Political risk

report 2024

March 2024
2 Political risk report 2024

Contents
01 Executive summary
3 04 The divergent risks of a
macroeconomic shift
8

02 Shifting geoeconomic and

geopolitical structures
4
05 Climate change and the
energy transition
14

03 2024: The biggest election

year in history
6
06 Conclusion
16
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3 Political risk report 2024

Executive summary
Businesses face a world made more volatile and riskier by
systemic macroeconomic and geopolitical changes. Governments
are increasingly pursuing state-led economic policies, intensifying
the frequency and severity of trade disruption and distortion. At the
same time, international governance norms are losing legitimacy,
contributing to a surge in unpredictable and longer-lasting conflicts.
In this context, operational planning is an unusually volatile process.
Strengthening the ability to identify, prepare for, • Governments will continue implementing
and mitigate difficult to predict challenges is therefore protectionist climate change mitigation and
paramount for leaders. In the coming year and beyond, as investment policies. As domestic politics compete
these trends reshape structures of international politics, with international priorities, contract stability and
trade, and finance, they will also be influenced by specific project investment returns will be at risk of disruption.
risks in 2024: In turn, these policies may also create opportunities
ranging from national food security projects to water
• Around the world, more than 60 elections will take access sustainability improvements.
place, primarily oriented around inward-looking
By understanding how time-sensitive risks and
economic policymaking and outward-looking
long-term political trends affect business decisions,
security concerns. The outcomes are likely to affect
companies can more effectively position themselves
international relationships and drive policy uncertainty,
in uncertain geopolitical and economic conditions to
disrupting markets as a result. Media coverage can
take advantage of opportunities which, as the 2024
create a variety of distracting narratives, challenging
Global Risks Report notes, are still available. In such an
the ability of executives to see past the noise.
atmosphere, intelligent allocation of risk and use of
• The global macroeconomic transition underway may risk transfer solutions will help corporates and lenders
discourage businesses from pursuing otherwise continue to secure capital, access liquidity, and manage
available investment opportunities. To navigate through ambiguity, thereby enabling ongoing trade and
disrupted supply chains and an unstable geopolitical demand capture.
environment, companies will increasingly rely on data
and risk analysis to understand and manage risks.
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4 Political risk report 2023

Shifting
01| Global announced trade interventions by year (2010 – 2023)
300

macroeconomic

New trade interventions

200

and geopolitical
structures
100

0
The era of globalization and commerce-oriented 2010 2014 2018 2022

policymaking by governments has been sidelined Harmful Liberalizing

by increasing regionalization, export controls, and
a growing number of barriers to trade and finance. Source: Global Trade Alert

Driving this, in part, is a renewed focus by governments

on ensuring supply chain resilience, protecting national Note: Labels in the above image, including Harmful and Liberalizing, are replicated from Global Trade Alert
source data and are in reference to the impact of government trade interventions on foreign investment.
security, and delivering a successful green transition.

Over the past five years, many governments have issued significant financial support
and imposed trade barriers to protect economically and politically important domestic
industries. They have also encouraged investment in climate-friendly sectors,
sometimes disregarding existing international economic rules. This shift coincides
with an increasingly inward-looking electorate; an IPSOS global poll found that positive
perceptions of “globalization” had dropped 10% in all countries surveyed.

Businesses that have become accustomed to operating in a globalized environment

must develop a renewed focus on regulatory decision-making and the direction of
state-level relations. Failing to stay updated on these matters can pose significant
risks to their operations.
5 Political risk report 2024

