream of experiencesand events qaite unlike those of
our individual life. Thus, for example, the common
construction by the dream-fancy of the experience of
flight in mid-air, and the creation of those weird
ibrms which the terror of a nightmare is wont to
bring in its train, seem to point to the past action of
waking fancy. To imagine one's self flying when
looking at a bird is probably a commonaction with
all persons,at least in their earlier years,and images
of preternaturallyhorrible beings are apt to be sup-
plied to mostof us sometime during life by nursesor
by books.
Indirect Central Stiimilation.

Besides these direct central stimulations, there

are others which, in contradistinction, may be called
indireet, depending on some previous excitation.
Theseare, no doubt, the conditionsof a very large
number of our dream-images. There must, of course,
be someprimary cerebral excitation, whether that of a
present peripheral stimulation, or that which has been
termed central and spontaneous; but when once this
first link of the imaginative chain is supplied, other
links may be added in large numbers through the
operationof the forcesof association.Onemay,indeed,
safelysaythat the large proportionof the contentsof
every dream arise in this way.
trace behind, may thus rise into the clear light of consciousness
during
sleep. Maury relates a curious dream of his own, in which there
appeareda figure that seemedquite strange to him, though he after-
wards found that he must have been in the habit of meeting the
original in a street through which he was accustomedto walk (loo.
cit., p. 124).
154 DEEAMS.

The very simplest type of dream excited by a

presentsensationcontainstheseelements. To take an
example,I oncedreamt,as a consequence of the loud
barking of a dog, that a dog approachedme when
lying down,and beganto lick my face. Here the play
of the associativeforces wasapparent: a mere sensation
of sound called up the appropriate visual image, this
again the representationof a characteristic action^and
so on. So it is with the dreams whosefirst impulse is
some central or spontaneousexcitation. A momentary
sight of a face or even the mention of a name during
the preceding day may give the start to dream-activity ;
but all subsequentmembers of the series of imagesowe
their revival to a tension,so to speak,in the fine threads
which bind together, in so.complicated a way, our im-
pressions
and ideas.
Among the psychic accompaniments of...these
central excitations visual images, as already hinted,
fill the mostconspicuous
place. Even auditoryimages,
though by no means absent*are much less numerous
than visual. Indeed, when there are the conditions
for the former,it sometimeshappensthat the auditory
effect transforms itself into a visual effect. An illus-
tration of this occurredin my own experience.Trying
to fall asleep by means of the well-known device of
counting,I suddenlyfound myself losing my hold on
thefaintauditoryeffects,my imagination
transforming
theminto a visualspectacle,
underthe formof a path
of light stretching away from me, in whieh the numbers
appeared
under the grotesqueform of visible objects,
tumbling along in glorious confusion.
Next to these visual phantasms,certain motor
 REVIVAL BY WAY OF ASSOCIATION. 155

hallucinations seem to be most prominent in dreams.

By a motor hallucination, I mean the illusion that
we are actually moving when there is no peripheral
excitation of the motor organ. Just as the centres
concernedin passive sensation are susceptibleof
central stimulation, so are the centres concerned
in muscular sensation. A mere impulse in the centres
of motor innervation (if we assume these to be the
central seat of the muscular feelings) may suffice to
give rise to a complete representation of a fully
executed movement. And thus in our sleep we seem
to walk, ride, float, or fly.
The most common form of motor hallucination is
probablythe vocal. In the social encounterswhich
make up so much of our sleep-experience,we are wont
to be very talkative. Now, perhaps,we find ourselves
zealously advocating some cause, now very fierce in
denunciation,nowvery amusing in witty repartee^and
so on. This imagination of ourselves as speaking, as
distinguishedfromthat of hearingotherstalking, must,
it is clear,, involve the excitation of the structures
engagedin the production of the muscular feelings
which accompany vocalaction, as much as,if not more
than, the auditory centres. And the frequencyof this
kind of dream-experience may be explained,like that
of visual imagery,by the habits of waking life. The
speechimpulseis one of the mostdeeply rootedof all
our impulses,and onewhich has beenmostfrequently
exercisedin wakinglife*
156 DEEAMS.

Combinationof Dream-Elements.
It is commonlysaid that dreamsare a grotesque
dissolution of all order, a very chaos and whirl of
imageswithout any discoverableconnection. On the
other hand,a few writers claim for the mind in sleep
a power of arranging and grouping its incongruous
elements in definite and even life-like pictures.
Each of these views is correct within certain limits;
that is to say,there are dreamsin which the strangest
disorder seemsto prevail, and others in which one
detects the action of a central control. Yet, speaking
generally, sequencesof dream-imageswill be found to
be determined by certain circumstances and laws, and
so far not to be haphazard or wholly chaotic. We
have now to inquire into the laws of these successions;
and, first of all, we may ask how far the known laws
of association,together with the peculiar conditions of
the sleepingstate,are ableto accountfor the various
modesof dream-combination.We have already re-
garded mental associationas furnishing a large
additional store of dream-imagery; we have now to
consider it as explaining the sequencesand concatena-
tions of our dream-elements.

Incoherenceof Dreams.
First of all, then, let us look at the chaotic and
apparently lawless side of dreaming, and see whether
any clue is discoverableto the centre of this labyrinth.
In the caseof all the less elaborately ordered dreams,
in which sights and sounds appear to succeed one
another in the wildest dance (which class of dreams
 HOW DKEAM-ELEMENTS COMBINE. 157

probably belongsto the deeper stagesof sleep),the

mind may with certainty be regarded as purely
passive,and the modeof sequencemay be referredto
the action of association complicated by the ever-
recurring introduction of new initial impulses, both
peripheral
andcentral. Thesearethedreams
in which
we are consciousof being perfectly passive, either as
spectatorsof a strangepageant,or as borne away by
someapparentlyextraneousforce through a seriesof
the most diverse experiences. The flux of images in
these dreamsis very much the same as that in certain
waking conditions,in which we relax attention,both
external and internal, and yield ourselves wholly to
the spontaneous play of memoryand fancy.
It is plain at a glancethat the simultaneouscon-
currenceof wholly disconnectedinitial impulses will
serveto impressa measureof disconnectedness on our
dream-images. From widely remote parts of the
organismthere comeimpressionswhich excite each
its peculiar visual or other image accordingas its
local origin or its emotional tone is the more distinctly
present to consciousness.Now it is a subjective ocular
sensation suggesting a bouquet of lovely flowers, and
closeon its heelscomesan impressionfrom the organs
of digestion suggesting all manner of obstacles, and
so our dream-fancyplunges from a vision of flowers to
one of dreadful demons.
Let us now look at the way in which the laws of
associationworking on the incongruouselementsthus
cast up into our dream-consciousness,will serve to
give a yet greater appearanceof disorder and confusion
to our dream-combinations.According to theselaws,
158 DREAMS.

any idea may, under certain circumstances,call up

another,if the correspondingimpressionshave only
onceoccurredtogether,or if the ideashaveanydegree
of resemblance, or, finally, if only they stand in
marked contrast with one another. Any accidental
coincidenceof events, such as meeting a person at a
particular foreign resort, and any insignificant re-
semblancebetween objects, sounds, etc., may thus
supplya path, so to speak,from fact to dream-fancy.
In our waking statesthese innumerablepaths of
associationare practically closed by the supreme
energy of the coherentgroups of impressionsfurnished
us from the world without through our organs of sense,
andalsoby the volitional control of internal thought
in obedienceto the pressureof practical needsand
desires. In dream-life both of these influences are
withdrawn, so that delicate threads of association,
which have no chanceof exerting their pull, so to
speak,in our waking states,now make known their
hidden force. Little wonder, then, that the filaments
which bind together these dream-successions
should
escapedetection,since even in our waking thought
we so often fail to see the connection which makes us
passin recollectionfrom a name to a visible sceneor
perhapsto an emotionalvibration.
It is worth,noting that the origin of an association
is often to be looked for in one of those momentary
half-conscious acts of waking imagination to which
reference has already been made. A friend, for
example,has been speakingto us of somecommon
acquaintance,remarking on his poor health. The
languagecalls up, vaguely,a visual representationof
 CONDITIONS OF INCOHEKENT DEEAMS. 159

the person sinking in health and dying. An associa-

tion will thus be formed betweenthis person and the
ideaof death. A night or two after, the image of this
person somehowrecurs to our dream-fancy,and we
straightwaydream that we are looking at his corpse,
watching his funeral, and so on. The links of the
chain which holds together these dream-imageswere
really forged,in part, in our waking hours,though the
process was so rapid as to escape our attention. It
may be added, that in many caseswhere a juxtaposition
of dream-imagesseemsto have no basis in waking life,
carefulreflectionwill occasionallybring to light some
actual conjunctionof impressionsso momentaryas to
have faded from our recollection.
We mustremember,further,how greatan apparent
disorder \\ill invade our imaginative dream-life when
the binding force of resemblance
has uncheckedplay*
In wakingthought we haveto connectthings accord-
ing to their essentialresemblances,
classifyingobjects
and events for purposesof knowledge or action, accord-
ing to their widest or their most important points of
similarity. In sleep, on the contrary, the slightest
touchof resemblance may engagethe mind and affect
the direction of fancy. In a sense we may be said,
when dreaming, to discover mental affinities' between
impressions
and feelings,including those subtle links
of emotionalanalogyof which I have alreadyspoken.
This effect is well illustrated in a dream recorded by
M. Maury, in which he passedfrom one set of images
to anotherthrough somesimilarity of names,as that
betweencorpsand cor. Such a movementof fancy
would,of course,be preventedin full waking"conscious-
160 DKEAMS.

nessby a predominantattention to the meaningof the

sounds.
It will be possible,I think, after a habit of analyz-
ing one'sdreamsin the light of precedingexperience
has been formed, to discover in a good proportion of
cases some hidden force of association which draws
together the seemingly fortuitous concourseof our
dream-atoms. That we should expect to do so in
everycaseis unreasonable, since,owingto the number-
less fine ramificationswhich belong to our familiar
images,many of the paths of associationfollowed by
our dream-fancycannotbe afterwardsretraced.
To illustrate the odd way in which our imagesget
tumbled together through the action of occult asso-
ciation forces,I will record a dream of my own. I
fanciedI wasat the houseof a distinguishedliterary
acquaintance, at her usualreceptionhour. I expected
the friends I was in the habit of meeting there.
Insteadof this, I sawa numberof commonlydressed
peoplehaving tea. My hostesscameup and apolo-
gized for having asked me into this room. It was,she
said,a tea-partywhich shepreparedfor poorpeopleat
sixpence a head. After puzzling over this dream, I
came to the conclusion that the missing link was a
verbal one. A lady who is a connection of my
friend, and bears the same name, assists her sister in a
large kind of benevolent scheme. I may add that I
had not, so far as I could recollect, had occasion very
recently to think of this benevolent friend, but I had
beenthinking of my literary friend in connectionwith
her anticipated return to town.
In thus seekingto trace,amid the superficialchaos
 DREAM-FANCY AS CONSTRUCTIVE. 161

of dream-fancy, its hidden connections, I make no

pretence to explain why in any given case these
particularpathsof associationshould be followed,and
more particularly why a slender thread of association
shouldexert a pull wherea strongercord fails to do so.
To account for this, it would be necessary to call in
the physiological hypothesis that among the nervous
elementsconnectedwith a particular element, a, already
excited, some,as m and n, are at the moment, owing to
the state of their nutrition or their surrounding in-
fluences,more powerfully predisposed to activity than
other elements, as 5 and c.
The subjectof associationnaturally conductsus to
the secondgreatproblemin the theory of dreams-the
explanationof the order in which the variousimages
groupthemselves in all our moreelaboratedreams.
Coherenceof Dreams.
A fully developed dream is a complex of many
distinct illusory sense-presentations:in this respect it
differs from,the illusions of normal waking life, which
are for the most part single and isolated. And this
complex of quasi-presentations appears somehow or
other to fall together into one whole scene or series
of events,which, though it may be very incongruous
and absurdlyimpossiblefrom a waking point of view,
neverthelessmakes a single object for the dreamer's
internal vision, and has a certain degreeof artistic
unity. This plastic force, which selects and binds
togetherourunconnecteddream-images, hasfrequently
been referred to as a mysterious spiritual faculty,
underthe name of " creativefancy." Thus Oudworth,
M
162 BKEAMS.

remarks,in his Treatiseconcerning

Eternaland Im-
mutableMorality: "That dreamsare many times
begottenby the phantastical
powerof the soulitself
is evident from the orderly connection and
coherenceof imaginationswhich many times are con-
tinued in a long chain or series." Onemayfind a good
dealof mysticalwriting on the nature and activity of
this faculty, especiallyin Germanliterature. The ex-
planation of this elementof organic unity in dreams
is, it may be safely said, the crux in the scienceof
dreams. That the laws of psychology help us to
understandthe sequences
of dream-images,we have
seen. What we have now to ask is whether these laws
throw any light on the orderly grouping of the ele-
mentsso broughtup in consciousness in the form of a
connectedexperience.
It is to be remarkedat the outset that a singular
kind of unity is sometimes given to our dream-com-
binations by a total or partial coalescenceof different
images. The conditionsof suchcoalescence havebeen
referred to already.1 Simultaneousimpressionsor
imageswill alwaystend to coalescewith a forcewhich
varies directly as the degree of their similarity. Some-
times this coalescence is instantaneous and not made
known to consciousness. Thus, Badestock suggests
that if the mind of the sleeper is simultaneously in-
vaded by an unpleasant sensation arising out of some
disturbanceof the functionsof the skin, and a subjec-
tive visual sensation, the resulting mental image may
be a combination of the two, under the form of a
caterpillarcreepingover the bodily surface. And the
1 Seep. 53.
 TEANSFOEMATION OF IMAGES. 163

coalescence
may even be prepared by sub-conscious
operations
of wakingimagination.Thus,for example,
I oncespokeaboutthe cheapnessof haresto a member
of my family,whosomewhatgrimly suggestedthat they
were London cats. I did not dwell on the idea, but
the following night I dreamt that I sawa big hybrid
creature,half hare, half cat, sniffing about a cottage.
As it stood on its hind legs and took a piece of food
from a window-ledge,I became sure that it was a cat.
Here it is plain that the cynical observationof my
relativehad,at the moment,partially excitedan image
of this feline hare. In somedreams,again, we may
become aware of the process of coalescence,as when
personswho at one moment were seento be distinct
appearto our dream-fancyto run together in some
third person.
A very similar kind of unification takes place be-
tween sequent images under the form of transformation.
When two images follow one another closely, and have
anythingin common,they readily assumethe form of a
transmutation. There is a sort of overlapping of the
mental images,and so an appearanceof continuity pro-
duced in somerespectsanalogous to that which arises
in the wheel-of-life (thaumatrope) classof sense-illusions.
This would seera to account for the odd transformations
of personality which not unfrequently occur in dreams,
in whicha personappears,by a kind of metempsychosis,
to transfer his physical ego to another, and in which the
dreamer'sown bodily phantom plays similar freaks.
And the same principle probably explains those dis-
.solving-view effects which are so familiar an accom-
paniment of dream-scenery.1
1 SeeMaury, loc, cit., p. 146.
164 DREAMS.

But passingfrom this exceptionalkind of unity in

dreams,let us inquire how the heterogeneouselements
of our drearn-fancybecomeorderedand arrangedwhen
they preserve their separate existence. If we look
closely at the structure of our more finished dreams,we
find that the appearanceof harmony, connectedness,or
order,may be given in oneof two ways. Theremay,
first of all, be a subjectiveharmony,the variousimages
being held together by an emotional thread. Or there
may, secondly,be an objective harmony,the parts of
the dream,though answeringto no particular experi-
encesof waking life, bearing a certain resemblanceto
our habitual modesof experience. Let us inquire into
the way in which eachkind of orderis broughtabout*
Lyrical Element in Dreams.
The only unity that belongsto manyof our dreams
is a subjectiveemotionalunity. This is the basisof
harmony in lyrical poetry, where the succession of
images turns mainly on their emotionalcolouring.
Thus, the images that float before the mind of the Poet
Laureate, in his In Memoriam, clearly have their link
of connection in their common emotional tone, rather
than in any logical continuity. Dreaminghas been
likened to poetic composition,and certainly many of
our dreamsare built upon a groundworkof lyrical
feeling. They might "bemarkedoff, perhaps,as our
lyrical dreams.
The way in which this emotional force acts in
these caseshas already been hinted at. We have seen
that the analogyof feeling is a commonlink between
dream-images.Now, if any shadeof feeling becomes
 DEE AM-STRUCTURE AND FEELING. 165

fixed and dominant in the mind, it will tend to control

all the imagesof the time, allowing certaincongruous
onesto enter,and excluding others.1 If, for example,
a feeling of distress occupies the mind? distressing
imageswill have the advantagein the struggle for
existence which goes on in the world of mind as well
as in that of matter. We may say that attention,
which is here wholly a passive process,is controlled by
the emotion of the time, and bent in the direction of
congruentor harmoniousimages.
Now,a ground-toneof feeling of a certain com-
plexion,answeringto the sum of sensationsarising in
connection with the different organic processesof the
time, is a very frequent foundation of our dream-
structure. So frequent is it, indeed,that one might
almost saythere is no dream in which it is not one?
greatdeterminingfactor. The analysisof a very large
number of dreams has convinced me that traces of this
influence are discoverablein a great majority.
I will give a simpleillustration of this lyrical type
of dream. A little girl of about four years and three-
quarters went with her parentsto Switzerland. On
their way shewastaken to the cathedral at Strasburg,
and sawthe celebrated clock strike, and the figures of
the Apostlescomeout, etc. In Switzerlandshestayed
at G-irnmelwald,
near Murren,oppositea fine massof
snowy mountains. One morning she told her father
that she had had " such a lovely dream." She fancied
she was on the snow-peakswith her nurse, and walked
on to the sky. There came out of the sky " such
1 See what was said respecting the influence of a dominant
emotional agitation on the interpretation of actual sense-impressions.
166 DREAMS.

beautifultilings/' just like the figuresof the clock.

This vision of celestial things was clearly due to the
fact that both the clock and the snow-peaks touching
the blue sky had powerfully excitedher imagination,
filling her with much the same kind of emotion,
namely,wonder,admiration,and longing to reach an
inaccessibleheight.
Our feelings commonlyhave a gradual rise and
fall, and the organic sensationswhich so often con-
stitute the emotional basis of our lyrical dreams
generallyhave stagesof increasingintensity. More-
over, such a persistent ground-feeling becomes rein-
forcedby the imageswhich it sustainsin consciousness.
Hence a certain crescendo character in our emotional
dreams,or a gradualrise to someculminating point or
climax.
This phaseof dream can be illustrated from the
experienceof the samelittle girl. When just five
yearsold, shewasstayingat Hanipstead,neara church
which struck the hours somewhat loudly. One morn-
ing she related the following dream to her father (I
useher own language). The biggest bells in the world
were ringing; when this wasover the earth and houses
beganto tumbleto pieces;all the seas,rivers,andponds
flowed together, and covered all the land with black
water, as deep as in the seawhere the ships sail;
people were drowned; she herself flew above the
water, rising and falling, fearing to fall in; she then
saw her mamma drowned, and at last flew home to tell
her papa. The gradual increaseof alarm and distress
expressedin this dream, having its probable cause in
the cumulativeeffect of the disturbing soundof the
church bells, must be patent to all.
 EXAMPLES OF LYRICAL DREAMS. 167

Thefollowingrathercomicaldreamillustratesquite
as clearly the growth of a feeling of irritation and
vexation,'probably connected with the development of
someslightly discomposing
organicsensation.I dreamt
I wasunexpectedlycalled on to lecture to a classof
youngwomen,on Herder. I beganhesitatingly, with
somevague generalitiesabout the Augustan age of
German literature, referring to the three well-known
namesof Lessing,Schiller, and Goethe. Immediately
my sister,whosuddenlyappearedin the class,took me
up, and said she thought there was a fourth distin-
guishednamebelongingto this period. I wasannoyed
at the interruption,but said,with a feeling of triumph,
" I suppose you meanWieland?" andthen appealedto
the class whether there were not twenty persons who
knew the names I had mentioned to one who knew Wie-
land's name. Then the class becamegenerally dis-
orderly. My feelingof embarrassment
gainedin depth.
Finally, as a climax, several quite young girls, about
ten years and less, cameand joined the class. The
dreambrokeoff abruptly as I wasin the act of taking
these children to the wife of an old college tutor, to
protest against their admission.
It is worth noting, perhaps, that in this evolution
of feeling in dreaming the quality of the emotion
may vary within certain limits. Oneshadeof feeling
may be followed by another and kindred shade, so
that the whole dream still preservesa degree,though
a less obviousdegree,of emotionalunity. Thus, for
example, a lady friend of mine once dreamt that she
was in church, listening to a well-known novelist of
the more earnest sort, preaching. A wounded soldier
168 DREAMS,

was brought in to be shot, becausehe was mortally

wounded,andhaddistinguishedhimselfby his bravery.
He wasthen shot, but not killed, and, rolling over in
agony,exclaimed," How long!" The development
of an extreme emotion of horror out of the vague
feeling of awewhichis associated
with a church,gives
a curious interest to this dream.

Verisimilitude in Dreams.

I must not dwell longer on this emotional basis

of dreams,but passto the considerationof the second
and objectivekind of unity whichcharacterizes many
of our more elaboratedream-performances. In spite
of all that is fitful and grotesque in dream-combi-
nation, it still preserves a distant resemblance to our
actual experience. Though no dream reproducesa
particular incident or chain of incidents in this ex-
perience,though the dream-fancyinvariably trans-
forms the particular objects,relations, and eventsof
waking life, it still makes the order of our daily
experienceits prototype. It fashionsits imaginary
world on the modelof the real. Thus, objectsgroup
themselvesin space,and act on one another conform-
ably to theseperceivedspace-relations;eventssucceed
one another in time, and are often seen to be connected;
men act from more or less intelligible motives, and
so on. In this way, though the dream-fancysets at
nought the particular relations of our experience,it
respectsthe generaland constantrelations. How are
we to account for this ?
It is said by certain philosophersthat this super-
position of the relations of space,time, causation,
 KATIOKA.L CONGRUITY IN DEEAMS. 169

etc.,on the productsof our dream-fancyis due to the

fact that all experiencearises by a synthesis of mental
forms with the chaotic matter of sense-impressions.
Thesephilosophersallow, however,that all particular
connections are determined by experience. Accord-
ingly, what we have to do here is to inquire how far
this scientific method of explaining mental connec-
tions by facts of experiencewill carry us. In other
words, we have to ask what light can be thrown on
these tendencies of dream-imagination by ascertained
psychological
laws,and moreparticularlyby whatare
known as the laws of association.
Theselawstell us that of two mental phenomena
which occur together, each will tend to recall the
other whenever it happens to be revived. On the
physiologicalside, this meansthat any two parts of
the nervous structures which have acted together
become in some way connected, so that when one
part beginsto work the other will tend to work also.
But it is highly probablethat a particular structure
actsin a great many differentways. Thus,it may be
stimulatedby unlike modesof stimuli, or it may enter
into very various connections with other structures.
What will follow from, this ? One consequence
would
appearto be that there will be developedan organic
connection between the two structures, of such a kind
that wheneveroneis excited the other will be disposed
to act somehow
and anyhow,evenwhenthereis nothing
in the present mode of activity of the first structure to
determinethe secondto act in someonedefinite way,
in otherwords,
whenthis modeof activityis, roughly
speaking, novel.
170 DREAMS.

Let me illustrate this effectin oneof the simplest

cases,,
that of the visual organ. If, when \valking-
out on a dark night, a few points in my retina are
suddenlystimulatedby rays of light, and I recognize
someluminousobject in a correspondingdirection,I
am preparedto seesomethingaboveand below,to the
right and to the left of this object. Why is this?
There may from the first have beena kind of innate
understandingamong contiguousoptic fibres,predis-
posing them to such concertedaction. But however
this be, this disposition would seemto have been
largely promoted by the fact that, throughout my
experience,the stimulation of any retinal point has
been connectedwith that of adjoining points, either
simultaneously by somesecondobject,or successively
by the sameobject as the eye movesover it, or as
the objectitself movesacrossthe field of vision.
When, therefore,in sleep any part of the optic
centresis excited in a particular way, and the images
thus arising have their correspondingloci in space
assignedto them,there will be a dispositionto refer
any othervisual imageswhich happenat the moment
to arise in consciousness to adjacent parts of space.
The character of these other imageswill be determined
by otherspecialconditionsof the moment;their locality
or positionin spacewill be determinedby this organic
connection. We may, perhaps, call these tendencies
to concertedaction of somekind generalassociative
dispositions.
Just as thereare such dispositionsto united action
among various parts of one organ of sense, so there
may be among different organs, which are either con-
 ASSOCIATIVE DISPOSITIONS. 171

nected originally in the infant organism, or have

communications opened up by frequent coexcitation
of the two. Such links there certainly are between
the organsof tasteand smell,and betweenthe earand
the muscular system in general, and more particu-
larly the vocal organ.1 A new odour often sets us
asking how the object would taste, and a series of
sounds commonly disposes us to movement of some
kind or another. How far there may be finer threads
of connection between other organs, such as the eye
and the ear, which do not betray themselves amid the
strongerforcesof waking mental life, one cannot say.
Whatever their number, it is plain that they will
exert their influencewithin the comparativelynarrow
limits of dream-life, serving to impress a certain cha-
racter on the images which happento be called up
by specialcircumstances,
and giving to the combina-
tion a slight measure of congruity. Thus, if I were
dreamingthat I heard somelively music, and at the
same time an image of a friend was anyhow excited,
my dream-fancymight not improbably representthis
personas performing a sequenceof rhythmic move-
ments, such as those of riding, dancing, etc.
A narrowerfield for these generalassociativedis-
positionsmay be found in the tendency,on the recep-
tion of an impression of a given character, to look for
a certainkind of secondimpression;though the exact
nature of this is unknown. Thus, for example, the
1 It is proved experimentally that the ear has a much closer
organic connection with the vocal organ than the eye has. Ponders
found tliat the period required for responding vocally to a sound-
signal is less than that required for responding in the sameway to a
light-signal.
172 DREAMS.

form and colour of a new flower suggest a scent, and

the perceptionof a humanform is accompanied by a
vaguerepresentationof vocalutterances.Thesegeneral
tendencies of association appear to me to be most
potent influencesin our dream-life. The manystrange
human forms which float before our dream-fancy are
apt to talk, move,-andbehavelike men and womenin
general,howeverlittle they resembletheir actual pro-
totypes,and howeverlittle individual consistencyof
character is preserved by each of them. Special con-
ditions determine what they shall say or do; the
general associativedisposition accountsfor their saying
or doing something,
We thus seem to find in the purely passive pro-
cessesof association some ground for that degree of
natural coherence and rational order which our more

maturedreamscommonlypossess.Theseprocesses go
far to explain, too, that odd mixture of rationality
with improbability,of natural order and incongruity,
which -characterizes our dream-combinations.

Rational Construction in Dreams.

Nevertheless,I quite agree with Herr Volkelt that

association,
evenin the mostextendedmeaning,cannot
explain all in the shaping of our dream-pictures. The
" phantasticalpower" which Cudworth talks about
clearlyincludes.somethingbesides. It is an erroneous
supposition that when we are dreaming there is a com-
plete suspensionof the voluntary powers, and conse-
quently an absenceof all direction of the intellectual
processes.This supposition,which has been maintained
by numerouswriters,from Dugald Stewartdownwards,
 VOLUNTARY ATTENTION IN DEEAMS. 173

seemsto be based on the fact that we frequently find

ourselvesin dreamsstriving in vain to movethe whole
bodyor a limb. But this only shows,as M. Maury
remarks in the work already referred to, that our
volitions are frustrated through the inertia of our
bodily organs,not that these volitions do not take
place. In point of fact, the dreamer,not to speak of
the somnambulist,is often consciousof voluntarily going
through a series of actions. This exercise of volition
is shown unmistakably in the well-known instances of
extraordinary intellectual achievements in dreams, as
Condillac'scompositionof a part of his Cours$ Etudes.
No one would maintain that a result of this kind was
possiblein the total absenceof intellectual action
carefully directed by the will. And something of this
same control showsitself in all our more fully de-
veloped dreams.
One manifestation of this voluntary activity in
sleep is to be found in those efforts of attention which
not unfrequently occur. I have remarked that, speak-
ing roughly and in relation to the waking condition,
the state of sleep is marked by a subjection of the
powersof attention to the force of the mental images
presentto consciousness.Yet somethingresembling
an exerciseof voluntary attention sometimeshappens
in sleep. The intellectual featsjust spokenof, unless,
indeed,they are referredto some mysteriousuncon-
sciousmental operations,clearly involve a measureof
volitional guidance. All who dream frequently are
occasionallyawareon awaking of having greatly exer-
cisedtheir attention on the imagespresentedto them
during sleep. I myself am often able to recall an
174 DBEAMS.

effort to seebeautiful objects,whicli threatenedto dis-

appearfrom,niy field of vision,or to catchfaint receding
tones of preternatural sweetness; and some dreamers
allege that they are able to retain a recollection of the
feeling of strain connectedwith such exerciseof atten-
tion in sleep.
The main function of this voluntary attention in
dream-life is seen in the selection of those images
o
which are to passthe threshold of clear consciousness.
I have already spokenof a selectiveaction brought
about by the ruling emotion. In this case,the atten-
tion is held captive by the particular feeling of the
moment. Also a selective processgoes on in the case
of the action of those associativedispositionsjust re-
ferred to. But in each of these cases the action of
selectiveattentionis comparativelyinvoluntary,passive,
and even unconscious,not having anything of the
character of a consciousstriving to compasssome end.
Besides this comparatively passive play of selective
attention, there is an active play, in which there is
a consciouswish to gain an end; in other words, the
operationof a definite motive. This motive may be
described as an intellectual impulse to connect and
harmonize what is present to the mind. The voluntary
kind of selection includes and transcends each of
the involuntary kinds. It has as its result an imitation
of that order which is brought about by what I have
called the associative dispositions, only it consciously
aims at this result. And it is a processcontrolled by a
feeling, namely, the intellectual sentimentof consis-
tency, which is not a mode of emotional excitement
enthralling the will, but a calm .motive, guiding the
 IMPULSE TO LOOK FOE OEDEE. - 175

activities of attention. It thus bears somewhat the same

relation to the emotional selection already spoken of,
as dramatic creation bearsto lyrical composition.
This processof striving to seize some connecting
link, or thread of order, is illustrated whenever, in
waking life, weare suddenlybrought faceto facewith
an unfamiliar scene. When taken into a factory, we
strive to arrange the bewildering chaos of visual im-
pressionsunder somescheme,by help of which we are
said to understandthe scene. So, if on entering a
roomweare plunged in mediaeres of a lively conver-
sation, we strive to find a clue to the discussion. When-
ever the meaning of a scene is not at once clear, and
especiallywheneverthere is an appearance of confusion
in it, we are consciousof a painful feeling of per-
plexity, which acts as a strong motive to ever-renewed
attention.1
In touching on this intellectual impulseto connect
the disconnected,we are, it is plain, approachingthe
questionof the very foundationsof our intellectual
structure. That there is this impulse firmly rooted in
the mature mind nobody can doubt; and that it
manifestsitself in early life in the child's recurring
" Why ?" is equally clear. But how weare to account
for it, whether it is to be viewed as a mere result of
the play of associatedfragmentsof experience,or as
somethinginvolved in the very processof the associa-
tion of ideas itself, is a question into which I cannot
here enter.

1 On the nature of this impulse, as illustrated in waking and in

sleep, seethe article by Delboeuf," Le Sommcil et les Reves/' in the
Revue-Philosophique,June, 1880,p. 636.
176 BEEAMS.

What I am here concerned to show is that the

searchfor consistency
and connectionin the manifold
impressionsof the momentis a deeplyrootedhabit of'
the mind, and one which is retained in a measure
during sleep. When,in this state,our minds are in-
vaded by a motley crowd of unrelated images, there
resultsa disagreeable
senseof confusion;andthis feeling
acts as a motive to the attention to sift out those pro-
ducts of the dream-fancy which may be made to cohere.
When once the foundations of a dream-action are laid,
newimagesmust to someextent fit in with this; and
herethereis roomfor the exerciseof a distinct impulse
to order the chaotic elements of dream-fancy in certain
forms. The perceptionof anypossiblerelation between
one of the crowd of new images ever surging above the
level of obscureconsciousness,
and the old group at
once serves to detain it. The concentration of atten-
tion on it, in obedienceto this impulse to seek for an
intelligible order, at once intensifiesit and fixes it,
incorporatingit into the seriesof dream-pictures.
Here is a dream which appears to illustrate this
impulseto seekan intelligible order in the confused
and disorderly. After being occupiedwith correcting
the proofsof my volume on Pessimism, I dreamt that
my book was handedto me by my publisher,fully
illustrated with coloured pictures. The frontispiece
representedthe fantastic figure of a man gesticulating
in front of a ship, from which he appearedto havejust
stepped.My publishertold me it wasmeantfor Hamlet,
andI immediatelyreflectedthat this characterhadbeen
selectedas a concrete example of the pessimistic ten-
dency. I may add that, on awaking,I wasdistinctly
 EXAMPLES OF IMPULSE TO AKBANGE. 177

aware of having felt puzzled when dreaming, and of

havingstriven to reada meaninginto the dream.
The rationale of this dream seenis to me to be
somewhat as follows. The image of the completed
volumerepresented, of course,a recurring anticipatory
imageof waking life. The colouredplates were due
probablyto subjectiveopticalsensationssimultaneously
excited, which were made to fit in (with or without an
effort of voluntary attention) with the image of the
book under the form of illustrations. But this stage
of coherencydid not satisfy the mind, which, still
partly confusedby the incongruity of colouredplates
in a philosophicwork, looked for a closerconnection.
The image of Hamlet was naturally suggested in con-
nection with pessimism. The effort to discover a
meaningin the picturesled to the fusion of this image
with oneof the subjectivespectra,and in this way the
ideaof a Hanilet frontispieceprobablyarose.
The whole processof dream-construction Is clearly
illustrated in a curious dream recorded by Professor
Wundt.1 Before the houseis a funeral procession
: it
is the burial of a friend, who has in reality been dead
for some time past. The wife of the deceasedbids
him and an acquaintancewho happensto be with him
go to the other side of the street and join the proces-
sion. After shehasgoneaway,his companionremarks
to him, " She only saidthat becausethe cholerarages
over yonder,and she wantsto keep this side of the
street to herself." Thencomesan attempt to fleefrom
the region of the cholera. Returning to his house, he
finds the processiongone,but the street strewn with
1 PhysiologischePsychologic,p. 660.
N
178 DKEAMS.

rich nosegays;and he further observescrowdsof men

who seem to be funeral attendants, and who, like him-
self, are hasteningto join the procession. Theseare,
oddly enough,dressedin red. When hurrying on, it
occursto him that he has forgotten to take a wreath
for the cofiin. Then he wakesup with beatingof the
heart.
The sourcesof this dream are, according to Wundt, '
asfollows. First of all, he had,on the previousday,
met the funeralprocession of an acquaintance.Again,
he had read of cholera breaking out in a certain town.
Oncemore,he had talked about the particular lady
with this friend, who had narrated facts which clearly
proved her selfishness. The hastening to flee from
the infected neighbourhood and to overtake the
procession was prompted by the sensation of heart-
beating. Finally, the crowd of red bier-followers, and
the profusion of nosegays,owed their origin to subjec-
tive visual sensations,the "light-chaos" which often
appearsin the dark.
Let us now see for a moment how these various
elementsmay have becomefused into a connectedchain
of events. First of all, it is clear that this dream is
built up on a foundationof a gloomytone of feeling,
arising, as it would seem,from an irregularity of the
heart's action. Secondly, it owes its special structure
and its air of a connectedsequence
of events,to those
tendencies,passiveand active, to order the chaotic of
which I havebeenspeaking. Let us try to trace this
out in detail.
Tobeginwith, wemaysuppose that the imageof the
procession
occupiesthe dreamer'smind. From quite
 A DBEAM ANALYZED. 179

another sourcethe image of the lady enters conscious-

ness,bringing with it that of her deceased
husbandand
of the friend whohasrecently beentalking about her.
These new elementsadapt themselvesto the scene,
partly by the passivemechanismof associativedispo-
sitions, and partly, perhaps,by the activity of voluntary
selection. Thus, the idea of the lady's husband would
naturally recall the fact of his death, and this would fall
in with the pre-existing scene under the form of the
idea that he is the person who is now being buried.
The next step is very interesting. The imageof the
lady is associated with the idea of selfish motives.
Thiswouldtend to suggesta variety of actions,but the
one which becomes a factor of the dream is that which
is specially adapted to the pre-existing representations,
namely, of the procession on the further side of the
street,and the cholera(which last, like the image of
the funeral, is, we may suppose,due to an independent
central excitation). That is to say, the request of the
lady, and its interpretation, are a resultant of a number
-of adaptative or assimilative actions, under the sway
of a strong desire to connect the disconnected,and a
lively activity of attention. Once more, the feeling
of oppressionof the heart,and the subjectivestimu-
lation of the optic nerve, might suggestnumberless
imagesbesidesthoseof anxiousflight and of.red-clad
menandnosegays;they suggestthese,andnot others,
in this particular case,becauseof the co-operationof
the impulseof consistency, which, setting out with the
pre-existing mental images, selects from among many
tendenciesof reproduction those which happen to
.chime in with the scene.
180 DREAMS.

The Nature of Dream-Intelligence.

