Interpretation of Statutes LAW

Interpretation of Statutes and its Rules

Table of Contents
• Introduction

• Interpretation meaning

• Construction meaning

• Difference between Interpretation and Construction

o Interpretation

o Construction

• Classification of Statutes

o Codifying statutes

o Consolidating statutes

o Declaratory statutes

o Remedial statutes

o Enabling statutes

o Disabling statutes

o Penal statutes

o Taxing statutes

o Explanatory statutes

o Amending statutes

o Repealing statutes

o Curative or repealing statutes

• Rules of Interpretation

o Literal or Grammatical Rule

o The Mischief Rule

o The Golden Rule

o Five part analysis of the golden rule of

interpretation
o Applicability and usage of golden rule of

interpretation
o The judicial criticism faced on the application of

golden rule
o Case laws

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 o Harmonious Construction
• Conclusion
Introduction
One of the most substantial and the principal duty which
are vested on the judiciary is the interpretation of the
statutes or law which are in force. When the courts
deliver justice in a legal dispute, they strictly abide with
the boundaries framed by the legal frameworks which
encompasses certain laws, statutes, The Constitution and
delegated legislations. The legal framework of a
democratic country like India includes a plethora of
legislations and regulations. The Legislature with the
compliance of the procedural Parliamentary rules,
formulates and drafts certain written statutes and
legislations. The courts deliver justice in a legal matter by
interpreting the underlying principles in these
legislations. The written laws are substantiated by the
courts and justice is administered by the courts through
the pronouncement of verdict over the legal dispute. For
the purpose of interpreting statues and to prevent any
wrongful interpretation of the laws, the court should
follow certain rules to shape these laws. So, one of the
most basic rules of interpretation is the Literal rule of
Interpretation of statutes where the court interprets the
wordings of the law as it is. However, there may be
certain loopholes which may be found in the law due to
which it is not interpret a straight-forward understanding
of the language of the statutes. It may lead to ambiguity
and absurdity if the courts interpret the natural meaning
of the language used in the statute.

Interpretation meaning
The term has been derived from the Latin
term ‘interpretari’, which means to explain, expound,
understand, or to translate. Interpretation is the process
of explaining, expounding and translating any text or
anything in written form. This basically involves an act of

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 statute - a written law passed by a legislative body.

discovering the true meaning of the language which has

been used in the statute. Various sources used are only
limited to explore the written text and clarify what exactly
has been indicated by the words used in the written text
or the statutes.

Interpretation of statutes is the correct understanding

of the law. This process is commonly adopted by the
courts for determining the exact intention of the
legislature. Because the objective of the court is not only
merely to read the law but is also to apply it in a
meaningful manner to suit from case to case. It is also
used for ascertaining the actual connotation of any Act or
document with the actual intention of the legislature.

There can be mischief in the statute which is required to

be cured, and this can be done by applying various norms
and theories of interpretation which might go against the
literal meaning at times. The purpose behind
interpretation is to clarify the meaning of the words used
in the statutes which might not be that clear.

According to Salmond, “Interpretation” is the process

by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the
legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed.

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Construction meaning
In simple words, construction is the process of drawing
conclusions of the subjects which are beyond the direct
expression of the text. The courts draw findings after
analysing the meaning of the words used in the text or the
statutes. This process is known as legal
exposition. There are a certain set of facts pending
before the court and construction is the application of the
conclusion of these facts.

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The objective is to assist the judicial body in determining
the real intention of the legislature. Its aim is also to
ascertain the legal effect of the legal text.

Difference between Interpretation and Construction

Interpretation Construction

1. Construction, on the
1. In law, interpretation other hand, refers to
refers to exposing the drawing conclusions
true sense of the from the written texts
provisions of the which are beyond the
statutes and to outright expression of
understand the exact the legal text.
meaning of the words 2. The purpose of
used in any text. construction is to
2. Interpretation refers to determine the legal
the linguistic meaning of effect of words and the
the legal text. written text of the
3. In the case where the statute.
simple meaning of the 3. In the case where the
text is to be adopted literal meaning of the
then the concept of legal text results in
interpretation is being ambiguity then the
referred to. concept of construction
is adopted.

Classification of Statutes
Codified statutory law can be categorized as follows-

Codifying statutes

The purpose of this kind of statute is to give an

authoritative statement of the rules of the law on a
particular subject, which is customary laws. For

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example- The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and The
Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Consolidating statutes

This kind of statute covers and combines all law on a

particular subject at one place which was scattered and
lying at different places. Here, the entire law is constituted
in one place. For example- Indian Penal Code or Code
of Criminal Procedure.

Declaratory statutes

This kind of statute does an act of removing doubts,

clarifying and improving the law based on the
interpretation given by the court, which might not be
suitable from the point of view of the parliament. For
example- the definition of house property has been
amended under the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985
through the judgement of the supreme court.

Remedial statutes

Granting of new remedies for enforcing one’s rights can be

done through the remedial statutes. The purpose of these
kinds of statutes is to promote the general welfare for
bringing social reforms through the system. These statutes
have liberal interpretation and thus, are not interpreted
through strict means. For example- The Maternity
Benefits Act, 1961, The Workmen’s Compensation
Act, 1923 etc.

Enabling statutes

The purpose of this statute is to enlarge a particular

common law. For example- Land Acquisition Act enables
the government to acquire the public property for the
purpose of the public, which is otherwise not permissible.

Disabling statutes

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It is the opposite of what is provided under the enabling
statute. Here the rights conferred by common law are
being cut down and are being restrained.

Penal statutes

The offences for various types of offences are provided

through these statutes, and these provisions have to be
imposed strictly. For example- Indian Penal Code,
1860.

Taxing statutes

Tax is a form of revenue which is to be paid to the

government. It can either be on income that an individual
earns or on any other transaction. A taxing statute thus,
levies taxes on all such transactions. There can be income
tax, wealth tax, sales tax, gift tax, etc. Therefore, a tax
can be levied only when it has been specifically expressed
and provided by any statute.

Explanatory statutes

The term explanatory itself indicates that this type of

statute explains the law and rectifies any omission left
earlier in the enactment of the statutes. Further,
ambiguities in the text are also clarified and checked upon
the previous statutes.

Amending statutes

The statutes which operate to make changes in the

provisions of the enactment to change the original law for
making an improvement therein and for carrying out the
provisions effectively for which the original law was passed
are referred to as amending statutes. For example- Code
of Criminal Procedure 1973 amended the code of 1898.

Repealing statutes

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A repealing statute is one which terminates an earlier
statute and may be done in the express or explicit
language of the statute. For example- Competition Act,
2002 repealed the MRTP Act.

Curative or repealing statutes

Through these statutes, certain acts which would

otherwise be illegal are validated by curing the illegality
and enables a particular line of action.

Rules of Interpretation

Literal or Grammatical Rule

It is the first rule of interpretation. According to this rule,

the words used in this text are to be given or interpreted
in their natural or ordinary meaning. After the
interpretation, if the meaning is completely clear and
unambiguous then the effect shall be given to a provision
of a statute regardless of what may be the consequences.

The basic rule is that whatever the intention legislature

had while making any provision it has been expressed
through words and thus, are to be interpreted according
to the rules of grammar. It is the safest rule of
interpretation of statutes because the intention of the
legislature is deduced from the words and the language
used.

According to this rule, the only duty of the court is to give

effect if the language of the statute is plain and has no
business to look into the consequences which might arise.
The only obligation of the court is to expound the law as it
is and if any harsh consequences arise then the remedy
for it shall be sought and looked out by the legislature.

Case Laws

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Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, In this case, the
appellant, a citizen of India after arriving at the airport did
not declare that he was carrying gold with him. During his
search was carried on, gold was found in his possession as
it was against the notification of the government and was
confiscated under section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act.

Later on, he was also charged under section 8 of the

Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947. The
appellant challenged this trial to be violative under Article
20(2) of the Indian Constitution. According to this article,
no person shall be punished or prosecuted more than once
for the same offence. This is considered as double
jeopardy.

It was held by the court that the Seas Act neither a court
nor any judicial tribunal. Thus, accordingly, he was not
prosecuted earlier. Hence, his trial was held to be valid.

Manmohan Das versus Bishan Das, AIR 1967 SC 643

The issue in the case was regarding the interpretation of

section 3(1)(c) of U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
1947. In this case, a tenant was liable for evidence if he
has made addition and alternate in the building without
proper authority and unauthorized perception as
materially altered the accommodation or is likely to
diminish its value. The appellant stated that only the
constitution can be covered, which diminishes the value of
the property and the word ‘or’ should be read as land.

It was held that as per the rule of literal interpretation, the

word ‘or’ should be given the meaning that a prudent man
understands the grounds of the event are alternative and
not combined.

