CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION
All courts, whether civil or criminal, posses, in the absence of any express provision, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of
justice. This is on the basis of the principle “quando lex aliquid alicue concedit, concedere
videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest” which means ‘when the law gives a person
anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist’1.

The idea of inherent powers depends on making a distinction between powers that are expressly
granted by the constitution or by statutes and those that a government, a constitutional
functionary, or a single officer of government, possesses implicitly, whether because of the
nature of sovereignty or due to a permissive interpretation of the constitution or a law’s
language.

The word “inherent” means something that is natural or always connected to something else.
So, when we talk about inherent powers, we mean the abilities a court has to make sure
everything is fair and complete in a case.
Meaning of ‘inherent’ is existing in something as a permanent, absolute, inseparable, essential
or characteristic attribute. Inherent powers of courts are those powers which may be applied by
the court to perform full and complete justice between the parties before it. It is the duty of the
Courts to serve justice in every case, whether given in this code or not, brings with it the
important power to do justice in the absence of a definite or separate provision. Courts duty to
do justice in all cases, whether provided for or not, carries with it the necessary power to do
justice in the absence of express provision. This power is said to be the inherent power that is
maintained by the court, though not conferred2.

The Black’s law dictionary defines it as “powers over and beyond those explicitly granted in
the Constitution or reasonably to be implied from the express grants.”

Webster’s new world dictionary defines the inherent power as “a power that must be deemed
to exist in order for a particular responsibility to be carried out.”

1
J.D. Pinsler, “The Inherent Powers of the Court” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1997).
2
K. P. Kylasnatha Pillay, Inherent Powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (1999) (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cochin University of Science and Technology).

1
Courts duty to do justice in all cases, whether provided for or not, carries with it the necessary
power to do justice in the absence of express provision.

The Code has rules, but they can’t cover every situation because the people who make the rules
can’t predict everything that might happen in the future. That’s when these inherent powers
come into play. They can be used when there are no specific rules in the Code to handle a
situation and they are used to make sure things are fair and just.
Inherent power is given to both civil courts and criminal courts.
INHERENT POWERS OF COURTS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (C.P.C)
1908:
Sec 151 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with the inherent powers. This provision being a
part of procedural law requires a liberal interpretation to advance the cause of justice and
further it ends or to effect enforcement of substantive rights.
The inherent powers are considered necessary to do the right and undo the wrong in the course
of administration of justice4 and to be regarded as ‘supplementary to specially conferred
powers. Inherent powers have roots in necessity and they are coextensive with necessity in
order to do complete justice3. Section 151 of the Code gives inherent powers to the court to do
justice. That provision has to be interpreted to mean that every procedure is permitted to the
Court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited, and not that every procedure is prohibited
unless expressly permitted. Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra4.
The law relating to inherent powers is contained in Sec 148 to Sec 153A of the Civil Procedure
Code, which visualizes the exercise of powers in different circumstances.
INHERENT POWERS OF COURTS UNDER CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE (C.R.P.C) 1973:
Section 482 of CrPC, which deals with the inherent powers of the high courts. Such powers
can be exercised to secure ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any court and to
make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, depending
upon the FACTs of a given case. The court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice
and prevent the same by exercising its powers under section 482 of Cr.P.C. These powers are
neither limited nor curtailed by any other provisions of the Code. However, such inherent
powers are to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
The object and purpose of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Dinish Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan as follows: “The principle embodied in the section is
based upon the maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo
res ipsa esse non potest. This maxim means that when the law gives to anyone, it gives all
those things without which the thing itself would be available”.

3
Nitish Kaushik, “Scope of the Inherent powers of the High court under s.482 of Cr.P.C,1973” (April 5, 2013),
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2316261orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2316261
4
AIR 2011 SC 1137

2
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has not given the details of that what exactly constitutes
the inherent power of the court. In that sense, the Code is very vague as it does not lay out the
grounds on which the foundations of the inherent power of court lay. Consequently, the
application of Section 482 of CrPC is a very agitated issue in litigation along with being a
strongly debated concept in the legal academic circles.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The inherent powers of courts refer to the authority vested in the courts to act in a manner
necessary to uphold justice and maintain the rule of law, even when such actions are not
explicitly provided for in statutes or rules. These powers are considered inherent because they
are essential for the courts to function effectively and fulfill their role as dispensers of justice.
In India, the inherent power of courts is recognized and protected by the Constitution of India.
Article 142 of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power to pass any order necessary
for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. This provision empowers
the Supreme Court to exercise its inherent power to ensure a just outcome, even in situations
where the law may be silent or inadequate.
The concept of inherent power is not limited to the Supreme Court alone. The High Courts in
India also possess inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
allows them to quash criminal proceedings in certain cases in the interest of justice. These
inherent powers are exercised sparingly and with great circumspection, taking into account the
facts and circumstances of each case5.
In India, the concept of inherent powers of courts finds roots in the English legal system, where
courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction to do justice between the parties before them. The
inherent powers of courts in India are recognized under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, civil courts in India have inherent powers to make orders as may be necessary for the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court6.
This provision empowers the courts to pass orders that are not specifically provided for in the
Civil Procedure Code but are essential to secure the ends of justice. Similarly, under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Courts in India have inherent powers
to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. This allows the High Courts to exercise their inherent powers to
prevent the misuse of the criminal justice system and uphold the principles of justice.
The inherent powers of courts are not unlimited and must be exercised judiciously and in
accordance with established legal principles. The courts must ensure that their inherent powers
are used to fill gaps in the legal framework or to prevent injustice, rather than to bypass
statutory provisions or infringe upon the rights of the parties before them.

5
https://blog.ipleaders.in/section-482-crpc
6
Aruna Shyam M ‘A Critical Study Of Inherent Powers Of High courts In Administration Of Criminal Justice
In India’ 2023 <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/10603/454830>accessed23 june 2024

3
The development of inherent power has been shaped by various judicial pronouncements over
the years. The Supreme Court has held that the power should be used sparingly and only in
exceptional circumstances. The courts have also emphasized the importance of adhering to the
principles of natural justice and ensuring that the exercise of inherent power is fair and just.
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the need to protect the independence
of the judiciary and to prevent executive subordination and political interference in judicial
functioning. The courts have been vigilant in defending their institutional composition and
power, and have taken steps to ensure that they can exercise their inherent power without any
external influence.
Overall, the historical development of the inherent power of courts in India reflects the
evolution of the legal system and the changing needs of society. The courts have played a
crucial role in shaping and defining the scope of inherent power, and have used it to ensure that
justice is served and the rule of law is upheld.
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

• Writ Proceedings Under Article 226/227

The main distinction between Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution is
that Section 482 only applies to cases or procedures involving the Code and cannot be used in
other matters, whereas Article 226 grants the High Court more discretion to exercise than
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. A writ can be issued against the State in any circumstance. A similar
provision is included in Article 227, which grants the High Court the authority to preside over
all courts within the region within its purview. A judicial as well as an administrative authority
of supervision is granted by this article. Therefore, this provision provides the High Court broad
authority to ensure that the procedures of the courts below it are not misused. A writ petition
under Articles 226 and 227 may be used to request a directive that may be granted under
Section 482 of the Code. The High Court has frequently held the position that any ruling can
be challenged through a writ procedure without affecting the High Court’s inherent powers.

• Exercise Of Inherent Powers Differs From Appeal And Revision

The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is not part of the ordinary litigation process. The court
does not serve as an appeals or revisions court when using its section 482 authority. Statutes
were used to create the appeals and revisions processes; they were not intended to be a part of
the court’s inherent authority. When exercising its inherent authority, the High Court would
not review the evidence in the same way that it did if the case had come before the court via
statutory appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court clearly erred in admitting the
second revision application under section 482 in the case where a Sessions Judge had dismissed
the revision application against the order of the judicial magistrate and the High Court had
entertained the second revision application by the same party barred by section 397 (3) of the
Cr.P.C. The High Court’s decisions made while acting under its inherent authority are not

4
subject to legislative appeal. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the affected party may file
a special leave petition with the Supreme Court in opposition to the High Court’s decision7.

There are mainly three purposes for which the inherent power can be exercised. They are:

(1) To give effect to an order passed under Cr.P.C

(2) To prevent abuse of the process of any court

(3) To otherwise secure the ends of justice.

Even though the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide,
it has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified. The High Court can and must utilise its inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C.
only in situations where it is satisfied that an order passed under the Code would be rendered
ineffectual, that any court’s process would be abused, or that the goals of justice would not be
attained.

Ordinarily, barring a few exceptions, the following principles have been followed by the courts
in relation to the exercise of inherent power:

(a) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Cr.P.C. for
redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(b) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(c) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other
provision of the Code.

The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according
to whim or caprice. The inherent power contemplated by section 482 has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not the
rule but an exception.