SUPPLY CHAIN DISTORTION INCREASED CONFLICT RISK

A major impact of growing government intervention in economic activity is that businesses may relocate As Western governments join others in stepping up unilateral intervention in economic activity, those same
their operations to geographies perceived to be geopolitically or regulatorily safer. This can distort supply governments are increasingly being seen as disengaging from all but the most significant global security
chains, creating supplier uncertainty and bringing businesses into closer contact with comparatively issues. Many governments and other actors around the world are no longer deterred by the perceived
unfamiliar governments and regulatory systems. As governments continue to intervene, businesses must consequences that may have once discouraged military action — for example, the Syrian government’s
consider how local actions, global policy decisions, and over-the-horizon risks can affect their operations actions across the country, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by Houthis.
and the overall business environment. By doing so, leaders can develop strategies to mitigate and transfer
specific risks before they develop. This shift can be seen in data. The number of conflicts worldwide has doubled since 2005 and will likely remain
high in the foreseeable future. Further, with the perception of fewer consequences and without credible
resolution mechanisms, conflicts may last longer; since 2000, conflicts are lasting 50% longer on average.

Growing geopolitical instability These realities will continuously stress the ability of most economic models — designed for and built off
The ongoing process of geoeconomic fragmentation is closely linked to geopolitical data from an era of relative economic and political stability — to forecast future outcomes. Further, as some
changes, which have accelerated in recent years. The unipolar international security actors take advantage of the heightened level of insecurity and unpredictability, assets and investments in
system, dominated by the US for more than 20 years, is strained, increasing complexity many foreign markets may be more exposed to political violence, terrorism, expropriation, or disruption.
and unpredictability for businesses in coming years.
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6 Political risk report 2023
2024

2024: The
02| 2024 elections span the globe

biggest election
year in history
As organizations make decisions for the
future, they need to consider how long-
term uncertainty caused by geoeconomic
competition and geopolitical insecurity may
also be influenced by current events.
More than 60 countries, representing at least 40% of the global population
and GDP, will hold elections in 2024. As pre- and post-election noise
increasingly permeates media and business conversations, the focus areas Source: Marsh
for organizations seeking to understand the implications should include:

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE
The risk of electoral violence and the impact of AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
artificial intelligence.
The link between elections and civil unrest is well understood; given the number of elections in 2024,
there is a correspondingly elevated risk for electoral violence. Compounding this risk is a new and
poorly understood factor: the potential for artificial intelligence to amplify political misinformation and
The value of tracking voter turnout in unfree races. disinformation.

The threat that misinformation poses to democratic structures is already being aggravated by the ability of
actors — including non-state groups, adversarial states, politicians, and individuals — to leverage AI tools
How the US presidential election could influence to create convincing, yet fake, video and audio. Such tools can also enhance the speed and spread of false
corporate and sovereign decision-making. narratives across social and traditional media. The US government has already accused the governments of
China, Russia, and Iran of attempting to weaponize AI for those purposes.
7 Political risk report 2024

The misuse of AI can exacerbate the connection between political violence consequences. On a positive note, the limited range of potential outcomes will
and its impact, leading to heightened risks for businesses, particularly where facilitate efforts to use scenario-planning strategies to prepare for the results.
political tensions are high. As the election nears, levels of governmental policy paralysis are expected
to worsen, with neither Democratic nor Republican parties eager to give the
VOTER TURNOUT opposition a legislative victory on which to campaign.