State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese and others, 1987

AIR 33 SCR(1) 317, in this case a person was caught
along with the counterfeit currency “dollars” and he was

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charged under section 120B, 498A, 498C and 420 read
with section 511 and 34 of Indian Penal Code for
possessing counterfeit currency. The accused contended
before the court that a charge under section 498A and
498B of Indian Penal Code can only be levied in the case
of counterfeiting of Indian currency notes and not in the
case of counterfeiting of foreign currency notes. The court
held that the word currency notes or bank note cannot be
prefixed. The person was held liable to be charge-sheeted.

The Mischief Rule

Mischief Rule was originated in Heydon’s case in 1584. It

is the rule of purposive construction because the purpose
of this statute is most important while applying this rule.
It is known as Heydon’s rule because it was given by Lord
Poke in Heydon’s case in 1584. It is called as mischief rule
because the focus is on curing the mischief.

In the Heydon’s case, it was held that there are four things
which have to be followed for true and sure interpretation
of all the statutes in general, which are as follows-

1. What was the common law before the making of an

act.
2. What was the mischief for which the present statute
was enacted.
3. What remedy did the Parliament sought or had
resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
4. The true reason of the remedy.
The purpose of this rule is to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy.

Case laws

Smith v. Huges, 1960 WLR 830, in this case around the

1960s, the prostitutes were soliciting in the streets of

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London and it was creating a huge problem in London. This
was causing a great problem in maintaining law and order.
To prevent this problem, Street Offences Act, 1959 was
enacted. After the enactment of this act, the prostitutes
started soliciting from windows and balconies.

Further, the prostitutes who were carrying on to solicit

from the streets and balconies were charged
under section 1(1) of the said Act. But the prostitutes
pleaded that they were not solicited from the streets.

The court held that although they were not soliciting from
the streets yet the mischief rule must be applied to
prevent the soliciting by prostitutes and shall look into this
issue. Thus, by applying this rule, the court held that the
windows and balconies were taken to be an extension of
the word street and charge sheet was held to be correct.

Pyare Lal v. Ram Chandra, the accused in this case, was

prosecuted for selling the sweeten supari which was
sweetened with the help of an artificial sweetener. He was
prosecuted under the Food Adulteration Act. It was
contended by Pyare Lal that supari is not a food item. The
court held that the dictionary meaning is not always the
correct meaning, thereby, the mischief rule must be
applicable, and the interpretation which advances the
remedy shall be taken into consideration. Therefore, the
court held that the word ‘food’ is consumable by mouth
and orally. Thus, his prosecution was held to be valid.

Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC

871.

Issues of the case were as follows- section 418 of Delhi

Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to
round up the cattle grazing on the government land. The
MCD rounded up the cattle belonging to Kanwar Singh. The
words used in the statute authorised the corporation to
round up the abandoned cattle. It was contended by

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Kanwar Singh that the word abandoned means the loss of
ownership and those cattle which were round up belonged
to him and hence, was not abandoned. The court held that
the mischief rule had to be applied and the word
abandoned must be interpreted to mean let loose or left
unattended and even the temporary loss of
ownership would be covered as abandoned.

Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Sri

Krishna Manufacturing Company, AIR 1962
SC 1526, Issue, in this Case, was that the respondent
concerned was running a factory where four units were for
manufacturing. Out of these four units one was for paddy
mill, other three consisted of flour mill, saw mill and copper
sheet units. The number of employees there were more
than 50. The RPFC applied the provisions of Employees
Provident Fund Act, 1952 thereby directing the factory to
give the benefits to the employees.

The person concerned segregated the entire factory into

four separate units wherein the number of employees had
fallen below 50, and he argued that the provisions were
not applicable to him because the number is more than 50
in each unit. It was held by the court that the mischief rule
has to be applied and all the four units must be taken to
be one industry, and therefore, the applicability of PFA was
upheld.

The Golden Rule

It is known as the golden rule because it solves all the

problems of interpretation. The rule says that to start with
we shall go by the literal rule, however, if the
interpretation given through the literal rule leads to some
or any kind of ambiguity, injustice, inconvenience,
hardship, inequity, then in all such events the literal
meaning shall be discarded and interpretation shall be
done in such a manner that the purpose of the legislation
is fulfilled.

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The literal rule follows the concept of interpreting the
natural meaning of the words used in the statute. But if
interpreting natural meaning leads to any sought of
repugnance, absurdity or hardship, then the court must
modify the meaning to the extent of injustice or absurdity
caused and no further to prevent the consequence.

This rule suggests that the consequences and effects of

interpretation deserve a lot more important because they
are the clues of the true meaning of the words used by the
legislature and its intention. At times, while applying this
rule, the interpretation done may entirely be opposite of
the literal rule, but it shall be justified because of the
golden rule. The presumption here is that the legislature
does not intend certain objects. Thus, any such
interpretation which leads to unintended objects shall be
rejected.

Five part analysis of the golden rule of interpretation

Whenever there is a shadow of scepticism casted on the

grammatical construction of any law then in such
circumstances, the golden rule of interpretation can be
applied on the law in order to apply it to the facts in a
legal dispute. The external manifestation of the
underlying law which is interpreted from reading between
the lines projects the true intent of the legislature for
which the golden rule is used. By taking into
consideration the consequences of the judgement, the
judges have the discretion to interpret the law in a
rational manner. The analysis of Golden Rule can be
divided into five categories as discussed below:

• WARBURTON’S CASE
Explaining the principle underlying the Golden rule,
Justice Burton in the case of Warburton v.
Loveland observed that in the very first instance of
application of law the grammatical sense of the wordings
of law must be paid heed. But if there is involvement of

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any absurdity, inconsistency, or is against the declared
purpose of the statute then in such circumstance, the
grammatical sense of the law can be modified or
interpreted so far as there is no injustice caused to the
parties of the case. Even though the elementary rule of
interpreting the words as it is in their grammatical sense
has been upheld by the courts in numerous cases
like Madan Lal v. Changdeo Sugar Mills, the courts should
still be open to various interpretations of the law so that
no injustice is caused. This well-known rule was strictly
formulated by Parke B. in the case of Becke v.
Smith wherein it was held that, the wordings of the law
which are unambiguous and plain nature should be
construed in their regular sense even though, if in their
assessment it is absurd or promotes injustice. We
assume the function of the legislature when we deviate
from the ordinary meaning of the statute due to which
from the adherence to its literal meaning we prevent the
manifestation of injustice.

• LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

The term golden rule was coined by Lord Wensleydale
which was later adopted in the case of Gray v.
Pearson due to which it is primarily called the Lord
Wensleydale’s Golden Rule of Interpretation. Lord
Wensleydale expressing this opinion of the rule,
mentioned that he is deeply awestruck with the
perception of the rule which is being universally accepted
by the courts all over the world in order to understand all
the written laws, construing wills and other written
frameworks. He also mentioned that the ordinary
derivative and the grammatical construction of the law
should be abided by in the first instance unless there is
any absurdity or repugnancy due to which it is necessary
to modify the ordinary understanding of the words. In the
case of Matteson v. Hart the golden rule was elaborately
discussed by Jervis CJ where he relied on the Golden Rule
of Construction in order to understand the words used by

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the Legislature in the Acts and also to prevent any
absurdity and injustice which may stem from the
intention of the statute.

• HEYDON’S RULE OF MISCHIEF

In the Heydon’s Rule of Mischief, he elaborated that only
in such circumstances where the intention of the
legislature appears to be unjust, only in such cases the
intervention of the office of judges in interpreting the law
is reasonable. Slightly deviating from what Lord
Wensleydale has opined, instead of viewing the
legislative intent as a whole and construe it all-together,
the reasons for the enactment of the laws in retrospect
should be taken into consideration so that we can derive
the object it plans to subserve and the evil it plans to
end. In the case of Newspaper Ltd. v. State Industrial
Tribunal, the Latin maxim “ex visceribus actus” was cited
which meant that while determining the intention of the
legislation, detached sections of parts of the Act should
not be taken, instead the intention of the act as a whole
which construes the constituent parts should be
considered. This principle was reaffirmed in the case
of Inland Revenue Commissioners. V. Herbert where Lord
Haldane interpreted a legislation which was newly
enacted and he adjudged that “Where words of general
understanding are used, the common understanding of
men is one main clue to the meaning of legislature.” But
the Golden Rule of Interpretation laid by Lord
Wensleydale has been a principle accepted worldwide.

• LITERAL GOLDEN MISCHIEF

As described by Lord Granworth LC, this is a “Cardinal
Rule ” which is a rule based on common sense which is
as strong as can be”. In the English cases, there are
three basic rules as elucidated by GW Paton. Those are:

1. Whatever the result, if the meaning of the wordings

of law is plain then they should be applied as per the
Literal Rule.

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 2. Unless there is any ambiguity or absurdity in the
wordings of the law, the ordinary sense of the law
should be resorted to as per the Golden Rule.
3. The general policy or intention of the statute must
be considered and eliminate the evil which was
directed as per the Mischief Rule.