The majority of cases involving the assertion of inherent rights are brought in an effort to have
the criminal proceedings interrupted at any point, so it is important to thoroughly comprehend
these claims. In R.P.Kapoor v. State of Punjab8, the Supreme Court listed some of the types of
requests for the dismissal of criminal proceedings that might warrant the High Court exercising
its inherent authority to do so:

(i)The High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground if the criminal
proceeding in question relates to an offence that an accused person is accused of having

7
http://student.manupatra.com/Academic/Abk/Code-of-Civil-Procedure.
8
(2001) 8 SCC 570

5
committed and it is clearly evident that there is a legal barrier to the institution or continuation
of the said proceeding.

(ii)Cases arising under this category, for instance, might be provided by the absence of the
necessary sanction.

(iii)There may also be situations in which the First Information Report or complaint’s
allegations, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the
alleged offence. In these situations, there is no need to consider the value of the evidence; one
must simply determine whether the alleged offence is disclosed by reading the complaint or
the First information Report.

In Pepsi Food v. Special Judicial Magistrate, the Supreme Court held that even though the
magistrate can discharge the accused at any point during the trial if he believes the charges are
without merit, this does not preclude the accused from filing a petition with the High Court
under section 482 to have the complaint dismissed if it does not allege that the accused
committed a cognizable offence against them. Therefore, the court determined that the High
Court’s ruling refusing to dismiss the case on the grounds that the accused had access to
alternative remedies under the code was improper.

After reviewing a number of prior Supreme Court rulings on the subject, the Supreme Court
once again reaffirmed the factors necessary for the dismissal of a criminal case in Indian Oil
Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd9. The following were the relevant principles that the court so
declared:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegation made in the complaint, even if
accepted in their totality and taken at face value, do not, on their own, establish an
offence or establish the guilt or innocence.

(ii) (ii) A complaint may also be quashed when there has been an obvious misuse of the
legal system, such as when it is determined that the criminal case was started with the
intent to hurt or exact revenge, or when the charges are ridiculous and improper

(iii)The ability to quash, however, may not be utilised to stop or thwart a valid investigation.
Use the power wisely and with great caution.

(iv)The legal elements of the alleged offence need not be described in detail in the complaint.
The proceedings should not be thrown out if the complaint has all the necessary factual
information, this is true even if some elements have not been described in great detail. Only
when the complaint is so devoid of even the most basic facts that are absolutely necessary for
proving the offence is it warranted to quash the complaint.

(v) A given set of facts may point to:

(a) a civil wrong that is also a criminal offence;

9
2006 (6) SCC 736

6
 (b) a criminal offence that is just a civil wrong; or

(c) both a civil wrong and a criminal offence.

A business deal or a legal issue may also contain a criminal offence, in addition to providing
grounds for seeking relief under civil law. The mere fact that the complaint relates to a
commercial transaction or breach of contract for which a civil remedy is available or has been
used does not by itself constitute a ground to dismiss the criminal proceedings because the
nature and scope of civil proceedings differ from those of criminal proceedings. If a criminal
offence is revealed by the complaint’s accusations, that will be the test.

• Exercise Of Inherent Power To Direct Registration Of FIR

In many cases, the petitioner would approach the High Court praying for a direction to the
state to register the case if the police had not done so. However, the Apex Court has shown its
displeasure with this practise. In Zakir Vasu v. State of U.P 10, it was held that the High Court
should not support this practise and should typically decline to intervene in such matters,
leaving the petitioner to pursue his alternative remedies before the relevant police officers first
under sections 154(3) and section 36 Cr.P.C. and, if that doesn’t work, by approaching the
concerned magistrate under section 156(3). Keeping in mind the fact that inherent powers must
be used sparingly and by way of abundant caution11.

• Inherent Powers Are Not To Be A Factor In Post-Conviction Appeals

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P12, the Supreme Court took seriously the fact that the
High Court had, in response to a section 482 petition, stayed both further proceedings against
the accused and the nonbailable warrant that the trial court had issued against him due to his
absence from court on the day of verdict after the accused had been found guilty and was
awaiting the order of sentence to be passed on him. The Supreme Court ruled that the orders
issued by the High Court were unlawful and expressed displeasure that they were issued under
section 482 rather than directing the convict to appear in court for further proceedings and
disregarding the fact that the accused will have the right to appeal even after being sentenced.

• No Power Under Section 482 To Review Its Judgement

The Supreme Court ruled in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa13, that there is no
clause in the Criminal Procedure Code that allows the High Court to appeal a decision it made
while exercising appellate, revisional, or original jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be used in
conjunction with or as a cover for another authority under section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

• The Order Shall Be Required To Resolve The Case In Accordance With The Law

10
AIR 1983 SC 911
11
Raj Kumar Yadav, “First Information Report in India: A Study of Legislative and Judicial Trends” 14
Maharshi Dayanand University Research Journal 175 (2009).
12
(1977) 4 SCC 551
13
(2001) 1 SCC 169

7
 In State of Rajasthan v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava14, the Supreme Court struck down the portion
of the High Court’s ruling issued in accordance with section 482 of the code that forbade the
state from taking any negative or punitive action against the petitioner as a result of the FIR
that was filed. According to the Supreme Court, making such a decision was completely
unnecessary to resolve the dispute.

• Inherent Power And Quashing Of FIRs

Very often petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are filed in the High courts to quash First
Information Reports registered by the police. In a catena of decisions the Supreme Court has
consistently given a note of caution that inherent power of quashing an FIR should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases. The Supreme Court
has also held that the High Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR and inherent power
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whims and caprice.
In Kuruskshetra University v. State of Haryana15, the Apex Court observed: It surprises in the
extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. it could quash an FIR. The police had not even commenced investigation into the
complaint filed by the warden of the university and no proceedings at all was pending in any
court in pursuance of the FIR. It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice It has also been
held that the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution16.

• Quashing Of FIR After Chargesheet Is Filed

Even after the prosecution has filed a chargesheet, the High Court has the authority to quash a
FIR under Section 482. The parties may also reach an agreement. Even after the investigation,
the accused can inform the Court that there is no material evidence against him. Another option
for the accused is to plead inherent improbability based on the full facts and evidence gathered
against him in the charge sheet. Because the High Court's powers under Section 482 are broad,
it can issue an order quashing a FIR under such circumstances.

• FIR Quashed On The Grounds Of A Compromise

The FIR can be overturned by the High Court at any time based on a compromise. The
complainant and the accused can reach an agreement. Both parties might submit a joint plea
for FIR quashing under Section 482 CrPC. Following that, the Court will examine the facts,
circumstances, and elements of the case before issuing a quashing order. If the High Court is
not pleased with the facts of the compromise, the quashing on the basis of compromise can be
denied. If the offence is compoundable and the High Court has declined to quash the FIR, the
parties might go to the Trial Court. If the parties to the process have reached an agreement and

14
2012 CriLJ 1181
15
[1977] 4 SCC. 551
16
Debasmita Panda and Rucha Bhimanwar, “Quashing of a Criminal Proceedings in Respects of Non-
Compoundable Offences on the Basis of Compromise”, 4, Supremo Amicus 146 (2018), available at
https://supremoamicus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/v4g16.pdf

8
sought for the FIR to be cancelled, the High Court can order it to be quashed. The High Court
in Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab17, refused to quash the FIR on the grounds that the
offence under section 406 of the IPC is not compoundable. An appeal was filed to the Supreme
Court, which concluded that “it is likely appropriate that in conflicts when the issue is of a
purely personal nature, the court should typically accept the terms of compromise even in
criminal proceedings”

• FIR Quashing In Financial Disputes

When a financial issue is resolved after the parties reach an agreement, quashing the FIR is the
natural option. If certain major offences other than economic offences are involved, parties
frequently resort to a Compromise Deed and seek the quashing of the FIR. Using the authority
provided by Section 482 CrPC, the High Court can issue an order for quashing on the grounds
of settlement, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case.

• Second FIR Quashed On Petition Under Section 482 Cr.p.c

A second FIR based on the same facts is not allowed. The second FIR would not be invalidated
if the facts and allegations of the earlier FIR differed from the facts and allegations of the
second FIR. A person cannot be harassed or accused twice in two FIRs for the same or related
crimes, hence the second FIR would be cancelled on a petition under S. 482 CrPC. If the
charges in the FIR do not establish a case against the accused or are so ludicrous and
fundamentally unlikely that no reasonable person could possibly conclude that there is
adequate foundation to proceed against the accused, In such instances, the High Court has the
authority to quash the FIR in order to protect the interests of justice and avoid misuse of the
court’s procedure. The High Court has the ability to quash a FIR or even a complaint under
S.482, CrPC, subject to the limitations and criteria set down in various judgments. However,
the High Courts must use this power with caution and only in the most exceptional of
circumstances.

• Quashing Of FIR When Investigation Has Not Begun

The High Court cannot quash the FIR if the police investigation has not yet begun and there
are no proceedings pending in any court in connection with the FIR. Because the FIR does not
reveal any offence, the inquiry cannot be quashed because it might be conducted using other
evidence18.

