22 - Interfaces and Interactions Between Railway Control v2
22 - Interfaces and Interactions Between Railway Control v2
struck through but will be set on new reading list editions nos. 24, 25, 26 & 27
The railway system is made up of various subsystems which interact to deliver the required outputs,
normally the movement of passengers and freight. The way these systems interact all have a role to
play in the safe and efficient running of the overall railway. Railway control and communications
systems are designed and operated whilst taking into account their interactions with related
systems. This article gives an overview of the interfaces and interactions between railway control
and communications systems and the related subsystems in the railway environment.
• Signalling;
• Telecommunications;
• Operations, including control centres, passenger information and public address systems;
• Drivers;
• Rolling stock;
• Permanent way / track – including the rails, fasteners, sleepers and ballast / slab track as
well as on-track train detection & monitoring systems;
• Civil Engineering structures, including bridges, tunnels and stations;
• Electric traction supply;
• Electric power systems;
• Evacuation systems.
During the life of a railway system, changes will be made either to enhance its capacity and
capability, renew life expired assets or add new services. When making changes to one part of the
system it is essential that the impacts of the change on other parts of the system are considered if
the overall system is to continue to perform its functions safely and correctly.
The interfaces with the signaller are described in more detail in the Back to Basics Article “Operator
Interfaces” (IRSE News, Issue 269, September 2020).
Train Describers
To set the correct route for a train, the signaller needs to know the identities of the individual trains
as they enter, pass through and leave the control area. Each train is allocated a train reporting
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number, to identify the train. The train reporting number allocates each train a unique identity
which may be based on a combination of the train type, destination, operating company and an
identity number.
The train reporting numbers are initially entered into the system by the operator, which may be a
signaller, or depot controller at the start of the train’s journey. The train describer then uses
information from the interlocking about the status of the signalling system to “step” the train
through the control area. At the fringes of the control area, the information is passed to adjacent
train describers via a telecoms link.
The train reporting numbers can be manually altered, or interposed by a signaller if required. This
may occur when a train has reached the end of its timetabled service and needs to start a new one,
when a train divides to form two separate services or two trains join to make one.
The train describer system is not safety critical, as the interlocking protects trains from unsafe
movements if a train is misrouted.
Passenger information and automated public address systems usually take their inputs from the
train describer and the timetable information to create real-time data. More information on
passenger information systems can be found in the Back to Basics article “Telecoms Part 2” (IRSE
News, Issue 271, November 2020).
An automatic train protection system take information about the status of the signalling system,
such as signal aspects, issued movement authorities or permissible speed information. The system
automatically intervenes if trains are travelling too quickly to safely stop at a signal at danger or
buffer stop, or decelerate sufficiently for a speed restriction. The intervention may consist of an
alarm and/or visual indication in the driver’s cab, or go further and automatically apply the brakes
until either the train has slowed sufficiently or stopped completely, depending on the system
installed.
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automation, including starting and stopping of trains, operation of doors and handling of emergency
situations. It is primarily in use in metro systems, but is becoming more widespread on mainline
railways. Automatic Train Operation takes input from the signalling system to determine how far
ahead the line is clear, and trackside beacons that transmit brake commands to the train. The train’s
on-board computer calculates the required the braking curve to bring the train to a stand at the
correct position in platforms or at junctions. The braking calculations are updated frequently to
ensure accuracy.
In some cases, the signal spacing would allow for trains with better braking performance to run at
higher speeds than others, whilst still maintaining sufficient distances between signals. In these
cases those trains may be permitted to travel at a higher speed.
The braking characteristics of the rolling stock authorised to run on a route also impact on signing of
maximum permissible speeds. Where there is a large reduction in maximum permissible speed,
sufficient warnings for the speed reduction needs to be given for the trains to slow to the lower
speed. This may be via lineside signage, or restrictive signal aspects to force a train to slow down.
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The braking characteristics of trains impact on the design and efficacy of automatic train protection
systems. Some train protection systems evaluate train speed against the distance to a speed
restriction or signal at danger and intervenes or sounds a warning if the train is travelling too quickly
to brake sufficiently.
For trains fitted with in-cab signalling systems, movement authorities are issued via radio and
displayed in the cab for the driver. The train’s on-board system calculates braking curves using speed
restriction information, train current position and speed, train braking characteristics and the
distance to the end of movement authority. The system warns the driver of possible over-speeding
and may intervene by applying the brakes to slow the train if it is necessary.
Where gradients are falling in the direction of travel (downhill), the spacing between signals needs
to be increased to allow for longer braking distances. This is of particular importance for freight
trains. Where gradients are rising (uphill), the spacing between signals can be reduced due to
shorter braking distances.
Positioning a signal at the bottom or part way up a steep rising gradient should be avoided because
of the time taken to accelerate and possible wheel slip during poor adhesion conditions. This is
particularly important for heavy freight trains or where trains may be required to stop frequently.
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In metro systems, sometimes the stations are designed to be at the top of a rising gradient. This
helps to reduce braking effort to stop the train and the consequential heat generation from braking.