• LATTER PART OF THE RULE

There is a lot of care which must be taken with regards to
the later part of the Golden Rule and in the case
of Christopher v. Lotinga, every word of the Golden Rule
was subscribed to by Justice Willes. In the case
of Woodward v. Watts, Justice Crompton expressed his
doubts regarding this rule and opined that the Legislature
must have enacted the legislation with a particular intent
which may be destroyed if the courts reinterpret it due to
some absurdity which defeats the whole purpose of the
enactment. To understand the applicability of the three
methods of judicial approach which is the literal rule, the
golden rule and the mischief that the statute is designed
for in order to prevent it, the case of Vacher v. London
Society of Compositors can be referred to. In this case,
the validity of Section 4(1) of the Trade Disputes Act,
1906 was in question as to whether any torturous acts
which are committed by the trade unions are included
under the protection or is it only such are which was
torturous in nature in furtherance of any trade dispute.
Deciding on the former view, the House of Lords relied on
the aforementioned three judicial approaches in which
Lord Macnaughten adopted the golden rule of
interpretation which is derived from the case of Grey v.
Pearson, while Lord Atkinson espoused the literal
approach which is derived from the case of Cooke v.
Charles A Vageler and lastly, the history of the
enactment of the stature and the application the mischief
method has been relied upon by Lord Moulton.

Applicability and usage of golden rule of interpretation

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If there is a choice between two interpretations, then the
interpretation which reduces the futility or which is
narrower in nature fails to incorporate the purpose of the
legislation due to which such a construction must be
avoided as discussed in the case of Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd by Viscount Simon L.C.
Instead, we should admit the bolder form of the
construction which is the intention of the Parliament to
enact the legislation only for the purpose of making the
result effective. The transfer of an undertaking which
includes, property, duties, liabilities and rights from the
old company to a new company is dealt with under
Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929. In the case
of Luke v. R.R.C. an issue was raised with regards to the
transfer of contract of service existing between the
former company and the individual. The House of Lords
adjudged that the notice of amalgamation should be
provided to the individual. The golden rule of
interpretation has been used in this case where if the
prima facie meaning of the words would be taken into
consideration, then no consent would be required of the
employee during amalgamation, but this would lead to
injustice. But in the present case the court deviated from
the wordings of the law and decided that it is the duty of
the transferor company to inform the workers about the
amalgamation.

A restricted Construction was adopted by the legislature

while drafting the Central Services (Classification, Appeal
And Control) Rules, 1956 specifically Rule 11(VI) due to
which it was interpreted by the court by using the Golden
Rule in the case of Nyadar Singh v. Union of India. This
provision imposes a penalty if there is any reduction in
the grade post or service or the pay scale of the
employee. It was adjudged by the Supreme Court that if
any person is appointed to a bigger post or pay grade,
then he cannot be abridged to a lower pay grade or post
due to which this provision acquired a wider construction

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as interpreted by the Court. As per Maxwell, the
applicability of Golden Rule is significant in the area
which is dedicated to the construction of legislations to
adjudge consequences and also the construction of
certain provisions which eliminate injustice and
inconvenience or also evasion.

To explain the applicability of the Golden rule, the case

of Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Panasinghe can be
referred where it was held that if a prisoner escapes from
prison due to fire accident, then he did not commit a
felony under the Statute as this act committed by him
was not with the intention of getting freedom but it is to
save his life. Similarly, if there is any act which is done
on certain justifiable grounds then that act would not
qualify as criminal in nature.

The Supreme Court and High Court in India have applied

the Golden Construction of Statutes in various
judgements as previously discussed. But there is a
certain confusion which is observed between the Golden
rule and the Literal Rule as even though initially the
literal meaning of the statute is taken into consideration
if it is plain and logical but if there is any trace of
absurdity or uncertainty then the interpretation of the
court would pay a significant role. But if there is a
possibility that there is more than one meaning of the
wording in the statute, then any addition, substitution or
rejection should be done by the court modifying the
language so that the intention of the legislature is
expounded. Some of the landmark Indian cases in which
the Golden Rule was used was with respect to the
interpretation of the provisions like “Section 23 of the
Representation of People’s Act, 1951” and Section 3A of
the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 which were dealt with
in Narendra Kiadivalapa v. Manikrao Patil and Annapurna
Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax,
U P respectively. Therefore, the applicability of the
Golden Rule of Interpretation in the Indian cases and the

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foreign cases has a narrow and wide approach which
needs to be observed by the courts in their working.

The judicial criticism faced on the application of golden

rule

The golden rule of interpretation should be adopted with

caution because of certain reasons which were discussed
by the Court in the case of Lord Moulten in Vacher &
Sons v. London Society of Compositor. There is a
possibility that this rule could develop into a conventional
jurisdictive critique of the legislature’s acts’ legality. The
statutes must be interpreted on the basis of the wordings
of the law, and while the respective resultants of two
competing interpretations may occasionally direct us in
our options, we can only do so if we are in a position to
convince ourselves that the words could not have been
used as per the sense of the suggested arguments by
looking at the Act as a whole and comparing it to the
prevailing law of the land at the time of the enactment of
the legislation. The legal rights or laws which are
formulated for the advantage of the community at large
may come in struggle with the individual interest of the
public due to which it may cause injustice in the form of
repugnancy or absurdity. The Apex Court in the case
of State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money has
judged that the duty of the courts of justice is to take
care of the rights of the public at large instead of
individual rights. If the words of the statute are absurd in
their nature, then they should even come under the term
of repugnancy in order to use the Golden Rule due to
which the scope of the term is wide.

The Golden Rule is considered to be an old law which has

been used since the 16th century, when British law was
the fundamental basis for law and parliamentary
sovereignty had not yet been constituted. It is contended
that it gives the unelected judiciary too much jurisdiction
and responsibility, which is undemocratic in nature. The

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Golden Rule also clearly violates the law of the land by
constructing a crime after the occurrence of the events,
as observed in in Smith v Hughes and Elliot v Grey. It
encroaches on the separation of powers by assigning
judges a legislative role, and judges can bring their own
opinions, conscience, and preconceptions to a matter, as
seen in the case of DPP v Bull and Smith v Hughes.

Case laws

Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 850

In this case, there was an issue with regard to issuing of

the notice under section 99 of Representation of
People’s Act, 1951, with regard to corrupt practices
involved in the election.

According to the rule, the notice shall be issued to all those

persons who are a party to the election petition and at the
same time to those who are not a party to it. Tirath Singh
contended that no such notice was issued to him under the
said provision. The notices were only issued to those who
were non-parties to the election petition. This was
challenged to be invalid on this particular ground.

The court held that what is contemplated is giving of the

information and the information even if it is given twice
remains the same. The party to the petition is already
having the notice regarding the petition, therefore, section
99 shall be so interpreted by applying the golden rule that
notice is required against non-parties only.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial

Company, AIR 1967 SC 276, Issues of the case are as
follows.

A transporting company was carrying a parcel of apples

was challenged and charge-sheeted. The truck of the
transporting company was impounded as the parcel

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contained opium along with the apples. At the same time,
the invoice shown for the transport consisted of apples
only.

Section 11 of the opium act 1878, all the vehicles

which transport the contraband articles shall be
impounded and articles shall be confiscated. It was
confiscated by the transport company that they were
unaware of the fact that opium was loaded along with the
apples in the truck.

The court held that although the words contained

in section 11 of the said act provided that the vehicle
shall be confiscated but by applying the literal rule of
interpretation for this provision it is leading to injustice and
inequity and therefore, this interpretation shall be avoided.
The words ‘shall be confiscated’ should be interpreted
as ‘may be confiscated’.

State of Punjab v. Quiser Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC

1604, a period of limitation was prescribed for, under
section 18 of land acquisition act, 1844, that an appeal
shall be filed for the announcement of the award within 6
months of the announcement of the compensation. Award
was passed in the name of Quiser Jehan. It was intimated
to her after the period of six months about this by her
counsel. The appeal was filed beyond the period of six
months. The appeal was rejected by the lower courts.

It was held by the court that the period of six months shall
be counted from the time when Quiser Jehan had the
knowledge because the interpretation was leading to
absurdity. The court by applying the golden rule allowed
the appeal.

Harmonious Construction

According to this rule of interpretation, when two or

more provisions of the same statute are repugnant to each

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other, then in such a situation the court, if possible, will
try to construe the provisions in such a manner as to give
effect to both the provisions by maintaining harmony
between the two. The question that the two provisions of
the same statute are overlapping or mutually exclusive
may be difficult to determine.

The legislature clarifies its intention through the words

used in the provision of the statute. So, here the basic
principle of harmonious construction is that the legislature
could not have tried to contradict itself. In the cases of
interpretation of the Constitution, the rule of harmonious
construction is applied many times.

