Oil

2024
Analysis and forecast to 2030
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
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Oil 2024 Abstract

Abstract

Energy supply security remains a central pillar of the global policy agenda as
international oil trade flows are upended by wide-ranging sanctions on Russia and
attacks on tankers transiting the critical Red Sea shipping corridor. At the same
time, Asia’s growing structural shortfall in crude and oil products and the
ever-expanding supply surplus in the Atlantic Basin are creating new trade routes
in the global oil market. This eastward shift to non-OECD Asia, especially China
and India, is coinciding with a multitude of new challenges driving oil market
activity as the energy transition gathers pace. Increased use of EVs, emerging
clean energy technologies and more expansive efficiency policies are combining
to chart a much slower growth trajectory for oil demand, plateauing towards the
end of our 2023-2030 forecast period. Oil 24, the IEA’s medium-term outlook,
explores these critical developments and their impact on the global oil market.

Oil 2024 looks beyond the short-term horizon covered in the IEA’s monthly
Oil Market Report to provide a comprehensive overview of evolving oil supply and
demand dynamics through to 2030. The report provides detailed analysis and
forecasts of oil demand fundamentals across fuels, sectors and regions. It also
outlines projected supply from planned upstream and downstream projects around
the world. Our findings provide compelling insights on spare production capacity,
product supply and trade flows, as well as the implications of surging output of
natural gas liquids (NGLs) in this era of petrochemical-driven demand growth.

I EA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements, contributors
and credits

This publication was prepared by the Oil Industry and Markets Division (OIMD) of
the Directorate of Energy Markets and Security. Toril Bosoni, head of OIMD, led
the analysis and editing of the report. The principal authors are, in alphabetical
order, Yuya Akizuki, Alexander Bressers, Joel Couse, Ciarán Healy, Peg Mackey,
David Martin, Jacob Messing, Jeremy Moorhouse and Jenny Thomson. Ramiz
Farishta and Julien Canu provided statistical support and essential research
assistance. Keisuke Sadamori, director of the IEA’s Directorate of Energy Markets
and Security, provided expert guidance and advice. Deven Mooneesawmy
provided essential editorial and publishing support. Diane Munro carried editorial
responsibility. Lorenzo Squillace designed the cover.

The report benefited greatly from valuable insights and feedback provided by
senior management and other colleagues from across the IEA, including Laura
Cozzi, Paolo Frankl, Tim Gould, Farrah Boularas, Leonardo Collina, Jérôme
Hilaire, Tae-Yoon Kim, Christophe McGlade, Rebecca McKimm, Apostolos
Petropoulos, Courtney Turich and Arturo Regalado.

The IEA Communications and Digital Office provided production and launch
support. Particular thanks go to Jethro Mullen and his team; Curtis Brainard, Astrid
Dumond, Merve Erdil, Grace Gordon, Julia Horowitz, Rob Stone, Clara Vallois and
Lucile Wall.

I EA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Table of contents

Table of contents

Executive summary ................................................................................................................. 6

Demand ................................................................................................................................. 11
Global summary ....................................................................................................................... 11
Fundamentals........................................................................................................................... 16
Road fuel demand approaching peak ...................................................................................... 20
Efficiencies slow jet and marine fuel growth ............................................................................ 25
Oil displacement in power generation ...................................................................................... 27
Petrochemicals lead growth ..................................................................................................... 29
Demand developments by region ............................................................................................ 35
Supply ................................................................................................................................... 47
Global summary ....................................................................................................................... 47
Investment and exploration ...................................................................................................... 51
OPEC+ supply .......................................................................................................................... 58
Non-OPEC+ supply .................................................................................................................. 70
Refining and trade ................................................................................................................. 86
Global summary ....................................................................................................................... 86
Refining capacity ...................................................................................................................... 97
Regional developments .......................................................................................................... 101
Product balances and trade ................................................................................................... 117
Natural Gas Liquids ............................................................................................................ 124
Global summary ..................................................................................................................... 124
Ethane markets ...................................................................................................................... 127
LPG markets .......................................................................................................................... 129
C5+ from fractionation ............................................................................................................ 131
Biofuels................................................................................................................................ 132
Government policies support biofuels growth ........................................................................ 132
Ethanol feedstock demand remains steady ........................................................................... 133
Tables ..................................................................................................................................... 135
Abbreviations and acronyms............................................................................................... 148
Units of measure .................................................................................................................... 149

List of boxes
Non-OECD price controls limit pass-through of market prices to retail ........................................... 19
Chinese capacity and US NGLs reshaping global markets ............................................................ 34
Chinese refined product reporting may overstate fuel growth ........................................................ 45
Shale price sensitivity scenarios ..................................................................................................... 74
Indian refineries set for continued growth ..................................................................................... 114
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Oil 2024 Executive summary

Executive summary

Global oil markets navigate a challenging landscape

Global oil markets will need to traverse myriad challenges in the medium-term as
structural shifts reshape oil demand and trade flows, while rising oil supplies could
potentially weigh on prices through the end of the decade.

Divergent regional economic trajectories and the accelerating deployment of clean

and energy-saving technologies are combining to progressively slow the pace of
oil demand growth, with a plateau emerging in the final years of our forecast, which
runs to 2030. Emerging economies in Asia, particularly China and India, account
for all of global demand growth. By contrast, oil demand in advanced economies
falls sharply.

Rising world oil supplies, led by non-OPEC+ producers, are expected to surpass
forecast demand from 2025 onwards. Mirroring demand’s break with long-term
trends, a front-loaded build in oil production capacity is forecast to lose momentum
and swing into contraction towards the end of our medium-term outlook. A surge
in natural gas liquids (NGLs) and condensates will account for 45% of new
capacity increases over the forecast period. In a major shift in strategy, Saudi
Arabia has put on hold its planned crude oil capacity increase and will now focus
on expanding natural gas liquids and condensates, which aligns with its efforts to
boost domestic gas supply. It may also reflect an acknowledgment of the rapidly
building surplus in global crude oil production capacity. The rise of petrochemicals
as the main pillar of global demand growth largely tracks the substantial increase
in global supply of NGLs, which are instrumental in their production.

At the same time, these changes will also create new challenges for refiners as
demand for refined products is displaced by non-refined products such as NGLs
and biofuels. Non-refined fuels are set to capture a staggering three-quarters of
projected global demand growth over the 2023-2030 period. Moreover, refiners
will need to reconfigure their product slates to meet divergent trends for distillates
amid reduced consumption as the energy transition accelerates. This is especially
the case in road transport fuels as EVs rapidly increase their market share.

Amid all these structural changes to supply and demand patterns, the global oil
market outlook faces further uncertainties from weaker macroeconomic
expectations, new government policies and regulations to fast-track the energy
transition, and an unprecedented level of investment to scale up more efficient
technologies.
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Oil 2024 Executive summary

While the challenges are formidable, the industry has consistently proved its
adaptability to dramatic supply and demand changes, including from the energy
crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic
before that.

Surplus global supply capacity will reach unprecedented

levels by 2030
A ramping up of world oil production capacity, led by the United States and other
producers in the Americas, is expected to outstrip demand growth over the
2023-2030 forecast period and inflate the world’s spare capacity cushion to levels
that are unprecedented, barring the Covid-19 period. Total supply capacity rises
by 6 mb/d to nearly 113.8 mb/d by 2030, a staggering 8 mb/d above projected
global demand of 105.4 mb/d.

OPEC+ spare crude production capacity and implied total oil stock build, 2016-2030
10 Implied oil
mb/d

stock build

8 Off mkt due to

sanctions

Other OPEC+
6

Iraq
4
UAE

2
Saudi Arabia

0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Projections based on the current OPEC+ supply agreement. OPEC+ countries are crude oil only. Assumes Iran and
Russia remain under sanctions. Implied oil stock builds include total oil.

Such a massive cushion could upend the current OPEC+ market management
strategy aimed at supporting prices. For now, the producer alliance has laid out a
roadmap for unwinding extra voluntary cuts of up to 2.2 mb/d from Q4 2024 to
Q3 2025. But this outlook is subject to their caveat that the production increases
can be paused or reversed depending on market conditions.

A lower price environment would ultimately challenge the US shale industry,

traditionally the fastest respondent to changing market circumstances. How the
industry will adapt and adjust to the new supply landscape will have wide-ranging
consequences for producers and consumers globally through the remainder of the
decade and beyond.
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Oil 2024 Executive summary

World oil demand tempered by clean energy transition

Based on today’s market conditions and policies, global oil demand will level off
at around 106 mb/d towards the end of the decade amid the accelerating transition
to clean energy technologies. Surging EV sales and continued efficiency
improvements of vehicles, and the substitution of oil with renewables or gas in the
power sector, will significantly curb oil use in road transport and electricity
generation.

Total oil demand is nevertheless forecast to rise by 3.2 mb/d between 2023 and
2030, supported by increased use of jet fuel and feedstocks from the booming
petrochemical sector. Indeed, consumption of naphtha, liquified petroleum gas
(LPG) and ethane will climb by 3.7 mb/d over the forecast period, fuelled also by
growth in LPG use for clean cooking.

World oil demand dominated by growth in petrochemical feedstocks

Oil demand, 2017-2030 Growth in oil demand, 2022-2030
110 3.0

105 2.5
mb/d

100 2.0

95 1.5

90 1.0

85 0.5

80 0.0

75 -0.5

70 -1.0
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

Others Biofuels Petrochemical Feedstocks Total

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Growth will be dominated by Asian economies, especially India and China, as oil
demand’s pivot to emerging markets continues. Demand from the two Asian
economic powerhouses will develop in very different ways, however. In China,
growth is set to be driven by the petrochemical sector as rapid deployment of clean
energy technologies and massive infrastructure investments in high-speed rail
blunt demand for transport fuels. In India, transport fuels will defy the global trend,
rising sharply. Significant gains will also come from other emerging and developing
economies in Asia. By contrast, demand in advanced economies will continue its
decades-long decline, falling from 45.7 mb/d in 2023 to 42.7 mb/d by 2030. Apart
from during the pandemic, the last time demand was this low was in 1991. Over
that same time period, oil demand from emerging and developing economies will
have increased by a factor of 2.5.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Executive summary

Upstream investments and oil supply on the rise

In line with the ascendancy of petrochemicals as the anchor of global oil demand
growth, 45% of the supply capacity increase over the forecast period comes from
NGLs and condensates. While Saudi Arabia has shelved its planned crude
capacity increase from 12 mb/d to 13 mb/d, its development of the massive
Jafurah gas field will move ahead. This will result in a substantial ramping up of
gas liquids output of almost 1 mb/d by 2030, volumes that are not subject to
OPEC+ quotas. Strong gains in US NGLs are also expected. Total NGLs and
condensates are projected to rise by 2.7 mb/d from 2023 to 2030. By comparison,
crude oil production capacity is forecast to increase by 2.6 mb/d over the same
period, while biofuels account for 620 kb/d of the 6 mb/d total.

Non-OPEC+ producers will continue to lead the capacity build, accounting for
4.6 mb/d, or 76% of the net increase. The United States alone makes up 2.1 mb/d
of the non-OPEC+ gains, while Brazil, Guyana, Canada and Argentina contribute
a further 2.7 mb/d. As the sanctioned project queue fizzles out towards the end of
our forecast, growth stalls in the United States and Canada while Brazil and
Guyana shift into decline based on current plans. However, should companies
swiftly approve additional projects that are already on the drawing board, an
incremental 1.3 mb/d of non-OPEC+ capacity could become operational by 2030.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraq lead a 1.4 mb/d rise in
OPEC+ oil capacity as African and Asian members post declines. The UAE and
Iraq are raising crude oil capacity while Saudi Arabia is poised for a significant
increase NGL and condensates supply. Capacity in Russia is expected to show
only a marginal decline despite international sanctions as the giant Vostok project
ramps up, helping to offset losses at mature oil fields.

The boost in supply follows a steady increase in upstream investments. Global

upstream capital expenditures rose by 13% to an eight-year high of
USD 538 billion in 2023 and are on track to increase by another 7% this year.

Refiners adjust to slowing demand for refined fuels

Global refining capacity is forecast to rise by 3.3 mb/d from 2023 to 2030, well
below historical trends. Even with the moderate expansion in capacity, the
increase outpaces the call on refined products over the period.

Refiners will need to progressively modify their product output to meet divergent
trends for distillates as gasoline demand falls amid an increase in the market share
of electric vehicles while jet fuel consumption rises. In addition, non-refined fuels
such as NGLs and biofuels further undermine demand for refined product supplies
and the need for additional refining capacity. Non-refined fuel products are set to
capture more than 75% of projected demand growth over the 2023-2030 period.
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Oil 2024 Executive summary

This significant rise in non-refinery product supplies will add pressure on operating
rates and refinery profitability, especially in mature demand centres. That raises
the prospect of further capacity closures by the end of the decade. Capacity
growth will remain concentrated in Asia, most notably in China and India, but
post-2027 there are signs of expansions slowing.

Global oil trade will continue its eastward shift

Global oil trade will continue to be dictated by Asia’s growing structural shortfall in
crude and product supply and the expanding surplus of crude, NGLs and products
in the Atlantic Basin. Rising non-OPEC+ crude supply, in tandem with sanctions
on Russian crude exports and OPEC+ voluntary cuts, will push higher volumes
from the Atlantic Basin to East of Suez over the outlook period.

Net crude oil exports versus Asian import requirement, 2019-2030

30
mb/d

Atlantic Basin
(ex-Russia)
25

20 Russia

15

Middle East
10

5
Asian Crude
Deficit
0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0

The loss of medium sour crudes from the Middle East amid OPEC+ cuts is partially
offset by rising supplies from Brazil, Guyana and Canada. Asian markets have
been opened in earnest to Canadian crude through the expanded Trans-Mountain
pipeline to the Pacific Coast. Light sweet US crude oil will increasingly move to
Europe and Africa as well as to India and other Asian refiners.

As the dominant centre of oil product demand growth, Asia will attract a greater
share of product supply from the broader region, notably from the Middle East.
Supplies from Russia, which are subject to sanctions in much of the Atlantic Basin,
will continue to head eastward, although Africa and Latin America may also boost
imports over time. Europe’s shortfall in diesel and jet fuel supply, plus North
America’s need for jet fuel imports, will focus global competition most keenly in
the middle distillate markets.
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Oil 2024 Demand

Demand

Global summary
World oil demand on course to plateau by 2030
Oil demand growth will slow progressively over the rest of the decade. The post-
pandemic rebound has faded, macroeconomic drivers remain weak and the
accelerating deployment of clean energy technologies weighs heavily on key
sectors and regions. Growth decelerates from 2.1 mb/d in 2023, with demand
plateauing at 105.6 mb/d by 2029, and then shifting into a narrow contraction in
the final year of our medium-term outlook. This slow erosion in global demand
growth results in a net increase of 3.2 mb/d during the 2023-2030 forecast period.

Growth will be dominated by non-OECD Asian economies, especially India and

China, as oil demand’s decades-long pivot to emerging markets continues. Total
non-OECD demand is forecast to rise 6.1 mb/d by 2030. While road transport use
will ease as vehicle electrification gathers pace, significant potential remains for
incremental jet fuel and petrochemical feedstock consumption. By contrast, the
OECD, led by Europe and Americas, will post a sharp decline of 2.9 mb/d over the
forecast period.

Shifting patterns of use, with most growth taking place in non-combustion

applications like petrochemicals and a higher share of biofuels, mean that CO2
emissions from oil use could peak as early as 2026.

World oil demand forecast to plateau this decade

Oil demand, 2017-2030 Growth in oil demand, 2022-2030
110 3.0

105 2.5
mb/d

100 2.0

95 1.5

90 1.0

85 0.5

80 0.0

75 -0.5

70 -1.0
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

Others Biofuels Petrochemical Feedstocks Total

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Demand

Oil demand growth to decouple from slower GDP expansion

The global economy has so far proved resilient during the unprecedented central
bank interest rate hikes of 2022-2023 that coincided with the end to the post-Covid
economic (and inflationary) rebound. These campaigns can be considered largely
successful in that consumer inflation – although still above-target – has eased
considerably, while economic activity remained mostly robust. Still, the long-term
impact of this bout of monetary tightening is undetermined, especially in developed
countries. Here, GDP growth remains subpar at 1-2% over the forecast period
amid lacklustre manufacturing and trade, and tight credit conditions.

On a global level, this is partly counterbalanced by robust growth in non-OECD

economies, averaging 4% in India and other Asian countries. While China’s growth
will also settle around this level, this marks a sharp deceleration from the country’s
overleveraged 1990-2010 boom years, with the protracted property slump
weighing on economic sentiment. Consequently, global GDP growth is set to
remain around half a percent below its 2010s pre-pandemic trend at an average
annual rate of 3% over the forecasting period.

Growth in global oil demand and GDP, 2011-2030

3.0%
Oil demand growth

2022 2011-2023
2.5%
2023 2015
2017
2.0%
2013 Forecast
2014 2024-2030
1.5%
2018
2012
1.0%
2016 2011
2024 2025 Forecast
2019 without
0.5% 2026
2027 substitution
2029
2028
0.0%
2030 Pre-
-0.5% pandemic
trend
2.6% 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.2%
GDP growth

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Excludes 2020 and 2021 due to Covid-19 distortions.

Now that the pandemic period (when public health restrictions drove changes in
oil demand) has concluded, economic fundamentals are set to regain their
traditional role as main drivers of oil demand, albeit only briefly. Global oil demand
growth of about 1 mb/d in 2024 and 2025 is roughly in line with the level implied
by GDP growth. However, this long-established correlation is set to break down in
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 12
Oil 2024 Demand

subsequent years. Oil consumption effectively decouples from GDP from 2026
onwards, as substitution away from oil in transport and power generation pushes
oil demand growth towards zero, and eventually into decline.

Emerging Asia and petrochemicals dominate growth

The substitution effect is especially prominent in transport – the mainstay of oil
demand – with road fuel demand already plateauing this year, and total transport
close behind. EV sales are set to continue their stellar growth trajectory, resulting
in significant fuel savings. This will displace 6 mb/d of gasoline and diesel demand
by 2030, with a further contribution from improving fuel economies. Post-pandemic
changes in consumer mobility behaviour contribute a further 1 mb/d in transport
fuel savings as remote and hybrid work are now well established. The picture for
public transport use is more mixed – city mass transit ridership has not yet
regained 2019 levels in developed countries, partly because consumers shifted to
car journeys. Conversely, in China public transport rebounded to pre-Covid levels
in the immediate aftermath of the country’s reopening, while highway passenger
volumes remain at around half of 2019 levels, according to data reported by
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

The displacement of oil used in electricity generation will also play a major role in
shifting global demand to a plateau. In particular, Saudi Arabia has plans that
would see about 1 mb/d cut from direct crude, fuel oil and gasoil use in power
plants by 2030. A large increase in utilisation of domestic gas and renewable
resources would enable this. Iraq is also expected to reduce oil burn in power
plants, albeit on a smaller scale.

Growth in world oil demand by product, 2023-2030

3.0
mb/d

2.0

1.0

0.0

-1.0

-2.0
LPG/Ethane Naphtha Gasoline Jet/Kero GasoilDiesel Fuel Oil Other Products

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 13
Oil 2024 Demand

Long-distance transport such as aviation and marine shipping, where demand is

less amenable to direct substitution, will continue to post growth. However, here
fuel efficiencies are increasingly slowing demand gains. Global flight activity
regained pre-pandemic levels over the course of 2023, but at present jet/kerosene
use remains about 5% below 2019 levels. Consumption is not expected to surpass
pre-Covid levels until 2027, with healthy underlying demand for air travel
counterbalanced by major strides in aircraft fuel efficiencies. Along the same line,
efficiencies related to regulations by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
are set to gradually erode consumption of marine fuels.

World oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 13.1 13.3 13.7 14.1 14.6 15.0 15.4 15.8 16.2 16.5 16.8 17.1 2.3% 2.5
Naphtha 6.7 6.6 7.1 6.9 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.5 2.2% 1.2
Gasoline 26.9 23.7 25.7 26.3 27.0 27.2 27.2 27.0 26.7 26.4 26.0 25.4 -0.8% -1.6
Jet/Kerosene 7.9 4.7 5.1 6.2 7.2 7.5 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.5 2.4% 1.3
Gasoil/Diesel 28.3 26.1 27.6 28.4 28.5 28.4 28.8 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.8 28.7 0.1% 0.2
Residual fuel oil 6.2 5.8 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.3 -0.3% -0.1
Other products 11.5 11.6 11.8 11.8 11.3 11.0 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.0 -0.4% -0.4
Total products 100.6 91.7 97.5 100.1 102.2 103.2 104.2 105.0 105.3 105.5 105.6 105.4 0.4% 3.2
Annual change 0.5 -8.9 5.8 2.6 2.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1

In a marked contrast to the increasingly anaemic gains in transport fuels,

petrochemical feedstocks will be the cornerstones of overall growth, as global
polymer and synthetic fibre consumption steadily rises. Naphtha and LPG/ethane
use will climb by a combined 3.7 mb/d over the forecast period. Four-fifths of this
increment will be for deliveries to petrochemical plants, with growth in LPG
demand for clean cooking and other domestic applications also playing a major
role. Especially strong growth for LPG/ethane use – up by 2.5 mb/d between 2023
and 2030 – reflects substantial increases in new NGL supply, notably from the
United States and major Middle Eastern producers.

China will continue to dominate growth in petrochemicals and gains of 1.4 mb/d in
feedstock products will be close to the country’s overall increase to 2030. On the
other hand, rapid deployment of clean energy technologies will balance strong
underlying mobility growth. Climbing EV sales and the impacts of infrastructure
investments such as high-speed rail have blunted gasoline demand growth and
China’s use of the fuel is set to peak by 2025.

In India transport fuels will defy the global trend and increase significantly. Indian
demand is expected to rise by 1.3 mb/d, with growth almost equal to that of its
northern neighbour. Combined gains in all non-OECD Asian economies other than
China and India will be even larger at 1.6 mb/d. Together, emerging Asian
economies will be far and away the most important source of oil demand growth
this decade.
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Oil 2024 Demand

Growth in oil demand by region, 2023-2030

2.0
mb/d

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

-1.5

-2.0
OECD OECD OECD Asia China India Other Asia Middle East Africa Other
Americas Europe Oceania Americas

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

By contrast, demand in OECD economies will continue its decades-long decline.

In 2007, OECD demand was 50.2 mb/d and accounted for 57% of global oil use.
By 2019 this had fallen to 47.5 mb/d (47% of the total) and in 2023 deliveries
averaged 45.7 mb/d (45%). By 2030, OECD consumption will drop to 42.7 mb/d,
41% of the global total. Advanced economies have comparatively low GDP
elasticities and can expect more limited economic growth. In general, they have
also implemented ambitious clean energy policies. As a result, OECD countries
will experience the largest declines in transport fuel demand and smaller rises in
jet fuel demand. Increases in OECD petrochemical feedstock use will be largely
confined to the United States.

OECD and non-OECD oil demand, 2007-2030

65 65%
OECD
mb/d

60 60%
Non-
OECD
55 55%

OECD
50 50%
share
(RHS)
45 45%

40 40%

35 35%
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 15
Oil 2024 Demand

There are various risks to our demand forecast, of which assumptions about
economic growth, oil prices and the pace of EV sales are key. Also, deviations for
these factors are likely to be interdependent – for example, a faster pace of GDP
growth is likely to be accompanied by higher oil prices and quicker EV adoption.
Moreover, oil’s flattish, plateauing demand profile post-2027 means that it would
only take relatively minor changes in its underlying drivers to directionally shift oil’s
demand trajectory. For example, either a 0.3% quickening in global GDP growth,
a USD 5/bbl annual decline in real oil prices or a 15% slowdown in the pace of
global EV adoption would be sufficient for oil consumption to cross the narrow
dividing line back from shrinkage to growth at the end of the decade. Conversely,
opposite shifts of the same magnitude would accelerate oil demand’s slide into
contraction.

World oil demand by region (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
North America 24.9 21.9 23.7 24.3 24.6 24.5 24.6 24.4 24.0 23.7 23.4 23.0 -0.9% -1.6
S&C America 6.7 5.7 6.4 6.7 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3 1.0% 0.5
Europe 15.8 13.7 14.5 14.9 14.8 14.7 14.6 14.5 14.4 14.2 14.0 13.8 -1.0% -1.0
Africa 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 2.6% 0.8
Middle East 8.8 8.1 8.4 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.1 9.0 0.0% 0.0
Eurasia 4.3 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 0.8% 0.3
Asia Pacific 35.9 34.2 35.8 36.3 38.1 39.1 39.8 40.4 41.0 41.5 41.9 42.3 1.5% 4.2
World 100.6 91.7 97.5 100.1 102.2 103.2 104.2 105.0 105.3 105.5 105.6 105.4 0.4% 3.2
Annual change 0.5 -8.9 5.8 2.6 2.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1

Fundamentals
Green shoots emerging, but GDP growth remains below trend
The global economy is still in the process of adjusting to 2022’s sea change, when
major central banks launched their unprecedented battle against consumer
inflation that reached 40-year highs. These measures have to date resulted in a
cumulative 4-5% hike in interest rates for advanced economies. Whilst still
inconclusive considering monetary policy’s long and variable lags, these
campaigns can so far be considered largely successful – inflation has retreated
from its 9-10% peak to around 3% in most developed countries. Moreover, the
decline has been achieved without driving the global economy into recession,
amid notably firm labour markets and resilient consumer spending.

However, the final stage of this push has proved challenging, with inflation
remaining stubbornly above its target of 2%, by around 1-2%. Until this “last mile”
has been completed, the hoped-for soft landing for the global economy,
accompanied by a return to monetary easing, may prove elusive. In this context,
breakeven inflation rates derived from bond markets price annual US inflation at
around 2.4% at a five-year horizon.
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Oil 2024 Demand

Regardless, higher interest rates and tighter credit mean that global economic
growth is set to remain below its pre-pandemic trend for the foreseeable future. A
slump in global trade weighs heavily on export-dependent China and the
eurozone, with both pivoting towards structurally lower expansion. In this regard,
the present shift towards deglobalisation does not augur well, as higher tariffs and
other restrictions hamper trade and upend supply chains. Sino-US trade frictions,
focused on technology, have become especially visible. In parallel, geopolitical
risks have also become more pertinent, amid wars in Ukraine and the Middle East
and an increasingly tense relationship between China and some neighbouring
countries.

Government spending has been rampant since the pandemic, with knock-on
effects on borrowing, interest rates and prices. As outlays for programmes such
as social security, health care, the green economy and defence balloon, so do
fiscal deficits and government debt burdens. The IMF has singled out budget
deficits in the United States and China as posing significant financial stability risks
for the global economy.

Real GDP growth assumptions

2011-2019 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026-30
USA 2.4% 1.9% 2.5% 2.6% 1.9% 1.7%
Europe 2.0% 3.2% 1.3% 1.5% 2.0% 1.4%
Japan 0.9% 0.9% 1.9% 0.5% 0.9% 0.4%
China 7.3% 3.0% 5.2% 4.7% 4.1% 3.7%
India 6.8% 6.6% 7.7% 6.3% 7.4% 6.4%
Africa 3.7% 3.8% 2.5% 3.0% 3.9% 3.4%

OECD 2.1% 3.0% 1.7% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%

Non-OECD 4.7% 3.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.4% 3.9%
World 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 3.0% 3.3% 2.9%

Source: Oxford Economics.

Global GDP growth is projected to average 3% over the 2024-2030 forecast period
– about half a point lower than during the 2010s. Emerging economies will remain
the main drivers by far, with average 2024-2030 non-OECD GDP growth more
than double the OECD rate (4% versus 1.7%). By 2030, the non-OECD share of
total global GDP will climb to 59%, from 55% in 2023.

GDP expansion in the United States will reach 2.6% in 2024 before subsiding, as
higher-for-longer interest rates trickle down into the real economy and excess
savings from the pandemic era are finally depleted. Growth will average 1.7% over
the remainder of the forecast period. Soaring fiscal deficits (at 7.1% of GDP in
2025, according to the IMF, it is almost three times the 2% average for other
advanced economies) will increasingly add to price pressures and act as a drag
on economic growth.
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Oil 2024 Demand

The eurozone will gradually emerge from the economic stagnation that began in
2022, as lower interest rates and disinflation boost real incomes and private
consumption. Germany will be a key engine of the modest recovery as a rebound
in manufacturing lifts GDP growth to 1.3% in 2025 after two years of little growth
and will remain around that level thereafter.

Japan’s GDP will expand by 0.5% on average between 2024 and 2030 – the
lowest of any major economy as an ageing population and a shrinking labour force
weigh on productivity and depress potential growth.

China’s economy continues to battle formidable headwinds such as a shrinking

population, a protracted real estate slump now in its third year, industrial
overcapacity, heavily indebted local governments and a nascent deflationary
spiral amid soft domestic demand. Baseline trend growth will fall below 4% in 2026
and remain there to the end of our forecast period. Whilst reasonably firm in global
terms, this is around half of the country’s pre-pandemic trend.

India’s GDP growth will remain by far the strongest among major economies,
averaging 6.5% over the forecast period due to structural tailwinds such as benign
demographics, a burgeoning middle class, and accelerating urbanisation and
industrialisation. Oil demand will grow at a relatively fast rate as the energy
intensity of the country’s economy picks up from a low base.

Scenarios show price impact on oil demand

Assumptions about GDP growth and its impact on oil demand are a key
component of our demand estimates. The average GDP elasticity of global oil
demand is about 0.3 for OECD and 0.6 for non-OECD, reflecting the greater
oil-intensity of emerging markets.

Additionally, expectations of future oil prices are paramount for demand estimates,
with forecasts sensitive to both the absolute price level and sequential price
changes over the outlook period. Oil prices used for the modelling are based on
an average 2025 Brent crude price of about USD 79/bbl – which is held constant
in real terms over the remainder of the forecasting period.

In addition to this base case, we have considered alternative high- and low-price
scenarios:

High-price scenario: Assumes oil prices increase by 2.5% in real terms per
annum, in line with their long-term historical pattern.

Low-price scenario: Estimates of future spot prices are based on the ICE Brent
forward curve (slowing from USD 79/bbl in 2025 to USD 69/bbl in 2030). These
prices are then discounted to real terms.
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Oil 2024 Demand

The high-price scenario would curtail 2030 global oil demand by 650 kb/d.
However, this would not cause demand to peak earlier. Conversely, the low-price
scenario would lift oil consumption by 1.1 mb/d at the end of the forecasting period,
eliminating the current 2029 peak.

Alternative real oil price scenarios and impact on global oil demand, 2024-2030
Alternative price scenarios Impact on global oil demand
$100 1,200
USD/bbl

1,000

Kb/d
$90 800
600
$80 400
200
$70 0
-200

$60 -400
-600

$50 -800
2024 2026 2028 2030 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Low OECD Low Non-OECD
Base Low High
High OECD High Non-OECD

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Non-OECD price controls limit pass-through of market prices to retail

The impact of changes in oil prices on oil demand is roughly similar in OECD and
non-OECD economies, despite non-OECD oil consumption being, at least in
theory, more sensitive to changes in oil prices. Developing economies tend to be
more oil intensive with their output gravitating towards agriculture and heavy
industry. Also, energy ranks high in developing country Consumer Price Index
(CPI) baskets, with poorer households spending a larger share of their income on
basic goods. In theory, this results in higher oil demand price elasticities, as a price
increase will be more keenly felt in developing countries.
However, these higher theoretical elasticities for lower-income countries are not at
all clear in reality. This is because the market price mechanism whereby open
market oil prices are converted into retail prices is less straightforward in poorer
countries, being heavily mediated by their governments through price controls and
subsidies.
These controls contribute to retail prices that are, as a rule, much lower in
developing countries and closer to global wholesale market levels. In this regard,
poorer countries contrast sharply with OECD countries where elevated fuel taxes
inflate retail prices. More importantly, the prevalence of price controls in non-OECD
economies results in a weak pass-through of market oil prices into pump prices. A
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Oil 2024 Demand

prime example is India, where retail prices have remained virtually unchanged
since mid-2022. Retail pump prices in petrostates such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
Kuwait and Qatar have also been fixed for years, according to data from
GlobalPetrolPrices. Statistically, the disparity is reflected in the demand-weighted
correlation between global gasoline prices and local currency retail pump prices.
From January 2021 to February 2024, this correlation was only 58% for non-OECD
countries, compared to 81% for OECD countries. The equivalent percentages for
diesel were 64% and 84%, respectively.

Energy weight in CPI baskets; gasoline retail price by country vs demand

Energy % weight in CPI baskets, 1Q24 Gasoline: retail price by country vs
cumulative demand (mb/d), Feb 2024
$2.50
15%
% CPI Basket Weight

$2.00
USD/litre
13%

$1.50
11%

$1.00
9%

7% $0.50

5% $0.00
0 5 10 15 20 25

OECD Non-OECD

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Oxford Economics, GlobalPetrolPrices.

Road fuel demand approaching peak

EVs to curtail consumption of key fuels
Global electric car sales continue to display stellar growth. According to the IEA’s
Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2024, sales could reach around 17 million in 2024,
increasing from 14 million in 2023, with EVs accounting for nearly one in five cars
sold globally. This ascent is set to persist, with total sales projected to reach
40 million in 2030, when almost one in two new cars will be an EV. This will
displace around 6 mb/d of road fuels demand by the end of our forecast period.

The EV phenomenon remains primarily a Chinese one. In 2023 the majority of EV

sales were in China (60%), with Europe (25%) and the United States (10%)
accounting for the bulk of sales elsewhere. This dominance is set to continue – almost
one in three cars on the roads in China by 2030 is expected to be electric, compared
to almost one in five in both the United States and the European Union. Along the
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Oil 2024 Demand

same lines, more than half of all EVs sold globally were produced by Chinese
carmakers, compared to only 10% for internal combustion engine (ICE) cars.