It mustnot besupposedthat this process

of welding
together the chaotic materials of our dreams is ever
carriedout with anything like the clearrational pur-
pose of which we are consciouswhen seeking, in
wakinglife, to comprehend somebewilderingspectacle.
At bestit is a vaguelonging, andthis longing, it may
be added,is soonsatisfied. Thereis, indeed,something.
almost pathetic in the facility with which the dreamer's
mind can be pacified with the least appearanceof a
connection. Just as a child's importunate " Why ?"
is often silenced by a ridiculous caricature of an ex-
planation, so the dreamer's intelligence is freed from
its distressby the leastsemblanceof a uniting order.
It thus remains true with respecteven to our most-
coherentdreams,that there is a completesuspension,.
or at least a considerableretardation,of the highest
operationsof judgment and thought; also a great
enfeeblenient,to say the least of it, of those sentiments
such as the feeling of consistency and the senseof the
absurd which are so intimately connected with these
higher intellectual operations.
In order to illustrate how oddly our seemingly
rational dreams caricature the operations of waking
thought,I may, perhaps,be allowed to recordtwo of
my own dreams,of which I took carefulnote at the-
time.
On the first occasion I went "in my dream" to>
the " Stores"in August, and found the place empty.
A shopmanbrought me somelarge fowls. I .asked
their price,and he answered,
" Tenpene-ea pound." I
 LIMITS OF DREAM-raTELLIGENCE. 181

then-asked their weight, so as to get an idea of their

total cost,and he replied, " Forty pounds." Not in
the least surprised,I proceededto calculatetheir cost:
40 x 10 = 400 -T-12 = 33-J. But, oddly enough,I
took this quotient as pence,just as though I had not
already divided by 12, and so madethe costof a fowl
to be 2s. 9d., which seemedto nie a fair enough price.
In my seconddreamI was at Cambridge,amonga
lot of undergraduates.I sawa coach drive up with
six horses. Three undergraduates got out of the coach.
I asked them why they had so manyhorses,and they
said, " Becauseof the luggage." I then said, " The
luggageis muchmorethan the undergraduates. Can
you tell me howto expressthis in mathematicalsym-
bols? This is the way: if x is the weight of an
undergraduate, then x + xn represents the weight of
an undergraduate and his luggage together." I noticed
that this sally wasreceived with evident enjoyment.1
"We may say,then, that the structure of our dreams,
equally with the fact of their completely illusory
character, points to the conclusion that during sleep,
just as in the moments of illusion in waking life, there
1 I may, perhaps,observe,after giving two dreamswhich have to do
with mathematical operations, that, though I was very fond of them in
my college days, I have long ceasedto occupy myself with these pro-
cesses. I would add, by way of redeemingmy dream-intelligence from
a deservedcharge of silliness, that I once performed a respectablein-
tellectual feat when asleep. I put together the riddle, " "What might
.a wooden ship say when her side was stove in ? Tremendous!"
(Tree-mend-us). I was awareof having tried to improve on the form
of this pun. I am happy to say I am not given to punning during
waking life, though I had a fit of it once. It strikes rne that punning,
consisting as it doesessentially of overlooking senseand attending to
.sound,is just such a debasedkind of intellectual activity asonemight
look for .in sleep.
182 DEEAMS.

is a deteriorationof our intellectuallife. The highest

intellectual activities answeringto the least stable
nervous connectionsare impeded, and what of intellect
remains correspondsto the "most deeply organized
connections.
In this way, our dream-life touches that childish
conditionof the intelligencewhichmarksthe decadence
of old age and the encroachmentsof mental disease.
The parallelismbetweendreamsandinsanity hasbeen
pointed out by most writers on the subject. Kant
observed that the madman is a dreamer awake, and
more
"
recentlyWundt hasremarked that, whenasleep,
we can experience nearly all the phenomenawhich
meetus in lunaticasylums." The grotesqueness
of the
combinations,the lack of all judgment as to consistency,
fitness, and probability, are common characteristics
of the short night-dream of the healthy and the long
day-dreamof the insane.1
But onegreat differencemarksoff the two domains.
When dreaming, we are still sane,and shall soon prove
our sanity. After all, the dream,of the sleeperis cor-
rected,if not so rapidly as the illusion of the healthy
waker. As soon as the familiar stimuli of light and
soundset the peripheral sense-organs in activity, and
call back the nervoussystemto its completeround of
healthy action,the illusion disappears,
and wesmile at
our alarms and agonies, saying, "Behold, it was a
dream!"
Onthe practical side,the illusions and hallucina-
tions of sleepmust beregardedas comparativelyharm-
1 SeeBadestock,op.cit., cb. ix.; VergleichungdesTraumesmit dem
Walinsinn.
 DEEAM-LIFE AND INSANITY. 183

less. The sleeper,in healthy conditions of sleep,

ceasesto be an agent, and the illusions which enthral
his brain have no evil practical consequences. They
may, no doubt, as we shall see in a future chapter,
occasionally lead to a subsequent confusion of fiction
and reality in waking recollection. But with the
exceptionof this, their worst effect is probably the
lingering senseof discomfort which a " nasty dream "
sometimesleaveswith us, though this may be balanced
by the reverberations of happy dream-emotions which
sometimes follow us through the day. And however
this be, it is plain that any disadvantages
thus arising
are more than made good by the consideration that
our liability to these nocturnal illusions is connected
with the need of that periodic recuperation of the
higher nervousstructureswhich is a prime condition
of a vigorousintellectual activity, and so of a triumph
over illusion during waking life.
For these reasons dreams may properly be classed
with the illusions of normal or healthy life, rather than
with those of disease. They certainly lie nearer this
region than the very similar illusions of the somnam-
bulist, which with respect to their origin appear to be
more distinctly connectedwith a pathologicalcon-
dition of the nervoussystem,and which with respect
to their practical consequences
may easily prove so
disastrous.

After-Dreams.
In concluding this account of dreams,I would call
attention to the importance of the transition states
betweensleepingand waking, in relation to the pro-
184: DEEAMS.

duction of sense-illusion. And this point may be

touched on here all the more appropriately,sinceit
helpsto bring out the closerelationbetween
waking
and sleepingillusion. The mind doesnot passsud-
denly and at a bound from the condition of dream-
fancy to that of waking perception. I have already
had occasionto touchon the " hypnagogicstate/' that
condition of somnolence or " sleepiness" in which ex-
ternal impressionsceaseto act, the internal attention
is relaxed, and the weird imagery of sleep begins to
unfold itself. And just as there is this anticipationof
dream-hallucination in the presomnial condition, so
there is the survival of it in the postsomnial condition.
As I have observed, dreams sometimes leave behind
them, for an appreciable interval after waking, a vivid
after-impression,and in somecaseseven the semblance
of a sense-perception.
If one reflects how many ghosts and other mi-
raculous apparitions are seen at night, and when the
mind is in a more or less somnolent condition, the
idea is forcibly suggested that a good proportion of
these visions are the debris of dreams. In some cases,
indeed, as that of Spinoza, already referred to, the hal-
lucination (in Spinoza'scasethat of " a scurvy black
Brazilian") is recognizedby the subjecthimself as a
dream-image.1 I am indebted to Mr. W. li. Pollock
for a fact which curiouslyillustrates the position here
adopted. A lady was staying at a country house.
During the night and immediatelyon waking up she
1 For Spinoza's experience, given in Ms own words, see Mr.. F.
Pollock's Spinoza,p. 57; c/. what Wundt sayson his experience,Phy-
siologisclie"Psycliologie,
p. CIS, footnote 2.
 AFTEB-DBEAMS AND SPECTBES. 185

had an apparition of a strange-lookingman in

mediaevalcostume,a figure by no meansagreeable,
andwhich seemedaltogether unfamiliar to her. The
next morning, on rising, she recognized the original of
her hallucinatoryimagein a portrait hanging on the
wall of her bedroom,which must haveimpresseditself
"onher brain beforethe occurrenceof the apparition,
though shehad not attendedto it. Oddly enough,she
now learnt for the first time that the house at which
shewasstaying had the reputation of being haunted,
.andby the very samesomewhat repulsive-lookingmedi-
eval personagethat had troubled her inter-somnolent
moments. The caseseemsto me to be typical with
respectto the genesisof ghosts,and of the reputation
of haunted houses.

NOTE.

THE HYPNOTIC CONDITION.

I have not in this chapterdiscussedthe relation

of dreamingto hypnotism,or the state of artificially
producedquasi-sleep,becausethe nature of this last
is still but very imperfectly understood. In this
condition, which is induced in a number of ways by
keeping the attention fixed on somenon-excitingob-
ject, and by weak continuousand monotonousstimu-
lation, as stroking the skin, the patient can be .made
to act conformablyto the verbal or other suggestionof
the operator,or to the bodily positionwhich he is made
to assume. Thus, for example,if a glasscontaining
186 DREAMS.

ink is given to Mm, with the commandto drink, he

proceedsto drink. If his hands are folded, he proceeds
to act as if he were in church, and so on.
Braid, the writer who did so much to get at the
facts of hypnotism,and Dr. Carpenterwho has helped
to make known Braid's careful researches,regardthe
actionsof the hypnotizedsubjectas analogousto ideo»
motor movements; that is to say, the movements due
to the tendencyof an ideato act itself out apart from
volition. On the other hand, one of the latest in-
quirers into the subject, Professor Heidenhain, of
Breslau,appearsto regardtheseactionsas the outcome
of " unconsciousperceptions " (Animal Magnetism,Eng-
lish translation, p. 43, etc.).
In the absence of certain knowledge, it seems
allowable to argue from the analogy of natural sleep
that the actions of the hypnotized patient are accom-
paniedwith the lower forms of consciousness,
includ-
ing sensation and perception, and that they involve
dream-like hallucinations respecting the external
circumstancesof the moment. Regarding them in this
light, the points of resemblance
betweenhypnotism
and dreaming are numerous and striking. Thus, Dr.
Heidenhain tells us that the threshold or liminal
value of stimulation is lowered just as in ordinary
sleep sense-activity as a whole is lowered. According
to ProfessorWeinhold, the hypnotic condition begins
in a gradual loss of taste, touch, and the senseof tem-
perature; then,sight is gradually impaired,while hear-
ing remainsthroughout the least interferedwith.1 In
1 Seeaninteresting accountof " EecentResearcheson Hypnotism,"
by G. Stanley Hall, in Mind, January, 1881.
 THE HYPNOTIC CONDITION. 187

this way,the mind of the patient is largely cutoff from

the externalworld,as in sleep,and the powerof orien-
tation is lost. Moreover, there are all the conditions
present,both positive and negative,for the hallucina-
tory transformation of mental images into percepts just
asin natural sleep. Thus,the higher centresconnected
with the operationsof reflection and reasoningare
thrown Jiors de combat or, as Dr. Heidenhain has it,
"inhibited."
The condition of hypnotism is marked off from
that of natural sleep, first of all, by the fact that the
accompanying hallucinations are wholly clue to ex-
ternal suggestion(including the effects of bodily
posture). Dreams may, as we have seen, be very
faintly modified by external influences,but during
sleep there is nothing answering to the perfect control
which the operator exercises over the hypnotized
subject. The largest quantity of our " dream-stuff"
comes, as we have seen, from within and not from.
without the organism. And this fact accountsfor the
chief characteristic difference between the natural and
the hypnotic dream. The formeris complex,consist-
ing of crowdsof images,and continually changing:
the latter is simple,limited, and persistent. As Braid
remarks,the peculiarity of hypnotism is that the
attention is concentratedon a remarkably narrow field
of mental imagesand ideas. So long as a particular
bodily postureis assumed,
solongdoesthe corresponding
illusion endure. One result of this, in connection with
that impairing of sensibilityalreadyreferredto, is the
scopefor a curiousoverriding of sense-impressions by
the dominant illusory percept, a processthat we have
188 DREAMS.

seen illustrated in the active sense-illusionsof waking

life. Thus, if salt water is tasted and the patient is
told that it is beer, he complains that it is sour.
In being thus in a certain rapport, though so
limited and unintelligent a rapport, with the ex-
ternal world, the rnind of the hypnotized patient
would appearto be nearer the conditionof waking
illusion than is the mind of the dreamer. It must
be remembered, however, and this is the second
point of differencebetweendreamingand hypnotism,
that the hypnotizedsubject tendsto ad out his hal-
lucinations. His quasi-percepts are wont to trans-
form themselves into actions with a degree of force
of which we see no traces in ordinary sleep. Why
there should be this greater activity of the motor
organsin the one condition than in the other,seems
to be a point as yet unexplained. All sense-im-
pressionsand perceptsare doubtlessaccompanied by
somedegreeof impulseto movement,though,for some
reasonor another,in natural and healthy sleepthese
impulses are restricted to the stage of faint nascent
stirrings of motor activity which hardly betray them-
selvesexternally. This difference,involving a great
differencein the possible practical consequences
of the
two conditionsof natural and hypnotic sleep,clearly
servesto bring the latter condition nearer to that of
insanity than the former condition is brought. A strong
susceptibility to the hypnotic influence, such as
Dr. Heidenhaindescribes,
might, indeed,easily prove
a very serious want of "adaptation of internal to
externalrelations," whereasa tendency to dreaming
would hardly prove a rnaladaptation at all.
 GHAPTEE VIII.

ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION1.

WE have now, perhaps,sufficiently reviewed sense-

illusions,both of waking life and of sleep. And having'
roughly classifiedthem according to their structure and
origin, weare ready to go forwards and inquire whether
the theory thus reachedcanbe applied to other forms
of illusory error. And here we are compelled to inquire
at the outset if anything analogous to sense-illusion
is to be foundin that othergreat regionof presentative
cognition,usuallymarkedoff from external perception
as internal perception, self-reflection.,or introspection.

Illusionsof Introspection
defined.
This inquiry naturally sets out with the question:
What is meant by introspection? This cannot be
better defined,perhaps,than by saying that it is the
mind's immediatereflective cognitionof its own states
as such.
In one sense,of course,everything we know may
be calleda mental state,actxialor imagined. Thus, a
sense-impression
is known,exactlylike anyotherfeeling
of themind,asa mentalphenomenon
ormentalmodifi-
190 ILLUSIONS OF INTKOSPECTIOK

cation. Yet we do not usually speakof introspectively

recognizing a sensation. Our sense-impressionsare
marked off from all other feelings by having an ob-
jective character,that Is to say, an immediate relation to
the external world, so that in attending to one of them
our minds passaway from themselves in what Professor
Bain callsthe attitude of objectiveregard. Introspec-
tion is confined to feelings which want this intimate
connectionwith the external region, and includes
sensationonly so far as it is viewed apart from ex-
ternal objects and on its mental side as a feeling, a
processwhich is next to impossiblewherethe sensa-
tion has little emotional colour, as in the case of an
ordinary sensationof sight or of articulate sound.
This being so, errors of introspection, supposing
"such to be found, will in the main be sufficiently
distinguishedfromthoseof perception. Evenan hallu-
cinationof sense,whethersetting out from a subjective
sensationor not, always contains the semblance of a
sense-impression, and so would not be correctly classed
with errors of introspection.
Just as introspection must be marked off from
perception,so must it be distinguishedfrom memory.
It maybe contendedthat, strictly speaking,all intro-
spectionis retrospection,sinceevenin attendingto a
presentfeeling the mind is reflectivelyrepresentingto
itself the immediatelyprecedingmomentaryexperience
of that feeling. Yet the adoptionof this view does
not hinder us from, drawing a broad distinction be-
tween acts of introspection and acts of memory.
Introspectionmust be regarded as confined to the
knowledgeof immediately antecedentmental states
 SUBJECT DEFINED. 191

with referenceto which,no error of memorycan be

supposedto arise.
It followsfrom this that an illusion of introspection
could only be found in connectionwith the appre-
hensionof presentor immediately antecedentmental
states. On the other hand, any illusions connected
with the consciousness
of personalcontinuity and iden-
tity would fall rather under the classof mnemonic than
that of introspectiveerror.
Once more, introspection must be carefully dis-
tinguished from what I have called belief. Some of
our beliefs may be found to grow out of and be
compounded of a numberof introspections. Thus,my
conceptionof my own character,or my psychological
conceptionof mind as a whole,may be seento ariseby
a combination of the results of a number of acts of
introspection. Yet, supposingthis to be so,we must
still distinguishbetweenthe single presentativeact of
introspection and the representative belief growing out
of it.
It follows from this that, though an error of the
latter sort might conceivably have its origin in one of
the former; though, for example, a man's illusory
opinion of himself might be found to involve errorsof
introspection,yet the two kinds of illusion would be
sufficiently unlike. The latter would be a simple
presentativeerror,the former a compoundrepresenta-
tive error.
Finally, in order to complete this preliminary
demarcationof our subject-matter,it is necessaryto
distinguishbetweenan introspection(apparentor real)
of a feelingor idea,and a process
of inference
based
192 ILLUSIONS OF INTKOSPECTION.

on this feeling. The term introspectiveknowledge

must,it is plain, be confinedto what is or appearsto
be In the mind at the moment of inspection.
By observing this distinction, we are in a position
to mark off an illusion of introspectionfrom a fallacy
of introspection. The former differs from the latter in
the absenceof anything like a consciousprocessof
inference. Thus, if we supposethat the derivation
by Descartes of the fact of the existence of God from
his possessionof the idea to be erroneous,such a con-
sciously performed act of reasoningwould constitute a
fallacy rather than an illusion of introspection.
We may, then, roughly define an illusion of intro-
spectionas an error involved in the apprehension
of
the contents of the mind at any moment. If we mis-
take the quality or degreeof a feeling or the structure
of a complexmassof feeling,or if we confusewhat is
actually present to the mind with some inference
based on this, we may be said to fall into an illusion
of introspection.
But here the question will certainly be raised:
How can we conceivethe mind erring as to the nature
of its presentcontents; and what is to determine,if
not my immediateact of introspection,what is present
in my mind at any moment? Indeed, to raise the
possibilityof error in introspectionseemsto do away
with the certaintyof presentativeknowledge.
If, however,the reader will recall what was said in
an earlier chapter about the possibility of error,in
recognizingthe quality of a sense-impression,he will
be preparedfor a similar possibilityhere. What we
areafecustonaed
to call a purely presentativecognition
 IS INTEOSPECTION FALLIBLE? 193

is, in truth, partly representative. A feeling as pure

feeling is not known; it is only known when it is
distinguished, as to quality or degree, and so classed
or brought under some representation of a kind or
descriptionof feeling, as acute, painful, and so on.
The accuraterecognition of an impression of colour
depends,as wehave seen,on this processof classing
being correctly performed. Similarly, the recognition
of internal feelings implies the presence of the appro-
priate or correspondingclass-representation.Accord-
ingly, if it is possible for a wrong representationto
' get substitutedfor the right one,there seemsto be an.
opening for error.
Any error that would thus arise can, of course,
only be determined as such in relation to some other
act of introspection of the same mind. In matters of
internal perception other minds cannot directly assist
us in correcting error asthey can in the caseof external
perception,though, as we shall seeby-and-by, they
may do so indirectly. The standard of reality di-
rectly applicable to introspective cognition is plainly
what the individual mind recognizes at its best mo-
ments, when the processesof attention and classify-
ing are accurately performed, and the representation
may be regarded with certainty as answering to the
feeling. In other words, in the sphere of internal,
as in that of external experience, the criterion of
reality is the averageand perfect, as distinguished
from, the particular variable and imperfect act of
cognition.
We see,then, that error in the processof intro-
spectionis at least conceivable. And now let us
o
194 ILLUSIONS -OF INTEOSPECTION.

examinethis processa little further, in order to find

out what probabilitiesof errorattach to it.
Tobeginwith,then,an actof introspection,
to be
complete,clearly involvesthe apprehensionof an in-
ternal feeling or ideaas somethingmentaland marked
off from the region of external experience. This dis-
tinct recognitionof internal statesof mind as such,in
oppositionto external impressions,is by no means
easy,but presupposes a certain degreeof intellectual
culture, and a measureof the power of abstract at-
tention.

Confusionof Internal and External Experience.

Accordingly, we find that where this is wanting
there is a manifest disposition to translate internal feel-
ings into terms of external impressions. In this way
there may arise a slight amount of habitual and
approximatelyconstanterror. Not that the process
approachesto one of hallucination; but only that
the internal feelings are intuited as having a cause or
origin analogous to that of sense-impressions. Thus
to the uncultivatedmind a suddenthought seemslike
an audibleannouncement
"fromwithout. The super-
stitious man talks of being led by sonic good or evil
spirit when new ideas arise in his mind or new reso-
lutions shapethemselves. To the simple intelligence
of the booreverythought presentsitself as ananalogue
of an audible voice,and he commonly describeshis
rough musings as saying this and that to himself.
And this,modeof viewing the matter is reflectedeven,
in the languageof cultivated
"
persons. Thus we say,
u The idea struck me," or was borne in on me," " I
 MIND AS POPULAELY CONCEIVED. 195

was forced to do so and so/' and so on, and in tills

manner we tend to assimilate Internal to external
mental phenomena.
Much the samething showsitself in our customary
modesof describingour internal feelings of pleasure
and pain. When a man in a state of mental depression
speaks of having " a load" on his mind it is evident
that he is interpreting a mental Tbyhelp of an analogy
to a bodily feeling. Similarly, when we talk of the
mind being torn by doubt or worn by anxiety. It
would seem as though we tended mechanically to
translatementalpleasuresand painsinto the language
of bodily sensations.
The explanation of this deeply rooted tendency to
a slightly illusory view of our mental states is, I think,
aneasyone. For onething, it follows from the relation
of the mental image to the sense-impressionthat we
should tend to assimilate the former to the Litter as
to its nature and origin. This would account for the
commonhabit of regarding thoughts, which are of
course accompanied by representatives of their verbal
symbols, as internal voices, a habit which is probably
especially characteristic of the child and the uncivilized
man, as we have found it to be characteristic of the
insane.
Another reason, however, must be sought for the
habit of assimilating internal feelings to external sen-
sations. If language has been evolved as an incident
of social life, at once one of its effects and its causes,
it wouldseemto follow that it must have first shaped
itself to the needsof expressingthesecommonobjective
experienceswhich we receive by way of our senses.
196 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

Our habitual modesof thought, limited as they are

by language,retain traces of this origin. We cannot
conceiveany mental processexcept by somevague
analogy to a physical process. In other words, we can
even now only think with perfect clearnesswhen we
are concernedwith some object of common cognition.
Thus, the .sphereof external sensationand of physical
agenciesfurnishes us with the one type of thinkable
thing or object of thought, and we habitually view
subjectivementalstatesas analogues
of these.
Still, it may be said that these slight nascenterrors
are hardly worth naming, and the question would still
appear to recur whether there are other fully developed
errors deserving to rank along with illusions of sense.
Do we, it may be asked, ever actually mistake the
quality, degree,or structureof our internal feelingsin
the mannerhinted above,and if so,what is the range
of such error ? In order to appreciate the risks of such
error, let us comparethe processof self-observationwith
that of external perception with respect to the difficul-
ties in the way of accurate presentative knowledge.

Misreading of Internal Feelings.

First of all, it is noteworthy that a state of con-
sciousnessat any one moment is an exceedingly com-
plex thing. It is made up of a massof feelingsand
active impulses which often combine and blend in a
most inextricable way. External sensationscome in
groups,too,but asa rule they do not fusein apparently
simple wholes as our internal feelings often do. The
very possibility of perception depends on a clear dis-
criminationof sense-elements,
for example,the several
 DIFFICULTIES OF INTEOSPECTIOK. 197

sensations of colour obtained by the stimulation of

different parts of the retina.1 But no such clearly
definedmosaicof feelingspresentsitself in the internal
region: oneelementoverlapsand partly losesitself in
another,and subjectiveanalysisis oftenan exceedingly
difficult matter. Our consciousnessis thus a closely
woven texture in which the mental eye often fails to
trace the several threads or strands. Moreover, there
is the fact that many of these ingredients are exceed-
ingly shadowy,belonging to that obscure region of
sub-consciousness
which it is so hard to penetrate with
the light of discriminative attention. This remark
applies with particular force to that massof organic
feelingswhichconstitutes
whatis knownascoenoesthe^iS
or vital sense.
While, to speak figuratively, the minute anatomy
of consciousnessis thus difficult with respect to
longitudinal sectionsof the mentalcolumn,it is no less
difficult with respect to transverse sections. Under
ordinary circumstances,external impressions persist so
that they can be transfixed by a deliberate act oi
attention, and objects rarely flit over the external
sceneso rapidly as to allow us no time for a careful
recognitionof the impression. Not so in the case of
the internal region of mind. The compositestatesot
consciousness just described never remain perfectly
uniformfor the shortest conceivableduration. They
change continually, just as the contents of the kaleido-
scopevary with everyshakeof the instrument. Thus,
1 I need hardly observe that physiology shows that there is no
separation of different elementary colour-seusatiouswhich, are locally
identical.
198 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION",

oneshadeof feeling runs into another in such a way

that it is often impossibleto detect its exact quality ;
and even when the character of the feeling does not
change,its intensity is undergoingalterationsso that
an accurate observationof its quantity is impracticable.
Also, in this unstable shifting internal scenefeatures
may appearfor a duration too short to allow of close
"recognition. In this way it happensthat we cannot
sharply divide the feeling of the momentfrom its
antecedents and its consequents.
If, now, we take these facts in connection with
what has been said above respecting the nature of the
processof introspection, the probability of error will be
made sufficiently -clear. To transfix any particular
feeling of the moment,-to selectively attend to it, and
to bring it 'under "the proper representation, is an
operationthat requires time, a time which, though
short, is longer than the fugitive character of so much
of our internal mental life allows. From all of which
it wouldappearto follow that it must be very easy to
overlook, -confuse,and transform, both as to quality
and as to quantity, the actual ingredients of our in-
ternal consciousness.
From these sourcesthere spring a number of small
errors of introspection which, to distinguish them from
othersto be spokenof presently,maybe calledpassive.
Thesewouldincludeall errorsin detecting what is in
consciousnessdue to the intricaciesof the phenomena,
and not. aided by any strong basis. For example,a
mentalstatemayfail to discloseits componentparts to
introspectiveattention. Thus,a motive mayenterinto
ouractionwhichis soentangledwith otherfeelingsas to
 MIS-OBSERVATION OF FEELING. 199

escapeour notice. The fainter the feeling the greater

the difficulty of detaching it and inspecting it in
isolation. Again, an error of introspectionmay liave
its ground in the fugitive character of a feeling. If,
for example, a man is asked whether a rapid action
was a voluntary one, hie may in retrospection easily
imagine that it was not so,when as a matter of fact the
action was preceded by a momentary volition. When
a person exclaims," I did a thing inadvertently or
mechanically," it often meansthat he did not note the
motive underlying the action. Such transitory feelings
which cannot at the moment be seized by an act of
attention are pretty certain to disappear at once,
leaving not even a temporary trace in consciousness.
We will now pass to the considerationof other
illusions of introspection more analogousto what I have
called the active illusions of perception. In our ex-
amination of these we found that a pure representation
may under certain circumstances simulate the appear-
ance of a presentation,that a mental image may
approximateto a sense-impression.In the caseof the
internal feelings this liability showsitself in a still
more striking form.
The. higher feelings or emotions are distinguished
from the simplesense-feelings
in being largely repre-
sentative. Thus, a feeling of contentment at' any
moment,though no doubt conditionedby the bodily
state and the characterof the organic sensationsor
coencesthesis,
commonly dependsfor the most part on
intellectual representations of external circumstances
or relations, and may be called an ideal foretaste of
actual satisfactions,
such as the pleasuresof success,
200 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

of companionship,and so on. This being so, it is

easy for imaginationto call up a semblanceof these
higher feelings. Since they dependlargely on repre-
sentation,a mereact of representationmay sufficeto
excite a degreeof the feeling hardly distingnishable
from the actual one. Thus, to imagine myself as con-
tentedis really to seemyselfat the momentasactually
contented. Again, the actor, though,as we shall see
by-and-by,he doesnot feel all that the spectatoris
apt to attribute to him, tends, when vividly represent-
ing to himself a particular shadeof feeling,to regard
himselfas actuallyfeeling in this way. Thus,it is said
of Garrick, that when acting Kichard III., he felt
himself for the moment to be a villain.
We should expectfrom all this that in the act of
introspection the rnind is a}/t, within certain limits, to
find what it is prepared to find. And since there is in
these acts often a distinct wish to detect somepar-
ticular feeling, we can see how easy it must be for a
man through bias and a wrong focussing of the atten-
tion to deceivehimself up to a certain point with
respectto the actual contents of his mind.
Let us examine one of these active illusions a
little more fully. It would at first, sight seem to be
a perfectly simple thing to determineat any given
momentwhether we are enjoying ourselves,whether
our emotional condition rises above the pleasure-
threshold or point of indifference and takes on a
positive hue of the agreeableor pleasurable. Yet
there is good reason for supposingthat peoplenot
unfrequently deceivethemselveson this matter. It
is, perhaps,hardly an exaggerationto say that most
 ACTIVE SELF-DECEPTION. 201

of us are capableof imagining that we are having

enjoymentwhenwe conformto the temporary fashion
of socialamusement. It has beencynically observed
that peoplego into societylessin orderto be happy
than to seem so, and one may add that in this
semblanceof enjoymentthey may, provided they are
not "blase,
deceive themselves as well as others. The
expectation of enjoyment, the knowledge that the
occasionis intended to bring about this result, the
recognition of the external signs of enjoyment in
others-all this may serve to blind a man in the
earlier stagesof socialamusementto his actual mental
condition.
If welook closelyinto this variety of illusion, we
shall seethat it is very similar in its structure and
origin to that kind of erroneous
perceptionwhicharises
from inattention to the actual impression of the
moment under the influence of a strong expectation
of something different. The representation of our-
selvesas entertaineddislodgesfrom our internal field
of vision our actual condition, relegating this to the
region of obscure consciousness. Could we for a mo-
ment get rid of this representation and look at the
real feelings of the time, we should become aware
of our error; and it is possiblethat the processof
becomingllaseinvolvesa waking up to a good deal of
illusion of the kind.
Just as we can thus deceive ourselves within certain
limits as to our emotional condition, so we can mistake
the real nature of our intellectual condition. Thus,
when an ideais particularly grateful to our minds, we
may easilyimagine that w§ believe it, when in point
202 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

of fact all the time there is a sub-consciousprocessof

criticism going on, which,if we attendedto it for a
moment would amount to a distinct act of disbelief.
Somepersonsappear to be capable of going on habitu-
ally practisingthis petty deceit on themselves,
that is
to say,imagining they believe what in fact they are
stronglyinclinedto doubt. Indeed,this remark applies
to all the grateful illusions respecting ourselves and
others, which'will have to be discussedby-and-by.
The impulseto hold to the illusion in spite of critical
reflection, involves the further introspective illusion oi
taking a state of doubt for one of assurance. Thus, the
weak,flatteredman or womanmanagesto keep up a
sort of fictitious belief in the truth of the words which
are so pleasant to the ear.
It is plain that the external conditions of life
impose on the individual certain habits of feeling
which often conflict with his personalpropensities.
As a member of society he has a powerful motive to
attribute certain feelings to himself, and this motive
acts as a biasin disturbing his vision of what is actually
ia his mind. While this holds good of lighter matters,
as that of enjoyment just referred to, it applies still
more to graver matters. Thus, for example,a man
may easily pursuadehimself that he feels a proper
sentiment of indignation against a perpetrator of some
meanor cruel act, whenas a matter of fact his feeling
is much more one of compassionfor the previously
liked offender. In this way we impose on ourselves,
disguising our real sentiments by a thin veil of make-
-believe.
Sofar I havespokenof an illusion of introspection
 HAL-OBSERVATION OF FEELING. 203

as analogous to the slight misapprehensions of sense-

impressionwhich weretouchedon in connectionwith
illusions of sense(ChapterIII.). It is to be observed,
however,that the confusingof elements of conscious-
ness,which is so prominent a factor in introspective
illusion,involvesa speciesof error closelyanalogousto a
completeillusion of perception,that is to say,onewhich
involves a misinterpretation of a sense-impression.
This variety of illusion is illustrated in the case in
which a presentfeeling or thought is confoundedwith
some inference based on it. For example, a present
thought may, through forgetfulness,be regardedas a
new discovery. Its originality appearsto be im-
mediately made known in the very freshness which
characterizes
it. Every authorprobablyhasundergone
the experience of finding that ideas which started
up to his mind as fresh creations, were unconscious
reminiscencesof his own or of somebody else's ideas.
In the caseof present emotional states this liability
to confuse the present and the past is far greater.
Here there is something hardly distinguishable from
an active illusion of sense-perception. In this con-
dition of mind a man often says that he has an " in-
tuition'* of something supposed to bo immediately
given in the feeling itself. For instance, one whoso
mind is thrilled by the pulsation of a new joy ex-
claims, " This is the happiest moment of my life,**
and the assuranceseemsto be containedin the very
intensity of the feeling itself. Of course, cool re-
flection will tell him that what he affirms is merely
a belief, the accuracyof which presupposes processes
of recollectionand judgment, but to the man's minci
204 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION".

at the momentthe supremacyof this particular joy

is immediately intuited. And so with the assurance
that the presentfeeling, for exampleof love, is un-
dying, that it is equal to the most severe trials, and
so on. A man is said to feel at the moment that it is
so, though as the facts believed have reference to
absentcircumstances and events,it is plain that the
knowledgeis by no meansintuitive.
At such times our minds are in a state of pure
feeling: intellectualdiscriminationand comparison are
no longer possible. In this way our emotions in the
moments of their .greatest intensity carry away our
intellects with them, confusing the region of pure
imagination with that of truth and certainty, and
even the narrow domain of the present with the vast
domain of the past and future. In this condition
differences of present and future may be said to dis-
appearand the energy of the emotion to constitute
aa immediate assuranceof its existenceabsolutely.1
The greatregion for the illustration of theseactive
illusions is that of the moral and religious life. With
respectto our real motives,our dominant aspirations,
and our highest emotionalexperiences,
we are greatly
liable to deceive ourselves. The" moralist and the
theologianhave clearly recognizedthe possibilitiesof
self-deception
in mattersof feeling and impulse. To
1 This kind of error is, of course,common to all kinds of cognition,
in so far as they involve comparison. Thus, the presenceof the ex-
citement of the emotion of wonder at the sight of an unusually large
object, saya mountain, disposes the mind to look on-it as the largest
of its class. Such illusions come midway betweenpresentative and
representative illusions. They might, perhaps,be specially marked
®$ as illusions of " judgment"
 MORAL SELF-SCRUTINY. 205

them it is no mystery that the human heart

mistake the fictitious for the real, the momentary and
evanescent
fortheabiding. And theyhaverecognized,
too,the doublebiasin theseerrors,namely,the powerful
disposition
to exaggeratethe intensityandpersistence
of a presentfeelingonthe onehand,andon the other
hand to takeamerewish to feel in a particular-wayfor
the actualpossession
of the feeling.

Philosopliie Illusions.
The opinion of theologiansrespectingthe nature of
moral introspectionpresentsa singular contrastto that
entertainedby somephilosophersas to the nature of
self-consciousness. It is supposedby many of these
that in interrogatingtheir internal consciousness
they
are lifted above all risk of error. The " deliverance of
consciousness
" is to them somethingbearing the seal
of a supremeauthority, and must not be called in
question. And so they make an appeal to individual
consciousnessa final resort in all matters of philo-
sophical dispute.
Now, on the face of it, it doesnot seemprobable
that this operationshould havean immunity from all
liability to error. For the matters respectingwhich
we are directed to introspect ourselves, are the most
subtle and complex things of our intellectual and
emotionallife. And someof thesephilosopherseven
go so far asto affirm that the plain man is quite equal
to the nicetiesof this process.
It has been brought as a charge against some of
thesesamephilosophersthat they have basedcertain
of their doctrineson errors of introspection.This
206 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

charge must,of course,be receivedwith somesort of

suspicionhere,since it has been brought forward by
avoweddisciples of an opposite philosophicschool.
Nevertheless,as there is from our present disinterested
andpurely scientific point of view a presumptionthat
philosopherslike othermen arefallible, and sinceit is
certain-thatphilosopicalintrospectiondoesnot materi-
ally differ from other kinds, it seemspermissiblejust
to glanceat someof thesealleged illusionsin relation
to other and more vulgar forms. Further referenceto
them will be made at the end of our study.
Theseso-calledphilosophical illusions will be found,
like the vulgar ones just spoken of, to illustrate the
distinction drawn between passive and active illusions.
That is to say, the alleged misreading of individual
consciousness would result now from a confusion of
distinct elements,including wrong suggestion, due to
the intricaciesof the phenomena,now from a powerful
predispositionto readsomethinginto the phenomena.
A kind of illusion in which the passiveelement
seemsmostconspicuous would be the error into which
the interrogator of the individual consciousnessis said
to fall respectingsimpleunanalyzablestatesof mind.
On the face of it, it is not likely that a mere inward
glanceat the tangle of consciousstates should suffice
to determinewhat is such a perfectly simple mental
phenomenon.Accordingly, when a writer declares
that an act of introspectiondemonstrates the simple
unanalyzablecharacterof sucha feeling as the senti-
ment of beautyor that of moralapproval,the opponent
of this view clearly has someshowof argumentfor
sayingthat this simplicity may be altogetherillusory
 MIS-INTROSPECTION IN PHILOSOPHY. 207

and due to the absence of a perfect act of attention.

Similarly,, when it is said that the idea of space
containsno representations of muscularsensation,the
statementmay clearly arise from the want of a
sufficiently carefulkind of introspectiveanalysis.1
In mostcasesof thesealleged philosophicalerrors,
however,the active and passivefactors seemto com-
bine. There are certain intricacies in the mental
phenomenonitself favouring the chancesof error, and
thereare independentpredispositionsleading the mind
to look at the phenomenonin a wrong way. This
seemsto apply to the famousdeclarationof a certain
schoolof thinkers that by an act of introspectionwe
can intuit the fact of liberty, that is to say,a power
of spontaneous determinationof action superiorto and
regulative of the,, influence of motives. It may bo
plausibly contendedthat this idea arises partly from
1 So far as any mental state, though originating in a fusion of
elements,is now unanalyzable by the best effort of attention, we must
of course regard it in its present form as simple. This distinction
between what is simple or complex in its present nature, and what is
originall}' so, is sometimesoverlookedby psychologists. "Whetherthe
feelings and idoashere referred to arc now simple or complex,cannot,
I think, yet bo very certainly determined. To take the idea of Bpaci.',
I find that after practice I recognize the ingredient of muscular
feeling much better than I did at first. And this exactly answers to
Helmholtz's contention that elementary sensations as partial tones
can be detected after practice. Such separate-recognition may bo
said to depend on correct representation. On the other hand, it must
bo allowed that there is room for the intuitiouist to say that tho
associationistid here reading something into the idea which dot's not
belong to it. It is to be added that tho illusion which tho assoeia-
fcionistcommonly seeksto fasten on his opponent is that of confusing
final with original simplicity. Thus, he says that, though tho idea of
spacemay now to all intents and purposes bo simple, it was n-ally
built up out of many distinct elements. More will ho said on tho
relation of questionsof nature and genesisfurther o»
208 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

a mixing up of facts of presentconsciousness with

inferencesfrom them, and partly from a natural predis-
positionof the mind to invest itself with this supreme
power of absolute origination.1
In a similar way, it might be contended that other
famousphilosophicdicta are foundedon a processof
erroneous
introspectionof subjectivementalstates. In
some cases,indeed, it seemsa plausible explanation to
regard these illusions as mere survivals in attenuated
shadowyform of grosserpopularillusions. But this
is not yet the time to enter on these,which,moreover,
hardly fall perhaps under our definition of an illusion
of introspection.
Value of the Introspective Method.
In drawing up this rough sketch of the illusions of
introspection,I havehad no practical object in view.
I havetried to look at the factsas they are apartfrom
any conclusions to be drawnfrom them. The question
how far the liability to error in any region of inquiry
vitiates the whole process is a difficult one; and the
questionwhetherthe illusions to which we are subject
in introspectionmaterially affect the value of self-
knowledge as a whole and consequentlyof the intro-
spectivemethodin psychology,as many affirm, is too
subtle a one to be fully treated now. All that I shall
attempt here is to show that it does not do this any
more than the risk of sense-illusion can be said
materially to affect the value of external observation.
1 I may as well bo frank and say that I myself, assumingfree-will
to be an illusion, have tried to trace tho various threads of influence
which havecontributed to its remarkable vitality. (See Sensationand
Intuition) ch. v., " The Genesisof the Free-Will Doetriue.")
 IS INTROSPECTION VALUELESS? 209

It is to be noted first of all that the errors of

introspectionare much more limited than those of
sense-perception.
They broadlyanswerto the slight
errors connectedwith the discrimination and recogni-
tion of the sense-impression.There is nothing
answeringto a complete hallucination in the sphere
of the inner mental life. It follows, too, from what has
been said above, that the amount of active error in
introspectionis insignificant,since the representation
of a feeling or belief is so very similar to the actual
experienceof it,
In brief, the errors of introspection, though
numerous,are all too slight to render the processof
introspectionas a whole unsoundand untrustworthy.
Though, aswehaveseen,it involves,strictly speaking,
an ingredient of representation,
this fact doesnot do
awaywith the broaddistinction betweenpresentative
and representative cognition. Introspection is pre-
sentative in the sensethat the reality constituting the
object of cognition,the mind's presentfeeling,is as
directly present to the knowing mind as anything can
be conceivedto be. It may be addedthat the power
of introspectionis a comparativelynewacquisitionof
the human race,and that, as it improves,the amount
of error connectedwith its operationmay reasonably
be expectedto becomeinfinitesimal.
It is often supposedby thosewho undervalueth©
introspectivemethod in psychologythat there is a
special difficulty in th© detection of error in intro-
spection,owingto the fact that the object of inspection
is somethingindividual and private,and not open to
commonscrutiny as th©object of external perception.
210 ILLUSIONS OF INTROSPECTION.