It can be assumed that if the legislature has intended to

give something by one, it would not intend to take it away
with the other hand as both the provisions have been
framed by the legislature and absorbed the equal force of
law. One provision of the same act cannot make the other
provision useless. Thus, in no circumstances, the
legislature can be expected to contradict itself.

Cases –

Ishwari Khaitan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, in this case, the State Government proposed to
acquire sugar industries under U.P Sugar Undertakings
(Acquisition) Act, 1971. This was challenged on the
ground that these sugar industries were declared to be a
controlled one by the union under Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. And
accordingly, the state did not have the power of acquisition
of requisition of property which was under the control of
the union. The Supreme Court held that the power of
acquisition was not occupied by Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The state
had a separate power under Entry 42 List III.

M.S.M Sharma v. Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395.

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Facts of the case are as follows- Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
expression. Article 194(3) provides to the Parliament for
punishing for its contempt and it is known as the
Parliamentary Privilege. In this case, an editor of a
newspaper published the word -for- word record of the
proceedings of the Parliament including those portions
which were expunged from the record. He was called for
the breach of parliamentary privilege.

He contended that he had a fundamental right to speech

and expression. It was held by the court that article
19(1)(a) itself talks about reasonable freedom and
therefore freedom of speech and expression shall pertain
only to those portions which have not been expunged on
the record but not beyond that.

What are External Aids to the Interpretation of

Statutes?

External aids to interpreting statutes are sources of

information and guidance utilised by courts and legal
professionals to understand the meaning and intent
behind a particular statute. These aids are external to the
statute’s text and provide supplementary context for its
interpretation.

External aids provide valuable assistance in the

interpretation of statutes. They help resolve uncertainties
and fill gaps in the statutory text. The legislative history,
including committee reports, debates and statements
made by lawmakers during the drafting process, is a
commonly used external aid. It provides insights into the
statute’s objectives, purpose and context, assisting in
determining the lawmakers’ intent.

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Case law is another important external aid. Judicial
decisions on related statutes or similar legal issues can
help understand the interpretation given by courts in
previous cases. These precedents serve as a guide for
future interpretations and contribute to the development
of legal principles.

Other external aids include dictionaries, legal treatises

and scholarly articles. Dictionaries help ascertain the
ordinary meaning of words used in a statute. Legal
treatises and scholarly articles provide academic analysis
and expert opinions on statutory interpretation, aiding in
understanding complex legal concepts.

Aids to interpretation can be external, i.e. those not

within the statute, and internal, i.e. those within the
statute. Further, there are certain rules that guide the
judges while interpreting the statutes, and every rule has
to be applied according to the provision in concern. In K.
P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam[1], the
Supreme Court observed that the interpretation of a
statute, it being an exercise in the ascertainment of its
meaning, everything that is logically relevant should be
acceptable as interpretation…There are three rules of
interpretation of statutes – the Literal rule, the Golden
rule and the Mischief rule. An aid, on the other hand, is a
device that helps in the interpretation. The court has to
choose the various internal and external aids for the
purpose of construction or interpretation.

While the internal aids may be of importance, external

aids to interpretation also carry a lot of weight because
they come into use when internal aids fail to deliver a
desirable result. It may also happen that the court may
take the help of both kinds of aids, external as well as
internal, when it becomes almost impossible to derive the

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meaning of a provision. The following text discusses the
external aids to interpretation as well as their application.

In Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose[2], the then

Chief Justice of India, Patanjali Shastri, stated that the
Statements of Objects and Reasons should not be taken
as an external aid to interpretation because it is
presented during the course of the processing of the bill,
and during that period the bill undergoes several
changes, meaning thereby the Statements would also be
liable to amends. But in State of West Bengal v. Subodh
Gopal Bose[3], Justice S. R. Das took into account the
Statements of Objects and Reasons to determine the
socio-political and economic condition of the bill
introduced, even though he fully supported the view in
Ashwini Kumar[4]’s case.

In Indira Sawhney v. Union of India[5], the Supreme

Court, while interpreting Article 16(4) of the Indian
Constitution, mentioned the speech Dr. B. R. Ambedkar
gave in the Constituent Assembly stating that the
expression ‘backward class of citizens’ was not defined.
The Court held that even though Parliamentary debate
cannot be binding upon the courts, it can be taken into
account to determine the context, background and intent
of the legislature.

Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances

Historical facts provide a background to the statute and
are important in establishing the environment in which
the statute was brought forward. This external aid is
specifically important when applying the Mischief Rule of
Interpretation, laid down in Heydon[6]’s case, which
seeks to answer four points:

The law before making of the statute in question

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The mischief (or injury, if loosely stated) for which the
earlier law did not provide
The remedy provided by the statute in question
The reason of the remedy so provided
These points directly correspond to the historical facts of
the statute, i.e. the setting in which the statute is being
enacted. The mischief rule was applied in Bengal
Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar[7], where the
construction of Article 286 was in question. The Court
held that the state can impose sales tax only if all the
ingredients of the sale have a territorial connection.
Several states cannot impose sales tax on the same
transaction.

Historical facts are basically the facts that lead to the

evolution of the statute[8], so they can be of aid to the
judges in finding out the true nature of the statute, and
hence allow a speedy trial. Any ancient fact that
participated in the development of the statute would be
of assistance when interpreting that statute.

Scientific Inventions
It may so happen that once a statute is brought into
force, certain developments related to the provisions of
the statute may take place. In such a case, when the
statute is interpreted, regard must be given to those later
developments, specially in the field of science and
technology, which is an ever-evolving field. The
contemporary society is not stationary; development in
every sphere is taking place at a rapid pace. Thus, these
developments need to be taken into consideration while
statutes made to govern these developments are being
construed.

In State v. J. S. Chawdhry[9], Section 45 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872, was in question. The section
mentions only handwriting experts and not typewriting
experts since typewriters were invented much later, while

Page 25 of 59
in the instant case the party on behalf of the state
wanted to use the opinion of typewriting experts. The
Supreme Court had earlier stated that the opinions of
typewriting experts could not be used[10], but in the
instant case, the Supreme Court ruled in opposition to its
own view and held such opinion as admissible.

Internal Aids to Construction

An ‘Aid’ is a device that helps or assists. While performing

the function of interpreting provision of a statute, the court
can take help from within the statute or even outside the
statute.

The former is called ‘internal aids’ and the latter is called

‘external aids’.

The internal aids include title, preamble, headings,

marginal notes, illustrations, punctuations, proviso,
definition or interpretation clauses, explanations,
schedules and punctuation.

Table of Contents
• Title

o Short title

o Long title

o Limitations of Title as Internal Aid to

Construction
o Preamble

o Marginal Notes

o Limitations of Marginal Notes as Internal Aid to

Construction
o Headings

o Limitations of Headings as Internal Aid to

Construction

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 § Illustrations
o Exceptions and Saving Clauses
o Schedules
o Punctuation
o Limitations of Punctuation Marks as Internal Aid
to Construction
o Explanations
o Limitation of Explanation as Internal Aid to
Construction
o Definition or Interpretation Clauses
o Limitations of Proviso as Internal Aid to
Construction
Title

Short title

The short title of the Act is only its name and is given solely
for the purpose of facility of reference.

It is merely a name given for identification of the Act and

not for description and generally ends with the year of
passing of the Act, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Evidence Act,
1872.

Even though it is a part of the statute, it has no role to

play while interpreting a provision of the Act. Neither can
it extend nor can it delimit the clear meaning of a particular
provision.

Long title

A statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give

a general description about the object of the act. Normally,
it begins with the words An Act to…

For instance, the long title of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 says: An Act to consolidate and amend
the law relating to criminal procedure, and that of the

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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 says: ‘An Act to
consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention
of corruption and matters connected therewith’.

In the olden days the long title was not considered a part
of the statute and was, therefore, not considered an aid
while interpreting it.

There has been a change in the thinking of courts in recent

times and there are numerous occasions when help has
been taken from the long title to interpret certain
provisions of the statute but only to the extent of removing
confusions and ambiguities. If the words in a statute are
unambiguous, no help is derived from the long title.

In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC

274- the title of the Madras General Sales Tax, 1939, was
utilised to indicate that the object of the Act is to impose
taxes on sales that take place within the province.

In the case of Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State

of Orissa AIR 2014 SC 1716- the Court has held that
the title of a statute determines the general scope of the
legislation, but the true nature of any such enactment has
always to be determined not on the basis of the label given
to it but on the basis of its substance.

In Manoharlal v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 418- it

was held that no doubt the long title of the Act extracted
by the appellant’s counsel indicates the main purposes of
the enactment but it cannot control the express operative
provisions of the Act.

In Fisher v. Raven 1964 AC 210 (HL)

• Interpretation of the words ‘obtained credit’ in Section

13(1) of the Debtor’s Act, 1869 was involved.
• The House of Lords looked at the long title of the Act
which reads ‘An Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment

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 for Debt, for the punishment of fraudulent debtors,
and for other purposes’ and held that the words refer
to credit for the payment of money.