Internationally, pre-US election paralysis may also have a significant impact on

In elections where voters will have limited ability to express their will, such as
several security issues, including:
in Russia and Algeria, turnout could be a crucial metric by providing businesses
with a sense of the country’s current and future levels of stability. • Ukraine’s continued ability to defend its frontlines relies on the passage of
multiple US military aid packages in 2024. Without this support, the onus
A recent example is the January election in Bangladesh, which resulted in an
may land on European countries to choose between expanded defense
overwhelming victory by the incumbent party. The vote, however, was marred
spending or a permanently fractured Ukraine.
by turnout falling 50% from the previous election, weeks of violent protests,
government oppression, and an opposition boycott. For an economy reliant • Russia will be eager to seize what military initiative it can and seek to
on disbursements from an ongoing 42-month International Monetary Fund avoid serious peace negotiations in 2024, hoping that a US government
(IMF) program, the risk of program suspension as a result of election violence less interested in transatlantic security issues would allow for a negotiated
is notable and could lead to further political recriminations. This instability also solution on terms favoring the Kremlin or an outright Russian victory.
threatens Bangladesh’s attractive geographic location as a link between India • US-aligned governments worldwide may consider the implications on their
and China, and as a reshoring alternative to China. own security arrangements of a US pullback from global conflicts instead
strengthen domestic defense capabilities and non-US defense agreements.
Ahead of numerous unfree elections in 2024, businesses should maintain
awareness in the following years/months of the potential increased risk of • Depending on the perceived level of post-election uncertainty,
strikes, riots, and other forms of civil unrest, such as coups. governments, including China and Iran, may consider how they can seize a
moment of heightened insecurity to pursue their own strategic objectives.
PRE- AND POST-ELECTION These are just four ways that pre-US election maneuvering could influence

PARALYSIS international security realities in 2024, likely accelerating the entrenchment of

difficult-to-predict security events.
In some 2024 elections, voters will elect candidates from polarized parties or Investors and corporates should consider, however, whether the unease and
shrink existing majorities, obligating those parties to find the common ground noise that is expected to build over the coming months about the stability of
necessary to avoid legislative paralysis in a difficult macroeconomic and the US political system is wholly warranted. Consideration of the possible US
geopolitical period. In one key election, however, paralysis will be heavily felt policy paralysis, and the possible impact of opportunistic strategies by other
before the election and could reach far beyond the country’s borders. countries, will help organizations identify and manage potential political,
economic, and credit risk factors.
The United States
The upcoming US presidential and legislative elections will drive behavior and
preparatory decision-making throughout 2024 as businesses and governments
attempt to divine the outcome and its potential economic and political
4
8 Political risk report 2024

The divergent 03| US economic uncertainty in a historical context

risks of a
100%

macroeconomic
75%

50%

shift 25%

Globally, financial markets have shifted focus from 0%

Oct - 07 Oct - 11 Oct - 15 Oct - 19 Oct - 23
tracking interest rate increases and are now also
concerned with how central banks are navigating Change in real GDP Unemployment rate Core PCE inflation

the transition in monetary policy and their ability

to control inflation while avoiding a widespread Source: US Federal Reserve Board

economic downturn.
Note: Since 2007, the US Federal Reserve Board has issued quarterly guidance to clarify the FOMC members’
Even in a soft-landing scenario, however, businesses should expect economic divergence sense of how uncertain their economic forecasts were relative to historical context. A 100% score means
between sectors and economies and consider the implications in the context of growing that every member of the committee views that quarter’s economic projections as more uncertain than
government intervention and increased levels of geopolitical insecurity. the historical norm. Conversely, a 0% score means that all members of the committee assess economic
uncertainty levels to be “normal.”

Members of the US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) assess the level
of US economic uncertainty to be falling, suggesting growing alignment with
markets on the likelihood of a soft landing for the US economy. However,
perceived uncertainty remains elevated relative to historical norms. The views
of the FOMC are a reminder that while progress on inflation and other core
economic metrics has been significant and better than expected, at least in the
US, the economic environment remains finely balanced.
9 Political risk report 2024

SOVEREIGNS
While advanced economies are generally forecast to register weak growth
in 2024, many emerging markets, led by India and much of Southeast Asia,
are expected to post resilient growth rates and continue to provide ample
opportunities for businesses. China, as the world’s largest developing economy,
may be an exception to this rule, with softer growth and structural domestic
imbalances that are expected to take much of the government’s attention.

However, two subsets of emerging markets could face structural economic

challenges this year that may manifest as political risks to business operations.