Yet, while allowing a certain force to this objection

I wouldpoint out, first of all, that evenin sense-percep-
tion, whatthe individual mind is immediatelycertain
of is its own sensations. The relatively perfect cer-
tainty which finally attachesto the presentativeside
of sense-perception is preciselythat which finally at-
tachesto the resultsof introspection.
In the secondplace,it may be said that the con-
trast betweenthe inner and the outer experienceis
much less than it seems. In many casesour emotions
are the 'direct result of a common external cause,and
evenwhenthey are not thus attachedto somepresent
external. circumstance, we are able, it is admitted, by
the useof language,roughly to compareour individual
feelings. And such comparisonis continually bring-
ing to light the fact that there is a continuity in our
mental structure, that our highest thoughts and
emotions lead us back to our common sense-impres-
sions, and that consequently, in spite of all individual
differencesof temperamentand mental organization,
our inner experienceis in all its larger featuresa
common experience.
I may add that this suppositionof the common
nature of our internal experience, as a whole, not only
underliesthe scienceof psychology,but is implied in
the very processof detecting and correctingerrorsof
introspection.I do not meanthat in mattersof
feeling" authority" is to override" privatejudgment.7'
Our last resortwith respectto things of the mind is,
as I have said, that of careful self-inspection.And
theprogress
of psychology
andthe correction
of illu-
sionproceed
by meansof an ever-improvingexercise
 VALUE OF INTKOSPECTIVE METHOD. 211

"of the introspective faculty. Yet such individual

inspectioncan at least be guided by the results of
others'similar inspection,and should be so guided as
soonas a generalconsensus in matters of internal ex-
perience is fairly made out. In point of fact, the
precedingdiscussionof illusions of introspectionhas
plainly rested on the sufficiently verified assumption
that the calmestand mostefficient kind of introspec-
tion, in bringing to light what is permanent as com-
paredwith what is variablein the individual cognition,
points in the direction of a common body of intro-
spected fact.
 CHAPTEE IX.

OTHEK QUASI-PKESENTATIVE ILLUSIONS I ERRORS OF

INSIGHT.

BESIDES
the perception of external objects,and the
inspection of our internal mental states,there are other
forms of quasi-presentative cognition which need to
"be touched on here, inasmuch as they are sometimes
erroneousand illusory.
In the last chapter I alluded to the fact that
emotion may ariseas the immediateaccompaniment
of a sense-impression. When this is the case there
is a dispositionto read into the external object a
quality answering to the emotion, just as there is a
disposition to ascribe to objects qualities of heat and
cold answering to the sensations thus called. And
such a reference of an emotional result to an external
exciting causeapproximatesin characterto an im-
mediate intuition. The cognition of the quality is
instantaneous,
and quite free from any admixture of
consciousinference. Accordingly, we have to inquire
into the illusory forms of such intuition, if such
there be.
 EMOTIONAL PERCEPTS. 213

JEsthetie Intuition.

Conspicuous among these quasi-presentativeemo-

tional cognitionsis aestheticintuition, that is to say,
the perceptionof an object as beautiful. It is not
necessaryhere to raise the questionwhether there is,
strictly speaking,any quality in things answeringto
the sentimentof beautyin our minds : this is a philo-
sophicaland not a psychologicalquestion,and turns on
the further question,whatwe meanby object. All that
we need to assumehere is that there are certain aspects
of external things, certain relations of form, together
with a power of exciting certain pleasurableideasin.
the spectator'smind, which are commonlyrecognized
as the causeof the emotion of beauty, and indeed
regardedas constituting the embodimentsof the ob-
jective quality,beauty. ./Estheticintuition thusclearly
implies the immediate assuranceof the existence of a
commonsourceof esthetic delight, a sourcebound up
with an object of commonsense-perception.And so
we may saythat to call a thing beautiful *is moreor
less distinctly to recognizeit as a cause of a present
emotion,and to attribute to it a power of raising a
kindred emotion in other minds.

^Esthetic Illusion.

Accordingto this view of the matter, an illusion of

aestheticintuition would arisewheneverthis power of
affecting a number of minds pleasurably is wrongly
attributed, by an act of " intuition/' to an object of
sense-perception, on the ground of a presentpersonal
feeling.
214 OTHER QUASI-PBESENTATIVE ILLUSIONS.

? this error is by no meanstinfrequent. Our

delight in viewing external things, though agreeing
up to a certain point, doesnot agreethroughout. It
is a trite remark ..that there is a large individual
factor,a considerable" personalequation/' in matters
of taste, as in other matters. Permanent differencesof
natural sensibility, of experience,of intellectual habits?
and so on,make an objectaestheticallyimpressiveand
valuable to one man and not to another. Yet these
differences tend to be overlooked. The individual
mind, filled with delight at some spectacle,auto-
matically projects its feeling outwards in the shapeof
a cause of a common sentiment. And the force of
this impulse cannot be altogether explained as the
effectof pastexperiencesand of association. It seems-
to involve, in addition, the play of social instincts, the
impulse of the individual mind to connectitself in
sympathywith the collectivemind.
Here, as in the other varieties of illusion already
treatedof, we maydistinguish betweena passiveand
an active side ; only in this casethe passive side must
not be taken as corresponding to any common sug-
gestionsof the object, as in the caseof perception
proper. So far as an illusion of aestheticintuition may
be consideredas passive, it must be due to the effect of
circumscribed individual associationswith the object.
All agree that what is called beauty consists,to a
considerableextent, of a power of awaking pleasant
suggestions,but in order that these should constitute
a ground of aestheticvalue, they must be common,par-
ticipated in by all, or at least by an indefinite number..
This will be the case when the association' rests on our
 SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE BEAUTY. 215

commonevery-dayexperiences, and our commonknow-

ledge of things, as in the caseof the peaceful beauty
of an ascendingcurl of blue smoke«ina woodyland-
scape,or the awful beauty of a lofty precipice. On
the other hand,whenthe experienceand recollections,
which are the sourceof the pleasure,are restricted and
accidental,any attribution of objectiveworth is illu-
sory. Thus, the ascription of beauty to one's native
village, to one's beloved friends, and so on, in so far as
it carries the conviction of objective worth, may imply
a confusion of the individual with the common ex-
perience.
The active side of this speciesof illusions would be
illustrated in every instance of ascribing beauty to
objects which is due, in a considerable measure at *
least, to somepre-existing dispositionin the mind,
whether permanent or temporary. A man brings his
peculiar habits of thought and feeling to th© con-
templation of objects, and the aesthetic impression
producedis colouredby these predispositions. Thus,
a person of a sad and gloomy cast of mind will be
disposedto seea sombrebeautywhereother eyessee
nothing of the kind. And then there are all the
effects of temporary conditions of the imagination and
the feelings. Thus, the individual mind may be
focussedin a certain way through the suggestionof
another. People not seldom see a thing to be beauti-
ful becausethey are told that it is so. It might not
be well to inquire too curiously how many of the
frequentersof the annual art exhibitions uso their
own eyes in framing their aestheticjudgments. Or
the temporarypredispositionmay reside in a purely
216 OTHEE QUASI-PEESENTATIVE ILLUSIONS.

personalfeeling or desireuppermostat the time. Our

enjoymentof nature or of art is colouredby our
temporary mood. There are moments of exceptional
mental exhilaration,when even a commonplacescene
will excite an appreciablekind of admiration. Or
there may be a strongwish to find a thing beautiful
begottenof anotherfeeling. Thus, a lover desiresto
find beautyin his mistress
; or,havingfoundit in her
faceand form,desiresto find a harmoniousbeautyin
her mind. In these different ways temporary acci-
dents of personalfeeling and imaginationenter into
and determineouraestheticintuition,making it deviate
from the commonstandard. This kind of error may
even approximate in character to an hallucination of
sensewhen there is nothing answeringto a common
source of aestheticpleasure. Thus, the fond mother,
through the very force of her -affection,will construct
a beautyin her child, which for others is altogether
non-existent.
What appliesto the perceptionof beautyin the
narrow sensewill apply to all -other modesof assthetic
intuition, as that of the sublime and the ludicrous, and
the recognitionof the oppositeof beautyor the ugly.
In like manner,it will apply to moral intuition in so
far as it is an instantaneous recognition of a certain
quality in a perceivedaction basedon, or at leastcon-
joined with, a particular emotionaleffect. In men's
intuitive judgmentsrespectingthe right and the wrong,
the noble and base,the admirable and contemptible,
and so on, we may see the same kind of illusory
universalizing of personal feeling as we have seen in
their judgments respecting the beautiful. And the
 KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS' FEELINGS. 217

sources of the error are the same in the two cases.

Accidentsof experience, giving special associations
to
the actions,will not unfrequentlywarp the individual
intuition. Ethical culture, like aestheticculture, means
a continual casting aside of early illusory habits of
intuition. And further, moral intuition illustrates all
thoseeffectsof feeling which we havebriefly tracedin
the caseof aestheticintuition. The perversionsof the
moral intuition under the sway of prejudice are too
familiar to need more than a bare allusion.

Nature of Insight
Thereremainsonefurther modeof cognitionwhich
approximatesin characterto presentativeknowledge,
.and is closely related to external perception. I refer
to the commonly called-" intuitive" process by which
weapprehendthe feelingsand thoughtsof otherminds
through the externalsigns of movement,vocal sound,
-etc.,which make up expressionand language. This
kind of knowledge,which is not sufficiently markedoff
from external perception on the one side and intro-
.spectionon the other, I venture to call Insight.
I am well aware that this interpretation of the
mental states of others is commonly described as a
process,
of inferenceinvolving a consciousreferenceto
our ownsimilar experiences. I willingly grant that it
is often so. At the sametime, it must be perfectly
plain that it is not always so. It is, indeed, doubtful
"whetherin its first stagesin earlylife it is invariably so,
for there seemto be goodreasonsfor attributing to the
infant mind a certain degreeof instinctive or inherited
218 OTHER QUASI-PKESENTATIVE ILLUSIONS.

capabilityin making out the looksand tonesof others.1

And, however this may be, it is certain that with the
progressof life a goodpart of this interpretationcomes
to be automatic or unconscious,approximating in
characterto a sense-perception.To recognizecontent-
ment in a placid smile is, one would say,hardly less
immediate and intuitive than to recognize the coolness
of a stream.
We must, of course, all allow that the fusion of
the preservative and the representative element is,
speaking generally, more complete in the caseof sense-
perceptionthan in that here considered. In spite of
Berkeley's masterly account of the rationale of visual
perceptionas an interpretationof " visual language'*'
and all that has confirmed it, the plain man cannot,at
the momentof looking at an object,easilybring him-
self to admitthat distanceis not directly presentto his
vision. On the other hand, on cool reflection, he will
recognize that the complacent benevolent sentiment is
distinct from the particular movementsand changesin
the eyeand otherfeatureswhich express it. Yet, while-
admitting this, I must contendthat there is no very
hard and fast line dividing the two processes,but that
the readingof others'feelings approximatesin charac-
ter to an act of perception.
An intuitive insight may, then, be defined as that
instantaneous, automatic, or " unconscious" mode of

1 I purposely leave aside here the philosophical question, whether

the knowledge of others' feelings is intuitive in the senseof being
altogether independent of experience, and the manifestation of a
fundamental belief. The inherited power referred to in the text
might, of course, be viewed as a transmitted result of ancestral
experience.
 INSIGHT AND PERCEPTION. 219

interpretinganother'sfeelingwhich occurswhenever
the feelingis fully expressed,and whenits signsare
sufficientlyfamiliarto us. Thisdefinitionwill include
the interpretation of thoughtsby meansof language,
thoughnot,of course,the belief in an objectivefact
grounded ona recognition of another'sbelief. Onthe
other hand,it will excludeall the more complexinter-
pretationsof looksand wordswhich imply conscious
comparison,reflection,
andreasoning.Further,it will
excludea large part of the interpretation of actionsas
motived,sincethis, though sometimesapproachingthe
intuitive form, is for the most part a processof con-
jectural or doubtful inference, and wanting in the
immediate assurance which belongs to an intuitive
readingof a presentemotionor thought.
From this short account of the processof insight, its
relationto perceptionand introspectionbecomespretty
plain. On the one hand, it closely resembles sense-
perception, since it proceeds by the interpretation of a
sense-impression
by meansof a representativeimage.
On the other hand,it differs from sense-perception,
and
is more closely allied to introspection in the fact that,
while the processof interpretation in the former case
is a reconstruction of external experiences,in the latter
caseit is a reconstructionof internal experiences. To
intuit another'sfeeling is clearly to representto our-
selvesa certain kind of internal experiencepreviously
known,in its elementsat least, by introspection,while
these representedexpeiiences are distinctly referred to
another personality.
And now we seewhat constitutesthe object of
insight. This is, in part, a common,experience,as in
220 OTHEE QtTASI-PBESEOTATIVE ILLUSIONS.

the case of sense-perception and aestheticintuition,

since to perceive another's feeling is implicitly to
cognizethe externalconditionsof a commoninsight.
But this is clearlynot the whole,nor eventhe main
part of objectivereality in this act of cognition. An
intuitive insight differsfroma sense-perception in that
it involves an immediate assurance of the existence of
a feeling presentatively known, though not to our own
minds. The object in insight is thus a presentativo
feeling as in introspection, though not our own, but
another's. And so it differs from the object in sense-
perception
in sofar asthis last involvessense-experi-
ences,as muscularand tactual feelings^which arenot
at themomentpresentativelyknownto any mind.

Illusions of Insight.
And nowwe arein a position,perhaps,to definean
illusion of insight,andto inquire whetherthereis any-
thing answeringto our definition. An illusory insight
is a quasi-intuitionof another'sfeelings which does
not answerto the internal reality as presentatively
known to the subjecthimself. In spite of the errors
of introspectiondealt with in the last chapter,nobody
will doubt that, when it is a question betweena man's
knowingwhat is at the momentin his ownmind and
somebodyelse'sknowing,logic, as well as politeness,
requiresus to give precedence
to the former.
An illusion of insight, like the other varieties of
illusion alreadydealt with, may ariseeither by way of
wrongsuggestionor by way of a warpingpreconception.
Let us look at each of these sourcesapart.
Our insights,like our perceptions,though intuitive
 PASSIVE ILLUSION'S OF INSIGHT. 221

in form, are obviously determinedby previous ex-

perience,
association,
and habit Hence,onits passive
side,an illusion of insight may be describedas a wrong
interpretationof a new or exceptionalcase. For
example,having associatedthe representationof a
slight feeling of astonishmentwith uplifted eyebrows,
we irresistibly tend to seea face in which this is a con-
stant feature as expressing this particular shade of
emotion. In this way we sometimesfall into grotesque
errors as to mental traits. And the most practised
physiognomistmaynot unfrequentlyerr by importing
the results of his special circle of experiencesinto new
and unlike cases.
Much the same thing occurs in language., Our
timbre of voice,our articulation, and our vocabulary,
like our physiognomy,have about them something
individual,and error often arisesfrom overlookingthis,
and hastily reading common interpretations into
exceptionalcases. The misunderstandingsthat arise
even among the most open and confiding friends
sufficientlyillustrate this liability to error.
Sometimesthe error becomes more palpable,as,for
example,when we visit another country. A foreign
language,when heard,provokingly suggestsall kinds
of absurd meanings through analogies to our familiar
tongue. Thus, the Englishman who visits Germany
cannot,for a time, hear a lady use the expression,
" Mein Mann," without having the amusingsuggestion
that the speakeris wishingto call special attention to
the fact of her husband'smasculinity. And doubtless
the German who visits us derives a similar kind of
amusement
fronxsuchinvoluntary comparisons.
222 OTHER QUASI-PKESENTATIYE ILLUSIONS.

A fertile sourceof illusory insight is, of course,

consciousdeception on the part of others. The rules
of polite societyrequire us to be hypocritesin a small
way, and we have occasionallyto affect the signs of
amiability, interest, and amusement,when our actual
sentiment is one of indifference, weariness, or even
positiveantipathy. And in this waya gooddealof
petty illusion arises. Although we may be well
awareof the generaluntrustworthinessof this society
behaviour,such is the force of associationand habit,
that the bland tone and flattering word irresistibly
excite a momentary feeling of gratification, an effect
which is madeall the more easyby the co-operationof
the recipient's own wishes,touched on in the last
chapter.
Amongall varietiesof this deception,that of the
stageis tUe most complete. The actor is a manwho
has elaborately trained himself in the simulation of
certainfeelings. And when his acting is of the best
quality,and the properbodily attitude,gesture,tone of
voice, and so on, are hit off, the force of the illusion
completelymastersus. For the momentwelosesight of
the theatrical surroundings,
and seethe actor as really
carried awayby the passionwhich he so closely imi-
tates. Histrionic illusion is as complete as any artistic
variety can venture to be.1
I have saidthat our insights are limited by our
own mental experience,and so by introspection. In
truth, every interpretation of another's look and word
1 I here assume,along with G. H. Lewes and other competent
dramatic critics, that the actor does not and dares not feel what he
expresses,at least not in the perfectly spontaneousway, and in the
samemeasurein which he appearsto feel it.
 ACTIVE ILLUSIONS OF INSIGHT. 223

Is determined ultimately, not by what we have pre-

viously observedin others, but by what we have
personallyfelt, or at leasthavein a sensemadeour
ownby intensesympathy.Hencewemay,in general,
regardan illusionof insight on the active side as a
hastyprojectionof our own feelings,thoughts,etc.,
Into other minds.
We habitually approach others with a predis-
positionto attributeto themourownmodesof think-
ing andfeeling. And this predisposition
will be the
more powerful, the more desirouswe are for sym-
pathy, and for that confirmation of our own views
which the reflection of another mind affords. Thus,
when making a new acquaintance,people are in
generaldisposedto project too much of themselves
into the personwhois the object of inspection. They
intuitively endow him with their own ideas, ways of
looking at things, prejudicesof sentiment,and so on,
and receive something like a shock when later on
they find out how differenthe is from this first hastily
formedand largely performedimage.
The same thing occurs in the reading of literature,
.andthe appreciationof the artsof expressiongenerally.
We usually approachan author with a predisposition
to read our own habits of thought and sentiment into
Ms words. It is probably a characteristic defect of a
good deal of current criticism of remote writers to
.attributeto them too muchof our modernconceptions
.andaims. Similarly,weoftenimport ourownspecial
feelings into the utterancesof the poet and of the
musical composer. That much of this intuition is
illusory, maybe seenby a little attention to the tcin-
224 OTHEE QUASI-PRESENTATIVJ3ILLUSIONS.

tuitions " of different critics. Two readers of unlike

emotionalorganizationwill find incompatiblemodesof
feeling in the samepoet. And everybodyknowshow
common it is for musical critics and amateurs to dis-
cover quite dissimilar feelings in the same com-
position.1
The effect of this active projection of personal
feeling will, of course, be seen most strikingly when
there is a certain variety of feeling actually excited at
the time in the observer's mind. A man who is in
a particularly happy mood tends to reflect his
exuberant gladness on others. The lover, in the
moment of exalted emotion, reads a responseto all his
aspirationsin his mistress'seyes. Again, a manwill
tend to projecthis ownpresentideasinto the mindsof
others, and so imagine that they know what he knows;
and this sometimes leads to a comical kind of
embarrassment,and even to a betrayal of some-
thing which it wasthe interest of the personto keep
to himself. Oncemore,in interpreting language,we
may sometimescatch ourselvesmistaking the mean-
ing, owing to the presenceof a certain idea in the
mind at the time. Thus, if I have just been thinking
of Comte, and overhear a person exclaim, " I'm posi-
tive," I irresistibly tend, for the moment, to ascribe to
him an avowal of discipleship to the great positivist.

Poetic Illusion,

The mostremarkableexampleof this projectionof

1 The illusory nature of much of this emotional interpretation of
music has been ably exposed by Mr. G-urney. (See Tlie Power of
Sound,p. 345,
 PEKSONIFICAT10N OF HATUKE. 225

feeling is undoubtedlyillustrated in the poetic inter-

pretationof inanimatenature. The personificationof
tree, mountain, ocean,and so on, illustrates, no doubt,
the effect of association and external suggestion ;
for there are limits to such personification. But
resemblanceand suggestioncommonly bear, in this
case, but a small proportion to active constructive
imagination. One might, perhaps,call this kind of
projection the hallucination of insight, sincethere is
nothing objective correspondingto the interpretative
image.
The imaginative and poetic mind is continually
on the look out for hints of life, consciousness,and
emotion in nature. It finds a certain kind of satis-
faction in this half-illusory, dream-like transformation
of nature. The deepestground of this tendency
mustprobablybe looked for in the primitive ideas of
the race, and the transmission by inheritance of the
effect of its firmly fixed habits of mind. The un-
disciplined mind of early man, incapable of distin-
guishingthe object of perceptionfrom the productof
spontaneous imagination, and taking his own double
existenceasthe type of all existence,actually sawthe
stream,the ocean,and the mountain as living beings;
and so firmly rooted is this way of regarding objects,
that even our scientifically trained minds find it a
relief to relapse occasionally into it.1
While there is this general imaginative disposition
in the poetic mind to endow nature with life and con-
1 The reader will note that this impulse is complementaryto the
other impulse to view all mental states as analogousto impressions
producedby externalthings,on whichI touchedin the last chapter.
Q
226 OTHEE QUASI-PKESENTATIVEILLUSIONS.

sciousness,thereare specialtendenciesto project the

individual feelings into objects. Every imaginative
mind looks for reflectionsof its owndeepestfeelings
in the world about it. The lonely embittered heart,
craving for sympathy,which he cannotmeetwith in
his fellow-man, finds traces of it in the sighing of the
trees or the moaning of the sad sea-wave. Our Poet
Laureate,in his great elegy, has abundantly illustrated
this impulse of the imagination to reflect its own
emotional colouring on to inanimate things: for ex-
ample in the lines-
" The wild unrest that lives in woe
Would dote and pore on yonder cloud
That rises upward always higher,
And onward drags a labouring breast,
And topples round the dreary west,
A looming bastion fringed with fire."

So far I have beenconsideringactive illusions of

insight as arising through the play of the impulse of
the individual mind to project its feelings outwards,
or to seetheir reflections in external things. I must
now add that active illusion may be due to causes
similar to those which we have seen to operatein the
sphere of illusory perception and introspection. That
is to say, there may be a disposition, permanent or
temporary, to ascribe a certain kind of feeling to others
in accordancewith our wishes,fears,and so on.
To give an illustration of the permanent causes,it
is well known that a conceited man will be disposed to
attribute admiration of himself to others. On the
other hand, a shy, timid person will be prone to read
into othermindsthe oppositekind of feeling.
 EXPECTATION AND INSIGHT. 227

Comingto temporary forces,we find that any ex-

pectationto meet with a particularkind of mental
trait in a new acquaintance will dispose the observer
hastily and erroneouslyto attribute corresponding feel-
ings to the person. And if this expectationsprings
out of a presentfeeling,the bias to illusory insight is
still morepowerful. For example,a child that fears
its parent'sdispleasurewill be prone to misinterpret
the parent'swordsand actions,colouring them accord-
ing to its fears. Soan angry man,strongly desirousof
making out that a personhas injured him, will be
disposedto seesignsof consciousguilt in this person's
looks or words. Similarly, a lover will read fine
thoughtsor sentimentsinto the mind of his mistress
under the influence of a strong wish to admire.
And what applies to the illusory interpretation of
others'feelingsappliesto the ascriptionof feelingsto
inanimate objects. This is due not simply to the
impulseto expandone'sconsciousexistencethrough
far-reaching resonancesof sympathy, but also to a
permanentor temporarydispositionto attribute a cer-
tain kind of feelingto an object. Thus, the poet per-
sonifiesnature in part becausehis emotional cravings
prompt him to construct the idea of something that
canbe admiredor worshipped. Oncemore,the action
of a momentary feeling when actually excited is seen
in the "mechanical" impulse of a man to retaliate
when he strikes his foot against an object, as a chair,
which clearly involves a tendency to attribute an inten-
tion to hurt to the unoffending body, and the rationale
of which odd procedure is pretty correct!)' expressed
in the popular phrase: " It relievesthe feelings."
228 OTHER QUASI-PRESEOTATIVE ILLUSIONS.

It is worth noting,perhaps,that theseillusions of

insight, like thoseof perception,may involve an in-
attention to the actual impression of the moment.
To erroneouslyattribute a feeling to another through
an excess of sympathetic eagernessis often to over-
look what a perfectly dispassionateobserverwould see,
as,for example, the immobility of the features or the
signs of a deliberate effort to simulate. This inatten-
tion will, it is obvious,be greatestin the poetic attri-
bution of life and personality to natural objects, in so
far as this approximates to a complete momentary
illusion. To seea dark overhangingrock as a grim
sombre human presence,is for the moment to view it
under this aspect only, abstracting from its many
obvious unlikenesses.
In the samemanner, a tendency to read a particular
meaning into a word may lead to the misapprehension
of the word. To give an illustration: I waslately read-
ing the fifth volume of G-. H. Lewes's Problems of
Life and Mind. In reading the first sentenceof one
of the sections,I again and again fell into the error of
taking "The great Lagrange," for "The great Lan-
guage." On glancing back I sawthat the section was
headed" On Language,"and I at oncerecognizedthe
causeof my error in the pre-existencein my mind of
the representative
imageof the word" language."
In ^concluding this short account of the errors of
insight, I may observethat their range is obviously
much greaterthan that of the previouslyconsidered
classesof presentativeillusion. This is, indeed,in-
volved in what has been said about the nature of the
process. Insight, as we haveseen,though hereclassed
 EAKITY OF ACCURATE INSIGHT. 229

with preservativecognition,occupiesa kind of border-

land betweenimmediateknowledgeor intuition and
inference,shading off from the one to the other. And
in the very nature of the case the scopefor error
must be great. Even overlooking human reticence,
and, what is worse,human hypocrisy,the conditionsof
an accuratereadingof others'mindsarerarelyrealized.
If, as has been remarked by a good authority, one
rarely meets,even among intelligent people,with a
fairly accurate observerof external things, what shall be
said as to the commonlyclaimed powerof "intuitive
insight" into other people'sthoughts and feelings,as
thoughit werea processabovesuspicion? It is plain,
indeed,on a little reflection,that, taking into account
what is required in the way of large and varied
experience(personaland social),a habit of carefulin-
trospection,as well as a habit of subtle discriminative
attentionto the externalsignsof mentallife, and lastly,
a freedomfrom prepossession and bias,only a very few
can ever hope evento approximateto good readersof
character.
And then we have to bear in mind that this large
amount of error is apt to remain unconnected. There is
not, as in the caseof external perception, an easy way
of verification, by calling in another sense; a mis-
apprehension,
onceformed,is apt to remain,and I need
hardly say that errors in these matters of mutual com-
prehensionhavetheir palpablepractical consequences.
All social cohesionand co-operation rest on this com-
prehension,andare limited \>yits degreeof perfection.
Nay, more, all common knowledge itself, in so far as it
dependson a mutual communicationof impressions,
230 OTHEE QUASI-PKESENTATIVE ILLUSIONS.

ideas,and beliefs,is limited by the fact of this great

liability to error in what at first seemsto be oneof the
most certain kinds of knowledge.
In view of this depressing amount of error, our
solace must be found in the reflection that this seem-
ingly perfect instrument of intuitive insight is, in
reality, like that of introspection,in processof being
fashioned. Mutual comprehensionhas only become
necessarysince man entered the social state, and this,
to judge by the evolutionist's measureof time, is not so
long ago. A mental structure so complex and delicate
requires for its development a proportionate degree of
exercise,and it is not reasonableto look yet for perfect
precision of action. Nevertheless,we may hope that,
with the advanceof social development, the faculty is
continually gaining in precisionand certainty. And,
indeed, this hope is already assured to us in the fact *
that the faculty has begun to criticise itself, to dis-
tinguish between an erroneous and a true form of
its- operation. In fact, all that has been here said
about illusionsof insight hasinvolved the assumption
that intellectual culture sharpensthe power and makes
it less liable to err.
 CHAPTER X.

ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

THUSfar we have "beendealing with Preservative Illu-

sions, that is to say, with the errors incident to the
process of what may roughly be called presentative
cognition. We have now to pass to the consideration
of Representative Illusion, or that kind of error which
attends representative cognition in so far as it is im-
mediateor self-sufficient,and not consciouslybasedon
other cognition. Of such immediate representative
cognition, memory forms the most conspicuous and
most easily recognizedvariety. Accordingly, I pro-
ceed to take up the subject of the Illusions of
Memory.1
The mystery of memorylies in the apparentim-
mediateness of the mind's contact with the vanished
past. In "looking back" on our life, we seem to our-
selves for the moment to rise above the limitations of

1 Errors of memoryhave sometimesbeen called " fallacies," as, for

example, by Dr. Carpenter (Human Physiology, ch. x.). While pre-
ferring the term " illusion," I would not forget to acknowledge my
indebtedness to Dr. Carpenter, who first set me seriously to consider
the subject of mnemonicerror.
232 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOKY.

time, to undoits work of extinction,seizingagainthe

realities which its on-rushing stream had borne far
from us. Memory is a kind of resurrectionof the
buried past: as we fix our retrospectiveglanceon it,
it appearsto start anew into life; forms arisewithin
our mindswhich,wefeel sure,mustfaithfully represent
the things that were. We do not askfor any proof of
the fidelity of this dramaticrepresentation of our past
history by memory. It is seento be a faithful imita-
tion, just because it is felt to be a revival of the past.
To seekto make the immediatetestimonyof memory
more sure seems absurd, since all our ways of de-
scribing and illustrating this mental operation assume
that in the very act of performing it we do recover a
part of our seemingly" deadselves."
To challengethe veracity of a person'smemoryis
one of the boldestthings one can do in the way of
attacking deep-seated conviction. Memory is the
peculiar domain of the individual. In going back in
recollection to the scenesof other years he is drawing
on the secret store-house of his own consciousness, with
whicha strangermust not intermeddle. To castdoubt
on a person's memory is commonly resented as an im-
pertinence, hardly less rude than to question his
readingof his ownpresentmentalstate. Even if the
challenger professedly bases his challenge on the
testimonyof his ownmemory,the challengedparty is
hardly likely to allow the right of comparingtesti-
monies. He can in most casesboldly assertthat those
whodiffer from him arelacking in his powerof recol-
lection. The past,in becomingthe past,has,for most
people,ceasedto be a common object of reference; it
 IS MEMOBY INFALLIBLE? 233

hasbecomea part of the individual's owninner self,

andcannotbe easilydislodgedor shaken.
Yet, although, people in general are naturally dis-
posed to be very confident about matters of recollec-
tion, reflective personsare pretty sure to find out,
sooner or later, that they occasionally fall into errors
of memory. It is not the philosopherwho first hints
"
at the mendacity of memory, but the " plain man
who takes careful note of what really happens in the
world of his personal experience. Thus, we hear
persons,quite innocent of speculative doubt, qualifying
an assertionmadeon personalrecollection by the pro-
viso," unlessmy memoryhas played me false." And
evenlessreflectivepersons,including many whopride
themselveson their excellent memory, will, when
sorelypressed,make a grudging admissionthat they
may,after all, be in error. Perhapsthe weakestde-
gree of such an admission, and one which allows to the
concedingparty a semblanceof victory, is illustrated
in the " last word " of one who has boldly maintained a
propositionon the strengthof individual recollection,
but beginsto recognizethe instability of his position:
"I either witnessed the occurrence or dreamt it."
This is sufficient to prove that, with all people's
boastingabout the infallibility of memory,there are
many who have a shrewd suspicionthat someof its
asseverationswill not bear a very close scrutiny.

Psychology
of Memory.
In order to understandthe errors of memory,we
mustproceed,asin the caseof illusionsof perception,
234 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

by examininga little into the nature of the normal

or correct process.
An act of recollectionis said by the psychologist
to be purely representativein character,whereasper-
ception is partly representative,partly preservative.
To recall an object to the mind is to reconstruct the
percept in the absenceof a sense-impression.1
An act of memory is obviously distinguished from
one of simple imaginationby the presenceof a con-
scious reference to the past. Every recollection is an
immediate reapprehensionof somepast object or
event. However vague this referencemay be, it must
be there to constitute the processone of recollection.
The every-day usages of language do not at first
sight seem to consistently observe this distinction.
Whena boy says,"I remembermy lesson,"he appears
to be thinking of the presentonly, andnot referringto
the past. In truth,, however,there is a Yaguereference
to the fact of retaininga piece of knowledgethrough
a given interval of time.
Again, when a man says, " I recollect your face,"
this means, " Your face seems familiar to me." Here
again,thoughthere is no definite referenceto the past,
there is a vague and indefinite one.
It is plain from this definition that recollection is
involved in all recognition or identification. Merely
to be aware that I have seena person before implies
a minimum exerciseof memory. Yet we may roughly
distinguish the two actions, of perception and re-
collection in the process of recognition. The mere
1 From this it would appearto follow that, so far as a percept is
representative,recollection must be re-representative.
 DEFINITION OF MEMORY. 235

recognition
of an objectdoesnot imply the presence
of a distinct representative or mnemonic image. In
pointof fact,in sofar asrecognition
is assimilation,
it
cannot be said to imply a distinct act of memory at all.
It is only whensimilarity is perceivedamid difference,
only whenthe accompaniments or surroundingsof the
objectaspreviouslyseen,,differencingit from the object
as now seen, are brought up to the mind that we may
be said distinctly to recall the past. And our state of
mind in recognizingan objector personis commonly
an alternation between these two acts of separating
the mnemonic image from the percept and so recalling
or recollectingthe past,and fusing the imageand the
perceptin what is specificallymarked off as recog-
nition.1
Although I have spokenof memoryas a reinstate-
ment in representativeform of external experience,the
term mustbe understoodto includeevery revival of a
past experience, whether external or internal, which is
recognizedas a revival. In a general way, the re-
callings of our internal feelings take place in close
connection with the recollection of external circum-
stances or events, and so they may be regarded as
largely conditionedby the lawsof this secondkind of
reproduction.
The old conceptions
of mind, which regardedevery
mental phenomenon as a manifestation of an occult
spiritual substance,naturally led to. the supposition
that an act of recollection involves the continued, un-
1 The relation of memoryto- recognition is very well discussedby
M. Delbccmf,in connection with a definition of memory given by
Descartes. (Seethe article *' Le Sommeil et les Beves," in the Revue
Philosophise, April, 1880,p. 428,.e
236 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

broken existence of the reproductive or mnemonic

imagein the hiddenregionsof the inind. To recollect
is, accordingto this view,to draw the image out of
the dark vaults of unconsciousmind into the upper
chamber of illumined consciousness.
Modern psychology recognizesno such pigeon-
hole apparatusin unconscious
mind. On the purely
psychicalside,memory is nothing but an occasional
reappearanceof a past mental experience. And the
sole mental conditions of this reappearanceare to be
found in the circumstances of the moment of the
original experienceand in those of the momentof
the reappearance.
Among theseareto be speciallynoted,first of all,
the degreeof ilnpressiveness
of the original experience,
that is to say, the amount of interest it awakenedand
of attention it excited. The more impressive any ex-
perience,the greater the chancesof its subsequent
revival. Moreover,the absence of impressivenessin
the original experience may be made good either by
a repetition of the actual experience or, in the case
of non-recurring experiences,by the fact of previous
mnemonic revivals.
In the secondplace,the pre-existingmental states
at the time of revival are essential conditions. It is
now known that every recollection is determined by
some link of association,that every mnemonic image
presents itself in consciousnessonly when it has been
precededby someother mental state,presentativeor
representative,which is related to the image. This
relation may be one of contiguity, that is to say,the
original experiencesmay have occurredat the same
 PSYCHOLOGY OF MEMORY. 237

time or in close succession; or one of similarity

(partial and not amountingto identity), as wherethe
sight of one place or person recalls that of another
place or person. Finally, it is to be observedthat
recollection is often an act, in the full sense of that
term, involving an effort of voluntary attention at the
moment of revival.
Modernphysiologyhasdonemuch towardshelping
us to understand the nervous conditions of memory.
The biologist regards memory as a special phase of
a universal property of organic structure, namely,
modifiability by the exerciseof function, or the survival
after any particular kind of activity of a dispositionto
act again in that particular way. The revival of a
mental impressionin the weakerform,of an image is
thus,on its physicalside,due in part to this remaining
functionaldispositionin the centralnervoustracts con-
cerned. And so, while on the psychical or subjective
side we are unable to find anything permanent in.
memory, on the physical or objective side we do find
such a permanent substratum.
With respect to the special conditions of mne-
monic revival at any time, physiology is lessexplicit.
In a general way, it informs us that such a rein-
statementof the past is determinedby the existence
of certain connections between the nervous struc-
tures concernedin the reviving and revived mental
elements. Thus, it is said that when the sound of a
name calls up in the inind a visual image of a per-
son seen some time since, it is because connections
have been formed between
*particular regions and
modesof activity of the auditoryand the visual centres.
238 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

And it is supposed
that the existenceof suchconnections
is somehowdue to the fact that the two regions acted
simultaneously in the first instance, when the sight of
the personwas accompaniedby the hearing of his
name. In other words,the centres,as a whole,will tend
to act at any future momentin the samecomplexway
in which they have acted in past moments.
All this is valuable hypothesisso far as it goes,
though it plainly leavesmuchunaccounted for. As to
why this reinstatementof a total cerebralpulsationin
consequence of the re-excitationof a portion of the
same should be accompanied by the specific mode of
consciousness which we call recollectionof something
past,it is perhapsunreasonable to ask of physiology
any sort of explanation.1
Thus far as to the general or essentialcharacteristics
of memory onits mental and its bodily side. But what
we commonlymean by memoryis, on its psychical
side at least,much more than this. We do not say
that we properlyrecollecta thing unlesswe are able
to refer it to somemore or lessclearly definedregion
of the past,and to localizeit in the succession
of ex-
periencesmaking up our mental image of the past.
In otherwords,though we may speakof an imperfect
kind of recollection where this definite reference is
1 A very interesting account of the most recent physiological
theory of memoryis to be found in a seriesof articles?bearing the title,
" La Memoir e comme fait biologique," published in the Revue Philo-
sophique,from the pen of the editor, M. Th. Ribot. (See especially
the Revue of May, 1880, pp. 516, et seq.) M. Ribot speaks of the
modification of particular nerve-elements as "the static base" of
"memory,and of the formation -of nerve-connectionsby meansof which
the modifiedelementmay bere-excited to activity as " the dynamicbase
of memory" (p. 535).
 MEMOKY AS LOCALIZATION. 239

wanting,we meanby a perfect form of memorysome-

thing whichincludesthis reference.
Without entering just now upon a full analysis
of what this reference to a particular region of the
past means,I may observethat it takes place by help
of an habitual retracing of the past, or certain portions
of it, that is to say, a regressive movement of the
imaginationalong the lines of our actual experience.
Setting out from the present moment, I can move
regressivelyto the precedingstate of consciousness,
to
the penultimate,and soon. The fact that eachdistinct
mental state is continuous with the preceding and the
succeeding,and in a certain senseoverlaps these,makes
any portion of our experienceessentiallya succession
of states of consciousness,
involving some rudimentary
ideaof time. And thus,whetherI anticipatea future
event or recall a past one, my imagination, setting out
from the present moment, constructs a sequence of
experiencesof which the one particularly dwelt on is
the other term or boundary. And our idea of the
positionof this last in time, like that of an object in
space,is one of a relation to our present position,
and is determined by the length of the sequence of
experiences thus run over by the imagination.1 It
may be added that since the imagination can much
moreeasilyfollow the actual order of experiencethan
conceive it as reversed, the retrospective act of
memorynaturally tendsto completeitself by a return
movement forwards from the remembered event to the
present moment.
1 What constitutes the differencebetween sucli a progressiveand a
retrogressivemovementis a point that will beconsideredby-and-by.
240 ILLUSIONS OF MBMOEY.