Limitations of Title as Internal Aid to Construction

• Title has no role to play where the words employed in

the language are plain and precise and bear only one
meaning.
• Title can be called in aid only when there is an
ambiguity in the language giving rise to alternative
construction.
• Title cannot prevail over the clear meaning of an
enactment.
• Title cannot be used to narrow down or restrict the
plain meaning of the language of the statute.

Preamble

The Preamble to the Act contains the aims and objectives

sought to be achieved, and is therefore, part of the Act. It
is a key to unlock the mind of the law makers.

Therefore, in case of any ambiguity or uncertainty, the

preamble can be used by the courts to interpret any
provision of that statute. But there is a caution here. The
apex court has held in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic
Vishwavidyalaya v. State of M.P. AIR (2013) 15 SCC
677– the court cannot have resort to preamble when the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.

Similarly it has been held that help from preamble could

not be taken to distort clear intention of the
legislature– Burrakar Coal Company v. Union of India
AIR 1961 SC 954.

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In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, it was observed that
the policy and purpose of the Act can be legitimately
derived from its preamble.

In Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity

Regulatory Commission– it was held that the object of
legislation should be read in the context of the Preamble.

In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v.

State of Maharashtra, it was held that Preamble of the
Act is a guiding Light to its interpretation.

Another important example is found in Kesavananda

Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461–
wherein the apex court strongly relied on the Preamble to
the Constitution of India in reaching a conclusion that the
power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under
Article 368 was not unlimited and did not enable the
Parliament to alter the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration AIR 1973 SC

913

• In this case, the appellant challenged his conviction

under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947.
• His main ground was that after the establishment of
the Delhi Special Police Establishment, the anti-
corruption department of the Delhi Police has ceased
to have power of investigating bribery cases because
the preamble of the Delhi Special Police Establishment
Act, 1946 pointed out to this effect.
• The court, however, held that no preamble can
interfere with clear and unambiguous words of a
statue.
• Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment,
1946 empowered the Delhi Special Police also to
investigate such cases.

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In Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. NTC (South
Maharashtra), the Supreme Court while interpreting
certain provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Take over
of Management) Act, 1983 held that when the language of
the Act is clear, preamble cannot be invoked to curtail or
restrict the scope of an enactment.

Limitations of Preamble as Internal Aid to

Construction

• Preamble can be resorted to only when the language

of a provision is reasonably capable of alternative
construction.
• Preamble cannot either restrict or extend the meaning
and scope of the words used in the enacting part.
• In case of conflict between Preamble and a section,
the preamble would succumb and section shall prevail.
• Preamble cannot be regarded as source of any
substantive power or of any prohibition or limitation.

Marginal Notes

Marginal notes are those notes which are inserted at the

side of the sections in the Act and express the effect of the
sections. These are also known as side notes.

In the olden times help used to be taken sometimes from

the marginal notes when the clear meaning of enactment
was in doubt. But the modern view of the courts is that
marginal notes should have no role to play while
interpreting a statute.

The basis of this view is that the marginal notes are not
parts of a statute because they are not inserted by the
legislators nor are they printed in margin under the
instructions or authority of the legislature. These notes are
inserted by the drafters and many times they may be
inaccurate too.

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However, there may be exceptional circumstances where
marginal notes are inserted by the legislatures and,
therefore, while interpreting such an enactment help can
be taken from such marginal notes. The Constitution of
India is such a case. The marginal notes were inserted by
the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, while
interpreting the Indian Constitution, it is always
permissible to seek guidance and help from the marginal
notes.

In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the

Supreme Court held that the marginal notes to Article 286
of the Constitution was a part of the Constitution and
therefore, it could be relied on for the interpretation of that
Article.

In Tara Prasad Singh v. Union of India, it was held that

marginal notes to a section of the statute cannot take away
the effect of the provisions.

In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh AIR 2015 SC

1420 – the apex court held that marginal note appended
to Section 47 of Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
Act, 1955 makes it clear that idea of section 47 was not to
discriminate against employees who acquire disability
during service.

In S.P. Gupta v. President of India

• The Supreme Court held that if the relevant provisions

in the body of a statute firmly point towards a
construction which would conflict with the marginal
note, the marginal note has to yield.
• If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the
provisions in the body of the statute, the marginal
note may be looked into as an aid to construction.

Page 32 of 59
Limitations of Marginal Notes as Internal Aid to
Construction

• Marginal notes are very rarely used for interpretation

as they are not considered to be a good aid to
construction.
• Only those marginal notes can be used for construing
a provision which have been inserted with assent of
the legislature.
• Marginal notes can be called in aid only when language
suffers from ambiguity and more than one
construction is possible.
• Marginal notes cannot frustrate the effect of a clear
provision.

Headings

In all modern statutes, generally headings are attached to

almost each section, just preceding the provisions. For
example, the heading of Section 437 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 is “When bail may be taken in
case of non- bailable offence”.

Headings are not passed by the Legislature but they are

subsequently inserted after the Bill has become law.

Headings are of two kinds- one which are prefixed to a

section and the other which are prefixed to a group or set
of sections. These headings have been treated by courts
as preambles to those sections or set of sections.

Naturally, the rules applicable to the preamble are followed

in case of headings also while interpreting an enactment.
Therefore, if the plain meaning of enactment is clear, help
from headings cannot be taken by the courts.

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However, if more than one conclusion are possible while
interpreting a particular provision, the courts may seek
guidance from the headings to arrive at the true meaning.

A heading to one set of sections cannot act as an aid to

interpret another set of sections– Shelly v. London
County Council, 1949 AC 56

But chapter heading can be used to interpret ambiguous

provisions– Bullmer v. I.R.C.

In Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular

Diseases, it was held that sectional headings have a
limited role to play in the construction of statutes. The
heading of Ch. XXXVI, Cr.P.C. is not an indicator that the
date of taking cognizance is the date on which limitation
period commences.

In Novartis Ag. v. Union of India, the sectional

headings were relied on while interpreting Section 5, 3(d),
2(1) (j) and (ja) and 83 of the Patents Act, 1970.

In Union of India v. ABN Amro Bank

• It was held that the heading of a section can be

regarded as key to interpretation of the operative
portion of said section.
• If there is no ambiguity in the language of the
provision or if it is plain and clear, then heading used
in said section strengthens that meaning.
In N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, it was held that
“Heading” can be relied upon to clear the doubt or
ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to
discern the legislative intent.

Click Above

Limitations of Headings as Internal Aid to Construction

Page 34 of 59
 • Headings can neither cut down nor extend the plain
meaning and scope of the words used in the enacting
part.
• Headings cannot control the clear and plain meaning
of the words of an enactment.

Illustrations

Illustrations are sometimes appended to a section of a

statute with a view to illustrate the provision of law
explained therein. A very large number of Indian Acts have
illustrations appended to various sections.

They being the show of mind of the legislature are a good

guide to find out the intention of the farmers. But an
enactment otherwise clear cannot be given an extended or
a restricted meaning on the basis of illustrations appended
therein.

The Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj

Kumari Sharma observed that illustration is a part of the
section and it helps to elucidate the principle of the section.

However, illustrations cannot be used to defeat the

provision or to modify the language of the section. This is
reflected by a legal maxim “Exampla illustrant, non-
restringent legem” which means examples only illustrate
but do not narrow the scope of rule of a law.

In Mudliyar Chatterjee v. International Film Co., it

was observed that in construing a section, an illustration
cannot be ignored or brushed aside.

In Mohommed Sydeol Ariffin v. Yeah Ooi Gark, it was

held that the illustrations are of relevance and value in the
construction of the text of the section, although they donot
form part of the section. Therefore, they should not be
readily rejected as repugnant to the sections.

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Exceptions and Saving Clauses

Exceptions are generally added to an enactment with the

purpose of exempting something which would otherwise
fall within the ambit of the main provision.

For instance, there are ten exceptions attached to section

499, IPC which defines ‘Defamation’. These ten exceptions
are the cases which do not amount to defamation.

Similarly there are five exceptions attached to section 300

of the Indian Penal Code which defines ‘murder’. These five
exceptions are the cases which are not murders but
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

An exception affirms that the things not exempted are

covered under the main provision.

In case a repugnancy between an operative part and an

exception, the operative part must be relied on.

Some decisions have, however, been given on the principle

that an exception, being the latter will of the legislature,
must prevail over the substantive portion of the
enactment.

In Director of Secondary Education v. Pushpendra

Kumar, the Supreme Court held that a provision in the
nature of an exception cannot be so interpreted as to
subserve the main enactment and thereby nullify, the right
conferred by the main enactment.

In Collector of Customs v. M/s. Modi Rubber Limited,

the Supreme Court held that whenever there is a provision
in the nature of an exception to the principal clause
thereof; it must be construed with regard to that principal
clause.