• FIR Disclosing Offence

An FIR should only be overturned in the most exceptional of circumstances. When a prima
facie case is revealed in a FIR, the FIR cannot be quashed simply because it was filed late. The
High Court would not be justified in quashing the initial information report if the FIR discloses
the crime. If the facts in the FIR appear to disclose a cognizable offence, the High Court is

17
(2008) 4 SCC 582
18
K.p. Kylasanatha pillay, ‘Inherent Powers Of The High Court Under Section 482 Of The Code Of Criminal
Procedure, 1973’

9
required to investigate the veracity, reliability, sufficiency, and adequate proof of the facts
alleged, as well as to conduct a meticulous examination. It is not necessary at this stage to
determine whether all of the ingredients are precisely spelled out in the complaint. The
FIR/Complaint cannot be quashed if the petitioner fails to prove that the allegations in the
FIR/Complaint do not constitute an offence. When a FIR reveals an offence, it cannot be
quashed before the inquiry is completed. If, after considering the charges in light of the oath
statement, the ingredients of the offence are revealed and the complaint is not mala fide,
frivolous, or vexatious, there would be no grounds for the High Court to intervene When a
prima facie case is established, the FIR cannot be quashed under Section 482, CrPC, and the
evidentiary value of the statements cannot be evaluated in a petition under Section 482, CrPC.
When a FIR reveals the commission of alleged crimes, the accused’s denial is insufficient to
quashing the FIR. Under S. 482, CrPC, a FIR that discloses a cognizable offence cannot be
quashed. The FIR in a case under S.376, IPC would not be invalidated just because the
prosecutrix might be embarrassed in the future. Even if the prosecution is mala fide, or the
offence is of a technical nature, if the allegations in the FIR constitute an offence, the
prosecution cannot be quashed. The High Court cannot use its inherent power under S. 482,
CrPC to quash a FIR or police inquiry in response to a Magistrate’s order under S.156(3).
Whether or not the accusations in the complaint are true, an order for investigation under
Section 156 (3) CrPC is without authority and can be invalidated under Section 482
CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution. There cannot be a blanket prohibition on the quashing of
a proceeding while it is still under investigation. If the High court is convinced that the first
information report discloses a cognizable offence and that the continuation of an investigation,
based on no foundation would amount to an abuse of power of police, necessitating interference
to secure the ends of justice the inherent power will have to be exercised. The High Court will
interfere with the investigation only if non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice.

• Quashing Of FIR If Allegations Do Not Constitute An Offence

The High Court is normally hesitant to interfere with FIR and inquiry, but it can be quashed if
the FIR does not disclose components of a cognizable offence. The High Court may, in the
exercise of its inherent powers, quash a FIR that contained no Facts constituting an offence. A
full bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that there is no blanket bar against the
quashing of a first information report and the consequent investigation. It has laid down the
following requisite preconditions for the exercise of the power
(i) When the FIR, even if accepted as true, discloses no reasonable suspicion of the
commission of a cognizable offence.
(ii) When the materials subsequently collected in the course of an investigation further disclose
no such cognizable offence at all;
(iii)When the continuation of such investigation would amount to an abuse of power by the
police; and
(iv) That even if the FIR or its subsequent investigation purports to raise a suspicion of a
cognizable offence, the High Court can still quash if it is convinced that the power of
investigation has been exercised mala fide. After charge sheet against the accused has been
filed and charge has been framed in the case, the question of quashing FIR on petition filed
10
 under S. 482 CrPC would not arise. The power of the High Courts to quash FIRs while
exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC even for offences which are not
compoundable under Cr.PC has been settled in a number of judgments.
• Quashing Of FIR In Matrimonial Cases
The Courts in India are now normally taking the view that endeavour should be taken to
promote conciliation and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family
affairs such as, matrimonial disputes between the couple or between the wife and her in-laws.
This has led to a situation where the High Courts are exercising the power under section 482
to quash prosecutions launched invoking section 498A of Indian Penal Code.

• Other Aspects

The High Court can in the exercise of its inherent power expunge remarks made by it or by a
lower court in respect of any conduct of a person or official if it be necessary to do so to prevent
abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In State of Telangana
v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani19 the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the question
whether the High Court while refusing to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to interfere in an application for quashment of the
investigation, can restrain the investigating agency not to arrest the accused persons during the
course of investigation. A single Judge of the High court while considering a petition filed
under section 482 referred to the FIR and also took note of the submissions of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that all the allegations that had been raised in the FIR were false and
they had been falsely implicated. Thereafter the Judge expressed his disinclination to interfere
in the matter on the ground that it was not appropriate to stay the investigation of the case.

19
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 141

11
 CHAPTER- II
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
• SECTION 482 C.R.P.C
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with the inherent power of the high
court. It reads:
Saving of inherent power of High Court:
“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of any process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”.
Three circumstances are listed in section 482 Cr.P.C. that allow the High court to employ its
inherent powers, including
(i) carrying out a code-mandated order,
(ii) guarding against misuse of the legal system, and
(iii) generally advancing the interests of justice.
The three requirements are not mutually exclusive; rather, their application would inevitably
result in overlap. For instance, it is impossible to distinguish between preventing abuse of the
legal system and achieving justice’s purposes; in reality, preventing such abuse would serve
only to secure the ends of justice only.
It also serves to secure the goals of justice to carry out an order made pursuant to the code.
The scope of “securing the goals of justice” is obviously a fairly broad term that encompasses
the first two requirements as well. A rigid regulation that would control how the court would
employ its inherent powers cannot be established and is neither desired nor attainable. The
High Court’s authority is unquestionably very broad and unrestricted under the afore mentioned
paragraph20.
Ex debito justitiae must be used sparingly, deliberately, and sensibly in order to carry out true
and substantive justice, for which the court is the only institution that exists. The High court
hasn’t received any new authority as a result of the inclusion of this clause; it already had those
powers.
Additionally, it does not grant any additional powers. Only that the court’s inherent powers
shall be protected is stated in this clause. The old Cr.P.C of 1898 had a section 561-A that is
equivalent to section 482 of the Cr.P.C. With regard to the provisions of the old Cr.P.C. of 1898,

20
Diganth Raj Sehgal, ‘Inherent Powers of the High Courts’2019<https://blog.ipleaders.in/inherent-powers-of-
the-high-courts/>accessed 10 may 2024.

12
the 1973 Cr.P.C. simply changed the sections number from 561-A to 482 without altering
anything from what was provided in the section.
The Indian courts have often ruled that the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court
cannot be constrained, cabined, or limited to certain cases that have already been resolved. As
a result, these powers must remain flexible and not be in any way restrained, as was intended
by parliament. However, Indian courts have also issued a warning against overusing this
authority. In R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab21 the Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Gajendragadkar observed that, in general, a criminal proceeding against an accused person
must be tried under the general provisions of the Code, so the High Court should be reluctant
to quash the proceeding at an interlocutor. The case involved the High Court seeking to use its
inherent powers to stop the criminal proceedings. This statement was made while stating the
well established fact that the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can quash a
criminal case in order to accomplish the objectives of justice or prevent misuse of any court’s
process22.

• SECTION 151 C.P.C

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court.

Section 151 is a kind of saving clause, where the inherent powers save by this section can be
used to secure the ends of justice. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lays down:

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the
Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse
of the process of the court." Section 101 does not confer power on the Court, it only
acknowledges the inherent powers of the Court by virtue of its being a judicial forum to
dispense justice”.

Generally under its inherent powers under section 181, the Court can recall its own orders and
can correct mistakes: can set-a-side an ex-parte order passed against the party; can issue
temporary injunctions; can add, delete or transpose any party to a suit; can revive execution
applications; can allow amendment of pleadings, etc. But only after looking into the facts and
circumstances of the case. A court cannot act under the shelter of such powers arbitrarily but
is supposed to invoke its judicial mind before granting relief to the applicant.

The inherent powers of the Court under section 151 can be exercised:-

(1) For ends of justice.-

21
(2001) 8 SCC 570
22
Gauraw Kumar, ‘Inherent Powers Of The Court Under CPC, 1908’2020<https://blog.ipleaders.in/inherent-
powers-of-the-court/> accessed 12 may 2023.

13
The following two rules relating to ends of justice may be noted:

(a) It is in the ends of justice that injury should be remedied and needless expenses and
inconvenience to parties be avoided.

(b) It will not be in the ends of justice to exercise inherent powers if it would interfere with the
interest of third party or cause mischief or in justice.

(2) To prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.--

The power under this head or section 151 can also be exercised to prevent the abuse of the
process of a court. Such abuse may be committed by a court or by a party. The basic principle
of section 151 is that, the injustice, if any, so done to the party must be remedied on the basis
of the doctrine actus curae neminem gravabit.

So abuse of process whether it is by way of instituting vexatious, obstructive or dilatory tactics,

or by encouraging multiplicity of litigations, or by practising fraud on the Court, or by trying
to secure an undue advantage over the opposite party, the Court while applying its judicial
mind may grant some relief to the applicant, in the interest of justice.

Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders (sections 152, 153 and 153A).