The environment for EVs has become more challenging in Western countries of
late amid the partial phasing out of tax breaks and subsidies, with unsold cars
piling up at car dealership lots. In contrast to China’s mass-market adoption, EVs
remain a comparatively niche product in developed economies, experiencing
difficulty broadening their appeal beyond relatively prosperous, environmentally
concerned urban motorists. High sticker prices, the lack of an adequate charging
infrastructure and collapsing second-hand values act as deterrents to less affluent
buyers. At the same time, trade frictions between China and the west are building
due to cheap EVs from China rapidly gaining market share, crowding out
higher-cost Western carmakers. This has prompted accusations that, backed by
disproportionate government aid, China is exporting its structural overcapacity.
The May 2024 decision by the Biden Administration to quadruple tariffs on
Chinese EVs is a case in point. The European Union was also conducting an anti-
dumping investigation into Chinese EVs at the time of writing.

Despite these headwinds, we expect EV growth to continue the acceleration of

recent years, with oil demand savings advancing as more cars enter the fleet. This
increase will be underpinned by ambitious zero-emissions targets, ongoing
industrial policy support and steadily falling prices – parity with ICE cars could be
attained by 2030 for most models outside of China. Still, it is worth emphasising
that our forecast is highly dependent on EV ownership extending beyond early
adopters and finding mass-market acceptance in Western economies.

While China remains the key driver of growth, sales will become less concentrated
both geographically (with emerging market economies such as India more
prominent) and in terms of fuels, with diesel gaining in relative importance. EVs
are set to avoid an extra annual 1 mb/d of road fuels demand in 2029 and 2030,
for a cumulative displacement of 6.1 mb/d, marking a sixfold increase versus 2023.
Of this amount, 4.7 mb/d will be in gasoline and 1.4 mb/d in diesel. For the latter
fuel, commercial and freight use will account for around 1 mb/d of savings, while
in regional terms Europe will be responsible for the lion’s share at 630 kb/d –
outstripping the continent’s gasoline savings of 530 kb/d.

Efficiency improvements continue to reduce fuel use

Efficiency improvements will assume increased importance over the forecast
period in all transport segments, including road, maritime and aviation. Total
efficiency gains are expected to reduce oil demand growth by 4.7 mb/d from 2023
to 2030, with the majority of savings in OECD road fuels amid stricter
environmental regulations in Europe and the United States.
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Oil 2024 Demand

The European Union adopted new vehicle carbon dioxide (CO2) standards in
March 2023, requiring a 55% reduction in emissions of new cars by 2030 versus
2021. The new rule released by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in March 2024 is projected to cut CO2 emissions from light-duty
vehicles by nearly 50% in 2032 from 2026, to 85 grammes of CO2 per mile.
Carmakers have been given a three-year extension to 2030 to reduce tailpipe
emissions amid a “technology neutral” approach. Besides fully electric vehicles,
compliance can be attained by producing a range of “cleaner” cars, including gas-
powered cars, hybrid EVs, and plug-in hybrids.

Much of these efficiency gains are being offset by a shift towards larger
conventional cars, which will support road fuel demand in the medium term. To a
considerable extent, improvements in engine efficiency have enabled more
widespread ownership of larger vehicles, as fuel cost savings increase
affordability, in line with the Jevons Paradox. In some cases, carmakers also use
larger bodies for hybrid vehicles, where additional equipment requires more
space. This increase in size may also be visible within the EV segment. As a result
of efficiency improvements and EVs crowding out ICE cars, road fuels, especially
gasoline, would become more readily available and comparatively lower in cost.
Price‑elastic consumers, especially in emerging market countries, would be the
main beneficiaries of a rebound effect on demand, partly offsetting direct global
fuel savings due to efficiencies and greater EV use.

Behavioural pandemic-era mobility transformations persist

Four years after the Covid-19 pandemic brought unprecedented disruptions to
everyday life, people’s daily routines have overwhelmingly returned to normal. In
parallel, oil demand growth has reverted to its former underlying behavioural
drivers, with traditional economic factors replacing public health restrictions. A key
exception in this regard is in corporate life, where mobility patterns have been
transformed due to a persistent shift to remote and hybrid work.

After cratering during H1 2020, office attendance initially rebounded sharply as

social distancing measures were relaxed. However, this recovery has stalled since
2022, with remote and hybrid work in developed economies stabilising at
permanently higher levels. In 2023, full-time employees in America worked from
home (WFH) 1.4 days per week on average according to the Global Survey of
Working Arrangements – a fivefold increase versus 2019.

In this context, the United States is emblematic of a group of advanced economies,

predominantly in the Anglosphere – for example, Canada (1.7 days) and the
United Kingdom (1.5 days) – where WFH has effectively become part of the new
normal. The custom has advanced less in other developed economies, with an
average 0.8 days per week worked remotely in mainland European countries, and
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Oil 2024 Demand

0.7 days in Asia. Also, there are large differences within countries across age
groups, incomes and industries. WFH is most common among higher-paid,
higher-educated workers and concentrated in knowledge-intensive sectors such
as finance and information technology, where work can be more easily performed
remotely. These technologically adept employees also tend to be younger. Other
factors contribute to the appeal of WFH – US workers tend to have longer and
more expensive commutes as well as bigger homes, incentivising remote work.

WFH’s future, beyond the stabilisation of recent years, is uncertain. Its impact on
productivity is still hotly debated, with some employers tightening their rules and
demanding that remote staff return to their desks at least some of the time. A
recent slowdown in hiring in finance and tech may strengthen their hand.
Conversely, lawmakers in several nations have passed legislation promoting the
right to flexible work arrangements or proposed doing so. Also, technological
innovation in video conferencing may enhance the quality and prevalence of
virtual meetings.

In the United States, WFH has accelerated the long-term decoupling between road
fuel demand and the size of the economy. Gasoline consumption has been lagging
key macroeconomic indicators for decades, as driving mobility gradually moved
towards saturation. In 2023, total vehicle miles travelled (VMT) were almost the
same as in 2019, although GDP had increased by 8%. Widening the gap further
is that fuel demand has also lagged mobility – US gasoline deliveries were 4%
lower over this period, as more efficient car engines and an expanding EV fleet
curtailed demand.

US GDP, Vehicle Miles Travelled, gasoline demand, December 2019-March 2024

150%

140%
GDP
130%

120%
VMT
110%

100% Gasoline
Demand
90%

80%

70%
Dec-09 Dec-11 Dec-13 Dec-15 Dec-17 Dec-19 Dec-21 Dec-23

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Sources: IEA analysis based on data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Highway Administration.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Demand

Partially counteracting WFH’s negative effects on gasoline demand since 2020

was a switch from public transport to car journeys, as health risk-averse travellers
avoided public transit and quieter roads in some regions made driving easier.
While mass transit ridership rebounded strongly in 2022 and 2023, passenger
volumes in most developed economies remain short of 2019 levels. Public
transport use has fallen in major US and UK cities due to remote working.
According to the Metropolitan Transport Authority, ridership on the New York
subway averaged 68% of pre-pandemic traffic in 2023. Data from Transport for
London (TfL) paint a similar picture, with bus and metro journeys at 84% of pre-
Covid levels by October. Along the same lines, the German Federal Statistical
Office reported 8% fewer bus and rail passenger journeys in 2023 than in 2019.

The key contrast with this lacklustre recovery has been in China, where mobility
made a swift and complete comeback in the immediate aftermath of the country’s
reopening. Passenger volumes for rail and urban traffic had returned to pre-Covid
level by mid-2023, as had domestic flight activity. Similarly, holiday travel
rebounded to around 20% above 2019 levels during 2023’s major festivals. The
chief exception in this regard is long-distance car travel, amid a cross-modal shift
to rail and air traffic – highway passenger volumes are around half of 2019 levels,
according to NBS data.

Oil demand displacement by EVs and by teleworking

Oil demand displaced by EVs Oil demand displaced by teleworking

mb/d

7.0 1.25

6.0
1.00
5.0
0.75
4.0

3.0 0.50
2.0
0.25
1.0

0.0 0.00
2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029

US Gasoline US Diesel Europe Gasoline Europe Diesel US Other

China Gasoline China Diesel Other Gasoline Other Diesel

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

We see the cumulative impact of post-Covid remote working behavioural changes

reflected in a reduction of global road fuels demand of 800 kb/d from 2023 to 2030.
This reduction is highly concentrated in the United States, where an estimated
500 kb/d of fuel use is being avoided compared with 2019.
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Oil 2024 Demand

Efficiencies slow jet and marine fuel growth

Jet fuel will only surpass 2019 levels by 2027
The pandemic wreaked large-scale devastation on global air travel, rendering
jet/kerosene by far the most affected among the major oil products, with demand
collapsing by 41% to 4.7 mb/d during 2020. In subsequent years, as lockdown
restrictions eased and use rebounded, the fuel became the main driver of oil
demand growth, at 1 mb/d each in 2022 and 2023. With the post-pandemic
rebound now having run its course, growth is set to recalibrate to a sharply slower
300 kb/d in 2024. This deceleration will continue in 2025-2030, averaging 170 kb/d
annually for a cumulative 850 kb/d gain, as increasing passenger demand for air
travel is counterbalanced by major strides in aircraft design. As a result, global jet
fuel demand will not surpass 2019 levels until 2027.

The global recovery to pre-pandemic air travel activity became complete during
2023 by measures such as number of flights, passengers and miles flown.
Passenger numbers regained the 2019 level somewhat earlier than flight
movements, as airlines flew larger, fuller planes on high-traffic routes. February
2024 marked the first occurrence of a full recovery in both the domestic (+13.7%
versus 2019) and international (+0.9% versus 2019) segments, measured in
revenue-passenger kilometres (the number of paying passengers multiplied by the
total distance travelled), according to International Air Transport Association
(IATA) data.

Global number of commercial flights (daily), 2019-2024

160,000

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0
J F M A M J J A S O N D

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from FlightRadar, Bloomberg.
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Oil 2024 Demand

Nonetheless, jet fuel demand has failed to keep pace with air travel, making it the
only fuel where consumption has not yet regained pre-pandemic levels. Global jet
fuel demand in 2024 is only 95% of 2019 levels, despite a widespread recovery in
flight numbers. Among the major economies, China’s rebound to 101% stands
out, contrasting with demand lagging elsewhere – 97% in the United States, 96%
in OECD Europe and 93% in OECD Asia.

Although operational improvements and optimisation in flight planning have

contributed to this divergence, the gap arises chiefly due to the advances that
have been made in aircraft fuel efficiencies since 2019. Flagship new-generation
models such as the Airbus320neo (introduced in 2016) and the Boeing 737 MAX
(2017) burn up to 30% less fuel than their predecessors. The replacement of older
models in fleets has been swift – thus far, deliveries of the A320neo and MAX
families have been 3 279 and 1 486, respectively, with years-long backlogs for
planes. Fuel savings have followed and are set to continue, with Airbus
progressing towards an upgrade to the current A320neo that would boost fuel
efficiency by a further 20% to 25%.

These fuel economies will partially counteract solid underlying global growth in
demand for air travel. IATA forecasts this to double by 2040, increasing at an
annual rate of 3.4% between 2019-2040. Geographically, growth rates range
between 2.1% for Europe and the United States to 4.6% in the Asia Pacific region,
with the latter making up half of global passenger demand in 2040. Structurally
lower GDP growth will constrain demand increases in advanced economies, as
will limited capacity at airports and heightened concerns about the climate impact
of air travel. As a result, the Asia Pacific region will account for two-thirds of
2023-2030 demand gains, as both higher wealth and disposable incomes drive
changes in consumer behaviour, boosting aspirations for perceived luxuries such
as tourism and air travel.

Slowing trade and IMO efficiencies erode marine fuel growth

Demand for marine fuels (comprising marine bunkers and domestic navigation) is
expected to hover around 5.3 mb/d throughout the forecast period, as below-par
growth in trade and seaborne freight combines with tighter standards imposed by
the IMO to reduce the carbon intensity of shipping.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) forecasts

maritime trade to expand at an average annual growth rate of 2.1% by 2028 –
below the 3% historical average of the past three decades. In addition to
below-trend GDP growth, the expansion of tariffs and other restrictions act as a
headwind to global trade, as do higher ocean freight rates.

At the same time, regulatory targets for shipping carbonisation are accelerating.
The 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships updated the
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Oil 2024 Demand

initial strategy adopted in 2018 with enhanced net zero targets, calling for a 20%
to 30% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.

The efficiency standards mandated by the IMO will counterbalance underlying

trade growth of around 600 kb/d by 2030, resulting in a flattish demand profile for
marine fuels over the forecast horizon.

Oil displacement in power generation

Oil burn set to plummet as Saudi ambitions come into focus
Ambitious plans by Saudi Arabia and Iraq to cut the use of oil in power generation
are projected to make a momentous contribution to taming global oil demand
growth. Middle Eastern countries are estimated to have used 1.5 mb/d of oil to
produce electricity in 2023, about 40% of the global total and one-sixth of overall
regional oil consumption. Fuel oil and direct crude burning each accounted for
around 600 kb/d. Much of this is concentrated in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, where it
plays a crucial role in managing peak summer electricity demand. We estimate
that this substitution in power sources, focused on new gas and solar capacity,
will reduce the amount of oil used in generation by 1.1 mb/d by 2030.

Impact of Middle East substitution of oil use in power generation, 2019-2030

1.8
1.6
mb/d

1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Direct crude Fuel oil Gasoil

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Saudi Arabia is currently the world’s largest consumer of oil for power generation
but has announced plans that would end this dependency by 2030 in favour of
natural gas and renewables. The Kingdom’s Liquid Fuel Displacement Program
would eliminate approximately 1 mb/d of crude oil, fuel oil and gasoil use through
a combination of incremental domestic gas resources, notably from the Jafurah
project, and an enormous increase in renewables generation. Based on these
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Oil 2024 Demand

plans, we estimate that direct crude burn will be reduced by 500 kb/d from 2023
to 2030, while fuel oil and gasoil use falls by 350 kb/d and 150 kb/d, respectively.
The country has set a target of 50% of electricity to come from renewable sources
by 2030, with a goal of 130 GW of renewables capacity.

Despite substantial growth in other sectors, Saudi Arabia’s total domestic

consumption is forecast to fall by 530 kb/d (14%) between 2023 and 2030. Only
the United States will see a steeper decline in absolute terms between now and
the end of the decade. These two countries, the world’s top oil producers, will post
the largest drops in demand.

Iraq’s electricity grid has come under strain in recent years. Power plants have
struggled to meet surging peak summer demand, even with imports from
neighbouring countries. Currently, the country receives both power and gas from
other nations, most notably Iran. An agreement where Iraq receive Iranian gas
was extended for five years in March 2024, meaning that incremental domestic
generation and new imports from other sources can be used to meet the gap with
demand and reduce oil burn. The country burns on average approximately
150 kb/d of crude and around 360 kb/d of fuel oil but started curbing crude used
in power generation in May.

This year Iraq plans to reduce crude oil burn as part of its obligation to offset
overproduction of its OPEC+ target in Q1 2024. In March, Iraq submitted a
compensation plan to make up its excess output, in which it agreed to cut
production by reducing crude oil use in power generation from May-December
2024. Iraq will gradually reduce crude burn over the nine-month period, and will
average around 45 kb/d, which will cap its crude burn at 75 kb/d.

In the medium term, domestic resources coupled with increased imports of gas
and electricity should allow for further replacement of crude and fuel oil used in
power generation. With support from the United States, Iraq aims to capture
associated gas, which is currently being flared from oil fields, for power generation.
Additionally, TotalEnergies is working on projects to develop gas and solar
resources within the country. We estimate that these will result in a 120 kb/d
reduction in direct crude burn by 2030.

These changes would be sufficient to see both Saudi and Iraqi oil demand peak
in the middle of this decade, comfortably ahead of the world as a whole. In the
process, substantial additional crude volumes would become available for export.
These changes also will materially loosen global fuel oil balances at a time when
refiners are set to grapple with ever-lighter crude slates.
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Oil 2024 Demand

Petrochemicals lead growth

Use of feedstock products will expand throughout the decade
Rising demand for petrochemical feedstocks will be the largest force for growth in
oil demand during the medium-term. Projected 2023-2030 gains of 2.8 mb/d would
be equivalent to about three-quarters of the overall increase in oil consumption
and will be dominated by ethane (+820 kb/d) and LPG (+730 kb/d) as the industry
digests burgeoning global NGL volumes.

China will remain far and away the most important region for higher petrochemical
activity. In the wake of an unprecedented wave of plant construction, feedstock
use is forecast to go up by 1.3 mb/d between 2023 and 2030, having risen by
2.6 mb/d from 2017 to 2023. This surge reflects a drive towards self-reliance in
polymers by the world’s largest importer of petrochemical products, boosting both
imports and domestic production of ethane, LPG and naphtha.

Petrochemical feedstock demand growth, 2019-2030

By region By process

1.0 1.0
0.8
mb/d

0.8
mb/d

0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
-0.2 -0.2
-0.4 -0.4
-0.6 -0.6
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

OECD Americas Other OECD China Cracker ethane Cracker LPG PDH propane
Middle East Other regions Total Cracker naphtha Aromatics ex ref. Total

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

In contrast to other segments of oil demand, overall petrochemical activity

continued to expand during the pandemic years as the interruption to demand
from manufacturing, textiles and construction was more than offset by increased
plastic use in packaging, and medical and protective equipment. Indeed, overall
demand for ethylene – the most important petrochemical building-block molecule
– may have fallen slightly in 2022 as this exceptional demand subsided.

Over the rest of this decade, this remarkably steady growth is set to continue. We
expect demand for light olefins (ethylene and propylene) to increase by about
2.8% per year from 2023 to 2030. Longstanding trends like the growth of cities
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 29
Oil 2024 Demand

and average incomes, especially in emerging markets, as well as the increasing

prevalence of online shopping and delivery services, boost packaging demand. In
addition, some important manufacturing growth areas, including clean energy
technologies like EVs and solar panels, are relatively polymer intensive. Factors
like these mean that plastic consumption rises most sharply as an economy enters
middle-income status and, as with overall oil use, gains in polymer end-use will be
highly concentrated in non-OECD nations.

While the global rate of growth in petrochemical activity has been relatively stable
over recent years, this disguises major shifts in where the production, and
associated feedstock consumption, is taking place. These changes result from
patterns of investment and feedstock availability.

Chinese and US petrochemical market shares expanding

A major shift in activity took place over the pandemic years, with China rapidly
cementing its role as the world’s foremost centre of polymer production. This has
had major implications for oil demand, with combined naphtha, LPG and ethane
increasing by 1.7 mb/d from 2019 to 2023. Over the same period, total oil demand
went up by the same amount globally.

Light olefins capacity additions, 2019-2030

By region By technology

20 20
Mt/y

Mt/y

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0

-5 -5
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

OECD Americas Other OECD China Steam crackers PDH Total

Middle East Other regions Total

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Between 2019 and the end of 2024 Chinese producers will have completed
construction of ethylene and propylene producing plants roughly equivalent to the
combined existing capacity in Europe, Japan and Korea. We expect them to add
half as much again before the end of the decade. These new facilities are
overwhelmingly a combination of world-scale naphtha crackers closely integrated
to new refineries as well as LPG/ethane crackers and propane dehydrogenation
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 30
Oil 2024 Demand

(PDH) plants designed to process imported feedstocks. Alongside major

investments underway elsewhere, especially the Middle East, this means that
global petrochemical markets are set to remain fiercely competitive.

In addition to having the world’s largest petrochemical industry, China remains the
world’s largest importer of petrochemical commodities. Average 2023 shipments
of polymers, synthetic fibres and intermediates were equivalent to about 2.1 mb/d
of overseas feedstock use (roughly equal to total German oil demand). Combined
with an estimated 4.6 mb/d of local feedstock intake, a total of 6.5% of global 2023
oil consumption went to supply China with petrochemical commodities. This
quantity is larger than the national oil demand for all but two countries, the United
States and China. Growth of 1.3 mb/d between 2019 and 2023 in Chinese
consumption of petrochemicals, correcting for import substitution, accounted for
81% of global oil demand gains.

This import substitution has been a major focus of Chinese investments, with
global 2023 shipments of ethylene and its derivatives to the country tumbling by
23% compared to average 2019-2020 levels, according to an analysis of ICIS
trade data. Imports of paraxylene, the most important aromatic building-block
molecule, have collapsed by almost 40%. Overall, we estimate that increased
Chinese production has displaced more than 700 kb/d of feedstock demand in the
rest of the world, so that more than one-third of the rise in Chinese feedstock
requirements has been at the expense of oil consumption in other regions.

China and United States ethylene derivatives trade, 2017-2023

China imports, by source US exports, by destination

2.5 1.5
mb/d equivalent, naphtha

mb/d equivalent, ethane

2.0

1.0
1.5

1.0
0.5

0.5

0.0 0.0
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
North America Europe Middle East Northeast Asia Other Asia Other regions

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from ICIS.

US output of petrochemicals has also risen dramatically as a result of burgeoning

domestic NGL supply and investments in capacity to utilise the resulting low-cost
ethane on a large scale. Total US ethane demand was 2.1 mb/d in 2023, 560 kb/d
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 31
Oil 2024 Demand

higher than in 2019 and almost double its 2015 level. This growth has been
overwhelmingly to produce polyethylene and ethylene glycol for export. Total US
exports of ethylene derivatives have increased by 33% since 2019, according to
ICIS data. These volumes would require 300 kb/d of ethane to produce. Further
growth will be comparatively limited to 2030, with the start-up of only one more
world-scale ethane cracker expected, in 2027 or 2028. Nonetheless, ample
domestic availability should enable a gradual increase in US operating rates and
polymer exports for 2023-2030 feedstock demand growth of 310 kb/d.

Naphtha crackers and traditional exporters under pressure

Consecutive waves of capacity additions in China and the United States have left
producers in other regions facing significant pressure amid an oversupplied
market. The sharpest fall in operating rates has been seen in OECD Europe,
where naphtha demand fell by 240 kb/d (22%) between 2021 and 2023.
Petrochemicals Europe data shows steam cracker operating rates falling to 66%
in 2023, compared to 81% in 2021 and 90% in 2016. European imports of ethylene
derivatives increased sharply ahead of and during the pandemic years. North
America was responsible for almost all of these new shipments, incremental
regional flows that would require the consumption of 180 kb/d of naphtha.

European petrochemical trade, 2017-2030 and operations, 2014-2023

Ethylene derivative imports, by source European cracker operations and demand

700 2.6 100%

kb/d equivalent, naphtha

mb/d

600
2.4 90%
500

400
2.2 80%
300

200
2.0 70%
100

0 1.8 60%
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023

North America Europe Middle East Naphtha, LPG and ethane demand
Northeast Asia Other Asia Other regions Cracker operating rate

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from ICIS, Petrochemicals Europe.

Operating levels in Asia, excluding China, have also suffered. OECD Asia naphtha
consumption, which takes place almost exclusively in Korea and Japan, fell by
7.9% (160 kb/d) between 2021 and 2023. We estimate that naphtha use in the
rest of Asia declined by 16% (210 kb/d), with drops concentrated in Chinese Taipei
and Thailand. Activity at other chemical industry hubs, notably Singapore also
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 32
Oil 2024 Demand

likely suffered significantly. As with Europe, we have assumed that there will not
be a sharp rebound in activity during the medium-term, owing to continued
competitive pressures.

At first glance, the fact that Asian feedstock demand fell by less than in Europe is
a little surprising. Asian petrochemical operations are much more directly exposed
to Chinese competition than their peers elsewhere and operate on a similar cost
base to Europe. Multiple factors have likely contributed to this comparative
resilience. Typically, plants in the region are newer and better integrated to
refineries and downstream consumption – especially in Korea, which accounted
for 40% of 2023 Asian naphtha demand (excluding China). Notably, European
capacities are often operated by companies with global portfolios of plants. In an
oversupplied global market, this may result in these producers deciding to supply
European customers by bringing in additional material from lower cost regions like
North America.

Middle Eastern producers, especially in Saudi Arabia and Iran, also appear to
have lost substantial market share over recent years. While regional producers
should be highly cost-competitive, a decline in operating rates may reflect
limitations on feedstock availability amid upstream production cuts and a strong
focus on export markets in general, and China in particular. Saudi 2023 exports of
ethylene derivatives fell by 21% compared with 2019, according to ICIS data.
Although partially offset by rising domestic demand, this would be equivalent to a
combined loss of 230 kb/d in LPG and ethane use. In Iran, which is extremely
dependent on China as a polymer export destination, ethylene exports fell by 35%,
or the equivalent of 70 kb/d of LPG/ethane demand over the same period.

Saudi Arabia and Iran ethylene derivatives trade, 2017-2023

Saudi Arabia exports, by destination Iran exports, by destination

1.2 250
mb/d equivalent, LPG/ethane

kb/d equivalent, LPG/ethane

1.0
200

0.8
150
0.6
100
0.4

50
0.2

0.0 0
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
North America Europe Middle East Northeast Asia Other Asia Other regions

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from ICIS.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 33
Oil 2024 Demand

Nevertheless, we expect Middle Eastern petrochemical operations to recover and

post strong growth during the decade. An expected 270 kb/d of ethane will come
from Saudi Aramco’s NGL-rich Jafurah project. Along with a similar volume of
LPG, this would be sufficient to reinforce operating rates at existing facilities and
supply new steam cracking and propane dehydrogenation (PDH) units, while
making additional LPG volumes available for export. Other new plants in the UAE,
Qatar and Oman will also add to regional demand for naphtha, LPG and ethane
consumption for an overall increase in 2030 feedstock use of 520 kb/d compared
with 2023.

Chinese capacity and US NGLs reshaping global markets

Chinese petrochemical feedstocks have provided the single most important
contribution to world oil demand growth in recent years, dovetailing neatly with one
of the largest driver of incremental global supply: US NGLs. Together these
countries have formed a mutually reinforcing symbiosis, with the wave of cheap
propane and ethane exports from the United States finding an indispensable outlet
and keeping input costs for Chinese importers low. This has transformed oil and
petrochemical market dynamics.

US NGLs supplying Chinese petrochemical demand growth, 2019-2023

1.0 2.0
mb/d

0.8 1.6

0.6 1.2

0.4 0.8

0.2 0.4

0.0 0.0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
US LPG/ethane shipments to China China imports, including derivatives ethane equivalent
US LPG/ethane supply from NGLs
China petchem capacity to consume, 80% OR World petrochemical demand

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Kpler, ICIS.

Between 2019 and 2023, US exports of ethane and LPG increased by 940 kb/d,
according to Kpler data. A large majority of these incremental volumes went to
China, where US shipments rose from close to zero, to around 700 kb/d. Total
Chinese imports of these products increased by only 570 kb/d over the period.
During this period, the United States has also been the only major producer to
boost its polymer exports into China, according to ICIS data. Total North American
shipments more than doubled from 2019 to 2023, corresponding to 160 kb/d of
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 34
Oil 2024 Demand

ethane use. By this combination, China has accommodated an equivalent of about

850 kb/d of burgeoning US NGL supply since 2019. This is just over half of global
demand growth across all oil products over the same period.
Alongside this regional interdependence, a similar relationship exists between
ethane crackers, which produce ethylene, and PDH units, which produce
propylene from propane. Together, these can replace the two most important
outputs of naphtha crackers, which produce significant amounts of both major light
olefins.
In the past, the impact of increases in ethane cracker capacity on naphtha cracking
was limited by their lack of propylene production. New ethane-consuming units put
pressure on naphtha crackers in Europe and Asia, reducing their output. This
tightens propylene markets, with relative prices rising, supporting naphtha cracker
economics. However, the wave of new PDH capacity over recent years appears to
have changed this. Chinese producers alone have more than doubled global PDH
capacity between 2019 and 2024. Thanks to ample propane availability, propylene
supply from these plants has been able to rise in tandem with ethane-cracker
ethylene output, especially in the United States. This one-two punch has
substantially weakened the position of naphtha crackers and paved the way for a
fall in operating rates on the scale seen in Europe since 2021.

Demand developments by region

North American, European oil demand contracts
Oil demand in North America is forecast to average 24.6 mb/d in 2024-2025,
before gradually declining to 23 mb/d in 2030. Oil consumption in the region will
not regain its 2019 level of 24.9 mb/d. Among the constituent countries, only the
United States will, briefly, recover to pre-pandemic levels, unlike Canada and
Mexico. The United States, representing more than 80% of the region’s
consumption, is already seeing demand plateau near its current level of 20.4 mb/d,
peaking in 2025 and ending the forecasting period at 18.9 mb/d.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Demand

North America oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6 1.8% 0.5
Naphtha 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.2% 0.0
Gasoline 11.0 9.4 10.2 10.4 10.5 10.3 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.0 8.6 -2.8% -1.9
Jet/Kerosene 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.3% 0.2
Gasoil/Diesel 5.1 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.7 -1.1% -0.4
Residual fuel oil 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 -1.1% 0.0
Other products 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.2% 0.0
Total products 24.9 21.9 23.7 24.3 24.6 24.5 24.6 24.4 24.0 23.7 23.4 23.0 -0.9% -1.6
Annual change -0.2 -3.1 1.8 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4

Gasoline will account for the bulk of the US decline, as WFH, vehicle efficiencies
and EVs combine for an average annual decrease of 3% for the fuel. The main
expansionary contribution will come from LPG/ethane. At about 400 kb/d over the
forecast horizon, or 1.9% per year, LPG/ethane posts the highest growth rate
among the key products but still marks a major deceleration from the 6% pace
posted in 2022-2023. In the absence of major capacity additions, growth will
largely depend on incremental improvement in steam cracker operating rates.

Growth in oil demand for North America and Europe by product, 2023-2030
North America Europe
1.0 0.2
mb/d

0.5 0.0

0.0 -0.2

-0.5 -0.4

-1.0 -0.6

-1.5 -0.8

-2.0 -1.0

-2.5 -1.2

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

European oil demand, having already reached its post-pandemic peak in 2022, is
set to contract throughout the forecast period. Gasoil – the continent’s main fuel
by far, accounting for almost half of the product mix – will be responsible for most
of the decrease, continuing the decline that started in 2022.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Demand

Europe oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1% 0.1
Naphtha 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 -0.7% 0.0
Gasoline 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 -1.8% -0.3
Jet/Kerosene 1.6 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.1% 0.1
Gasoil/Diesel 7.1 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7 -2.2% -1.0
Residual fuel oil 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.3% 0.0
Other products 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.5% 0.0
Total products 15.8 13.7 14.5 14.9 14.8 14.7 14.6 14.5 14.4 14.2 14.0 13.8 -1.0% -1.0
Annual change 0.0 -2.0 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2

Consumption is weighed down by the eurozone’s lacklustre manufacturing

climate, as well as by displacement in home heating and, especially, road
transport amid Europe’s ongoing migration from diesel to gasoline-engine cars.
This shift will, temporarily, keep gasoline demand growth in positive territory,
counterbalancing headwinds of expanding EV fleets and vehicle efficiencies. Still,
the combined share of new gasoline (35.3%) and diesel (13.6%) sales constituted
less than half of the passenger market in 2023, according to the European
Automobile Manufacturers’ Association. While both powertrains have falling
market shares, the contraction for gasoline cars of 1.1% contrasts with a diesel
decline of 2.8%. Gasoline use will conclude the forecast period at 2.1 mb/d, about
300 kb/d below the high set in 2024. Annual growth of around 1% in LPG/ethane
and jet/kerosene growth during 2023-2030 will be unable to counterbalance the
structural decline in road fuels, and aggregate demand in 2030 of 13.8 mb/d will
be a full 2 mb/d lower than in 2019.

Asia Pacific propels global demand growth

Oil demand in Asia Pacific, which includes OECD Asia Oceania and represents
around 40% of global oil use, will rise by 4.2 mb/d during 2023-2030. This
surpasses the net 3.2 mb/d in global gains, as consumption contracts in advanced
economies. Robust economic growth in Asia, topping 4% per annum over the
forecast period, is buoyed by structural factors such as population growth and
industrialisation, as well as a growing middle class that is more likely to spend on
energy intensive luxury goods such as cars and travel. Growth is fairly evenly
balanced across the product mix, with LPG/ethane, naphtha, jet/kerosene and
gasoil each contributing around 1 mb/d. This leaves gasoline as the main outlier,
with regional demand largely unchanged over the forecast period, weighed down
by substantial Chinese EV savings. In parallel, growth will be more geographically
balanced, with other Asian countries such as Viet Nam, Singapore, Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia more prominent as China’s dominance during the Covid
era fades.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 37
Oil 2024 Demand

Asia Pacific oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 2.7% 1.1
Naphtha 4.6 4.5 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 2.6% 1.1
Gasoline 7.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.1 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.8 -0.1% -0.1
Jet/Kerosene 2.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.2% 0.8
Gasoil/Diesel 9.2 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.8 1.5% 1.1
Residual fuel oil 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 0.6% 0.1
Other products 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 0.2% 0.1
Total products 35.9 34.2 35.8 36.3 38.1 39.1 39.8 40.4 41.0 41.5 41.9 42.3 1.5% 4.2
Annual change 0.4 -1.8 1.6 0.5 1.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3

China oil demand heading for plateau

Demand in China, long the single most important driver of global growth in oil use,
is set to reach a plateau at close to 18 mb/d (1.4 mb/d higher than 2023) by the
end of the decade. While our projections do not show a peak before 2030, the
annual increase would be 100 kb/d or less, well within the margin of error, after
2027. Chinese demand will grow by 850 kb/d (2.5% per year) from 2023 to 2025
before slowing, with a gain of 570 kb/d (0.6% per year) during the final five years
of our forecast.

China oil demand and economic growth, 2014-2030

Demand growth by product, 2023-2030 GDP and oil demand
800
225
600
2014 = 100
kb/d

200
400

200 175

0
150
- 200
125
- 400

- 600 100

GDP
Oil demand
Non-petrochemical oil demand
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Oxford Economics.