Saving clauses are generally appended in cases of repeal

and re-enactment of a statute.

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By this the rights already created under repealed
enactment are not disturbed nor new rights are created by
it. A saving clause is normally inserted in the repealing
statute.

In case of a clash between the main part of statute and a

saving clause, the saving clause has to be rejected.

In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra

Yograj Sinha, the Supreme Court did not allow the use of
a saving clause, which was enacted like a proviso, to
determine whether a section in an Act was retrospective in
operation.

In Agricultural and Processed Food Products v.

Union of India, the Supreme Court while interpreting the
saving clause in the Export Control Order, 1988 held that
the clause only saved the rights which were in existence
before the order was issued and it did not confer any new
rights which were not in existence at that time.

Schedules

Schedules attached to an Act generally deals with as to

how claims or rights under the Act are to be asserted or as
to how powers conferred under the Act are to be exercised.
The Schedules are appended towards the end of the
enactment.

Sometimes, a schedule may contain some subjects in the

form of a list as is the case with the Constitution of India
to enable the Union and the states to legislate in their
respective fields.

Schedules are parts of the Statute itself and may be looked

into by the courts for the purpose of interpreting the main
body of the statute.

Page 37 of 59
Similarly, while interpreting the schedules help may
always be taken from the main body of the Act to find out
the true spirit of the Act.

Sometimes, a schedule may contain transitory provisions

also to enable an Act to remain in existence till the main
provisions of the Act begin to operate, such as the Ninth
Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935.

In M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of

Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that in case of a
clash between the schedule and the main body of an Act,
the main body prevails and the schedule has to be
rejected.

In Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan and others,

the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of a schedule is
to advance the object of the main provision and deletion
of schedule cannot wipe out provisions of an Act in effect
and spirit.

Punctuation

In ancient times, statutes were passed without

punctuation and naturally, therefore, the courts were not
concerned with looking at punctuation.

But in modern times statutes contain punctuation.

Therefore, whenever a matter comes before the courts for
interpretation, the courts first look at the provision as they
are punctuated and if they feel that there is no ambiguity
while interpreting the punctuated provision, they shall so
interpret it.

However, while interpreting the provision in the

punctuated form if the court feels repugnancy or
ambiguity, the court shall read the whole provision without
any punctuation and if the meaning is clear will so interpret

Page 38 of 59
it without attaching any importance whatsoever to the
punctuation.

In Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, the Supreme Court

held that a punctuation cannot be regarded as a controlling
element and cannot be allowed to control the plain
meaning of a text.

Therefore, in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West

Bengal, the Supreme court held that the word ‘which’
used twice in Article 22(7) of the Constitution, followed by
a comma after each, was to be read conjunctively because
the context so required.

In Mohammad Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra

• Interpretation of Section 27 of the Drugs and

Cosmetics Act, 1940 was in question.
• This provision says that whoever ‘manufactures for
sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes’ a
drug without licence would be liable to punishment.
• The Supreme Court held that mere stocking of a drug
is not an offence and an offence is made out only when
stocking is for sale.
• There is no comma after the word ‘stocks’ which
means that the words ‘stocks or exhibits’ are both
qualified by the words ‘for sale’ used thereafter.
In Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu, the Supreme Court held that
the punctuation marks by themselves do not control the
meaning of a statute where its meaning is otherwise
obvious.

In the English case of I.R.C. v. Hinchy, it was held that it

is very doubtful if punctuation marks can be looked at for
the purposes of construction.

In Bihar SEE v. Pulak Enterprises, it was held that

punctuation mark (comma) is a minor element in the

Page 39 of 59
interpretation of statute, especially in case of subordinate
legislation.

In Director of Public Prosecution v. Schildkamp,

LORD REID agreed that punctuation can be of some
assistance in construction.

Limitations of Punctuation Marks as Internal Aid to

Construction

• Some jurists have opined that punctuation marks are

of no use as internal aids to construction and it is an
error to rely on punctuation marks in construing the
Acts of Legislature.
• Presence of comma or absence of comma must be
disregarded if it is contrary to plain intention of the
statute.

Explanations

Explanations are inserted with the purpose of explaining

the meaning of a particular provision and to remove
doubts which might creep up if the explanation had not
been inserted.

It does not expand the meaning of the provision to which

it is added but only ties to remove confusion, if any, in the
understanding of the true meaning of the enactment.

A large number of Indian Acts have explanations attached

to various sections. For instance, Section 108 of the Indian
Penal Code which defines the word ‘abettor’ has five
explanations attached to it. Sometimes, explanations are
inserted not at the time of enactment of a statute but at a
later stage. For instance, the two explanations to Section
405 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines the crime of
‘Criminal breach of trust’, were inserted in 1973 and 1975
respectively.

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There may be a case where in spite of many clauses in a
section only one explanation is attached to the section as
is the case with Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. In such a case it must be seen as to which clause
the explanation is connected with– Patel Roadways
limited v. Prasad Trading Company.

In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the

Supreme Court has observed that an explanation is a part
of the section to which it is appended and the whole lot
should be read together to know the true meaning of the
provision.

In Bihta Co-operative Development Cane Marketing

Union v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court said that in
case of a conflict between the main provision and the
explanation attached to it, the general duty of the court is
to try to harmonise the two.

In S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhiraman, the Supreme

Court observed that it is now well settled that an
explanation added to a statutory provision is not a
substantive provision in any sense of the term but as the
plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant
to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have
crept in the statutory provision.

The object of an explanation to a statutory provision is:

• to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act

itself;
• where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main
enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it
consistent with the dominant object which it seems to
subserve;
• to provide additional support to the dominant object
of the Act in order to make it meaningful and
purposeful.

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An explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change
the enactment of any part thereof but where some gap is
left which is relevant for the purpose of the explanation, in
order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of
the Act it can help or assist the court in interpreting the
true purport and intendment of the enactment, and it
cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which
any person under a statute has been clothed or set at
naught the working of the Act by becoming an hindrance
in the interpretation of the same.

In M.K. Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar Shamsunder

Chaudhari, the Supreme Court observed that where a
provision is related to two kinds of accommodation—
residential and non-residential, and the explanation
attached to it refers to only residential accommodation, it
cannot control non-residential accommodation and,
therefore, cannot be looked into in matters connected with
the latter.

Limitation of Explanation as Internal Aid to Construction

• Explanation cannot have the effect of modifying the

language of section.
• Explanation cannot control the plain meaning of words
of the section.

Definition or Interpretation Clauses

Definition or interpretation clauses are generally included

in a statute with the purpose of extending the natural
meaning of some words as per the definition given or to
interpret such words, the meanings of which are not clear,
by assigning them the meaning given in the definition
clause.

Generally, the meaning given to a particular word in the

interpretation clause will be given to that word wherever it
is used in that statute.

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The only exception to this rule is that if the court feels that
in the context of a particular provision the definition
clause, if applied will result in an absurdity, the court will
not apply the definition clause while interpreting that
provision.

Similarly, the definition clause of one Act cannot be used

to explain the same word used in another statute.
However, if both the statutes are in pari materia and the
word has been defined in one Act, the same meaning may
be assigned to the word in the other Act also.

Whenever the words means or means and includes are

used in the definition clause, they afford an exhaustive
explanation of the word in the statute.

The language in which both words ‘includes and shall not

include’ are used, such definitions are inclusive and
exclusive.

The word includes is generally used in the definition clause

to enlarge the ordinary and natural meaning of that
particular word.

In M/s. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy

Labour Commissioner, the Supreme Court observed
that when an interpretation clause uses the word
‘includes’, it is prima facie extensive.

When it uses the words ‘means and includes’, it will afford

an exhaustive explanation to the meaning which for the
purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the
word or expression.

In Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat, the

Supreme Court observed that the use of the word
‘includes’ indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of
the word used in the statute.

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The use of the word denotes in the interpretation clause
shows that the expressions denoted therein are covered
within the ambit of that particular word.

The expression deemed to be in the interpretation clause

creates a fiction. The use of the phrase that is to say in the
definition clause is illustrative of the meaning and not
restrictive.

In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, the JJ

Group of Hospitals was held by the Supreme Court an
industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. The court observed that Section 2 (J) of the Act of
1947 is an inclusive definition clause and is, therefore,
liable to be interpreted in an extended way and not in a
restrictive way.

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saith and Skelton

Private Limited, the Supreme Court, while interpreting
the word ‘Court’ in Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act,
1940, held that its meaning given in Section 2 (c) of the
Act that it means a Court which would entertain a suit on
the subject-matter, cannot be accepted in the light of the
context, and that ‘Court’ in the present instance must
mean a court which appoints the arbitrator.