A tricky balance of domestic politics and

international debt obligations
The first set of emerging markets includes countries with high debt/GDP ratios
that may see repayment difficulties compounded by interest rate pressures
and skeptical creditors. Given already high levels of unrest, these countries may
find it difficult to balance elevated repayment obligations with the needs and
expectations of their citizens for ongoing state support. Failure to successfully
navigate this narrow path could raise political violence, credit, and nonpayment
risk throughout 2024.
10 Political risk report 2024

04| Political risk ratings for countries facing high debt/GDP ratios and risk of unrest

Security environment Trading environment Investment environment

Country
Currency Contractual
Strikes, riots, & civil Country economic inconvertibility & agreement Legal & regulatory
commotion Terrorism War & civil war risk transfer risk Sovereign credit risk Expropriation repudiation risk

Argentina 7.4 2.9 2.0 7.4 7.8 8.3 4.7 5.5 5.5

Bangladesh 7.6 5.4 3.8 5.1 6.0 5.7 4.0 5.9 6.9

Egypt 4.5 5.9 4.7 5.9 6.2 6.6 4.6 4.9 5.9

Ethiopia 6.5 6.8 6.4 6.4 7.4 8.9 5.7 7.0 5.9

Kenya 6.4 6.9 3.5 5.3 5.9 6.7 4.5 5.4 5.7

Marsh’s risk ratings are generated monthly by a proprietary,

algorithm-based modeling system incorporating over One such country is Egypt, which in 2024 which could allow President El-Sisi to balance These conflicting interests will likely result in
200 international indices across 197 countries. For each will likely spend the equivalent of 40% of creditor requirements with the population’s a difficult multi-directional standoff between
peril, countries are scored on a scale from 0.1 to 10.0, with government revenues on interest payments expectations and the tricky process of governments, international creditors, and
intervals of one decimal; 0.1 represents the lowest risk alone. While the government reached an privatizing state-owned assets, many of domestic interests, and may see businesses
score, 10.0 the highest. Five risk bands are identified within agreement with the IMF on a US$3 billion which are held by the country’s politically caught in the middle.
the scale, correspond to distinct risk environments. deal in December 2022, backed by the powerful army.
prospect of billions more from Gulf states,
HIGH RISK LOW RISK it spent most of the following months The needle El-Sisi will need to thread is
in a standoff with creditors over how to narrow and not dissimilar to the one faced
8.1–10.0 6.1–8.0 4.1–6.0 2.1–4.0 0.1–2.0 by many other governments in this group
accommodate domestic opposition to the
agreed reforms and teetering on the edge of — international creditors expect subsidies
a balance-of-payment crisis. to be lifted, spending cuts, and privatization
pursued (refer Figure 4). However, powerful
Ratings current as of February 2024.
Positively, high turnout in the December 2023 domestic interests and somewhat subsidy-
Source: Marsh
presidential election and western institutions dependent populations are unlikely to easily
newly eager to support Egypt in the wake of accept those changes, which could negatively
Hamas’s attack on Israel has created space affect their quality of life or level of influence.
11 Political risk report 2024

05| Government gross debt/GDP grows globally Advanced economies

Emerging markets are not alone in facing record-high debt burdens this year. Developed countries,
120 including the US, Italy, and Japan, have seen their debts balloon since the COVID-19 pandemic, with US debt
making up more than one-third of the world’s total. Meanwhile, Japan has the second-highest debt/GDP
100 ratio globally (above 250%). Italy’s debt fundamentals have noticeably weakened; as of late 2023, its 10-year
bond yield reached levels rarely seen since the Eurozone crisis.