China also displays major divergences in demand patterns. The expansion of its
petrochemical industry will continue to lead the world, albeit less explosively than
over the past five years, while demand for major transport fuels shows more
limited scope for growth. Gasoline demand may even tip into decline from 2025
amid rampant, mass-market electrification. Together, battery EVs and plug-in
hybrids were approaching 50% of domestic sales by May 2024, and up by more
than a third for the first five months of the year, according to China Passenger Car
Association data.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 38
Oil 2024 Demand

China oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.5% 0.7
Naphtha 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.9% 0.7
Gasoline 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 -2.1% -0.5
Jet/Kerosene 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 5.2% 0.3
Gasoil/Diesel 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 0.7% 0.2
Residual fuel oil 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6% 0.0
Other products 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 -0.2% -0.1
Total products 14.1 14.3 15.1 15.1 16.6 17.1 17.5 17.7 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.1 1.2% 1.4
Annual change 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.0 1.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0

Petrochemical demand remains the lynchpin of Chinese oil demand, drawing in

burgeoning imports of LPG/ethane, especially from the United States, and
utilisation of naphtha and other liquid feedstocks a key focus of highly integrated,
world-scale refining/petrochemical operations. These strategic investments are
more than meeting strong growth in domestic polymer and synthetic fibre
consumption, allowing large-scale import substitution. We expect total feedstock
demand to rise by 1.3 mb/d between 2023 and 2030, at 570 kb/d for LPG/ethane
and 780 kb/d for liquids. This means that 95% of net national growth in oil demand,
and 42% of the net global rise, will take place in China’s chemical plants.

The development of EV supply chains represents another example of strategic

investments reshaping domestic and international oil demand. Chinese EVs,
which can compete with ICE vehicles on price, have steadily gained consumer
acceptance and market penetration. They are set to eliminate 1.6 mb/d of growth
in road fuels by 2030 and vehicle exports will help to reduce demand in the rest of
the world. Chinese gasoline demand is likely to peak in 2024 or 2025.
Battery-powered trucks play a small but growing role in China, at about 3% of
sales in 2023. Electrification of trucks and vans will contribute about 300 kb/d of
the overall reduction. We estimate that the increased use of freight vehicles fuelled
by liquified or compressed natural gas will reduce diesel demand by an additional
100 kb/d.

In addition, very large investments in high-speed rail (HSR) over the past decade
have changed long-distance mobility patterns, with highway traffic subdued and
containing the still strong growth in domestic air traffic. Rail passenger kilometres
(pkm) increased by an average of 5.5% in the five years before 2020 and
subsequently recovered beyond this level, while highway travel declined. Had this
growth in railway use not happened, an estimated 300 kb/d of additional oil would
have been needed, assuming the growth in travel was split between road and air.
This is comparable to the 450 kb/d of road fuel displaced by EVs in 2023.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Demand

China oil demand and substitution, 2014-2030

25 HSR fuel
mb/d

displacement
Natural gas
road freight
20 EV diesel

EV gasoline
15
Petrochemical
LPG/ethane
Petrochemical
10 naphtha/liquids
Other uses

Diesel
5
Gasoline

0 Total demand
2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: HSR = High-speed rail.

Forecast demand, excluding petrochemical feedstocks, is already embarking on

a long plateau with a high point in 2027 or 2028. This consumption is expected to
be about 12 mb/d in both 2024 and 2029 and we estimate that it will not exceed
12.5 mb/d. Although the country’s population is set to fall by 1% during the forecast
period, this long plateau sharply diverges from steady GDP growth of almost 4%
per year. In this respect, China epitomises the decoupling of GDP growth and oil
demand which is a major feature of our global outlook.

India leads world in fuel demand growth

India’s demand is forecast to grow by more than any country other than China
between 2023 and 2030. Unusually, in a global context, an increase of more than
1.3 mb/d will be dominated by rising demand for road transport fuels, with a
comparatively small role for petrochemical feedstocks and underlying growth
comfortably outpacing deployment of clean energy technologies. In the second
half of this decade, India will become by far the most important contributor to
overall growth. Gains of 900 kb/d between 2025 and 2030 will be well ahead of
China’s 570 kb/d and three-quarters of net global gains over the final five years of
our forecast.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 40
Oil 2024 Demand

India growth in oil demand by product, 2023-2030

600
kb/d

500

400

300

200

100

0
LPG/ethane Naphtha Gasoline Jet/kerosene Gasoil/diesel Fuel oil Other products

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

India is set to be the world’s fastest growing major economy for the third year
running in 2024. Manufacturing and industrial activity has been especially strong
and a massive domestic consumer market, labour force and supportive
demographics should see this continue. The nation’s population, which recently
overtook China’s to become the world’s largest, is projected to increase by 6%
during our forecast period, and higher average incomes will further support
mobility demand. Road diesel, the most used product in India and closely linked
to industry and commerce, will account for 520 kb/d of 2023-2030 growth (38% of
the total).

Similarly, gasoline will register a rise of 270 kb/d (20% of the total) as car
ownership becomes more widespread. This is far more than in any other country
in our projections. Compared with 2000, there was an eightfold increase in the
number of cars on the road by 2023. Nevertheless, the fact that last year China
had almost seven times as many cars as India highlights the potential for further
growth. Our projections assume a roughly 40% increase in the size of the car fleet
by 2030. Two- and three-wheelers, which make up about three-quarters of the
total vehicle count in India today, will remain very important, especially in urban
transportation and last-mile delivery of goods over the forecast period. With lower
growth potential compared with passenger cars and a comparatively high potential
for electrification, this segment will act as a slight drag on gasoline growth.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 41
Oil 2024 Demand

Growth and electrification of India’s passenger vehicle fleet, 2015-2030

Passenger cars Two-/three-wheelers
80 20.0% 400 20.0%
Million vehicles

60 15.0% 300 15.0%

40 10.0% 200 10.0%

20 5.0% 100 5.0%

0 0.0% 0 0.0%
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Total EVs EV share (RHS) Total EVs EV share (RHS)

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Owing to relatively limited construction of new facilities, Indian will see a lower
share of growth come from petrochemicals. Feedstock requirements are set to
climb by around 140 kb/d between 2023 and 2030, with an emphasis on naphtha
use (+100 kb/d). LPG and ethane use in petrochemical production will rise by a
more limited 40 kb/d.

This means that overall LPG/ethane growth of 180 kb/d will be dominated by
growth in other areas, especially domestic cooking and heating use. The Indian
government has promoted the use of LPG as a clean fuel for cooking for several
years, launching the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana scheme in 2016. Between
2015 and 2023, LPG/ethane demand, excluding estimated petrochemical use,
grew by 160 kb/d. We expect further growth of 140 kb/d by 2030 as access to and
uptake of the fuel continues to expand.

India oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.5% 0.2
Naphtha 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 5.1% 0.1
Gasoline 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 3.5% 0.3
Jet/Kerosene 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 6.0% 0.1
Gasoil/Diesel 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.8% 0.5
Residual fuel oil 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6% 0.0
Other products 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.5% 0.1
Total products 5.0 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.7 3.2% 1.3
Annual change 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 42
Oil 2024 Demand

Africa leads other emerging markets growth

Africa will register demand increases of around 2% per year for all key products,
aided by robust GDP growth of 3.4% between 2023 and 2030 – only slightly below
the continent’s pre-pandemic trend. Robust population growth (of 17% between
2023 and 2030, to 1.32 billion) will be a key driver in this regard, but also poses
challenges to governments to feed their citizens. Moreover, financial and political
instability remains a constant risk to Africa’s economic outlook. Multiple countries
have experienced chronic sovereign debt crises of late, amid soaring inflation and
collapsing currencies – with Egypt, Nigeria and Ghana the most recent cases.
Gasoline and diesel, together accounting for two-thirds of the product mix, will be
the main drivers of growth, each climbing by around 2% annually. Jet/kerosene
demand, increasing by an annual 1.7%, will average a relatively meagre 240 kb/d
during 2024-2030, as air travel remains out of reach for the great majority of
Africans. LPG will lead relative gains of nearly 5% per year (230 kb/d), almost
entirely due to the greater access to clean cooking.

Africa oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 4.8% 0.2
Naphtha 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4% 0.0
Gasoline 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.0% 0.2
Jet/Kerosene 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.7% 0.0
Gasoil/Diesel 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.5% 0.3
Residual fuel oil 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.0% 0.1
Other products 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.6% 0.0
Total products 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 2.6% 0.8
Annual change 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Central and South America will experience stable but lacklustre growth of around
70 kb/d, or 1% annually during 2023-2030, in line with equally subdued GDP
expansion of 2.2% over the forecast period. GDP growth lags other major
emerging regions such as Africa by a full point. The continent’s economic outlook
is depressed by above-par inflation and unemployment, low productivity, poor
infrastructure and limited participation in global trade. Argentina and Brazil,
together responsible for nearly 60% of the region’s oil demand, face distinct
challenges. Argentina, struggling to emerge from decades of economic
mismanagement and political instability, will see oil demand growth turn positive
in 2025 after three straight years of contraction, and thereafter rise by around
10 kb/d. This pace is similar to Brazil’s – the country remains highly dependent on
agribusiness (and, indirectly, climate and weather), its non-farming economy
plagued by low productivity and a lack of international competitiveness.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 43
Oil 2024 Demand

Central and South America oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9% 0.0
Naphtha 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2% 0.0
Gasoline 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.9% 0.1
Jet/Kerosene 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.7% 0.0
Gasoil/Diesel 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 0.9% 0.2
Residual fuel oil 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.4% 0.1
Other products 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9% 0.0
Total products 6.7 5.7 6.4 6.7 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3 1.0% 0.5
Annual change 0.0 -0.9 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Eurasian oil use will rise by 280 kb/d over the forecast period, with LPG/ethane
the main driver of growth. Russia will not partake in this increase – the country’s
oil demand will be flat from 2023 to 2030 at 3.8 mb/d, as international sanctions
weigh on trade, with subpar average GDP growth of around 1% annually.

Middle East oil demand by product (mb/d), 2019-2030

2023-30
Growth 2023-30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Rate Growth
LPG/Ethane 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.3% 0.5
Naphtha 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.6% 0.1
Gasoline 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2% 0.3
Jet/Kerosene 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.0% 0.1
Gasoil/Diesel 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 -0.1% 0.0
Residual fuel oil 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 -4.0% -0.4
Other products 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 -9.4% -0.6
Total products 8.8 8.1 8.4 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.1 9.0 0.0% 0.0
Annual change 0.1 -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2

Middle Eastern oil demand is expected to stay essentially flat between 2024 and
2030 at 9 mb/d, but with a significant shift within the product mix. Greater use of
natural gas, which is accompanied by rising NGL availability, particularly in Saudi
Arabia, will curtail oil use in power generation but boost demand for petrochemical
feedstocks, as the latter emerges as the main driver of growth, increasing by
600 kb/d from 2024 to 2030. These gains will be complemented by an aggregate
increase in gasoline, gasoil and jet/kerosene of around 300 kb/d, or around 10%
cumulatively. This pace is comparable to the region’s robust population growth –
set to increase by the same percentage between 2023 and 2030 to exceed
300 million people. However, these gains will be counterbalanced by lower use of
fuel oil and direct crude burn in power generation amid substitution towards natural
gas and renewables.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 44
Oil 2024 Demand

Chinese refined product reporting may overstate fuel growth

Changes in Chinese oil market data reporting in recent years mean that apparent
growth in fuel demand since the pandemic is likely overstated. While output of
major fuels was seemingly under-reported between 2017 and 2022, data over the
last two years appear much more accurate and complete. Changes to our historical
product-level demand will await systematic revisions to annual data, but it is
possible to make illustrative estimates of the impact of these changes.
The distortions can be seen more clearly in the level of implied other products
demand in China, which we estimate based on refinery outputs of major products
and total refinery runs. This has fluctuated considerably over the past decade.
Between 2017 and 2022, other products demand increased by 50%, from 2.3 mb/d
to 3.6 mb/d, while overall demand increased by a comparatively smaller 20%.
During 2023, implied other products consumption dropped sharply, before
stabilising, and the 2024 level is set to be just below 3 mb/d, 16% lower than in
2022.
The large implied changes to other product output and demand changes seem to
have been the result of under-reported output of the two major fuels during this
period. In particular, apparent gasoil demand tumbled by almost 10% from 2018 to
2019 despite a growing economy. Estimated gasoline consumption also remained
subdued, compared to a growing ICE vehicle fleet. Reported output of these
products, particularly gasoil, rose sharply in H2 2022, despite stringent anti-Covid
lockdowns, amid efforts from Beijing to improve data quality and a reported
crackdown on tax evasion by refiners.
To illustrate the scale of the distortion to Chinese and global demand growth we
have made a simple reallocation of this ‘excess’ other products demand to gasoline
and gasoil. Based on the premise that reporting was relatively complete in each of
2017 and in 2024, assuming steady growth in other products in the intervening
years, would imply large additional volumes allocated to fuels without changing
overall demand.
This would also result in a much more even development in gasoline and gasoil
demand during the pandemic years. On this basis, gasoline usage likely peaked
in 2021 and would decline slightly between 2023 and 2024, while 2023 would be
the peak year for gasoil consumption. This trajectory fits much better with known
government restrictions and bottom-up modelling of vehicle and industrial activity.
In particular, developments in recent years are much more in line with the rapid
deployment of clean energy technologies like EVs.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 45
Oil 2024 Demand

China’s other products, combined gasoil and gasoline demand, 2017-2030

Other products Gasoil and gasoline
3.6 7.6
mb/d

3.4 7.4
7.2
3.2
7.0
3.0
6.8
2.8
6.6
2.6
6.4
2.4 6.2
2.2 6.0
2.0 5.8
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
Modified Current

These changes are large enough to have global implications. Notably, the stronger
than expected growth of gasoline in 2023 and 2024 would be blunted and global
gasoil demand may well have peaked in 2022 with declines in both 2023 and 2024.
Although demand for both fuels narrowly surpassed pre-pandemic levels in 2023,
gasoline appears much closer to its turning point than might otherwise be
supposed and gasoil may already been in decline.

World’s other products, combined gasoil and gasoline demand, 2017-2030

Other products Gasoil and gasoline
12.0 57
mb/d

56
11.8
55
11.6
54
11.4
53
11.2
52
11.0
51
10.8 50
10.6 49
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

Modified Current
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 46
Oil 2024 Supply

Supply

Global summary
Oil production capacity far outpaces demand, boosting
spare supply to record highs
World oil production capacity, led higher by the United States and other producers
in the Americas, is forecast to outstrip demand growth over the 2023-2030 forecast
and, barring the Covid pandemic period, inflate the world’s spare capacity cushion
to unprecedented levels. Total supply capacity rises by 6 mb/d to 113.8 mb/d by
2030, a staggering 8 mb/d above projected global demand of 105.4 mb/d.

Around 45% of the supply capacity increase over the forecast period comes from
NGLs and condensates, mirroring the shift in demand to petrochemicals as the
foundation of global growth. Saudi Arabia and the United States will account for
two-thirds of the net 2.7 mb/d NGLs and condensates increase from 2023 to 2030.
By contrast, crude oil production capacity will expand more moderately relative to
historical trends, with non-OPEC+ producers providing more than 80% of the
gains.

Global oil supply capacity forecast, year-on-year change, 2024-2030

2.0 2.0
mb/d

1.5 1.5

1.0 1.0

0.5 0.5

0.0 0.0

-0.5 -0.5

-1.0 -1.0
2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
United States Non-OPEC+ Latam Non-OPEC+ Crude OPEC+ Crude
Other Non-OPEC+ Saudi Arabia
UAE Other OPEC+ Biofuels Non-OPEC+ NGLs
Demand OPEC+ NGL Non-OPEC+ Pre-FID

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Assumes Iran and Russia remain under sanctions. OPEC+ NGLs include condensates. Crude includes processing
gains and non-conventional volumes. Right-hand chart includes pre-sanctioned projects, listed in the Tables section.

In a break with long-term trends, the front-loaded build in global oil production
capacity is forecast to lose momentum and swing into contraction towards the end
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 47
Oil 2024 Supply

of our medium-term outlook, with the 2024 expansion of 1.8 mb/d reversing to a
drop of 280 kb/d in 2030. This tracks the world’s pivot towards cleaner energy that
leads to a plateau in our demand outlook by the end of the forecast and results in
an effective OPEC+ spare crude oil capacity cushion of 6.8 mb/d, mostly
concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

OPEC+ spare crude production capacity and implied total oil stock build, 2016-2030
10 Implied oil
mb/d

stock build

8 Off mkt due to

sanctions

Other OPEC+
6

Iraq
4
UAE

2
Saudi Arabia

0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Based on the current OPEC+ supply agreement. OPEC+ countries are crude oil only. Assumes Iran and Russia
remain under sanctions. Implied oil stock builds include total oil.
.

Such a massive oil production buffer could usher in a lower oil price environment,
posing tough challenges for producers in the US shale patch and the OPEC+ bloc.
Given shale’s short-cycle time frame and price reactivity, some output could be at
risk (see Shale price sensitivity scenarios). Moreover, reduced requirements for
OPEC+ crude may put the alliance’s market management to the test. The huge
amount of excess supply could also tempt some in the group to rationalise
capacity plans. Saudi Arabia has already taken the lead, announcing in early 2024
a suspension of its 1 mb/d crude capacity expansion. At the same time, it is
ramping up gas liquids, reflecting the expanding role of gas in Riyadh’s efforts to
transition towards its net zero ambitions.

Producers outside the OPEC+ bloc (non-OPEC+) dominate medium-term

capacity expansion plans, adding a total of 4.6 mb/d, or 76%, of the net increase.
The United States alone accounts for 2.1 mb/d of the non-OPEC+ gains, while
Brazil, Guyana, Canada and Argentina contribute a further 2.7 mb/d. As
sanctioned expansions ease markedly towards the end of our forecast, growth will
stall in the United States and Canada while Brazil and Guyana shift into decline
based on current plans. However, should companies continue to sanction
additional projects that are already on the drawing board, an incremental 1.3 mb/d
of non-OPEC+ capacity could become operational by 2030.
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PAGE | 48
Oil 2024 Supply

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq lead a 1.4 mb/d rise in OPEC+ oil capacity as
African and Asian members battle continuing declines. The UAE and Iraq are
raising crude oil capacity while Saudi Arabia is poised for a significant increase in
its output of NGLs and condensates. Capacity in Russia, despite international
sanctions, is expected to show only a marginal decline as Moscow opens the taps
at its giant Vostok project, helping to offset losses at mature oil fields.

Global upstream capital expenditures rose to USD 538 billion in 2023, the highest
level since 2015. However, in real terms, spending was still lower than in 2019
due to capital discipline and oilfield services inflation. Based on 2024 guidance,
spending is expected to expand by 7% y-o-y – a slower annual increase than the
average 14% in the last three years, signalling the post-Covid bounce has ended,
and roughly aligned with the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS).

World producers to pump more than enough to keep

market in balance
Global oil supply to the market, as opposed to capacity, is estimated at 106.4 mb/d
by 2030. This represents a net increase of 4.2 mb/d from 2023 versus growth in
demand of 3.2 mb/d over the same period. Non-OPEC+ producers in the Americas
dominate the outlook, contributing 4.4 mb/d by the end of the forecast. Anticipated
robust non-OPEC+ production throughout most of the forecast period, combined
with a marked slowdown in demand, is expected to reduce the call on OPEC+
crude oil by 1.3 mb/d on average annually compared with 2024.

Call on OPEC+ crude oil, 2023-2030

43 1.5 mb/d
mb/d

42 1.0

41 0.5

40 0.0

39 -0.5
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Implied balance (RHS) Call on OPEC+ crude OPEC+ crude supply

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Based on the current OPEC+ supply agreement.

By 2030, OPEC+ oil output, including NGLs and condensates, falls by about
370 kb/d. For this report, our OPEC+ oil supply outlook is based on the group’s
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 49
Oil 2024 Supply

current output policy. In that case, and even with deep output cuts in place, the
bloc would pump above the call on its crude oil to varying degrees from 2025
through 2030.

Global oil supply reaches a projected 102.9 mb/d in 2024, up 690 kb/d y-o-y,
driven by non-OPEC+ for a second year in a row. That is a marked slowdown in
growth of 2 mb/d in 2023. From 2025-2029, annual supply gains average
550 kb/d. After 2029, world oil supply is forecast to swing into contraction in line
with a deceleration in oil demand growth due to, amongst other factors, the
continued uptake of EVs and intensified efforts to substitute oil use in Middle East
power generation.

The United States and Canada break fresh annual records throughout the seven-
year period. Qatar reaches its highest ever oil output in 2027 and then climbs
further on the back of its LNG expansion. By contrast, Mexico posts the single
largest capacity loss of any producer in the world due to underinvestment.

Oil supply changes for select countries in 2025-2030 compared to 2021-2024

2.0
Post-Covid growth
mb/d

Post-Covid declines
and future growth and future growth

1.5
United States
Saudi Arabia
2025-2030 Growth

1.0 Brazil
Qatar Guyana
Canada
0.5 Biofuels
Russia
UAE Iran
United Kingdom
0.0
Iraq Libya
Nigeria
-0.5 Norway
China
Post-Covid declines Post-Covid growth
and future declines Mexico and future declines
-1.0
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
2021-2024 Growth mb/d

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Based on current OPEC+ supply deal. Assumes Russia and Iran remain under sanctions. Sized to 2024 total liquids
production.

The weaker momentum in the United States and Americas from 2029 will
decrease the market share of non-OPEC+, allowing OPEC+ to reclaim a bit of its
lost share thanks to increased liquids supply, primarily from Saudi Arabia. This
year, the group’s total oil market share has dropped to 48.5%, the lowest since it
was formed in 2016, due to its sharp voluntary output cuts.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 50
Oil 2024 Supply

OPEC+ reclaims market share towards the end of medium-term forecast

120 58%
mb/d

Non-OPEC+
100 56%

80 54%

60 52% OPEC+

40 50%

20 48% OPEC+
market share

0 46%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Based on current OPEC+ supply deal. Russia and Iran remain under sanctions. Based on current OPEC+ composition
throughout.
.

Investment and exploration

Capex continues to grow in the Americas, Middle East
Global upstream capital expenditure (capex) rose to USD 538 billion in 2023, the
highest level since 2015 but still below 2019 levels in real terms. It was the first
time in nine years that investment did not move in sync with oil prices, as
benchmark crude prices declined y-o-y. Based on 2024 guidance, spending is
expected to expand by 7% y-o-y – a slower annual increase than the average of
14% in the last three years, in nominal terms.

The increase in upstream investment last year was concentrated in projects

executed by national oil companies (NOCs) in the Middle East, China and the
Americas. Middle Eastern NOCs increased spending by 16% y-o-y in 2023, to
twice the levels seen 10 years ago. Saudi Aramco cancelled plans to boost its
crude production capacity by 1 mb/d to 13 mb/d, reducing its total capex by
USD 40 billion over the 2024-2028 period. However, the Kingdom intends to focus
more on natural gas and invest between USD 48 billion and USD 58 billion this
year, higher than last year’s outlay of USD 49.7 billion. In the UAE, the Abu Dhabi
National Oil Co (Adnoc) maintains an official strategy to raise crude supply
capacity to 5 mb/d by 2027 and will spend USD 150 billion between 2023 and
2027 to achieve this.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Global oil and gas upstream capital spending

800 120
USD billions

USD/bbl
700
100
600
Actual
80
500
Guidance
400 60

300 Real (USD 2023)

40
200 Brent Price (rhs)
20
100

0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on company reports and data from Argus Media Group.

In Asia, China has been accelerating investment in exploration and development

under a Seven-Year Action Plan that started in 2019. China National Offshore Oil
Company (CNOOC) raised upstream spending in 2023 by 33% to CNY137 billion
(Yuan renminbi), equivalent to USD 19.4 billion, helping to boost oil and gas output
by 9% y-o-y. This year, the company is targeting a further 5% increase in
production with a similar capex budget. PetroChina spent 12% more, or
CNY 248 billion (USD 35.1 billion), in oil, gas and new energy in 2023, but is
planning to cut investments in these segments by a combined 14% this year. By
contrast, Sinopec’s capex shrunk 6% y-o-y for exploration and production in 2023
to CNY 79 billion (USD 11.1 billion) and is targeting marginally lower spend this
year. It plans to cut oil production, mainly abroad, while expanding domestic gas
production and refinery throughput.

Major oil companies and US independent E&Ps overspent compared to the mid-
point of their guidance range in 2023. For the most part, 2024 guidance is similar
to last year’s actual spending as the majors focus on promising projects in the
Americas and independents continue to develop shale resources.

ExxonMobil's total capex was above the target range partly due to accelerated
drilling programmes in the Permian Basin and Guyana. Chevron will continue to
invest USD 5 billion in the Permian and more than USD 2 billion in the US Gulf of
Mexico (GoM), including its Anchor project, which is expected to start up this year.
A successful acquisition of Hess could increase Chevron's total annual investment
by USD 5-6 billion.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Oil and gas capital spending by selected companies

Major E&P companies US independent E&P companies

100 25 100 25

mboe/d
USD billions

mboe/d
USD billions
80 20 80 20

60 15 60 15

40 10 40 10

20 5 20 5

0 0 0 0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Guidance Actual Production

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Sources: IEA analysis based on company reports. Major companies include BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Eni, ExxonMobil,
Shell and TotalEnergies. US independent companies include 17 selected companies.

European majors meanwhile have raised their oil production targets. BP revised
its 2030 oil and gas output reduction target from 40% to 25% compared with 2019
levels, excluding production from Rosneft. This resulted in an upwards adjustment
to its oil and gas investment of USD 8 billion by 2030, already seen in increased
spending for new developments in the United Kingdom and GoM. Shell’s new
CEO scrapped its plan to reduce oil production by 20% by 2030. In addition, it is
aiming to grow its integrated gas business to maintain its rank as the world’s
largest LNG player. While increasing investments in clean energy technologies,
TotalEnergies remains committed to oil and gas. Key upstream projects include
the second phase of the Mero project in Brazil and frontier developments in
Suriname and Namibia. However, net investment was within its stated target range
due to its divestment of Canadian assets.

Meanwhile, hydrocarbon output for the majors decreased for the fourth year in a
row in 2023, led by European companies. This was not only because of their
withdrawal from Russian operations but also due to strategy differences with their
American counterparts. Among the four European companies, only Eni managed
to stymie continuous production losses. However, in its 2024-2027 plan Eni
decided to divest some upstream projects and revised its capex from
EUR 6-6.5 billion to EUR 5 billion while production targets were kept at a 3-4%
compound average growth rate. By contrast, ExxonMobil, Chevron and
ConocoPhillips continued to increase output thanks to booming US production.

Additionally, 2023 was a busy year for mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
Earthstone Energy was integrated into Permian Resources in a USD 4.5 billion
deal in August. In the same month, Chevron completed the acquisition of PDC
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Oil 2024 Supply

Energy at USD 7.6 billion. Occidental Petroleum announced at end-2023 it would

acquire CrownRock which would add 170 kboe/d to its portfolio. Chesapeake
announced a merger plan with Southwestern Energy, which would create a natural
gas behemoth.

Oil and gas M&A transaction resources and value

30 160
billion boe

USD billion
140
25
120
20
100 Liquid
15 80
60
10 Gas
40
5
20
Total Value (rhs)
0 -

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: 2024+Unclosed numbers are at the time of writing.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Rystad Energy.

Other major companies are also trying to expand their shale oil business. In May
2024, ExxonMobil completed the purchase of Pioneer Natural Resources for
USD 59.5 billion, and Chevron announced it had reached an agreement to buy
Hess for USD 53 billion, although the deal was in arbitration at the time of
publishing. This year, APA Corporation completed an acquisition of Callon
Petroleum. In February, Diamondback Energy announced a merger with
Endeavor Energy Resources, valuing that latter business at USD 26 billion. Most
recently, ConocoPhillips announced their intent to acquire Marathon Oil
Corporation at USD 22.5 billion. 2024 capex could be lower than the original
guidance before these mergers, but it is expected that the synergies will increase
capital efficiency.

Outside of the shale patch, ExxonMobil sold its stake in Iraq’s West Qurna-1 project
to state-run Basrah Oil Co and Indonesia's Pertamina. ExxonMobil also divested its
share in the Ursa Princess in the GoM, while Chevron transferred some of its GoM
exploration portfolio to Woodside. TotalEnergies sold TotalEnergies EP Canada Ltd
to Suncor in November 2023, completing its withdrawal from the Canadian oil sands
business. At the same time, the company announced the acquisition of additional
interests in Angola and Namibia. In Europe, Harbour acquired Wintershall Dea
assets for USD 11.2 billion while Neptune Energy was carved up between Var
Energi (Norwegian assets) and Eni (all other assets).
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Oil 2024 Supply

Recently approved projects to compensate for pandemic

underinvestment
The drop in upstream investment during the pandemic years will affect supply
growth towards 2030. Conventional projects sanctioned in 2019 will add an
estimated 2.2 mb/d at peak, while new field start-ups approved in 2020 will only
add 1.5 mb/d at their maximum. Peak production from projects approved in 2021
and 2022 are expected to produce above 2 mb/d by 2027 and 2028. Major
developments are concentrated in the Americas, notably Búzios in Brazil as well
as the Stabroek Block in Guyana and Whale in the US GoM. Projects sanctioned
in 2023 are expected to add approximately 2.4 mb/d of supply by 2030, led by
ExxonMobil Uaru project in Guyana, Equinor’s Raia development in Brazil, Eni’s
full field development of Agogo in Angola and increased gas liquids from Qatar’s
new LNG projects.

Conventional production additions by sanction year

12
mb/d

2023
10

2022
8

2021
6

4 2020

2 2019

0
2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Expected production by year based on sanctioned projects.
Source: IEA analysis based on Rystad Energy UCube data.

According to Rystad Energy, 9 billion barrels of conventional resources were

discovered in 2023, the lowest level since 2016, with growth concentrated in deep
water South America. Large volumes were found at Stabroek and Corentyne in
Guyana, and Sapakara South in Surinam. In Namibia additional resources were
found at Lesedi.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Conventional discoveries by region

30 000
Russia
Million bbl

25 000 Europe

North America
20 000
South America
15 000
Africa

10 000 Middle East

Asia
5 000
Australia
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on Rystad Energy UCube data.

As a result, the average liquids reserves-to-production ratio (R/P) for the majors
decreased further, dipping below 10 years. Only ConocoPhillips increased its R/P
ratio in 2023. The divestment of Russian assets had a particularly steep impact on
BP whose reserves shrunk to less than half of 2022 levels.

While discovered resource volumes are decreasing, companies are reallocating

capital and operating expense (opex) dollars to stymie output losses from
producing fields. Well capex and field direct opex levels are key drivers of decline
rates. And while total real capex is still below 2019 levels, real well capex is
forecast at record levels of USD 300 billion. Whereas facility capex has only
recovered to 70% of its 2014 peak in real terms, field direct opex is at record levels
when viewed in real or nominal terms. SLB, rebranded from Schlumberger in 2022
and the world’s largest oilfield services company, stated in its Q1 2024 earnings
call that its customers consider increased production recovery from existing assets
to be critical in the coming years while current period revenue from opex-driven
well interventions has soared. Baker Hughes’ CEO recently echoed the sentiment
that the oil industry is currently either in the beginning or middle of an opex-spend
cycle.

When looking at total upstream oil spend of well capex, facility capex and field
direct opex, the share of facility spend has been falling constantly, from 30% at
the 2014 peak to 21% this year. Meanwhile, outlays on wells have remained
constant at around 40% and field direct opex spend has increased from 30% of
the total to close to 40% today.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Annual supply replacement volumes and upstream oil spend by year

Annual Supply Replacement Upstream Oil Spend by Year

106 900

USD Billion
1.4
mb/d

104 800
0.4 0.5
0.7 0.5 700
102 4.3 1.6
600
100 500

103.1
101.6

98 2.7 400

96 2.0 300
200
94
100
-

Field Direct Opex Well Capex Facility Capex

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Rystad Energy UCube data.

The rotation in capital allocation has seen the shift toward short-cycle investment
in shale wells and infrastructure-led offshore expansions, both of which inherently
have higher percentage of spend directed towards wells. Additionally, there has
been savings in facility spend thanks to a push towards standardization and
“right-sizing” offshore facilities compared to the last decade.

Indicative field declines and US LTO production by development year

Indexed Production for Shale and US LTO Production by Yearly Development
Conventional Reservoir
10
mb/d

1.0

0.8 8

6
0.6

4
0.4

2
0.2
0
0.0 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
0 12 24 36 48
months Pre-2015 2015 2016 2017
2018 2019 2020 2021
Svalin Permian Delaware 2022 2023 2024

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: Permian Delaware median well type curve from Rystad Energy ShaleWellCube data.

Due to the natural decline rate of oil and gas production from conventional and
tight reservoirs, close to 5 mb/d of supply needs to be replaced annually to hold
production flat. This rate of decline is after capex and opex spend and represents
a global average of close to 5%. Lowering the underlying decline rate by 10 basis
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Oil 2024 Supply

points (bps) keeps 100 kb/d or a medium-sized major capital project worth of
production online every year. The increase in opex spend since Covid-19 has
helped hold replacement volumes steady even as more output comes from high-
decline shale barrels.

The growing share of light tight oil (LTO) has important implications for observed
decline rates. There was a 2.7 mb/d decline in production from existing US shale
wells last year on a production base of 9 mb/d, while non-OPEC+ conventional oil
output declined by 2 mb/d on a 40 mb/d base. Understanding the different
segments of supply and how their decline rates evolve over the medium-term is
key to determining the path of supply and investment.

OPEC+ supply
Middle East drives OPEC+ capacity increase
OPEC+ oil production capacity, including condensates and NGLs, is forecast to
grow by a net 1.4 mb/d from 2023 through 2030 led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
Iraq. Significantly, nearly 1 mb/d of NGLs and condensates are forecast to be
added in the medium-term thanks largely to Saudi Arabia’s Jafurah gas field
development. By contrast, total OPEC+ crude capacity is projected to rise by
460 kb/d. The UAE and Iraq are expected to lift crude oil capacity by a combined
1.4 mb/d by 2030. Middle East producers, along with Kazakhstan, will more than
offset losses from Mexico, Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa and Asia.

The OPEC+ alliance will see its share of world oil production ease below 50% from
this year onwards as non-OPEC+ countries dominate growth. Angola quit the
group at the start of 2024, reducing its ranks to 22 members. Brazil has signed on
to the OPEC+ “Charter of Cooperation” but this agreement does not subject the
country to production quotas. As such, Brazil remains in our non-OPEC+
classification. The producer alliance is meanwhile courting countries such as
Guyana and Namibia as potential new recruits.