Another problem arises where there are several lines running in the same direction and it is difficult
for a driver to identify which line the signal applies to. This problem can be mitigated by placing
signals parallel to one another, by providing additional reading distance for the signals, or by
mounting signals on the other side of the line to increase separation between signal aspects.
Cant is the slope of the track across the rails, where the outer rail of a curve is positioned higher
than the inner rail, providing a banked turn; thus allowing trains to move through the curve at a
higher speed than would otherwise be possible. This consequentially affects the maximum
permissible speed on the line, signal spacing and required sighting distances. The cant can cause
issues with cable routing or, at level crossings, uneven cross track profiles for road users.
A simple set of points consists of four rails. The two outside rails (stock rails) are fixed. The two
inside rails (switch rails) can move from side to side at one end. For a train to safely pass through a
set of points, one side of the switch must be physically touching the stock rail and the other switch
rail must allow sufficient space for the train’s wheels to pass between it and the other stock rail.
The crossing section of a set of points is usually a cast lump of metal which allows breaks in the
running rails sufficient to allow the flange of the wheels to cross the running rail of the other track. A
check rail help keep the train’s wheels on the track where there is a risk that the train could move
laterally. The check rail simply guides the wheel by applying a barrier to the wheel.
A common arrangement of points connects two parallel lines of a double track railway. This
combination is known as a ‘crossover’ and both point ends are often worked together under one
control so that they are always in correspondence with one another, that is, both set for the straight
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route, or both set for the route over the crossover. Crossovers, and some other arrangements of
crossings are illustrated on the next page.
Switch diamond, for higher speed junctions. Single slip, where two tracks cross and it is
There is no useable connection between the possible to move from one line to the other.
two lines. Double slips have a slip on each side.
Point Machines
Points can be controlled by direct connection to a control lever, such as in a mechanical signal box or
ground frame, where the movement of the points are under the direct control of a human.
More commonly, the points are driven by a point machine, powered by an electric motor or
hydraulic system, with the movements controlled by the interlocking. In both cases, when the points
are in use, they are required to be locked in position, so that the points cannot be moved by the
signalling system or the vibration of the train. This is particularly important when they are facing
points and helps to prevent derailment and damage to the points.
The interlocking must know the position of the point blades, to check that the points are in the
correct position for the safe movement of trains and have not failed or become obstructed. An
individual detector rod is attached between the point blades and point machine that proves the
position of the point blades by making the appropriate contacts within the point machine. If the
blades are out by as little as a few millimetres, the rods will not be in the correct position and will
prevent the contacts operating. The state of the contacts is fed back to the interlocking so that the
signalling system is aware of the lie of the points.
Other types of point machine exist that apply locking and prove point lie in different ways, but the
requirement for locking and detection of points is essentially the same.
Catch/Trap Points
It is sometimes necessary to derail a train deliberately to protect against potential collision with
another train.
Catch points are designed to derail anything running against the normal direction of traffic, such as
loose wagons that have no or ineffective brakes and have “run away”. The spring catch point
consists of one point blade, normally open in the derailing position. A train moving in the normal
direction will push the point blade closed against a spring and continue unimpeded. A train moving
in the wrong direction will derail at the spring catch. Another type of catch point is the wide-to-
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gauge type, consisting of two switches that work in opposite directions with the switches either both
open or both closed. These are operated by the signalling system and a train travelling over these
points whilst in the open position will be derailed.
Trap points protect lines from trains on adjacent lines that have passed a signal at danger, typically
at the exit from sidings or freight loop lines. They are controlled by the interlocking, with locking and
detection of point lie fed back to the signalling system.
Junctions
Where two railway lines meet, there is potential for conflict between trains. Signals, or limits of
movement authority are required close to junctions to prevent trains traversing the junction when it
is not safe to do so and to authorise trains to traverse the junction when it is safe.
Signals are usually placed with a safety margin (overlap) between the signal and any potential points
of conflict to protect trains traversing the junction from a train overrunning one of the protecting
signals due to an error in braking judgement. It is undesirable for signals to be placed at very long
distances from the junctions because this would reduce the junction capacity due to the increased
time required for a train to clear the junction after being given a movement authority.
• Axle counters. These count the number of axles passing over a given point. They are
clamped to one of the rails and their location can be constrained by, for example, the
presence of check rails or third rails for traction power.
• Train protection systems. There are many different systems, but all involve track mounted
equipment sending information to the train by electrical, magnetic or physical means.
• ETCS (European Train Control System), CBTC (Communications Based Train Control) and
automatic driving systems. These typically require equipment fixed to the sleepers between
the rails to transmit to or receive information from trains. The equipment can include
beacons or transmitters (often known as balises or transponders) and loops of cable.
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• Hot axle box detectors. These consist of infrared scanners that measure the abnormal levels
of heat generated by failing bearings in axle boxes. Failed bearings cause the axle to seize
and can cause derailment, so early detection is essential.
• Other items can be fitted to the sleepers rather than the rails such as beacons for on board
train announcements or speed restrictions and loops of cable for coded track circuits.