In practice this detailed retracing of successive

moments of mental life is confined to very recent
experiences. If I try to localize in time a remote
event, I am content with placing it in relation to a
series of prominent events or landmarks which serves
me as a rough scheme of the past. The formation
of such a mnemonic framework is largely due to the
needsof social converse,
which proceedsby help of a
commonstandardof reference. This standardis sup-
plied by thoseobjective,that is to say,commonlyex-
perienced regularities of successionwhich constitute
the natural and artificial divisions of the years,seasons,
months,weeks,etc. The habit of recurring to these
fixed divisional points of the past renders a return
of imagination to any one of them more and more
easy. A man has a definite idea of "a year ago"
which the child wants,just becausehe has had so fre-
quently to executethat vague regressivemovement
by which the idea arises. And though,as our actual
point in time movesforward,the relative positionof
any given landmark is continually changing, the
changeeasily adaptsitself to that schemeof time-
divisions which holds good for any present point.
Few of our recollections of remote events involve
a definite reference to this system of landmarks.
The recollections of early life are, in the case of
most people,so far as they dependon individual
memory,very vaguelyand imperfectlylocalized. And
many recent experienceswhich are said to be half
forgotten, are not referred to any clearly assignable
positionin time. One maysay that in averagecases
definitelocalizationcharacterizes
only such supremely
 IMPERFECT MNEMONIC LOCALIZATION. 241

interestingpersonalexperiencesas spontaneously recur

againand again to the rnind. For the rest it is con-
fined to those facts and events of general interest to
which our socialhabits lead us repeatedlyto go back.1
The consciousnessof personalidentity is said to be
boundup with memory. That is to say,I arnconscious
of a continuous permanent self under all the varying
surface-play
of the streamof consciousness,
just because
I can, by an act of recollection,bring together any
two portions of this stream of experience,and so
recognizethe unbroken continuity of the whole. If
this is so, it would seem to follow from the very frag-
mentary character of our recollections that our sense
of identity is very incomplete. As we shall see
presently,there is good reason to look upon this
consciousnessof continuous personal existence as rest-
ing only in part on memory, and mainly on our inde-
pendentlyformedrepresentationof what hashappened
in the numberless
and often huge lacunaeof the past
left by memory.
Having thus a rough idea of the mechanismof
memoryto guide us, we may be able to investigate
the illusions incident to the process.

Illusionsof Memory.
By an illusion of memory we are to understand a
false recollection or a wrong reference of an idea to
1 It is not easyto sayhowfar exceptionalconditionsmay serveto
reinstate the seeminglyforgotten past. Yet the experiencesof dreamers
and of those who have been recalled to consciousnessafter part al
drowning, whatever they may prove with respect to the reviviibilitv of
remote experiences,do not lead us to imagine that the range of our
definitely localizing memoryis a wide one.
K
242 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

someregionof the past. It might, perhaps,be roughly

describedas a wrong interpretation of a specialkind
of mental image, namely, what I have called a
mnemonic image.
Mnemonicillusion is thus distinct from mere forget-
fulnessor imperfectme'mory. To forget or be doubt-
ful abouta pasteventis onething ; to seemto ourselves
to remember it when we afterwards find that the fact
wasotherwisethan we representedit in the apparent
act of recollection is another thing. Indistinctness of
recollection, or the decay of memory, is, as we shall
soonsee,animportantco-operant
conditionof mnemonic
illusion, but does not constitute it, any more than
haziness
of visionor disease
of thevisualorgan,though
highly favourableto optical illusion, can be said to
constitute it.
We may conveniently proceed in our detailed
examination of illusions of memory, by distinguishing
between three facts which appear to be involved in
every complete and accurate process of recollection.
When I distinctly recall an event, I anaimmediately sure
of threethings: (1) that somethingdid really happen
to me; (2) that it happenedin the way I nowthink;
and (3) that it happenedwhen it appearsto have
happened. I cannot be said to recall a past event
unless I feel sure on each of these points. Thus, to be
able to say that an event happenedat a particular
date, and yet unable to describehow it happened,
means that I have a very incomplete recollection.
The sameis true when I can recall an event pretty
distinctly, but fail to assignit its properdate. This
beingso,it followsthat there are three possibleopen-
 ILLUSIONSCLASSIFIED. 243

ings,andonlythree,by whicherrorsof memorymay

creepin. And,asa matterof fact,eachof theseopen-
ings will be foundto let in one classof mnemonic
illusion. Thus we have (1) false recollections,
to
whichtherecorrespond no real eventsof personal
history;(2)otherswhichmisrepresent
the mannerof
happening
of the events;and(3) otherswhichfalsify
the date of the events remembered.
It is obvious,from a mere glance at tins three-
fold classification,that illusions of memory closely
correspond
to visualillusions. Thus,class(1) maybe
likenedto the opticalillusionsknownas subjective
sensationsof light, or ocular spectra. Here we can
provethat there is nothing actually seenin the field
of vision, and that the semblance of a visible object
arisesfrom,quite anothersourcethan that of ordinary
external light-stimulation,and by what may be called
an accident. Similarly, in the caseof the first classof
mnemonicillusions, we shall find that there is nothing
actually recollected, but that the mnemonic spectra or
phantomsof recollectedobjectscan be accountedfor
in quite another way. Such illusions come nearest to
hallucinations in the region of memory.
Again, class(2) has its visual analogue in those
opticalillusionswhich dependoneffectsof hazinessand
of the actionof refractingmediainterposedbetweenthe
eye and the object; in which cases,though there is
somereal thing correspondingto the perception,this
is seenin a highly defective,
distorted,andmisleading
form. In like manner, wecansaythat the imagesof
memory often get obscured, distorted, and otherwise
alteredwhenthey haverecededinto the dim distance,
244 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

and are looked back upon through a long spaceof

intervening mental experience. Finally, class(3) has
its visual counterpartin erroneousperceptionsof dis-
tance,as when,for example,owing to the clearnessof
the mountain atmosphereand the absenceof inter-
vening objects,the sideof the Jungfrau looks to the
inexperiencedtourist at Wengernalp hardly further
than a stone's throw. It will be found that when our
memoryfalsifiesthe dateof an event,the error arises
much in the same way as a visual miscalculation of
distance.
This threefold division of illusions of memory is
plainly a rather superficial one, and not based on dis-
tinctions of psychological nature or origin. In order to
make our treatment of the subject scientific as well as
popular, it will be necessaryto introduce the distinction
betweenthe passive and the active factor under each
head. It will be found, I think, without forcing the
analogy too far, that here,as in the caseof the illusions
of perception and introspection, error is attributable
now to misleading suggestionon the part of the mental
contentof the moment,now,to a processof incorpo-
rating into this contenta mental imagenot suggested
by it, but existing independently.
If we are to proceedas we did in the caseof the
illusions of sense,and take up the lower stagesof error
first of all, we shall need to begin with the third
classof errors, those of localization in time, or of what
may be called mnemonic perspective. It has been
already observed that the definite localization of a
mnemonicimageis only an occasionalaccompaniment
of what is loosely called recollection. Hence, error as
 ILLUSIONS OF TIME-PEKSPEOTIYE. 245

to the positionof an eventin the pastchain of events

would seein to involve the least degree of violation
of the confidence which we are wont to repose in
memory. After this, we may proceedto the discussion
of the secondclass,whichI may call distortionsof the
mnemonicpicture. And, finally, we may deal with
the most signal and palpable variety of error of memory,
namely,the illusions which I have called mnemonic
spectra.

Illusionsof Perspective:A. DefiniteLocalization.

In order to understand these errors of mnemonic
perspective, we shall have to inquire more closely than
we have yet done into the circumstances which cus-
tomarily determineour idea of the degreeof propin-
quity or of remotenessof a past event. And first of
all, we will take the caseof a completeact of recollec-
tion when the mind is able to travel back along an
uninterrupted series of experiences to a definitely
apprehended point Here there would seem, at first
sight, to be no room for error, since this movement
of retrospective imagination may be said to involve
a direct measurement
of the distance,just as a sweep
of the eye over the 'ground betweena spectator and an
object'affordsa direct measurementof the intervening
space.
Modern science,however, tells us that this mode of
measurement is by no meansthe simple and accurate
processwhich it at first seemsto be. In point of fact,
there is something like a constant error in all such
retrospectivemeasurement.Vierordt has proved ex-
perimentally,by making a persontry to reproducethe
216 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

varying time-intervals between the strokes of the

pendulumof a metronome, that when the interval is
a very small one, we uniformly tend to exaggerate it
in retrospection;when a large one, to regard it, on
the contrary, as lessthan it actually was.1
A mereact of reflectionwill convinceany onethat
when he tries to conceivea very small interval,say a
quarterof a second,he is likely to make it too great.
Onthe other hand,whenwetry to conceivea year, we
do not fully grasp the whole extent of the duration.
This is proved by the fact that merely by spending
moretime overthe attempt,and so recalling a larger
number of the details of the period, we very consider-
ably enlarge our first estimate of the duration. And
this leadsto great discrepancies
in the appreciationof
the relative magnitudes of past sections of time. Thus,
as Wundt observes,though in retrospect both a month
and a year seemtoo short,the latter is relatively much
more shortened than the former.2
The cause of this constant error in the mode of
reproducingdurationsseemsto be connectedwith the
very natureof the reproductiveact. It mustbe borne
in mind that this actis itself,like the experience
which
it represents,
a mentalprocess, occupyingtime,andthat
consequentlyit may very possibly reflect its time-
character on the resulting judgment. Thus, since it
certainly takesmorethan a -quarterof a secondto pass
in imaginationfrom one impressionto another,it may
be that we tend to confound this duration with that
which we try to represent. Similarly, the fact that
1 Der Zeitsinn nach Versuchen,p. 36, et seg.
a PhysiologischePsijcUologie,
p. 782.
 MISEEPEESENTATION OF FAST TIME. 247

in the act of reproductiveimagination we under-esti-

mate a longer interval betweentwo impressions,say
those of the slow beats of a colliery engine., may be
accountedfor by the suppositionthat the imagination
tends to passfrom the oneimpressionto the succeed-
ing one too rapidly.1
The gross misappreciationof duration of long
periods of time, while it may illustrate the principle
just touched on, clearly involves the effect of other
and more powerful influences. A mere glance at what
is in our mind when we recall such a period as a
month or a year, shows that there is no clear concrete
representationat all. Time, it has been often said, is
known only so far as filled with concrete contents or
consciousexperiences,and a perfect imagination of any
particular period of past time would involve a re-
tracing of all the successiveexperiences which have
gone to make up this section of our life. This, I need
not say, never happens,both because,on the one hand,
memory does not allow of a complete reproduction of
any segment of our experience, and because,on the
other hand, such an imaginative reproduction, even if
possible,would clearly occupyas much time as the
experience itself.2
1 Wundt refers these errors to variations in the state of pre-adjust-
ment of the attention to impressions and representations,according
as they succeedone another slowly or rapidly. There is little doubt
that the effectsof the state of tension of the apparatus of attention,are
involved here, though I am disposed to think that Wundt makes too
much of this circumstance. (SeePhysiologischePsyeliologie,pp. 782,
783. I have given a fuller accountof Wundt's theory in Mind, No. i.)
2 Strictly speaking, it would occupy more time, since the effort
of recalling each successivelink in the chain would involve a greater
interval betweenany two images than that between the corresponding
experiences.
248 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

WhenI call up an imageof the year just closing,

whatreally happensis a rapid movementof imagination
over a series of prominent events, among which the
successionof seasonsprobably occupies the foremost
place,serving,as I haveremarked,as a frameworkfor
my retrospectivepicture. Each of the eventswhich I
thus run over is really a long successionof shorter
experiences,
which,however,I do not separatelyrepre-
sent to myself. My imaginative reproduction of such
a period is thus essentially a greatly abbreviated and
symbolic mode of representation. It by no means
corresponds
to the visual imaginationof a large mag-
nitude, say that of the length of seahorizon visible at
any one moment, which is complete in an instant, and
quite independent of a successiveimagination of its
partsor details. It is essentiallya very fragmentary
and defective numerical idea, in which, moreover, the
real quantitative value of the units is altogether lost
sight of.
Now, it seems to follow from this that there is
something illusory in all our recallings of long periods
of the past. It is by no meansstrictly correct to say
that memory ever reinstates the past. It is more true
to say that we see the past in retrospect as greatly
foreshortened. Yet even this is hardly an accurate
account of what takes place, since, when we look at an
object foreshortenedin perspective, we seeenough to
enable us imaginatively to reconstruct the actual size
of the object,whereasin the caseof time-perspective
no such reconstruction is even indirectly possible*
It is to be added that this constant error in time-
reproductionis greaterin the caseof remoteperiods
 ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE DURATION. ,249

than of near ones of the same length. Thus, the retro-

spectiveestimateof a duration far removedfrom the
present,say the length of time passedat a particular
school,is much moresuperficialand fragmentarythan
that of a recent correspondingperiod. So that the
time-vista of the past is seento answerpretty closely
to a visible perspectivein which the amountof ap-
parent error due to foreshorteningincreaseswith the
distance.
In practice,however,this defect in the imagina-
tion of duration leads to no error. Although, as a
concreteimage answeringto somedefinite succession
of experiencesa year is a grossmisrepresentation,
as a
general conceptimplying a collection of a certain
number of similar successionsof experience it is suffi-
ciently exact. That is to say, though we cannot
imagine the absolute duration of any such cycle of
experience,
wecan,by the simple deviceof conceiving
certain durations as multiples of others, perfectly well
comparedifferentperiods of times, and so appreciate
their relative magnitudes.
Leaving, then, this constant error in time-appre-
ciation,we will passto the variable and morepalpable
errorsin the retrospective measurement of time. Each
person's experience will have told him that in esti-
mating the distanceof a past event by a mere retro-
spectivesenseof duration,he is liable to extraordinary
fluctuations of judgment. Sometimes when the clock
strikes we are surprised at the rapidity of the hour.
At other times the timepiece seemsrather to have
laggedbehind its usual pace. And what is true of a
shortintervalis still moretrue of longerintervals,as
250 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

months and years. The understandingof thesefluc-

tuations will be promoted by our brief glance at the
constant errors in retrospective time-appreciation.
And here it is necessaryto distinguish betweenthe
senseof duration which we have during any period,
and the retrospectivesensewhich survivesthe period,
for these do not necessarily agree. The former rests
mainly on our prospectivesenseof time, whereasthe
latter must be altogether retrospective.1
Our estimateof time as it passes
is commonlysaid
to depend on the amount of consciousnesswhich we
are giving to the fact of its transition. Thus, when
the mind is unoccupied and suffering from, ennui, we
feel time to move sluggishly. On the other hand,
interestingemployment,by diverting the thoughtsfrom
time, makesit appearto moveat a morerapid pace.
This fact is shownin the commonexpressions which
we employ, such as " to kill time," and the German
Langweile. Similarly, it is said that when we are
eagerlyanticipatingan event,as the arrival of a friend,
the mere fact of dwelling on the interval makes it
appearto swell out.2
This view is correct in the main, and is seen,indeed,
to follow from the great psychologicalprinciple that
what weattend to existsfor us more,has morereality,
and so naturally seems greater than what we do not
1 I needhardly say that there is no sharp distinction betweenthese
two modesof subjective appreciation. Our estimateof an interval as
it passesis really made up of a number of renewed anticipations and
recollections of the successiveexperiences. Yet we can say broadly
that this is a prospective estimate, while that which is formed when
the period hasquite expired must be altogether retrospective.
2 Seean interesting paper on " Consciousness ol Time," by Mr. G.
J. Eomanes,in Mind (July, 1878).
 ESTIMATE OF DOTATION AT THE TIME. 251

attend to. At the same time, this principle must be

supplemented by anotherconsideration. Supposethat
I am very desirousthat time shouldnot passquickly.
If, for example,I am enjoying myself or indulging in
idleness, and know that I have to be off to keep a not
very agreeableengagementin a quarter of an hour,
time will seemto passtoo rapidly; and this not be-
cause my thoughts are diverted from the fact of its
transition, for, on the contrary, they are reverting to it
more than they usually do, but becausemy wish to
lengthen the interval leads me to representthe un-
welcomemomentas further off than it actually is, in
other words, to construct an ideal representationof
the period in contrast with which the real duration
looks miserably short.
Our estimateof duration,when it is over,depends
less on this circumstanceof having attended to its
transition than on other considerations. Wundt, in-
deed,seemsto think that the feeling accompanying
the actual flow of time has no effect on the surviving
subjectiveappreciation; but this must surely be an
error, since our mental image of any period is deter-
termined by the characterof its contents. Wundt
saysthat whenoncea tediouswaiting is over,it looks
short becausewe instantly forget the feeling of tedium.
My self-observation,
as well as the interrogation of
others, has satisfied me, on the contrary, that this
feeling distinctly colours the retrospective apprecia-
tion. Thus, when waiting at a railway station for a be-
lated train, I am distinctly awarethat eachquarter of
an hour looks long, not only as it passes,but when it
is over. In fact, I am disposedto expressmy feeling
252 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOBY.

as oneof disappointmentthat only so shortan interval

has passedsince I last looked at my watch.
Nevertheless,I am ready to allow that, though a
feeling of tedium,or the contraryfeeling of irritation
at the rapidity of time, will linger for an appreciable
interval and colour the retrospective estimate of time,
this backwardviewis chiefly determinedby other con-
siderations. As Wundt remarks, we have no sense of
time's slowness
during sleep,yet on wakingweimagine
that we have been dreamingfor an immenselylong
period. This retrospective appreciation is determined
by the number and the degree or intensity of the
experiences,and, what conies very much to the same
thing, by the amount of unlikeness, freshness,and dis-
continuity characterizing these experiences.
Time, as I have already hinted, is known under the
form of a succession
of differentconsciousexperiences.
Unbroken uniformity would give us no senseof time,
becauseit would give us no conscious experience at
all. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a
perfectly uniform mental state extendingthrough an
appreciableduration. In looking at oneand the same
object,evenin listening to one and the sametone,I
am in no two successivefractions of a secondin exactly
the same state of mind. Slight alterations in the
strengthof the sensation,1
in the degreeor directionof
attention, and in the composition of that penumbra
of vagueimageswhich it calls up, occurat everydis-
tinguishablefraction of time.
1 It is well known, that there is, from the first, a gradual falling
oif in the strength of a sensation of light when a moderately bright
object is looked at.
 ESTIMATE OF DURATION AFTERWARDS. 253

This being so,it wouldseemto follow that the

greater the number of clearly marked changes,and
the moreimpressiveand exciting thesetransitions,the
fuller will be our sense of time. And this is borne
outby individual reflection. When striking and deeply
interesting eventsfollow one another very rapidly, as
when we are travelling, duration appearsto swell
out. "

It is possiblethat sucha successionof stirring ex-

periencesmay beget a vagueconsciousness of time at
eachsuccessive moment,and apart from retrospection,
simply by forceof the change. In other words,without;
our distinctly attending to time, a seriesof novel im-
pressionsmight, by giving us the consciousness of
change,makeus dimly awareof the numericalrichness
of our experiences. But, however this be, there is no
doubt that, in glancing back on such a succession
of
exciting transitions of mental condition, time appears
to expandenormously,just as it doesin looking back
on our dream-experience, or that rapid series of in-
tensifiedfeelingswhich, accordingto Be Quinceyand
others,is producedby certainnarcotics.
Thereasonof this is plain. Such a type of succes-
sive experience offers to the retrospective imagination
a largenumberof distinguishablepoints, andsiiico this
modeof estimating time depends,as we have seen, on
the extent of the process of filling in, time will neces-
sarily appearlong in this case. On the other hand,
whenwe havebeenengagedin very ordinary pursuits,
in which few deeply interesting or exciting events
haveimpressedthemselveson memory,our retrospec-
tive picture will necessarilybe very much of a blank,
254 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY,

and consequently
the durationof the periodwill seem
to be short

I observedthat this retrospectiveappreciationof

time dependedon the degreeof connectionbetween
the successiveexperiences. This condition is very
much the sameas the other just given, namely, the
degreeof uniformityof the experiences, sincethe more
closely the successivestages of the experienceare
connected-aswhen,for example,weare goingthrough
our daily routine of work-the more quiet and un-
exciting will be the transition from eachstage to its
succeeding one. And on the otherhand, all noveltyof
impressionand exciting transition of experienceclearly
involves a want of connection. Wundt thinks the
retrospective estimate of a connected series of expe-
riences, such as those of our daily round of occupa-
tions, is defective just becausethe effort of attention,
which precedeseven an imaginative reproductionof
an impression,so quickly accommodatesitself in this
caseto each of the successivesteps, whereas,when the
experiences to be recalled are disconnected,
the effort
requiresmore time. In this way, the estimateof a
past durationwouldbe colouredby the senseof time
accompanyingthe reproductive processitself. This
mayverylikely be the case,
yet I shouldbe disposed
to attach most importanceto the number of distin-
guishableitemsof experiencerecalled.
Ourrepresentation
of the positionof a givenevent
in thepastis, asI havetried to show,determined by
the movementof imaginationin going backto it from
the present.And this is the samething asto say
that it dependson our retrospectivesenseof the inter-
 VARIATIONS IN TIME-ESTIMATE. 255

veningspace.Thatis to say,the sense

of distancem
time,as in space,is the recognition of a term to a
movement.And just asthe distanceof an objectwill
seemgreaterwhenthere are many intervening objects
affording points of measurement,
than when there are
none (as on the uniform surface of the sea), so the
distanceof an event will vary with the number of
recognizedintervening points.
The appreciationof the distanceof an eventin time
doesnot, however,wholly dependon the characterof
this movement of imagination. Just as the apparent
distanceof a visible object dependsinter alia on the
distinctness of the retinal impression, so the apparent
temporal remoteness of a past event depends in part
on the degreeof intensity and clearnessof the mne-
monic image. This is seen even in the case of those
imageswhich we are abledistinctly to localize in the
time-perspective. For a series of exciting experiences
intervening between the present and a past event ap-
pearsnot onlydirectlyto add to our senseof distanceby
constitutingan apparentlylong interval, but indirectly
to add to it by giving an unusual degree of faintness
to the recalled image. An event preceding some un-
usually stirring seriesof experiencesgets thrust out
of consciousness by the very engrossingnatureof the
new experiences,and so tends to grow more faint and
ghost-like than it would otherwise have done.
The full force of this circumstance is best seen in
the fact that a very recent event,bringing with it a
deepmentalshockanda rapid stirring of wide tracts of
feeling and thought,may get to look old in a marvel-
lously short spaceof time. An announcementof the
256 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

lossof a dearfriend,whensuddenand deeplyagitating,

will seeni remote even after an hour of such intense
emotional experience. And the same twofold con-
siderationprobably explains the well-knownfact that
a year seemsmuch shorter to the adult than to the
child. The novel and comparatively exciting im-
pressionsof childhood tend to fill out time in retro-
spect, and also to throw back remote events into a
dimly discernible region.
Now, this same circumstance, the degree of vivid-
ness or of faintness of the mnemonic image, is that
which determines our idea of distance when the
character of the intervening experiencesproduces no
appreciable effect.1 This is most strikingly illus-
trated in those imperfect kinds of recollection in which
\ve are unable to definitely localize the mnemonic
image. To the considerationof these we will now
turn.

B. Indefinite Localization.
Speaking roughly and generally, we may say that
the vividness of an image of memory decreasesin pro-
portion as the distance of the event increases. And
this is the rule which we unconsciously apply in
determiningdistancein time. Nevertheless,this rule
gives us by no meansan infallible criterion of distance.
The very fact that different people so often dispute
about the datesand the order of past events experienced
in common,shows pretty plainly that images of the
1 Cf. Hartley, Observations
on Man,Part I. ch. iii. sec.4 (fifth edit.,
p. 391).
 EFFECT OF VIVIDNESS OF RECOLLECTION. 257

sameage tend to arisein the mind with very unequal

degreesof vividness.
Sometimespictures of very remote incidents may
suddenly present themselvesto our minds with a
singular degreeof brightnessand force. And when
this is the case,there is a disposition to think of
them as near. If the relations of the event to other
events preceding and succeeding it are not remem-
bered,this momentaryillusion will persist. We have
all heard personsexclaim, " It seems only yester-
day/' under the sense of nearnesswhich accompanies
a recollection of a remote event when vividly excited.
The mostfamiliar instanceof suchlively reproduction
is the feeling which we experienceon revisiting the
scene of some memorable event. At such a time the
past may return with something of the insistence of a
present perceived reality. In passing from place to
place, in talking with others,and in reading,we are
liable to the suddenreturn by hiddenpaths of associa-
tion of images of incidents that had long seemed
forgotten, and when they thus start up fresh and
vigorous, away from their proper surroundings, they
invariably induce a feeling of the propinquity of the
events.

In many caseswe cannotsay why theseparticular

images,long buried in oblivion, should thus suddenly
regain so much vitality. There seems,indeed,to be
almostas much that is arbitrary and capriciousin the
selection by memory of its vivid images as in the
selection of its images as a whole; and, this being so,
it is plain that we are greatly exposedto the risk of
illusion from this source.
258 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOKY.

There is an oppositeeffect in the caseof recent

occurrences that, for some reason or another, have
left but a faint impressionon the memory; though
this fact is not, perhaps, so familiar as the other. I
met a friend, wewill suppose,-
a few days sinceat iny
club, and we exchangeda few words, lly mind was
somewhatpreoccupied at the time, and the occurrence
did not stamp itself on my recollection. To-day I
meet him again, and he reminds me of a promise
I made him at the time. His reminder suffices to
restore a dim image of the incident, but the fact
of its dimnessleads to the illusion that it really
happenedmuch longer ago, and it is only on my
friend's strong assurances,and on reasoning from other
data that it must have occurred the day he mentions,
that I am. able to dismiss the illusion.
The most striking examplesof the illusory effect
of mere vividness, involving a complete -detachment
of the event from the prominent landmarks of the
past, are affordedby public eventswhich lie outside
the narrower circle of our personal life, and which do
not in the natural course of things become linked to
any definitely localizedpoints in the field of memory.
These events may be very stirring and engrossing
for the time, but in many casesthey passout of the
mind just as suddenlyas they enteredit. We have
no occasionto revert to them, and if by chance we are
afterwardsremindedof them, they are pretty certain
to look too near,just becausethe fact of their having
. greatlyinterested
ushasservedto rendertheir images
particularly vivid.
A curious instance of this illusory effect was
 ISOLATED PUBLIC EVENTS. 259

supplied not long since by the case of the ex-de-

tectives,the expiration of whoseterm of punishment
(three years)servedas an occasionfor the newspapers
to recall the event of their trial and conviction. The
news that three years had elapsed since this well-
remembered
occurrence
provedverystartling to myself,
and to a number of my friends, all of us agreeing that
the event did not seem to be at more than a third of Its
real distance. More than one newspaper commented
on the apparent rapidity of the time, and this shows
pretty plainly that there wassomecauseat work, such
as I have suggested,producing a common illusion.
I have treated of these illusions connected with the
estimate of past time and the dating of past events as
passiveillusions,not involving any active predisposi-
tion on the part of the imagination. At the same
time, It Is possible that error in these matters may occa-
sionally depend on a present condition of the feelings
and the imagination. It seemsplain that since the
.apparentdegreeof remotenessof an event not distinctly
localized in the past varies inversely as the degree of
vividness of the mnemonic image, any conscious con-
centrationof mind on a recollectionwill tend to bring
it too near. In this way,then, an Illusorypropinquity
may'be given to a recalled event through a mere
desire to dwell on it, or even a capriciouswish to
"deceive one's self.
When,for example,old friends cometogetherand
talk overthe daysof yore, thereis a gradualreinstate-
mentof seeminglylostexperiences, whichoftenpartakes
"of the characterof a semi-voluntaryprocessof self-
delusion. Through the cumulative effect of mutual
260 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

reminder,incidentafter incidentreturns,,adding some-

thing to the whole picture till it acquiresa degreeof
completeness,coherence, and vividness that render it
hardly distinguishablefrom a very recent experience.
The processis like looking at a distant objectthrough
a field-glass. Mistinessdisappears,fresh details come
into view, till we seem, to ourselves to be almost within
reachof the object.
Where the mind habitually goes back to some
painful circumstanceunder the impulse of a morbid
disposition to nurse regret, this momentaryillusion
may becomerecurring, and amountto a partial con-
fusion of the near and the remotein our experience.
An injury long brooded on seemsat length a thing
that continually moves forward as we move; it always
presents itself to our memories as a very recent event.
In statesof insanity brought on by somegreat shock,
we see this morbid tendency to resuscitate the dead
past fully developed, and remote events and circum-
stancesbecoming confused with present ones.
On the other hand, in more healthy states of mind
there presentsitself an exactly opposite tendency,
namely, an impulse of the will to banish whatever
when recalled gives pain to the furthest conceivable
regionsof the past. Thus, whenwe have lost some-
thing we cherisheddearly, and the recollectionof it
brings fruitlesslonging, we instinctively seekto expel
the recollection from our minds. The very feeling
that what hasbeencanneveragain be,seemsto induce
this idea of a vast remotenessof the vanished reality.
When,moreover,the lost objectwasfitted to call forth
the emotionof reverence,the impulseto magnify the-
 CHERISHING AND BANISHING THE PAST. 261

remotenessof the loss may not improbably be rein-

forced by the circumstance that everything belonging
to the distant past is fitted on that accountto excite
a feelingakin to reverence. So, again,any rupture in
our mental development may lead us to exaggerate
the distanceof somepast portion of our experience.
When we have broken with our former selves,either in
the way of worseningor bettering,we tend to project
thesefurther into the past.
It is only when the sting of the recollection is
removed,when, for example,the calling up of the
image of a lost friend is 110longer accompaniedwith
the bitternessof futile longing, that a healthy mind
ventures to nourish recollections of such remote events
and to view these as part of its recent experiences.
In this casethe mnemonicimagobecomes transformed
into a kind of presentemotionalpossession,
an element
of that idealized and sublimatedportion of our ex-
perience with which all imaginative persons fill up
the emptiness of their actual lives, and to which the
poet is wont to give an objective embodimentin his
verse.

Distortions of Memory.
It is now time to pass to the secondgroup of
illusions of memory, which, according to the analogy
of visual errors, may be called atmospheric illusions.
Plerethedegreeof error is greatertlian in the caseof
illusions of time-perspective,since the very nature of
the events or circumstances is misconceived. We do
not recall the event as it happened,but see it in part
only, and obscured,or bent and distorted as by a
262 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOKY.

process of refraction. Indeed, this transformation of

the past doescloselycorrespondwith, the transforma-
tion of a visible object effectedby intervening media*
Our minds are such refracting media, and the past
reappearsto us not as it actually waswhen it wasclose
to us5but in numerousways altered and disguisedby
the intervening spacesof our consciousexperience.
To beginwith, whatwe call recollectionis uniformly
a processof softeningthe reality. Whenwe appearto
ourselves.to realize eventsof the remote past, it is
plain that our representationin a generalway falls
below the reality: the vividness,the intensity of our
impressionsdisappears.More particularly, so far as-
our experiences are emotional, they tend thus to be-
cometoned down by the mere lapse of time and the
imperfectionsof our reproductivepower. That which.
we seemto see in the act of recollection is thus very
different from the reality.
Not only is there this general deficiency in
mnemonic representation,there are special deficiencies
due to the fact of oblivescence. Our memories restore
us only fragmentsof our pastlife. And just as objects
seen Imperfectly at a great distance may assume a
shape quite unlike their real one, so an inadequate
representation
of a pasteventby memoryoftenamounts
to misrepresentation.When revisiting a place that
we have not seenfor many years,we are apt to find
that our recollection of it consisted only of some in-
significant details,which arrangedthemselvesin our
minds into somethingoddly unlike the actual scene
So,too, Someaccidentalaccompaniment of an incident
in early life is preserved,as though it werethe main
 FORGETFULNESSAND EEEOE. 263

feature,servingto give quite a falsecolouringto the

whole occurrence.
It seemsquite impossible to account for these
particular survivals,they appear to be so capricious.
When a little time has elapsedafter an event, and
the attendant circumstances fade away from memory,,
it is often difficult to say why we were impressed
with it as we afterwardsprove to have been. It is
no doubt possibleto seethat many of the recollections
of our childiood owe their vividness to the fact of
the exceptionalcharacterof the events; but this can-
not always be recognized. Someof them seemto our
mature minds very oddly selected,although no doubt
there are in every case good reasons,if we could
only discoverthem, why those particular incidents
rather than any others should have been retained.
The liability to error resulting from mere obliv-
escenceand the arbitrary selection of mental images is
seen most plainly, perhaps, in our subsequentrepresen-
tation and estimateof wholeperiodsof early life. Our
idea of any stage of our past history, as early child-
hood,or schooldays,is built up out of a fewfragmentary
intellectual relics which cannot be certainly known to
answerto the mostimportant and predominantexperi-
encesof the time. When,for example,wetry to decide
whether our schooldays wereour happiest days,as is
so often alleged,it is obviousthat weare liable to fall
into illusion through the inadequacyof memoryto pre-
serve characteristicor typical features,and none but
these. Wecannoteasilyrecallthe ordinaryevcry-day
level of feelingof a distantperiodof life, but rather
think of exceptionalmoments of rejoicingordepression.
264 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOKY.

The ordinaryman'sideaof the emotionalexperienceof

his school
daysisprobablybuilt up outof afewscrappy
recollectionsof extraordinaryand exciting events,such
as unexpectedholidays, successin the winning of
prizes, famous" rows " with the masters, and so on.
Besidesthe impossibility of getting at the average
and prevailing mental tone of a distant section,of life,
there is a specialdifficulty in determiningthe degree
of happinessof the past,arising from the fact that our
memoryfor pleasures and for painsmaynot be equally
good. Most people, perhaps, can recall the enjoyments
of the past much more vividly than the sufferings."
On the other hand, there seem to be some who find
the retention of the latter the easier of the two. This
fact should not be forgotten in reading the narrative
of early hardshipswhich somerecent autobiographies
have given us.
Not only does our idea of the past become inexact
by the mere decay and disappearanceof essential
features,it becomespositively incorrect through the
gradualincorporationof elementsthat do not properly
belong to it. Sometimesit is easyto seehow these
extraneous ideas get imported into our mental repre-
sentationof a past event. Suppose,for example,that
a man haslost a valuablescarf-pin. His wife suggests
that a particular servant, whosereputation doesnot
stand too high, has stolen it. When he afterwards
recalls the loss, the chances are that he will confuse
the fact with the conjectureattachedto it, and sayhe
remembersthat this particular servantdid steal the
pin. Thus,the pastactivityof imaginationservesto
corrupt and partially falsify recollectionsthat have a
genuinebasisof fact.
 CONFUSION
OF MNEMONICELEMENTS. 265

It is evident that this class of mnemonic illusions

approximates
in characterto illusionsof perception.
Whenthe imaginationsuppliesthe interpretationat
theverytime,andthe mind readsthis into the per-
ceivedobject,the error is one of perception.When
the addition is madeafterwards,on reflectingupon the
perception,
theerroris oneof memory.The" fallacies
of testimony" whichdependon an adulterationof pure
observation with inference and conjecture, as, for
example,
theinaccurate
andwild statements
of people
respectingtheir experiencesat spiritualist seances,
while they illustrate the curious blending of both
kinds of error,are probably much oftener illusions of
memory than of perception.1
Although in manycaseswe canaccountto ourselves
for this confusion of fact and imagination, in other
cases it is diilicult to see any close relation between
the fact rememberedand the foreign elementimported
into it. An idea of memoryseemssometimesto lose
its propermoorings,so to speak; to drift about help-
lessly amongother ideas,and finally, by somechance,
to hook itself on to one of these, as though it naturally
belongedto it. Anybody who hashad an opportunity
of carefully testing the truthfulness of his recollection
of some remote event in early life will have found how
oddly extraneouselementsbecomeincorporatedinto
the memorialpicture. Incidents get put into wrong
places,the wrong personsareintroduced into a scene,
and so on. Here again we may illustrate tlio mne-
monic illusion by a visual one. When a tree standing
beforeor behind a houseand projecting abovoor to
1SeoDr. Carpenter'sMentalPhysiology,
fourth edit, p. 456.
266 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY,

the side of it is not sharply distinguishedfrom the

latter, it may serve to give it a very odd appearance.
Theseconfusionsof the mental image may arise even
whenonly a short interval haselapsed. In the caseof
many of the fleeting impressionsthat are only half
recollected, this kind of error is very easy. Thus, for
example, I may have lent a book to a friend last week.
I really remember the act of lending it, but have
forgotten the person. But I am not awareof this.
The picture of memory has unknowingly to myself
been filled up by this unconscious process of shifting
and rearrangement,and the idea of another person has
by some odd accident got substituted for that of the
real borrower. If we could go deeply enough into the
matter, we should, of course,be able to explain why this
particular confusionarose. We might find, for ex-
ample, that the two persons were associatedin my
mind by a link of resemblance, or that I had
dealings with the other person about the same time.
Similaiiy, whenwemanageto join an eventto a wrong
place, we may find that it is becausewe heard of the
occurrencewhen staying at the particular locality, or
in some other way had the image of the place closely
associated in our minds with the event. But often we
are wholly unable to explain the displacement.
So far I have beenspeaking of the passivepro-
cessesby which the past comes to wear a new face to
our imaginations.In theseour presenthabitsof feeling
and thinking take no part; all is the work of the past,
of the decay of memory, and the gradual confusionof
images. This process of disorganizationmay bo
likenedto the actionof clampon someold manuscript,.
 ACTIVE TRANSFORMATION
OF PAST. 267

obliteratingsomeparts, altering the appearance

oi
others,and evendislocatingcertain portions. Besides
thi^ passiveprocess
of transformation,
thereis a more
activeonein whichour presentmindsco-operate.In
memory,asin perception and introspection,
there is a
processof preparationor preadjustmentof mind,and
here will be found room for what I had called active
error. This may be illustrated by the operationof " in-
terpreting " an old manuscriptwhich has got partially
obliterated,or of "restoring" a faded picture; in each
of which operationserror will be pretty sure to creep
in through an importation of the restorer'sown ideas
into the relic of the past.
Just as when distant objectsare seenmistily our
imaginationscomeinto play, leading us to fancy that
we seesomethingcompletelyand distinctly, so when
the imagesof memorybecomedim, our presentimagi-
nation helps to . restorethem, putting a new patch
into the old garment. If only thereis somerelic of the
past eventpreserved,a bare suggestionof the way in
which it may havehappenedwill often sufficeto pro-
ducethe convictionthat it actually did happenin this
way. The suggestionsthat naturally arise in our
mindsat suchtimeswill bearthe stampof ourpresent
modes of experienceandhabitsof thought. Hence,in
trying to reconstruct
the remotepast,weareconstantly
in dangerof importingour presentselvesinto our past
selves.