The Rules of Procedure are hand made’s of justice. Section 151 of the Code gives inherent
powers to the court to do justice. That provision has to be interpreted to mean that every
procedure is permitted to the Court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited, and not that
every procedure is prohibited unless expressly permitted. Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash
Chandra Mishra23.

LIMITATIONS OF INHERENT POWER OF COURTS

Following are the limitations on the inherent powers of the Court:

(i) The Court has no inherent power to do what is prohibited (expressly or impliedly)
by the Code so as to defeat the statutory provisions of the law of the land. Section 151
does not invest the Court with jurisdiction over the matters which are excluded from its
cognizance.

(ii) Where specific provisions are contained in regard to particular issue(s) under the
Code, the Court has no power to make such provision(s) meaningless and to devise its
own procedure.

(iii) The inherent power is not to be exercised under the applicant has remedy provided
elsewhere in the Code but has neglected himself. Equity aids the vigilant not the
indolent. Further, where the applicant did not came to court with clean hands and has
suppressed the facts, the inherent power is not to be exercised.

23
AIR 2011 SC 1137

14
 (iv) The inherent power of the Court is in relation to the procedural matters, for section
151 is part of procedural Code. This section cannot be used to disturb the substantive
rights of the parries.

The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very broad but are
not unlimited. There are certain limitations to the inherent powers of the High Court, which are
listed below:

• Inherent powers under Section 482 can only be exercised in cases when no other legal
remedy is available in the whole Code. If the Court could grant remedy from any other
provisions of the Code, the inherent powers under Section 482 could not be invoked.
• The Court will never act as an investigating authority in any situation while exercising
its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.
• The Court could not conduct a mini-trial while exercising the inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code. As preventing the abuse of the process of any court is an
objective of Section 482, the High Court would not act arbitrarily and would never cut
down the normal procedures of trial from a trial Court.
• The Parliament cannot add any new or specific powers to the inherent powers. As the
inherent powers are not granted, and they are vested in the High Court, it is not possible
to add any new inherent powers.

In case of Manohar Lal v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal24, it was observed that--"the
restrictions on the inherent powers are not because they are controlled by the provisions of the
Code, but because it should be presumed that the procedure provided by the legislature is
dictated by the interests of justice."

24
AIR 1962 SC 527 (1962) Supp 1 SCR 450

15
 CHAPTER- III
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
PADAM SEN AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH25

FACTS
Padam Sen and Shekhar Chand (the "Appellants") appealed against the order of the Allahabad
High Court dismissing their appeal against the order of the Special Judge, Meerut, convicting
them of an offence under Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code (the "IPC"). The High Court
granted leave to appeal against its order.
Genda Mal, father of Shekhar Chand, Appellant 2, sued Mithan Lal and others in the Court of
the Additional Munsif. Ghaziabad. for money on the basis of promissory notes executed by the
defendants in his favour. The appellants do not challenge these findings of fact recorded by the
courts below. Their only contention is that Sri Raghubir Pershad, the Commissioner, was not a
public servant, and therefore even on the basis of the findings of fact arrived at by the courts
below, they did not commit any offence under Section 165-A of the IPC.
ISSUE
Whether the appointment of Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner for seizing the plaintiff's
books of account was without jurisdiction and whether he can be treated as a public servant
under Explanation 2 to Section 21 of the IPC.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court held that the Additional Munsif had no power under the Code to appoint
the Commissioner for seizing the plaintiff’s books of accounts. The order appointing sri
Raghubir Prasad as Commissioner for this purpose was therefore an order passed without
jurisdiction and was therefore a null and void under. It was also held that Sri Raghubir Prashad
cannot be held to be a public servant as the Explanation does not apply when there is no pre-
existing post. or when the person appointing has no authority to appoint. Therefore, the
appellants did not commit any offence under Section 165-A of the IPC by their offering him
money in order to have an opportunity to tamper with the books of account which were in his
custody. The appeal was allowed, the order of the Courts below was set-a-side, and the
appellants were acquitted of the offence Under Section 165-A. The fine, if paid, was to be
refunded The appellants were on bail and therefore the bail bonds were cancelled.

GORIGE PENTAIAH V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS26

FACTS
The appeal is directed against the judgement dated 19-9-2006 passed by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh. Gorige Pentaiah, s/o Bakkaiah abused the appellant with the name of their
caste on 27-5-2004, but no action was taken against them. The complaint filed by Respondent

25
[1961] 1 S. C. R. 884
26
2009 Cri.L.J. 350

16
3 lacked the basic ingredients of the offence and Section 506 of the Penal Code. The allegation
made in the complaint that the appellant demolished the wall on 14-6-2004 could not arise les
Respondent 3 was not even in possession of the land in question.
ISSUE
Whether the High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice?
JUDGEMENT
The appeal is allowed and disposed of. The impugned judgment passed by the High Court is
set aside, and the complaint emanating from Crime No. 281 of 2004, Police Station Uppal.
Hyderabad, is quashed.
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The power under
Section 482 CPC has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Exercise of power under Section
482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand would in deed secure the ends
of justice.
Filing of such a frivolous complaint in the instant case is a total abuse of process of law.
Consequently, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set aside, and the complaint
emanating from Crime No. 281 of 2004, Police Station Uppal, Hyderabad, is quashed.

MOHIT ALIAS SONU AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND

ANOTHER27
FACTS
Kamta Prasad died due to injuries alleged to have been caused by the accused. The High Court
directed the lower court to summon the accused-appellants under Section 319 CrPC The
appellants appealed to the Supreme Court

ISSUES
• Whether the application of the complainant before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC
challenging the order passed under Section 319 CrPC was maintainable.
• Whether the Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient evidence on record
for the purpose of exercising power under Section 319 CrPC
• Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned order.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court held that the complainant ought to have challenged the order before the
High Court in revision under Section 397 CrPC and not by invoking inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The Court also held that for the purpose of exercising
power under Section 319 CrPC, the Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient
evidence on record and not only on the basis of prima facie case. The Court further held that

27
(2013) 7 SCC 789

17
the High Court erred in passing the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the High
Court to consider the matter afresh after giving an opportunity. of hearing to the present
appellants.

OMPRAKASH YADAV V. STATE OF M.P AND ANOTHER28

FACTS
On 12-10-2007 at 8.30 AM at Firozabad, the respondent No. 2 and co-accused allegedly
committed the murder of the petitioner's brother. Suman Prakash Yadav, by firing gun shots at
him. The petitioner lodged a report on the same day at PS Firozabad UP and a case was
registered against respondent No. 2 and others under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, and 307 of
the Indian Penal Code.
However, a case under the Excise Act was registered at Police Station Morar by Town Inspector
Niranjan Upadhyaya and others, apparently in an attempt to create a ground of alibi for
respondent No. 2 in connection with the murder of Suman Prakash Yadav.
ISSUES
1. Whether the case registered under the Excise Act is fabricated and manipulated to create an
alibi for respondent No. 2?
2. Whether the inherent powers of the Court should be invoked to secure the ends of justice
and prevent an abuse of the Court's process?
JUDGEMENT
The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the case registered under the Excise Act is
fabricated and manipulated solely for the purpose of creating an alibi for the petitioner and
distancing him from the alleged offence of his brother's murder. It is argued that this is a rare
case that warrants the invocation of the Court's inherent powers to secure the ends of justice
and prevent an abuse of the Court's process.
Furthermore, the petitioner claims to have a strong alibi, as he was present in Gwalior. which
is 160 Kms away from Firozabad, at the time of the alleged murder. Therefore, it is argued that
this case is a good candidate for invoking the inherent powers of the Court.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the petition is allowed and further
proceedings pending in the Court of CJM Gwalior in connection with the Excise Act,
concerning Case No. 15003 of 2007, are hereby stayed until the disposal of the Criminal Case
pending at Firozabad, concerning Crime No. 617 of 2007.

28
AIR 2019 SC 5556

18
MOHIT ALIAS SONU AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
ANOTHER29

FACTS
Kamta Prasad died due to injuries alleged to have been caused by the accused. The High Court
directed the lower court to summon the accused-appellants under Section 319 CrPC. The
appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
• Whether the application of the complainant before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC
challenging the order passed under Section 319 CrPC was maintainable.
• Whether the Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient evidence on record
for the purpose of exercising power under Section 319 CrPC.
• Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned order.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court held that the complainant ought to have challenged the order before the
High Court in revision under Section 397 CrPC and not by invoking inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The Court also held that for the purpose of exercising
power under Section 319 CrPC, the Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient
evidence on record and not only on the basis of prima facie case. The Court further held that
the High Court erred in passing the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the High
Court to consider the matter afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the present
appellants.

K.K VELUSAMY V. N. PALANISAMY30

FACTS
The respondent sought specific performance of the agreement of sale or alternatively refund of
the advance of Rs. 1,60,000 with interest at 12% per annum from 20-12-2006. The appellant
resisted the suit and alleged that he executed and registered a sale agreement in favour of the
respondent as security for the repayment of a loan of Rs. 1,50,000 with interest. The respondent
was not entitled to specific performance.
The court held that a contemporaneous electronic recording of a relevant conversation is
admissible as evidence under Section 8 of the Act. The court also held that the power under
Section 151 of the code to reopen evidence or recall witnesses should be used sparingly in
appropriate cases to meet the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of court. The
court affirmed the dismissal of IA No. 217 of 2009 under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code.
ISSUES
1. Whether the respondent was entitled to specific performance?