80 Unlike some of their emerging market peers, however, these advanced economies benefit from important
debt safeguards that can limit the risks faced by investors. US debt is expected to remain the world’s
safe-haven asset; yields on Japan’s debt are uniquely low and, therefore, unusually sustainable; and Italy’s
60
sovereign risk remains manageable thanks to the euro and the watchful eye of the European Central
Bank. Nevertheless, high debts may discourage further subsidy implementation and support the ongoing
40 implementation of trade barriers.
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Europe North Africa North America South America Southeast Asia

Source: International Monetary Fund

12 Political risk report 2024

Export-dependent emerging markets could Vietnam, for example, is expected to have a year of relatively soft growth but is equally likely
face passing headwinds to stand out over the mid- and long-term. In addition to the relative reliability of the country’s
single-party rule and an improved regulatory environment, the government has demonstrated
The second set of emerging markets likely to underperform in 2024 are those with the an apparent skill at navigating the competing interests of major powers; it was the only country
largest trading relationships with major advanced economies (such as the US, the EU, visited by both US and Chinese presidents in 2023.
and the UK), given that many of the latter are expected to see underwhelming growth,
which may drag down import volumes. Short-term economic underperformance, Businesses looking for the countries best placed to benefit from supply chain distortions
however, should not dissuade investors from focusing on the long-term opportunities brought on by macroeconomic competition should consider focusing less on emerging
that these emerging markets provide and the likely benefits they can derive markets’ geographic proximity to major advanced economies. Instead, they should evaluate
from smart positioning within the context of macroeconomic competition. whether governments possess the structures and relationships necessary to steer through a
shifting landscape of competing international incentives.

06| Export-dependent emerging markets that could face passing headwinds

Security environment Trading environment Investment environment

Country
Currency Contractual
Strikes, riots, & Country inconvertibility & Sovereign agreement Legal &
civil commotion Terrorism War & civil war economic risk transfer risk credit risk Expropriation repudiation regulatory risk

South Korea 4.9 1.3 3.0 2.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 3.0 2.9

Malaysia 3.3 2.8 2.2 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.4 4.0 3.7

Mexico 6.1 3.6 2.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.4 6.8 5.4

Philippines 4.9 5.6 5.1 3.8 3.5 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.2

Thailand 5.2 4.9 4.1 3.4 3.0 3.4 2.3 4.6 4.9

Vietnam 4.6 2.2 2.7 3.4 4.7 4.6 3.8 4.8 5.5

HIGH RISK LOW RISK

8.1–10.0 6.1–8.0 4.1–6.0 2.1–4.0 0.1–2.0

Source: Marsh Ratings current as of February 2024.
13 Political risk report 2024

07| Insolvency heat map

CORPORATE INSOLVENCIES PAINT
A VARIED PICTURE Strongly Brazil Netherlands Ireland
Some of the lowest business insolvency growth rates expected in 2024 are likely to be in major emerging increasing Estonia US Poland
Italy
markets — the same markets where governments issued little pandemic support and surviving businesses (+30% and more) South Korea
Japan
were severely tested. In contrast, the wide support provided in many advanced economies means that
insolvency growth rates may remain high as the last pandemic-era zombie firms fail and the remnants of
any stimulus effects work out of the financial system. Noticeably Australia Canada
Chile Lithuania France Finland
increasing
Türkiye Germany Hungary
Broadly, businesses reliant on consumer spending could face the most significant challenges across all (+15% to 30%)
Luxembourg UK
asset classes and sectors, including consumer goods, restaurants, healthcare, and real estate. Cumulative New Zealand Sweden
change Norway
Two downside risks to the divergent insolvency rates stand out in 2024. First, a large volume of speculative- Portugal
over 2023
grade corporate debt comes due in 2025, which could challenge many already distressed borrowers.
and 2024
The second risk is that in the event cautious corporate boards sensing impending economic weakness, Austria
Increasing India Colombia Belgium Denmark
they may act proactively to cut back on capital and operational spending to protect their own balance Czechia Bulgaria Morocco
(0% to 15%) Latvia
sheets. By cutting back on spending, they may contribute to the very economic slowdown they collectively Slovakia Switzerland Spain
hoped to avoid. With interest rates likely to remain high well into 2024, a strong focus on working capital Romania
management and containment of operational costs is warranted. Corporate efforts to reduce nonpayment
risk should pay off in the short, medium, and long term. China
Decreasing Russia South Africa Taiwan Hong Kong
Singapore