Thekind of illusionof memorywhichthusdepends

onthespontaneous
or independent
activityof present
imagination is strikingly illustrated in the curious
cases
of mistaken
identity with whichthe proceedings
268 ILLUSIONS OF MEHOEY.

of our law courts supply us from time to time. When

n witness in good faith, but erroneously,affirms that a
man is the sameas an old acquaintanceof his, wemay
feel surethat there is somestriking point or pointsof
similarity betweenthe two persons. But this of itself
would only partly account for the illusion, since we
oftenseenewfacesthat, by a numberof curiouspoints
of affinity, call up in a tantalizing way old and familiar
ones. What helps in this case to produce the illu-
sion is the preconception that the present man is the
witness's old friend. That is to say, his recollection
is partly true, though largely false. He doesreally
recall the similar feature, movement, or tone of voice;
he only seemsto himself to recall the rest of his friend's
appearance;for, to speak correctly, he projectsthe
present impressioninto the past, and constructshis
friend's face out of elements supplied by the new one.
Owing to this cause,an illusion of memoryis apt to
multiply itself, one man's assertionof what happened
producingby contagiona counterfeitof memory'srecord
in other minds.
I said just now that we tend to project our present
modesof experience
into the past. We paint our past
in the hues of the present. Thus we imagine that
things which impressed us in some remote period of
life must answer to what is impressive in our present
stageof mentaldevelopment. For example,a person
recalls a hill near the home of his childhood, and has
the conviction that it was of great height. On revisit-
ing the place he finds that the eminenceis quite
insignificant. How can we account for this ? For one
thing, it is to be observedthat to his undeveloped
 PAST INTERPRETED BY PRESENT. 269

childish, muscles the climbing to the top meant a con-

siderableexpenditureof energy,to be followed by a
senseof fatigue. The man remembersthesefeelings,
and " unconsciously reasoning" by presentexperience,,
that is to say,by the amountof walking which would
now producethis senseof fatigue, imaginesthat the
height wasvastly greaterthan it really was. Another
reasonis, of course,that a widerknowledgeof mountains
hasresultedin a greatalterationof the man'sstandard
of height.
From this cause arises a tendency generally to*
exaggeratethe impressionsof early life. Youth is
the period of novel effects,when all the world is fresh,
and newand striking impressionscrowd in thickly on
the mind. Consequently, it takes much less to pro-
ducea given amountof mental excitation in childhood
than in after-life. In looking back on this part of our
history, we recall for the most part just those events
and sceneswhich deeply stirred our minds by their
strangeness,novelty,etc.,and so impressedthemselves
on the tablet of our memory; and it is this senseof
something out of the ordinary beat that gives the
characteristic colour to our recollection. In other
words,we remembersomethingas wonderful,admir-
able,exceptionallydelightful, and so on,ratherthan as
a definitely imaginedevent. This being so,we uncon-
sciously transform the past occurrenceby reasoning
from our presentstandardof what is impressive. Who
hasnot felt anunpleasantdisenchantmentonrevisiting
somechurch,house,or park that seemeda wondrous
paradiseto his young eyes? All our feelings are
capableof leading us into this kind, of illusion. What
270 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

seemedbeautiful or awful to us as children, is now

pictured in imagination as correspondingto what
moves our mature minds to delight or awe. One
cannot help wondering what we should think of our
early heroesor heroinesif we could seethem again
with our adult eyes exactly as they were.
' While the past may thus take on an illusory hue
through the very progressof our experienceand our
emotional life, it may become further transformed by
a more consciousprocess,namely, the idealizing touch
of a present feeling. The way in which the emotions
of love, reverence, and so on, thus transform their lost
objects is too well known to need illustration. Speak-
ing mgenerally, we may say that in healthy minds the
play of these impulses of feeling results in a softening
of the harsherfeaturesof the past, and in an idealization
of its happier and brighter aspects. As Wordsworth
says, we may assign to Memory a pencil-
*' That, softening objects, sometimes even
Outstrips the heart's demand;

" That smoothesforegone distress,the lines

Of lingering care subdues,
Long-vanished happinessrefines,
And clothesin brighterhues."1
Enough has now been said, perhaps,to showin
how many ways our retrospective imagination trans-
formsthe actualeventsof our past life. Sothoroughly,
indeed,do the relics of this past get shakentogether
in new kaleidoscopiccombinations,so much of the
1 This is, perhaps,what is meant by saying that people recall their
past enjoymentsmore readily than their sufferings. Yet much seems
to turn on temperament and emotional peculiarities. (For a fuller
discussionof the point, seemy Pessimism,p. 344:.)
 EXTENT OF TRANSFORMATION. 271

result of later experiences

getsimported into our early
years,that it may well be askedwhether,if the record
of our actual life were ever read out to us, we should be
able to recognizeit. It looks as though wecould be
sure of recallingonly recenteventswith any degreeof
accuracyand completeness.As soonas they recedeat
any considerable distancefrom us,they are subject to
a sort of atmosphericeffect. Much grows indistinct
and drops altogether out of sight, and what is still
seen often takes a new 'and grotesquely unlike shape.
More than this, the play of fancy., like the action of
some refracting medium, bends and distorts the out-
lines of memory'sobjects,making them wholly unlike
the originals.

Hallucinations of Memory.
We will now go on to the third classof mnemonic
" error, which I have called the spectra of memory,
where there is not simply a transformation of the
past event, but a complete imaginative creation of
it. This classof error corresponds,as I have observed,
to an hallucination in the region of sense-perception.
And just as we distinguished between those halluci-
nationsof sensewhich arisefirst *of all through some
peripherally caused subjective sensation,and those
which want eventhis element of reality and depe&d
altogether on the activity of imagination,so we may
mark off two classes of mnemonic hallucination. The
falserecollectionmay correspondto somethingpast-
and to this extent be a recollection-though not to
anyobjectivefact, but only to a subjectiverepresen-
tation of such a fact, as, for example,a dream* In
272 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

this casethe imitation of the mnemonicprocessmay

be very definite and complete. Or the false recollec-
tion maybe wholly a retrojectionof a presentmental
image,and so by no stretch of languagebe deserving
of the name recollection.
It is doubtfulwhetherby anyeffort of will a person
could bring himselfto regarda figmentof his present
imagination as representative of a past reality. Defi-
nite and complete hallucinations of this sort do not in
normal circumstancesarise. It seemsnecessaryfor a
completeillusion of memory that there should be some-
thing pastand recoveredat the moment,though this
may not be a real personal experience.1 On the
other hand, it is possible, as we shall presently see^
under certain circumstances,to create out of present
materials,and in a vagueand indefinite shape,pure
phantomsof past experience,that is to say, quasi-
mnemonic images to which there correspond no past
occurrences whatever.
All recollection, as we have seen,takes place by
meansof a present mental image which returns with
a certain degree of vividness, and is instantaneously
identified with some past event. In many casesthis
instinctive process* of identification proves to be
legitimate, for, as a matter of fact, real impressions

1 The only exception to this that I can think of is to be found

in the power which I, at least, possess,after looking at a new object,
of representing it as a familiar one. Yet this may be explained by
saying that in the case of every object which is clearly apprehended
there must be vague revivals of similar objects perceived before.
Casesin which recent experiencestend, owing to their peculiar nature,
very rapidly to assumethe appearanceof old events,will be con-
sideredpresently.
 HALLUCINATIONS OF MEMOEY. 273

are the first and the commonestsourceof such lively

mnemonicimages. But it is not always so. There
are other sources of our mental imagery which com-
pete, so to speak,with the region of real personal
experience. And sometimestheseleave behind them
a vivid image having all the appearanceof a genuine
mnemonicimage. When this is so,it is impossibleby
a mereintrospectiveglanceto detectthe falsity of the
messagefrom the past. We are in the sameposition
as the purchaserin a jet market, where a spurious
commodity has got inextricably mixed up with the
genuine,and there is no ready criterion by which he
can distinguish the true from the false. Such a
person,if he purchasesfreely, is pretty sure to make
a number of mistakes. Similarly, all of us are liable
to take counterfeit mnemonic images for genuine ones;
that is to say,to fall into an illusion of "recollecting"
what never really took place.
But what, it may be asked, are these false and
illegitimate sources of mnemonic images, these un-
authorized mints which issue a spurious mental
coinage,and so confusethe genuinecurrency? They
consist of two regions of our internal mental life,
which most closely resemblethe actual perceptionoi
real things in vividness and force, namely, dream-
consciousnessand waking imagination. Each of these
may introduce into the mind vivid images which
afterwards tend, under certain circumstances,to assume
the guise of recollections of actual events.
That our dream-experience
may now and again
lead us into illusory recollection has already been
hinted. And it is easy to understand why this is so.
T
274 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

When dreaming we have, as we have seen,a mental

experiencewhich closely approximatesin intensity
and reality to that of waking perception. Conse-
quently,dreamsmay leave behind them, for a time,
vivid imageswhich simulate the appearanceof real
images of memory. Most of us, perhaps,have felt
this after-effectof dreamingon our waking thoughts.
It is sometimesvery hard to shakeoff the impression
left by a vivid dream,as, for example,that a dead
friend has returned to life. During the clay that
follows the dream, we have at intermittent moments
something like an assurance that we have seen our
lost friend; and though we immediately correct
the impression by reflecting that we are recalling but
a dream,it tends to revive within us with a strange
pertinacity.
In addition to this proximate effect of a dream
in disturbingthe normal processof recollection,there
is reason to suppose that dreams may exert a more
remote effect on our memories. So widely different in
its form is our dreamingfrom our waking experience,
that our dreams are rarely recalled as wholes with
perfect distinctness. They revive in us only as dis-
jointed fragments, and only for brief moments when
some accidental resemblance in the present happens
to stir the latent trace they have left on our minds.
We get sudden flashesout of our dream-world,and the
processis too rapid, too incompletefor us to identify
the region whencethe flashes come.
It is highly probable that our dreamsare, to a
large extent, answerablefor the senseof familiarity
that wesometimesexperiencein visiting a newlocality
 DREAMS AND FALSE KECOLLECTION. 275

or in seeing a new face. If, as we have found some of

the bestauthoritiessaying,we are,whenasleep,always
dreamingmoreor less distinctly, and if, as we know,
dreaming is a continual processof transformationof
. our waking impressions in new combinations, it is not
surprising that our dreams should sometimes take the
form of forecastsof our waking life, and that conse-
quently objects and scenes of this life never before
seenshould now and again wear a familiar look.
That someinstancesof this puzzling senseof famili-
arity can be explained in this way is proved. Thus,
Paul Radestock,in the work Schlaf und Traum, already
quoted, tells us: " When I have been taking a walk,
with my thoughts quite unfettered, the idea has often
occurredto me that I had seen,heard,or thought of
this or that thing once before, without being able to
recall when, where,and in what circumstances. This
happenedat the time when,with a view to the pub-
lication of the present work, I was in the habit of
keepingan exactrecordof my dreams. Consequently,
I was able to turn to this after these impressions, and
on doingso I generallyfound the conjectureconfirmed
that I had previously dreamt something like it."
Scientificinquiry is often saidto destroyall beautiful
thoughts about nature and life; but while it destroys
it creates. Is it not almost a romantic idea that just
as our waking life images itself in our dreams, so
our dream-life may send back some of its shadowy
phantomsinto our prosaic every-clayworld, touching
this with somethingof its own weird beauty?
Not only may dreams beget these momentary
illusions of memory, they may give rise to something
276 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

like permanentillusions. If a dreamservesto connect

a certain idea with a place or person,and subsequent
experience
doesnot tendto correctthis,wemaykeep
the belief that we have actually witnessedthe event.
xlncl we may naturally expect that this result will
occur most frequently in the case of those who
habitually dreamvividly, as youngchildren.
It seems to me that many of the quaint fancies
which children get into their headsabout things they
hearof arisein this way. I knowa personwho,when
a child, got the notion that when his baby-brother was
weaned,he was taken up on a grassy hill and tossed
about. He had a vivid idea of having seen this curious
ceremony. He has in vain tried to get an explanation
of this picturesquerendering of an incident of baby-
hood from his friends, and has come to the conclusion
that it was the result of a dream. If, as seems
probable,children's dreamsthus give rise to subse-
quent illusions of memory,the fact would throw a
curious light on some of the startling quasi-records
of childish experienceto be met with in autobio-
graphical literature.
Oddthough it mayat first appear,old ageis said to
resembleyouth in this confusion of dream-recollection
with the memory of waking experience. Dr. Car-
penter1 tells us of "a lady of advancedage who
. . . continually dreamsabout passing events, and
seems entirely unable to distinguish between her
dreamingand her waking experiences,narrating the
formerwith implicit belief in them,and giving direc-
tions based on them." This confusion in the case
1 MentalPhysiology,p. 456.
 EFFECTS OF PAST IMAGINATION. 277

of the old may possibly arise not from an increasein

the intensity of the dreams, but from a decreasein the
intensity of the waking impressions. As Sir Henry
Holland remarks,1in old age life approachesto the
state of a dream.
The other sourceof what may, by analogy with
the hallucinations of sense, be called the peri-
pherally originating spectra of memory is waking
imagination. In certain morbid conditions of mind,
and in the case of the few healthy minds endowed
with specialimaginative force, the products of this
mental activity, may, as we saw when dealing with
illusions of perception,closely resemble dreams in
their vividnessand apparentactuality. Whenthis is
the case,illusions of memory may arise at once just
as in the case of dreams. This will happen more
easily when the imagination has for sometime been
occupiedwith the samegroupof ideal scenes,persons,
or events. To Dickens, as is well known, his fictitious
characters were for the time realities, and after he had
finished his story their forms and their doings lingered
with him, assumingthe aspect of personalrecollec-
tions. So, too, the energetic activity of imagination
which accompanies
a deep and absorbingsympathy
with another's painful experiences, may easily result
in so vivid a realization of all their details as to leave
an after-sense
of personalsuffering. All highly sym-
pathetic personswho have closely accompaniedbeloved
friendsthrough a great sorrowhave known something
of this subsequentfeeling.
The close connection and continuity between nor-
1 Mental Physiology,secondedit., p. 172.
278 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOIIY.

mal and abnormal states of mind is illustrated in

the fact that in insanity the illusion of taking past
imaginationsfor pastrealitiesbecomes far morepower-
ful and.persistent. Abercrombie(IntellectualPowers,
Part III. sec.iv. § 2, " Insanity ") speaksof " visions
of the imaginationwhich haveformerlybeenindulged
in of that kind which we call waking dreams or
castle-building recurring to the mind in this condition,
and now believed to have a real existence." Thus,
for example,one patient believedin the reality of the
good luck previously predicted by a fortune-teller.
Other writers on mental disease observe that it is a
common thing for the monomaniac to cherish the
delusionthat he has actually gained the object of
some previous ambition, or is undergoing some pre-
viously dreaded calamity.
Nor is it necessaryto these illusions of memory
that there shouldbe any exceptionalforce of imagina-
tion. A fairly vivid representationto ourselvesof
anything, whether real or fictitious, communicated by
others, will often result in somethingvery like a
personal recollection. In the caseof works of history
and fiction, which adopt the narrative tense, this
tendency to a subsequentillusion of memory is
strengthenedby the dispositionof the mind at the
momentof readingto project itself backwardsas in
an act of recollection. This is a point which will be
further dealtwith in the next chapter.
In mostcases,however,illusionsof memorygrowing
out of previousactivitiesof the imaginationappearonly
afterthe lapseof sometime,whenin the natural course
of things the mental imagesderived from actual ex-
 RECOLLECTIONS OF CHILDHOOD. 279

perience would sink to a certain degree of faintness.

Habitual novel-readers often catch themselves mis-
taking the echoof somepassagein a good story for
the trace left by an actual event. A person'sname,
a striking saying, and even an event itself, when we
first corneacrossit or experienceit, may for a moment
seem familiar to us, and to recall some past like
impression, if it only happens to resemble something
in the works of a favourite novelist. And so, too, any
recital of another's experience,whether oral or literary,
if it deeply interests us and awakens a specially vivid
imagination of the events described, may easily be-
come the starting-point of an illusory recollection.
Children are in the habit of " drinking in " with
their vigorous and eager imaginations what is told
them and read to them, and hence they are specially
likely to fall into this kind of error. Not only so:
when they grow up and their early recollections lose
their definiteness, becoming a few fragments saved
from a lost past, it must pretty certainly happen that
if any ideas derivedfrom these recitalsare preserved,
they will simulate the form of memories. Thus, I
have often caught myself for a moment under the
swayof the illusion that I actually visited the Exhi-
bition of 1851,the reasonbeing that I am able to
recall the descriptionsgiven to me of it by my friends,
and the excitement attending their journey to London
on the occasion. It is to be added that repetition of
the act of imaginationwill tend still further to deepen
the subsequent feeling that we are recollecting some-
thing. As Hartleywell observes,
a man,by repeating
a story,easilycomes
to suppose
that he remembers
it.1
1 LOG.oit., p. 390.
280 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

Here, then, we have anothersourceof error that

wemust take into accountin judging of the authen-
ticity of an autobiographicalnarration of the events
of childhood. The more imaginative the writer, the
greater the risk of illusion from this sourceas well
as from that of dream-fancies. It is highly probable,
indeed, that in such full and explicit records of very
early life as those given by Rousseau,
by Goethe,or
by De Quincey,somepart of the quasi-narrativeis
basedon mental images which come floating down
the stream of time, not from the substantial world of
the writer's personalexperience,but from the airy
regionof dream-landor of waking fancy.
It is to be added that even when the quasi-
recollection does answer to a real event of childish
history, it may still be an illusion. The fact that
others, in narrating events to us, are able to awaken
imaginations that afterwards appear as past realities,
suggeststhat muchof our supposedearly recollection
owesits existence to what our parents and friends have
from time to time told us respecting the first stages of
our history.1 We see, then, how much uncertainty
attaches to all autobiographicaldescription of very
early life.
Modernsciencesuggestsanother possiblesourceof
thesedistinctspectra
of memory.Mayit not happen
that, by the law of hereditarytransmission,which is
nowbeingappliedto mentalaswell as bodily phe-
nomena,ancestral experienceswill now and then reflect

1 This sourceof errorliasnot escaped

the noticeof autobiofrrnpliers
themselves.Seethe remarksof Goethein the openingpassages of
his WalirlteitundDiclitung.
 RECOLLECTION OF PRENATAL, EVENTS. 281

themselvesin our mental life, and so give riseto ap-

parently personal recollections ? No one can say that
this is not so. When the infant first steadies his eyes
"ona humanface,it may,for aught weknow,experience
"a feeling akin to that describedabove,whenthrough
a survival of dream-fancy\\e take somenew sceneto
be alreadyfamiliar. At the age whennew emotions
rapidly developthemselves, when our hearts are full
of wild romantic aspirations,do there not seemto
blend with the eagerpassionof the time deep reso-
nancesof a vast and mysterious past,and may not
this feeling be a sort of reminiscenceof prenatal,
that is, ancestralexperience?
This idea is certainly a fascinating one,worthy to
be a newscientific support for the beautiful thought
"ofPlato and of Wordsworth. But in our present state
of knowledge,any reasoningon this suppositionwould
probablyappeartoo fanciful. Someday we may find
out how much ancestralexperienceis capableof be-
queathingin this way, whethersimply shadowy,uncle-
finable mental tendencies,or somethinglike definite
concreteideas. If, for example,it werefound that a
child that was descended from a line of seafaring
ancestors,and that had never itself seen or heard of
the " clark-gleaniing sea," manifested a feeling of re-
cognitionwhen first beholding it, we might be pretty
sure that such a thing as recollection of prenatal events
does take place. But till we have such facts, it seems
better to refer the " shadowyrecollections" to sources
which fall within the individual's ownexperience.
We may now pass to those hallucinations of
memory which are analogous to the centrally excited
 282 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.
F

hallucinationsof sense-perception.As I have ob-

served,these are necessarilyvague and imperfectly
developed.
I havealreadyhad occasionto touch on the fact of
the vast amountof our forgottenexperience. And I
observedthat forgetfulness'
wasa commonnegativecon-
dition of mnemonic illusion. I have now to complete
this statementby the observationthat total forget-
' fulnessof any period or stage of our past experience
necessarilytendsto a vaguekind of hallucination. In
looking back on the past, we see-no absolutegaps
in the continuity of our conscious life; our image
of this past is essentially one of an unbroken series
of conscious experiences. But if through forget-
fulnessa part of the series is effacedfrom memory,
how, it may be asked, is it possible to construct this
perfectly continuous line ? The answer is that we fill
up such lacunaevaguely by help of some very im-
perfectly imagined commontype of consciousexpe-
rience. Just as the eye sees no gap in its field of
vision correspondingto the " blind spot " of the retina,
but carries its impressionover this area,so memory
seesno lacuna in the past, but carriesits image of
consciouslife over each of the forgotten spaces.
Sometimesthis processof filling in gaps in the
pastbecomesmore complete. Thus, for example,in
recalling a particular night a week or so ago, I instinc-
tively representit to myself as somany hoursof lying
in.bed with the wakingsensationsappropriateto the
circumstances,as those of bodily warmth and rest, and
of the surrounding silence and darkness.
It is apparentthat I cannotconceivemyself apart
 FILLING UP GAPS IN MEMORY. 263

from somemodeof conscious experience. In thinking

of myself in any part of the past or future in which
there is actually no consciousness,or of which the con-
rcious content is quite unknown to me, I necessarily
"imaginemyself as consciouslyexperiencingsomething.
If I picture myself under any definitely conceived
circumstances,I irresistibly import into my mental
image the feelingsappropriateto thesesurroundings.
In this way, peopletend to imagine themselvesafter
death as lying in the grave, feeling its darkness and
its chilliness. If the circumstances of the time are
not distinctly represented,the conception of the con-
scious experience which constitutes that piece of the
ego is necessarilyvague, and seemsgenerally to resolve
itself into a representation of ourselves as dimly self*
conscious. What this consciousness of self consists of
is a point that will be taken up presently.

Illusionswith respectto PersonalIdentity.

It would seem,to follow from these errors in imagi-
natively filling up our past life, that our conscious-
ness of personalidentity is by no meansthe simple
and exact process which it is commonly supposed to
be\ I have alreadyremarked that the very fact of
therebeing so large a region of the irrevocablein our
past experienceproves our consciousness of personal
continuity to be largely a matter of inference, or of
imaginative conjecture,and not simply of immediate
recollection. Indeed,it may be said that our powerof
ignoring whole regions of the past and of leaping
complacently over huge gaps in our memory and
linking on consciousexperiencewith consciousex-
284: ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

perience,involvesan illusory senseof continuity, and

so far of personalidentity. Thus,our ordinaryimage
"of our past life, if only by omitting the very large
fraction passedin sleep,in at least an approximately
unconscious state, clearly contains an ingredient of
illusion.1
It is to be added that the numerous falsifications of
our past history, which our retrospectiveimagination
is capable of perpetrating, make our representation of
ourselvesat different momentsand in different stages
of our pasthistory to a considerableextent illusory.
'Thus, though to mistake a past dream-experiencefor a
waking one may not be to lose or confusethe sense of
identity, since our dreams are, after all, a part of our
"experience,
yet to imagine that we have ourselves
seenwhat we have only heard from another or read is
clearlyto confusethe boundariesof our identity. And
with respectto longer sectionsof our history, it is
plain that when we wrongly assimilateour remoteto
our presentself, and clothe our childish nature with
the feelingsandthe ideasof our adult life, weidentify
ourselves overmuch. In this way, through the cor-
ruption of our memory,a kind of shamself getsmixed
up with the real self,so that we cannot,strictly speak-
ing, be surethat when we project a mnemonicimage
into the remotepast we are not really running away
from our true personality.
One wonderswhether those persons who, in consequenceof an
injury to their brain,periodicallypassfroma normalinto an abnormal
condition of mind, in each of which there is little or no memoryof the
contentsof the other state,completetheir idea of personalcontinuity
in each state by the same kind of processas that described in the
text.
 REMEMBERED AND IMAGINED SELVES. 285

So far I have been touching only on slight errors

in the recognitionof that identical self which is repre-
sented as persistingthrough all the fluctuations of
consciouslife. Other and grosserillusions connected
with personal identity are also found to be closely
related to defects or disturbancesof the ordinary
mnemonic process,and so can be best treated here.
In orderto understandthese,we must inquire a little
into the nature of our idea and consciousnessof a per-
sistent self. Here; again, I would remind the readerthat
I am treating the point only so far as it can be treated
scientificallyor empirically,that is to say,by examin-
ing what concretefacts or data of experienceare
taken up into the idea of self. I do not wish to fore-
closethe philosophicquestionwhetheranything more
than this empirical content is involved in the con-
ception.
My idea of myself as persisting appearsto be
built up of certain similarities in the successionof niy
experiences. Thus, my permanent self consists,on the
bodily side, of a continually renewable perception of
my own organism, which perception is mainly visual
and tactual, and which remains pretty constant
within certain limits of time. With this objective
similarity is closely conjoineda subjectivesimilarity.
Thus, the same sensibilities continue to characterize
the variousparts of my organism. Similarly, there arc
the higher intellectual,emotional,and moral peculiari-
ties and dispositions. My ideaof my persistentself is
essentiallya collectiveimagerepresentinga relatively
unchanging
materialobject,endowed
with unchanging
sensibilitiesand forming a kind of support for per*
manenthigher mentalattributes.
286 ILLUSIONS OF MEMOEY.

The constructionof this idea of an enduring un-

changingego is renderedvery much easierby the fact
that certain concretefeelings are approximatelycon-
stant elementsin our mental life. Among these must.
be ranked first that dimly discriminated mass of
organic sensation which in average states of health
is fairly constant, and which standsin sharp contrast
to the fluctuating externalsensations.Thesefeelings
enterinto and profoundlycolour eachperson'smental
image of himself. In addition to this, there are the
frequently recurring higher feelings, the dominant
passions and ideas which approximate more or less
closely to constant factors of our consciousexperience.
This total image of the ego becomes defined and
renderedprecise by a number of distinctions,as that
between niy own body or that particular material
objectwith which areintimately united all my feelings,
and other material objects in general; then between
my organism and other human organisms,with which
I learn to connect certain feelings answering to my
own, but only faintly represented instead of actually
realized feelings. To these prime distinctions are
added others, hardly less fundamental, as those be-
tween my individual bodily appearanceand that of
other living bodies,betweenmy personaland charac-
teristic modes of feeling and thinking and those of
others, and so on.
Our sense of personal identity may be said to be
rooted in that special side of the mnemonicprocess
which consists in the linking of all sequent events
together by means of a thread of common conscious-
ness. It is closely connected with that smooth,
 CONTENTS OF THE IDEA OF SELF. 287

gliding movementof imagination whicli appearsto

involve some more or less distinct consciousness of
the uniting threadof similarity. And so long as this
movement is possible,so long, that is to say, as retro-
spective imagination detects the common element,
which we may specifically call the recurring con-
sciousnessof self, so long is there the undisturbed
assuranceof personalidentity. Nay, more,evenwhen
such a recognitionmight seemto be difficult, if not
impossible,as in linking together the very unlike
selves, viewed both on their objective and subjective
sides, of childhood, youth, and mature life, the rnind
manages,as we have seen,to feign to itself a suffi-
cient amountof suchsimilarity.
But this process
of linking stageto stage,of discern-
ing the commonor the recurring amid the changing
and the evanescent,has its limits. Every' great and
suddenchangein our experiencetends,momentarilyat
least,to hinder the smoothreflux of imagination. It
makestoo sharpa break in our consciouslife, so that
imagination is incapable of spanning the gap and
realizing the then and the now as parts of a connected
continuous tissue.1
These changesmay be either objective or subjec-
tive. Any sudden alteration of our bodily appear-
ance sensibly impedes the movement of imagination.
tl patient after a fever, when he first looks in the glass,
1 The reader will remark that this condition of clear intellectual
consciousness,namely, a certain degreeof similarity and continuity of
character in our successivemental states, is complementary to the
other condition, constant change,already referred to. It may, per-
haps, be said that all clear consciousness lies between two extremes of
excessive sameness and excessive difference.
288 ILLUSIONS OP MEMOEY.

exclaims, " I clon't know myself." More commonly the

bodily changeswhich affect the consciousness
of an
enduring self are such as involve considerable altera-
tions of ccen£esthesis,
or the mass of stable organic
sensation. Thus, the loss of a limb, by cutting off
a portion of the old sensationsthrough which the
organism may be said to be immediately felt, and
by introducing new and unfamiliar feelings,will dis-
tinctly give a shock to our consciousnessof self.
Purely subjective changes,too, or, to speak cor-
rectly, suchas areknownsubjectivelyonly, will suffice
to disturb the sense of personal unity. Any great
moral shock, involving something like a revolution in
our recurring emotional experience,seems at the
moment to rupture the bond of identity. And even
some time after, as I have already remarked, sucli
cataclysmsin our mental geologyleadto the imagina-
tive thrusting of the old personality away from the
new one under the form of a " dead self." l
We see,then, that the failure of our ordinary
assuranceof personalidentity is due to the recog-
nition of differencewithout similarity. It arisesfrom
an act of memory-for the mind must still be able to
recall the past, dimly at least-but from a memory
which misses its habitual support in a recognized
1 It follows that any great transformation of our environment may
lead to a partial confusion\vith respectto self. For not only do great
and violent changesin our surroundings beget profound changes in
our feelings and ideas, but since the idea of self is under one of its
aspectsessentially that of a relation to not-self, any great revolution
in the oneterm "will confusethe recognition of the other. This fact is
expressedin the commonexpressionthat we " lose ourselves " when in
unfamiliar surroundings, and the processof orientation, or "taking
our bearings," fails.
 APPARENT BUPTURES OF IDENTITY. 289

elementof constancy. If there is no memory,that is

to say, if the past is a complete blank, the mind
simply feels a rupture of identity without any trans-
formation of self. This is our condition on awaking
from a perfectly forgotten period of sleep,or from a
perfectly unconsciousstate (if such is possible)when
induced by anesthetics. Such gaps are, as we have
seen,easilyfilled up, and the senseof identity restored
by a kind of retrospective" skipping." On the other
hand, the confusion which arises from too great and
violenta transformationof our remembered experiences
is much lesseasilycorrected. As long as the recollec-
tion of the old feelings remains, and with this the
sense of violent contrast between the old and the new
ones,so long will the illusion of two sundered selves
tend to recur.
The full development
of this processof imaginative
fission or cleavageof self is to be met with in mental
disease. The beginningsof suchdisease,accompanied
as they commonly are with disturbances of bodily
sensationsand the recurring emotions, illustrate in a
very interesting way the dependence of the recog-
nition of self on a certain degree of uniformity in the
contents of consciousness.The patient, when first
awareof thesechanges,is perplexed,and often regards
the newfeelingsas making up another self,a foreign
Tu, as distinguished from the familiar Ego. And
sometimes he expressesthe relation between the old
and the newself in fantasticways,as whenhe imagines
the formerto be underthe powerof someforeign
personality.
Whenthechangeis complete,
thepatientis aptto
u
290 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

think of his former self as detachedfrom his present,

and of his previouslife as a kind of unreal dream; and
this fadingawayof the pastinto shadowyunreal forms
has, as its result, a curious aberration in the sense of
time. Thus, it is said that a patient, after being in an
asylum only one day, will declarethat he has been
there a year, five years, and even ten years.1 This
confusionas to self naturally becomesthe starting-
point of illusionsof perception;the transformationof
self seemingto require as its logical correlative(for
there is a crude logic even in mental disease)a trans-
formation of the environment. When the disease is
fully developedunder the particular form of mono-
mania, the recollection of the former normal self
commonlydisappearsaltogether,or fades away into
a dim imageof someperfectly separatepersonality. A
newegois nowfully substitutedfor the old. In other
andmoreviolent formsof disease(dementia)the power
of connectingthe past and present may disappear
altogether,and nothing but the disjectamembraof an

Enoughhas,perhaps,beensaid to showhow much

of uncertaintyand of self-deception entersinto the pro-
cessesof memory. This much-esteemed faculty, valu-
ableandindispensable thoughit certainlyis,canclearly
lay no claim to that absoluteinfallibility which is some-
times said to belongto it. Our individual recollection,
1 On thesedisturbancesof memoryand self-recognitionin insanity,
seeG-riesinger,op.cit., pp. 49-51; also Ribot," DesD^sordresG£ne'raux
de la Memoire," in the Revue Philosophique, August, 1880. It is
related by Leuret (FragmentsPsych,sur la Folie, p. 277) that a patient
spokeof his former self as " la personnede moi-me'ine."
 VALUE OF MEMORY. 291

left to itself, is liable to a number of illusions even with

regard to fairly recent events,and in the caseof remote
onesit may be said to err habitually and uniformly in
a greater or less degree. To speak plainly, we can
never be certainon the ground of our personalrecol-
lection alone that a distant event happenedexactly
in the way and at the time that we suppose. Nor does
there seem to be any simple way by mere reflection
on the contentsof our memory of distinguishing what
kinds of recollection are likely to be illusory.
How, then, it may be asked, can we ever be certain
that we are faithfully recalling the actual events of
the past? Given a fairly good, that is, a cultivated
memory, it may be said that in the caseof very recent
events a man may feel certain that, when the con-
ditions of careful attention at the time to what
really happenedwere present,a distinct recollection
is substantially correct. Also it is obvious that with
respectto all repeated experiencesour memories afford
practically safeguides. When memory becomesthe
basis of some item of generalized knowledge, as, for
example, of the truth that the pain of indigestion has
followed a too copious indulgence in rich food, there is
little room for an error of memory properly so called
On the other hand, when an event is not repeated in
our experience,
but formsa uniquelink in our personal
history, the chancesof error increasewith the distance
of the event; and here the best of us will do well to.
have resort to a process of verification or, if neces-
sary, of correction.
In order thus to verify the utterances of memory,
we must look beyond our own internal mental states
292 ILLUSIONS OF MEMORY.

to someexternal facts. Thus, the recollections of our

early life may often be tested by letters written by
ourselvesor our friendsat the time, by diaries,and so
on. When there is no unerring objective record to
be found, we may have recourseto the less satis-
factory method of comparing our recollectionswith
those of others. By so doing we mayreach a rough
averagerecollectionwhich shall at least be free from
any individual error correspondingto that of personal
equationin perception. But eventhus we cannotbe
sure of eliminating all error, since there may be a
causeof illusion acting on all our minds alike, "as,for
example, the extraordinary nature of the occurrence,
which would pretty certainly lead to a common ex-
aggeration of its magnitude, etc., and since, moreover,
this processof comparingrecollectionsaffordsanoppor-
tunity for that readingback a presentpreconception
into the past to which referencehas already beenmade.
The result of our inquiry is less alarming than it
looks at first sight. Knowledge is valuable for action,
and error is chiefly hurtful in so far as it misdirects
conduct. Now, in a general way, we do not need to
act upon a recollectionof singleremoteevents; our
conduct is sufficiently shaped by an accurate recollec-
tion of single recent events,together with those bundles
of recollections of recurring events and sequencesof
eventswhich constitute our knowledgeof ourselves
and our common knowledge of the world about us.
Nature has done commendablywell in endowingus
with the meansof cultivating our memoriesup to this
point, andwe ought not to blameher for not giving us
powerswhich would only very rarely prove of any
appreciablepracticalserviceto us.
 ( 293 )

NOTE.