29
[2010] 11 SCR 788 : (2010) 10 SCC 361
30
(2011) [11 SCC 275]

19
2. Whether the power under Section 151 of the code can be used to reopen evidence or recall
witnesses?
3. Whether the court has the power to grant any relief under Section 151 of the code?
4. Whether the court can receive evidence after a party closes his evidence?
5. Whether the dismissal of IA No. 216 of 2009 and IA No. 217 of 2009 was appropriate?

JUDGEMENT
The court allowed the appeals in part. The orders of the High Court and the trial court
dismissing IA No. 216 of 2009 under section 151 of the code were set aside. The orders were
affirmed in regard to the dismissal of IA No. 217 of 2009 under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code.
The trial court shall now consider IA No. 216 of 2009 afresh in accordance with law.
The court held that the respondent was not entitled to specific performance as he had advanced
a loan to the appellant and the sale agreement was executed as security for the repayment of
the loan with interest. The court also held that the power under Section 151 of the code to
reopen evidence or recall witnesses should be used sparingly in appropriate cases to meet the
ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of court.
The court affirmed the dismissal of IA No. 217 of 2009 under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code as
there was no provision in the Code enabling the parties to reopen evidence for further
examination-in-chief or cross-examination. The court allowed IA No. 216 of 2009 to be
considered afresh in accordance with law as the dismissal of the application only on the ground
that the matter was already at the stage of final arguments and the application would have the
effect of delaying the proceedings was not appropriate.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH & NEURO SCIENCES V. C.

PARAMESHWARA.31
FACTS
On 29-6-1985, the respondent was appointed Senior Pharmacist in National Institute of Mental
Health and Neuro Sciences, the appellant. On 21-6-1988, the respondent was charge-sheeted
for alleged misappropriation of drugs to the extent of Rs. 1,79,668.46. On 23-12-1997, the
Government of Karnataka referred the industrial dispute raised by the respondent to the Labour
Court at Bangalore for adjudication. The respondent sought stay of the said suit till disposal of
Writ Petition No. 24348 of 2002.

ISSUES
Whether Section 10 CPC is applicable to the present case and whether the High Court was
justified in invoking Section 151 CPC?

JUDGEMENT
Section 10 CPC is referrable to a suit instituted in a civil court and has no application to the
Facts of this case. The High Court was not justified in invoking Section 151 CPC. The appeal

31
AIR 2005 SC 242

20
is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

BAGAI CONSTRUCTION THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR LALIT BAGAI V. GUPTA

BUILDING MATERIAL STORE.32

FACTS
The respondent instituted a suit against the appellant for recovery of sum of Rs 4.35.250.18
along with interest accrued thereon, as despite notice, the appellant did not pay any amount.
By order dated 25-2-2010, the Additional District Judge, Delhi dismissed both the applications.
Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has preferred this appeal by way of special leave.
The High Court by the impugned order set aside the order of the trial court and directed taking
on record the bills which are proposed to be filed by the plaintiff, granted permission to recall
PW 1 to prove those bills. The High Court passed such order in favour of the plaintiff subject
to payment of costs of Rs 5000.

ISSUES
1. Whether the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC are intended to be used to fill up omissions
in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined?
2. Whether the power under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC is to be sparingly exercised
and in appropriate cases and not as a general rule?
3. Whether the power under Section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is intended to be used
routinely, merely for the asking?
4. Whether the evidence should be permitted in exercise of its power under section 151 of the
code?
5. Whether the course of not placing documents on record during the entire trial is permissible
even with the aid of Section 151 CPC?

JUDGEMENT
The impugned order of the High Court dated 23-8-2011 in Gupta Building Material Store v.
Lalit Bagai is set aside and the order dated 252-2010 of the trial court is restored. The appeal
is allowed with no order as to costs.

The provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC have been interpreted to include applications to be
filed by the parties for recall of witnesses, however, the main purpose of the said Rule is to
enable the court, while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard to the
evidence led by the parties. The said provisions are not intended to be used to fill up omissions
in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. The power under the provisions
of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC is to be sparingly exercised and in appropriate cases and not as a

32
AIR 2013 SC 1849

21
general rule merely on the ground that his recall and re-examination would not cause any
prejudice to the parties.

The power under Section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used
routinely, merely for the asking. There is no acceptable reason or cause which has been shown
by the plaintiff as to why these documents were not placed on record by the plaintiff during the
entire trial. Such course is not permissible even with the aid of Section 151 CPC.

MUKTAR STEELS (P) LTD. CO. V. HIND RO-ROLLING INDUSTRIES LTD.33

FACTS
The appellant, who was the plaintiff in the suit, filed an application under Section 151 CPC in
the High Court, challenging the order passed by the trial court directing the appellant to pay ad
valorem court fee under Section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Fee Act on a sum of Rs 2.97,93,310.
The High Court dismissed the application, ruling that since the suit was essentially for a relief
of permanent injunction and not for the recovery of the mentioned amount, ad valorem court
fee was not payable.

The trial court directed the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court fee under Section 20 of the Andhra
Pradesh Fee Act on a specific sum. The High Court, in its order dated 28-71999, concluded
that as the suit sought relief of permanent injunction and not the recovery of the mentioned
amount, ad valorem court fee was not required to be paid.

ISSUES
1. Whether ad valorem court fee is payable under Section 20 for the mentioned sum.
2. Whether the application under Section 151 CPC filed by the appellant should be allowed.

JUDGEMENT
The Court, after reviewing the order and the prayer in the revision petition, determined that no
ad valorem court fee was payable on the mentioned amount as the suit did not seek the recovery
of that sum. While inclined to allow the application under Section 151 CPC, the Court noted
that the State had not been made a party or notified. Therefore, the matter was remanded back
to the High Court to reconsider the application, treating it as an application under Order 47
Rule 1 CPC. The High Court was directed to involve the State Government, if necessary, and
to pass an appropriate order to correct the earlier decision.

The appeal was allowed with the directions to remand the matter to the High Court for further
consideration in accordance with the Court's ruling.

33
W.P.(CRL.) 2524/2022

22
M/S. SHA VINDICHAND HASTIMAL & CO. V. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA34

FACTS:
The respondent-Bank filed a suit seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 9.72.241. On the same day
the suit was dismissed for default, a representative of the respondent-Bank appeared before the
Court and filed an application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to set
aside the dismissal order.

ISSUE:
Whether the application under Section 151 CPC should be allowed to set aside the order of
dismissal of the suit.

JUDGEMENT
The Court held that since the plaintiff had filed an application under Section 151 CPC on the
same day the suit was dismissed for default, no injustice would be caused by allowing the
dismissal order to stand. Therefore, the Court did not admit the Civil Revision Petition
(C.R.P).the opportunity to file the application under Section 151 CPC on the day of dismissal,
there was no apparent injustice in upholding the dismissal order. Consequently, the Court found
no grounds to admit the Civil Revision Petition and allowed the dismissal order to stand.

The Court did not admit the Civil Revision Petition filed by the respondent-Bank and upheld
the order of dismissal of the suit for default.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS V. ROSHAN SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS.

AND OTHERS35

FACTS:
The case involves an appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petitions Nos. 17464 of 1984 and 8825 & 19050 of
1995. The first writ petition challenged the order passed by the prescribed authority under the
U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, and the appellate order passed by the
appellate authority.

After issuing a notice under Section 10(2) of the Act, an area of 17 bighas 10 biswas and 2
biswansis of land belonging to the respondent. Roshan Singh, was declared as surplus.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the approach of the High Court in the impugned judgment is erroneous.
2. Whether Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked in the present case.
3. Whether the inherent powers of the Court can be used to reopen settled matters.

JUDGEMENT

34
(1994) ILR (Kar) 3517
35
AIR 1992 SC 563

23
The Supreme Court held that the orders of the High Court in the appeals cannot be sustained
and are set aside. The subsequent two writ petitions were allowed primarily on the ground that
the first writ petition was allowed. The appeals were allowed without any order as to costs.

The Court found that the High Court's approach was erroneous and that there was no scope for
invoking the inherent powers of the Court in this case. It was emphasized that Section 151 of
the Civil Procedure Code should only be used to supplement the provisions of the Code and
not to override or evade other express provisions. The Court also noted that inherent powers
should be exercised to secure the ends of justice and not to reopen settled matters.

The appeals were allowed, and the orders of the High Court were set aside. No order was made
as to costs. This case brief summarizes the appeal challenging the judgment of the Allahabad
High Court in a matter related to the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders, emphasizing the limited scope of
invoking inherent powers and the need to adhere to express statutory provisions.