In 2023, total oil supplies, including condensates and NGLs, from the OPEC+
alliance fell by 370 kb/d to an average 50.7 mb/d. Saudi Arabia’s production was
down by more than 900 kb/d on average due to OPEC+ curbs, while some other
members of the bloc with output targets posted very modest reductions. The
group’s overall decline was partly offset by Iran, exempt from supply quotas, which
pushed output to a five-year high. This year could see a steeper decline of
740 kb/d for OPEC+ if existing extra voluntary curbs remain in place. The producer
group agreed to reduce supply in late 2022 to support the market as the economic
outlook worsened. Led by Saudi Arabia, additional voluntary curbs from some
members in 2023 have further reduced the bloc’s output ceiling. In early June,
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Oil 2024 Supply

OPEC+ extended those cuts through the third quarter of 2024 and provided a
timeline for unwinding them – subject to market conditions.

Saudi, UAE fuel gains in OPEC+ oil capacity

Saudi Arabia is set to lead OPEC+ oil capacity growth, with virtually all its gains
in NGLs and condensate. By contrast, the country’s crude capacity remains
broadly unchanged over the period. Aramco is tapping into its giant
unconventional Jafurah gas field and could add around 1 mb/d of total liquids
production by the end of the outlook period. This non-associated gas field is due
to start up in 2025 and once fully onstream in 2030 is expected to yield roughly
870 kb/d of condensates and NGLs, of which around 270 kb/d is ethane. Saudi
Aramco is set to continue investing heavily in the expansion of its natural gas
production capacity until at least the end of this decade. With oil demand growth
shifting more towards petrochemicals and light ends, the planned liquid increases
from Jafurah would be well aligned with this changing pattern.

OPEC crude oil production capacity change, 2023 vs 2030

0.8
mb/d

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

-0.2

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Assumes Iran remains under sanctions.

Riyadh unexpectedly suspended plans for a 1 mb/d expansion in crude oil

production capacity to 13 mb/d in January 2024, a target originally set in 2020. As
a result, crude oil production capacity, including the Neutral Zone shared with
Kuwait, is expected to remain broadly steady over the next seven years. As
recently as November 2023, Saudi Aramco indicated it was on track to hit the
13 mb/d capacity goal by 2027 and was spending billions to do so. After the
announcement at the start of this year, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz
bin Salman was quoted as saying: “We have postponed this investment simply
because we’re transitioning.”
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Oil 2024 Supply

Expansions at Safaniyah and Manifa that were part of the planned increase are
now on hold, but three other projects are going ahead to help offset declines at
mature oil fields. Marjan and Berri are due to come online by 2025 and add a
combined 550 kb/d while the capacity of the Zuluf field is on course to increase by
600 kb/d by 2026.

Aramco has announced a capital expenditure budget of USD 48-58 billion for 2024
compared to USD 49.7 billion in 2023. It still plans to grow capex beyond 2024,
until around the middle of the decade despite a reduction of around USD 40 billion
for the 2024-2028 period after Riyadh put its crude oil capacity expansion on hold.
The reduction is due mainly to the deferral of offshore projects such as Safaniyah
and Manifa and lower infill drilling as the Kingdom sustains its maximum
production capacity of 12 mb/d, excluding the Neutral Zone.

Saudi Arabia estimated crude oil production and capacity, 2023-2030

14
mb/d

12

10

0
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Capacity Production

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Production projection based on the current OPEC+ supply deal.

Since the fourth quarter of 2022, Riyadh has been slashing output via extra
voluntary OPEC+ cuts amid booming US volumes and robust growth from Brazil
and Guyana, amongst others. Having cumulatively shut in close to 2 mb/d of
supply since Q3 2022, it is now pumping 9 mb/d of crude oil – a level we have
held throughout this outlook. Barring the 2020-2021 Covid period, that’s the lowest
level since 2011.

As a result, Saudi Arabia is holding spare crude oil capacity of over 3 mb/d – well
above the 2 mb/d average for the past two decades. For Aramco, the size of that
buffer makes it less urgent in the short-term to raise production capacity beyond
the current 12 mb/d. That raises the question of when, or if, Aramco would need
to reactivate its capacity expansion plan, especially given the cost of sustaining
idle capacity.
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Oil 2024 Supply

The UAE is set to provide the biggest increase in crude oil production capacity
within the OPEC+ bloc, adding 800 kb/d by 2030 as it continues with its ambitious
expansion. Annual average crude output in 2023 hovered near an all-time high of
3.3 mb/d. Its comparatively low-cost resource base and secure operating
environment have reinforced the UAE’s expansion scheme. We estimate that
capacity will grow to 5 mb/d in 2030. Thus, holding the UAE at current production
of around 3.3 mb/d throughout the outlook would leave it with close to 1.8 mb/d of
spare at the end of the decade.

UAE estimated crude oil production and capacity, 2023-2030

mb/d

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Murban Upper Zakum Others Production

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Production projection based on the current OPEC+ supply deal.

Offshore oil fields are vital to the build-up. Capacity at the Exxon-operated Upper
Zakum field, one of the world’s largest, is around 1 mb/d and further growth
towards 1.2 mb/d is planned over the forecast period. At the 275 kb/d Umm Shaif
field, the plan is to raise capacity by 115 kb/d by the end of 2027. A short-term
increment of 20 kb/d is planned for the 450 kb/d Lower Zakum field, with a further
50 kb/d to be added by 2027. In March, the 45 kb/d capacity Belbazem offshore
block, where first oil was initially due in 2023, started up.

For the onshore sector, which produces its prized Murban crude, the focus is on
lifting capacity by 100 kb/d at the 650 kb/d Bu Hasa, the largest onshore oil field,
and by 90 kb/d at the 450 kb/d Bab field by 2027. To support gains, Adnoc has
carried out onshore and offshore licensing rounds.

Iraq is poised to deliver crude oil capacity growth of 630 kb/d to reach 5.4 mb/d in
2030, largely through the brownfield expansion of its massive southern fields. As
for actual supply, in 2023 the country pumped at an annual rate of 4.3 mb/d. This
year, it is expected to produce similar volumes, which would leave it with roughly
600 kb/d of spare capacity. Plans to raise production capacity are constrained by
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Oil 2024 Supply

access to water for injection and infrastructure bottlenecks at Iraq’s southern

export terminals. In the short-term, the installation of new pumps has lifted export
capacity in the south to 3.5 mb/d. The long-delayed start-up of a fifth single point
mooring buoy would add another 500 kb/d to export capacity.

Despite the above-ground challenges that can hamper project execution, Iraq is
straddling some of the world’s largest and lowest cost resources. The southern oil
hub of Basrah, where international oil companies (IOCs) are involved in mega
projects, will provide most of the capacity gains over the medium-term.

Iraq estimated crude oil production and capacity, 2023-2030

6
mb/d

0
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

South/Central North KRG Production

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Production projection based on the current OPEC+ supply deal.

Water injection will be vital and, to that end, TotalEnergies will play a crucial role.
Baghdad and TotalEnergies formally signed a long-delayed deal that aims to raise
energy production with investments of more than USD 10 billion. Included in the
first phase is a project to inject 5 mb/d of treated seawater into core southern oil
fields such as Zubair and West Qurna to sustain pressure. TotalEnergies also
intends to raise output at the Ratawi oil field from 85 kb/d to 210 kb/d and build a
large solar power plant. The deal was initially signed in 2021 and finally closed in
April 2023 when Baghdad accepted a smaller 30% share. TotalEnergies will hold
45% and QatarEnergy 25%.

At West Qurna-1, PetroChina has taken over as operator following ExxonMobil’s

official departure with plans to raise capacity from roughly 550 kb/d to 600 kb/d by
the end of 2024 and towards 700 kb/d in the longer term. At West Qurna-2, Lukoil
and Baghdad have agreed to extend the service contract for the field by 10 years
to 2045 and gradually boost capacity from 480 kb/d to 800 kb/d. At Zubair, Eni
continues to work on expanding the 450 kb/d field towards a plateau of 700 kb/d.
At the Garraf oil field, also in the south, Petronas is close to lifting capacity to
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Oil 2024 Supply

200 kb/d from roughly 150 kb/d. Baghdad also plans to increase output at
Majnoon, now pumping roughly 130 kb/d, to 450 kb/d over the next several years.

The northern Kirkuk oil fields and capacity that is controlled by the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) are expected to contribute only marginal growth.
Shipments of roughly 450 kb/d along the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline to the Turkish
Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan have been halted since the end of March 2023,
forcing the shut-in of more than 200 kb/d of the KRG’s production. Around
200 kb/d is reportedly moving into the local market or trucked across its borders.

Kuwait estimated crude oil production and capacity, 2023-2030

mb/d

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Capacity Production

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Kuwait is projected to deliver a 180 kb/d increase in capacity to just above 3 mb/d
over the seven-year forecast period. Annual average crude oil production in 2023
fell 80 kb/d to 2.6 mb/d. Kuwaiti capacity had been slipping since 2018 due to
ongoing field declines, falling 250 kb/d to roughly 2.8 mb/d in 2021. Since then, it
has been edging higher and should reach nearly 2.9 mb/d this year. The giant
Burgan oil field in the south has suffered steep declines, but the Kuwait Oil Co
says a continuous effort is being made to increase its production capacity. We see
Kuwait’s share of capacity in the Neutral Zone holding at around 250 kb/d.

Kuwait is meanwhile striving to reach capacity of 3.2 mb/d by 2028 through an

ambitious drilling programme, construction of two gathering centres as well as
water injection facilities and other infrastructure that are now underway. However,
reaching that capacity goal may yet prove elusive. Upgrading and developing
Kuwait’s complex and ageing oil fields will demand substantial investment to
support the drilling effort along with more costly enhanced oil recovery technology.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Iran ramps up supply but sanctions stall capacity growth

Iran has continued to ramp up crude oil production despite sanctions by steadily
increasing exports to China, its main customer. It ranked as the world’s
second-largest source of supply growth after the United States in 2023, with crude
oil output up 450 kb/d y-o-y to nearly 3 mb/d, the highest since end-2018. That left
it with around 800 kb/d of spare crude oil capacity. In the meantime, official talks
to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which would ease sanctions, have been on
hold since late 2022.

Tehran appears to be keeping up brisk oil sales, primarily destined for China, that
have climbed to around 1.6 mb/d. Before the former US administration withdrew
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018,
exports of Iranian oil, including condensates, had been running above 2 mb/d. To
support the higher export flows, Iran has reportedly raised operational capacity at
the Kharg Island export terminal by 1 mb/d. Higher exports and domestic
throughput pushed Iranian crude production up to around 3.3 mb/d by June 2024
and we have held that level throughout the remainder of the forecast period.

Iran crude oil production, 1986-2030

4.0
mb/d

Iran-Iraq War Sanctions

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

On the capacity front, we believe Iran is still able to maintain its extensive oil
network, which will allow it to ramp up relatively swiftly to full capacity if and when
sanctions are eased. Lower wellhead output most likely prompted the National
Iranian Oil Co (NIOC) to shut in wells at its high-cost offshore fields and carry out
maintenance at its ageing oil fields. Shutting in output can be helpful for mature oil
fields as it will allow pressure to rebuild and make it easier for operations to restart.

As for efforts to sustain and expand its existing crude capacity, Iran is turning
inward given the lack of foreign investment due to sanctions. The previous round
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Oil 2024 Supply

of international sanctions had already left the oil sector in dire need of foreign
capital and technology, especially in enhanced oil recovery methods to sustain
and raise output at mature oil fields.

Tehran is meanwhile looking to the core West Karun oil fields of North and South
Azadegan, Yaran and Yadavaran to drive future growth of 1 mb/d. The oil province
in the southwest is currently producing around 450 kb/d. Iranian companies have
reportedly increased output by 50 kb/d at the smaller West Karun fields of Jofeyr
and Sepehr. And NIOC has signed USD 13 billion in contracts aimed at raising
output by 400 kb/d to 620 kb/d at the onshore fields of Azadegan, Azar 2, Saman,
Delavarn, Soomar and Masjid Suleiman.

OPEC crude oil production capacity (mb/d), 2023-2030

OPEC Crude Oil Production Capacity
(million barrels per day)
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2023-30
Algeria 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.1
Congo 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1
Equatorial Guinea 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.03
Gabon 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1
Iran 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 0.0
Iraq 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 0.6
Kuwait 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.2
Libya 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.0
Nigeria 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 -0.2
Saudi Arabia 12.2 12.2 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 0.1
UAE 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 0.8
Venezuela 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1
Total OPEC 32.7 33.1 33.3 33.5 33.6 33.8 33.9 34.1 1.4
Annual Change 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2

Oil output in Oman, including condensates and NGLs, was around 1.1 mb/d in
2023. The ongoing development of offshore fields such as Block 50, the start-up
of onshore fields including Blocks 62 and 65 and those offered in its 2021 bid
round are expected to help sustain crude oil production capacity.

Russian growth trajectory upended by war on Ukraine

Russian oil supply is holding up following its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, but
sanctions have stymied its growth story. Our pre-war estimate for Russia showed
oil production rising by 100 kb/d to reach 11.3 mb/d in 2025 before edging lower.
Our current outlook is running close to 600 kb/d below that early 2022 estimate.
Overall, however, the country’s oil sector has shown resilience, ramping up drilling
in its Western Siberian oil hub and with crude and product exports rerouted to new
markets. In 2023, total oil supply fell by a marginal 130 kb/d to 11 mb/d. This year
oil production is expected to decline by a further 260 kb/d to 10.7 mb/d as the
country carries out deeper OPEC+ production cuts.
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Oil 2024 Supply

The world’s third-largest oil producer after the United States and Saudi Arabia,
Russia acknowledges that substantial future development will require more capital
and high-cost technology that have grown harder to secure due to sanctions. But
we expect supply to hold broadly steady through 2030 as top Russian producer
Rosneft taps further into its giant Vostok Oil project, which helps to offset declines
at its ageing oil fields. Furthermore, its ability to self-finance its oil industry
operations and its access to Chinese kit may help fend off a sharp decline in the
medium-term.

Russia total oil supply, 2023-2030

mb/d

11.5

11.3

11.1

10.9

10.7

10.5

10.3

10.1
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Oil 2024 estimate Pre-invasion estimate

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Moscow had been hoping that its massive resources in the Arctic would provide
growth to bolster output. But development of those hard-to-recover reserves will
be more difficult and expensive than conventional fields. And given the current
environment, it will prove a challenge for Rosneft’s Vostok Oil mega project, a vital
source of Arctic growth, to hit its ambitious targets. Igor Sechin, the head of
Rosneft, has reportedly suggested the project could require more than
USD 120 billion to tap. The aim is for the Vostok scheme to launch 600 kb/d by
the end this year and eventually produce more than 2 mb/d. The reported 2024
plan is for half the Vostok volume to be pumped from the operational Vankor and
neighbouring Suzunskoye and Lodochnoye fields. The remaining 300 kb/d is due
to come online from the fields of Payakha, Ichemminskoye and Baikalovskoye.

Production in neighbouring countries will be supported by the further expansion of

Tengiz in Kazakhstan and the start up in Azerbaijan of the BP-led Azeri Central
East (ACE) platform. In Kazakhstan, total oil output increased by 110 kb/d to
1.9 mb/d in 2023 and is expected to rise to a record 2.15 mb/d in 2026 and then
taper lower through the end of the forecast. Next year could see a significant boost
in output, provided the giant Tengiz oil field expansion starts up as planned. Led
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Oil 2024 Supply

by Chevron, the Future Growth Project is set to expand output at Tengiz, the
country’s largest oil field, by 260 kb/d from around 600 kb/d now when it finally
comes online in 2025. The current cost estimate for the expansion is USD
46.7 billion compared to an initial estimate in 2016 of USD 37 billion. At the giant
Kashagan oil field, the plan is to raise output to around 450 kb/d from 2025
onwards. The field is now producing roughly 400 kb/d.

Total oil supply from Azerbaijan slipped 50 kb/d in 2023 to 620 kb/d and is forecast
to hover around that level through 2026 before easing again through 2030. Output
has been falling for years, but BP’s recent start of the new ACE platform in the
Caspian Sea will help halt declines at the giant Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG)
offshore field. Production from the USD 6 billion ACE project should reach 24 kb/d
by the end of this year as additional wells are brought online, with further gains
towards its 100 kb/d capacity in 2025-2026. After reaching an annual average
peak of roughly 840 kb/d in 2009, ACG pumped about 360 kb/d in 2023.

Downward spiral for African OPEC+

Apart from Libya, African OPEC+ members are expected to see output decline
over the seven-year period as producers fail to coax sufficient investment to stem
losses. Nigeria saw its crude output rebound from 40-year lows to reach 1.2 mb/d
in 2023 after major export streams recovered. We expect a short-lived
stabilisation, with underinvestment and sabotage continuing to take a toll. Crude
oil capacity is expected to decline from 1.4 mb/d in 2023 to 1.2 mb/d in 2030.

OPEC+ Africa crude oil production capacity (y-o-y change), 2023-2030

mb/d

0.10

0.05

0.00

-0.05

-0.10
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Libya Algeria Nigeria Other OPEC+ Africa

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The battle to reverse declines and refurbish ageing infrastructure highlights the
chronic underinvestment in Nigeria’s vital oil sector. For many, the future of the oil
industry lies in the ability of the Petroleum Industry Act to spur new investment
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Oil 2024 Supply

with its improved fiscal terms. But signals from international oil companies are not
reassuring. Shell, ExxonMobil, Equinor and Eni have announced divestment plans
for onshore and shallow-water assets.

But there are some encouraging signs. TotalEnergies announced a shallow-water

oil and gas discovery in offshore Block OML 102 (Ntokon) that it plans to develop
as a tie-back to production facilities for the Okon field. On the condensate front,
TotalEnergies and its partners have started up the offshore Akpo West field – a
tie-back to the existing Akpo floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO),
which pumped around 120 kb/d in 2023. Akpo West will add 15 kb/d of
condensates by mid-2024 and up to 4 million cubic metres per day of gas by 2028.

Relative stability throughout 2023 allowed Libya’s crude output to rise 160 kb/d
to an average 1.16 mb/d. But this year kicked off with the country's National Oil
Corporation declaring force majeure at the 300 kb/d Sharara oilfield due to
protests in the area. After a three-week closure, overall crude output recovered to
1.18 mb/d. As for capacity, we see levels holding broadly steady at around
1.2 mb/d over the seven-year period. There is significant upside potential,
however, depending on political stability and investment.

The North African producer’s oil fields and terminals are often targeted by political
factions or militants and that is likely to make its official 2 mb/d production target
largely aspirational. To expand output, Libya plans to rely on a combination of
brownfield and greenfield projects but for now it is concentrating on stabilising
current production. To do so, it must depend on the southwestern Sharara oil field,
the country’s largest. The nearby Elephant field can pump up to 80 kb/d. In the
east, the Abu Attifel and Zueitina oil fields can each contribute around 70 kb/d.
Other oil fields in the east operated by Arabian Gulf Oil Co (Agoco) and Sirte Oil
Co can produce around 200 kb/d and 80 kb/d, respectively. The offshore Bouri
and al-Jurf fields add 80 kb/d between them. Located in the northeast Sirte Basin,
the Waha Oil Co, with current capacity of roughly 400 kb/d, would be key to any
further growth.

Mexico slumps, Venezuela stabilises

Mexico posts the largest drop in output, not just among the OPEC+ alliance, but
out of all producers – falling 640 kb/d to 1.5 mb/d. Its long-term oil production
decline showed a brief respite from 2021-2023 as the Quesqui condensate field
ramped up in earnest. The sector has floundered since the pandemic when Pemex
severely curtailed investments. Since then, the state-owned operator has dealt
with a continued string of serious incidents with its offshore platforms, undermining
public and partner trust. Additionally, the administration has requested they focus
on quick crude production growth from onshore and shallow-water fields to the
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Oil 2024 Supply

detriment of larger resource deepwater reservoirs. As of now, over half of Pemex’s

production comes from just seven of its 240 fields.

Mexico total production and contribution by new fields

2.5 0.8
mb/d

2.0
0.6

1.5
0.4
1.0

0.2
0.5

0.0 0.0
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030
KMZ Cantarell Priority fields Hokchi Amoca
Ichalkil Ayatsil Pit
Other Baseline New fields Trion

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Looking forward, the picture doesn’t change much, with only two major projects
expected to start up over the forecast period – the 100 kb/d Trion field and the
80 kb/d Pit project. And unlike some of its neighbours, Mexico doesn’t have a
robust queue of other pre-sanctioned projects waiting to backfill production as
existing fields mature.

Crude production in Venezuela was up for a third straight year in 2023, rising by
70 kb/d to 770 kb/d, thanks mostly to Chevron’s return after Washington granted
it a licence to restart operations. Output this year is on track to top the 800 kb/d
mark. That is still down around 70% from 2015, when it stood at nearly 2.5 mb/d.

We do not expect significant short-term upside as capacity is currently constrained

by long overdue maintenance, modest operational enhancements and US
sanctions. Consequently, we are holding our crude oil capacity estimate at
880 kb/d through the remainder of the forecast, although a turnaround in the
political situation would provide the opportunity to rebuild the energy sector. It was
election concerns related to the government of President Nicolas Maduro that led
Washington on 17 April to reinstate sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sector with
a 45-day window to wind down operations. The move did not affect Chevron – it
continues to keep its licence to operate. And Washington continues to issue
individual licences for companies in the energy sector.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Venezuela crude oil production, 2015-2030

2.5
mb/d

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
2015 2018 2021 2024 2027 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Under the US Treasury’s licence, Chevron’s joint ventures with Petroleos de

Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) – PetroPiar, PetroIndependencia, PetroBoscan and
PetroIndependiente – can produce oil (including importing diluent) and the US
company can lift that oil as repayment for investments it has made in Venezuelan
assets. Washington also has reportedly granted Maurel & Prom a licence to
continue its upstream work at the Urdaneta Oeste field in Lake Maracaibo through
May 2026. The French independent intends to raise output from around 16 kb/d
to 25 kb/d by the end of this year. Repsol also received US approval to continue
and expand its Venezuelan joint venture oil and gas operations.

PDVSA is meanwhile aiming to lift output by reopening wells and carrying out
maintenance in its vast Orinoco Belt. Any longer-term recovery in production
would require replacing lost professional skills and investment capital.

Non-OPEC+ supply
Non-OPEC+ supply growth led by the Americas
The Americas drive a 4.6 mb/d increase in non-OPEC+ oil production over the
seven-year forecast period. A further 1.3 mb/d of supply could be added if pre-FID
(final investment decision) projects are sanctioned in the near-term. US growth
continues to be led by light tight oil developments, specifically the Permian Basin.
Guyana, powered by the ExxonMobil-led Stabroek Block, has emerged as a
substantial producer, and explorers continue to find new resources in its territorial
waters. Brazil is set to ramp up production with Petrobras and other large oil
companies continuing the FPSO-factory development of pre-salt reservoirs. And
the Vaca Muerta shale play in Argentina has substantial upside potential, pending
infrastructure development and economic reforms.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Total Non-OPEC+ Supply (mb/d), 2023-2030

2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2023-30
OECD 29.0 29.7 30.6 30.8 31.0 31.1 31.1 31.1 2.2
OECD Americas 25.3 26.1 26.8 27.2 27.5 27.7 27.8 28.0 2.7
OECD Europe 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 -0.4
OECD Asia Oceania 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 -0.1
Non-OECD 17.1 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.9 19.3 19.3 18.8 1.7
FSU 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
Europe 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
China 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 -0.3
Other Asia 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.4
Non-OECD Americas 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.5 7.7 8.1 8.2 7.8 1.7
Middle East 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 0.6
Africa 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 0.2
Non-OPEC+ Oil Supply 46.0 47.3 48.6 49.4 49.8 50.4 50.4 49.9 3.8
Processing Gains 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.1
Global Biofuels 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 0.6
Total-Non-OPEC+ Supply 51.5 53.0 54.4 55.4 55.8 56.5 56.5 56.1 4.6
Annual Change 1.4 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.0 -0.4
Note: OECD Americas excludes Mexico.

Non-OPEC+ Africa is showing green shoots as recent major discoveries in

Namibia and Côte d’Ivoire continue to progress through the exploration and
appraisal lifecycle. Other West African countries also shine as Senegal joins the
producers’ club this year and Niger ramps up output after a new export pipeline
came into service. Angola sees first oil from four new projects with a combined
270 kb/d of capacity. Yet other parts of the continent continue to struggle. Ghana,
Kenya and Mozambique all see continued project delays while the Lake Albert
development in Uganda is slowly progressing after the host government tacked
eastward to China for financing and insurance guarantees.

Other parts of the non-OPEC+ world continue to slump. The North Sea is on the
front line of the energy transition, with secure, stable and low-carbon production;
yet faces some of the greatest opposition to hydrocarbon extraction in the world.
A decade-long decline in Asia Pacific oil production, excluding China, continues
as companies prioritise gas developments. Other legacy South American
producers have seen increased political risk, hampering an already dim
development outlook.

Resilient yet slower US production growth

Questions over US oil and gas industry resilience were answered last year as total
liquids increased by 1.5 mb/d, after rising by 1.2 mb/d in 2022. Oil supply is
expected to expand by a further 660 kb/d in 2024, reaching a third consecutive
record high. While US output is set to increase every year through the end of the
forecast period, the pace of growth slows markedly as producers navigate
shareholder requirements, complex wells and a tighter regulatory environment.
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Oil 2024 Supply

US growth expectations moderate over the decade

US total oil supply US total oil supply growth (y-o-y)
mb/d

25 2

20

1
15

10
0

0 -1
2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

LTO Gulf of Mexico Alaska Other Crude NGLs Other Liquids

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The United States is the largest contributor to medium-term supply growth, adding
2.1 mb/d by 2030, bringing total supply to 21.5 mb/d. Crude oil production is
forecast to increase by 1.2 mb/d to 14.1 mb/d. NGLs from processing plants are
set to rise by 920 kb/d to 7.4 mb/d, led by both higher exports and domestic
petrochemical facility utilisation rates as Permian Basin associated gas continues
to drive growth.

US crude oil production will set new record highs in each year of this decade. The
increase is led by LTO, primarily from the Permian Basin. The shale patch has
continued to mature financially to a lower growth trajectory after a wave of M&A
reinforced disciplined investing, deleveraging and returning cash to shareholders.
The next stage of industry evolution will likely surround inventory management,
value chain integration and emissions profiles.

US LTO production increases by 1.7 mb/d from 2023 to 2030, reaching 10.6 mb/d,
while conventional Lower 48 output is expected to decline by 590 kb/d over the
same timeframe. Overall shale production rises just below a 3% compound annual
growth rate, with the Permian Basin providing approximately 80% of it. Gains are
front-loaded, with 420 kb/d of additions this year slowing to just 190 kb/d in 2030.

While LTO remains the major engine of US oil production, annual increases across
all basins slow from the 9% rate posted coming out of the pandemic to just below
3% towards the end of the decade. Headwinds to growth come amid capital
discipline, a recent wave of consolidations, and challenges to productivity and
profitability metrics.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Base case US LTO production and per barrel well costs

US LTO production Well cost per barrel

12 18
mb/d

$/bbl
16
10
14
8 12
10
6
8
4 6
4
2
2
0 0
2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2017 2019 2021 2023

Midland Delaware Bakken Eagle Ford DJ/Niobrara Other

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Well cost per barrel determined by dividing the median well costs by the median estimated ultimate recovery. Other
excluded from well cost chart.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Rystad Energy ShaleWellCube.

Over the last 24 months, the inventory of drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs)
has fallen by 800 to a decade low around 4 500, according to the Energy
Information Administration Drilling Productivity Report (EIA DPR). DUCs provide
operational buffers, allowing companies to optimise their field development
planning. DUCs can normally be fracked and brought online in two months
compared to the nine to 12 months it takes to drill and bring on a new well.

The industry is now operating as close to a just-in-time inventory model as it ever

has. The exceptionally low level of DUCs combined with reduced activity rates and
a structurally tighter oilfield services market moving forward present headwinds to
growth over the coming years. Additionally, the large wave of recent M&A has led
us to reduce price responsiveness assumed in our model moving forward due to
longer planning horizons and capital allocation processes of large corporations.

Moreover, after almost consistently falling since 2015, wellhead breakeven prices
have risen steadily since 2021. Well costs per barrel have also increased across
all key basins for the second year running. Drilling rig rates have fallen with activity
levels over the last 12 months, but that only represents 33% of total well costs
while completion costs can make up close to 60% of well costs.

The high grading of frack spreads, advanced completion techniques – such as

simul-fracs – and longer laterals have increased well costs while allowing
operators to continue to realise production gains at the expense of profitability
metrics. When normalising for lateral length, initial production rates on a 30-, 90-
or 180-day basis across all major basins declined in 2023, with the Permian, Eagle
Ford and Bakken showing three consecutive years of degradation.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Productivity trends have tapered in key LTO basins

Lateral Length Normalized IP90 rates
12 160

b/d per 1000 feet

1000 feet

10
120
8

6 80

4
40
2

0 0
Midland Delaware Eagle Bakken DJ Basin Midland Delaware Eagle Bakken DJ Basin
Ford Ford

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Normalised IP90 rates are the median flow rates taken 90-days after a well is put on production normalised by the
median lateral length.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Rystad Energy ShaleWellCube.
.

Shale price sensitivity scenarios

For modelling purposes, this report assumes that 25% of production is responsive
to forward strip pricing with the other 75% less price responsive due to long-term
corporate planning, hedging programmes or other factors. We have also adjusted
our forecast to account for the trends seen in productivity and DUCs. These
elements, combined with a correlation of completion activity to margins, forms the
basis of our forecast. The responsiveness of the model, and in our view the
industry, has been reduced from last year’s forecast based on the above dynamics.
In our base case, LTO output is expected to rise by 1.7 mb/d from 2023 to 2030,
reaching 10.6 mb/d. While sustained higher prices will drive increased activity and
extra barrels, the ceiling is lower than previously thought. But should prices stay
below the threshold for drilling new wells, producers and oilfield service companies
are expected to respond swiftly. Our high-price sensitivity case estimates that an
incremental 550 kb/d of production could come online by 2030 whereas our
low-price sensitivity anticipates roughly 1.6 mb/d of downside potential.
Oil prices used for the base case are based on a spot crude price of USD 85/bbl
for Brent. We assume this level remains constant in real terms over the forecasting
period and forms the basis for the non-responsive portion of pricing. The high-price
scenario assumes oil prices increase 2.5% in real terms per annum. In the low-
price scenario, estimates of future spot prices are based on the ICE Brent forward
curve then discounted to real terms.
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Oil 2024 Supply

US LTO production with high- and low-price sensitivities

12
mb/d

11

10

6
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Two Alaskan projects with 230 kb/d of capacity are slated to see first oil during the
latter half of the decade. The 80 kb/d Santos-operated Pikka Phase 1
development and the 150 kb/d ConocoPhillips Willow project are expected to start
in 2026 and 2029, respectively. Alaskan output will increase by 35% to 590 kb/d
when these fields start up.

Offshore production from the US GoM is expected to rise by 250 kb/d between
2023 and 2026, peaking at 2.1 mb/d. Output will then retreat to 1.8 mb/d in 2030,
100 kb/d below current levels, as a dearth of sanctioned projects leads to an
overall decline. Three major projects are set to see first oil in 2024 and another
two will be commissioned in 2025 for 350 kb/d of new capacity. After that, Shell’s
Sparta is the only other major project that has been sanctioned in the area, with
60 kb/d expected to come online in 2028.

While not included in our baseline forecast, Beacon Energy may soon sanction its
60 kb/d Shenandoah tie-back (Walker Ridge 316) while BP may take FID on its
70 kb/d Kaskida project. If approved, production could come online in 2026 and
2029, respectively. An additional 250 kb/d of pre-FID production capacity could
come online by the end of the decade with close to half of it operated by BP and
the remainder spread between Shell, LLOG and Beacon Energy.

The results from the federal US Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 261 held in December
2023 achieved the highest gross receipts in eight years and, similar to Lease Sale
259, reconfirmed that companies are interested in maintaining a footprint in the
GoM. Hess, Shell and Occidental Petroleum were dominant bidders offering
USD 382 million in total signature bonuses, a 45% increase from the previous
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Oil 2024 Supply

sale. US federal offshore lease sales are planned in five-year blocks with the
2024-2029 timeframe expected to see three auctions (2025, 2027 and 2029)
compared to the 11 held from 2017-2022 (note that Lease Sale 259 and 261 were
held in 2023 but were authorized under the previous plan).

US NGLs will expand by 920 kb/d, slightly more than the gains expected from
Guyana, the second-largest source of non-OPEC+ supply growth. While
decelerating, NGL growth isn’t forecast to slow as sharply as US LTO growth as
gas-oil ratios (GOR) have been increasing across key shale basins due to
reservoir dynamics and new drilling location quality.

Last year, US NGL supply was comprised of 41% ethane, 31% propane, 16%
butane and 12% pentane plus (on a volumetric basis). In recent years, growth in
NGLs has been divorced from natural gas prices as associated gas production in
the Permian Basin has accounted for the bulk of the increase. Close to 25% of
Permian hydrocarbon output is gas yet only 7% of the revenue from the basin is
derived from gas sales. Additionally, this year has seen Waha pricing (the local
Permian sales point) for gas briefly turn negative.

The Gulf Coast PADD 3 region accounted for 77% of total US ethane growth last
year and close to 60% of the gains since 2014. Another quarter of the increase is
from the gas-rich northeastern plays in PADD 1. Propane volumes will see similar,
if slightly less extreme trends, with PADD 3 accounting for 50% of last decade’s
growth and Bakken volumes from PADD 4 making up another 10%.

Canadian oil sands grow with additional export capacity

Canadian production is set to continue its upward trajectory over the forecast
period, buoyed by increases in bitumen output and expanded export capacity via
the Trans-Mountain Expansion (TMX) pipeline. Optimisation and debottlenecking
of operations at oil sands projects will add incremental barrels, while new capital
projects are limited in size and scope due to social costs and expectations of
carbon tax increases. Additional headwinds to growth will come from capital
discipline and shareholder distributions. By 2030, supply will be just above
6.5 mb/d, 680 kb/d higher than in 2023.