MOMENTARY ILLUSIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

The account of the apparent ruptures in our

personalidentity given in this chaptermay help us
to understandthe strange tendency to confuseself
with other objects which occasionally appears in
waking consciousnessand in dreams. These errors
may be said generally to be due to the breaking up
of the compositeimageof self into its fragments,and
the regarding of certain of these only. Thus, the
momentary occurrence of partial illusion in intense
sympathywith others,including that imaginativepro-
jection of self into inanimate objects, to which refer-
ence has already been made, may be said to depend
on exclusiveattention to the subjectiveaspectof self,
to the total disregardof the objective aspect. In
other words, when we thus momentarily " lose our-
selves," or merge our own existence in that of another
object,we clearly let drop out of sight the visual re-
presentation of our own individual organism. On the
other hand, when in dreams we double our personality,
or represent to ourselves an external self which, be-
comes the object of visual perception, it is probably
becausewe isolate in imagination the objective aspect
of ourpersonalityfrom the other andsubjectiveaspect.
It is not at all unlikely that the severalconfusionsof
self touched on in this chapter have had something
to do with the genesisof the varioushistorical theories
of a transformedexistence,as, for example,the cele-
brateddoctrineof metempsychosis.
 CHAPTEE XL

ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

OUEknowledgeis commonlysaidto consistof two large

varieties-Presentative and Kepresentative. Kepresen-
tative .knowledge,again, falls into two chief divisions.
Thefirst of theseis Memory,which,though not primary
or original, like presentativeknowledge,is still re-
gardedas directly or intuitively certain. The second
division consistsof all other representative knowledge
besidesmemory, including, among other varieties, our
anticipations of the future, our knowledge of others'
past experience,and our general knowledge about
things. There is no one term which exactly hits off
this large sphereof cognition: I proposeto call it
Belief. I am awarethat this is by no meansa perfect
word for my purpose,since,on the one hand,it sug-
gests that every form of this knowledge must be less
certain than presentativeor mnemonicknowledge,
which cannot be assumed; and since, on the other
hand,the word is so useful a one in psychology,for
the purposeof marking off the subjective fact of
assurance in all kinds of cognition. Nevertheless,
I know not what better one I could select in order to
 IMMEDIATE BELIEF. '295

makemy classification
answerascloselyaisa scientific
treatment will allow to the deeply fixed distinctions
of popular psychology.
It might at first seemas if perception,introspecs
tion, and memorymust exhaustall that is meant by
immediate,or self-evident,knowledge,and as if what I
have here called belief must be uniformly mediate,
derivate, or inferred knowledge. The apprehension
of somethingnow presentto the mind, externally or
internally, and the reapprehensionthrough the pro-
cess of memoryof what was once so apprehended,
might appear to be the whole of what can by any
stretch of language be called direct cognition of
things. This at least would seemto follow from the
empirical theory of knowledge,which regards per-
ception and memoryas the ground or logical source
of all other forms of knowledge.
And evenif wesuppose, with somephilosophers,that
there are certain innate principles of knowledge,it
seemsnow to be generally allowed that these, apart
from the particular facts of experience,are merely ab-
stractions; and that they only develop into complete
knowledgewhen they receivesomeempirical content,
which must be supplied either by presentperception
or by memory. So that in this case,too, all definite
concreteknowledgewould seernto be either presenta-
tive cognition,memory,or, lastly, somemode of in-
ference from these.
A little inquiry into the mental operationswhich
I here includeunder the namebelief will show,how-
ever, that they are by no meansuniformly processe-
of inference. To take the simplestform of suchknow-
296 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

ledge,anticipation of somepersonalexperience:this
mayarisequite apartfromrecollection,asa spontaneous
projectionof a mentalimage into the future. A per-
sonmay feel " intuitively certain" that somethingis
going to happento him which doesnot resembleany-
thing in his pastexperience. Not only so; evenwhen
the expectationcorrespondsto a bit of past expe-
rience,this sourceof the expectationmay,under cer-
tain circumstances,be altogether lost to view, and the
belief* assumea secondarily automatic or intuitive
character. Thus, a man may have first entertained a
belief in the success
of someundertakingas the result
of a rough processof inference, but afterwards go on
trusting when the grounds for his confidenceare wholly
lost sight of.
This much may suffice for the present to show that
belief sometimes approximates to immediate, or self-
evident, conviction. How far this is the case will
come out in the course of our inquiry into its different
forms. This being so, it will be needful to include
in our present study the errors connectedwith the
processof belief in so far as they simulatethe imme-
diate instantaneous form of illusion.
What I have here called belief may be roughly
distinguishedinto simpleand compoundbelief. By a
simplebelief I meanone which hasto do with a single
eventor fact. It includessimplemodesof expectation,
aswell as beliefsin singlepast factsnot guaranteed
by
memory. A compoundbelief, on the other hand,has
reference to a number of events or facts. Thus, our
belief in the continued existence of a particular object,
as well asour convictionsrespectinggroupsor classes
 BELIEF AS SIMPLE AND COMPOUND. 297

of events,nmst be regardedas compound,sincethey

can be shownto include a number of simple beliefs.

A. Simple Illusory Belief: Expectation.

It will be well to begin our inquiry by examin-
ing the errors connected with simple expectations,
so far as these come under our definition of illusion.
And here, following our usual practice, -we may set
out with a very brief account of the nature of the
intellectual processin its correct form. For this pur-
posewe shall do well to take a complete or definite
anticipationof an eventas our type.1
The ability of the mind to moveforward,forecasting
an order of events in time, is clearly very similar to its
power of recalling events. Each depends on the
capability of imagination to represent a sequence of
events or experiences. The difference between the
two processesis that in anticipation the imagination
setting out from the present traces the successionof
experiences in their actual order, and not in the
reverse order. It would thus appear to be a more
natural and easy process than recollection, and obser-
vation bearsout this conclusion. Any object present
to perception which is associatedwith antecedentsand
consequents
with the samedegreeof cohesion,calls up
its consequents rather than its antecedents. The
spectacle of the rising of the sun carries the mind
much more forcibly forwardsto the advancingmorn-
1 In Ihe following account of the process of belief and its errors, I
am going over someof the ground traversed by my essayon Belief,
its Varietiesand Conditions(" Sensationand Intuition," ch. iv.). To
this essayI must refer the reader for a fuller analysis of the subject.
298 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

ing than backwardsto the recedingnight. And there

is goodreasonto suppose that in the order of mental
developmentthe power of distinctly expecting an
event precedesthat of distinctly recollecting one.
Thus, in the caseof the infant mind, as of the animal
intelligence,the presenceof signsof coming events,
as the preparationof food, seemsto excite distinct and
vivid expectation.1
As a mode of assurance,expectation is clearly
marked off from memory,and is not explainableby
meansof this. It is a fundamentally distinct kind of
conviction. So far as we are capableof analyzingit,
we may say that its peculiarity is its essentially active
character. To expect a thing is to have stirred the
activeimpulses,including the powersof attention; it
is to be on the alert for it, to have the attention
already focussedfor it, and to begin to rehearsethe
actions which the actual happening of the event-for
example,the approachof a welcomeobject-would
excite. It thus standsin markedcontrastto memory,
which is a passiveattitude of mind, becomingactive
only when it givesrise to the expectationof a recur-
rence of the event.2
And now let us pass to the question whether ex-
pectationever takesthe form of immediateknowledge.
1 For an accountof the difference of mechanism in memory and
expectation,see Taine, De I'Intelligence, 2ieme partie, livre premier,
ch. ii. sec. 6.
2 J. S. Mill distinguishes expectation as a radically distinct mode
of helief from, memory, but does not bring out the contrast with
respect to activity here emphasized (James Mill's Analysis of the
Human Mind, edited by J. S. Mill, p. 411, etc.). For a fuller state-
ment of my view of the relation of belief to action, as comparedwith
that of ProfessorBain, seemy earlier work.
 EXPECTATION AND RECOLLECTION. 299

It may,perhaps,
be objectedthat the anticipationof
somethingfuture cannot be knowledgeat all in the
sensein which the perceptionof somethingpresentor
the recollectionof somethingpastis knowledge. But
this objection,
whenexaminedclosely,appearsto be
frivolous. Becausethe future fact has not yet come
into the sphereof actual existence,it is none the less
the objectof a perfectassurance.1*
But, even if it is conceded that expectation is
knowledge,the objection may still be urged that it
cannot be immediate, since it is the very nature of
expectationto ground itself on memory. I have
alreadyhinted that this is not the case,and I shall
now try to show that what is called expectation
coversmuch that is indistinguishable from immediate
intuitive certainty, and consequently offers room for
an illusory form of error.
Let us set out with the simplest kind of expecta-
tion, the anticipation of somethingabout to happen
within the region of our personal experience,and
similar to what has happened before. And let the
coming of the event be first of all suggested by some
presentexternal fact or sign. Suppose,for example,
that the sky is heavy,the air sultry, and that I havea
bad headache;I confidentlyanticipatea thunderstorm..
It wouldcommonly
besaidthat suchan expectation
is
a kind of inferencefrom the past. I rememberthat
theseappearances
havebeenfollowedby athunderstorm
very often,and I infer that they will in this new case
be so followed.

1 For somegoodremarksonthe logicalaspectsof futureeventsas

matters of fact, seeMr. Venn's Logic of Chance,ch. x.
300 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

To thi?,however,it maybe repliedthat in mostcases

there is no consciousgoing back to the past at all. As
I havealreadyremarked,anticipationis pretty certainly
in advance of memory in early life. And even after
the habit of passing from the past to the future, from
memory to expectation, has been formed, the number
of the past repetitions of experience would prevent the
mind's clearly reverting to them. And, further, the
very force of habit would tend to make the transition
from memory to expectation more and more rapid,
automatic, and unconscious. Thus it comes about that
all distinctly suggestedapproaching events seemto be
expected by a kind of immediate act of belief. The
present signs call up the representation of the coming
event with all the force of a direct intuition. At
least, it may be said that if a processof inference,it is
one which has the minimum degreeof consciousness.
It might still be urged that the mind passesfrom
the presentfacts as signs,and so still performsa kind
of reasoningprocess. This is, no doubt, true, and
differentiatesexpectationfrom perception,in which
there is no conscioustransition from the presented to
the represented. Still I take it that this is only a
processof reasoningin so far as the sign is consciously
generalized,and this is certainly not true of early
expectations,or even of any expectationsin a wholly
uncultivated mind.
For these reasonsI think that any errors involved
in suchan anticipationmay,without much forciDg,be
brought under our definition of illusion. When due
altogetherto the immediateforce of suggestionin a
presentobject or event, and not involving any con-
 INTUITIVE EXPECTATION. 301

scionstransition from past to future, or from general

truth to particular instance,these errorsappear to me
to have more of the character of illusions than of that
of fallacies.
Much the same thing may be said about the
vivid anticipationsof a familiar kind of experience
calledup by a clearand consecutiveverbal suggestion.
Whena man,evenwith an apparentair of playfulness,
tells me that something is going to happen,and gives a
consistent consecutive account of this, I have an antici-
pationwhich is not consciouslygrounded on any past
experienceof the value of human testimony in general,
or of this person'stestimony in particular, but which is
instantaneous
andquasi-immediate.Consequently, any
error connected
with the mentalact approximatesto an
illusion.
So far I have supposedthat the anticipatedevent
is a recurringone,that is to say,a kind of experience
which has already become familiar to us. This, how-
ever,holdsgoodonly of a very few of our experiences.
Our life changesas it progresses,
both outwardlyand
inwardly. Many of our anticipations, when first formed,
involve much more than a reproduction of a past
experience, namely, a complex act of constructive
imagination. Our representations of these untried ex-
periences,as, for example, those connected with a new
set of circumstances,a new social condition, a new mode
of occupation,and so on,areclearlyat the first far from
simpleprocesses of inferencefrom the past. They are
put togetherby the aid of many fragmentaryimages,
restoredby distinct threadsof association,yet by a
processso rapid asto appearlike an intuition. Indeed,
302 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

the anticipation of such,new experiencesmore often

resembles an instantaneousimaginative intuition than
a processof conscioustransition from old experiences.
In the caseof theseexpectations,then, there would
clearly seem to be room for illusion from the first.
But even supposingthat the errors connected
with the first formation of an expectation cannot
strictly be called illusory, we may seethat suchsimple
expectationwill, in certain cases,tend to grow into
somethingquite indistinguishable from illusion. I
refer to expectations of remote events which allow of
frequentrenewal, Even supposingthe expectationto
have originated from some rational source,as from a
consciousinferencefrom past experience,or from the
acceptanceof somebody's statement, the very habit of
cherishing the anticipation, tends to invest it with an
automatic self-sufficient character. To all intents and
purposes the prevision becomes intuitive, by which
I mean that the mind is at the time immediately cer-
tain that something is going to happen, without need-
ing to fall back on memoryor reflection. This being
so, whenever the iaitial process of inference or quasi-
inference happensto have been bad, an illusory expecta-
tion may arise. In other words, the force of repetition
and habit tends to harden what may, in its initial
form, have resembled a kind of fallacy into an illusion.
And nowlet us proceedfurther. Whena permanent
expectationis thus formed,there arisesthe possibility
of processes
whichfavourillusion preciselyanalogous
to those which we have studied in the caseof memory.
In the first place,the habit of imagininga future
event is attended with a considerable amount of
 PEKMANENT EXPECTATIONS. 303

illusion as to time or remoteness. After what has

been said respectingthe conditions of such error in
the caseof memory, a yery few words will suffice
here.
It is clear,then, in the first place,that the mind
will tend to shorten any period of future time, and so
to antedate,so to speak,a given event,in so far as the
imaginationis able clearly and easily to run over its
probableexperiences.From this it follows that re-
peated forecastingsof seriesof events,.by facilitating
the imaginative process,tend to beget an illusory
appearanceof contraction in the time anticipated.
Moreover, since in anticipation, so much of each
division of the future time-line is unknown, it is
obviously easy for the expectant imagination to skip
over long intervals, and so to bring together widely
remote events.

In addition to this general error, there are more

special errors. As in the caseof recollection, vividness
of mental image suggests propinquity; and accord-
ingly, all -vivid anticipations, to whatever cause the
vividnessmay be owing,whether to powerful sugges-
tion onthe part of externalobjects,to verbalsuggestion.
or to spontaneous imagination and feeling, are apt to
representtheir objectsas too near.
It followsthat an event intenselylonged for, in so,
far as the imaginationis busy in representingit, will
seemto approach the present. At the same time, as
we have seen,an event much longed for commonly
appearsto be a great while coming, the explanation
being that there is a continually renewed contradiction
betweenanticipationand perception. The self-adjust-
304 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

ment of the mind in the attitude of expectant attention

proves again and again to be Tain and futile, and it is
this fact which brings home to it the slownessof the
sequencesof perceived fact, as compared with the
rapidity of the sequencesof imagination.
When speaking of the retrospective estimate of
time, I observedthat the apparent distance of an event
depends on our representationof the intervening
time-segment. And the, same remark applies to the
prospectiveestimate. Thus, an occurrencewhich we
expectto happennext weekwill seemspeciallynearif
we know little or nothing of the contents of the inter-
vening space, for in this case the imagination does
not project the experiencebehind a number of other
distinctly representedevents.
Finally, it is to be remarkedthat the prospective
appreciationof any durationwill tend to err relatively
by wayof excess, wherethe time is exceptionallyfilled
out with clearly expected and deeply interesting ex-
periences. To the imaginationof the child, a holiday,
filled with new experiences,appearsto be boundless.
Thus far I have assumed that the date of the
future event is a matter which might be known. It is,
however, obvious, from the very nature of knowledge
with respectto the future, that we may sometimesbe
certain of a thing happeningto us without knowing
with any degreeof definitenesswhen it will happen.
In the caseof thesetemporallyundefinedexpectations,
the law alreadyexpoundedholdsgoodthat all vividness
of representationtendsto lend the things represented
an appearanceof approachingevents. On the other
hand, there are some events, such as our own death,
 MISKEPBESENTATION OF FUTUKE. 305

which our instinctive feelings tend to banish to a region

so remoteas hardly to be realizedat all.
So much with respectto. errors in the localizing
of future events.
In the secondplace,,a habit of imagining a future
event or group of events will give play to those
forces which tend to transform a mental image. In
other words, the habitual indulgence of a certain
anticipationtendsto an illusory view, not only of the
" when ? " but also of the " how ? " of the future event.
These transformations, due to subtle processes of
emotion and intellect, and reflecting the present habits
of these,exactly resemblethose by which a remem-
bered event becomesgradually transformed. Thus, we
carry on our presenthabits of thought and feeling into
the remote future, foolishly imagining that at a distant
period of life, or in greatly altered circumstances,
we
shall desire and aim at the same things as now in our
existing circumstances.In closeconnectionwitJb.this
forwardprojectionof our presentselves,there betrays
itself a tendency to look on future events as answer-
ing to our presentdesires,and aspirations. In this
way,we are wont to soften,beautify, and idealize the
future, marking it off from the hard matter-of-fact
present.
The lesslike the future experienceto our pastexpe-
rience,or the more remotethe time anticipated,the
greater the scopefor such imaginative transformation.
And from this stage of fanciful transformation of a
future reality to the completeimaginative creationof
such a reality, the step is but a small one. Here we
reach the full developmentof illusory expectation,
306 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

that which corresponds

to hallucinationin the region
of sense-perception.
In order to understand these extreme forms of
illusory expectation,it will be necessaryto saysome-
thing moreaboutthe relation of imaginationto antici-
pationin general. Thereare,I conceive,goodreasons
for saying that any kind of vivid imaginationtends
to passinto a semblance of an expectationof a coming
personal experience,or an event that is about to happen
within the sphere of our own observation. It has long
been recognizedby writers,amongwhomI may men-
tion Dugald Stewart, that to distinctly imagine an
event or object is to feel for the moment a degree of
belief in the corresponding
reality. Now,I havealready
said that expectation is probably a more natural and
an earlier developed state of mind than memory. And
so it seems probable that any mental image which
happensto take hold on the mind, if not recognized
as one of memory, or as correspondingto a fact in some-
body else'sexperience,naturally assumesthe form of
an expectationof a personalexperience. The forceof
the expectationwill vary in generalas the vividness
and persistenceof the mental image. Moreover,it
follows, from what has been said, that this force of
imagination will determine what little time-character
weever give to thesewholly ungroundedillusions.
"Wesee,then,that anyprocess
of spontaneous imagi-
nationwill tend to begetsomedegreeof illusory expec-
tation. And among the agenciesby which such un-
grounded imagination arises, the promptings of feeling
play the most conspicuouspart. A present emotional
excitementmay give to an imaginative anticipation,
 IMAGINATION AND EXPECTATION. 307

suchasthat of the propheticenthusiast,a reality which

approximatesto that of an actually perceivedolbject.
And even where this force of excitement is wanting, a
gentle impulseof feeling may suffice to beget an as-
suranceof a distant reality. The unknownrecesses of
the remote future offer, indeed, the field in which the
illusory impulsesof our emotionalnature have their
richest harvest.

'* Thus, from afar, each dim discover'd seen©

More pleasing seemsthan all the past hath "been.;
And every form, that Fancy can. repair
Prom dark oblivion, glows divinely there."

The recurring emotions,the ruling aspirations,find

objectsfor themselvesin this veiled region. Feelings
too shy to burst forth in unseemlyanticipation of the
immediatefuture, modestly satisfy themselveswith
this remoteprospectof satisfaction. And thus, there
arisesthe half-touching, half-amusing spectacle of men
and women continually renewing illusory hopes, and
continually pushing the date of their realization further
on as time progressesand brings no actual fruition.
So far I havespokenof such expectations
as refer to
future personal experience only. Growing individual
experienceand the enlargement of this by the addition
of social experience enable us to frame a number of
otherbeliefsmoreor lesssimilar to the simpleexpecta-
tions just dealt with. Thus, for example, I can forecast
with confidence events which will occur in the lives of
others,and which I shall not even witness; or again,
I may even succeedin dimly descrying events,such
as political changes or scientific discoveries, which
will happenafter my personalexperienceis at an end.
308 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

Once more, I can believe in somethinggoing on

now at some distant and even inaccessible point of tbe
universe, and this appears to involve a conditional
expectation, and.to mean that I am certain that I or
anybody else would see the phenomenon,if we could
at this momentbe transportedto the spot.
All suchprevisionsare supposed to be formedby a
process of inferencefrom personalexperience, including
the trustworthiness of testimony. Evenallowing,how-
ever,that this was so in the first stagesof the belief,
It is plain that, by dint of frequent renewal,the ex-
pectation would soon ceaseto be a processof inference,
and acquire an apparently self-evident character. This
being so, if the expectation is not adequatelygrounded
to start with, it is very likely to develop into an illusion.
And it is to be added that thesepermanentanticipa-
tions may have their origin much more in our own
wishes or emotional promptings than in fact and ex-
perience. Themind undisciplinedby scientifictraining
is wont to entertain numerous beliefs of this sort re-
spectingwhat is nowgoing on in unvisitedpartsof the
world, or what will happen hereafter in the distant
future. The remote,and thereforeobscure,in space
and in time has always been the favourite region for
the projection of pleasant fancies.
Oncemore, besides these oblique kinds of expecta-
tion, I may form other seemingly simple beliefs, to
which the term expectation seemsless clearly applic-
able. Thus, on waking in the morning and finding
the ground coveredwith snow,my imaginationmoves
backwards,as in the processof memory,and realizes
 QUASI-EXPECTATIOXS. 809

the spectacleof the softly falling snow-flakesin the

hours of the night. The oral communication of others9
experience,
including the traditions of the race,enables
me to set out from any present point of time, and
reconstruct complex chains of experience of vast
length lying beyondthe boundsof my own personal
recollection.
I need not here discuss what the exact nature of
such beliefs is. J. S. Mill identifies them with ex-
pectations. Thus, accordingto him>my belief in the
nocturnal snowstorm is the assurance that I should
have seenit had I waited up during the night. So my
belief in Cicero's oratory resolves itself into the con-
viction that I should have heard Cicero under certain
conditions of time and place, which is identical with
my expectation that I shall hear a certain speaker
to-morrow if I go to the House of Commons.1 How-
everthis be,the thing to note is that suchretrospective
beliefs, when once formed, tend to approximate in
character to recollections. This is true even of new
beliefs in recent events directly made known by present
objective consequencesor signs, as the snowstorm.
For in this case there is commonly no conscious
comparison
of the presentsignswith previouslyknown
signs,but merely a direct quasi-mnemonic passageof
mind from the present fact to its antecedent. And
it is still ttiore true of long-entertainedretrospective
beliefs. When, for example, the original grounds of an
historical hypothesis are lost sight of, and after the
1 JamesMill's Analysisof the. Human Hind, edited by J. S. Mill,
vol. 1 p. 4.14,et ser[.
310 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

belief has hardened and solidified by time, it comesto

look muchmorelike a recollectionthan anexpectation.
As a matter of fact, we have seen,when studying the
illusions of memory, that our personal experiencedoes
become confused with that of others. And one may
say that all long-cherished retrospective beliefs tend
to become assimilated to recollections.
Here then, again, there seems to be room for
illusion to arise. Even in the case of a recent past
event, directly made known by present objective signs,
the mind is liable to err just as in the case of fore-
casting an immediately approaching event. And such
error has all the force of an illusion: its contradiction is
almost asgreat a shock as that of a recollection. When,
for example, I enter my house,and see a friend's card
lying on the table,I so vividly representto myselfthe
recent call of my friend, that when I learn the card is
an oldonewhich hasaccidentallybeenput on the table,
I experiencea senseof disillusionvery similar to that
which attends a contradicted perception. The early
crude stages of physical science abundantly illustrate
the genesisof such illusions.
It may be added that if there be any feeling present
in the rnincl at the time, the barest suggestion of some-
thing having happened will suffice to produce the
immediate assurance. Thus, an angry person is apt to
hastily accuseanother of having done certain things on
next to no evidence. The love of the marvellous seems
to haveplayed a conspicuous part in building up and
sustaining the fanciful hypotheseswhich mark the
dawn of physical science.
Verbal suggestionis a commonmode of produc-
 QUASI-EECOLLEOTIONS. 311

ing this semblanceof a recollected event. By means

of the narrative style, it vividly suggeststhe idea
that the events described belong to the past, and ex-
cites the imagination to a retrospectiveconstruction
of them as though they were rememberedevents.
Hencethe powerof works of fiction on the ordinary
mind. Even when there is no approachto an illusion
of perceptionyor to one of memoryin the strict sense,
the readingof a work of fiction begetsat the moment
a retrospectivebelief that hasa certainresemblanceto
a recollection.
All such illusions as those just illustrated, if not
afterwards corrected, tend to harden into yet more dis-
tinctly " intuitive " errors. Thus, for example, one of
the crude geologicalhypotheses,of which Sir Charles
Lyell tells us,1would,by the mere fact of being kept
beforethe mind, tend to petrify into a hard fixed be-
lief. And this processof hardeningis seenstrikingly
illustrated in the case of traditional errors, especially
when these fall in with our own emotional propensities.
Our habitual representations of the remote historical
past are liable to much the same kind of error as our
recollectionsof early personalexperience. The wrong
statements of others and the promptings of our own
fanciesmay lead in the first instanceto a filling up
of the remote past with purely imaginary shapes.
Afterwardsthe particular origin of the belief is for-
gotten, and the assuranceassumesthe aspect of a
perfectly intuitive conviction. The hoary traditional
myths respectingthe golden age,and so on, and the
3 Principles of Geology,ch. iii.
312 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

persistenterrorsof historiansunder the swayof a strong

emotional bias, illustrate such illusions.
So much as to simple illusions of belief, or such
as involve single representationsonly. Let us now
passto compoundillusions, which involve a complex
group of representations.

B. Compound
Illusory Belief,
A familiar exampleof a compoundbelief is the
belief in a permanentor persistentindividual object
of a certain character. Such an idea, whatever its
whole meaning may be-and this is a disputed point
in philosophy-certainly seems to include a number
of particular representations, corresponding to direct
personal recollections.,to the recollections of others,
and to numerous anticipations of ourselves and of
others. And if the object be a living creature endowed
with feelings, our idea of it will contain, in addition
to these represented perceptions of ourselves or of
others, a series of represented insights, namely, such
as correspondto the inner experienceof the being,
so far as this is known or imagined.
It would thus seem that the idea which we
habitually carry about with us respecting a complex
individual object is a very composite idea. In order
to see this more fully, let us inquire into what is
meant by our belief in a person. My idea of a par-
ticular friend contains, among other things, numbers
of vague representationsof his habitual modesof
feeling and acting, and numbersof still more vague
expectations of how he will or might feel and act in
certain circumstances.
 IDEAS OF PERMANENT THINGS. 313

Now,it is plain that such a compositeidea must

have been a very slow growth, involving, in certain
stagesof its formation,numerousprocesses
of inference
orquasi-inference
fromthe pastto the future. But in
processof time these elementsfuse inseparably: the
directly knownand the inferred no longer standapart
in my mind; naywhole conceptionof the individual
as he has been,is, and will be, seems one indivisible
cognition; and this cognition is so firmly fixed and
presentsitself so instantaneouslyto the mind when I
thiuk of the object,that it has all the appearanceof
an intuitive conviction.
If this is a fairly accuratedescriptionof the struc-
ture of these compoundrepresentationsand of their
attendantbeliefs,it is easyto seehowmany openings
for error they cover. To begin with, my representation
of so complexa thing as a concretepersonalitymust
always be exceedinglyinadequateand fragmentary.
I see only a few facets of the person'smany-sided
mind and character. And yet, in general,I am not
aware of this, but habitually identify my representa-
tion with the totality of the object.
More than this, a little attentionto the processby
which these compound beliefs arise will disclose the
fact that this apparently adequaterepresentationof
anotherhas arisenin part by other than logical pro-
cesses. If the blending of memory and expectation
were simply a mingling of facts with correct inferences
from these, it might not greatly matter; but it is
something very different from this. Not only has
our direct observation of the person been very limited,
even that which we have been able to see has not
314 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

beenperfectlymirroredin ourmemory.It Lasalready

beenremarked that recollectionis a selectiveprocess,
and this truth is strikingly illustrated in the growth
of our enduring representationsof things. What
stamps itself on my memory is what surprised me or
what deeply interested me at the moment. And then
there are all the risks of mnemonic illusion to be
taken into account as well. Thus, my idea of a person,
so far even as it is built up on a basis of direct
personalrecollection,is essentiallya fragmentaryand
to someextent a misleading representation.
Nor is this all. My habitual idea of a person is
a resultant of forces of memory conjoined with other
forces. Among these are to be reckoned the in-
fluenceof illusory perceptionor insight, my own and
that of others. The amount of misinterpretation of
the wordsand actionsof a single humanbeingduring
the courseof a long acquaintancemust be very con-
siderable. To these must be, added the effect of erro-
neoussingle expectationsand reconstructions of past
experiences,in so far as these have not been dis-
tinctly contradictedand dissipated. All theseerrors,
connectedwith single acts of observingor inferring
the feelings and doings of another, have their effect
in distorting the subsequenttotal representationof
the person.
Finally, we must include a more distinct ingredient
of active illusion, namely, all the complex effects of
the activity of imagination as led, not by fact and ex-
perience,but by feeling and desire. Our permanent
idea of another reflects all that we have fondly
imagined the person capableof doing, and thus is
 OUR REPRESENTATIONS OF OTHERS. 315

made up of an ideal as well as a real actually known

personality. And this result of spontaneousimagina-
tion must be taken to include the ideals entertained
by otherswhoarelikely to haveinfluencedus by their
beliefs.1
Enough has probablybeen said to showhow im-
mensely improbable it is that our permanent cognition
of so complexan object as a particular humanbeing
should be at all .an accurate representation of the
reality, how much of the erroneous is certain to get
mixed up with the true. And this being so, we may
say that our apparently simple direct cognition of a
given person,our assuranceof what he is and will
continue to be, is to some extent illusory.

Illusion of Self-Esteem.
Let us now pass to another case of compound
representation,where the illusory element is still more
striking. I refer to the idea of self which each of
us habitually carries about with him. Every man's
opinion of himself, as a whole, is a very complex
mental product, in which facts known by intro-
spectionno doubt play a part, but probably only a
very subordinate part. It is obvious, from what has
been said about the structure of our habitual repre-
sentations of other individuals, that our ordinary
representationof ourselveswill be tinged with that
mass of error which we have found to be connected

1 To mate this roughanalysismorecomplete,

I ought,perhaps,to
include the effect of all the errors of introspection, memory,and spon-
taneous belief, into which the person himself falls, in so far as they
communicate themselves to others.
316 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

with single acts of introspection,recollectionsof past

personalexperience, -andillusory single-expectationsof
future personalexperiences. How large an opening
for erroneous conviction here presents itself can only
be understood by a reference to certain deeply fixed
impulsesand feelings connectedwith the very con-
sciousnessof self, and favouring what I have marked
off as active illusion. I -shall try to show very briefly
that eachman'sintuitive persuasion of his ownpowers,
gifts, or importance-in brief, of his own particular
value, contains, from the first, a palpable ingredient of
active illusion.
Most persons,one supposes,have with more or less
distinct consciousness framed a notion of their own
value,if not to the world generally,at least to them-
selves. And this notion, however undefined it may
be, is held to with a singular tenacity of belief. The
greater part of mankind,indeed,seemnever to enter-
tain the question whether they really possesspoints of
excellence. They assumeit as a matter perfectly self-
evident, and appearto believe in their vaguely con-
ceived worth on the same immediate testimony of
consciousness by which they assurethemselves of their
personal existence. Indeed, the conviction of personal
consequencemay be said to be a constant factor in
mostmen'sconsciousness.
However restrainedby the
rules of polite intercourse, it betrays its existence and
its energy in innumerableways. It displays itself
mosttriumphantly whenthe mind is suddenlyisolated
from other minds, when other men unite in heaping
neglectand contempton the believer'shead. In these
momentshe provesan almostheroic strengthox con-
 OUR REPRESENTATIONS OF OURSELVES. 817

fidence,believingin himselfandin his claimsto careful

considerationwhenall his acquaintancearepractically
avowing their disbelief.
The intensity of this belief in personalvaluemay
be observedin very different forms. The young
woman who, quite independentlyof others' opinion,
and even in defianceof it, cherishesa conviction that
her external attractions have a considerable value; the
young man who, in the face of general indifference,
persists in his habit of voluble talk on the supposition
that he is conferring on his fellow-creatures the fruits
of profound wisdom; and the man of years whose
opinion of his own social importance and moral worth
is quite disproportionate to the estimation which others
form of his claims-these alike illustrate the farce and
pertinacity of the belief.
Thereare,no doubt, many exceptionsto this form
of self-appreciation. In certain robust minds, but
little given to self-reflection,the ideaof personalvalue
rarely occurs. And then there are timid, sensitive
naturesthat betray a tendency to self-distrust of all
kinds,and to an unduedepreciationof personalmerit.
Yet even here tracesof an impulse to think well of
self will appear to the attentive eye, and one can
generally recognize that this impulse is only kept
down by someother stronger force, as, for example,
extreme sensitivenessto the judgment of others, great
conscientiousness,
and so on. xlnd however this be, it
will be allowed that the averageman rates himself
highly.
It is to be noticedthat this persuasionof personal
value or excellenceis, in common,very vague. A man
318 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

may havea generalsenseof Lis own importancewith-

out in the least beingableto say wherein exactly his
superiority lies. Or, to put it anotherway, he may
have a strong conviction that he stands high in the
scale of morally deserving persons, and yet be unable
to define his position more nearly. Commonly,the
conviction seemsto be only definable as an assurance
of a superlativeof which the positive and comparative
are suppressed. At most,his idea of his moral altitude
resolvesitself into the proposition," I am a good deal
better than Mr. A. or Mr. B." Now,it is plain that in
these intuitive judgments on his own excellence, the
man is making an assertionwith respect,not only to
inner subjective feelings which he only can be supposed
to know immediately, but also to external objective
facts which are patent to others, namely, to certain
active tendencies and capabilities, to the direction of
external conduct in certain lines.1 Hence, if the
assertion is erroneous,it will be in plain contradiction
to others' perceptionsof his powersor moral endow-
ments. And this is what we actually find. A man's
self-esteem,
in a large preponderance
of cases,
is plainly
in excess of others' esteem of him. What the man
conceives himself to be differs widely from what others
conceive him to be.
" Oh wad somepowerthe giftie gie us,
To see onrsels as others see us 1"

Now, whence comesthis large and approximately

uniform discrepancybetween our self-esteemand
1 In the caseof a vain woman thinking herself much more pretty
than others think her, the error is still more obviously one connected
with a belief in objectivefact.
 ILLUSION OF SELF-ESTEEM. 319

others9esteem of us? By trying to answer this

questionwe shall cometo understandstill better the
processes
by which the mostpowerfulforms of illusion
are generated.
It is, I think, a matter of eyery-clayobservation
that childrenmanifestan apparentlyinstinctivedis-
positionto magnify self as soonas the vaguestidea of
self is reached. It is very hard to definethis feeling
morepreciselythan by terming it a rudimentarysense
of personalimportance. It may showitself in very
different ways,taking now a more active form, as an
impulseof self-assertion, and a desire to enforceone's
own will to the suppressionof others' wills, and at
another time wearing the appearanceof a passive
emotion,an elementaryform of amourpropre. And it
is this feeling which formsthe germ of the self-estima-
tion of adults. For in truth all attribution of value
involvesan elementof feeling, as respect,and of active
desire,and the ascription of value to one'sself is in
its simplestform merely the expressionof this state
of mind.