The Supreme Court in Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar

• Was seized of the question of interpreting the word

‘owner’ in the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods
(Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961
which defined it as the owner and includes bailee of a
public carrier vehicle or any manager acting on the
owners behalf.
• The Court held that the use of the word includes gives
a wider concept to the word and so it means the actual
owner as well as the others included in the definition.
In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras, v. G.R.
Karthikeyan

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 • The question was whether prize money received by a
participant in a motor rally was ‘income’ within the
premise of Section 2 (24) of the Income-tax Act,
1961.
• The Supreme Court held that several clauses in
Section 2 (24) were not exhaustive in nature and,
therefore, money received under any new head not
covered under the provision is income and so subject
to income-tax under the law.
In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta,
the Supreme Court ruled that:

• ‘Housing construction’ comes within the meaning of

‘service’ as defined in section 2(o) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986, even though the provision gives
an inclusive definition of the word ‘service.
• In the aftermath of the case, the Parliament amended
the section and expressly included ‘housing
construction’ in ‘service’.
In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of
Gujarat

• The words “including the power to punish for contempt

of itself” occurring in Article 129 of the Constitution of
India were construed by the Supreme Court.
• This Article declares the Supreme Court to be a Court
of Record.
• It was held that these words do not limit the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of
itself as also of subordinate courts.
Proviso

In some sections of a statute, after the main provision is

spelled out, a clause is added, with the opening words
“provided that…”.

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The part of the section commencing with the words
“Provided that…” is called Proviso.

A proviso is a clause which is added to the statute to accept

something from enacting clause or to limit its applicability.

As such, the function of a proviso is to qualify something

or to exclude, something from what is provided in the
enactment which, but for proviso, would be within the
purview of enactment.

The general rule about the interpretation of a proviso is

that proviso is not to be taken absolutely in its strict literal
sense but is of necessity limited to the ambition of the
section which it qualifies.

The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a

view to enlarge its scope. The proviso must reasonably be
conveyed by the words used therein.

Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the

proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as
the proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers.

The real nature and function of a proviso has been

effectively laid down in following case laws:

In Union of India v. Sanjay Kumar Jain, the function of

proviso was declared that it qualifies or carves out an
exception to the main provision.

In Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, the Supreme Court

held that a proviso cannot be permitted by construction to
defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive
provision.

In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh, it has been

held that though a proviso does not travel beyond the
provision to which it is appended, golden rule is to read

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the whole Section, inclusive of the proviso in such manner
that they mutually throw light on each other and result in
a harmonious construction.

It has been held in R. v. Leeds Prison (Governor), that

the main part of an enactment cannot be so interpreted as
to render its proviso unnecessary and ineffective.

In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal v. M/s.

Shelly Products, the Supreme Court:

• While interpreting the proviso to Section 240 of the

Income-tax Act, 1961 clarified that where a proviso
consists of two parts, one part may be declaratory but
the other part may not be so.
• Therefore, merely because one part of the proviso has
been held to the declaratory, it does not follow that
the second part of it is also declaratory.
• Since proviso (b) to Section 240 of the Act is
declaratory, it was held to be retrospective in
operation.
In Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, the Apex Court held
that a proviso should be construed in relation to the main
provision.

But, in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. V. State of

Tamil Nadu, the apex court clarified that where the main
provision is clear and unambiguous, recourse to the
proviso cannot be taken to interpret it.

In State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, the Supreme Court

held that the proviso has to read as an exception to the
main provision of a section.

Sometimes more than one provisos are attached with the

section. If there is any repugnancy between the two
provisos, the latter shall prevail.

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A proviso may serve four different purposes:

• qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the

main enactment;
• it may entirely change the very concept of the
intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain
mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make
the enactment workable;
• it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become
an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the
tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself;
and
• it may be used merely to act as an option addenda to
the enactment with the sole object of explaining the
real intentions of the statutory provision.

Limitations of Proviso as Internal Aid to Construction

• Proviso is constructed in relation to the section to

which it is appended.
• The ambition and scope of enacting sections cannot be
widened or curtailed by the proviso.

Rule of heydon case

The rule of Heydon's Case, also known as the mischief

rule, was established in 1584. The rule states that courts
should adopt a construction that reduces the mischief
and advances the remedy. The rule is only applicable
when the words used are ambiguous or reasonably
capable of more than one meaning.
The rule is applied to find out what Parliament meant. It
looks for the wrong, or "mischief", which the statute is
trying to correct. The court's role is to suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy.

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The case was heard by the court of Exchequer in 1584.
This was a time of great political conflict between the
church and the crown. The church controlled a lot of land
in England, and the Parliament led by the crown wanted
to get a lot of it back.

The rule in Heydon's case is applicable only when the

words used are ambiguous. Also they are applicable
when they are reasonably capable of more than one
meaning. Say for example, the term 'prize competition' is
defined as any competition. In which prizes are offered
for the solution of any !ુઝલે

Rule of beneficial construction or the Heydon’s Rule

Where the language used in a statute is capable of more

than one interpretation rule, the principle laid down in
the Heydon’s case shall apply. The interpretation rule
which is also known as ‘purposive construction’ or
‘mischief rule’. It has been introduced to avoid
misinterpretation of statutes.

The rule directs that the courts must adopt that

construction which shall suppress (reduce) the mischief
and advance remedy. The rule in Heydon’s case is
applicable only when the words used are ambiguous. Also
they are applicable when they are reasonably capable of
more than one meaning.

Say for example, the term ‘prize competition’ is defined

as any competition. In which prizes are offered for the
solution of any puzzle. It is based upon the building up
arrangement, combination or permutation of letters,
words or figures. The issue is whether the Act applies to
competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in
the nature of gambling. Considering the possibility of
mischief, courts have the opinion. The competitions in

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which success does not depend on any substantial degree
of skill ought to be controlled and regulated by the Act.

Golden rule of interpretation

The golden rule of interpretation is a rule that allows

judges to deviate from the literal meaning of words to
prevent absurd outcomes. The rule states that if the
literal rule produces an absurdity, then the court should
look for another meaning of the words to avoid that
absurd result. The rule aims to give effect to the spirit of
the law.
The golden rule was first propounded by Lord Wesleyan
in 1857, in *Grey Vs. Pearson*. The rule has become
famous by the name of Wensleydale's Golden rule.
The golden rule may be applied in its broad sense to
avoid a result that is contrary to principles of public
policy. For example, the rule was applied in this sense in
Re Sigsworth in 1935, in the context of the
Administration of Estates Act 1925.

The golden rule of interpretation is an expansion or

extension of the literal rule, allowing judges to deviate
from the strict literal meaning of words to prevent absurd
outcomes. According to the golden rule, when
interpreting a statute, the Court must generally adhere to
the ordinary meaning of the words used

What are the Rules of Interpretation

As per Salmond, “interpretation is the process by which
the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of legislation
through the medium of the authoritative form in which it
is expressed.” The word ‘interpretation’ is derived from
the Latin term “interpretari” which means to explain or

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understand. So when we say judges interpret the law, we
mean judges try to ascertain the true meaning of the
words used in a statute.

It is important to note that judges do not get into the

interpretation of statutes unless it is necessary. If the
language of a provision is unambiguous and clear as to
the intention of the maker, the courts do not try and
modify it. Their duty to interpret arises only when the
language of the provision is unclear, vague or
ambiguous. To guide the judges in using this discretion
appropriately, certain principles have been developed
which we now refer to them as ‘rules of interpretation’.

The three rules of interpretation

There are three rules, the literal rule, the golden rule,
and the mischief rule.

The Literal rule

The literal rule is the first rule of interpretation. According
to this rule, the judge has to read the statute as it is and
consider the literal meaning of what’s written. It basically
means to extract the plain meaning of the text. This is
why it is also called the ‘plain meaning rule’. The first
step in interpreting anything is to read whatever is
written as it is. The plain text of the statute can give an
insight into the minds of its makers. In such cases, where
the true meaning can be derived from the normal text of
the statute, no modifications should be made. The end
goal is to derive the one and only meaning of the text.
Thus, this rule shall be applied when the language of a
provision does not give rise to more than one meaning
and is completely clear about what it deals with.

In the case of Duport Steel Ltd v. Sirs (1980), Lord

Diplock observed that where the meaning of the words in
a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for
judges to invent ambiguities to give them an excuse for

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failing to apply the plain meaning to the case at hand
because they presume it to be unjust.

The Mischief rule

This rule originated in Heydon’s case in 1584. It is also
called Heydon’s rule as it was given by Lord Poke in that
case. It is the rule of purposive construction as the
purpose of the statute is most important while applying
this rule. The focus of this rule is to cure the mischief,
which means to prevent the misuse of provisions of a
statute. As per this rule, the meaning of the statute
should be interpreted in a way, where there is no room
for mischief. If there has been an attempt to add mischief
to a statute, then it must be weeded out using this rule.

Let’s understand this rule using an example.