Canadian offshore output is set to remain broadly flat at around 200 kb/d as
renewed interest in the province does little more than offset base decline. Last
year saw the Suncor-led 30 kb/d Terra Nova FPSO restart. The Cenovus-led West
White Rose project has been progressing and is slated to bring up to 80 kb/d to
the market starting in 2026 – extending the asset life by over a decade. Outside
of that, interest is muted with Equinor the only company to have recently drilled
successful exploration wells in the area.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Canadian oil supply by product, 2020-2030

7
mb/d

NGLs
6

5 Other
conventional

4 Offshore

3 Syncrude/
upgrader
2
Bitumen

1
Alberta
conventional
0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Takeaway capacity for the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin expanded by

590 kb/d this year as the TMX pipeline went into service. The once beleaguered
project offers a welcome relief to producers as last winter saw a surge in output
after turnarounds, increasing rail car usage while depressing local differentials
relative to WTI. The new pipeline will also open additional capacity to Asia and US
West Coast refineries. Currently, PADD 5 refineries import close to 1.2 mb/d of
crude, of which only 300 kb/d are of Canadian origin, while PADDs 2 and 4 import
a combined 2.9 mb/d of crude with almost the entirety being from Canada. This
report expects TMX to be fully utilised by 2028.

Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin liquids takeaway capacity

6
mb/d

Rail capacity

5 Rail

TM Expansion
4
Enbridge Line 3
3
Keystone

2 Trans Mountain

Rang/Milk River/Exp
1
Enbridge Mainline

0 WCSB supply
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Supply

The Latin America FPSO factory keeps running

Total oil supply in non-OPEC+ Latin America will grow by 1.7 mb/d to 7.9 mb/d in
2030 after peaking at 8.2 mb/d in 2029. Prolific resources tapped in Brazilian
offshore pre-salt reservoirs, the Stabroek Block in offshore Guyana and the
Neuquén Basin in Argentina offset declines from mature producers in the rest of
the region. Additional barrels could be on the horizon from frontier areas such as
Brazil’s Equatorial Margin or Argentina’s North Argentine Basin.

More project sanctions needed to maintain Brazilian growth by end of the decade
5.0
mb/d

4.5 Pre-FID
Bachalao
4.0
Itapu
3.5
Sepia
3.0
Mero
2.5
Iara
2.0 Buzios
1.5 Tupi
1.0 Base

0.5

0.0
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Brazilian output will rise by 770 kb/d, peaking at 4.6 mb/d in 2029 before retreating
to 4.3 mb/d in 2030. Petrobras operated fields are expected to contribute 85% of
the increase, while TotalEnergies, Shell, Equinor, CNOOC and CNPC also
expand their footprint in Brazil’s prolific offshore. The majority of the projects and
expansions are slated for the Santos Basin, currently home to 70% of Brazilian
crude production. With a base production decline rate close to 15% per year, any
significant project delays or operational issues could put Brazil’s projected growth
at risk. Extended production plateaus from robust infill drilling present upside risks
to our forecast.

Mero and Búzios are two large multi-phase projects that will deploy a combined
total of 15 FPSOs by 2028, including seven already in service. Petrobras plans to
bring online 11 FPSOs between now and 2029, including six Búzios installations.
The Búzios project will have a capacity of close to 2 mb/d after the 11 FPSOs are
in service. Moreover, Petrobras has plans for four additional FPSOs that are
currently pre-FID but not included in this forecast. Even with these, production
peaks in 2029.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Guyana growth driven by recent discoveries in Stabroek Block

1.4
mb/d

Pre-FID
1.2
Phase 6 (Whiptail)
1.0
Phase 5 (Uaru)
0.8
Phase 4
0.6 (Yellowtail)
Phase 3
0.4 (Prosperity)
Phase 2 (Unity)
0.2
Phase 1 (Destiny)
0.0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Guyana has posted strong growth over the last five years, from producing its first
barrel of oil in 2019 to averaging close to 600 kb/d in 2024. The ExxonMobil-led
consortium has continued to make discoveries in the prolific Stabroek Block,
where current estimates of recoverable oil equivalent resources stand at close to
12 billion barrels and a seventh phase is reportedly in the pipeline but not yet
sanctioned. The third FPSO, Prosperity, was brought online in December 2023.
Three more sanctioned FPSO vessels totalling 750 kb/d of capacity are expected
to be brought online over the next three years. Based on the current project
pipeline and in the absence of further sanctioned phases, production could peak
close to 1.3 mb/d in 2028 before declining to 1.1 mb/d by 2030.

The most promising block for Suriname’s first offshore barrels lies directly east of
Guyana. Block 58 is a joint TotalEnergies and APA Corporation owned parcel,
with FID anticipated for late 2024. First oil is expected five years after FID, with a
FPSO designed to produce between 180-200 kb/d. Three other blocks in the
country are promising, with companies in various stages of exploration and
appraisal, but even if successful those volumes would likely materialise in the
second half of the next decade. Assuming that Block 58 is indeed sanctioned,
Suriname’s output would grow from 10 kb/d to 200 kb/d by the end of the decade.

Argentina’s main shale patch, the Vaca Muerta in the Neuquén Basin, roared
back to life over the last three years despite geopolitical and other above-ground
risks. Newly elected President Javier Milei campaigned on a platform of broad
sweeping reforms. Our forecast assumes the energy sector gets a lift from his
proposed reforms to privatise the state-owned YPF and in curtailing the current
capital controls.
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Oil 2024 Supply

Additionally, last year saw improvements in liquids takeaway capacity with the
completion of the Trans-Andean pipeline revamp. Talks are in place for a potential
partnership between YPF and Energy Transfer to build up to 800 kb/d of additional
pipeline and export capacity. Creating a global market for Neuquén oil and gas
will require large infrastructure investments. Argentina’s LTO is forecast to grow
by 520 kb/d to 830 kb/d by 2030, bringing total output from 770 kb/d in 2023 to
1.2 mb/d.

By contrast, supply in the rest of Latin America is expected to decline as the lack
of investment and projects take their toll on the region’s industry. Peru, currently
producing 120 kb/d, has announced plans to boost investment in exploration and
production over the next five years, which will mitigate losses but the roadmap to
increased volumes remains unclear.

Ecuador had stated similar goals in previous years but the referendum on closing
the 60 kb/d Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) field, passed during the 2023
election, has chilled the investment climate in the country. The referendum was
supposed to close the field within one-year and newly elected President Daniel
Noboa had promised to respect the result. Earlier this year, among rising domestic
unrest and widespread violence, he had apparently changed his position. This
report assumes the ITT field remains operating for the outlook period.
Nonetheless, output is projected to fall from 450 kb/d to 390 kb/d by 2030.

After the 2022 elections, the Colombian government tacked towards renewables
and halted new oil and gas exploration licences. The impacts of this decision will
weigh more heavily on oil due to the nature of the country’s hydrocarbon systems
and recent offshore gas discoveries. While Colombian mature fields have seen an
improvement in maintenance operations and underlying base production rates,
supply is expected to continue on a managed decline, falling from 790 kb/d in 2023
to 620 kb/d at the end of the decade.

North Sea oil pits energy security against carbon

constraints
North Sea assets are currently in sharp focus as a UK general election looms and
Norwegian courts pumped the brakes on a handful of petroleum development
plans. The long-term erosion of North Sea supply has seen a temporary respite
since 2022 but is expected to resume after 2025. The United Kingdom is
particularly susceptible as volumes are expected to drop 4% per year to a 50-year
low of 570 kb/d by 2030, even as three projects come online and companies mull
over others.

Norway’s situation is different as new projects will lead to a slight boost in output
to 2025 when the Johan Sverdrup field will make up close to one in every three
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Oil 2024 Supply

barrels that Norway produces. After that, Norway will begin a downward spiral
unless new projects are sanctioned, a prospect that appears more challenging
every year. Total North Sea production is forecast to decline by 400 kb/d to
2.4 mb/d by 2030.

Investments in Norway delay but do not offset European offshore decline

North and Norwegian Sea production Norway production
3.5 2.5

3.0
mb/d

2.0
2.5

2.0 1.5

1.5 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5

0.0 0.0
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

Norway UK Denmark Norway Base Johan Sverdrup Norway New Other

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Net zero ambitions as well as social pressure on governments, major financial

institutions and insurers are shaping the future production profile of the North Sea
– already undergoing a structural shift as private equity reduces the major’s
dominance. Home to some of the lowest emission intensities in the world,
Norwegian producers are striving for world class carbon intensity metrics by
electrifying upstream facilities to improve their longevity and remain attractive
investment prospects. Balancing those ambitions is the need for regional energy
security as Europe continues to progress its energy transition.

Norway’s crude oil production is expected to grow through 2025 as three new
developments started up last year and four more are planned to see first oil this
year and next, including the large Johan Castberg project in the Barents Sea.
Norway has substantial remaining resources, robust infrastructure and a low-
carbon intensity from oil production. Yet a recent court ruling invalidated three field
licences, including one that had already started producing. Whether this is a
harbinger of shifting attitudes in the country is yet to be seen. Without a continued
willingness to sanction new projects, output will fall from its 2025 peak by 340 kb/d
to 1.8 mb/d in 2030.

The United Kingdom’s five-year production decline is expected to pause in 2025

at 710 kb/d before continuing its downward path through our forecast period.
Neptune’s Seagull project that started up last year and Shell’s Penguins
redevelopment this year, along with BP’s improved Clair Ridge project, arrest the
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Oil 2024 Supply

county’s declining output in 2024 and 2025. However, these developments, along
with Equinor’s 2027 start-up of Rosebank, are not sufficient to offset years of weak
investment. And with few other projects sanctioned, output looks set to fall to
570 kb/d in 2030.

Qatar grows, China peaks and Other Asia declines

Non-OPEC+ Asia Pacific oil production continues to falter due to ageing oil fields,
Western company exits and investments increasingly geared towards natural gas.
China is the only exception, thanks to high reinvestment rates and a strong
government mandate to increase output in the short-term. Regional volumes have
fallen by 700 kb/d over the last decade and are poised to decline by a further 13%,
or 870 kb/d, by 2030.

The three state-owned Chinese companies – Sinopec, China National Petroleum

Corporation (CNPC) and the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) –
have stepped up their efforts and increased investments to stymie declines, with
production having increased by 10% since 2018 to 4.3 mb/d in 2023. This trio has
thus far been successful in executing the 14th Five-Year Plan that laid out
ambitious energy and climate goals that prioritise energy security and fossil fuel
developments. CNPC and Sinopec have been able to arrest the decline in onshore
reservoirs while CNOOC has continued to find new offshore reserves and bring
them online. These efforts will boost total oil supply to 4.5 mb/d in 2025 before
natural declines get the upper hand. Output in 2030 is forecast at 4 mb/d.

Asian oil supply by country, 2020-2030

8
mb/d

Other
7

6 Viet Nam

5 Thailand

4
Australia
3
India
2
Indonesia
1

0 China
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Australian supply is forecast to fall by one-third from 380 kb/d to 260 kb/d in 2030,
driven by declines in the Greater Enfield development and Northwest Shelf
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Oil 2024 Supply

condensates. Australian regulators approved the Santos’ 80 kb/d Dorado

development in 2023 yet the company still has not taken FID. If approved this year,
production could be started by 2028.

The other medium-sized producers – India, Indonesia and Thailand – continue on

managed declines with no major projects in the queue to turn around faltering
production. Indian output will get a small uplift in 2024 as the 50 kb/d offshore
Krishna Godavari Basin Cluster-2 project ramps up and the onshore Rajasthan
Basin posts a modest increase. From 710 kb/d in 2024, output falls to 570 kb/d in
2030.

Volumes in Indonesia (630 kb/d) and Thailand (330 kb/d) have fallen since 2016
and are forecast to slip by a further 230 kb/d and 80 kb/d, respectively, to 400 kb/d
and 250 kb/d by 2030. Indonesia put new bid terms in place during 2023 to attract
investment in an effort to supply growing domestic oil and gas consumption with
indigenous production. While it is too soon to see if these efforts bear fruit, the
country’s upstream regulator SKK Migas estimated that close to USD 16 billion
was invested in the country in 2023.

Qatari oil supply is set to rise by 600 kb/d over the forecast period after it
announced further development of associated condensates from the massive
North Field. Its total oil production is due to rise in every year of the forecast to a
record 2.4 mb/d in 2030. The country’s 64 million tonnes per year (Mt/yr) LNG
expansion will be carried out in three phases: first the 32 Mt/yr North Field East
(NFE) followed by the 16 Mt/yr North Field South (NFS) and then the 16 Mt/yr
North Field West (NFW). We expect full capacity to be reached after 2030.

The three schemes combined are expected to raise LNG capacity from 77 Mt/yr
to 142 Mt/yr and increase the volume of NGLs starting from 2026. This latest
capacity addition will require the construction of two LNG trains, in addition to the
six already underway for the earlier expansions. NFE and NFS are expected to
start up in 2026 and 2027, respectively. NFE will have four trains that are due to
produce some 260 kb/d of condensate, 130 kb/d of LPG and 70 kb/d of ethane.
NFS will have two trains that are slated to produce 130 kb/d of condensate along
with 60 kb/d of LPG and 30 kb/d of ethane. Qatar’s crude production is expected
to edge up to 650 kb/d by 2030 from around 610 kb/d currently due to new
additions at the Al Shaheen and Bul Hanine fields.

Bridled optimism builds in Africa

Non-OPEC+ African supply is set to increase by 190 kb/d, or 8%, through the forecast
period as projects ramp up in Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Ghana. Senegal and Uganda
are set to join the producers’ club later this year and in 2026, respectively, while new
discoveries continue offshore Namibia and Côte d’Ivoire. Yet it is not all smooth sailing
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Oil 2024 Supply

as projects in Kenya, Ghana and Mozambique continue to face delays and Uganda’s
Lake Albert project remains bogged down by domestic politics.

Non-OPEC+ African oil production by country, 2020-2030

3.0
mb/d

Uganda
2.5

Senegal
2.0

Other
1.5

Ghana
1.0

Egypt
0.5

0.0 Angola
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Higher oil prices and renegotiated production sharing contracts have helped arrest
a six-year decline in Egyptian output. Increased investment from APA
Corporation, Eni and the Capricorn-Cheiron consortium as well as further bid
rounds, will help to flatten declines but aren’t enough to grow future liquids supply.
For the last two years, total oil output has remained relatively constant at 600 kb/d.
This year and next are expected to average 580 kb/d, with output sliding to
500 kb/d by the end of the decade.

Senegal is on track to become an oil producer later this year when Woodside’s
100 kb/d Sangomar FPSO is commissioned. The vessel arrived in coastal waters
in February and work is being done to hook up 23 production, injection and gas
wells that are part of the first phase. Ghana also sees an uptick in flows this year
as the Jubilee Southeast project, commissioned in 2023, ramps up. Total output
is forecast to reach 220 kb/d in 2030. Additionally, supply in Niger is expected to
increase in 2024 and 2025 as a Chinese built pipeline facilitates increased drilling
in the Agadem Rift Basin. Oil production is seen growing by 50 kb/d this year and
another 30 kb/d in 2025, before declining through the end of the decade.

In Côte d’Ivoire, Eni’s Baleine project saw first oil last year when Phase 1 came
online. An additional 30 kb/d of capacity is slated for late 2024 when Phase 2 starts
up. Eni has discussed an additional 100 kb/d of output with a Phase 3, but it has
not taken an FID and as such is not included in our forecast. Baleine is notable as
Africa’s first Scope 1 and Scope 2 net zero oil and gas development. It has been
a pioneering step for the industry to take FID on a major capital project with a full
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Oil 2024 Supply

lifecycle net zero intent. Eni’s successes have continued with their recent potential
1 billion barrel Calao discovery, the second-largest in the country’s history.

In Namibia’s offshore Orange Basin, another recent find by Galp Energia SA that
could be as large as 10 billion barrels brings the country’s potential discovered
resource base to a level similar to that of Guyana. TotalEnergies, Shell and
QatarEnergy have been performing appraisal and delineation work on their
discoveries. While no development plans have been submitted to exploit these
fields, they have the potential to catapult Namibian output along a similar path as
to Guyana’s early in the next decade.

Angola, which quit OPEC at the start of 2024, is expected to see oil supply ease
by about 100 kb/d to roughly 1 mb/d by 2030. Its output has been slumping for
years due to underperforming assets and operational setbacks. The departure of
the West African country from the producer bloc came after it publicly rejected the
group’s decision to revise down its 2024 crude oil production ceiling.

Angola’s crude oil production plateaued at 1.7-1.8 mb/d from 2008 to 2016 before
starting on a decline aggravated by operational issues at its high-cost deepwater
oil fields. In an effort to help stem the decline, TotalEnergies has taken an FID on
the Kaminho deepwater project, comprising the Cameia and Golfinho fields, where
first oil is targeted for 2028 and expected to ramp up to around 70 kb/d.

TotalEnergies and CNOOC approved two projects in Uganda near Lake Albert in
late 2021 and early 2022, respectively. The projects have been marred by
repeated delays, with financing issues and land compensation schemes still
hampering progress. FID of the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), the
project’s only export route, hasn’t been completed as Chinese insurers still need
to sign off on it. The 1 440 km heated pipeline has been a source of controversy
since it was announced. Environmental campaigners opposed the project and
successfully lobbied Western banks not to fund it. The latest setback for the project
has pushed our start-up dates for both the Tilenga and Kingfisher fields to 2026.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Refining and trade

Global summary
Decelerating demand growth weighs on refining sector
The global refining industry is set to undergo another major step change as it
adapts to slowing oil demand growth amid the accelerating transition to clean
energy technologies over the 2023-2030 forecast period. Global refining capacity
is projected to expand by 3.3 mb/d by the end of the decade, a marked slowdown
from historic trends. Despite this more modest rate of capacity expansion, it will
still outpace the call on refined products by a factor of nearly three-to-one over the
forecast period as non-refined fuels including fractionated NGLs and biofuels
increase by a combined 2.5 mb/d.

Product demand growth, 2023-2030

103
mb/d

102
-0.0 -0.1 0.1
101
1.2
100 -1.7
1.2
99
100.4
98

97 2.5
97.4
96

95
2023 LPG/ Naphtha Jet/ Gasoil/ Fuel oil Other Gasoline 2030
Demand ethane kerosene diesel products Demand

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Demand net of CTL/GTL, additives, biofuels and direct use of crude.

Refiners will need to adjust their product slates to meet the challenge of reduced
consumption of road transport fuels, as electric vehicles increase their market
share. Moreover, the surge in petrochemical feedstock use – the pillar of oil
consumption growth in our outlook – will largely be met by the massive ramp up
of NGLs this decade. This, in combination with rising biofuel use – the other source
of non-refined fuels – undermines demand for refined product supplies and the
need for additional refining capacity. Non-refined fuel products are set to capture
more than 75% of additional demand over the 2023-2030 period.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Oil demand and call on refined products (mb/d), 2023-2030

2023-30
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
growth
Total liquids demand 102.2 103.2 104.2 105.0 105.3 105.5 105.6 105.4 3.21
Biofuels 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 0.61
Total Oil demand 99.2 100.0 100.8 101.5 101.8 102.0 102.0 101.8 2.60
CTL/GTL*/additives 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 -0.02
Direct use of crude oil 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 -0.42
Total call on oil products 97.4 98.2 99.1 99.8 100.2 100.4 100.5 100.4 3.03
Fractionation products** 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.4 14.6 1.87
Refined product demand 84.6 85.1 85.7 86.2 86.3 86.2 86.0 85.8 1.16
Refinery market share 82.8% 82.5% 82.2% 82.1% 81.9% 81.7% 81.5% 81.4% -1.4%

Notes: *CTL/GTL: Coal-to-liquids and gas-to-liquids. **Ethane, LPG and pentanes plus, excluding estimated diluent use in
North America.

This significant rise in non-refinery product supplies will add pressure on refinery
operating rates and, potentially, profitability. Arguably, this pressure might be
greatest on catalytic cracking units given weak gasoline demand and strong
competition for middle distillates, including vacuum gasoil as a feedstock. The
threat of falling utilisation rates in mature demand centres raises the prospect of
further capacity closures before the end of the decade. Capacity growth will remain
concentrated in Asia, most notably in China and India. However, even these
stalwarts of capacity growth will slow down, particularly post-2026.

Americas upstream surplus matches Asian products deficit

Global oil trade will continue to be driven by Asia’s growing structural shortfall in
crude and product supply and the Atlantic Basin’s increasing surplus of crude,
NGLs and products.

Global refinery throughputs and the change in product balances, 2023-2030

Refinery throughput Change in product balances 2023-2030

mb/d

44 1.6
mb/d

1.2
43
0.8

42 0.4

0.0
41
-0.4

40 -0.8

39
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

East of Suez Atlantic Basin

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Rising non-OPEC+ crude supply, in conjunction with international sanctions on

Russian crude exports and OPEC+ voluntary cuts, will push higher volumes from
the Atlantic Basin to East of Suez over the outlook period. The loss of
predominantly medium sour crudes from the Middle East amid OPEC+ output cuts
is partially offset by rising Brazilian, Guyanese and Canadian supplies, with the
Canadian exports gaining greater access to Asian markets. Light sweet crude
grades from US LTO production will continue to find homes in Europe, and
increasingly in Africa, India and elsewhere in Asia.

Product trade will see higher intra-regional flows East of Suez, driven by Asia,
attracting more product supply from the Middle East. Supplies from Russia, which
are broadly subject to import sanctions in much of the Atlantic Basin, will continue
to head east, although Africa and Latin America may also boost imports over time.
Europe’s continuing shortfall in diesel and jet fuel supply, plus North America’s
need for jet fuel imports, will focus global competition in middle distillate markets.

Regional crude surplus and deficits, 2023-2030

20
mb/d

15

Export
10

-5

Import
- 10

- 15
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
China Other Asia Europe India North America Africa FSU Other Americas Middle East

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The Western Hemisphere, with North and South Americas combined, is the largest
incremental supplier of oil to global markets in our forecast period, while the
Eastern Hemisphere is the leading driver of demand. Going forward, the disparity
between the east and west will add further impetus to global trade flows.

The twin challenges of falling demand and rising NGL supplies

Refiners have adapted to the global redrawing of product market flows following
the imposition of sanctions on Russian crude and product exports since early
2022. The rebalancing of markets to reach this new equilibrium has boosted
middle distillate and gasoline cracks in the Atlantic Basin. In parallel, refineries in
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Asia have absorbed increasing crude volumes from the continued surge in US
LTO production and heavily discounted Russian Urals exports.

Despite two years of exceptionally strong margins, the refining industry now faces
two challenges that will drive market dynamics in the coming years and weigh on
operating rates and profitability. First, the projected peak in transportation fuel
demand in the medium term will pressure utilisation rates. Second, competition in
petrochemical feedstock markets from surging NGL production risks swamping
light distillate markets. Historically, naphtha could be blended into the gasoline
pool. However, by 2030 this flexibility will be limited by ample gasoline supply,
relative to demand. This will likely further intensify competition between naphtha
and LPG. Adding to these competing sources of LPG and light distillate supply,
government mandates will increase the use of renewable and biofuel supplies
thereby compounding the pressure on refineries to lower operating rates.

Product market dislocations boost Atlantic Basin cracks

Longstanding regional product imbalances have seen their price impact magnified
by the sanctions-driven oil market dislocations over the past two years. This report
assumes that Russia-related sanctions will remain in place through 2030.

Benchmark crude and product prices, 2019-2024

200
$/bbl

North Sea
180
dated
160

140 ULSD
NWE
120

100
Gasoline
80 NWE
60

40 Urals FOB
Primorsk
20

0
Jan 19 Jul 19 Jan 20 Jul 20 Jan 21 Jul 21 Jan 22 Jul 22 Jan 23 Jul 23 Jan 24

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

First and foremost, European diesel markets have lost a major source of short-
haul supply. Consequently, European imports are increasingly being met from the
United States, Middle East and, at the margin, Asia. This has boosted regional
diesel cracks, as workable import arbitrage opportunities support a premium to
low-cost supply from the Middle East. Similar patterns have emerged in other
import-dependant regions, including European and US jet fuel markets and US
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

East Coast gasoline markets. These markets have seen stronger premiums
versus assessed low-cost sources of supply.

Regional diesel arbitrage, 4-week rolling average

$/bbl

25

20 Northwest
Europe

15
Singapore

10

US Gulf
5 Coast

0
Middle
Jan 19 Jul 19 Jan 20 Jul 20 Jan 21 Jul 21 Jan 22 Jul 22 Jan 23 Jul 23 Jan 24 East Gulf
-5

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: The inter-regional arbitrage is the region’s price versus the lowest cost source of supply.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

Refineries can generate a competitive advantage from several factors, all of which
establish a defensive moat that protects profit margins. Refineries may benefit
from scale and complexity, or they might have cost advantages due to their
location or access to cheap crude.

Refinery profitability normalising as product cracks ease back to pre-Covid levels

Light sweet cracking margins - monthly Northwest Europe product cracks

$/bbl

$/bbl

45 100

35
60
25
20
15

5 - 20

-5 - 60
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 May-24

NW Europe Singapore US Gulf Gasoline Jet/Kero Diesel Naphtha HSFO

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Right-hand chart denotes yearly cracks, last column is the monthly values in May of 2024.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Similarly, refiners may be able to command a premium for their product pricing.
Some refineries may have the operational flexibility to adapt output yields more
easily to the rise in middle distillate demand versus the fall in gasoline demand
that we expect to see over the forecast period.

In addition to these competitive factors, refiners may also sit within an integrated
value chain that limits their exposure to these market dynamics. Consequently,
the challenges looming on the horizon can, individually or in combination,
undermine or even erase a refinery’s competitive position.

Of the projected 3.2 mb/d of growth in demand during 2024-2030, more than 75%
will be met by non-refined fuels including fractionated NGLs and biofuels, which
increase by a combined 2.5 mb/d over the forecast period. We assume that higher
cost OECD regions will be more acutely impacted by the rising share of non-
refined products than non-OECD regions, but falling utilisation rates will have
repercussions that will be felt across the global refining industry by the end of the
decade.

Refined product demand growth undermined by higher NGLs and biofuels, 2023-2030
mb/d

89
88
87
86 Fractionation products
85 Biofuels
84 CTL/GTL/additives

83 Total liquids growth

82 Global

81
80
Refined product Total liquids demand Non-refined fuels Refined product
demand 2023 growth supply growth demand 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Refinery capacity growth is underpinned by a projected 5.1 mb/d of new projects

to be completed by the end of the decade, while 1.8 mb/d is forecast to be shut-in,
for an overall net increase of 3.3 mb/d. This view is more cautious than envisaged
in the Oil 2023 report as several projects that failed to make any discernible
progress over the past 12 months have been removed from the project pipeline.

Recent record profitability has not triggered a new wave of refinery project and
expansion announcements. However, several planned closures have been
deferred, as refineries reap the benefits of the strong margins posted in 2022 and
2023. Moreover, the current schedule of expansions is expected to be largely
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

complete by 2026. Consequently, from 2027 onwards only limited capacity

increases, concentrated in China and India, are expected. However, projects that
have yet to receive a final investment decision (pre-FID) could yet be completed
by 2030 if approvals are made in the very near future. Similarly, projects that have
made insufficient progress to be finished within the forecast period could be
included if progress accelerates from current rates. Notably, the 1.2 mb/d
Ratnagiri refinery in India and the 200 kb/d Lobito refinery in Angola fall into the
first and second categories, respectively.

Net capacity additions outpace refined product demand growth, 2023-2030

mb/d

5.5
5.0
Global
4.5
4.0 Europe

3.5 Asia
3.0 North America
2.5 China
2.0 Africa
1.5 Middle East
1.0 Other
0.5
0.0
New sites Expansions Shutdowns Net additions Refined product
demand growth

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Refiners must navigate an array of challenges to remain

competitive
How refiners respond to these shifting product and regional demand challenges
will depend on a multitude of factors, including access to cheap crude and natural
gas, premium pricing locations, operating costs, and yield configurations.
Arguably, a vertically integrated value chain from the upstream wellhead, through
refining and onto a retail or industrial/commercial consumers, provides an
insulated business model that can ignore shifts in value creation across the chain.
However, this oversimplifies the complex nature of a returns-focused business
that seeks to optimise each aspect of its value creation.

Without either a reduction in capacity, lower utilisation, or a material change in

yields (such as an integrated petrochemical capacity addition), a refinery facing
contracting domestic demand is increasingly exposed to international competition.
This shifts a greater share of production from inland CIF-based pricing within the
integrated value chain into the inherently weaker FOB-based pricing mechanism
as products are exported.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Data for mature markets such as Japan indicate that weaker demand initially
results in utilisation rates dropping, but ultimately forces capacity to be closed.
Falling demand also subjects refined product markets to greater exposure to
international trade, as demand and refined products output can become
misaligned. Consequently, the above factors point towards an environment where
closures are more likely in the Atlantic Basin. Considering the scale and
complexity of regional refining industries, Europe stands out as having older,
relatively small, and less complex refineries that are more open to international
trade than other regions.

Conversely, utilisation rates East of Suez remain steady as positive regional

demand growth offers some protection from the impact of the energy transition.
Furthermore, cost-advantaged locations, access to low-cost crude and proximity
to structurally short markets in Asia all play a part.

Japan’s falling utilisation and increasing international trade penetration, 2006-2023

Crude runs and international trade share of demand Final demand and crude runs
4 500 4 500

4 000 4 000

3 500 3 500
kb/d

kb/d

3 000 3 000

2 500 2 500

2 000 2 000
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 3 000 3 500 4 000 4 500 5 000 5 500
kb/d

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Quarterly data in both charts. Vertical axis for both charts is kb/d refinery crude throughput. Right-hand chart is final
demand in kb/d on the horizontal axis.

Refinery profitability is driven by the balance between crude

and product market tightness
One lens through which to view refinery profitability is the relative tightness
between crude and product markets. If refiners face a disparity in conditions
between crude and product markets, then arguably they have three options for
handling the mismatch. First, if the margin structure supports it, they can continue
to pay up for crude. Second, if they have operational flexibility, refiners can draw
crude inventories, which effectively contributes to tighter crude market conditions.
Lastly, if margins don’t support processing crude, they can cut runs and thereby
transmit weakness in product markets back to crude markets.
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Tightness in both crude and product markets results in outsized returns for
refineries as backwardated market structure in crude amplifies the backwardated
market structure in product markets and results in extremely strong cracks for
products of net importers, e.g. European diesel cracks. Conversely, weaker crude
and product market conditions, as witnessed in 2020-2021 implies a tougher
operating environment for refineries.

Two caveats to this assessment are worth highlighting. First, the refining industry
doesn’t have to process crude where margins don’t support it. The demand
collapse of 2020 demonstrated the power of enforcing economic run cuts to
restore profitability at refineries. Lessons learnt from this episode have likely not
been forgotten. Run cuts effectively transfer product market weakness back into
crude markets. Second, the refining industry now has a greater share of merchant
refineries that can respond more quickly and be operationally and financially
disciplined in reacting to changes in market conditions.

Demand trends will likely dictate the rate of capacity closures

The prospect of refined product demand contracting over the balance of the
decade, initially for gasoline, and subsequently for diesel, will require adjustments
to activity levels and refinery yield structures that will be signalled by individual
product cracks. Some refineries will be forced to cut runs, either proactively or
reactively, or, in the longer run, exit the industry.

Regional growth in refined product demand, 2022-2030

2.0
mb/d

Other Asia

1.5 Africa

1.0 China

Middle East
0.5

Americas
0.0
Europe

-0.5
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 FSU

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Within our assessments for the period through to 2030 we do not explicitly forecast
capacity closures beyond those already announced. However, refinery operating
rates are adjusted to reflect the heightened competitive pressures. We envisage
that European and North American refining capacity will suffer the sharpest
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

decline in rates, given the speed of the demand contraction is greatest there.
Furthermore, a particularly dramatic shift could occur to US Gulf Coast (USGC)
refineries. The period to 2030 will see the rerouting of Canadian barrels to the
Pacific market via the TMX pipeline, and declining Mexican exports of Maya crude.
Both these factors will tighten regional crude markets and likely pressure profits
and operating rates.

Regional refinery utilisation rates, 2023-2030

95%
Utilisation rate

FSU

85% Other Asia

North
America

75% Europe

China

65%
2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Refineries production yield structure will need to change

This report’s analysis through to 2030 envisions a global refining industry that
faces the challenge of meeting strong kerosene and diesel demand growth, while
gasoline use drops, even though increasing naphtha demand offers a partial
offset. We assume that refineries will adapt to the shifting demand patterns by
raising middle distillate yields at the expense of naphtha and gasoline.

Gasoline yields will need to shrink globally by 1.3% to contain potential surplus
supplies. Notable changes that drive this are in the US refining system, given the
typical draw on the middle distillate pool to feed upgrading units, such as catalytic
cracking. Elsewhere, a partial offset comes from higher naphtha yields.

The Covid-19 demand collapse and subsequent recovery demonstrated that

national refining systems can adjust kerosene and diesel production when
required by as much as two percentage points. In aggregate the changes required
to middle distillate yields to adapt to the 2030 demand mix are neither as dramatic
nor as rapid.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Projected global refinery yield changes, 2023-2030

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%

Refined
-0.5% product
yield

-1.0%

-1.5%
LPG Naphtha Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Fuel oil Other
products

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Rising US LTO and NGL supplies are the second challenge

The second challenge that refineries face is the continued surge in US LTO and
NGL production. Rising supplies of light sweet crude to global markets and the
concurrent OPEC+ production policy which restricts the availability of medium and
heavy crude have compressed light sweet grades price premiums versus heavy
sour crude differentials.

Prior to the US shale revolution boosting supply of light sweet crude oil, the
marginal barrel available to refineries was typically heavier and sourer than the
average. This dynamic gave complex refineries a competitive advantage over less
sophisticated refining capacity. US shale oil has inverted this trend and thereby
improved the competitiveness of less sophisticated plants that would otherwise be
disadvantaged by the lack of upgrading and hydrotreating capacity versus more
complex ones.