LAL CHAND SHARMA V. J.K. WHITE CEMENTS WORKS LTD. & ANR.36

FACTS
The petitioner filed an application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC)
seeking, among other reliefs, the reconnection of the gas facility provided by the respondents.
The application was opposed by the respondents. The trial court noted that a previous
application filed by the petitioner under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 & 2 CPC had been dismissed.
Based on this, the trial court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to seek relief under
Section 151 CPC and subsequently dismissed the application.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner, having had a previous application dismissed under Order XXXIX,
Rule 1 & 2 CPC, was entitled to seek relief under Section 151 CPC?
2. Whether the trial court was justified in dismissing the petitioner's application under Section
151 CPC?

JUDGEMENT
finding that the petitioner, having had a previous application dismissed under Order XXXIX.
Rule 1 & 2 CPC, was not entitled to seek relief under Section 151 CPC. The court held that the
dismissal of the previous application precluded the petitioner from seeking similar relief
through Section 151 CPC. Therefore, the trial court's decision to dismiss the application filed
by the petitioner was deemed justified.

The trial court reasoned that the dismissal of the petitioner's previous application under Order
XXXIX, Rule 1 & 2 CPC indicated a prior adjudication on the matter, which precluded the
petitioner from seeking the same relief under Section 151 CPC. The court found that allowing
the petitioner to circumvent the dismissal of the previous application by seeking relief under a

36
(2007) 12 Supreme Court Cases 43

24
different provision of the CPC would undermine the finality of court decisions and the
principles of res judicata.

The trial court dismissed the writ petition. upholding the respondents' opposition and finding
that the petitioner was not entitled to relief under Section 151 CPC due to the prior dismissal
of an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 & 2 CPC.

HAMIDA V. RASHID ALIAS RASHEED AND OTHERS37

FACTS
The respondents-accused were initially granted bail in offences under Sections 324, 352 and
506 IPC by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar. The offence was later converted to
one under Section 304 IPC. The High Court directed that the respondents-accused would
continue to remain on bail if they furnished the requisite personal bonds and sureties before the
court concerned. Subsequently, the remaining two accused were also released on bail. The only
submission made before the High Court was that the accused had been granted bail by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and they had not misused the privilege of the bail and,
therefore, they should be allowed to remain on bail even after conversion of offence. The
appellant submitted that the accused ought to have surrendered and after they had been taken
into custody, they should have applied afresh for bail in the offence under Section 304 IPC.

ISSUE
Whether the High Court had the power to entertain a petition under Section 482 CrPC for the
respondents-accused to remain on bail even after the offence had been converted to one under
Section 304 IPC.

JUDGEMENT
The order of the High Court was set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC
could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as
provided in the Code. The exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is
clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.

KAPTAN SINGH V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS38

FACTS
The appellant filed a complaint against the private respondents under Sections 147, 148, 149,
406, 329 and 386 of the Penal Code, 1860. The Magistrate found a prima facie case of
cognizable offence and directed the police to register the FIR and investigate it. The FIR alleged
that Munni Devi appointed the complainant as her power-of-attorney holder to take care of a
plot she wanted to sell. Munni Devi entered into a registered agreement to sell the plot with
one Mamta Gupta, who handed over five cheques of Rs 2 lakhs each, but one of the cheques
was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Munni Devi served legal notices, but Mamta Gupta

37
(2008) 1 SCC 474
38
[(2021) 9 SCC 35]

25
showed no positive response. Munni Devi then appointed the complainant as a power-of-
attorney holder. The private respondents approached the High Court to quash the criminal
proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

ISSUE
Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings under
Section 482 CrPC?

JUDGEMENT
The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings under Section
482 CrPC. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court are quashed and set
aside. The trial is to be conducted and proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own
merits. The present appeal is allowed.

The High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC without
considering the material collected during the investigation. The High Court also erred in
observing that the original complaint had no locus. Appreciation of evidence is not permissible
at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. When
there are serious triable issues, the High Court is not justified in quashing the criminal
proceedings. Therefore, the impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court are
quashed and set aside.

SHIJI ALIAS PAPPU AND OTHERS V. RADHIKA AND ANOTHER39

FACTS
Criminal MC No. 3715 of 2010 was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, with a prayer for quashing criminal proceedings in FIR No. 6 of 2010 alleging
commission of the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 394 IPC. The High Court of
Kerala at Ernakulam dismissed the petition on the ground that the offences with which the
appellants stand charged, are not "personal in nature" so as to justify quashing the pending
criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the first informant-
complainant and the appellants. The parties had amicably settled the matter among themselves
during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. The High Court declined the prayer made by
the appellants holding that the offences committed by the appellants were not of a personal
nature so as to justify quashing of the proceedings in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC.

ISSUES
Whether the criminal proceedings in question could be quashed in the facts and circumstances
of the case having regard to the settlement that the parties had arrived at?

JUDGEMENT

39
AIR 2012 SC 499

26
The High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for
quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. That power can in our opinion be
exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and
the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. The two alleged
eyewitnesses, who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer supportive of the
prosecution version. Section 482 CrPC could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by
the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful
exercise by the courts below. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order
passed by the High Court and quash the prosecution in CC No. 183 of 2010 pending in the
Court of the Judicial Magistrate. First Class, Neyyattinkara.

VINEET KUMAR AND OTHERS V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND

ANOTHER40

FACTS
The accused have made several financial transactions with the complainant. Smt Rekha Rani,
her husband, Akhilesh Kumar and her son, Ankur in the month of May 2015. Accused 3 gave
Rs 9 lakhs to the husband and son of the complainant for business purposes. Earlier, the
husband of the complainant took Rs 6 lakhs from Accused 1.
It was further alleged that she went to the police station on the same day but the police did not
register FIR. The IO recorded the statement of Nikesh Kumar, brother of the complainant's
husband. On this dispute my sister-in-law Rekha has instituted case against Vineet and others.
My Bhabhi Rekha has lodged a case in the court out of anger which is a false case."
The wife of Nikesh Kumar, Smt Bina Vishnoi also made the following statement before the IO
which is the part of the case diary: "Statement of Smt Bina Vishnoi. w/o Nikesh Kumar resident
of Mohalla Vishanpura Kasba and PS Kanth is present. She stated that on the date of occurrence
Rekha Rani was in her parental house to celebrate Dussehra and was not present at her house."

ISSUE:
Whether the High Court has the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC,
and if so, whether the present case is a fit case for the exercise of such power.

JUDGEMENT
The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court dated 16-12-2016 2016 SCC Online All
1445 as well as the order of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 38-2016 and the
order of the Sessions Judge dated 22-10-2016 including the entire criminal proceedings are
quashed.
The inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and
object of advancement of justice. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be
allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. Category 7 of Section
482 CrPC is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although, the High Court has

40
(2017) 13 SCC 369

27
noted the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, 1992 SCC (Cri)
426, but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which final report
was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where the
High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the
criminal proceedings.

SIMRIKHIA V. DOLLEY MUKHERJEE AND CHHAВІ MUKHERJEE AND

ANOTHER41

FACTS
In a case instituted on a private complaint by the appellant for offences under Sections 452 and
323 IPC, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patna, in exercise of power under Section 192(2)
CrPC transferred the case for enquiry under section 202 of the code. The Court of the Second
Class Magistrate, after examining witnesses, by order dated March 22, 1985 issued process to
the two accused, the respondents herein. The order of the Magistrate issuing process was
challenged by the respondents under Section 482 before the High Court.

ISSUE
The legality of the order of the High Court dated August 19, 1989 passed on an application
made under Section 482 CrPC is challenged in this appeal.

JUDGEMENT
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under
Section 362. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier
order on a reconsideration of the same materials. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling
reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage.
We allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court.

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH V. LAXMI NARAYAN AND OTHERS42

FACTS
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused. who
were charged with offences under Sections 307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 1860 (IPC).
The High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shiji v. Radhika (2011) 10 SCC
705, (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101 and allowed the application filed by the accused. under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) on the ground that the accused and the
complainant had settled the dispute amicably. The State of Madhya Pradesh filed an appeal
against the decision of the High Court.

ISSUE

41
(1990) 2 SCC 437
42
(2019) 5 SCC 688

28
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, who
were charged with heinous and serious offences, solely on the ground that the accused and the
complainant had settled the dispute amicably.

JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding
or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the
power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the CrPC.
Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have
settled the dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put
the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by
not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the
victim.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court and remanded the case back to the
High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

ANAND KUMAR MOHATTA (S) V. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) (S).43

FACTS
The Appellants have filed this Criminal. Appeal challenging the final judgment and order dated
02.02.2016 of the High Court of Delhi. The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the
Appellants under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code and refused to quash FIR
No.0139/2014 dated 20.08.2014.. The Appellants seek quashing of the FIR dated 20.08.2014
and the charge sheet dated 03.08.2018. The Appellants contend that the FIR was completely
untenable in the facts and circumstances of the case. They have additionally filed an
amendment application seeking to incorporate a prayer for quashing of the charge sheet in
addition to the prayer for quashing of the FIR.