But how is it, it may be asked,that this feeling

showsitself instinctively as soon as the idea of self
begins to arise in consciousness
? The answer to this
questionis to be found,I imagine,in the generallaws
of mental development. All practical judgments like
that of self-estimationarebasedon somefeeling which
is developedbeforeit; and, again,the feeling itself is
basedon some instinctive action which, in like manner,
is earlier than the feeling. Thus, for example,an
Englishman's judgment that his native country is of
paramountvalue springs out of a long-existentsenti-
320 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

ment of patriotism,which, sentiment again may be

regardedas having slowlygrown up about the half-
blindly followed habit of defending and furthering
the interests of one's nation or tribe. In a similar way,
one suspects,the feeling of personalworth, with its
accompanying judgment,is a productof a long process
of instinctive action.
What this action is it ia scarcely necessary to
remind the reader. Every living organismstrives,or
acts as if it consciouslystrove, to maintain its life
and promote its well-being. The actionsof plants
are clearly related to the needs of a prosperousexist-
ence, individual first and serial afterwards. The move-
ments of the lower animals have the same end. Thus,
on the suppositionthat man has been slowly evolved
from lower forms, it is clear that the instinct of self-
promotionmustbe the deepestand mostineradicable
element of his nature, and it is this instinct which
directly underlies the rudimentary sentiment of self-
esteemof which we are now treating.
This instinct will appear,first of all, as the unre-
flecting organized habit of seeking individual good,
of aiming at individual happiness,and so of pushing
on the action of the individual will. This impulse
shows itself in distinct form as soon as the individual
is brought into competitionwith anothersimilarly con-
stituted being. It is the force which displaysitself
in all opposition and hostility, and it tends to limit
and counteract the gregariousinstincts of the race.
In the next place, as intelligence expands,this in-
stinctive action becomesconsciouspursuit of an end,
and at this stagethe thing pursuedattractsto itself
 OEIGIN OF SELF-ESTEEM. 321

a sentiment. The individual now consciouslydesires

his own happinessas contrastedwith that of others,.
knowinglyaimsat enlarginghis ownsphereof action
to the diminution of others' spheres. Here we have
the nascent sentiment of self-esteem, on which all
later judgmentsrespecting
individual importance
are,
in part at least, founded.
Thus, we see that long before man had arrived
at an idea of self there had been growing up an
emotional predisposition to think well of self. And
in this way we may understand how it is that this
sentimentof self-esteemshowsitself immediatelyand
instinctively in the child's mind as soonas its un-
folding consciousness is strong enough to grasp the
first rough idea of personalexistence. Far down, so
t3 speak, below the surface of distinct consciousness,
in the intricate formation of ganglion-cell and nerve-
fibre, the connections between the idea of self and
this emotion of esteemhave been slowly woven through
long agesof animaldevelopment.
Here, then, we seemto have the key to the appar-
ently paradoxicalfact that a man, with all his superior
means of studying his own feelings, commonly esteems
himself, in certain respects at least, less accurately
than a good external observerwould be capable of
doing. In forming an opinion of ourselveswe are ex-
posedto the full force of a powerful impulseof feeling.
This impulse, acting as a bias, enters more or less
distinctly into our single acts of introspection,into
our attempts to recall our past doings, into our in-
sights into the meaningof others'words and actions
as related to ourselves(forming the natural disposition
Y
322 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

to enjoy flattery), and finally into our wild dreams

as to our future achievements.It is thus the principal
root of that gigantic illusion of self-conceit,which has
long beenrecognizedby practical senseas oneof the
greatestobstaclesto socialaction; and by art as oneof
the most ludicrous manifestations of human weakness.
If there are all these openings for error in the
beliefs we go on entertaining respecting individual
things, including ourselves,there must be a yet
larger number of such openings in those still rnore
compoundbeliefswhich we habitually hold respecting
collections or classesof things. A single illusion of
perceptionor of memorymay sufficeto give riseto a
"whollyillusorybeliefin a classof objects,
for example,
ghosts.Thesuperstitious beliefsofmankindabundantly
illustrate this complexity of the sourcesof error. And
in the caseof our every-daybeliefsrespectingreal
classesof objects, these sources contribute a consider-
able quotaof error. We mayagainseethis by examin-
ing our ordinarybeliefsrespectingour fellow-men.
A moment'sconsiderationwill showthat our pre-
vailing views respectingany sectionof mankind,say
our fellow-countrymen, or mankind at large,correspond
at best to a very loose processof reasoning. The
.accidentsof our personalexperienceand opportunities
of observation,the traditions which coloured our first
ideas,the influenceof our dominantfeelingsin selecting
for attention and retention certain aspectsof the com-
plex object,and in idealizingthis object,-thesesources
"of passive and active illusion must, to say the least,
have had as much to do with our present solidified and
seemingly" intuitive " knowledgeas anything that can
 ILLUSORY VIEWS OF WORLD. 323

be called the exercise of individual judgment and

reasoning power.
The force of this observation and the proof that
suchwidely generalizedbeliefsare in part illusory, is-
seen in the fact that men of unlike experience and
unlike temperamentform, such utterly dissimilar views
of the sameobject. Thus, as Mr. Spencerhas shown,1
in looking at things national there may be not only a
powerful patriotic bias at work in the case of the
vulgar Philistine, but also a distinctly anti-patriotic
bias in the case of the over-fastidious seeker after
culture. And I need hardly acid that the different
estimates of mankind held with equal assurance by
the cynic, the misanthropist,and the philanthropic
vindicator of his species, illustrate a like diversity
of the psychological conditions of belief.
Finally, illusion may enter into that still wider
collectionof beliefswhich makeup our ordinaryviews
of life and the world as a whole. Here there reflect
themselvesin the plainest manner the accidents of our
individual experienceand the peculiar errors1to which
our intellectual and emotionalconformationdisposes
us. The world is for us what we feel it to be ; and we
feel it to be the causeof our particular emotionalex-
perience. Just as we have found that our environment
helps to determineour ideaof self and personalcon-
tinuity, so,conversely,our inner experience,
our remem-
beredor imagined joys and sorrowsthrow a reflection
on the outerworld,giving it its degreeof worth. Hence
the contradictory,and consequentlyto someextent at
least illusory, viewsof the optimist and the pessimist,
1 The Study of Sociology>cb. is.
32-i ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

" intuitions " which, I have tried to show elsewhere,

are connectedwith deeply rooted habits of feeling,
and areantecedentto all reasonedphilosophicsystems.
If proofwereyet wantedthat thesewide-embracing
beliefs may to someextent be illusory, tit would be
found in the fact that they can be distinctly coloured
by a temporary mood or mental tone. As I have
more than once had occasionto remark, a feeling
whenpresenttendsto colourall the ideas of the time.
And when out of sorts, moody, and discontented, a man
is proneto find a large objectivecauseof his dissatisfac-
tion in a world out of joint and not moving to his mind.
It is evident that all the permanent beliefs touched
on in this chaptermust constitutepowerful predisposi-
tions with respectto any particular act of perception,
insight, introspection,or recollection. In other words,
thesepersistentbeliefs,sofar as individual or personal,
are but another name for those fixed habits of mind
which, in the case of each one of us, constitute our
intellectual bias, and the source of the error known as
personalequation. And it may be addedthat, just as
these erroneousbeliefs existing in the shape of fixed
prejudicesconstitutea bias to new error, so they act
as powerful resisting forcesin relation to new truth
and the correction of error.
In comparing these illusions of belief with those of
perception and memory, we cannot fail to notice their
greater compassor range, in other words, the greater
t xtent of the region of fact misrepresented. Even if
they arelessforcible and irresistible than theseerrors*
they clearly makeup for this by the areawhich they
cover*
 DIVERGENCE Otf BELIEF. 825

Another thing to be observedwith respectto these

comprehensivebeliefs is that where,as here,so many
co-operantconditions are at work, the whole amount of
commonobjectiveagreementis greatly reduced. In
other words,individual peculiarities of intellectual con-
formation,emotionaltemperament,andexperiencehave
a far wider scope for their influence in these beliefs
than they havein the caseof presentativecognitions.
At the same time, it is noteworthy that error much
more rapidly propagates itself here than in the caseof
our perceptionsor recollections. As we have seen,
these beliefs all include much more than the results of
the individual's own experience. They offer a large
field for the influenceof personalascendency,of the
contagion of sympathy, and of authority and tradition.
As a consequence'of this, the illusions of belief are
likely to be far more persistentthan those of percep-
tion or of memory; for not only do they lose that
salutary processof correctionwhich comparisonwith
the experienceof others affords,but they may even
be strengthenedand upheld to someextent by such
social influences.
And here the question might seemto obtrude itself,
whether, in relation to sucha fluctuating massof belief
as that just reviewed, in which there appears to be so
little common agreement, we can correctly speak of
anything as objectivelydeterniinable. If illusion and
error as a whole are defined by a reference to what is
commonly held true and certain, what, it may be
asked, becomesof the so-called illusions of belief?
This questionwill have to be fully dealt with in
the following chapter. Here it may be sufficient to
328 ILLUSIONS OF BELIEF.

remark that amid all this apparentdeviation of belief

from a common standard of truth, there is a clear
tendencyto a rational consensus.Thought, by dis-
engaging what is really matter of permanent and
common cognition, both in the individual and still
more in the class/ and fixing this quantum of common
cognition in the shape of accurate definitions and
universal propositions,is ever fighting against and
restraining the impulses of individual imagination
towards dissociation and isolation of belief. And this-
same processof scientific control of belief is ever tend-
ing to correct widespread traditional forms of error,
and to erect a new and better standard of common
cognition.
This scientific regulation of belief only fails where
the experienceswhich underlie the conceptions are
individual, variable, and subjective. Hence there is
no definite common conception of the value of life
and of the world, just because the estimate of this
value must vary with individual circumstances, tem-
perament,etc. All that canbe lookedfor here in the
way of a common standard or norm is a rough average
estimate. And this common-sensejudgment serves
practicallyas a sufficientcriterion of truth, at leastin
relation to such extreme one-sidedness of view as-
approaches the abnormal,that is to say,oneof the two
poles of irrational exaltation, or "joy-madness,"and
1 As a matter of fact, the proportion of accurateknowledgeto error
is far larger in tho caseof classes than of individuals. Propositions
with general terms for subject are less liable to be faulty than propo-
sitions with singular terms for subject.
 CONVERGENCE OF BELIEF. 327

abjectmelancholy,whichappearamongthe phenomena
of mental disease.1

1 For a description of eachof these extremes of boundless gaiety

and utter despondency,seeGriesinger, op. cit^ Bk. III. ch. i. and ii.
The relation of pessimism to pathological conditions is familiar
enough; less familiar is the relation of unrestrained optimism. Yet
Griesingerwrites that among the insane " boundlesshilarity," with " a
feeling of goodfortune," and a general contentment with everything,,
is as frequent as depressionand repining (see especially p. 281, also
pp. 64, GJ).
 CHAPTER XIL ..

RESULTS,

THE foregoingstudy of illusionsmay not improbably

have had a bewildering effect on the mind, of the
reader. To keep the mental eye, like the bodily eye,
for any time intently fixed on one object is apt to
producea feeling of giddiness. And in the case of a
subject like illusion, the effect is enormously increased
by the disturbing character of the object looked at.
Indeed, the first feeling produced by our survey of the
widefield of illusory error might be expressedpretty
accuratelyby the despondentcry of the poet-
"Alas! it is delusion all:
The future cheats us from afar,
Nor can we bo what \ve recall,
Nor dare we think on what "we are."

It must be confessedthat our study hastendedto

bring hometo the mind the wide rangeof the illusory
and unreal in our intellectual life. In sense-percep-
tion, in the introspection of the mind's own feelings, in
the readingof others'feelings,in memory,and finally
in belief, we have found a large field for illusory
cognition. And while illusion has thus so great a
depth in the individual mind, it has a no less striking
 EANGE OF ILLUSION. 329

Breadth, or extent in the collective human mind. No

doubt its grosserforms manifest themselves most con-
spicuouslyin the undisciplined mind of the savage
"andthe rustic ; yet eventhe cultivated mind is by no
means free from, its control. In truth, most of the
illusions illustrated in this work are such as can be
.sharedin by all classesof mind.
In view of this wide far-reaching area of ascer-
tained error, the mind naturally asks,What are the
real limits of illusory cognition, and how can we bo
ever sureof having got beyondthem? This question
leads us on to philosophicalproblemsof the greatest
consequence, problemswhich can only be very lightly
touchedin this place. Before approachingthese,let
us look back a little more carefully and gather up our
results, reflect on the method which we have been
"unconsciously adopting, and inquire how far this
"scientificmodeof procedurewill take us in determin-
ing what is the whole range of illusory cognition.
We havefound an ingredient of illusion mixed up
with all the popularly recognizedforms of imme-
diate knowledge. Yet this ingredient is not equally
'Conspicuousin all cases. First of all, illusion varies
very considerablyin its degreeof force andpersistence.
Thus,in general,a presentativeillusion is morecoercive
than a representative;an apparentreality presentto
the mind is naturally felt to be more indubitable than
oneabsentand only represented. On the other hand,
a representative illusion is often more enduring than a
presentative,that is to say,less easily found out. It
as to be added that a good deal of illusion is only
partial, there being throughout an under-current of
:$30 RESULTS.

rational consciousness,
a gentle play of self-criticism,
-whichkeepsthe error from developinginto a perfect
self-delusion. This remark applies not only to the
innocent illusions of art, but also to many of our
every-clay
illusions,both presentativo
and representa-
tive. In manycases, indeed,as,for example,in looking
at a reflectionin a mirror,the illusion is veryimperfect,
remainingin the nascentstage.
Again, a little attention to the facts here brought
togetherwill showthat the proportion of illusory to
real knowledgeis far from being the samein each
classof immediate or quasi-immediate cognition. Thus,
with respectto the great distinction betweenpresenta-
tive and representativeknowledge,it is to be observed
that, in sofar asany act of cognitionis, strictly speak-
ing, presentative,it doesnot appearto admit of error.
The illusions of perception are connected with the
representativeside of the process,and are numerous
just becausethis is so extensive. On the other hand,
in introspection,wherethe scopeof independentrepre-
sentationis so limited, the amountof illusion is very
inconsiderable, and may in practice be disregarded..
So again,to take a narrowergroup of illusions, we
find that in the recalling of distant eventsthe pro-
portion of erroris vastly greater than in the recalling
of near events.
So much as to the extent of illusion as brought to
light by our precedingstudy. Let us now glanceat
the couclusionsobtainedrespectingits nature andits
causes.
 CAUSES OF ILLUSION". 331

Causesof Illusion.

Looking at illusion as a whole, and abstracting

from the differencesof mental mechanismin the pro-
cessesof perception,memory,etc., we may say that
.the rationale or mode of genesisof illusion is very
much the samethroughout. Speaking broadly, one
may describeall knowledge as a correspondence of
representationwith fact or experience,or as a stable
condition of the representation which cannot be dis-
turbed by new experiences. It does not matter, for
our presentpurpose,whether the fact representedis
supposedto be directly present,as in presentative
cognition; or to be absent,either as somethingpastor
future, or finally as a " generalfact," that is to say,the
groupof facts(past andfuture) embodiedin a universal
proposition.1
In generalthis accordancebetweenour representa-
tions and facts is securedby the laws of our intellectual
mechanism. It follows from the principles of associa-
tion that our simple experiences,external and internal,
will tend to reflect themselves in perception, memory,.
expectation,and generalbelief, in the very time-con-
nections in which they actually occur. To put it
briefly, factswhich occur togetherwill in general be
represented together,and they will bo the more per-
fectly co-representedin proportionto the frequencyof
this concurrence.

1 It lias beenseenthat, from a purely psychological point of view,

even Tvhat looks at first like pure presentative cognition, as, for ex-
ample,the recognitionof a presentfeeling of the mind, involves.
«n ingredient of representation.
S32 RESULTS.

Illusion, as distinguishedfrom,correct knowledge,

is, to put it broadly,deviation of representationfrom
fact. This is due in part to limitations and defects
hi the intellectual mechanism itself, such as the im-
perfections
of the activities of attention,discrimination,
and comparison,in relation to what is present. Still
more is it due to the control of our mental processes
by association and habit. These forces,which are at
the very root of intelligence, are also, in a sense,the
originators of error. Through the accidents of our
"experienceor the momentary condition of our repro-
ductive power, representations get wrongly grouped
with presentations and with one another; wrongly
grouped, that is to say, according to a perfect or ideal
standard,namely, that the grouping should always
exactly agree with the order of experience as a whole,
and the force of cohesionbe proportionate to the number
of the conjunctions of this experience.
This great source of error has been so abundantly
illustrated under the head of Passive Illusions that I
neednot dwell on it further. It is plain that a passive
orror of perception,or of expectation,is due in generalto
-adefective grouping of elements,to a grouping which
answers,perhaps,to the run of the individual's actual
experience,but not to a large and completecommon
experience.1Similarly, an illusory generalbelief is
plainly a welding together of elements(hereconcepts,
answering to innumerable representative images) in
disagreementwith the permanentconnectionsof ex-
perience. Even a passiveillusion of memory,in so
1 See especially -what was said about the rationale of illusions
of perception,pp. 37, 38.
 RATIONALE OF ILLUSION. 333

far asit involvesa rearrangementof successive

repre-
sentations, shows the same kind of defect.
In the secondplace, this incorrect grouping may-
be due, not to defects in attention and discrimination,
combinedwith insufficientlygroundedassociation, but
to the independentplay of constructiveimagination
andthe capricesof feeling. This is illustrated in what
I have called Active Illusions, whether the excited
perceptions and the hallucinations of sense, or the
fanciful projectionsof memory or of expectation.
Here we have a force directly opposedto that of ex-
perience. Active illusion arises,not through the im-
perfections of the intellectual mechanism, but through
a palpable interference with this mechanism. It is a
regrouping of elements which simulates the form of
a suggestion by experience,but is, in reality, the out-
come of the individual mind's extra-intellectual im-
pulses.
We see, then, that, in spite of obvious differences
in the form, the processin all kinds of immediate
cognition is fundamentally identical. It is essentially
a bringing together of elements,whether similar
or dissimilar and associatedby a link of contiguity,
and a viewing of these as connected parts,of a whole ;
it is a process of synthesis. And illusion, in all its
forms,is bad grouping or carelesslyperformed synthesis.
This holds good even of the simplest kinds of error in
which a presentativeelementis wrongly classed;and
it holds good of those more conspicuouserrors of per-
ception, memory, expectation, and compound belief, in
which representationsconnect themselves in an order
not perfectly answering to the objective order.
331 RESULTS.

This view of the nature and causes of illusion is

clearlycapableof beingexpressed in physicallanguage.
Bad grouping of psychical elementsis equivalentto
imperfectco-ordinationof their physical,that is to say,
nervous, conditions, imperfect in the evolutionist's
sense,as not exactly according with external relations.
So far as illusions of suggestion (passive illusions)
are concerned,the error is connected with organized
tendencies, due to a limited action of experience.
On the other hand, illusions of preconception (active
illusions)usually involve no such deeplyfixed or per-
manentorganicconnections,but merely a temporary
confluence of nerve-processes.1 The nature of the
physicalprocessis best studiedin the caseof errorsof
sense-perception.Yet we may hypothetically argue
that even in the caseof the most complex errors, as
those of memoryand of belief, there is implied a
deviation in the mode of connection of nervous struc-
tures (whether the connection be permanent or tem-
porary)from the externalorderof facts.
And nowwe are in a position to seewhether illusion
is ultimately distinguishable from, other modes of
error, namely,tho^e incident to consciousprocesses
of reasoning. It must have been plain to an attentive
reader throughout our exposition that, in spite of our
provisional distinction, no sharp line can be drawn
betweenmuch of what, on the surface,looks like im-
mediate knowledge, and consciously derived or inferred
knowledge. On its objective side,reasoningmay be
1 I say " usually," because,as -weLave seen,there may sometimes
be a permanentand evenan inherited predispositionto active illusion
in the individual temperamentand nervousorganization.
 ILLUSION AND FALLACY. 335

roughly definedas a conscioustransition of mind from

certain facts or relations of facts to other facts or
relations recognized as similar. According to this
definition, a fallacy would be a hasty, unwarranted
transition to new cases not identical with the old.
And a good part of immediate knowledge is funda-
mentally the same,only that here, through the ex-
ceptionalforce of associationand habit, the transition
Is too rapid to be consciouslyrecognized. Conse-
quently, illusion becomesidentified at bottom with
fallacious inference: it may be briefly described as
collapsedinference. Thus, illusory perception and
expectationare plainly a hasty transition of mind
from old to new, from past to present, conjunctions of
experience.1And, as wehaveseen,an illusory general
belief owes its existence to a coalescenceof represen-
tations of known facts or connections with products
of imagination which simulatethe appearanceof in-
ferences from these facts.
In the case of memory, in so far as it is not aided
1 See what was said on the nature of passive illusions of sense
(pp. 44, GS,70,etc.)- The logical characterof illusion might be brought
"outby saying that it resemblesthe fallacy which is due to reasoning
from an approximategeneralizationas though it were a universal truth.
In thus identifying illusion and fallacy, I must not be understood to
say that there is, strictly speaking, any such thing as an unconscious
reasoning process. On the contrary, I hold that it is a contradic-
tion to talk of any mental operation as altogether unconscious. I
simply wish to show that, by a kind of fiction, illusion may be de-
scribedas the result of a seriesof stepswhich, if separately unfolded
to consciousness (as they no longer are), would correspondto those of
a processof inference. The fact that illusion arises by a processof
contraction out of consciousinference seemsto justify this use of lan-
guage, even apart from the fact that the nervous processesin the two
casesare pretty certainly the same.
336 RESULTS.

by reasoning from, present signs, there seems to be-

nothing like a movement of inference. It is evident,
indeed, that memory is involved in and underlies every
such transition of thought. Illusions of memory illus-
trate rather a processof wrong classing, that is to say,
of wrongly identifying the present mental image with
past fact, which is the initial step in all inference. In
this way they closely resemblethoseslight errorsof
perception which are due to erroneousclassingof sense-
impressions.But sincethe intellectualprocessinvolved
in assimilating mental elements is very similar to that
implied in assimilating complex groups of such ele-
ments, we may say that even in these simple kinds of
error there is something which resemblesa wrong
classingof relations, something,therefore,which ap-
proximates in character to a fallacy.
By help of this brief review of the nature and
causes of illusion, we see that in general it may be
spoken of as deviation of individual from common
experience. This appliesto passiveillusion in so far
asit followsfromthe accidentsof individual experience,
and it still more obviouslyappliesto activeillusion as
due to the vagaries of individual feeling and construc-
tive imagination. We might, perhaps,characterizeall
illusion as partial view, partial both in the sense of
being incomplete, and in the other senseof being that
to which the mind by its peculiar predispositions in-
clines. This being so, we may very roughly describe
all illusion as abnormal. Just as hallucination, the
most signal instance of illusion, is distinctly on the
border-land of healthy and unhealthy mental life;
just as dreamsare in the direction of such unhealthy
 EREOB AS INDIVIDUAL. 337

mental action ; so the lesser illusions of memory and so

on are abnormal in the sense that they imply a
departurefrom a commontypical modeof intellectual
action.
It is plain, indeed,that this is the positionwe have
beentaking up throughoutour discussionof illusion.
We have assumed that what is common and normal is
true, or answersto what is objectively real. Thus, in
dealingwith errorsof perception,we took for granted
that the common percept-meaning by this what is
permanentin the individual and the general ex-
perience-is at the sametime the true percept. So
in discussing the illusions of memory we estimated ob-
jective time by the judgment of the average man, free
from individual bias, and apart from special circum-
stances favourable to error. Similarly, in the caseof
belief, true belief was held to be that which men in
general, or in the long run, or on the average, hold
true, as distinguished from what the individual under
variable and accidental influences holds true. And
even in the case of introspection we found that true
cognition resolved itself into a consensusor agreement
as to certain psychical facts.
Criterion of Illusion.
Now,it behovesus hereto examinethis assumption,
with the view of seeing how far it is perfectly sound.
For it maybe that what is commonlyheld true does
not in all cases strictly answerto the real, in which
case our idea of illusion would have to be extended so
as to include certain common beliefs. This question
waspartly openedup at the closeof the last chapter.
338 RESULTS.

It will be found that the full discussion of It carries us

beyond the scientific point of view altogether. For
the present,however,let us seewhat canbe saidabout
it from that standpoint of positive scienceto which we
have hitherto been keeping.
Now, if by common be meant what has been shared
by all mindsor the majority of minds up to a particu-
lar time, a moment'sinspection of the processof
correctingillusion will showthat scienceassumesthe
possibility of a commonillusion. In the history of
discovery,the first assaulton an error wasthe setting
up of the individual against the society. The men
who first dared to say that the sun did not move round
the earth found to their costwhat it wasto fly in the
faceof a common,though illusory, perceptionof the
senses.1
If, however, by common be understood what is
permanently and unshakably held true by men in
proportion as their minds becomeenlightened,then
science certainly does assume the truth of common
perceptionandbelief. Thus, the progressof the phy-
sical sciencesmay be described as a movement towards
a new, higher, and more stable consensusof ideas and
beliefs. In point of fact, the truths accepted by men
of science already form a body of common belief for
1 If we turn from the region of*physical to that of moral ideas,
we see this historical collision between common and individual con-
viction in a yet more impressive form. The teacher of a new moral
truth has again and again been set down to be an illusionist by a
society which WHSitself under the sway of a long-reigning error.
As GeorgeEliot observes," What we call illusions are often, in truth,
a wider vision of past and present realities-a willing movement of a
man's soul with the larger sweepof tho world's forces."
 TRUTH AS COMMON". 339

thosewho are supposedby all to have the meansof

testing the value of their convictions. And the same
appliesto the successive improvementsin the concep-
tions of the moral sciences,for example, history and
psychology. Indeed, the very meaning of science
appearsto be a body of commoncognition to which
all minds -converge
in proportion to their capabilities
and opportunitiesof studying the particular subject-
matter concerned.
Not only so, from a strictly scientific point of
view it might seem possible to prove that common
cognition, as defined above,must in general be true
cognition.. I refer here to the now familiar method of
the evolutionist.
According to this doctrine, which is a scientific
methodin so far as it investigatesthe historical de-
velopments of mind or the order of mental phenomena
in time, cognition may be viewed as a part of the result
of the interaction of external agenciesand the organism,
as an incident of the great processof adaptation, phy-
sical and psychical, of organism to environment. In
thus looking at cognition, the evolutionist is making
the assumptionwhich all science makes, namely, that
correct views are correspondencesbetween internal
(mental) relations and external (physical) relations,
incorrect views disagreements betweenthese relations.
From this point of view he may proceed to argue that
the intellectual processesmust tend to conform to ex-
ternal facts. All correspondence,he tells us, means
fitness to external conditions and practical efficiency,
all want of correspondence practical incompetence.
Consequently, those individuals in whom the corre-
340 RESULTS.

spondencewas more complete and exact would have

an advantagein the struggle for existence and so tend
to be preserved. In this way the processof natural
selection,by separatelyadjusting individual repre-
sentationsto actualities,would make them, converge
towards a common meeting-point or social standard of
true cognition. That is to say,by eliminating or at
least greatly circumscribing the region of individual
illusion,natural selectionwouldexcludethe possibility
of a persistentcommon illusion.
Not only so, the evolutionist may say that this
coincidence between common beliefs and true beliefs
would be furthered by social as well as individual
competition. A communityhas an advantagein the
struggle with other communitieswhen it is dis-
tinguished by the presence of the conditions of
effective co-operation, such as mutual confidence.
Among these conditions a body of true knowledge
seems to be of the first importance, since conjoint
action always presupposescommon beliefs, and, to be
effective action, implies that these beliefs are correct.
Consequently, it may be argued, the forces at work
in the action of man on man, of society on the indi-
vidual, in the way of assimilating belief, must tend,
in the long run, to bring about a coincidence between
representations and facts. Thus, in another way,
natural selection would help to adjust our ideas to
realities,and to excludethe possibility of anything,
like a permanentcommon error.
Yet oncemore,accordingto Mr. Herbert Spencer,
the tendency to agreement between our ideas and
the environmentwould be aidedby what he callsthe
 EVOLUTIONIST'S VIEW OF ERROR. 341

directprocess
of adaptation.Theexercise
of a function
tendsto the developmentof that function. Thus, our
actsof perceptionmust becomemore exactby mere
repetition.So, too,the representations
and concepts
growingout of perceptionsmust tend to approximate
to externalfactsby the direct actionof the environment
on our physicaland psychical organism; for external
relations which are permanentwill, in the long run,
stampthemselveson our nervousand mental structure
more deeply and indelibly than relations which are
variable and accidental.
It would seem, from all this, that so long as we
arekeeping to the scientific point of view, that is to
say, taking for granted that there; is somethingob-
jectively real answeringto our perceptionsand con-
ceptions,the questionof the possibility of a universal
or (permanently)commonillusion doesnot arise. Yet
a little more reflection will show us that it may arise
in a way. Sofar as the logical sufficiencyof the social
consensusor commonbelief is accepted as scientifically
proved, it is open to suspicion on strictly scientific
grounds. The evolutionist's proof involves one or two
assumptionswhich are not exactly true.
In the first place, it is not strictly correct to say
that all illusion involves a practical unfitness to cir-
cumstances. At the close of our investigation of
particulargroupsof illusion, for example,thoseof per-
ception and memory,it was pointed out that manyof
the errorsreviewedwere practically harmless,being
either momentary and evanescent,or of such a cha-
racter as not to lead to injurious action. And now,
by glancingback over the field of illusion as a whole,
342 RESULTS.

wemay seethe samething. The day-dreams

in which
some people are apt to indulge respecting the remote
future have little effect on their conduct. So,too, a
man's general view of the world is often unrelated to
his daily habitsof life. It seemsto matter exceedingly
little, in general,whether a persontake up the geo-
centric or the heliocentric conception of the cosmic
structure, or even whether he adopt an optimistic or
pessimisticview of life and its capabilities.
So inadequate,indeed,doesthe agencyof natural
selectionseemto be to eliminate illusion,that it may
even be asked whether its tendency may not be
sometimes to harden and fix rather than to dissolve
and dissipate illusory ideas and beliefs. It will at
once occur to the readerthat the illusion of self-esteem,
discussedin the last chapter,may have beenhighly
useful as subserving individual self-preservation. In
a similarway,it has been suggestedby Schopenhauer
that the illusion of the lover owes its force and his-
torical persistenceto its paramount utility for the pre-
servation of the species. And to pass from a recurring
individual to a permanently common-belief, it is main-
tained by the same pessimist and his followers that
what they regard as the illusion of optimism, namely,
the idea that human life as a whole is- good,,grows out
of the individual's irrational love of life, which is only
the same instinctive impulse of self-preservation ap-
pearing as conscious desire. Once more, it has been
suggestedthat the belief in free-will, even if illusory,
\\ouldbe preservedby the processof evolution,, owing
to its paramount utility in certain stages of moral
development. All this seems to show at least the
 HAEMLESS ILLUSIONS. 343

possibilityof a kind of illusionwhich wouldtend to

perpetuateitself,andto appearasa permanentcommon
belief.
Now, so far as this is the case,so far as illusion is
useful or only harmless,natural selectioncannot,it is
plain, be countedon to weedit out, keeping it within
the narrow limits of the exceptionaland individual.
Natural selectiongetsrid of what is harmful only, and
is indifferent to what is practically harmless.
It may, however, still be said that the process of
direct adaptation must tend to establish such a con-
sensus of true belief. Now, I do not wish for a moment
to dispute that the growth of intelligence by the con-
tinual exercise of its functions tends to such a con-
sensus: this is assumed to be the case by everybody.
What I want to point out is that there is no scientific
proof of this position.
The correspondenceof internal to external relations
is obviously limited by the modes of action of the
environment on the organism, consequently by the
structure of the organism itself. Scientific men are
familiar with the idea that there may be forces in the
environment which are practically inoperative on the
organism,there being no corresponding mode of sensi-
bility. And evenif it be said that our presentknow-
ledge of the material world, including the doctrine
of the conservationof energy,enablesus to assertthat
there is no mode of force 'wholly unknown to us, it
canstill be contended
that the environment
may,for
aughtwe know,bevastly morethan the forcesof which,
owingto the nature of our organism,we knowit to be
composed.In short,since,,on the evolutiontheory
344 RESULTS.

viewed as a scientific doctrine, the real external world

does not directly mirror itself in our minds, but only in-
directly brings our perceptions
and representations
into
adjustmentby bringing into adjustmentthe nervous
organismwith which they are somehowconnected, it
is plain that wecannotbe certainof adequatelyappre-
hending the external reality which is here assumed
to exist.
Science, then, cannot prove, but must assume the
coincidencebetweenpermanent common intuitions and
objectivereality. To raisethe questionwhether this
coincidenceis perfect or imperfect, whether all common
intuitions known to be persistent are true or whether
there are any that are illusory, is to pass beyond the
scientific point of view to another,namely,the philo-
sophic. Thus,our study of illusion naturally carries
us on from scientific to philosophic reflection. Let me
try to makethis still moreclear.
Transition to Philosophic View.
All science makes certain assumptions which it
never examines. Thus, the physicist assumes that
when we experiencea sensationwe are acted on by
some pre-existing external object which is the cause,
or at least one condition, of the sensation. While
resolving the secondaryqualities of light, sound,etc.,
into modes of motion, while representing the object
very differently from the unscientificmind, he agrees
with this in holding to the reality of something ex-
ternal, regardingthis as antecedentto and thereforeas
independentof the particular mind which receivesthe
sense-impression.Again, he assumesthe uniformity
 COMMON INTUITIONS CHALLENGED.

of nature,the universality of the causal relation, and

so on.

Similarly, the modernpsychologist,whenconfining

himself within the limits of positive science,and treat-
ing mind phenomenallyor empirically, or, in other
words,tracing the order of mental statesin time and
assigningtheir conditions,takes for grantedmuch the
sameas physicalsciencedoes. Thus, as our foregoing
analysisof perceptionshows,heassumes that thereis an
external cause of our sensations, that there are material
bodiesin space,which act on our sense-organs
and so
serve as the condition of our sense-impressions. More
than this, he regards, in the way that has been illus-
trated in this work, the percept itself, in so far as it
is a processin time, as the normal result of the action
of such external agents on our nerve-structures, in
other words, as the effect of such action in the case
of the healthy and perfect nervous organism with the
averageorganizeddispositions,
physical and psychical;
in which casehe supposesthe perceptto correspond,
in certain respects at least, with the external cause
as made known by physical science. And, on the
otherhand,he lookson a false or illusory perceptas
arising in anotherway not involving, as its condition,
the pre-existenceof a correspondingmaterial bodyor
physical agent. And in this view of perception,as of
othermentalphenomena, the psychologistclearlytakes
for granted the principle that all mental events con-
form to the law of causation. Further, he assumes
that the individual mind is somehow,
in a way which
it is not his province to inquire into, one and the same
throughout, and so on.
346 RESULTS.

The doctrine of evolution, too, in so far as scientific

-that is, aiming at giving an account of the historical
and pre-historicaldevelopments
of the collectivemind
in time-agrees with psychologyin making like as-
sumptions. Thus, it conceivesan external agency
(the environment) as the cause of our common sensa-
tions and perceptions. That is to say, it represents
the external world as somehowantecedent to, and so
apparentlyindependentof, the perceptionswhich are
adjusted to it. And all this showsthat science,while
removed from vulgar unenlightened opinion, takes
sides with popular thought in assuming the truth of
certain fundamental ideas or so-calledintuitive beliefs,
into the exactmeaningof which it doesnot inquire.
When the meaning of these assumptions is
investigated,we pass out of the scientific into the
philosophicdomain. Philosophyhas to critically in-
vestigatethe data of popular thought and of science.
It has to discover exactly what is implied in these
fundamentalprinciples. Then it has to test their
valueby erectinga final criterion of truth, by probing
the structure of cognition to the bottom, and deter-
mining the properorganof certainor accurateknow-
ledge; or, to put it another way, it has to examine
what is meant by reality, whether there is anything
real independently of the mind, and if so, what. In
doing this it inquires not only what common sense
means by its object-world clothed in its variegated
garment of secondaryqualities, its beauty, and so on,
but also what physical science means by its cosmic
mechanism of sensible and extra-sensible matter in
motion: whether there is any kind of objective reality
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 347

belonging to the latter which does not also belong to

the former; and: bow the two worlds are related one to
another. That is to say, he asks whether the bodies
in spaceassumedto exist by the physicist as the ante-
cedent conditions of particular sensationsand percepts
are independent
of mind aad perceptiongenerally.1
In doing all this, philosophy is theoretically free to
upsetasmuch of popular belief of the persistentkind
as it likes. Nor can science find fault with it so long
as it keeps to its own sphere,and does not directly con-
tradict any truth which science,by the methods proper
to it, is able to establish. Thus, for example, if
philosophy finds that there is nothing real inde-
pendently of mind, sciencewill be satisfied so long as
it finds a meaning for its assumedentities, such as
space,externalthings, and physical causes.2
The student of philosophy need not be told that
theseimposing-lookingproblemsrespectingcognition,
making,up what the Germanscall the "Theory of
Cognition," and the cognateproblem respectingthe
nature of reality, are still a long way from being settled.
To-day, as in the days of Plato and Aristotle, are
argued,in slightly altered forms,the vexed questions,
What is true cognition? Is it a mere efflux from

1 To make this accountof the philosophic problem of the object-

world complete,I ought to touch not only on the distinction between
the vulgar and the scientific view of material things, but also on the
distinction, within physical science, between the less and the more
abstract view roughly representedby molar and molecular physics.
2 For an excellent account of the distinction between the scientific
and the philosophic point of view, see Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's
Philosophy of Reflection,Bk. I. chs. i. and iii.; also Uk. III. cha.vii.
and viii.
848 EESULTS.

sensation, a passive conformity of representation to

sensation(sensualismor empiricism)? or is it, on the
other hand, a construction of active thought, involv-
ing certainnecessary
forms of intelligence(rationalism
or intuitivism) ?
Again, how are we to shape to ourselvesreal
objective existence? Is it something wholly inde-
pendent of the mind (realism)? and if so,is this
knownto be what we-meaning here commonpeople
and menof sciencealike-represent it asbeing(natural
realism),or somethingdifferent (transfiguredrealism)?
Or is it, on the contrary, something involving mind
(idealism) ? and if so, is it a strictly phenomenal dis-
tinction within our consciousexperience(empirical
idealism, phenomenalism),or one of the two poles
of subject and object constituted by every act of
thought (rational idealism) ? These are some of the
questionsin philosophy which still await their final
answer.

Philosophy being thus still a question and not a

solution, we need not here trouble ourselves about its
problems further than to remark on their close con-
nection with our special subject, the study of illusion.
Our brief referenceto someof the principalinquiries
of philosophy shows that it tends to throw doubt on
things which the unreflecting popularmind holds to
be indubitable. Different schools of philosophy have
shownthemselves unequally concerned about these so-
called intuitive certainties. In general it may be said
that philosophy,though, as I have remarked,theo-
retically free to set up its own standardof certainty,
has in practice endeavouredto give a meaning to.
 WHAT IS BEALITY? 319

and to find a justification for the assumptions or first

principles of science. On the other hand,it has not
hesitated, when occasion required, to make very light
of the intuitive beliefs of the popular mind as
interpretedby itself. Thus,rationalistsof the Platonic
type have not shrunk from pronouncingindividual
impressionsand objects illusory, an assertionwhich
certainly seemsto be opposedto the assumptionsof
common sense, if not to those of science. On the
other hand, the modern empirical or associationschool
is quite ready to declare that the vulgar belief in
an external world, so far as it represents this as inde-
pendentof mind,1is an illusion; that the so-called
necessarybeliefs respecting identity, uniformity, causa-
tion, etc., are not, strictly speaking, necessary; and so
on. And in these ways it certainly seemsto come
into conflict with popular convictions, or intuitive cer-
tainties, as they present themselves to the unreflecting
intelligence.
Philosophy seems,then, to be a continuation of that
process of detecting illusion with which science in
part concernsitself. Indeed, it is evident that our
1 I hold, in spite of Berkeley's endeavoursto reconcile his position
with that of common sense,that the popular view doesat least tend
in this direction. That is to say, the every-day hahit, when consider-
ing the external world, of abstracting from particular minds, leads on
insensibly to that complete detachment of it from mind in general
which expressesitself in the first stage of philosophic reflection, crude
realism. Thephysicist appearsto me, both from the first essaysin Greek
"nature-philosophy," as also from the not infrequent confusion even
to-day betweena perfectly safe "scientific materialism" and a highly
questionablephilosophic materialism, to share in this tendency to take
separateconsideration for separate existence. Each new stage of
abstractionin physical sciencegives birth to a new attempt to find an
independentreality, a thing-in-itself, hidden further away from sense
350 RESULTS.

special study has a very close connection with the

philosophic inquiry. What philosophy wants is some-
thing intuitively certain as its starting-point,some
point cCappuifor its construction. The errors incident
to the processof reasoning do not greatly trouble it,
since these can, in general, be guarded against by the
rules of logic. But error in the midst of what, on the
face of it, looks like intuitive knowledge naturally
raises the question, Is there any kind of absolutely
certain cognition, any organ for the accurate perception
of truth? And this intimate relation between the
scientific and the philosophic consideration of illusion
is abundantlyillustrated in the history of philosophy.
The errors of sense,appearing m a region which to
the vulgar seemsso indubitable,haveagainand again
set men thinking on the question, " What is the
whole rangeof illusion? Is perception,as popularly
understood,after all, a big hallucination ? Is our life a
dream?"1
On the other hand,if <wirstudy of the wide range
of illusion is fitted to induce that temper of mind
which is said to be the beginning of philosophy, that
attitude of universal doubt expressedby Descartesin
his famous maxim, De omn-ilm dulitandum, a con-
sideration of the processof correction is fitted to lead
the mind on to the determination of the conditions of
accurateknowledge. It is evident, indeed,that the
very conceptionof an illusion implies a criterion of
certainty: to call a thing illusory, is to judge it by re-
ferenceto someacceptedstandardof truth.
1 See the interesting autobiographical record of the growth of
philosophic
doubtin the PremiereMeditationof Descartes.
 CORRECTIONOF ILLUSION. 351

The mental processes involved in detecting,resist-

ing, and overcomingillusion, are a very interesting
subjectfor the psychologist,though we havenot space
here to investigate them fully. Turning to presenta-
tive, and more particularly sense-illusions,we find that
the detection of an illusion takes place now by an
appealfrom one senseto another, for example,from
sight to touch, by way of verification; * now (as in
Slyer's experiment)by a reference from senseand
presentationaltogether to representationor remem-
bered experienceand a processof reasoning; and now,
(as in the illusions of art) conversely,by a transition
of mind from what is suggested to the actual sense-
impression of the moment In the sphere of me-
mory, again, illusion is determined,as such, now by
attending more carefully to the contents of memory,
now by a processof reasoning from some presentative
cognition. Finally, errors in our comprehensive
generalrepresentations
of things areknownto be such
partly by reasoning from other conceptions,and partly
by a continual processof reduction of representation
to presentation,the general to the particular. I may
add that the correction of illusion by an act of re-
flection and reasoning,which brings the part into
consistent relation with the whole of experience,
includes throughout the comparison of the individual
with the collective or social experience.2
1 The appealis not, as we have seen,invariably from siglit to touch,
but may be in the reverse direction, as in the recognition of the
duality of the-points of a pair of compasses,which seem one to the
tactual sense.
"
2 I might further remark that this " collective experience" includes
previously detectedillusions of ourselvesand of others.
352 RESULTS.

We may,perhaps,roughly summarizetheseopera-
tions by saying that they consist in the control of the
lower automaticprocesses (associationor suggestion)
by the higher activitiesof conscious
will. Thisactivity
of will takes the form now of an effort of attention to
what is directly presentto the mind (sense-impression,
internal feeling, mnemonic image, etc.), now of con-
scious reflection,judgment, and reasoning,by which the
error is brought into relation to our experienceas a
whole, individual and collective.
It is for the philosopher to investigate the inmost
nature of these operations as they exhibit themselves
in our every-day individual experience, and in the
large intellectualmovementsof history. In no better
waycan he arrive at what commonsenseand science
regardas certaincognition,at the kinds of knowledge
on which they arewont to rely mostunhesitatingly.