Very low level Low level High level Very high level
(more than -20%) (-20% to -5%) (-5% to +20%) (+20% and more)
2024 expected level compared to 2019

Source: National sources, Allianz Research

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14 Political risk report 2024

Climate change and Water shortages increase business

disruption risk

the energy transition: The World Bank estimates that water shortages are
on track to cost some regions of the world 6% of GDP
by 2050, contributing to conflict and exacerbating

National politics and

migration flows as demand grows and supply becomes
unreliable. Short-term water access challenges will likely
persist and worsen, requiring businesses to adapt to
the social and political responses that these climate

international incentives events will inevitably precipitate.

Currently, legal proceedings seeking redress for

disrupted commercial access to water are relatively
uncommon as a limited number of countries have laws
The effects of more frequent and severe climate events on preferencing human consumption over commercial
nation-level policymaking may clash with market forces and the use. However, businesses operating in water-intensive
sectors — including mining, agriculture, and automotive
international consensus behind the energy transition in 2024. — should not expect governments to remain passive
In line with the broadening trend of state-led economic policies, going forward, nor should they overlook the possibility of
water becoming a source of geopolitical tension where
this clash could present in starkly different ways between freshwater supplies cross or share international borders.
emerging and advanced economies. Instead, governments are likely to take stronger actions to
protect and enhance public access to water. For example:
Emerging economies are home to many of the mineral resources necessary for low-carbon technologies while
typically highly exposed to environmental stresses. Governments in these markets will likely try to monetize • Mexico amended its mining code in 2023 to allow the
their natural resources in the form of carbon or nature credits. Further, the impact of climate change could government to revoke a mine operator’s water use
diminish the availability of key inputs, which, in turn, could increase operational challenges for businesses. permits in the event of a significant drought.

In advanced economies, policies designed to disincentivize emissions-heavy industries or develop domestic • Panama capped the number of ships allowed to
green economies may increasingly come into force, occasionally to the detriment of lower-income countries and transit the Panama Canal, as low water volumes
businesses that trade between them. For some emerging economies, however, policies such as the EU’s Carbon required the government to choose between letting
Border Adjustment Mechanism may create valuable investment opportunities in green manufacturing. more ships through the vital waterway and ensuring
water availability for other critical uses.
 15 Political risk report 2024

Worsening food security actions, and those of other advanced economies,

08| Dramatically increased costs for most food types create
increases conflict risk could have adverse effects on vulnerable
conditions for unrest emerging markets.
The link between deteriorating access to food
and energy supplies and increased conflict One recent example is the EU’s anti-
is well understood, and as climate change deforestation legislation, to be enforced
180
intensifies food insecurity, associated conflict starting in December 2024, that forbids the
risk is also compounded. Marsh’s World Risk importation of products into the EU that are
Review model shows the risk of strikes, riots, either created as a result of, or benefited from,
160 and civil commotion has worsened in five out of deforestation. Wary of contravening these rules,
six global regions relative to 2021. businesses are already altering their purchasing
strategies for products, including Ethiopian
A recent World Bank report found that the coffee, Brazilian beef, and Indonesian palm oil,
Food price index