Tunnels and viaducts also present a challenge for the installation and maintenance of equipment,
due to difficult access for staff, particularly if the tunnel or viaduct is long.
Limited clearance within tunnels can make it very difficult to place signals clear of the train’s
kinematic envelope, and this is sometimes managed by using special, smaller tunnel signals.
The ability of a driver to see signals at the minimum reading distance can be adversely affected by
the walls of the tunnels, particularly if clearance within the tunnel is tight, or the tunnel is curved. It
can be difficult for a driver to see the aspect displayed by a signal against a sunlit background if it is
placed close to the exit of a tunnel, especially if the tunnel is long or narrow.
Bridges can also affect the ability of drivers to see signals immediately beyond it, as they may be
obscured by the walls or span of the bridge.
A driver must be able to read, interpret and understand a signal aspect for a sufficient distance on
the approach. However, buildings, platform furniture, waiting shelters, canopies and passenger
standing on the platforms can adversely affect this, particularly if the platform is curved. To aid the
driver, an additional signal can be provided on the approach to the station, or part-way along the
platform to give the driver an early indication of the next signal aspect.
The proximity of platforms to the railway line can make installation, inspection and maintenance of
lineside equipment difficult. Where practical to do to, equipment such as train detection equipment
are placed clear of the platforms so that staff can work on equipment in a position of safety.
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In built up residential areas, where noise may be a problem for residents nearby, unnecessary
railway-related noise must be kept to a minimum. The audible alarms on level crossings may sound
at a lower level at night, or restrictions on the use of train horns on the approach to footpath
crossings may be imposed, enforced by signage or regional / national operating instructions.
Trains should not stop on level crossings unless it is unavoidable, so signals need to be positioned so
that they would not cause a train to obstruct the crossing when standing at the signal. Vandalism is
also a risk at level crossings, so all equipment should be a sufficient distance from the crossing,
ideally placed beyond security gates and anti-trespass guards / devices.
One of the difficulties with using one of the running rails for traction return is that the running rail
may also form part of the signalling train detection circuits. In this case there is the need for the
signalling equipment to be able to distinguish between the traction current and the track circuit
current. Train detection boundaries must also allow the traction return current to flow past the
boundary to the next track section, but prevent the flow of track circuit current across the boundary.
For more information on how this is achieved, refer to the Back to Basics article “Train Detection –
the Basics” (IRSE News, Issue 261, December 2019).
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overhead line. The current carried by the return conductor is weaker than the overhead lines, so
there is still potential for interference in the lineside signalling and telecoms cables.
Neutral Sections
Sources of traction power (feeder stations) need to be electrically insulated from one another, so a
neutral section is provided where no traction power is supplied. This is sufficiently long to ensure
that no train can be electrically connected to two separate supplies simultaneously, but not so long
that a train will not have enough energy to reach the next live section.
It is important that the signalling system is designed such that no train ever comes to a stand within
a neutral section, as any electric train would not be able to accelerate away again.
Immunisation
The effects of induction in signalling circuits can be limited by designing the signalling circuits and
equipment to be immune from the unwanted currents. This is particularly important in the design of
train detection systems where track circuits are used. In areas of AC electrification, DC track circuits
may be used, and vice versa. Alternatively, AC track circuits can be used that have no harmonics in
common with the traction current, enabling the track circuit receiver to distinguish between the
track circuit current and any traction current that may be present in the rails.
Signal Sighting
Overhead line equipment can affect the ability of a train driver to read and interpret lineside signals
and signs when they are obscured by equipment, even if just momentarily. This is a particular
problem where overhead line masts are on the inside of curves and may be overcome with the use
of cantilever structures for the overhead line masts or alterations to the positions of signals and
lineside signs.
In areas electrified by overhead line, any metal equipment beneath or near the overhead line is
bonded to a running rail carrying traction return current so that if the wires carrying the traction
current were to fall, the equipment is earthed via the running rail, protecting the equipment from
damage and staff and public from electric shock.
In third/fourth rail electrified and non-electrified areas it is not usual practice to bond all metal
structures to the traction return rail.
Signalling equipment within apparatus cases must be earthed to protect staff and equipment from
electric shock from contact with exposed conductive parts, such as circuitry, and other conductive
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parts that could be made live by an electrical fault. Other protective measures include enclosing high
voltage equipment in insulated units, providing insulated covers for live parts or insulating
conductors.
Signalling and telecoms equipment is commonly powered by a dedicated supply, and may be backed
up by an uninterruptible power supply in case of failure of the supply point, to allow time to change
to an alternative supply.
The signalling system may also be required to respond quickly to protect a hazard, such as a train
crash or fire. In many cases, trains involved in an incident may already be protected by the signalling
system. However, there may be a requirement for passengers to exit the train in a hazardous area
(or indeed they may do it contrary to instructions) and the signaller will require a mechanism for
protecting the site – by replacing all signals in the area to danger or sending an “all trains stop”
command via the radio, for example. Emergency communication and signalling intervention is
essential to prevent further problems or disaster.
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