Thereis oneother relation of our subjectto philo-

sophicproblemswhich I have purposelyleft for final
consideration. Our study has consistedmainly in the
psychologicalanalysisof illusionssupposed
to beknown
or capable of being known as such. Now, the modern
associationschool professesto be able to resolve some
of the so-called intuitions of common sense into ele-
ments exactly similar to those into which we have
here been resolving what are acknowledged by all as
illusions. This fact would seem to point to a close
connectionbetweenthe scientific study of illusion and
the particular view of these fundamental intuitions
taken by one philosophic school. In order to see
whetherthereis really this connection,
we mustreflect
 PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE. 353

a little further on the nature of the method which we

havebeenpursuing.
I havealreadyhad occasionto use the expression
"scientific psychology,"or psychologyas a positive
science,and the meaning of this expression must now
be more carefully considered. As a positive science,
psychologyis limited to the function of analyzing
mental states,and of tracing their origin in previous
and moresimplemental states. It has,strictly speak-
ing, nothingto do with the questionof the legitimacy
or validity of any mental act.
Take a percept,for example. Psychology can trace
its parentage in sensation, the mode in which it has
come by its contents in the laws of association. But
by common consent,a percept implies a presentative
apprehension of an object now present to sense. Is
this valid or illusory ? This question psychology, as
science,does not attempt to answer. It would not, I
conceive, answer it even if it were able to make out
that the wholemental content in the perceptcan be
traced back to elementary sensationsand their combi-
nations. For the fact that in the chemistry of mind
elements may combine in perfectly new forms does not
disprove that the forms thus arising, whether senti-
ments or quasi-cognitions,are invalid. Much less can
psychologydisputethe validity of a perceptif it cannot
be sure that the mind addsnothing to sensationand
its grouping; that in the genesis
of the perceptivestate,
with its intuition of somethingexternal and now pre-
sentas object,nothing like a form of intelligence is
superimposed on the elementsof sensation,giving to
the result of their coalescencethe particular unity
2A
354 .RESULTS.

which we find. Whether psychologyas a positive

science can ever be sure of this: whether, that is to
say,it can answerthe question," How do we comeby
the idea of object?" without assuming someparticular
philosophic or extra-scientific theory respectingthe
ultimate nature of mind, is a point which I purposely
leave open.
I would contend,then, that the psychologist,in
tracing the genesisof the percept out of previous
mentalexperiences, no moresettlesthe question,What
is the object of perception? than the physicistsettles
it in referringthe sense-impression
(and sothe percept)
to a present material agent as its condition.
The same applies to our idea of self. I may dis-
coverthe concreteexperiences
which supply the filling
in of the idea, and yet not settle the question, Does in-
telligence add anything in the constructionof the
form of this idea? and still less settle the question
whether there is any real unity answering to the
idea.
If this is a correct distinction, if psychology, as
science, does not determine questions of validity or
objectiye meaning but only of genesis, if it looks at
mental statesin relation only to their temporal and
causal concomitants and not to their objects, it must
follow that our preceding analysis-of illusion involves
no particular philosophic theory as to the nature of
intelligence, but, so far as accurate,consistsof scientific
facts which all philosophic theories of intelligence
must alike be preparedto accept. And I havelittle
doubt that each of the two great opposed doctrines,
the intuitive and the associational, would claim to be
 PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY. 355

In a positionto take up tliesefactsinto its particular

theory, andto view them in its ownway.
But in additionto this scientific psychology,there
is another so-called psychology,which is, strictly
speaking,philosophic. This, I need hardly say, is
the associationphilosophy. It proceedsby analyzing
certain cognitions and sentiments into their elements,
and straightway declaring that they mean nothing
more than these. That is to say, the associationist
passesfrom genesis to validity, from the history of a
consciousstate to its objective meaning. Thus, from
showingthat an intuitive belief, saythat in causation,
is not original (in the individual or at least in the
race),it goeson to assertthat it is not a valid imme-
diate cognition at all. Now, I am not concerned here
to inquire into the logical value of this transition, but
simply to point out that it is extra-scientific and dis-
tinctly philosophic. If logically justifiable, it is so
becauseof someplainly philosophicassumption,as that
made by Hume, namely, that all ideas not derived
from impressionsare to this extent fictitious or illusory.
And now we are in a position to understand the
bearing of our scientific analysis of acknowledged
illusions on the associationist'streatment of the alleged
illusions of common sense. There is no doubt, I think,
that some of the so-called intuitions of common sense
havepointsof analogyto acknowledged illusions. For
example,the convictionin the act of perceptionthat
something external to the mind and independent of it
exists, has a certain superficial resemblanceto an hallu-
cination of sense;and moreover,the associationistseeks
to explainit by meansof these very processes
which
356 RESULTS.

underlie what is recognizedby all as sense-illusion.1

Again,it maybe saidthat our notionsof forceand of a
causalnexusin the physicalworld imply the idea of
consciousenergy as known through our muscular
sensations,and so have a suspicious resemblance to
thoseanthropomorphic
illusionsof whichI havespoken
under Illusions of Insight. Once more, the conscious-
nessof-freedom may, as I haye suggested,be viewed
- as analogous in its form and its mode of origin to
illusionsof introspection. As a last example,it may
be said that the mind's certain conviction of the in-
nateness of some of its ideas resembles those illusions
of memory which arise through an inability to think
ourselvesback into a remote past having a type of
consciousness
widely unlike that of the present.
But now, mark the difference. In our scientific
analysisof popularlyknownillusions,wehad something
by *which to determine the illusory character of the
presentationor belief. We had a popularly or scien-
tifically acceptedstandardof certainty,by a reference
to whichwe might test the particular soi-disantcogni-
tion. But in the case of these fundamental beliefs we
haveno suchcriterion,exceptwe adoptsomeparticular
philosophictheory, saythat of the associationist
him-
self. Hence this similarity in structure and origin
cannotin itself be saidto amountto a proofof equality
of logical or objectivevalue. Here again it must be
remarked that origin doesnot carry validity or in-
validity with it.2
1 M. Taine frankly teaches that what is commonlycalled accurate
perception is a " true hallucination." (JDe?Intelligence,2iemepartie,
Livre I. ch. i. sec. 3).
2 It only seemsto do so, apart from philosophic assumptions,in
 FUNDAMENTAL ILLUSIONS. 357

We thus comeback to our starting-point. While

there are close relations, psychologicaland logical,
betweenthe scientific study of the ascertained facts of
illusion and the philosophicdeterminationof what is
illusory in knowledge as a whole, the two domains
must be clearly distinguished. On purely scientific
ground we cannot answer the question, " How far does
illusion extend ?" The solution of this question must
be handed over to the philosopher, as one aspect of his
problem of cognition.
Oneor two remarksmay, perhaps,be hazardedin
concluding this account of the relation of the scientific
to the philosophic problem of illusion. Science, as
we have seen, takes its stand on a stable consensus, a
bodyof commonlyacceptedbelief. And this being so,
it would seem to follow, that so far as she is allowed
to interest herself in philosophic questions, she will
naturally be disposedto ask, What beliefs are shared in
by all minds, so far as normal and developed? In
other words,shewill be inclined to look at universality
certain criseswhere experience testifies to a uniform tin trust worthi-
ness of the origin. For example, we may, on grounds of matter of
fact and experience, be disposed to distrust any belief that we
recognize as springing from an emotional source, from the mind's
feelings and wishes.
I may add that a so-calledintuitive belief may refer to a matter of
fact which can be tested by the facts of experience and by scientific
methods. Thus, for example, the old and now exploded form of the
doctrine of innate ideas, which declared that children were born with
certain ideas ready made,might be tested by observation of childhood,
and reasoning from its general intellectual condition. The same
applies to the physiological theories of space-perception,supposedto
be based on Kant's doctrine, put forward in Germany by Johannes
Muller and the "nativistic school." (See my exposition and criticism
of these doctrines in Mind, April, 1878,pp. 1GS-178and 103-195)
358 . EESULTS.

asthe main thing to be determinedin the regionof

philosophic inquiry. The metaphysical sceptic, fond
of daring exploits, may break up as many accepted
ideasas he likes into illusory debris,provided only he
has some bit of reality left to take his stand on.
Meanwhile,the scientific mind, here agreeing with
the practical mind, will ask, "Will the beliefs thus
said to be capableof being shownto be illusory ever
ceaseto exercisetheir hold on men'sminds,including
that of the iconoclast himself? Is the mode of demon-
stration of such a kind as to be likely ever to
materially weakenthe common-sense' intuition' ?"
This questionwould seemto be most directly an-
swerableby an appeal to individual testimony. Viewed
in this light, it is a question for the present,for some
fewalreadyallegethat in their casephilosophicreason-
ings exercisean appreciableeffect on these beliefs.
And so far as this is so,the man of scientifictemper
will feel that there is a question for him.
It is evident, however, that the question of the
persistence
of thesefundamentalbeliefs is muchmore
one for the future than for the present. The correction
of a clearly detected illusion is, as I have more than
once remarked,a slow process. An illusion such as the
apparent movementof the sun will persist as a
partially developederror long after it has been con-
victed. And it may be that the fundamental beliefs
here referred to, even if presumablyillusory, are
destinedto exercisetheir spell for long ages yet.
Whether this will be the case or not, whether these
intuitive beliefs are destined slowly to decay and be
dissolvedas time rolls on, or whether they will retain
 PERSISTENCE OF INTUITIONS. 359

an eternalyouth,is a questionwhich weof to-dayseem,

on a first view of the matter, to have no way of an-
sweringwhich doesnot assumethe very point in
question-thetruth or falsity of the belief. This
muchmay,however, be said. The association!stwho
resolves these erroneous intuitions into the play of
association,admits that the forces at work generating
and consolidatingthe illusory belief are constantand
permanent
forces,andsuchasare not likely to beless
effective in the future than they have been in the past.
Thus,he teachesthat the intuition of the singleobject
in the act of perception owes its strength to "in-
separableassociation/'according to which law the
ideasof the separate" possibilitiesof sensation,"
which
are all we know of the object, coalesce in the shape
of an idea of a single uniting substance. He adds,
perhaps,that heredity has tended,and will still tend,
to fix the habit of thus transforming an actual multi-
plicity into an imaginaryunity. And in thus arguing,
he is allowing that the illusion is one which, to say
the least of it, it will always be exceedingly difficult
for reasonto dislodge.
In view of this uncertainty,and of the possibility,
if not the probability, of these beliefs remaining as
they have remained,at least approximatelyuniversal,
the man of sciencewill probably be disposed to
hold himself indifferently to the question. He will be
inclined to say, "What does it matter whetheryou
call such an apparently permanent belief the cor-
relative of a reality or an illusion? Does it make
any practical difference whether a universal (intui-
tion/ of which we cannot rid ourselves, be described
860 BESULTS.

as a uniformly recurring fiction of the Imagination?

or an integral constitutive factor of intelligence?
And, in consideringthe historical aspectof the ques-
tion, doesit not cometo muchthe samething whether
such permanent mental products be spoken of as the
attenuated forms or ghostly survivals of more sub-
stantial primitive illusions (for example,anthropo-
morphicrepresentations of materialobjects,'animistic'
representations of mind and personality),or a& the
slowly perfected results of intellectual evolution ? "
This attitude of the scientificmind towardsphilo-
sophicproblemswill be confirmedwhenit is seenthat
those who seek to resolve stable common convictions
into illusionsareforced,by their very modeof demon-
stration,to allowtheseintuitions a measureof validity.
Thus,the ideasof the unity and externality attributed
to the object in the act of perceptionare said by the
associationistto answerto a matter of fact, namely,
the permanentcoexistenceof certain possibilitiesof
sensation,and the dependenceof the single sensations
of the individual on the presenceof the most permanent
of these possibilities, namely, those of the active or
muscular and passive sensationsof touch, which are,
moreover, by far the most constant for all minds.
Similarly, the idea of a necessaryconnection between
causeand effect, even if illusory in so far as it expresses
an objectivenecessity, is allowed to be true as an ex-
pressionof that uniformity of our experiencewhich all
scientific progresstends to illustrate more and more
distinctly. And even the idea of a permanent self, as
distinct from particular fugitive feelings, is admitted
by the associationistto be correct in so far as it ex-
 TBUTH AND INTELLECTUAL CONSENSUS. 361

presses
the fact that mind is "a seriesof feelings
whichis awareof itself as pastand future.'} In short,
these "illusory intuitions/' by the showingof those
who affirm them to be illusory, are by no means hal-
lucinationshaving no real object as their correlative,
but merelyillusions in the narrowsense,and illusions,
moreover, in which the ratio of truth to error seems
to be a large one.
It would thus appearthat philosophy tends,after
all, to unsettle what appear to be permanent con-
victionsof the commonmind and the presuppositions
of sciencemuch less than is sometimes imagined. Our
intuitions of external realities, our indestructible belief
in the uniformity of nature, in the nexus of cause
and effect, and so on, are, by the admission of all
philosophers,at least partially and relatively true;
that is to say, true in relation to certain features of
our commonexperience. At the worst,they can only
be called illusory as slightly misrepresenting the exact
results of this experience. And even so, the mis-
representation must, by the very nature of the case,
be practically insignificant. And so in full view of
the subtleties of philosophic speculation,the man of
sciencemay still feel justified in regarding his standard
of truth, a stable consensus of belief, as above
suspicion.
 INDEX.

A. Association,laws of, in percep-

tion, 22 ; in dreams, 153, 156 ;
Abercrombie, Dr. J., 141, note 1, link of resemblancein dreams,
278. 1591 associative dispositions in
Abnormal life, relation of, to nor- dreams,169; effect of,in insight,
mal, 1, 120, 121, 124, 1823 277, 221; inseparable, 359.
284, note *, 336; effects of Associationist, views of, 349, 352,
amputation, 62; modification of 355.
sensibility in, 65; gross sense- Attention, involved in perception
illusions of, 111, hallucinations 21; absence of, in sense-illusion,
of, 118 ; senseof personal iden- 39, 87; relation of, to recogni-
' tity in, 289. tion of objects, 1)0; expectant,
Active, stage in perception, 27 ; 93; attitude of, in dreaming,
illusion distinguished from pas- 137, 172; to internal mental
sive, 45, 332-334. states, 194; absence of, in,
Actor. SeeTheatre. errors of insight, 228.
Adaptation, illusion as want of, Authority, influence of, in intro-
124, 188, 339. spection, 210 ; in belief, 325.
^Esthetic intuition, 213; illusions Autobiography, errors connected
of, 214. with, 276, 280.
After-dreams, 144, 183. Automatic activity of centres, in
After-sensation, after.impression, hallucinations, 113 ; in dreams,
55,115, 136,151; automatic intellectual
Anaesthesia, 65. processes, 300, 335, 352.
Ancestral experience, results of,
281.
B.
Animals,recognitionof portraits
by, 1,05; expectation of, 298. Baillarger, J., 13,noter,n 3, note \
Anthropomorphism, 225, 360. 119, notes 1 and 2, 120, note-l.
Anticipation. SeeExpectation. Bain,Dr. A., 32, note x,117, note2,
Apparitions. SeeHallucination. 190.
Aristotle, 130. Beattie, J., 141, note1.
Art, illusions of, 77, 104. Beauty, sentiment of, 206, 213.
Artemidoros, 129., Belief, immediate, 14, 15, 294;
364: INDEX.

simple and compound, 296 ; object, 24; in introspective

illusory forms of, 297; simple recognition, 193.
expectation, 297; expectation. Clifford, Professor W. K., 56,
of extra-personal experiencesy .note *.
307; retrospective, 309; in Coalescence, of sensations,43, 52;
persistent objects and persons, of dream-images,162 ;"of inter-
312; self-esteem, 315; repre- nal feelings, 196; of mnemonic
sentation of classesof things, images,265.
322; representations of man- Coansesthesis,41, 99, 145, 286,
kind, 322; representation of 288.
life and the world as a whole, Cognition, immediate or intuitive,
322 ; as predisposition to error, 5, 14-16, 294; presentative
324; amount of divergence in, and representative, 9, 13, 217,
325; tendency towards con- 330 ; nature of, in dreams,168,
vergencein, 326. 172 ; nature of, generally, 295,
Beneficial, correct knowledge as, 331; philosophic problems of,
340 ; illusion as, 3 '1-2. 346.
Berkeley, Bishop, 218,349,note l. Colour, external reality of, 8, 37;
Binet, A..,53, note *. illusory perception of, 37, 88;
Boismont, Brierre de, 11, note *. subjective complementary co-
Borner, J., 146. lours (colour-contrast), 67, 83.
Braid, James,186,187. Coloured media, objects seen
Brewster, Sir D., 42, 73, 81, 116. through, 82.
Briicke, E., 77, note J. Common cognition, and truth,
Byron,Lord, 116, 337; genesisand validity of,
353.
C. Commonexperiencedistinguished
from individual, 26, 27, 137,
Carpenter,
Dr. W. B., 32, note *, 209,214,336, 351; illusionas,
108, 110,notel, 186, 231,notel, 47,325, 337.
265, note l, 276. Commonsense,intuitions of, 346,
Castle-building, as illusory per- 349, 352, 357.
ception, 3, 99. Complementary colours,67, 83.
Cause,idea of, in science, 344 ; Concave, apparent conversion of,
reality of relation of, 347, 349, into convex, 84.
356, 360. Conjuror,tricks of, 56, 106.
Change,a condition of conscious Consciousness,veracity of, 192,
life, 252, 287, note l. 205; inspection of phenomena
Childhood, our recollections of, of, 196; of self, 283, 285.
263, 269. Consensus,the standard of truth,
Children, curiosity of, 175, 180; 7, 8, 211, 325, 338, 357.
estimate of time by, 256; con- Conservationof energy, 343.
fusion of dream and waking Construction,rational, in dreams-,
life by, 276; imagination of, 170.
279; self-assertion of, 319; Continuumj. the perception of the
intellectual condition of, 357, world as, 52,, 56, note l:
note l. Correction of illusion, in sense-
Clarke, Dr. E. E., 117. illusion, 38, 124, 137; dreams,
Classification, in recognition of 182; introspection, 210; in-
sensation,21; in recognition,of sight, 229-,memory, 291; his.
 INDEX. S65

torical correction 338; intel- Emotion, and illusion of percep-

lectual processes involved ia, tion, 103; and hallucination,
351. 115; and bodily sensations,
Criterion of illusion, 337. 150; control of dreams by, 164;
Cudworth, E., 161 introspection of, 199 ; and illu-
sion of introspection, 203 ; and
D. aesthetic intuition, 213; and illu-
sion of memory, 270 ; and illu-
Deceptionof the senses,19; sionof belief,306,324; and
self-deception, 200; conscious cognition generally, 357, note *.
deceptionof others,222. Empiricism,
philosophic,
348.
Delbceuf,
J., 175, note1, 235, Ennui,andsenseof time,250.
notel. Environment, sourcesof sense-
Delirium tremens,118, note 2. illusion in, 47, 48, 70 ; view of,
Democritus,130. in mental disease,290, 326;
DeQuincey,
253,280. view of, in normallife, 323;
Descartes,
E.,116,350. actionof, in assimilating
belief,
Dickens, Charles,277. 339.
Direction, illusory sense of, in Error, immediate and mediate, 6,
vision, 66, 71, 73-, in hearing, 334.
72,75. See Abnormal
Disease. life.
Esquirol,J.E. D.,12,note2.
Evolution, relation of, to dissolu-
Dissolution.
SeeEvolution. tion,122;ofpowerofintrospec-
Doubt,starting-point
in philo- tion,209; of power
of insight,
sophy,350. 230; and self-assertion,320;
Dreams, relation of, to illusions evolutionist's view of error,
of sense,18,130;andwaking 339; doctrineof, as science,
experience,127; theories of, 346.
128; physiologyof,131;extent Exaggeration,
in interpretation
of
of,in sleep,132;psychological sensations,
65; in dream-in.
conditions
of,136; excitants
of, terpretation,
147;in memory,
139,143; exaggeration
in, 147; 269.
symbolism of, 149; as results Expectation, preliminary to per-
ofautomaticactivity-of
centres, ception, 30; andillusoryper-
151; as resultsof association, ception,
93,102,106; natureof,
153; structureof, 156; in- 295; andmemory, 298,*ofnew
coherent,156; coherent, 161; experience,301; of remote
actionof feelingin, 164j play events,3025 measurement of
of associativedispositionsin, durationin, 302; action of
168; co-operationof attention imagination
in, 305;extension
andintelligence
in,172;limits ofmeaningof,307,308.
of intelligence
in, 180;after- Experience,
effectof, in percep-
dreams,183,274; relationof, tion,22,68,85,86,91;external
to hypnoticcondition,185; andinternal,194,210;revivals
experience
of, in relationto of waking,in dreams,152;
errors
ofmemory,
273. effects
of present,
onretrospec-
tion, 267 j anticipation of new,
E. 301.'
Eccentricity, law of, 59. External world. See World.
Ego. See Self.
366 INDEX.

Happiness,feeling of, 200.

Harmful, illusion as, 188, 229,
Fallacy and illusion 6, 335; of 292, 339.
testimony,
265. Harmless,
illusionsas,124, 292,
Familiarity, sense of, in new 341.
objects,
272,281. Hartley, D., 139, 256,note \
Fechner,G. T., 51. 279.
Ferrier,Dr., 32,note J,58,note l. Hearing, as mode of perception,
Fiction, as producing illusion, 34, 48; localization of impres-
278,279,311. sionin, 60 ; senseof direction
Fitness.See Adaptation. in, 72; activityof, in sleep,
Flattery,rationaleof, 200,222. 140 j and muscular sense, 171.
Forgetfulness and illusion,278, Heidenhain,Dr.,186-188.
279,311. Helmholfcz,H., 22,23, note1, 44,
Free-will, doctrineof, 207,342, 51,54 andnoteT,55,note*,
356. 57, 67, note », 78, note 1) 80,
Future. BeeExpectation. 85,note', 88,90,207,noteJ.
Heraclitus, 137.
Heredity, and illusion of memory,
280 ; action of, in perpetuating
Galton,F., 117. intuition, 359.
Ghosts.See Hallucination. Hering,E.,67,note2. *
Goethe,116,117,280andnotel. Hodgson,Shad worth H., 347,
Griesinger,
W.,13,note1,63,notel, note*.
66, note\ 115, 118,note 2, Holland,SirH.,277.
119, note \ 120, note \ 290, Hood,Thomas,146.
note*, 327,note l. Hope,illusory. SeeExpectation. "
Gruithuisen,143,14.4. Hoppe,Dr. J. I., 51, 58,note \
Gurney,E., 224,note*. Horwicz,A., 145,note*.
Hume, D., 355.
Huxley, Professor T., 119, note l.
Hyperaesthesia,65.
Hall, G. S., 186, note \ Hypnotism, 185.
Hallucination, and illusion, 11, Hypochondria, 65.
109, 111, 112, 121; and sub- Hypothesis,asillusory, 310,311.
jective sensation,63,109,121;
sensory and motor, 66; ner-
vous conditions of, 112-114;
incomplete and complete, 113; Idealism, 348.
as having either central or Identity, casesof mistaken, 267.
peripheralorigin, 113; causes Identity, personal,confusion
of, in
of, classified, 115; in sane dreams, 163 ; consciousness of,
condition, 116; in insanity, 241, 267, 282, 285; illusory
118; visual and auditory, 119 ; forms of, 283; gross disturb-
dreams regarded as, 139,151; ancesof, in normal life, 287; in
hypnagogic, 143; after-dreams abnormal life, 289 ; momentary
and ghosts, 183; of memory, confusionsof, 293.
271; relation of, to errors of Illusion, definition of, 1; varieties
belief, 322; intuition of ex. of, 9; extent of, 328; rationale
ternal world regarded as, 355. of, 331, 337.
 IKDEX. 367

Image (physical). SeeReflection. illusory forms of, 190; con-

Image (mental), in perception, fusion of -inner and outer ex-
22; seat of, 32; in dreams, periences, 194; inaccurate in.
138 ; mnemonic, 236. spection of feelings, 196; pre-
Imagination, play of, in percep- sentation and representation
tion, 95, 99 ; and sense-illusion, confused, 199; feelings and
1061 nature of, in dreaming, inferences from these, 203;
'138, 161; as antecedent of moral self - scrutiny, 204;
dream, 152, 158; as poetic philosophic, 205; value of,
interpretation of nature, 224; 208.
memory corrupted by effect of Intuition. SeeCognition.
past, 264, 273, 277 ; present, Intuitivism, 348.
creating the semblance of recol-
lection, 267, 271; play of, in J.
expectation, 305; as element
of illusion generally, 333. Jaakson, Dr. J. Hughlings, 27,
Immediate. See Cognition. note 2, 33, 123, note \
Individual, and common experi- Johnson, Dr., 116.
ence, 26, 27, 137,209,214, 336;
dream-experience
as, 44, 68; K.
internal experience as, 209;
memory as, 232; belief and Klang, as compound sensation,
truth, 338. 53.
Inference, and immediate know- Knowledge. SeeCognition.
ledge, 6, 334; in perception,
22,26,68; in belief,295. L.
Innate, recollection as, 280; prin-
ciples, 295, 356. Language, function of, 195.
Insane, sense-illusions of, 63, 65, Leibnitz, 133.
111; hallucinations of, 118; Lelut, L. F.,* 120, note l.
dreaming and state of, 182; Lessing, G-.E., 133, note l.
mnemonic illusions of, 278, Leuret, 290, note 3.
289 ; beliefs of, 327. Lewes, G. H., 28, 32, note ', 52,
Insight, nature of, 217; illnsions notel, 62, note *, 68, note l, 89,
of, defined, 220; passive illu- note l, 115, note l, 150.
sions of, 220; histrionic illusion, Life, our estimate of, 323, 326,
222 ; active illusions of, 223 ; 327.
poetic interpretation of nature, Light, sensation and perception
224; value of faculty of, 228. of, 59 ; effects of reflection and
Interpretation, in correct percep- refraction, of, 73; represen-
tion, 22; of impression and tation of, in painting, 88, 91;
experience, 70; and volition, action of, in sleep, 140.
95; and fixed habits of mind, Localization, as local discrimina-
101; and temporary attitude of tion of sensations, 52; as lo-
mind, 102; of sensations in calizing of sensations, 59, 60;
dreams, 137, 147; of internal illusory, 61, 82; in halluci-
feelings, 203; of others' feel- nation, 118, 119; in dreaming,
ings, 217; of nature by poet, 148; of events in time, in
225; recollection ft,s,242. memory, 238, 245; in expec-
Introspection, nature of, 14, 189; tation, 304.
368 INDEX.

Locke, 133, mote !. Motor illusions. See Muscular

Lotze, H., 60, note 1. sense.
Lover, illusion of, 224, 227, 342. Movement, apparent, 50, 57, 73,
Luminosity of painting, 88, 91. 81, 95, 107j in dreams, 142,
Lustre, ascompoundsensation,54. 154.
Lyell, Sir Charles,311. Miiller, Johannes,58,note 2, 100,
117, 143,
MUSCOBvolitanteSj 118, note 2.
M. Muscular sense,in perception, 23 ;
illusions connected with, 50, 57,
Magic, arts of, 73. 62, 66; co-operation of, in
Magnitude, apparent,in vision, 75, dreams,142, 154.
note 2; perceptionof, in pic- Music, subjective interpretation
torial art, 88, 91 ; of time-in- of, 223.
tervals, 245, 249; recollection
of, 268.
Malebranche, 116.
Mankind, our views of, 322. Natural selection, effect of, in
Matter. SeeWorld (material). eliminating error, 340.
Mandsley, Dr. H., 32, note *. Nature, personification of, 224;
Maury, A., 140, 143,153, note ', uniformity of, 344, 360.
159, 163, note1, 173. Necessity, idea of, 349, 360.
Mayer, Dr. A., 66, note l. Nervous system, and condi-
Measurement,subjective, of time, tions of perception, 31; con-
245. nections of, 32, 169 ; function
Media, coloured, illusions con- of, and force of stimulus, .47,
nected with presenceof, 82. 50; prolonged activity of, 55;
Memory, nature of, 9, 13, 231; specific energy of, 58; varia-
" veracity of, 232, 290; denned, tions in state of, 64; fatigue
234; psychology of, 236; of, 65, 115 ; disease of, ibid. ?
physiology of, 237; localization nervous conditions of halluci-
of events in, 238 ; and sense of nation, 112, 115; nervous dis-
personal identity, 241, 283; solution and evolution, 122 ;
illusions of, 241 j illusory locali- condition of, in sleep, 131; in
zation, 245, 256; distortions of, hypnotic condition, 186; ner-
261; hallucinations of, 271; vousconditions of memory,237;
illusions respecting personal nervous conditions of illusion in
identity, 283; relation of, to general, 334.
belief, 295; compared with Normal life, relation of, to ab-
expectation,297j and inference, normal, 1, 121, 124, 182, 277,
335. 284, note l; hallucinations of,
Metempsychosis,294. 116.
Meyer, H., 83,144.
Mill, J. S.,298,note 2,309. O.
Mirrors, as means of delusion, 73.
Misanthropist, 2, 323. Object, nature of, 36, 353.
Mitchell, Dr. Weir^ 62. Objective and subjective experi-
Monomania, 111. ence, 26, 27, 137, 214.
Moral, intuition, 216; self-inspec- Old age, dreams how regardedin,
tion, 204. 276.
 INDEX. 369

Oneirocritics, 129. in sense of, 2S7; sense of, in

Opera, illusion connected with, insanity, 289; momentary con.
104. fusions of, 293; philosophic pro.
Optimism, 323, 327, 342. blem of, 285, 354, 360.
Organic sensations,discrimination Personification of nature, 224.
of, 41; interpretation of, 99; Perspective, linear, 79, 97, 98;
in sleep,145, 148. aerial, 80; of memory, 245.
Organism, conditions of illusion Pessimism,323, 327.
in, 47, 50; relation of onr con- Phenomenalism, 348.
ception of the universe to sen- Philosophy, conception of illusion
sibilities of, 343. by, 7, 36, 205, 285,349; of mind,
Orientation, 125,138. 132, 285, 344, 348; as theory
of knowledge, 295, 346; and
science, 346, 348 ; and common
P. sense,
347.
347, 349; problemsof,
Pain, recollection of, 264, 270. Phosphenes,58.
Painting, representation of third Physical science. SeeScience.
dimension by, 77; apparent Plato, 281.
movement of eye in portrait, Platonists, 349.
81; discrepancies between, and Pleasure, feeling of, 200; recol-
object in magnitude and lumi- lection of, 264, 270.
nosity, 88; realization of, and Plutarch, 133, note l.
mental preparation, 105 ; reali- Poetry, lyrical and dreams, 164;
zation of, by animals,105. misinterpretation of, 223 ; per-
Parsesthesia, 68. sonification, 224.
Paralysis of ocular muscles, 66. Points, discrimination of, 52.
Passive,and active factor in per- Poisons,action of, 115.
ception,27; and active illusion, Pollock, F., 184, note *.
45. Pollock, W. H., 184.
Percept, 22; and sense-impres- Predisposition, action of, in per-
sion, 59. ception, 44, 101, 102; in aes-
Perception, a form of immediate thetic intuition, 215; in in-
knowledge, 10, 13, 17, 18; sight, 223 ; in recollection, 268;
external and internal, 14; in belief, 305, 319; belief as,
philosophy of, 14, 20, 22, 36, 324.
346, 348, 353, 355, 359; illu- Prejudice. SeePredisposition.
sions of, 19, 35 ; psychology of, Prenatal experience, recollection
20; and inference, 22, 26, 76; of, 281.
physiological conditions of, 31. Preperception, 27; illusions con-
Persistent objects, representation nected with, 44, 93; voluntary,
of, 312. 95; result of habit of mind,
Persistent self. See Personal 101; result of temporary con-
identity. ditions, 102; as sub-expectation,
Personal equation, in perception, 102; as definite expectation,
101; in aesthetic intuition, 214; 106.
in memory, 292; in tbelief, 324. Presentation and representation,
Personal identity, consciousness 9, 10, 13, 14,192, 234, 329, 330.
of, 241, 282, 285; illusions con- Projection, outward, of sensa-
nected with, 283; disturbances tions, 63; of mental image, 111,
2 B
370 INDEX.

112 ; of solid form on flat, 79, Science, philosophy and, 8, 36,

81, 96. 285, 344; conception of the
Prophetic, dreams as, 129, 147, material world in physical, 36,
note l ; enthusiast, 307. 343,346, 347; and commoncog-
Psychology,popular and scientific, nition, 338, 357.
9, 10; distinguished from philo- Scott, Sir W., 116, 125.
sophy, 14, 36, 345, 352 ; intro- Secondaryqualities, 36, 344.
spective method of, 208 ; as a Selection, process of, in per-
kind of philosophy, 305. ception, 95; in dreams,174; in
Public events, localization,of, by memory, 257, 263.
memory,258. Self, confusion of, in dreams,163 ;
introspectiveknowledgeof, 192;
self-deception,200; identity of,
241,282, 285; confusion of pre-
Radestock, P., 130, note1, 132, sent and past, 267, 284 ; dis-
note l, 134, note *, 140, 141, turbancesin recognition of, 287,
149, note l, 162, 182, 275. 289 ; momentary confusions of,
Rationalism, philosophic, 348. 295; confusion of present and
Realism, 348. future, 305.
Reality, nature of, 36, 346. Self-esteem, illusion of, 315j
Recognition, and perception, 24, origin of, 319; utility of, 342.
25 ; illusions of, 87 ; and Self-preservation, 320.
memory,234. Sensation,element in perception,
Reflection (of light), illusions con- 20; discrimination and classifi-
nected with, 73, 83. cation of, 21; interpretation of,
Refraction and optical illusion, 73. 22; inattention to, 39, 87;
Relative, sensationas, 64; atten-, modified by central reaction, 39,
tion to magnitude and bright- 87, 89, 91; confusion of novel,
ness as, 91; estimate of duration 40; indistinct, 41; misinter-
as, 249. pretation of, 44; relation of, to
Relief, illusory perception of, 75, stimulus, 46, 50; limits to dis-
96. crimination of, 52; after-im-
Representation and presentation, pression, 55; subjective, 59,62,
9, 10, 13, 14, 192. 107,143 ; localization of, 59.
Retrospection. SeeMemory. Sensibility, limits of, 50; varia-
Ribot, T., 238, note J, 290, note l. tions of, 64.
Richter, J. P., 143. Sensualism,philosophic, 348.
Robertson, Professor G. C., 35, Shadow,cast-, 77.
note 1. Shakespeare, 3.
Romanes,G. J., 105, note2, 250, Sight, mode of perception, 19, 33,
note 2. 34, 48, 49 ; local discrimination
Rousseau, 280. in, 52; single vision, 54;
localization of impressionin, 60;
S. in sleep,139; imagesof, in sleep,
150,154.
Savage, dream theory of, 128; Single, vision, 54; touch, 72.
idea of nature of, 225. Sleep,mystery of, 127; physiology
Schemer, C. A., 140, 149. of, 131.
Schopenhauer,A., 145, 342. Sleight of hand. SeeConjuror.
Schroeder,E., 85. Smell, as mode of perception, 34,
 INDEX. 371

note *; localization of impres- in, 60 ; subjective sensationsof,

sion in, 60; subjective sensa- 63; variations in sensibility,
tions of, 108; in sleep, 141; 68; activity of, in sleep, 141
and taste, 171. and smell,171.
Solidity, illusory perception of, Temperament,a factor in sense-
75,96. illusion, 101; in dreams, 137;
Space,representation of, 207. in illusory belief, 325; in illu-
Specificenergy of nerves, 58. sion generally, 334, note 1.
Spectra,ocular, etc. SeeSubjec- Temperature, senseof, 65.
tive sensation. Tennyson, A., 226.
Spencer,Herbert, 32, note l, 128, Testa, A. J., 131.
note \ 323, 340. Testimony, of consciousness,205 ;
Spinoza,143,184. fallacies of, 265; to identity,
Spiritualist stances,103, 107, 123, 267.
265. Thaumatrope, 56.
Stereoscope,75. Theatre, illusion of the, 104, 222 ;
Stewart, Dugaldr 172, 306. self-deception of the actor, 200.
Stimulus, qualitative relation of, Thompson, Professor S. P., 51,
to sensations,46, 58, 67; quan- note *.
titative relation of, to sensation, Thought, in relation to belief, 326.
50, 64; after-effect of, 555 pro- Time, retrospective idea of, 239,
longed action of, 56; subjective 246, 250; constant error iu
or internal, 62; exceptional estimate of, 245; subjective
relation of, to organ, 70; action estimate of, 249; contempora-
of, in sleep, 135, 139, 143; in neous estimate of, 250; senso
hypnotic condition, 186. of, in insanity, 290; prospective
Strumpell, L., 144, 147, note 2. estimate of, 303.
Subjective, experience, 26, 27, Touch, as form of perception, 33,
137, 214; movement, 51, 57; 34, 49; local discrimination in,
sensation, 59, 62, 107, 113, 121, 52; subjective sensations of, 62;
143. variations in sensibility of, 65 ;
Suggestion, by external circum- in sleep,141.
stances, 30, 44, 89, 91, 267; Transformation, in perception, 94;
verbal, 30, 106, 188, 215, 268, of images in dreams, 163; in
301,310. memory, 262, 267; in expecta-
Symbol, dream as, 129,149. tion, 305.
Sympathy, basis of knowledge, Trick. SeeConjuror.
223; and illusion of insight, Take, Dr., 110.
"223; and illusion of memory, Tylor, E. B., 128, note >.
277; and momentary illusion,
293. Uo

Unconscious, inference, 22, 68,

T. 269,335,notel; mental activity,
' 133, 235; impressions, 41, 152.
Taine,H.560,notel, 108,note*, Useful. SeeBeneficial.
117, note \ 137, 298, note *,
356, note J. V.
Taste, aesthetic. See ^Esthetic in-
tuition. Vanity. SeeSelf-esteem.
Taste, localization of impression Venn, J. 299, note l.
 INDEX.

Ventriloquism, 82. W.
Verification, of sense-impression,
38,351; of self-inspection,
210; Weber,E. H., 43.
of memory,291. Weinhold,Professor,186.
Verisimilitude, in art, 80, 88; in Wetness,perception of, 53.
theatrical representation,
104j Wheatstone, Sir 0., 75.
in dreams, 168. Wheelof life, 56.
Vierordt,245. Will. SeeVolition.
Vision. SeeSight. Wordsworth,W., 281.
Visions,1, 110; dreamsregarded World,our estimateof, 323,326,
as,128,131. 327; scientific conceptionof
Vital sense. SeeCcensesthesis. material, 8,36,343,344; reality
Voice,internal,119,194j activity of external,344-346,349,353,
of, in.dreams,155. 355,360.
Volition,and perception,95; ab- Wundt,Professor,W. 13, note ',
senceof,duringsleep,137)172; 31,note l, 32,note l, 58, note2,
co-operation of,in correction,
of 67, note2, 75, 93, note », 118,
illusion, 352. note3, 136, note \ 139, 143,
Volkelt,J., 172. . 177,246,247,note^ 253, 252,
254.