While LTO supplies have been a boon to less complex refineries, complex
refineries have had to compete harder for heavy crude supplies and feedstocks to
fill upgrading capacity. The analysis contained in this report assumes the current
OPEC+ output agreement, including formal, voluntary and additional voluntary
cuts, remains in place. Consequently, the global sour crude market is tight in the
short term, but becomes increasingly long in the second half of the decade. We
assume the majority of the global surplus will result in a product overhang
dominated by gasoline components. Crude balances account for about one-third
of the surplus, but the need to meet diesel and, more particularly, kerosene
demand will drive crude runs higher until late in the decade.
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Surging NGL supply undermines refinery profitability

In contrast to the mixed impact on refining from higher shale oil supplies, the surge
in NGL production and exports from North America has, on balance, increased
competition in the petrochemical feedstock markets and been a drag on refineries.
Increased integration with petrochemical capacity has long been a preferred way
to boost refinery gross margins and absorb unwanted light ends production into
higher value product streams. The expansion of ethane- and propane-based
petrochemical capacity has marginalised the use of naphtha and mixed-feed
crackers in Europe and undermined the profitability of refinery produced
propylene. Further increases in NGL production will continue to win market share
in petrochemicals and limit refineries’ ability to shift away from gasoline production
to increased yields of propane and propylene from their catalytic cracking
operations.

Furthermore, in tandem with higher NGL supply, mandated increases in both

biofuel and renewable fuels use will also dampen the call on refined products. We
expect to see gains in competing supplies of kerosene from sustainable aviation
fuels (SAF), as well as from biodiesel and ethanol. On balance, the combination
of new refinery start-ups, predominantly in Asia, demand in the Atlantic Basin
falling and increased competition from NGLs, biofuels and renewables raises the
risks of further capacity closures.

We model falling utilisation rates in OECD Europe and Americas as a proxy for
this dynamic. However, the eventual losers in the competitive process will be
determined by the trade-off between being in a cost-advantaged area, e.g. the US
Gulf Coast, versus being located in a region that remains a net importer for large
swathes of its fuel needs, e.g. Europe. The balance between these two factors is
complicated by the recent imposition of import embargoes and trade sanctions on
Russia by the European Union and the Group of Seven (G7) that have
dramatically redrawn oil trade flows and forced European markets to reprice diesel
and jet fuel, such that they can attract more volumes from longer haul locations
East of Suez.

Refining capacity
Global refining capacity additions slow after 2026
Over the 2024 to 2030 timeframe, the global refining sector is poised for a period
of subdued growth, with nameplate capacity (including condensate splitters)
forecast to rise from 104.2 mb/d to 107.4 mb/d. Installed capacity remains more
than adequate to meet world demand for refined products of 85.8 mb/d by the end
of the forecast period. While capacity increases by a net 3.3 mb/d by 2030, refinery
runs are forecast to rise by only 2.1 mb/d and growth in demand for refined
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

products (excluding CTL/GTL, additives, industry direct use of crude oil and
fractionated products) by 1.2 mb/d. As demand growth tapers off, global utilisation
rates are expected to drop, prompting a rationalisation of capacity. The 3.3 mb/d
in net capacity additions over the seven-year period is less than the Oil 2023
forecast of 4.4 mb/d for the 2023-2028 period. This total includes 5.1 mb/d in new
projects, offset by 1.8 mb/d in announced closures. Annual net capacity additions
average 470 kb/d, a significant decline from the 2010-2019 average of 780 kb/d.

Announced capacity closures over the forecast period are lower than the historical
average, with more closures likely to be announced in the coming years. For now,
2025 is the peak year for refinery closures, with a total of 800 kb/d of capacity set
to go offline. OECD Europe will bear the brunt of this reduction, with four separate
closures amounting to 480 kb/d. In the Americas, the United States will see two
shutdowns totalling 380 kb/d. Unexpectedly, for regions East of Suez, China will
account for nearly 65% of the announced closures, as governmental restrictions
on import and export quotas, and regulations on emissions continue to force
independent refiners to shut down. Still, these closures, totalling 640 kb/d of
capacity, are overshadowed by 1.6 mb/d of new refinery capacity under
development.

Annual change in global crude distillation capacity, 2008-2030

3.0
mb/d

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5 Closures
0.0 Additions
2023 Net
-0.5
2024 Net
-1.0

-1.5

-2.0
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

This slowdown in investment in refining capacity is attributed to several factors,

including anticipated slower growth in demand, regulations driving the transition
away from fossil fuelled vehicles (notably in Europe) and hesitancy among refiners
to further expand due to environmental, social and governance (ESG) policy
pressures. Investment priorities for refineries have broadened from a focus on
volumetric and complexity enhancements to encompass reducing Scope 1 and
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Scope 2 greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 and methane), flexibility to co-process

low-carbon feedstocks and renewable fuel production.

Additionally, profitability is constrained by escalating carbon taxes, rising biofuel

supply, fuel efficiency regulations and surging EV sales that are all eroding
demand for refined transport fuels. Furthermore, uncertainties surrounding the
macroeconomic climate and geopolitical tensions, including the Russia-Ukraine
conflict, are set against recent record-level refinery margins, leaving many refiners
holding back investment.

The post-pandemic years saw a surge in capacity as projects that were delayed
by restrictions and supply chain bottlenecks were completed. Projects due
onstream from 2024 to 2026 account for around 4.4 mb/d, accounting for most of
the 5.1 mb/d of gross additions over the forecast period. Beyond 2026, expected
completions are relatively sparse. Against a backdrop of slowing global demand
and rising NGL, biofuel and renewable fuel supplies, the next three years may be
the last period of net capacity additions. Subsequently, closures, although not
explicitly forecast in this report, may well eclipse additions as demand growth for
refined products turn negative near the end of the decade.

Change in CDU capacity by region, 2023-2030

New sites Expansions Shutdowns

2% 4%
4%
8% 7%
7% 32% 28% 35%
34%
2.2 3.0 27% 1.8
mb/d mb/d mb/d
29%
9%
16% 5% 6%
21% 21%
3%

FSU China Americas Africa Middle East Europe Other Asia India

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The regional distribution of net capacity additions remains consistent with previous
editions of this report. East of Suez continues to drive capacity growth, accounting
for nearly 85% of the increase. New projects in the region will add a net 2.8 mb/d,
primarily dominated by developments China, India and the Middle East. China and
India will each add around 1 mb/d in capacity while the Middle East will expand by
630 kb/d.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

In the Atlantic Basin, new refineries in Nigeria (already commissioned) and Mexico
(set to be commissioned in 2025) add a combined 1 mb/d. Shutdowns in OECD
regions will partly offset these gains, however, resulting in a net increase of around
500 kb/d. The crude and condensate surplus in the Atlantic Basin grows by
2.7 mb/d, while the deficit in East of Suez expands by 2.8 mb/d, implying
increasing crude flows east.

Refining capacity at risk of closure is increasing

Beyond announced closures, we expect capacity that is at risk of closure (which
we define as the surplus capacity beyond that required to meet refined product
demand assuming an average 86% utilisation rate) to increase over the course of
the decade, as regional utilisation rates drop in the Atlantic Basin. The 2023 global
baseline assessment of 8.5 mb/d is inflated by poor utilisation rates in several
countries, most notably Mexico, Venezuela, Russia and China, that boost the
assessment by nearly 4 mb/d. Excluding these long-term low utilisation countries,
capacity at risk of closure increases from 5 mb/d in 2023 to 5.9 mb/d in 2030.

By 2030 Europe and North America could each have between 1-1.5 mb/d of at-risk
capacity. By contrast, some regions will experience a reduction in spare capacity,
notably in China, where improved utilisation rates for refining have been a
government objective for several years. Smaller reductions in Africa and Russia
come from increased refinery utilisation.

Refining capacity at risk of closure from low utilisation, 2012-2030

8
mb/d

0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
East of Suez Atlantic Basin

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Excluding estimates from China, Venezuela, Mexico and Nigeria because of perennially poor utilisation.
.

More Atlantic Basin crude to head to Asia

Asia’s growing structural shortfall in crude, in tandem with the Atlantic Basin’s
growing surplus, will dictate trade patterns through the end of the decade. The
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

exclusion of Russian crude from most Atlantic Basin importers due to sanctions
will also support increased flows of crude to the East of Suez.

Furthermore, reduced Middle East sour crude exports are partially offset by rising
Brazilian and Guyanese oil supplies. US LTO production will boost the supply of
light sweet grades to Europe, West Africa as well as to Asia, where Atlantic Basin
crude’s market share increases.

The global crude balance shifts from a deficit in 2024 to a surplus, by 2030 of
700 kb/d, driven by rising supply and slowing demand growth. Availability of crude
surpasses the global import requirements, leading to an opportunity to rebuild
global inventories.

Net crude oil trade by major regions, 2018-2030

25
mb/d

20
Middle East

15
FSU

10

Americas
5

Africa
0

-5
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Regional developments
Within the framework of the 2023-2030 outlook, increased capacity of 3.3 mb/d
and higher crude runs of 2.1 mb/d both far outweigh the growth in demand for
refined products of only 1.3 mb/d.

Refining activity in the Atlantic Basin will see utilisation rates drop by 2%, centred
mostly in Europe and the Unites States where throughput falls in line with the
decline in demand. As a result, output in the region will decrease by 600 kb/d.
Conversely, refinery runs East of Suez will grow by 2.7 mb/d, and throughput will
continue expanding unabated despite peak oil demand on the horizon. The Middle
East, India, China and Africa are set to lead crude throughput growth over the
forecast period.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Atlantic Basin versus East of Suez, refinery throughputs, 2012-2030

50 18

mb/d
mb/d

16
45
14

40 12
10
35
8

30 6
4
25
2

20 0
2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2012 2016 2020 2024 2028

Atlantic Basin East of Suez Middle East China India US Europe

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

By 2030, the Atlantic Basin surplus in crude and condensates is expected to reach
7.9 mb/d, representing an increase of 2.7 mb/d from 2023. This surplus will
primarily consist of light sweet crude, and to a lesser extent medium grades,
thanks to rising exports from the United States, Brazil and Guyana.

Regional developments in refining capacity throughputs and utilisation, 2023-2030

2023 2030 Change 2023 2030 Change 2023 2030

Total capacity (mb/d) Refinery throughput (mb/d) Utilisation rates
United States 18.4 18.0 -0.4 16.0 15.0 -0.9 87% 84%
Other North America 3.5 3.8 0.3 2.6 2.9 0.3 74% 76%
Europe 14.9 14.4 -0.5 12.1 11.1 -1.0 81% 77%
FSU 9.1 9.2 0.1 6.6 6.9 0.3 72% 75%
China 18.2 19.2 0.9 15.0 15.4 0.4 82% 81%
India 5.8 6.8 1.0 5.2 6.1 0.9 90% 90%
OECD Asia Oceania 5.8 6.8 1.0 5.2 6.1 0.9 90% 90%
Other Asia 8.4 7.6 -0.8 5.6 4.8 -0.8 67% 64%
Middle East 11.2 11.9 0.6 8.8 10.0 1.2 79% 84%
Latin America 6.0 6.1 0.1 3.8 3.9 0.1 64% 65%
Africa 3.0 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.4 0.7 54% 63%
World 104.2 107.4 3.3 82.5 84.7 2.1 79% 79%
Atlantic Basin 53.4 53.8 0.4 41.9 41.3 -0.6 78% 77%
East of Suez 50.8 53.6 2.8 40.7 43.4 2.7 80% 81%

The Americas continue to drive Atlantic Basin surpluses

Refining developments in the Americas

The US refining industry faces significant challenges in the coming years. Despite
the recent strength in refining margins, adverse demand trends and diminishing
nearby export markets will pressure utilisation rates. This will likely prompt further
rationalisation and restructuring to maintain the industry’s competitiveness.
Refinery runs are projected to decline by close to 1 mb/d by 2030, partly due to
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

announced refinery closures totalling nearly 400 kb/d, but primarily because
utilisation rates will need to decrease further to align with a 1.4 mb/d decline in US
oil products demand.

In California, Phillips 66 ceased processing crude at its 128 kb/d Rodeo facility
and has converted the plant to a biofuel facility. Meanwhile, Houston's Lyondell
refinery in Texas will shutter its 263 kb/d operation in 2025. A further 500 kb/d of
US refinery capacity is at risk by the end of the decade.

Despite this potential rationalisation, by 2030, the United States is projected to

have a surplus of approximately 5 mb/d in oil products, across LPG/ethane,
gasoline, naphtha and diesel.

US refined product demand, refining activity and product balances, 2012-2030

United States throughput vs demand United States Product balances

18 6.0
mb/d
mb/d

17 5.0

4.0
16
3.0
15
2.0

14
1.0

13 0.0

-1.0
12

US throughput US demand LPG/ethane Light distillates Middle distillates

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Demand for refined products excludes fractionated products.

The combined surplus in liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and ethane is forecast to
grow by 400 kb/d to 3 mb/d. NGLs supply rises by 900 kb/d, led by the Permian,
while domestic demand for ethane and LPG will be less than half of this, resulting
in a rising surplus available for the export market.

The persistent deficit in the rest of the Americas will likely absorb close to 40% of
the US LPG surplus, with the remainder exported to the rest of the world. However,
the United States will face competition from the Middle East for market share East
of Suez. The global market for light ends and LPG is projected to have an overall
surplus and, akin to a game of musical chairs, someone will inevitably be left with
excess product.

In Canada, the expansion of the TMX pipeline enables more Canadian heavy
crude to be exported to the US West Coast and Asia, creating new opportunities
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

for inter-regional trade. The 590 kb/d expansion to the pipeline commenced
operations in early May, with reports of a first shipment to China enroute. While a
sizeable portion of this will serve refineries on the US West Coast, the potential
exists for a substantial portion of the crude to reach Asia, particularly China, which
has the capacity to refine substantial quantities of extra heavy crude and bitumen.
This shift in trade patterns is also expected to reshape the global shipping industry,
as Canadian crude will increasingly compete with heavy crude from other
countries, particularly those in Latin America and the Middle East. However,
Western Canada’s pipeline export capacity remains at 5.1 mb/d over the balance
of the decade. By 2028, crude production is expected to exceed this level, pointing
to the use of rail shipments, on an increasingly frequent basis.

Despite being one of the largest producers of oil, Mexico will remain a net importer
of refined products to meet its domestic demand through the forecast period.
Although refinery operations are set to accelerate and demand growth for liquids
slows, the country will still need around 300 kb/d of imported fuels in 2030 to meet
demand, versus more than 700 kb/d in 2023. Over the past ten years, Mexico's
refinery system has operated well below average utilisation rates due to ageing
assets. However, it is set for a period of growth in the medium term.

State-owned Pemex is investing to upgrade and expand several of its refineries.

Our forecast assumes a rise of 11.5% in utilisation rates as this investment
programme bears fruit, reaching 63% by 2030. In early 2024, runs hit an eight-year
high, and could jump by 400 kb/d over the forecast, reducing the net product
import requirements.

Pemex will finally complete the long-awaited and heavily delayed Dos Bocas
340 kb/d refinery. Reports of its imminent commissioning have waxed and waned
as the project continues to face start-up issues. We anticipate it will come online
no earlier than the fourth quarter of 2025, with the full ramp-up taking several
years. Once operational, the refinery will significantly reduce Mexico’s
dependence on the United States for fuel. It will also cut exports of its heavy sour
Mayan crude to the USGC, as these volumes will be refined domestically. The
combined impact of these factors will be to reduce heavy sour crude exports from
1.1 mb/d in 2023 to potentially just 130 kb/d by 2030.

In Latin America, refinery capacity will increase by 130 kb/d, driven solely by
Brazil, closely aligning with the region's demand growth of around 100 kb/d.
However, regional crude supply will significantly outpace refinery demand, as an
additional 2 mb/d of production from Guyana, Argentina and Brazil comes online.
Despite refining capacity increases, the region will remain in a net product importer
through the forecast.

In Brazil, the Abreu e Lima Refinery (RNEST) Train 1 is operational, with a

proposed modernisation project set to expand capacity from 115 kb/d to 130 kb/d
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

by late 2024. The long-stalled Train 2 addition, which had been on hold since
2015, is now progressing and expected to come online by 2028. This expansion
aligns with Brazil’s stricter air pollution control programme for on-road heavy-duty
and utility vehicles, transforming existing refineries and improving diesel quality.
These refineries will combine with a growing biofuels sector to cut Brazil’s
domestic diesel and gasoline import requirements by nearly 250 kb/d by 2030.

Americas crude oil balances

Net crude and condensate exports from the Americas are projected to rise from
4.6 mb/d in 2023 to 8 mb/d by 2030, an increase of 3.4 mb/d. North America's
contribution will be significant, with exports rising to 3.6 mb/d by 2030, driven
mainly by increased US and Canadian production.

Heavy crude exports from Canada and South America, 2012-2030

Canadian dilbit export destinations South America heavy crude available for
export
mb/d

mb/d

3.5 4.5 4.5

mb/d
4.0 4.0
3.0
3.5
3.5
2.5 3.0
3.0 2.5
2.0 2.5 2.0
1.5 2.0 1.5
1.5 1.0
1.0 0.5
1.0
0.0
0.5 0.5 -0.5
0.0 0.0 -1.0
2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2012 2016 2020 2024 2028

Venezuela Mexico
United States China Columbia Ecuador
Other Americas (RHS)*

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Other Americas includes Brazil, Guyana and Argentina, which produce predominantly light to medium grades.

The complexity and preferred crude slate of the US’ refining industry means that
it remains structurally short of heavy crude. Nevertheless, the United States will
narrow its volumetric crude deficit from 3 mb/d in 2023 to just under 1 mb/d by
2030 due to an additional 1.1 mb/d in crude production and our assumption that
crude runs decline over the period to 2030. This will push more light sweet crude
to export markets.

The start-up of the TMX pipeline expansion noted above and the reduction in
Mexico’s crude export volumes present a challenge to US Gulf Coast and
Midcontinent refineries. US heavy crude markets will be considerably tighter after
these changes and, given regional refinery configurations and the prevalence of
coking capacity, the USGC will still need to import substantial volumes of
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

alternative heavy sour crude supplies. Latin America's growing crude surplus,
driven by rising production in Brazil, Argentina and Guyana, is expected to
increase by 1.7 mb/d to reach 4.5 mb/d by 2030. However, much of this is
insufficiently heavy to be of practical use and will likely meet the Asian crude
deficit. However, some heavier crudes could also address the gap in the US Gulf
Coast. The re-emergence of better-supplied fuel oil markets, as Middle Eastern
power burn drops towards the end of the decade, may provide the USGC with an
opportunity to boost upgrading unit feed rates.

European demand downturn slashes refinery runs

Refining developments in Europe

European refinery runs are expected to decline by 1.5 mb/d from 2023 to 2030,
in line with the reduction in refined products demand. As a result, close to 1.5 mb/d
of refinery capacity will be at risk of closure. Since 2010, Europe has consistently
shut refinery capacity, at an annual average rate of 220 kb/d. The Covid-19
demand shock led to the rationalisation of 650 kb/d of capacity during 2020 and
2021, and between 2024 and 2025 refiners will shut an additional 480 kb/d of
capacity. Eni closed its 120 kb/d Livorno refinery earlier in 2024, while the UK’s
130 kb/d Grangemouth refinery will be converted to a biofuel facility in 2025. Next
year will also see BP close 80 kb/d of capacity at its Gelsenkirchen refinery while
Shell will reduce capacity at the Rhineland refinery by 150 kb/d.

European throughput versus product balances

Europe throughput vs demand
Europe product balance
16 1.5
mb/d
mb/d

15 1.0

0.5
14

0.0
13

-0.5
12
-1.0
11
-1.5

10
2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 -2.0
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Europe demand Europe throughput Diesel Kerosene Gasoline Naphtha Fuel oil

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Despite the closures, European refinery output remains very much misaligned with
regional demand, resulting in structural jet/kerosene and diesel imports and
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

gasoline exports. Over the past five years, Europe has exported nearly 500 kb/d
of gasoline to West Africa on average, often with lower quality supplies than
required in other markets. The ramp-up of Nigeria’s new refinery could accelerate
further European refinery closures if competition for this export market intensifies.

European crude oil balances

Europe’s crude deficit is expected to narrow from 9.2 mb/d in 2023 to 8.5 mb/d in
2030. Lower refinery runs (-1.1 mb/d) outpace the decline in crude production
(-350 kb/d). European refineries will continue to need to attract North American
and African crude to meet the shortfall versus production, all the more so given
the assumption that the Russian crude import ban remains in place.

FSU to ramp up refinery capacity and runs

Refining developments in FSU

Despite Russia’s current geopolitical challenges, the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
is expected to see a net increase of 120 kb/d in refinery capacity from 2023 to
2030. Refinery crude runs will gain 320 kb/d over the same period, driven by oil
products demand growth of 340 kb/d and our assumption that Russian utilisation
rates normalise post-2025.

FSU seaborne crude exports to key regions, 2018-2024

2018 Americas

2019
China

2020
European Union

2021
India

2022
Non-EU Eur
2023
OECD Asia Oceania
2024*
Other Asia
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other
mb/d

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: 2024 includes data through to end-May 2024. Other includes unknown destinations and volumes in transit.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Kpler.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

The region maintains a surplus in both crude and refined products. However,
Western sanctions have forced many countries to replace Russian supplies with
alternative sources, resulting in a challenging export market for both Russian
crude and refined products. Longer term, while the domestic market remains well
supplied, the exportable crude surplus contracts due to the impact of sanctions
and voluntary OPEC+ cuts. Regional exports of crude and refined products will be
400 kb/d lower, albeit at a still respectable 8.6 mb/d.

In 2024 Ukrainian drone strikes at Russian refineries reportedly caused damage

to more than a dozen facilities and targeted several more. Cumulatively, these
attacks affected over 2 mb/d of gross refinery capacity by mid-year. Despite
Western sanctions, international oil markets still rely heavily on Russian exports
of diesel, naphtha, and jet fuel, while Asian refining systems absorb significant
amounts of Russia’s straight-run and cracked residue for upgrading unit
feedstocks. In theory, the return of these refineries to service may have been
hindered by international sanctions imposed by the west, which restrict access to
equipment and refining technology. Nevertheless, Russia's refining system is
large enough to mitigate some of these outages by deferring planned maintenance
or increasing runs elsewhere within the system. However, at the time of writing,
the full extent of the disruption caused by these attacks remains unclear, with
reports that Russian crude processing has been only minimally disrupted.

By 2026, Russia's capacity is set to grow by 50 kb/d with the expansion of the
Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov Oblast. In other parts of the FSU, Turkmenistan
will see a 20 kb/d expansion at its Seydi refinery, Kazakhstan will expand its
Ordabasy refinery by 40 kb/d, and Tajikistan will add 10 kb/d at the Danghara
refinery.

FSU crude oil balances

The FSU’s net export position remains stable over the balance of the decade. Net
crude exports drop from 6.7 mb/d in 2023 to 6.3 mb/d in 2030 and is largely based
on the assumption that continued OPEC+ cuts will impact shipments. Russia’s
mainly sour crude has a limited number of export markets in the Atlantic Basin due
to Western sanctions, but the country has secured new markets in Asia, mainly
India and China. A further drag on Russian crude exports comes from increased
domestic refinery runs, assuming a return to normal operating rates post-2025.
Consequently, Russian crude surplus volumes are expected to fall from 5.1 mb/d
in 2023 to 4.7 mb/d by 2030.
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African refinery capacity rises to meet stronger demand

Refining developments in Africa

In Africa, refinery capacity is on track to increase by 750 kb/d over the forecast
period, largely in line with the expected growth in refined product demand
(+840 kb/d). However, the continent remains heavily dependent on product
imports. The inauguration of the 650 kb/d Dangote refinery in Nigeria marks a
significant turning point for the region. While still in its start-up phase, the facility
is expected to be fully operational in 2025. Additionally, in Ghana, Sentuo Oil
Refinery Ltd. (SORL) commissioned Phase 1 of its grassroots refinery in Tema in
January. This refinery, capable of processing 40 kb/d of crude oil, is part of
Ghana's industrialisation agenda to boost the domestic economy and reduce
reliance on imported petroleum products. Despite these developments, by 2030
Africa will still require nearly 2.3 mb/d in imported products to meet growing
domestic demand, of which close to 60% will be diesel.

Africa crude oil balances

North Africa, with declining upstream production, will see its net crude oil exports
shrink by 140 kb/d to 1.6 mb/d by 2030. Europe currently processes much of the
region’s excess light sweet crude but African production faces tough competition
from the Americas and on the margin some supplies may head to East of Suez
markets.

Similarly, West African net crude exports will shrink in the coming years, as the
Dangote refinery reaches full capacity. However, the question remains whether
Nigeria will divert domestic production to this plant, or if the country will opt to
import increasing volumes of US light sweet crude or Russian Urals. Early crude
trade indicate that it is more cost-effective to land US WTI crude in Nigeria and
maintain exports of Nigerian grades to international markets.

East of Suez markets dominate refinery capacity growth

Refining developments East of Suez

Regions East of Suez account for the vast majority of demand growth as well as
refinery capacity growth through 2030. Consequently, the crude deficit East of
Suez is expected to grow from 4.9 mb/d in 2023 to 7.7 mb/d by 2030. It will be met
by increased supplies from the Atlantic Basin, including from Russia.

In the face of OPEC+ production management the East of Suez is expected to

see upstream output fall by 550 kb/d, with Middle East gains of 400 kb/d, driven
largely by increased condensate production, more than offset by falling Asian
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

supply. This pace of supply growth lags the region’s 2.5 mb/d growth in demand
for crude. Asia drives much of this increase, as its deficit rises by 2.3 mb/d, from
24.5 mb/d to 26.8 mb/d by 2030. Asian refinery throughputs are projected to
increase by 1.4 mb/d, while regional upstream production falls by 900 kb/d through
to 2030.

Regional crude balances: Atlantic Basin surplus fills Asia’s crude deficit, 2019-2030
30
mb/d

Atlantic Basin
(ex-Russia)
25

20 Russia

15

Middle East
10

5
Asian Crude
Deficit
0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0

Middle East capacity additions slow by mid-decade

Refining developments
The Middle East stands as the leading exporter of crude oil and refined products,
a trend that is expected to continue. Over the next seven years, refinery capacity
will expand by 630 kb/d, accounting for 23% of total capacity additions East of
Suez. Growth is driven by extensive construction and modernisation projects
aimed at producing fuels that meet higher international standards. Refinery runs
are projected to surge by 1.2 mb/d over the forecast period, with utilisation rates
climbing by close to 6%, as recently added capacity becomes fully operational.

Since 2022, the Middle East has added 1.5 mb/d of new capacity that is now
nearing full utilisation. Coupled with voluntary OPEC+ production cuts, crude
exports are projected to fall by around 300 kb/d over the 2023-2030 period. In
2024, the combined impact of higher runs and OPEC+ agreements and voluntary
production cuts will reduce crude exports by 1.1 mb/d y-o-y, while refined product
exports rise by over 550 kb/d. Nonetheless, the total balance of crude,
condensate, NGLs and products is projected to grow by 1.4 mb/d by 2030, with
5.5 mb/d of refined products and 17.2 mb/d of crude exported.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Middle East refining throughput and product balances, 2012-2030

14 4

mb/d
mb/d

12
3
10

8
2
6

4
1
2

0 0
2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2012 2016 2020 2024 2028

Total refining capacity Crude Throughput LPG Light and middle distillates

IEA. CC BY 4.0

Capacity developments include the modernisation of Bahrain's Sitra refinery that

will result in a 110 kb/d increase in CDU capacity upon completion in 2026. The
project aims to improve energy efficiency and produce cleaner products to meet
stringent environmental standards, including enabling diesel to conform to
ultra-low sulphur international specifications.

Iran will boost its condensate refining by 180 kb/d, including 60 kb/d at the Siraf
refinery and an additional 120 kb/d splitter at the Persian Gulf Star refinery by
2026. Iraq plans to expand its refining capacity by 320 kb/d, driven by government
mandates to improve the quality of its refinery production and transition towards
exporting refined products. This includes a 70 kb/d expansion at the Basra refinery
in 2025 and the revival of a 150 kb/d CDU tower at Baiji in the north, which was
damaged by the Islamic State in 2014, bringing its capacity back to 290 kb/d.
Saudi Arabia's Jubail refinery will see a 20 kb/d expansion in 2024. However, the
Yanbu crude to chemicals project, has stalled at the preliminary study phase and
has been pushed out beyond this report’s forecast timeline.

Despite crude and condensate exports falling from 18.5 mb/d in 2022, to 17.6 mb/d
in 2023, and our expectation that they will decline to 17.2 mb/d by 2030, the Middle
East remains the largest source of crude exports to fill the Asian deficit.

China
By 2030, Chinese refining capacity is expected to rise by 900 kb/d to 19 mb/d.
However, crude runs are forecast to lag this increase, gaining just over 400 kb/d,
as surging import volumes of petrochemical feedstocks bridge the gap versus
forecast demand growth of 1.4 mb/d. The increase of 900 kb/d in naphtha and
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

LPG/ethane imports account for the bulk of the additional product supply
requirements. At the same time, a surplus of transport fuels, particularly for
gasoline, will grow as EV market penetration increases in China and gasoline
demand falls.

Chinese capacity changes and demand for refined products, 2016-2030

Refining capacity changes Demand for refined products
1.6 20
mb/d

mb/d
1.4 18

1.2 16
14
1.0
12
0.8
10
0.6
8
0.4
6
0.2 4
0.0 2
-0.2 0
2016-19 2020-23 2024-27 2028-30* 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030
proposed
Coastal Landlocked Transport fuels Other Petrochemical feedstocks

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The pace at which China is building refineries is slowing. Announced closures also
weigh on capacity growth and from 2027 there are no major projects within our
forecast. In our timeframe, the annual average net addition of around 130 kb/d is
sharply lower than the 300 kb/d annual average witnessed over the past decade.

Furthermore, the Chinese government has set a minimum size for new oil
refineries and will ban small crude processors that claim to be speciality chemicals
or bitumen producers under its plan to limit total capacity to 20 mb/d by 2025.
China retains on paper a large swathe of spare capacity. Having averaged nearly
4 mb/d over the five years prior to Covid, spare capacity now stands at 3.5 mb/d
as smaller refineries have been shut. We expect the level of spare capacity to
remain close to current levels by 2030, leaving little room for additional projects.

Independent refiners in the Shandong region are already feeling the pinch.
Allocated crude import quotas are insufficient to meet the needs of all refiners, and
this has left some unable to fully utilise their capacity. Moreover, as state-owned
firms decrease their purchases of products from the independent refineries in
Shandong, this further weighs on the run rates for the independent sector. As a
result, 370 kb/d of independent capacity is slated to close.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Chinese refinery additions, 2012-2030

mb/d 2.5

2.0

1.5 Southwest China

South Central China
1.0 Northwest China
North China
0.5 Northeast China
East China
0.0

-0.5
2012-2015 2016-2019 2020-2023 2024-2027 2028-2030*
proposed

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The large-scale Yulong refinery should begin operations in mid-H2 2024 and will
process up to 430 kb/d. Additionally, Saudi Aramco and Norinco's integrated
petrochemical facility in Panjin will add 320 kb/d of crude distillation and is set to
come online in 2026, marking the last world-scale refinery before 2030. Expansion
projects at existing refineries include Sinopec's Zhenhai refinery, which will
expand by 260 kb/d to reach a capacity of 800 kb/d. CNOOC’s Daxie
petrochemical refinery will expand by 120 kb/d to 260 kb/d, with a further 160 kb/d
increase likely to be completed post-2030.

Sinopec is also consolidating operations at two refineries in the Hunan province,

merging its Changling and Yueyang plants and will reduce capacity by a net
100 kb/d to a combined 200 kb/d. This is part of an ongoing reform of state-owned
assets to enhance efficiencies and increase petrochemical capacity through
integrated refinery and petrochemical operations.

China represents the lion’s share of Asia’s crude deficit, with a shortfall of
11.7 mb/d by 2030, an increase of almost 700 kb/d from 2023. However, India's
import needs will grow by nearly 1 mb/d, from 4.6 mb/d to 5.6 mb/d, driven by
aggressive refinery expansion programmes that add 1 mb/d in crude processing
capacity.

OECD Asia Oceania

In OECD Asia Oceania, refinery activity is set to decline, with no new projects or
expansions announced. The anticipated decrease in the region’s demand is
poised to trigger further shutdowns, leading to a drop in throughput rates of around
200 kb/d over the forecast period. The refinery system utilisation is forecast to
drop by just under 2% while capacity drops by 120 kb/d to 6.9 mb/d by 2030. The
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

OECD Asia region will continue to be a net crude and product importer even as
demand falls. This exacerbates the growing need for refined products across Asia.
Notably, OECD Asia Oceania is expected to continue to need around 1.2 mb/d of
refined product imports over the forecast period.

Japan will see its demand for refined products decline by nearly 270 kb/d by 2030.
Japanese refineries, primarily built for domestic fuel needs, struggle to compete
internationally due to their lower scale and complexity compared to newer Asian
refineries. This, coupled with the processing of lighter, more expensive crude oil
and yielding lower-value products, puts them at a competitive disadvantage. The
closure of the 120 kb/d Yamaguchi refinery in Q1 2024 brings the cumulative loss
in capacity to 1.7 mb/d since 2006. This represents a cut of one-third of the
industry’s peak almost 20 years ago.

By contrast, Korea, with relatively stable demand and a refining industry deeply
integrated with the domestic petrochemicals industry, stands as the only net
exporting country in the region. However, it remains heavily reliant on imports of
LPG, ethane and naphtha to fuel its petrochemical sector. Despite this, the overall
surplus in refined products is expected to grow by 100 kb/d to reach more than
500 kb/d by 2030, alleviating the region's deficit in transportation fuels by nearly
300 kb/d.