ISSUES
1. Whether the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form
of a charge sheet after investigation?
2. Whether the alleged fraudulent transfer of property by the Appellant No.1 to his wife
constitutes the offence of a criminal breach of trust?
3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, an offence under Section 406 is
made out against the Appellants?
4. Whether the dispute has the contours of a dispute of civil nature and does not constitute a
criminal offence?
5. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition of the Appellants filed under Section
482 of Cr.P.С.

43
2018 SCC Online SC 2447

29
JUDGEMENT
The Court held that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken
the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The Court also held that the alleged fraudulent
transfer of property by the Appellant No.1 to his wife does not constitute the offence of a
criminal breach of trust. The Court further held that the dispute has the contours of a dispute
of civil nature and does not constitute a criminal offence. The Court noticed a growing trend in
business circles to convert purely civil dispute into criminal cases.

The Court set out the categories of cases in which the inherent power under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. can be exercised. The Court held that this was a fit case for the High Court to exercise
its inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR. The Court, therefore, quashed
the FIR and the charge sheet filed against the Appellants. The Court set aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 02.02.2016 of High Court of Delhi. Accordingly, the appeal is
allowed along with the application filed by the Appellants seeking amendment of the main
prayer.

MOHIT ALIAS SONU AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND

ANOTHER44

FACTS
Kamta Prasad died due to injuries alleged to have been caused by the accused. The High Court
directed the lower court to summon the accused-appellants under Section 319 CrPC, The
appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
1. Whether the application of the complainant before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC
challenging the order passed under Section 319 CrPC was maintainable.
2. Whether the Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient evidence on record
for the purpose of exercising power under Section 319 CrPC.
3. Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned order.

JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court held that the complainant ought to have challenged the order before the
High Court in revision under Section 397 CrPC and not by invoking inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The Court also held that for the purpose of exercising
power under Section 319 CrPC, the Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient
evidence on record and not only on the basis of prima facie case. The Court further held that
the High Court erred in passing the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the High
Court to consider the matter afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the present
appellants.

44
2013 LawSuit(SC) 520

30
The Court referred to Section 397 and Section 482 CrPC and held that the complainant ought
to have challenged the order before the High Court in revision under Section 397 CrPC and not
by invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.

The Court further held that for the purpose of exercising power under Section 319 CrPC, the
Court must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient evidence on record and not only on the
basis of prima facie case. The Court also held that the High Court erred in passing the impugned
order and remanded the matter back to the High Court to consider the matter afresh after giving
an opportunity of hearing to the present appellants.

INDER MOHAN GOSWAMI AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND

OTHERS45

FACTS
Appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)
to quash the non-bailable warrant issued against them by the Special Judicial Magistrate,
Rishikesh on the basis of a first information report (FIR) filed by the respondents under
Sections 420/467 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellants contended that the allegations
in the FIR did not constitute an offence under the IPC. The High Court dismissed the
application under Section 482 CrPC, leading to the present appeal.
The respondents filed a criminal complaint against the appellants alleging cheating and forgery
in connivance with other persons. The appellants cancelled a general power of attorney issued
in favour of one of the respondents, leading to the filing of the complaint. The respondents also
filed a civil suit for cancellation of a sale deed executed by the Sabha in favour of Sunil Kumar
and for permanent injunction against the appellants for interfering in their alleged property.
The Sabha, founded by Pt. Madan Mohan Malviya, is a grass-root organisation registered under
the Societies Registration Act. It is engaged in the work of uplifting backward and downtrodden
people and seeks to open hospitals for the poor and to develop the physical and mental state of
the youth, etc.

ISSUES
1. Whether the allegations in the FIR constitute an offence under the IPC?
2. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the application under Section 482
CrPC?
3. Whether the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised to quash proceedings
in this case?

JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed all the proceedings emanating from the
FIR. The Court held that the impugned. judgment of the High Court in declining to exercise its
inherent power had led to grave miscarriage of justice. The Court directed the parties to bear
their own costs.

45
(2007) 12 SCC

31
The Court noted that the tendency of perjury is on the increase and that chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by invoking the jurisdiction of
the criminal court. The Court also. cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases.

The Court held that the allegations in the FIR did not constitute an offence under Section 467
IPC and that the impugned judgment could not be sustained. The Court further held that the
inherent power under Section 482 CrPC could be exercised to quash proceedings in this case
to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure the ends of justice.

The Court observed that non-bailable warrants should be issued only when summons or
bailable warrants would be unlikely to have the desired result and that the court should properly
balance both personal liberty and societal interest before issuing warrants.

KULWINDER SINGH AND OTHERS V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER46

FACTS
In this case, the majority view held that the High Court does not have the power to quash
prosecution or allow compounding of non-compoundable offences, except for those arising out
of marital disputes. However, the minority view expressed that the High Court has
the power to quash proceedings to secure the ends of justice in all such eventualities, not
necessarily confined to matrimonial disputes alone.
The case arose when the petitioner sought the quashing of FIR No. 92 dated 28.6.2005, under
Sections 452, 427, 148, 149, registered at Police Station, Ghuman, District Gurdaspur. The
petitioner claimed that both parties had resolved their dispute and executed a compromise deed
dated 29.11.2006. The complainant also swore an affidavit in support of the petition.

ISSUES
1. Whether the High Court has the power to quash prosecution or allow compounding of non-
compoundable offences?
2. Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent power to quash an interlocutory order?
3. Whether the High Court can quash FIR relating to non-compoundable offences on the basis
of a compromise between the parties?
,

JUDGEMENT
The High Court held that the inherent jurisdiction includes the power to whittle down and
quash ongoing criminal prosecution, provided that a case "to prevent abuse of the process of
law" or "to advance the ends of justice" is made out in unequivocal terms.
However, inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits

46
2005(3) R.C.R. (Crl.) 426

32
the Court from doing. The provisions of section 561-a cannot be invoked for exercise of
a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code.
The Court also held that the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked to do something
which is expressly barred under the code. No review of an order is contemplated under the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court can exercise its inherent power under Section
482 of the Criminal Procedure Code even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, this power cannot be exercised if there
is a statutory bar in some other enactment. The inherent power must be exercised very
sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between.
The Court also held that minor offences as under Section 279 IPC may be permitted to be
compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. The power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly
and with utmost care and caution. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between
two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of
a Court which should endeavor to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is
abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.

SIMRIKHIA V. DOLLEY MUKHERJEE AND CHHABI MUKHERJEE AND

ANOTHER47
FACTS
In a case instituted on a private complaint by the appellant for offences under Sections 452 and
323 IPC, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patna, in exercise of power under Section 192(2)
CrPC transferred the case for enquiry under section 202 of the code. The Court of the Second
Class Magistrate, after examining witnesses, by order dated March 22, 1985 issued process to
the two accused, the respondents herein. The order of the Magistrate issuing process was
challenged by the respondents under Section 482 before the High Court.

ISSUE
The legality of the order of the High Court dated August 19, 1989 passed on an application
made under Section 482 CrPC is challenged in this appeal.

JUDGEMENT
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under
Section 362. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier
order on a reconsideration of the same materials. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling
reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage.
We allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court.

47
1990 AIR SC 1605

33
TALAB HAJI HUSSAIN V. MADHUKAR PURSHOTTAM MONDKAR AND
OTHER48
FACTS
The material provisions on the subject of bail are contained in Sections 496 to 498 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Section 497 deals with the question of granting bail in the case of non-
bailable offences. Sub-section (2) of Section 498 empowers the High Court or the Court of
Session to cause any person who has been admitted to bail under sub-section (l) to be arrested
and committed to custody. That is the effect of section 426(2)(a) which has been added in 1955.

ISSUE
The main issue in this case is whether the exercise of inherent power under Section 561-A is
inconsistent with the provisions of Section 496 regarding the right to be released on bail for a
person accused of a bailable offence.

JUDGEMENT
The court rules that there is no conflict between the provisions of Section 496 and the exercise
of the jurisdiction under Section 561-A. Section 496 does not confer an unqualified, absolute,
and indefeasible right to be released on bail for a person accused of a bailable offence. The
court also confirms the Bombay High Court's view that it has inherent power to act under
Section 561-A in this case.

KRISHNAN AND ANOTHER V. KRISHNAVENI AND ANOTHER49

FACT
In a litigation between Krishnaveni (first respondent) and Tulasiammal (second wife of
Chinnikrishnan, the first appellant), Krishnan offered his services and promised to help
Krishnaveni in conducting the said litigation. He asked her to execute a power of attorney in
his favor. However, it later transpired that the first appellant got her signature on an agreement
to sell her land instead of the power of attorney.

ISSUE
Whether the impugned order is without jurisdiction and vitiated by manifest error of law
warranting interference.

JUDGEMENT
The High Court must exercise revisional power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions
Judge has already exercised revisional power under Section 397(1).
The inherent power of the High Court is not conferred by the Code but is already possessed by
the High Court and preserved by the Code.