In the year 1959, the Street Offences Act of the UK was

enacted to prohibit prostitutes from soliciting on the
roads to the passing public. After the enactment, the
prostitutes started soliciting from their balconies and
windows. As per Section 1(1) of the Act, it was an
offence for an adult to solicit in a public place for the
purpose of prostitution. The prostitutes were charged
under this Section as their actions defeated the intention
of the legislation. When this was challenged before the
Court, it was found that the meaning of this Section was
being misinterpreted and was being taken advantage of
by the prostitutes. It applied the mischief rule of
interpretation and stated that the intention of the Act was
to prevent prostitution. Thus, it expanded the meaning of
the word ‘street’ and included the balconies and windows
of homes.

The Golden rule

The golden rule is a deviation from the literal rule. It is
used to modify the meaning of the absurd term to give it

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a useful and apt meaning to suit the context. It is
discussed in depth below.

What is the Golden Rule of Interpretation

The golden rule of interpretation was propounded in the
case of Grey v. Pearson by Lord Wensleydale in the year
1957. This is why it is also known as Wensleydale’s
Golden Rule. This rule is the modification of the literal
rule. The golden rule modifies the language of the words
in a statute to successfully interpret the actual meaning
of the legislation. It takes into account the context in
which the words are used so that justice can be done to
the intention of the legislation. It is to be noted that the
rule can be used only when the language of the statute is
ambiguous or grammatically incorrect. Thus the judges
need to be extremely careful with their interpretation and
only exercise this power when it is absolutely necessary.

The golden rule can be applied in a narrow or a broad

sense:

Narrow approach – This approach is taken when the

words in the statute are capable of multiple
interpretations. Through this approach, the judge is able
to apply the meaning which is clear and properly portrays
the true intention of the statute. This approach was used
in the R v. Allen, (1872) case.
Broad approach – This approach is taken when there
exists only one possible interpretation of a word. In some
cases, the meaning might cause absurdity. In order to
avoid this problem, the judges can use this approach to
modify the meaning of the word but this modification
should be limited and shouldn’t deviate from the actual
intention of the legislation. In Re. Sigsworth: Bedford v.
Bedford (1954), this approach was used.
The golden rule of interpretation is the second step after
the literal rule. As we’ve discussed, the literal rule would
apply only when the plain meaning of the word gives

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justice to the intention of the legislation. When the literal
rule fails due to the existence of multiple meanings of a
word in the statute, the golden rule is to be applied.

Advantages of the Golden Rule

An apparent advantage of the rule is that it allows the
judge to modify the meaning of words to remove
absurdity and apply the modified term effectively in the
case at hand.
When the literal rule of interpretation fails to achieve
clarity, the golden rule steps in to help the court.
It guides the judges in applying appropriate principles
while interpreting the meaning of the statute.
It takes away the requirement of amending the
legislation to make minute changes as the judges can do
that for the Parliament. For example, in the R v. Allen
case discussed above, the Court stepped in and closed
the loopholes by applying the golden rule. The
interpretation was in line with the original intention of the
Parliament. Thus, no amendments were required.
Disadvantages of the Golden Rule
The golden rule is restricted in its use as it can be used
only when the literal rule leads to ambiguities in
interpretation. Its use thus becomes limited and rare.
It is unpredictable and lacks guidelines.
One of the main disadvantages of the rule is that judges
can twist the meaning of the words and change the law.
This would cause a disbalance in the separation of
powers.

Ejusdem generis rule of

interpretation…

The ejusdem generis rule of interpretation is a legal

principle that states that general words following specific

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words should be interpreted as limited to things of the
same nature as those specified. The Latin term "ejusdem
generis" means "of the same kind". The rule is used to
interpret loosely written statutes.
For the rule to apply, the specific words must pertain to a
class or kind of objects rather than vastly different ones.
The specific words must form a distinct class or genus.
For example, if a law lists specific classes of persons or
things and then refers to them in general, the general
statements only apply to the same kind of persons or
things specifically listed.
The Supreme Court did not apply the principle of
Ejusdem Generis because the preceding words did not
constitute a genus.

The Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis provides that when a

list of specific words are being followed by the general
words, the general words are interpreted in a way so as
to restrict them to include the items or things which will
be of the same type as those of the specific words.

What is ejusdem generis in interpretation of law?

Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the
same kind," it is used to interpret loosely written
statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or
things and then refers to them in general, the general
statements only apply to the same kind of persons or
things specifically listed.

What is the rule of ejusdem generis Article 12?

Ejusdem generis is a constitutional law principle which
implies 'of the same kind'. It means that when general
words are followed by specific words, the general words
should be interpreted to include only such items and
things as are enumerated by the specific words

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Kesavananda bharati case summary

Kesavananda Bharati Case, also known as the

Fundamental Rights Case, holds a significant place in the
history of the Supreme Court of India. This landmark
case introduced the concept of the basic structure
doctrine, which safeguards the fundamental principles
and ideals of the Indian Constitution. The case involved
Kesavananda Bharati, a prominent petitioner, and
resulted in a 7:6 decision by the court, striking down
amendments that violated the Constitution’s fundamental
structure.

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala Case, 1973, is a

prominent legal case that established the concept of the
basic structure doctrine in the Indian Constitution,
ensuring the protection of fundamental constitutional
principles. This case holds great importance in the UPSC
exam as it falls under the polity section of the UPSC
Syllabus. It helps candidates understand the concept of
the basic structure of the Constitution, which is crucial in
comprehending the legal framework and constitutional
provisions of India.

The Kesavananda Bharati case was a landmark case in

India's constitutional and legal history. The case
originated in March 1970 when Kesavananda Bharati, the
head of a Hindu monastery, challenged the Kerala
government's attempt to take over the land. The main
points of the petition were that the Kerala Land Reforms
Act violated the rights of property owners and went
against the principles of equality and justice.
The Supreme Court established some landmark principles
in the 1973 Kesavananda Bharati case. The court upheld
the 24th Amendment Act and affirmed the first provision
of the 25th Amendment Act. However, the second clause
of the 25th Amendment Act was deemed unconstitutional

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because it undermined judicial review. The court also
defined the extent to which Parliament could restrict
property rights. The court ruled that the Parliament could
restrict property rights to pursue land reform and
redistribute large landholdings to cultivators. This ruling
overruled previous decisions that suggested that the right
to property could not be restricted.

In the Kesavananda Bharati Case 1973, the Supreme

Court established some landmark principles as the 24th
Amendment Act was upheld. The first provision of the
25th Amendment Act was affirmed, but the second clause
was deemed unconstitutional as it undermined judicial
review, a fundamental aspect of the કો()*ટટ, ૂશન

What was the decision of Kesavananda Bharati?

The Constitutional Bench in Kesavananda Bharati case
ruled by a 7-6 verdict that Parliament could amend any
part of the Constitution so long as it did not alter or
amend the basic structure or essential features of the
Constitution.

What is the importance of Kesavananda Bharati case?

The importance of Kesavananda Bharati judgement

As the Kesavananda Bharati judgement imposes limits on

the powers of the Parliament, it's considered to be a
landmark judgement securing India's democratic
credentials and also asserting independence of the
Judiciary

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Rule of language in statutory
interpretation

The rules of statutory interpretation are guidelines that

courts use to interpret statutes. The main rules are:
The literal rule: Words that have only one meaning
should be given that meaning.
The golden rule: The ordinary meaning of words should
be used unless there is ambiguity or absurdity.
The integrated approach: Also known as the purposive
approach.
The courts should interpret the law as it stands and not
modify, alter, or quantify its language. For example, if a
statute prohibits "dogs, cats, and rabbits", and does not
mention other animals, it would be interpreted as
excluding other animals from the 0ો1હ3બશન

There are three rules of language that used are often

used by the courts to aid in the interpretation of statutes
and contracts. Ejusdem generis: This maxim means "of
the same kind or nature". It is used when a general term
in a statute or contract is followed by a list of specific
examples

What are the rules of language in interpretation of

statutes?
Under this rule the court try to interpret Statute on the
literal, ordinary, popular, and common meaning of the
word and phrases. This rule postulates that it is duty of
the court to expound the law as it stands and not to
modify, alter or quantify its language

What are the 4 rules for the interpretation of statutes?

Contents hide
3.1. The Literal Rule of Interpretation of Statutes.
3.2. The Mischief Rule of Interpretation of Statutes.
3.3. The Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statutes.

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3.4. Rule of Harmonious Construction.

What is rule of law in legal language?

rule of law, the mechanism, process, institution, practice,
or norm that supports the equality of all citizens before
the law, secures a nonarbitrary form of government, and
more generally prevents the arbitrary use of power...
What are the 3 basic principles of interpretation of
statutes?
The main principles of interpretation are the Literal Rule,
Golden Rule and Mischief Rule. (1) The Literal Rule:
According to this rule, the words used in statutes and
legal instruments are to be construed literally i.e. by
giving the words their ordinary grammatical meaning...

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