Indian refineries set for continued growth

India's refining sector has established itself as a reliable global supplier of light and
middle distillates while effectively meeting domestic demand. The forecast through
to 2030 shows continued growth with several large-scale capacity expansions.
Despite facing competition from the Middle East Gulf export refineries, Indian
operators are gearing up to maintain their international product supply role, albeit
with the challenge of decarbonising operations to reduce emissions. This requires
substantial investment, including integrating low-carbon hydrogen and renewable
energy sources. Macroeconomic and social drivers, along with initiatives, such as
Make In India, are expected to propel demand growth for jet fuel, gasoline, diesel,
and petrochemicals. However, government programmes such as the 20% ethanol
blending mandate and the rise of electric vehicles may temper gasoline demand
growth in the coming years, potentially increasing export volumes. Nevertheless,
sustained GDP per capita growth and urbanisation are anticipated to drive robust
increases in overall demand, ensuring continued vitality for India's refining industry.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Indian refinery output and refined product demand, 2012-2030

Product Balance Refinery Output
7 4
mb/d

mb/d
6
3
5

4
2
3

2 1
1

0 0

Refinery output Product demand Fuel oil LPG Other Light distillates Middle distillates

IEA. CC BY 4.0

India witnessed a remarkable surge in its refining capacity over the past few
decades, with close to 3 mb/d in growth from 2006 to 2023. With a total refining
capacity of 5.8 mb/d, India has firmly established itself as the fourth largest refiner
worldwide. Recent expansions have been the result of investments in refining
infrastructure as well as refiners' strategic pivot towards integrating
petrochemicals. Currently, India has 23 operating refineries, with plans for further
expansions, including one new greenfield project and multiple modernisation
projects expected to add 1 mb/d of distillation capacity by 2030.

Indian refinery capacity growth, 2006-2030

8
mb/d

7
ONGC

6 Nayara
MRPL
5 HPCL
CPCL
4
NRL
3 BPCL
IOCL
2
Reliance
1

0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Indian Oil Corp. Ltd (IOCL), aims to enhance its capacity by 400 kb/d by 2030, with
ambitious projects underway at its Panipat, Barauni, Koyali, and Digboi refineries.
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd (HPCL) will bring on the latest greenfield project in
Rajasthan's Barmer, adding 180 kb/d, alongside an expansion at the Visakh
refinery for 70 kb/d. Additionally, Chennai Petroleum Corp. Ltd (CPCL) and
Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL) are undergoing substantial expansions,
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

contributing 300 kb/d to India's refinery capacity growth. Furthermore, Bharat

Petroleum Corp. Ltd (BPCL) will add 130 kb/d in capacity across its refineries.
Despite these expansions, challenges persist, such as land acquisition which are
creating hurdles to further growth. Completion of projects, such as the 1.2 mb/d
Ratnagiri Refinery project, currently lies beyond the 2030 time frame, unless rapid
progress can be made in reaching a final investment decision.
Over the past decade, India has also emerged as the world's second-largest net
crude oil importer, next to China, with average imports of 4.6 mb/d in 2023. We
expect imports to increase by a further 1 mb/d by 2030.
Despite India's strong export potential for light and middle distillates in the coming
years, the country will face a growing shortfall in LPG supplies, as rising domestic
demand for petrochemical feedstocks and the extension of the government’s clean
cooking initiative boosts demand and requires increased imports. India’s refiners
will be unable to adjust yields sufficiently to compensate. However, the availability
of cheap ethane and propane from the United States and the Middle East presents
an opportunity for India. Petrochemical capacity expansions are a recurring theme
across the industry, highlighting the ongoing need for efficient and cost-effective
feedstock supplies.

Other Asia
The remainder of Other Asia (Asia less India, China and OECD Asia Oceania) is
expected to see growing dependence on product imports. Refining capacity will
inch up by just 330 kb/d by 2030 to 7.5 mb/d, while refinery runs are projected to
rise by 270 kb/d to 5.5 mb/d by 2030. Demand will grow by 1.4 mb/d to 10.2 mb/d,
increasing the region’s reliance on imports. Consequently, the net crude import
requirement deepens from 3.7 mb/d in 2023 to 4.4 mb/d by 2030.

Efforts to expand and upgrade existing refineries to meet international fuel

standards will provide some relief. Indonesia's Balikpapan refinery is set to
increase its crude distillation capacity by 100 kb/d during 2025, while Thailand will
complete its 125 kb/d Sriracha facility in 2026. Brunei's plans for Phase II at the
Pulau Muara Besar refinery include a 55 kb/d expansion, expected to come online
in 2029. Smaller upgrades in Mongolia and Viet Nam will add another 50 kb/d.
Despite these improvements, Asian countries will continue to rely heavily on
imports of gasoline, naphtha, ethane, and LPG due to population and economic
growth, coupled with an expanding petrochemical industry.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Refinery runs in Other Asia versus demand for refined products, 2020-2030

12 5.0
mb/d

4.5 Demand for

10 refined
4.0 products
3.5
8
3.0
Throughput
6 2.5
2.0
4
1.5
1.0 Import
2 balance
0.5 (RHS)
0 0.0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Excludes China and India and OECD Asia. Demand excludes CTL/GTL, additives and biofuels.

Product balances and trade

Asian demand tightens product balances
Throughout the outlook period rising product exports from the Atlantic Basin,
sustained by the United States, are forecast to head East of Suez to meet higher
Asian demand. Middle East net exports of fuel oil and LPG surge post-2027 as
falling regional demand and increased refinery and NGL fractionation plant output
boost supplies to international markets.

Regional balances for total refined products, 2023-2030

Africa
China
Europe 2030
FSU
India
Middle East
OECD Asia Oceania
Other Americas
Other Asia 2023
Other N.America
United States

-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0

mb/d

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Regions that currently have large product import requirements, including Europe,
China, OECD Asia Oceania and Latin America, will all see their deficits increase
by 2030. This widening of product import needs in structurally short product
markets will increase global product trade and provide room for higher exports
from the Middle East and the United States.

Global product balances diverge as gasoline demand contracts, 2023-2030

Growth in demand for refined products Change in product balances

mb/d

1.8 1.8

mb/d
1.4 1.4
1.0 1.0
0.6 0.6
0.2 0.2
-0.2 -0.2
-0.6 -0.6
-1.0 -1.0
-1.4 -1.4
-1.8 -1.8
2023-2030 2023-2030

Ethane LPG Naphtha Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Fuel oil

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

The most important shift at the product level will be the emergence of a gasoline
market surplus. Despite the positive baseline revisions to gasoline demand in
2022 and 2023, and a stronger economic outlook in the short term, rising EV
penetration and increased biofuels supply in the coming years tip the balance into
heavy oversupply. To counter the impact of these changes we have assumed
global average gasoline yields will decline 1.3% by the end of the decade.

This potential surplus has important implications for the gasoline market’s ability
to absorb naphtha supplies via blending and a knock-on impact on how fierce
competition will be in the petrochemical feedstock market.

Rising NGL production should ensure that the LPG market remains very well
supplied and this will intensify competition with ex-refinery naphtha within the
petrochemical feedstock market. However, the overall light ends balance is
expected to improve by 2030 as the cumulative demand growth of 2.5 mb/d
catches up with this supply growth.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

Regional light distillate market balances, 2023 and 2030

Africa
China
Europe 2030
FSU
India
Middle East
OECD Asia Oceania
Other Americas
Other Asia 2023
Other N.America
United States

-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

mb/d

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Conversely, despite lifting global jet/kerosene yields back to, and in some cases
above, pre-Covid levels, the continued growth in jet fuel demand amounting to a
cumulative 1.2 mb/d over the forecast period will re-establish tight market
conditions for aviation fuels by the end of the decade. This pull from kerosene in
the middle distillate market will potentially tighten diesel markets and sustain
competition between these grades as refineries respond to stronger middle
distillate cracks. However, on a global level we see diesel supplies as better
balanced than last year for the period through to 2028.

Total oil product exports for key regions, 2018-2030

6
mb/d

4 United States

Middle East
3
FSU

0
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

Fuel oil markets will shift from being tight to being well supplied, despite ongoing
growth in bunker demand. The decline in residual fuel oil use for power generation
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

in the Middle East could dampen demand as soon as next year. While this may
weigh on fuel oil cracks, in a world where heavy sour crude production remains
constrained, we expect refineries to be willing buyers of heavy feedstocks that can
be used to boost upgrading unit utilisation.

In geographical terms, the United States and the Middle East will continue to
dominate product export growth, much as it has done for the past 10 years. By
contrast, Asia’s dependence on oil products is projected to increase by a
cumulative 2.7 mb/d between 2023-2030.

Americas product trade balances

In the Atlantic Basin, the United States is expected to maintain its position as the
largest net exporter of refined products, with Canada's surplus nearly offsetting
Mexico's deficit. As a result, the change in North America’s trade balances will
effectively be entirely driven by the United States.

North American refined product balances, 2023-2030

Growth in product output Growth in demand for refined products Change in product balances
1.5 1.0
1.0
mb/d
mb/d

mb/d

1.0 0.5 0.8

0.0 0.6
0.5
-0.5 0.4
0.0
-1.0 0.2

-0.5 -1.5 0.0

-1.0 -2.0 -0.2

2023-2030 2023-2030 2023-2030

LPG & Ethane Naphtha Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Fuel oil

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

US oil products exports are forecast to grow by 1.3 mb/d to 5 mb/d, primarily due
to declining demand eclipsing reduced refinery runs. The growth in refined product
exports is also propelled by the rise in NGL output, boosting exports of LPG,
ethane, and naphtha by approximately 500 kb/d. The increase in LPG flows will
help to meet the growing import requirements seen in China and India due to the
expansion of the petrochemical industry and the latter nation’s clean cooking
initiative. The surplus in gasoline stemming from the decline in demand contributes
around 600 kb/d.

Similarly, North American exports of diesel are forecast to increase by nearly

500 kb/d over the next seven years, driven by the United States. Given the
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

structural net import position of Europe, especially in the absence of Russian

supplies, US exports will likely find healthy demand against the backdrop of a
supportive global balance.

Conversely, gasoline exports are expected to face tougher competition in the

Atlantic Basin. Rising Mexican domestic supplies following the start of the Dos
Bocas refinery will cut import needs. Similarly, Latin American gasoline imports
are expected to diminish slightly by the end of the decade, as are West African
needs, once Nigeria’s Dangote refinery is fully operational. With US domestic
demand for refined gasoline expected to fall by a cumulative 1.6 mb/d over the
2023-2030 time frame, we think that US refineries, even as they enact a 3% yield
shift in favour of diesel, will still have an additional 600 kb/d of gasoline exports by
2030, assuming that runs are 900 kb/d lower by then.

Europe product trade balances

European refined product import requirements are forecast to remain at around
1.1 mb/d on average over the rest of the decade. In part, this reflects the
assumption that refinery activity declines keep pace with the decrease in demand,
resulting in relatively stable imports. The largest change to regional refined product
balances is driven by the rapid contraction in European diesel demand, which
drops by 1 mb/d. Lower crude runs drive the reduction in Europe’s diesel output,
but this is outpaced by the demand contraction.

European diesel imports by source, 2017-2024

1 200 60%
mb/d

1 000 50%

800 40%

600 30%

400 20%

200 10%

0 0%
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

FSU Middle East Americas Asia Other East of Suez share (RHS)

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Kpler.

Consequently, we expect net diesel imports to decline by 580 kb/d, to around

700 kb/d by 2030. Nevertheless, the loss of Russian product supplies has forced
the region to import a greater share from the Middle East and the United States.
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

North America’s rising diesel export volumes might account for the majority of
Europe’s import needs by 2030.

Middle East product trade balances

Refined products balances East of Suez will be driven by increased Middle East
refining activity and Asia’s burgeoning net product import needs. The Middle East
serves as the world’s largest product exporting hub and is expected to remain so
through to 2030. Refined product exports will surge by 1.7 mb/d over the forecast
period, pushing the surplus available to export up to 5.8 mb/d. Rising NGL
production should boost the LPG exports by 500 kb/d by 2030. Similarly, the full
impact of recent refining additions will increase supplies of naphtha, jet fuel and
diesel. In contrast to other regions, these additions will also lift exports of fuel oil,
as will Saudi Arabia’s shift away from fuel oil in power generation.

Asia product trade balances

Asia remains a net importer of both crude and products, although Korea and
Brunei are both net product exporters. Asia’s resilient economic growth and rising
demand point to substantial increases in imports. Light and middle distillates make
up the bulk of the import requirements and we expect volumes to grow by a
combined total of nearly 1 mb/d. LPG and ethane import needs will also increase,
deepening regional dependence on volumes from the Middle East and North
America by more than 800 kb/d by the end of the decade.

India is forecast to remain a net exporter of middle distillates throughout the

forecast period, as rising refining activity keeps pace with increases of 500 kb/d in
diesel and 100 kb/d in jet fuel demand. However, stronger demand growth
forecasts for gasoline (+170 kb/d in 2023-2030) and LPG are likely to push the
country into net product importer status by 2030. Petrochemical sector expansions
as well as the ongoing expansion of the clean cooking initiative lift LPG demand.
Despite aggressive steps taken by the refining industry in terms of capacity
additions and infrastructure development, it is likely to fail to match the rapid
growth in demand over the forecast period. For India to sustain its net product
exporter status, growth in refining capacity needs to accelerate beyond the 1 mb/d
contained in our forecast to meet its demand growth of 1.2 mb/d. LPG export
length from the United States and Middle East, will make up for the shortfall in
Asia.

China is set to remain the largest refiner globally, but the continued need to import
petrochemical feedstocks, namely LPG, ethane, and naphtha, weigh on the
overall product trade balance. Middle distillate exports contract marginally by the
end of the decade, while exports of gasoline are expected to grow by 570 kb/d, to
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Oil 2024 Refining and trade

roughly 700 kb/d by 2030. However, imports requirements of naphtha, LPG and
ethane could increase by 900 kb/d to 2.5 mb/d

Against the backdrop of a tight middle distillate market, the loss of Chinese export
volumes will push Asian markets to bid for additional middle distillate exports from
the Middle East and the Atlantic Basin. Conversely, the prospect of an
oversupplied gasoline market could make the increase in gasoline export
potentially problematic. Consequently, we see the potential for further yield shifts
by Chinese refineries to more closely align output with the domestic petrochemical
industry’s feedstock requirements. This could boost naphtha and jet fuel yields at
the expense of gasoline and diesel yields, respectively.

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Oil 2024 Natural Gas Liquids

Natural Gas Liquids

Global summary
Sustained growth ahead for ethane and LPG markets
Global NGLs production is on track to rise by 1.9 mb/d in the 2023-2030 outlook
period as liquified petroleum gas (LPG) and ethane markets continue to expand.
LPG growth is driven by stronger demand in petrochemicals and clean cooking
while ethane is supported by rising petrochemical industries in countries that
produce it as well as importers seeking low-cost feedstocks, particularly China.
Over the previous decade, NGLs output rose by 50% to 12.7 mb/d in 2023 but
growth will slow to 1.9% per year through 2030, reaching 14.6 mb/d.

From 2023 to 2030, overall ethane production rises 825 kb/d, with the Middle East
and United States accounting for almost 90% of growth. With ethane trade
expected to expand by nearly 20% by 2030, incremental shipping and terminal
capacity will be needed. LPG demand grows by 1.7 mb/d between 2023 and 2030,
mainly in markets East of Suez, while supply increases by a smaller 1.3 mb/d, of
which just over 60% is from East of Suez markets.

NGLs – the fastest growing segment of fossil liquids production

Natural gas liquids accompany gas production, either from dedicated gas wells (in
which liquids are present in a gaseous phase) or as associated gas from liquids
producing wells (crude or condensate). In the decade to 2023, the share of NGLs
in overall fossil liquids production has risen from 10% to just over 13%. The steady
progression reflects shifts in the weighting of crude production to regions with
lighter and gassier qualities, such as US shale oil production, as well as the
growing market for natural gas, much of which has been met by the expansion of
shale gas production in North America that is typically richer in gas liquids.

Natural gas at the wellhead consists of methane and numerous smaller fractions of
heavier hydrocarbons and other components. These include ethane, propane,
normal butane and isobutane, natural gasoline (C5+), acid gases (such as carbon
dioxide, hydrogen sulphide or mercaptans), other gases (nitrogen and helium) as
well as water. Before entering a distribution pipeline or a liquefaction facility, raw
natural gas must be processed to meet the desired specifications by extracting
components such as NGLs and other pollutants. These specifications may also
require calibration of the pipeline gas to a specific calorific value (megajoule (MJ)
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Oil 2024 Natural Gas Liquids

per standard cubic metre). Sweetening/acid removal processes eliminates the acid
gases. Marketable gas typically only has a few percent of NGLs and other gases.

Beyond meeting appropriate market specifications for natural gas, these liquids
have their own values in separate markets which are generally much higher than
the value of their energy (MJ) content. However, ethane is frequently returned to
the gas stream when its market value falls below its Btu value in the natural gas
pool. This may reflect a surplus of supply versus demand for ethane-based
petrochemical feedstocks, where that exists, or an absence of any demand. Due
to disparities in densities between the different molecules that make up the pool
of NGLs, supply and demand estimated in volume differs from that in tonnes or
terajoules (TJ).

Typical gas processing plant flow

Source: Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0, as modified by the IEA.

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Oil 2024 Natural Gas Liquids

At a global level, around 0.11 TJ of NGLs are produced for every TJ of natural gas
marketed, up from 0.09 a decade ago. This outlook sees a steady increase of that
ratio to 0.125 in 2030 (versus the WEO STEPS outlook for natural gas production).
More NGLs extraction reflects greater efforts to capture the value of these liquids
as well as increases in the liquids-rich share of gas production. The elimination of
gas flaring should also favour higher NGLs output, whether the methane goes to
a gas market or is reinjected to maintain well pressure.

This ratio of NGLs to natural gas production varies from country to country. In low
ratio cases, the gas may be very dry, with only a small cut of liquids in the wet gas
at the wellhead. It may also reflect low or no extraction of ethane in the NGL mix
in the absence of access to buyers or markets. An above average ratio appears
in countries having a high proportion of liquids in gas at the wellhead. It also
reflects associated gas producers where the dry gas (after removing NGLs) is
reinjected in the oil well (to maintain well pressure) or is flared (having no market
or use). Good examples of countries with such high ratios include Saudi Arabia
(0.48), the UAE (0.39), Kuwait (0.36) and Iraq (0.51).

Global NGL production was 12.7 mb/d in 2023, or roughly 13% of overall fossil
liquids production on a volume basis. Over the past decade output has risen by
50% from 8.5 mb/d in 2013. We forecast growth to slow to 1.9% per year from
2023, pushing NGL supply to 14.6 mb/d in 2030. Nevertheless, the share of NGLs
in production continues to rise, reaching 14.5% in 2030. At the same time, growth
in crude and condensate output slows to 0.3% per year, declining slightly by 2030.

Three countries account for 70% of NGL output and its growth. The United States
is the largest producer at 6.4 mb/d in 2023, or 50% of the global total, and similarly
leads growth through 2030, to reach 7.3 mb/d. Saudi Arabia produces 1.4 mb/d of
NGLs, or 11% of the global total, but will account for over 30% of growth in the
coming years and reach 1.9 mb/d, or 13% of global supply. This reflects the
development of the Jafurah gas field that is expected to start production in 2025.
Canadian NGL production will rise from 1.1 mb/d in 2023 (8% of global supply) to
1.3 mb/d in 2030.

Of the remaining 30% of global supply, production in the UAE rises from 550 kb/d
in 2023 (4.3% of world) to 615 kb/d in 2030. Output remains flat for Iran at around
500 kb/d (3.5%) while Qatar increases from 360 kb/d in 2023 (3%) to 610 kb/d in
2030 (4%). Another 10% of production is spread amongst a smattering of
producers amounting to 1-2% each for Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Iraq, Kuwait,
Mexico, Norway, and Thailand.
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Ethane markets
China, the United States and Saudi Arabia drive petrochemical
feedstock growth
Ethane generally holds a superior valuation relative the natural gas stream from
which it is extracted. Without that, there is no reason to extract the ethane. Global
trade today comprises just one major exporter (the United States) and a few major
importers including China, India and Northwest Europe, while Canada imports
ethane by pipeline from the US Northeast.

National data on ethane production and use is not always reliable. Trade data and
ethane demand (based on the existence of ethane-based steam crackers as used
in the demand section of this report) help to assess the actual production and use
for each country. In some cases, it may well overlook ethane/propane mixtures for
the petrochemical sector (typically 10-20% ethane) where crackers have the
necessary degree of flexibility, though this may not be public information.

Ethane demand and supply rise in parallel by 800 kb/d from 2023 to 2030.
Demand is dominated by a handful of countries where new ethane-based steam
cracker capacity is coming online.

The United States and Canada are major consumers, reflecting low-cost
production stripped from ample wet shale output and sold to local petrochemical
businesses. Canadian ethane demand rises from 245 kb/d in 2023 to 305 kb/d in
2030 (+60 kb/d) while US demand increases by 290 kb/d to 2.4 mb/d. Mexican
ethane use (85 kb/d) remains stable and is currently met from local supply, but
future imports may be required as domestic NGL production will fall by 60 kb/d
over the forecast period. In Latin America, both Brazil (37 kb/d) and Argentina
(30 kb/d) use local ethane supply.

In Europe, ethane use began in the United Kingdom and Norway but has
broadened to include Sweden and Belgium on the availability of competitive export
volumes from North America. The United Kingdom consumes 35 kb/d, of which
30 kb/d is from imports and Sweden uses 10 kb/d which is entirely from imports.
Norway consumes 45-50 kb/d, from imports since 2022 as local production has
been reinjected into the natural gas stream where it gains a higher value on an
energy basis in the European market. Imports to Belgium rise later this decade to
48 kb/d following investments to increase petrochemical feedstock flexibility.

The Middle East uses substantial volumes of ethane and exports none.
Saudi Arabia accounts for around half of these volumes (550 kb/d in 2023) while
Qatar (145 kb/d) and the UAE (185 kb/d) make up most of the rest. Availability of
low-cost feedstocks (ethane and LPG) has driven expansion of the petrochemical
industry in all these countries.
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Chinese demand rises from 225 kb/d in 2023 to 280 kb/d in 2030, fed mainly by
US exports. Indian demand is stable at around 140 kb/d, with roughly half met by
imports. Other Asian countries using ethane are Thailand (63 kb/d), Malaysia
(34 kb/d) and Australia (10 kb/d). In Africa, Egypt (20 kb/d) and Nigeria (10 kb/d)
also use ethane, as does Russia (50 kb/d), Turkmenistan (16 kb/d) and
Uzbekistan (17 kb/d).

From 2023 to 2030, overall ethane production rises 825 kb/d. Some 350 kb/d of
growth stems from the Middle East (170 kb/d in Saudi Arabia, 100 kb/d in Qatar,
45 kb/d in the UAE and 30 kb/d in Iran), about 380 kb/d from the United States
and around 60 kb/d in Canada.

Local supply meets demand growth in the Middle East, Latin America, the FSU
and North America while higher seaborne exports from the United States meet
evolving feedstock requirements elsewhere, driving an increase in trade.

Ethane demand and trade, 2012-2030

Ethane Demand Global Ethane Trade
2.5 - 600 600
kb/d
mb/d

2.0 - 500 500

- 400 400
1.5
- 300 300
1.0
- 200 200
0.5
- 100 100

0.0 0 0

US Middle East China Europe India China

India Canada Others Canada Others US (RHS)

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

US producers generate a substantial surplus that has been exported to

international markets since 2014. EU crackers initially purchased US ethane
exports, but rising volumes have attracted buyers in China and India. While
exports could be higher in the future, slower expansion in Chinese and Indian
ethane-based cracker capacity will limit US exports to around 565 kb/d at the end
of the decade (versus 470 kb/d in 2023).
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Oil 2024 Natural Gas Liquids

LPG markets
Supply lags demand growth by the end of the decade
The rapid expansion of NGL supply in recent years has boosted liquefied
petroleum gases availability, driving down its price as demand struggled to keep
pace. Around 40% of LPG comes from refineries and the rest from NGL
fractionation. Relatively low prices for LPG has created new markets in
petrochemicals, transportation fuels, heating and for cooking applications. The
demand section of this report details some of these trends, notably for
petrochemicals. Slightly less than one-third of all LPG supply globally goes to non-
energy uses as feedstocks for petrochemicals and just over 45% to residential
heating and cooking uses. Industry takes another 9%, road transport burns 7%
and agriculture 6% (mainly for drying crops).

This analysis considers overall LPG balances. But liquified petroleum gases
combine propane, normal butane (n-butane) and isobutane. Beyond use in
heating or as transport fuels, each molecule has specific applications in
petrochemicals and refining. Isobutane has an octane number of 100 and serves
as a gasoline octane enhancer, but also as a refrigerant and propellent. Gasoline
blenders and refiners use a few percent of low-cost n-butane to boost gasoline
volatility to improve ignition during cold weather. Butanes are also used in the
manufacture of MTBE, a key gasoline octane enhancer outside the United States
and Europe. Butylene used in the manufacture of synthetic rubber also require
butanes. Propane finds outlets as a petrochemical feedstock to produce ethylene
and propylene.

Overall LPG demand will grow by 1.7 mb/d between 2023 and 2030, two-thirds of
which in markets East of Suez. China accounts for 35% of global demand growth
(versus a market share of 23% today) and while the Middle East represents 8%
(versus 7%). Development of the petrochemical industry drives most of this
growth, but use in road transport, heating and cooking also increases. The latter
boosts African and Indian demand, which together account for 24% of global LPG
growth through 2030 as compared to a market share of just 13% in 2023. On the
other hand, growth lags market shares for North America (10% of growth versus
16% of market share), Europe (1.6% versus 10%) and Latin America (1.5% versus
5%) where stagnant or declining use in transportation, heating and cooking leaves
petrochemicals as the driver of moderate expansion.

Refinery output of marketable LPG (after refinery use in gasoline blending) grows
by 500 kb/d to 4.9 mb/d in 2030. Due to the continued development of refinery
capacity in the Middle East and Asia, countries East of Suez account for almost
all that increase (China 38%, India 9% and the Middle East as a whole 28%). The
contribution to overall LPG supply growth from refineries slightly lags its share in
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Oil 2024 Natural Gas Liquids

overall supply (37% versus 39%) but is central to meeting the development of
regional Asian demand. Refinery output of LPG in the Atlantic Basin stagnates as
expected refinery closures in Europe offset output from new capacity elsewhere.

Fractionator, or upstream, supply of LPG accounts for the bulk of growth to 2030,
rising 850 kb/d to 7.7 mb/d. Growth comes mainly from Canada (+140 kb/d), Qatar
(+120 kb/d), Saudi Arabia (+320 kb/d) and the United States (+420 kb/d). Minor
gains elsewhere (such as Argentina, Iraq and the UAE) are insufficient to offset
declines (as in India, Mexico, North Sea or Thailand) resulting in an overall decline
of 185 kb/d outside the four key producers.

LPG supply increases overall by 1.3 mb/d, of which 510 kb/d in the Atlantic Basin
and 830 kb/d East of Suez (reflecting the substantial contribution of refining in Asia
and the Middle East). Gains of 600 kb/d across the United States and Canada,
and more marginally Latin America, are offset by net losses elsewhere in the
Atlantic Basin, most notably 95 kb/d in Europe. Increases East of Suez are
dominated by the Middle East (+650 kb/d) as well as China (+185 kb/d) and India
(+25 kb/d). The Middle East accounts for 49% of global gains in LPG production,
a disproportionate share versus its 17% contribution to supply today. Incremental
supply from the United States and Canada combined (42% of global supply
growth) are also slightly ahead of their market share (39%), highlighting the
continued key role in meeting overall demand.

The combined production surplus of the United States and Canada rises steadily
from 2.7 mb/d in 2023 to 3.1 mb/d in 2030 as continued growth in production
outstrips demand gains centred on the petrochemical industry. However, the
Atlantic Basin deficit outside these two exporters increases from 1.3 mb/d in 2023
to 1.7 mb/d in 2030. Deficits increase in Africa (+220 kb/d), Europe (+110 kb/d)
and Mexico (+60 kb/d).

LPG supply and demand, 2012-2030

LPG supply LPG demand growth, 2023-2030
14 700
mb/d

kb/d

12 600
10
500
8
400
6
300
4
200
2
100
0
2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 2027 2030
0
Refiners Fractionation US
Fractionation MidEast Fractionation Others

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Natural Gas Liquids

Demand growth exceeds supply East of Suez, boosting LPG trade flows. The
520 kb/d of increase in the Middle East surplus by 2030 only offsets part of Asia’s
widening deficit (from 2.2 mb/d to 2.9 mb/d). China’s deficit alone rises by 400 kb/d
while that of India increases by 150 kb/d. The need for Atlantic Basin flows to
balance the region persists. These LPG exports to East of Suez will rise from
1.4 mb/d in 2023 to 1.6 mb/d in 2025 before easing through the end of the decade.
Shipping and terminal capacity will have to adapt.

C5+ from fractionation

A substantial uplift to global naphtha supply
The last cut from fractionation of NGLs is the heavier C5+ molecules. On a global
average basis, they represent around 18% of yields by weight but 12.5% of volume
yields (ethane 34% and LPG 54% by volume). However, the substantial increase
in C5+ production from NGL fractionation over 2023-2030 (+12%) boosts growth
in naphtha supply by 200 kb/d to 785 kb/d over the period, including refinery
output. This surge in C5+ supply comes from the United States (+100 kb/d) and
Canada (+30 kb/d) as well as from the Middle East (+120 kb/d) while the net
change in supply from the rest of the world is negative. While much of the C5+
finds its way to the naphtha pool, some of it is used as diluent for heavy crudes as
well as for blending in gasoline (hence the term “natural gasoline” for this
fractionation cut).

C5+ from fractionation, 2012-2030

900
kb/d

US
800

700
Middle East
600

500
Canada
400

300 Others
200

100

0
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Biofuels

Biofuels

Government policies support biofuels growth

Biofuels demand is set to rise by 600 kb/d to 3.7 mb/d by 2030, but growth slows
in the latter half of the forecast period. Government policies aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, decreasing oil imports and supporting domestic
agriculture drive the majority of this growth. However, in North America and
Europe electric vehicle uptake and efficiency improvements reduce total road
transport fuel demand thus slowing the potential increase for biofuels. In Latin
America and the Asia Pacific regions growth remains robust, further strengthening
biofuel fuel demand for road transport. Overall, biodiesel and renewable diesel
account for 42% (260 kb/d), ethanol for 35% (210 kb/d), and biojet fuel 23%
(140 kb/d) of the increase from 2023 and 2030.

Biofuel demand and growth by fuel and region, 2023 to 2030

2.4 10% 0.18 2.0%
mb/d
mb/d

2.2 0.15
8% 1.5%
2.0
0.12
1.8
5% 0.09 1.0%
1.6
0.06
1.4
3% 0.5%
1.2 0.03

1.0 0% 0.00 0.0%

2023 Decrease Increase 2030 2023 Increase 2030 2023 Increase 2030
Ethanol Biodiesel and renewable diesel Biojet

Europe North America Rest of World Asia and Pacific Latin America Share of transport demand

IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Share of transport demand is based on the volume share of ethanol in motor gasoline, biodiesel and renewable diesel
in diesel and biojet in jet kerosene in 2023 and 2030.

Ethanol demand rises to 2.1 mb/d by 2030, reaching 8% of motor gasoline

consumption compared with 7% in 2023. Brazil’s Fuel of the Future programme,
which plans to increase the mandated ethanol blending share from 27% to a
maximum of 30%, combines with higher RenovaBio Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
targets and increased motor gasoline demand to account for most of this growth.
In the Asia Pacific region, India’s pursuit of its 20% ethanol blending target along
with higher motor fuel demand will provide for most of the gains. By contrast, North
America ethanol demand is forecast to fall by 10% between 2023 and 2030, in line
with an anticipated 18% decline in motor gasoline consumption. Lower transport
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demand is partially offset by small increases in ethanol blending shares in the

United States, new alcohol-to-jet capacity, and rising ethanol use in Canada to
meet provincial policies and the national Clean Fuel Regulations. In Europe, a
13% decline in motor gasoline demand over the forecast slows ethanol growth to
near zero, despite the EU’s new Renewable Energy Directive target of 29%
renewable energy in transport fuels by 2030.

Biodiesel and renewable diesel demand increase to 1.4 mb/d, or 7% of diesel

consumption by 2030. Biodiesel demand expands the most in Brazil, Indonesia
and Malaysia thanks to growing fuel use and planned increases to blending
targets. Renewable diesel (HVO) expands quickest in North America and Europe
despite declining diesel use in both regions. In North America, the US renewable
fuels standard, Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) credits and state level policies drive
demand, while in Canada uptake is driven by the national Clean Fuel Regulations
and provincial policies. In Europe, the state level transposition of the EU’s RED III
and the Renewable Fuel Transport Obligation in the UK drive consumption.

Biojet demand rises to 150 kb/d by 2030

Demand growth for biojet is driven primarily by policies in the United States,
Europe and Japan. In Europe, the EU’s ReFuelEU targets 6% sustainable aviation
fuels (SAF) by 2030 with a 1.2% sub-target for renewable fuels of non-biological
origin (RFNBO). The UK is also planning to introduce a 10% SAF target by 2030,
while Japan is aiming for 10% SAF by 2030. There remains considerable upside
potential in the United States as well depending on future increases to the
renewable fuel standards (RFS) and extension of IRA credits as well as proposed
changes to state level policies such as California’s low-carbon fuel standard
(LCFS). Brazil, Singapore, India, the UAE and Indonesia are also considering new
biojet policies. Globally, announced biojet projects reach a capacity of 600 kb/d by
2030 (8% of jet fuel demand), but not all will be built, and more policies will need
to be implemented to enable investment in new facilities.

Ethanol feedstock demand remains steady

Crops supported 88% of biofuel production in 2023 and this share is forecast to
decrease slightly to 85% by 2030. The share of crops supporting ethanol
production remains steady between 2023 and 2030, with near 18% of global sugar
production and 6% of global starch supply used for fuels. By contrast, the share
of vegetable oils used to make biodiesel, renewable diesel and biojet is expected
to increase from 18% in 2023 to 25% of global production by 2030. Similarly,
residue oils such as used cooking oil and animal fats climb from 50% of estimated
collectible supply to 80% by 2030. Use of “other” feedstocks, such as agricultural
and forestry residues and municipal solid waste, more than double to 2030, but
only account for 3% of biofuel production globally.
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Oil 2024 Biofuels

Biofuel feedstock demand by type and region, 2023 to 2030

Ethanol feedstocks Biodiesel, renewable diesel and biojet

feedstocks
500 20% 100 100%
Mt/yr

Mt/yr
400 80
15% 75%

300 60
10% 50%
200 40

5% 25%
100 20

0 0% 0 0%
2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030

Sugars Starches Other Vegetable Residue oils Other

oils
North America Latin America Europe Asia and Pacific Rest of World Share of global supply

IEA. CC BY. 4.0.