48
1958 AIR SC 376
49
1997 ACR SC 21 338

34
The State is not prohibited from availing the revisional power of the High Court under Section
397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code.
Malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trials are conducted
expeditiously.
The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. This Court held
that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section
397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code.
It was held that by virtue of provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not
maintainable. The High Court, failing to apply its mind, committed an error of law in
discharging the accused, leading to a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, this Court set aside the
order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate.
In light of the above, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for
the second time.
Since the High Court left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be
inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. The issue of power and jurisdiction of the
High Court in the context of the revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section
397(3) and the inherent powers was considered. No justification warranting interference in the
appeal was found.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

DR RAGHUBIR SARAN V. STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER50

FACT
A bail application was filed on behalf of two accused persons who were allegedly seriously il
l in jail.The Magistrate released the accused on bail based on the information provided by a m
edical officer, despite no actual examination report being attached to the petition.The High C
ourt refused to expunge the remarks made by the Magistrate regarding the doctor's extreme c
arelessness.The State of Bihar raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUES
1. Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to expunge remarks in a judgment in a crimina
l case after the judgment has become final.
2. Whether the High Court's inherent power can be invoked to correct judgments of subordina
te courts.

JUDGEMENT
The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the High Court did not have the authority to e
xpunge the remarks made by the Magistrate regarding the doctor's carelessness. The court hel

50
1964 CRLJ SC 1

35
d that the remarks did not cause harm to the appellant and were not of such nature to warrant t
he exercise of the High Court's extraordinary power under Section 561-
A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

36
 CHAPTER- IV
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The inherent powers of courts, often referred to as inherent jurisdiction or inherent authority,
are a fundamental aspect of the legal systems of various countries around the world. While the
specific scope and application of inherent powers may vary from one jurisdiction to another,
the underlying principle remains consistent courts possess inherent powers to ensure the
administration of justice and maintain the rule of law.
1. United States: In the United States, the inherent powers of courts are derived from common
law principles and are often referred to as inherent judicial authority. Federal courts and
state courts both exercise inherent powers to regulate their proceedings and ensure justice
is served. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the authority of courts to exercise
inherent powers to manage cases efficiently, maintain order, and prevent abuse of the
judicial process.

Article III, Section 1: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

2. United Kingdom: In the United Kingdom, the inherent powers of courts are known as
inherent jurisdiction. English courts have inherent jurisdiction to make orders and decisions
that are necessary to uphold justice and protect the welfare of individuals, particularly in
family law matters. The High Court of England and Wales, as well as other courts in the
UK, exercise inherent jurisdiction to intervene in cases where it is necessary to do so in the
interest of justice51.
Some of the inherent powers of the courts in the UK include:
⎯ Judicial Review: Courts have the authority to review the actions of the executive and
legislative branches to ensure they are lawful and comply with the constitution and
established legal principles.
⎯ Interpretation of Laws: Courts have the power to interpret statutes and common law
principles to resolve disputes and clarify the meaning of the law.
⎯ Contempt of Court: Courts have the authority to punish individuals for contempt of court,
including disobedience of court orders, disruptive behaviour in court, or any action that
undermines the administration of justice.
⎯ Case Management: Courts have the power to manage their own proceedings, including
setting timetables, issuing directions, and making procedural rulings to ensure the efficient
and fair resolution of disputes.

51
Abhirami G Nair, ‘international journal of creative research thoughts’[2023] 11

37
⎯ Inherent Jurisdiction: Courts have inherent jurisdiction to make orders to protect the
welfare and rights of individuals, particularly in matters involving children and vulnerable
persons.
⎯ Enforcement of Judgments: Courts have the authority to enforce their judgments and
orders, including the power to issue warrants, impose fines, or take other appropriate
actions to ensure compliance.
3. Australia: In Australia, the inherent powers of courts are recognized under common law
principles and legislation. Australian courts have inherent jurisdiction to do all things that
are necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice.
The High Court of Australia and other courts in the country exercise inherent powers to
regulate their proceedings, prevent abuse of process, and uphold the rule of law. These
powers enable courts to effectively administer justice and maintain the rule of law.
Some of the inherent powers of courts in Australia include:

⎯ Australian courts have the inherent power to review the legality and constitutionality of
administrative actions and decisions made by government bodies.
⎯ Courts in Australia have the inherent power to interpret laws, including statutes, the
Constitution, and common law principles, to determine their meaning and application
in particular cases.
⎯ Courts have the inherent power to appoint independent experts to assist in resolving
complex factual or technical issues that arise in litigation.
⎯ Australian courts have the inherent power to protect and enforce fundamental rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws, including the right to a
fair trial and the protection of individual liberties.
4. South Africa: In South Africa, the inherent powers of courts are enshrined in the
Constitution and other legislation. The courts in South Africa have inherent jurisdiction to
protect and regulate their processes, ensure fairness, and provide effective remedies to
litigants. The judiciary plays a significant role in upholding the rule of law and safeguarding
constitutional rights through the exercise of inherent powers.
Some of the inherent powers of courts in South Africa include:

⎯ Equitable Remedies: Courts have the inherent power to grant equitable remedies, such as
injunctions, specific performance, and restitution, to provide relief in cases where monetary
damages are not adequate or appropriate.
⎯ Amendment of Pleadings: Courts have the inherent power to allow parties to amend their
pleadings, subject to certain limitations, to ensure that the real issues in dispute are properly
addressed and adjudicated.
⎯ Interpretation of Laws: Courts have the inherent power to interpret laws, including the
Constitution, statutes, and common law principles, to determine their meaning and
application in particular cases.
⎯ Appointment of Experts: Courts have the inherent power to appoint independent experts to
assist in resolving complex factual or technical issues that arise in litigation.

38
⎯ Inherent Jurisdiction: Courts have inherent jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter
that is justiciable, subject to any limitations imposed by law.
While the specific legal frameworks and terminology may vary, the underlying principle of the
inherent powers of courts remains consistent across different countries. Courts worldwide
possess inherent powers to ensure justice is served, maintain the rule of law, and protect the
rights of individuals. The exercise of inherent powers by courts is essential to upholding the
principles of justice, fairness, and the rule of law in diverse legal systems across the globe.

39
 CHAPTER- V
CONCLUSION
Inherent powers are the power of court which are helpful in minimizing litigation, avoid
multiplicity of proceedings and to render complete justice between two parties. Section 148 to
153B of CPC discusses the provisions of the Inherent powers of the Court. These provisions
discuss the enlargement of time, payment of court fees, transfer of the business of one court to
another court, end of justice, abuse of process of the court, amendment of judgement, decree,
orders, and records, etc.
Section 482 Cr.P.C has a very wide scope and is an essential part of the functioning of the High
courts in order to meet the end of justice but at the same time, it must be noted that the power
so assigned is so vast and can be easily misinterpreted. So, it becomes important for the courts
to use it wisely and according to the guidelines laid down by High Courts and Supreme Court.

Section 482, in its current form, has seen several changes with the changing times and as per
the requirement in any situation. The guidelines framed by the Supreme Court in several of its
judgments have played a key role in constraining or limiting this power and to ensure that it is
not abused by the Law Practitioners. Section 482 of Cr.P.C has made its space in Cr.P.C in
order to not only enable the High Courts to provide proper justice but also to curb the filing of
fictitious complaints.

SUGGESTIONS

• The investigating officers should be so conscious in making FIR with a proper way and
there should not include any offences it cannot be termed to be convicted at the time of
trial. For e.g. Instead of taking FIR under S. 324 IPC they may be restraint from initiating
sections under 308 IPC.
• Moreover, in Matrimonial offences the court will be more liberal in quashing the offences
under settlement arisen between the spouses and the court will not quash a POCSO Cases
on settlement.
• Women in matrimonial proceedings are usually advised to file a case against husband and
family members under section 498A of IPC. If the case registered is false and is filed merely
to get a divorce or for revenge, the same shall be quashed by filing a petition before High
Court under section 482 of Cr.P.C to save the accused from long drawn trails.
• Considering public interest in mind the court as well as the investigating agency should be
very conscious while investigating crimes and due diligence may be taken while doing so.
• Stringent measures should be taken against a public servant, if he has misused his power
or has taken undue influence to harass a person.
• Minor offences can be settled before the police station itself and it will help the court to
diminish the condemn of work.
• Ragging has to be viewed seriously and the court will not be in a position to take liberal
view and the same may not be quash then only the public will have a faith on the judiciary.

40
• Motor Vehicle Accidents has to be viewed liberally but in certain cases S. 304 A IPC will
be charge under S. 308 IPC has to be viewed seriously if the accused has having an intention
to commit murder. In the case of a trivial also it should be viewed liberally since most of
the trivial ones are because of contributory negligence and the same may well be settled.
• Negotiable Instrument Act is a private complaint cannot initiate action against the accused
the offences will be quashed only on technical grounds like lack of notice and non-
impleadment of company if the cheque is from the account of the company.
• In NDPS cases if the investigating officer faced to comply with the statutory directions of
search and seizure there is every chance for quashing the offence while searching the body
of an accused the investigating officer has to intimate the accused has to his right to be
searched in the presence of gazetted officer or magistrate.

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