140
number of people living in acute food insecurity distorting well-established supply chains and
increased by more than 60% between 2019 and destabilizing economically significant sectors
2022 and now represents more than 4% of the across several emerging market countries.
120 world’s population. These findings could worsen
once the current El Niño cycle’s full impact on Advanced economies are aware of the
global food availability is felt. And while nearly damaging implications these policies could
80% of people most exposed to crop failures live have for emerging economies but, to date,
100 in either Sub-Sahara Africa or South/Southeast are not doing enough to take action to
Asia, the effects of more frequently disrupted significantly offset their impact. For instance,
harvests will ripple worldwide — for instance, to help countries cope with the effects of anti-
80 through the potential spreading of conflict and deforestation rules, the EU announced a Team
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 larger migration flows. Europe Initiative in December 2023, funded with
an initial sum of €70 million, a small fraction
In 2024’s busy election year, many governments of the likely cost of the policy on impacted
will likely maintain existing food and fertilizer nations. Absent greater support from advanced
Meat indexed Dairy indexed Cereals indexed Sugar indexed
export controls to prevent electorally damaging economies, the economic impact may be
price spikes, with populations in other parts of wide-ranging: Out-of-compliance markets may
the world negatively impacted as a result. divert exports to non-EU countries, free trade
negotiations are likely to be further delayed,
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: FAO.FAOSTAT. License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Climate change mitigation and financing for high-deforestation risk
Accessed: January, 31 2024.
policies of advanced activities will be more challenging to obtain.
economies
With the European Union taking a strong lead on
enforcing climate policies, it is possible that its
6
16 Political risk report 2024

Conclusion
Navigating political and security risks has long been one of the
most complex and ill-defined tasks that organizations must
manage. Recently, this obligation has become more challenging
as the growing trend of self-interested government economic
intervention is layered with an increasing frequency of hard-to-
predict disruptive security events.
Organizations should identify this year’s most • A delicate macroeconomic period will be further
salient risks and discuss the implications for their stressed by high debt levels among companies
businesses, to: and governments, expected weak growth in
advanced economies, and a heightened risk of
• Encourage decision-makers to consider unpredictable conflict events and credit risk.
where certain risks in one geography
• The renormalization of government-led
or sector may increase the likelihood of
industrial and trade policy will overlap
knock-on disruption in another, and how
with the climate change agenda, creating
an understanding of that disruption can
a fluid web of regulatory complexity
guide the use of risk mitigation solutions.
and political risk for businesses.
• Focus on data and look past the noise. Narrative-
In a time of such uncertainty, where the range
filled politics and the potential of AI to spread
of possible scenarios and structural outcomes
disinformation means it can be easy for rapidly
seems to grow ever broader, those businesses
shifting consensus to cloud a long-term view.
that understand, accept, manage, and transfer the
The economic and political structural shifts risks inherent in the changing macroeconomic and
currently underway will both shape and be shaped geopolitical environment will be well-positioned to
by events specific to 2024: pursue growth opportunities that emerge during
this period of transition.
• Election politics in a year likely to see a record
number of voters will focus on internal
economic and international security concerns.
AI may be used to amplify misinformation
and disinformation, potentially creating policy
uncertainty and political violence risks.
17 Political risk report 2024

Contacts
For more information on the Political Risk & Structured Credit (PRSC) market please contact your regional
PRSC leader.

Europe and Latin America

Global Political Risks & Asia and the Caribbean North America
Structured Credit Leader and
CEO Credit Specialties, UK Serene Soo Ed Nicholson Mark McLeod
Political Risk & Structured Political Risk & Structured Political Risk & Structured Credit
Credit Leader Credit Leader Leader
Robert Perry

+44 7385 976 367 +65 9625 3996 +44 7852 765 494 +1 929 319 8508
robert.perry@marsh.com serene.soo@marsh.com ed.nicholson@marsh.com mark.mcleod@marsh.com

Middle East and North Africa Africa Pacific UK and Ireland

Sud Chanthralingam Lynn Harrod Kyle Williams Kate Muir-Jones

Political Risk & Structured Surety & Political Political Risk & Structured Political Risk & Structured
Credit Leader Risk Leader Credit Leader Credit Leader

+971 58 257 1044 +27 71 600 8987 +61 499 033 487 +44 7789 923 390
sud.chanthralingam@marsh.com lynn.harrod@marsh.com kyle.williams@marsh.com kate.muir-jones@marsh.com
About Marsh
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