Notes: Sugars include sugar cane and sugar beets; starches include maize, wheat, rice and other coarse grains; vegetable
oils include soybean oil, rapeseed oil, palm oil and other vegetable oils; and residue oils include used cooking oil, animal
fats, palm oil mill effluent and other residue oils. All other, “other” category includes non-crop feedstocks such as agricultural
residues, forestry residues and municipal solid waste. Shares for sugars, starches and vegetable oils are based on biofuel
feedstock demand in this forecast divided by global production estimates from OECD/FAO (2023), Agricultural Outlook 2023-
2032. Residue oil share is based on total collectible supplies of 37 Mt/yr based on 2020 World Economic Forum, Clean Skies
for Tomorrow: Sustainable Aviation Fuels as a Pathway to Net-Zero Aviation estimates.

Sugar demand for ethanol production, mostly sugar cane, expands 13% by 2030,
primarily in Brazil and India to meet growing ethanol demand. Maize use also rises
in Brazil for ethanol production. Growing demand for starches is partially offset by
declining consumption in the United States due to lower ethanol use.

Vegetable oil demand expands by nearly 50%, led by the United States, Canada,
Brazil and Indonesia. In the United States and Canada, demand is driven by
renewable diesel and biojet expansion, while in Brazil and Indonesia biodiesel use
expands. Residue oil demand increases by over 50%, primarily in the United
States, Canada and Europe thanks to policies that reward lower GHG intensities
or otherwise provide additional value for residues over crops. Demand rises in
Singapore as well to support renewable diesel and biojet production, primarily
destined for export to Europe and North America.

Other feedstocks, including agricultural and forestry residues and municipal solid
waste and ethanol for biojet more than double to 2030. Cellulosic ethanol accounts
for the non-crop growth primarily in Brazil and India. Total capacity for cellulosic
ethanol facilities expands to 15 kb/d by 2030. North America and Europe account
for most new processing technology expansion for renewable diesel and biojet
including alcohol-to-jet and Fischer-Tropsch pathways.
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Oil 2024 Tables

Tables

Table 1
Table 1 World Oil Supply and Demand
WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
(million barrels per day)

2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
OECD DEMAND
Americas 24.0 24.7 25.0 24.9 25.0 24.8 24.4 24.1 23.8 23.4
Europe 13.1 13.6 13.4 13.3 13.2 13.1 12.9 12.7 12.5 12.3
Asia Oceania 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0
Total OECD 44.4 45.6 45.7 45.5 45.3 45.0 44.5 44.0 43.4 42.7
NON-OECD DEMAND
FSU 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3
Europe 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
China 15.1 15.1 16.6 17.1 17.5 17.7 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.1
Other Asia 13.6 14.1 14.5 14.9 15.3 15.8 16.2 16.6 17.0 17.4
Latin America 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0
Middle East 8.4 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.1 9.0
Africa 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2
Total Non-OECD 53.0 54.5 56.6 57.7 58.9 59.9 60.8 61.6 62.2 62.7
Total Demand1 97.5 100.1 102.2 103.2 104.2 105.0 105.3 105.5 105.6 105.4
OECD SUPPLY
Americas 24.3 25.7 27.4 28.1 28.8 29.1 29.3 29.4 29.4 29.5
Europe 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
Asia Oceania 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Total OECD2 28.2 29.4 31.1 31.8 32.5 32.7 32.7 32.8 32.7 32.6
NON-OECD SUPPLY
FSU 13.8 13.9 13.8 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8
Europe 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
China 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0
Other Asia 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0
Latin America 5.3 5.6 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.5 7.7 8.1 8.2 7.8
Middle East 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6
Africa 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7
Total Non-OECD2 31.7 32.3 32.7 32.8 33.5 34.2 34.3 34.7 34.6 34.0
Processing gains3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Global Biofuels 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7
Total Non-OPEC 65.0 66.8 69.2 70.2 71.9 72.8 73.0 73.5 73.5 72.8
OPEC4
Crude 25.3 27.9 27.4
NGLs 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.7
Total OPEC 30.6 33.3 33.0
Total Supply 95.6 100.2 102.2
Memo items:
Call on OPEC crude + Stock ch.5 27.2 27.8 27.5 27.4 26.7 26.3 26.2 25.7 25.6 25.9
1 Measured as deliveries from refineries and primary stocks, comprises inland deliveries, international marine bunkers, refinery fuel, crude for direct burning, oil from
non-conventional sources and other sources of supply. Includes biofuels.
2 Comprises crude oil, condensates, NGLs, oil from non-conventional sources and other sources of supply.
3 Net volumetric gains and losses in the refining process and marine transportation losses.
4 OPEC includes current members throughout the time series.
5 Total demand minus total non-OPEC supply and OPEC NGLs.

For the purpose of this and the following tables :

- OECD comprises of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan,Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Republic of Türkiye, UK, US.
- OPEC comprises of Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Neutral Zone, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela.
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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 1a World Oil Supply andTable

Demand:
1a Changes from Oil 2023
WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND: CHANGES FROM OIL 2023
(million barrels per day)

2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

OECD DEMAND
Americas -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
Europe 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Asia Oceania -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Total OECD -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
NON-OECD DEMAND
FSU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Other Asia 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Latin America 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Middle East -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
Africa* 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total Non-OECD 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
Total Demand 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2
OECD SUPPLY
Americas 0.1 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Europe 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Asia Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total OECD 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6
NON-OECD SUPPLY
FSU 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4
Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latin America 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.6
Middle East 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Africa 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Total Non-OECD 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.4
Processing Gains 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Global Biofuels 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Non-OPEC 0.1 0.9 0.8 1.6 2.2 2.3 3.0
OPEC
Crude* 0.0
NGLs 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7
Total OPEC 0.2
Total Supply 0.4
Memo items:
Call on OPEC crude + Stock ch. 0.0 -1.1 -0.9 -1.7 -2.4 -2.9 -3.8
*Angola removed from OPEC and added to non-OPEC+ Africa in Oil 2024. These changes affect the OPEC crude and Africa rows of this table

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 1b World Oil Supply andTable

Demand:
1b
WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND - WEO Regions
WEO Regions (million barrels per day)

2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

DEMAND
North America 24.3 24.6 24.5 24.6 24.4 24.0 23.7 23.4 23.0
Central and South America 6.7 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3
Europe 14.3 14.2 14.1 14.0 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.4 13.2
Africa 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2
Middle East 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.1 9.0
Eurasia 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3
Asia Pacific 36.6 38.3 39.3 40.0 40.7 41.2 41.7 42.1 42.5
Total Demand1 100.1 102.2 103.2 104.2 105.0 105.3 105.5 105.6 105.4
NON-OPEC SUPPLY
North America 25.7 27.4 28.1 28.8 29.1 29.3 29.4 29.4 29.5
Central and South America 5.7 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.5 7.7 8.1 8.2 7.8
Europe 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9
Africa 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7
Middle East 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6
Eurasia 13.9 13.8 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8
Asia Pacific 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.3
Total Non-OPEC 61.6 63.8 64.6 66.1 66.9 67.0 67.5 67.3 66.6
Processing gains3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Global Biofuels 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7
Total Non-OPEC Supply 66.8 69.2 70.2 71.9 72.8 73.0 73.5 73.5 72.8
OPEC4
Crude 27.9 27.4
NGLs 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.7
Total OPEC 33.3 33.0
Total Supply 100.2 102.2
Memo items:
Call on OPEC crude + Stock ch.5 27.8 27.5 27.4 26.7 26.3 26.2 25.7 25.6 25.9
1 Measured as deliveries from refineries and primary stocks, comprises inland deliveries, international marine bunkers, refinery fuel, crude for direct burning, oil from
non-conventional sources and other sources of supply. Includes biofuels.
2 Comprises crude oil, condensates, NGLs, oil from non-conventional sources and other sources of supply.
3 Net volumetric gains and losses in the refining process and marine transportation losses.
4 OPEC includes current members throughout the time series.

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 2 Summary of Global OilTable

Demand
2
SUMMARY OF GLOBAL OIL DEMAND

2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Demand (mb/d)
Americas 24.96 24.94 24.96 24.77 24.44 24.14 23.78 23.38
Europe 13.45 13.28 13.19 13.09 12.91 12.71 12.51 12.29
Asia Oceania 7.25 7.26 7.19 7.17 7.17 7.12 7.09 7.05
Total OECD 45.65 45.48 45.34 45.03 44.51 43.98 43.38 42.71
Asia 31.10 32.06 32.80 33.48 34.08 34.56 35.05 35.44
Middle East 8.97 9.03 9.23 9.25 9.28 9.27 9.14 8.99
Americas 6.46 6.51 6.59 6.67 6.74 6.81 6.88 6.96
FSU 4.94 4.90 4.95 5.03 5.12 5.18 5.25 5.32
Africa 4.32 4.42 4.50 4.66 4.78 4.90 5.03 5.16
Europe 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87
Total Non-OECD 56.59 57.72 58.89 59.93 60.83 61.56 62.21 62.74
World 102.24 103.20 104.23 104.96 105.34 105.54 105.59 105.45
of which:
United States1 20.25 20.38 20.41 20.22 19.90 19.60 19.28 18.91
Europe 52 7.52 7.43 7.37 7.29 7.16 7.04 6.90 6.75
China 16.64 17.12 17.49 17.66 17.89 18.00 18.05 18.06
Japan 3.29 3.24 3.19 3.17 3.12 3.09 3.06 3.03
India 5.41 5.61 5.85 6.02 6.19 6.34 6.55 6.75
Russia 3.76 3.70 3.71 3.73 3.76 3.75 3.75 3.75
Brazil 3.25 3.32 3.33 3.35 3.35 3.36 3.38 3.39
Saudi Arabia 3.70 3.71 3.82 3.72 3.60 3.53 3.36 3.17
Canada 2.45 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.46 2.45 2.43
Korea 2.45 2.52 2.49 2.48 2.52 2.52 2.51 2.50
Mexico 1.74 1.72 1.71 1.70 1.69 1.68 1.66 1.65
Iran 1.77 1.79 1.81 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.93 1.96
Total 72.22 72.96 73.62 73.64 73.52 73.28 72.88 72.34
% of World 70.6% 70.7% 70.6% 70.2% 69.8% 69.4% 69.0% 68.6%
Annual Change (% per annum)
Americas 0.9 -0.1 0.1 -0.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.5 -1.7
Europe -0.8 -1.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -1.8
Asia Oceania -0.9 0.2 -1.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6
Total OECD 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -1.2 -1.2 -1.4 -1.5
Asia 6.3 3.1 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.1
Middle East 0.7 0.7 2.2 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -1.4 -1.6
Americas 2.3 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
FSU 0.1 -0.8 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.5
Africa -0.2 2.3 1.8 3.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Europe 0.5 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7
Total Non-OECD 3.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.8
World 2.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1
Annual Change (mb/d)
Americas 0.23 -0.02 0.02 -0.19 -0.34 -0.30 -0.36 -0.40
Europe -0.10 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 -0.18 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22
Asia Oceania -0.06 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Total OECD 0.07 -0.17 -0.13 -0.31 -0.52 -0.53 -0.60 -0.67
Asia 1.85 0.95 0.75 0.68 0.59 0.48 0.49 0.39
Middle East 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.15
Americas 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
FSU 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.08
Africa -0.01 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
Europe 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Total Non-OECD 2.06 1.13 1.17 1.04 0.90 0.73 0.65 0.53
World 2.13 0.96 1.03 0.73 0.38 0.20 0.05 -0.14
0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1 US figures exclude US territories.
2 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK.
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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 3 World Oil Production Table 3

WORLD OIL PRODUCTION
(million barrels per day)

2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

OPEC
Crude Oil
Saudi Arabia 10.52 9.63
Iran 2.55 2.99
Iraq 4.45 4.27
UAE 3.30 3.25
Kuwait 2.70 2.62
Nigeria 1.15 1.24
Libya 0.99 1.16
Algeria 1.01 0.97
Congo 0.26 0.27
Gabon 0.19 0.21
Equatorial Guinea 0.08 0.06
Venezuela 0.70 0.77
Total Crude Oil 27.89 27.44
of which Neutral Zone 1 0.28 0.29
Total NGLs2 5.44 5.52 5.59 5.68 5.91 6.14 6.34 6.53 6.70
Total OPEC3 33.33 32.96
NON-OPEC4
OECD
Americas 25.70 27.38 28.12 28.78 29.08 29.28 29.36 29.43 29.49
United States 17.93 19.44 20.10 20.66 20.99 21.18 21.25 21.35 21.50
Mexico 2.01 2.10 2.02 1.98 1.88 1.75 1.64 1.59 1.46
Canada 5.76 5.83 5.99 6.13 6.20 6.33 6.46 6.48 6.51
Chile 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Europe 3.19 3.22 3.17 3.32 3.21 3.06 3.04 2.91 2.77
UK 0.84 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.57
Norway 1.91 2.02 2.01 2.15 2.08 1.98 1.98 1.90 1.81
Others 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.39
Asia Oceania 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33
Australia 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.26
Others 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Total OECD 29.37 31.05 31.75 32.55 32.71 32.72 32.77 32.69 32.59
NON-OECD
Former USSR 13.91 13.84 13.53 13.75 13.87 13.81 13.81 13.79 13.78
Russia 11.09 10.96 10.70 10.77 10.78 10.76 10.80 10.81 10.83
Azerbaijan 0.67 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.55
Kazakhstan 1.82 1.93 1.90 2.03 2.15 2.14 2.13 2.11 2.09
Others 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30
Asia 6.90 6.94 7.02 6.97 6.80 6.60 6.43 6.24 6.02
China 4.18 4.27 4.40 4.45 4.39 4.29 4.20 4.09 3.98
Malaysia 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.38
India 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.57
Indonesia 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.40
Others 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.69
Europe 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Americas 5.65 6.18 6.53 6.88 7.49 7.69 8.11 8.19 7.85
Brazil 3.12 3.49 3.56 3.80 4.25 4.25 4.46 4.57 4.26
Argentina 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.86 0.92 0.98 1.05 1.13 1.21
Colombia 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.62
Guyana 0.28 0.39 0.61 0.71 0.88 1.08 1.27 1.21 1.15
Others 0.78 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.63 0.61
Middle East 3.16 3.13 3.12 3.17 3.20 3.32 3.52 3.61 3.65
Oman 1.07 1.06 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02
Qatar 1.80 1.82 1.86 1.91 1.95 2.07 2.28 2.37 2.42
Others 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21
Africa 2.53 2.52 2.53 2.66 2.71 2.81 2.76 2.72 2.67
Angola 1.18 1.14 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.04
Egypt 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.50
Others 0.76 0.79 0.83 0.99 1.05 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.13
Total Non-OECD 32.25 32.71 32.82 33.51 34.16 34.30 34.71 34.63 34.04
Processing gains5 2.32 2.36 2.39 2.40 2.46 2.48 2.47 2.46 2.47
Global biofuels 2.90 3.13 3.25 3.41 3.47 3.51 3.59 3.67 3.75
TOTAL NON-OPEC 66.84 69.25 70.22 71.86 72.79 73.02 73.54 73.46 72.85
TOTAL SUPPLY 100.17 102.21
1 Neutral Zone production is already included in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait production with their respective shares.
2 Includes condensates reported by OPEC countries, oil from non-conventional sources, e.g. GTL in Nigeria and non-oil inputs to Saudi Arabian MTBE.
3 OPEC data based on today's membership throughout the time series.
4 Comprises crude oil, condensates, NGLs and oil from non-conventional sources.
5 Net volumetric gains and losses in refining and marine transportation losses.
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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 3a Selected Upstream Project

Table 3a Start-Ups
SELECTED UPSTREAM PROJECT START-UPS

Peak Peak
Start Start
Country Project Capacity Country Project Capacity
Year Year
(kbd) (kbd)

OECD Americas OECD Europe

United States Mad Dog Ph 2 (Argos) 120 2023 Norway Njord/Bauge 30 2023
United States Vito 80 2023 Norway Fenja 30 2023
United States Anchor 75 2024 Norway Breidablikk 50 2023
United States Whale 80 2024 Norway Eldfisk North 30 2024
United States Shenandoah 60 2024 Norway Balder X 40 2024
United States Ballymore 75 2025 Norway Johan Castberg 170 2024
United States Leon/Castile 60 2025 Norway Tyrving 30 2024
United States Pikka Phase 1 (Alaska) 80 2026 Norway Yggdrasil 120 2027
United States Sparta 60 2028 Norway Bestla 30 2027
United States Willow (Alaska) 150 2029 Denmark Tyra Redevelopment 20 2024
Canada Terra Nova 30 2023 UK Seagull 30 2023
Canada Mildred Lake Extension 140 2025 UK Penguins 40 2024
Canada White Rose 80 2026 UK Rosebank 60 2027
Mexico Pit 80 2026 Middle East
Mexico Trion 100 2028 Israel Karish/Karish North 30 2023
Latin America Oman Bisat 30 2023
Brazil Buzios 5 (Almirante Barroso) 150 2023 Qatar North Field Expansion East 250 2026
Brazil Marlim redev 1 (Garibaldi) 80 2023 Qatar North Field Expansion South 120 2028
Brazil Mero 2 (Sepetiba) 180 2023 Qatar Bul Hanine Redevelopment 60 2027
Brazil Marlim redev 2 (Anna Nery) 70 2023 Saudi Zuluf Expansion 600 2026
Brazil Itapu (P-71) 150 2023 UAE Belbazem 45 2024
Brazil Atlanta FDS 50 2024 Saudi Marjan Expansion 300 2025
Brazil Mero 3 (Mal. Duque de Caxias) 180 2024 Saudi Berri Expansion 250 2025
Brazil IPB (Maria Quitéria) 100 2025 Africa
Brazil Bacalhau 220 2025 Ghana Mahogany-Teak-Akasa (MTAB) 30 2023
Brazil Mero 4 (Alexandre de Gusmão) 180 2025 Senegal Sangomar Ph 1 (SNE) 100 2024
Brazil Buzios 6 (P-78) 180 2025 Niger Agadem Phase 2 50 2024
Brazil Buzios 7 (Alm. Tamandaré) 220 2025 Cote d'Ivoire Baleine Phase 1 20 2023
Brazil Buzios 8 (P-79) 180 2026 Cote d'Ivoire Baleine Phase 2 30 2024
Brazil Buzios 9 (P-80) 225 2026 Angola Begonia, CLOV 3 50 2025
Brazil Buzios 10 (P-82) 225 2027 Angola Ndungu 40 2026
Brazil Buzios 11 (P-83) 225 2027 Angola Agogo Phase 3 120 2027
Brazil Raia (BM-C-33) 125 2028 Angola Kaminho 60 2028
Brazil Atapu 2 (P-84) 225 2029 Uganda Lake Albert (Kingfisher and Tilenga) 190 2026
Brazil Sepia 2 (P-85) 225 2029 Asia
Guyana Stabroek Ph 3 (Paraya/Prosperity) 220 2023 China Liuhua 30 2024
Guyana Stabroek Ph 4 (Yellowtail) 250 2025 China Lufeng 20 2024
Guyana Stabroek Ph 5 (Uaru) 250 2026 China Wushi 30 2024
Guyana Stabroek Ph 6 (Whiptail) 250 2028 India KG-DWN-98/2 (Cluster-2) 50 2024
FSU Viet Nam Lac Da Vang 30 2026
Azerbaijan Azeri Central East (ACE) 100 2024
Kazakhstan Tengizchevroil FGP 260 2025
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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 3b Selected Upstream Pre-Sanction

Table 3b Project
SELECTED UPSTREAM PRE-SANCTION PROJECT
(Projects with procurement/engineering started and first oil potentially by 2030)

Country Project Peak Capacity (kbd) Sanction Year Start Year

OECD Americas
United States Shenandoah 60 2024 2026
United States Kaskida 70 2025 2028
United States Tigris 120 2025 2029
United States Pikka Phase 2 40 2026 2030
Mexico Polok-Chinwol 50 2026 2029
Mexico Zama 150 2025 2030
Mexico Block 29 50 2025 2030
Latin America
Suriname Block 58 180 2024 2029
Guyana Stabroek Ph 7 (Fangtooth) 220 2025 2029
Guyana Stabroek Ph 8 220 2026 2030
Brazil BRC/CRT Revit 100 2025 2028
Brazil SEAP 1 110 2025 2029
Brazil SEAP 2 110 2025 2029
Brazil Albacora Revit 100 2025 2028
Brazil Gato do Mato 50 2026 2029
OECD Europe
Norway Fram (extension) 40 2025 2028
Norway Troll (extension) 30 2025 2029
Norway Johan Castberg Ph 2 30 2026 2028
Norway Aasgard 30 2026 2028
Norway Balder/Ringhorne 30 2026 2028
Norway Yggdrasil (extension) 40 2026 2029
Norway Johan Sverdrup Ph 3 60 2026 2028
Norway Wisting 80 2026 2029
UK Cambo 50 2026 2029
Africa
Cote d'Ivoire Baleine Phase 3 100 2025 2028
Kenya South Lokichar 100 2026 2029
Namibia Venus 150 2025 2029
Senegal Sangomar Phase 2 80 2025 2029
Nigeria Bonga Extension 50 2025 2029
Angola Block 32 80 2025 2029
Asia
Australia Dorado 80 2024 2027
FSU
Kazakhstan Kashagan Ph 2 50 2025 2028
IEA. CC BY 4.0.

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 3c Non-OPEC supply Table 3c

NON-OPEC SUPPLY - OIL MARKET REPORT AND WEO DEFINITIONS
(million barrels per day)

Calculation 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

Oil 2024 Report definitions

NON-OPEC SUPPLY 66.8 69.2 70.2 71.9 72.8 73.0 73.5 73.5 72.8
Processing gains 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Global biofuels 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7

NON-OPEC PRODUCTION
(excl. processing gains and biofuels) 1 61.6 63.8 64.6 66.1 66.9 67.0 67.5 67.3 66.6

Crude 2 50.4 51.9 52.4 53.6 54.2 54.3 54.5 54.2 53.4
of which: Condensate 3 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8

Tight oil 4 8.6 9.6 10.2 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.3 11.6 11.9

Un-upgraded bitumen 5 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3

NGLs 6 9.2 9.7 10.0 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.8 10.9 11.0

Syncrude (Canada) 7 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5

1
CTL, GTL, kerogen oil and additives 8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

World Energy Outlook definitions

NON-OPEC PRODUCTION
(excl. processing gains and biofuels) =1 61.6 63.8 64.6 66.1 66.9 67.0 67.5 67.3 66.6

Conventional 49.0 50.0 50.1 51.2 51.7 51.5 51.6 51.1 50.1

Crude oil =2-3-4-5 35.5 35.8 35.5 36.3 36.6 36.3 36.1 35.5 34.4

Natural gas liquids (total) =3+6 13.5 14.2 14.6 14.9 15.1 15.3 15.5 15.7 15.8

Unconventional 12.6 13.8 14.5 14.9 15.2 15.5 15.9 16.2 16.5
2
EHOB (incl. syncrude) =5+7 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9

Tight oil =4 8.6 9.6 10.2 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.3 11.6 11.9
1
CTL, GTL, kerogen oil and additives =8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
1 CTL = coal to liquids; GTL = gas to liquids.
2 Extra-heavy oil and bitumen

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 4
Table 4 World Refinery Capacity Additions
WORLD REFINERY CAPACITY ADDITIONS
(thousand barrels per day)

2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Total

Refining Capacity Additions and Expansions1
OECD Americas 290 -120 76 -44
OECD Europe -120 -358 -478
OECD Asia Oceania -122 -120 -120
FSU 70 50 120
Non-OECD Europe
China 472 450 60 531 -120 921
Other Asia 70 93 260 612 200 124 55 1,344
Non-OECD Americas 30 15 115 130
Middle East 631 170 130 232 100 632
Africa -100 690 60 750
Total World 1,271 1,113 244 1,425 200 219 55 3,256
Upgrading Capacity Additions2
OECD Americas 87 -197 -197
OECD Europe 22 30 -36 -6
OECD Asia Oceania
FSU 148 322 181 503
Non-OECD Europe 20
China 130 174 -183 -118 -127
Other Asia 161 5 402 196 111 57 40 811
Non-OECD Americas 85 85
Middle East 166 80 142 222
Africa -37 280 26 29 335
Total World 697 569 517 336 140 24 40 1,626
Desulphurisation Capacity Additions3
OECD Americas -403 -403
OECD Europe 38 38 -57 -19
OECD Asia Oceania
FSU 91 70 70
Non-OECD Europe
China 128 302 -84 -42 176
Other Asia 88 75 220 317 153 162 927
Non-OECD Americas -37 80 43
Middle East 482 283 283
Africa -24 263 43 38 344
Total World 802 678 -127 479 191 201 1,423
1 Comprises new refinery projects or expansions to existing Crude distillation units including condensate splitter additions. Assumes zero capacity creep.
2 Comprises gross capacity additions to coking, hydrocracking, residue hydrocracking, visbreaking, FCC or RFCC capacity.
3 Comprises additions to hydrotreating and hydrodesulphurisation capacity.

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 4a World Refinery Capacity

Table Additions:
4a Changes from Oil 2023
WORLD REFINERY CAPACITY ADDITIONS
CHANGES FROM OIL 2023
(thousand barrels per day)

2018 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 Total

Refining Capacity Additions and Expansions1
OECD Americas 269 -264 5
OECD Europe -28 -211 -239
OECD Asia Oceania
FSU -26 -16 -42
Non-OECD Europe
China 400 230 -620 181 -320 -129
Other Asia -64 89 -62 325 -99 24 213
Non-OECD Americas -15 -15
Middle East -82 38 -60 172 -100 335 385
Africa -30 -112 -60 30 -142
Total World -112 183 522 -1,186 678 -519 359 36
Upgrading Capacity Additions2
OECD Americas 197 -197
OECD Europe -52 -36 -36
OECD Asia Oceania 65 27 92
FSU -222 152 -70
Non-OECD Europe
China -145 -125 -270
Other Asia -206 219 86 -86 13
Non-OECD Americas -100
Middle East -111 -97 97
Africa -57
Total World -320 262 -643 138 58 -86 -271
Desulphurisation Capacity Additions3
OECD Americas 403 -403
OECD Europe -16 -57 -73
OECD Asia Oceania 243 109 352
FSU -70 30 -40
Non-OECD Europe
China -106 -50 -156
Other Asia -167 172 157 -157 5
Non-OECD Americas
Middle East 12 -72 -100 172 12
Africa -13 13
Total World 645 -309 -358 279 -157 100
1 Comprises new refinery projects or expansions to existing facilities including condensate splitter additions. Assumes zero capacity creep.
2 Comprises stand-alone additions to coking, hydrocracking or FCC capacity. Excludes upgrading additions counted under 'Refinery Capacity Additions
and Expansions' category.
3 Comprises stand-alone additions to hydrotreating and hydrodesulphurisation capacity. Excludes desulphurisation additions counted under
'Refinery Capacity Additions and Expansions' category.

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 4b
Table 4b Selected Refinery
SELECTED REFINERYCrude Distillation
CRUDE DISTILLATION Project
CHANGES LIST List

Country Project Capacity (kbd) Year Country Project Capacity (kbd) Year
OECD Americas Asia
Mexico Dos Bocas 340 2025 India Barauni, Bihar 60 2025
United States Houston Lyondell -264 2025 India Barmer 180 2026
United States Rodeo -120 2024 India Nagapattinam 180 2026
OECD Europe India Numaligarh, Assam 120 2026
Germany Gelsenkirchen -80 2025 India Panipat 200 2027
Germany Rheinland -147 2025 India Visakhapatnam 2/Vizag 70 2024
Italy Livorno -120 2024 China
United Kingdom Grangemouth -131 2025 China Changling Petchem -230 2026
OECD Asia Oceania China Dalian (II) WEPEC -80 2024
Japan Yamaguchi -120 2024 China Dalian (II) WEPEC -120 2025
Middle East China Daxie Petrochemical 120 2025
Bahrain Sitra 112 2026 China Huajin Petchem (Panjin II) 323 2026
Iran Persian Gulf Star (Bandar Abbas II 120 2026 China Shenchi Petrochemical 100 2024
Iraq Baiji 150 2024
Iraq Basra 70 2025
Iraq Dhi Qar 100 2028
Non-OECD Americas
Brazil RNEST 115 2028
Africa
Nigeria Lekki Free Trade Zone (Lagos) 650 2024

Note: Only includes refinery capacity changes (additions or closures) above 70 kb/d.

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Oil 2024 Tables

Table 5 World Ethanol Production

Table 5
1
WORLD ETHANOL PRODUCTION
(thousand barrels per day)
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
OECD North America 1,032 1,049 1,041 1,049 1,046 1,041 1,032 1,032 1,023
United States 1,002 1,019 1,011 1,013 1,008 1,002 992 991 982
Canada 29 30 31 36 38 39 40 41 41
OECD Europe 110 111 117 124 134 138 150 167 179
Austria 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Belgium 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
France 21 20 22 23 23 24 24 24 24
Germany 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Italy 0 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
Netherlands 10 10 11 13 19 21 23 38 49
Poland 7 7 8 8 9 10 10 12 13
Spain 9 10 10 10 14 15 15 15 15
UK 8 9 9 9 9 10 19 19 19
OECD Pacific 4 4 4 4 5 8 9 11 11
Australia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6
Total OECD 1,145 1,163 1,163 1,177 1,185 1,187 1,191 1,210 1,213
FSU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-OECD Europe 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
China 58 62 61 62 62 62 62 63 67
Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3
Other Asia 111 125 145 161 171 179 198 209 243
India 79 92 110 116 122 127 139 150 178
Indonesia 0 0 1 1 2 4 8 7 9
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Singapore 1 2 3 6 8 8 11 11 14
Thailand 23 22 24 29 31 32 33 33 34
Latin America 567 647 646 666 670 680 714 725 750
Argentina 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 22
Brazil 528 607 606 625 628 638 673 683 708
Colombia 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Total Non-OECD 742 840 859 896 910 927 981 1,003 1,066
Total World 1,887 2,003 2,021 2,073 2,095 2,114 2,172 2,212 2,279
1 Volumetric production; to convert to energy adjusted production, ethanol is assumed to have 2/3 energy content of conventional gasoline.

IEA. CC BY 4.0.

PAGE | 146
Oil 2024 Tables

Table 5a World Biodiesel Production

Table 5a
1
WORLD BIODIESEL PRODUCTION
(thousand barrels per day)
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
OECD North America 209 290 323 357 370 366 369 391 389
United States 203 280 306 330 336 328 326 348 346
Canada 6 10 17 27 34 38 43 43 43
OECD Europe 290 294 299 303 309 318 319 328 327
Austria 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Belgium 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
France 28 36 39 42 43 43 43 48 48
Germany 70 65 65 65 65 65 64 65 65
Italy 23 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Netherlands 37 38 39 39 44 45 44 46 45
Poland 19 18 18 17 17 17 17 18 18
Spain 35 32 33 34 34 34 34 34 34
UK 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
OECD Pacific 15 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 13
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total OECD 515 598 636 674 692 698 702 732 729
FSU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-OECD Europe 14 13 12 14 14 14 14 14 14
China 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Middle East 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Africa 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Other Asia 277 307 336 349 364 385 397 408 419
India 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Indonesia 189 212 226 233 240 258 268 275 281
Malaysia 24 28 37 39 46 46 47 48 48
Philippines 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
Singapore 29 33 32 33 33 33 32 33 35
Thailand 29 28 34 36 38 40 42 44 46
Latin America 161 161 201 252 255 256 257 258 259
Argentina 37 14 27 34 34 34 34 34 34
Brazil 108 130 151 194 194 195 194 195 196
Colombia 12 14 13 14 14 14 15 15 15
Total Non-OECD 498 526 595 660 678 700 713 725 737
Total World 1,012 1,124 1,230 1,334 1,371 1,398 1,415 1,458 1,466
1 Biodiesel includes renewable diesel.

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PAGE | 147
Oil 2024 Abbreviations and acronyms

Abbreviations and acronyms

ACG Azeri Chirag-Gunashli field (Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan)

Capex capital expenditure
CIF cost, insurance & freight
CDU crude distillation unit
E&P exploration and production
ESG environmental, social and governance
EU European Union
EVs electric vehicles
FPSO floating production, storage and offloading
FID final investment decision
FOB free on board
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gas
GoM Gulf of Mexico
HVO renewable diesel
HSR high-speed rail
IATA International Air Transport Association
IMO International Maritime Organization
ICE internal combustion engine
IOC international oil company
IRA Inflation Reduction Act
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
LCFS low-carbon fuel standard
LPG liquefied petroleum gas
LTO light tight oil
n-butane normal butane
MTBE methyl tert-butyl ether
NGLs natural gas liquids
NFE Qatar North Field East
NFS Qatar North Field South
NOC national oil companies
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
opex operating expense
PDH propane dehydrogenation
RFS renewable fuel standard
RFNBO renewable fuels of non-biological origin
RNEST Brazil Abreu e Lima Refinery
rpk rail passenger-kilometre
SAF sustainable aviation fuel
SUVs sports utility vehicles
TfL Transport for London
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PAGE | 148
Oil 2024 Abbreviations and acronyms

TMX Trans-Mountain Expansion Project

WEO STEPS IEA World Energy Outlook Stated Policies Scenario
WFH work from home
WTI West Texas Intermediate
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USGC United States Gulf Coast

Units of measure
b/d barrels per day
Btu British thermal unit
CO2 carbon dioxide
MJ megajoule
Mt million tonnes
Mt/yr million tonnes per year
TJ terajoules

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PAGE | 149
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