Covert Action
Covert Action
Covert Action
Covert action is one of many foreign policy tools used by policymakers to advance national interests.
Used in select international efforts, covert action encompasses a broad range of activities outside the
operations of traditional intelligence collection. Sanctioned by the White House and overseen by
Congress, covert action can provide results and otherwise unavailable information.
This memo provides an overview of covert action, including its legal basis, authorization and
notification procedures, and historical examples.
One distinction between covert action and other overt activities, such as traditional diplomatic
or military operations, is that U.S. officials could plausibly deny involvement in the activity. This
“plausible deniability,” however, is predicated upon the covert action remaining secret.
• Example: American involvement in the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation could not be kept secret
once the results became public, so President Kennedy publicly admitted responsibility
afterwards at a White House press conference.
Policymakers still use this foreign policy tool today. For example, covert action was an important
device for U.S. national security interests soon after 9/11, as CIA paramilitary groups, U.S. Special
Forces and indigenous Northern Alliance forces in 2001-2002 removed the Taliban from power in
Afghanistan.
The Iran-Contra experience led to a more substantial and formalized role for Congress for
overseeing and authorizing covert action. In the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress
established the following procedures for covert action:
• The President must determine, through a document called a presidential finding, that a covert
action is necessary to support “identifiable foreign policy objectives” of the U.S. A written
finding must be issued within 48 hours after the official policy decision which approves the
covert action.
• The CIA Director and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the Government
involved in a covert action shall keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed.
• When the President determines that extraordinary circumstances make it essential to limit
access to information about the covert action program, the finding may be reported to the Gang
of Eight: the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders
of the Senate, and other members of the congressional leadership that the President decides to
include.
For many years, Operation Ajax was viewed as tactically successful, as it achieved the U.S.
policymakers’ stated goal at the time. However, some suggest the operation was counterproductive
and had long-term negative repercussions for the U.S., as the Iranian monarchy fell a generation
later to the anti-U.S. clerical regime now ruling Iran.
CIA in Afghanistan 1979-89
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the CIA launched its largest-
ever covert action program to arm the Afghan resistance. During the next ten years, the U.S.,
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan provided the Afghans with billions of dollars of weapons and supplies,
including advanced anti-aircraft missiles. The armaments and aid proved decisive, neutralizing Soviet
air-support in the latter stages of the conflict and eventually causing the Soviets to withdraw from
Afghanistan.
In another example of far-reaching consequences, however, a number of the fighters that the U.S.
trained and equipped during the 1980s may be fighting American and NATO troops in Afghanistan
today.
Sources
Covert Action
Bearden, Milt. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House,
2003.
“Executive Order: Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333.” United States Intelligence Activities. 31 July 2008.
Johnson, Loch K and James Wirtz. Intelligence and National Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s men: an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &
Sons, 2008.
Lowenthal, Mark. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd Edition. CQ Press: Washington DC, 2003.
Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm. New York: Harper Collins, 2007.
Turner, Stansfield. Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence. New York: Hyperion, 2005.