Social Media—From Social Exchange to Battlefield

Author(s): Beata Biały

Source: The Cyber Defense Review , Vol. 2, No. 2 (SUMMER 2017), pp. 69-90
Published by: Army Cyber Institute
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26267344

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 Social Media—From Social
Exchange to Battlefield
Beata Biały

INTRODUCTION

W
SOCIAL MEDIA—BEGINNINGS
hen discussing the origins of social media, researchers usually start in
the 1980s and the Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). They were a kind of
online meeting room that allowed users to download games and other
files, and leave messages to co-users. The social aspect of this exchange
was pretty clear, but the interaction was rather limited and slow due to technological
reasons. What is more important, the social interaction had a rather random character—
people did not know who was sitting at the other end of the telephone line.
However, BBS proved a growing interest in this kind of communication and inspired
other platforms to emerge from the early Internet. The big success of sites like Class-
mates.com confirmed the need for a virtual exchange of memories, ideas, and views.
This time, users could enter into social interaction with precisely chosen people, and
create networks of “friends”, based on their common school experience. Classmates.
com has equivalents in countries all over the world. The best example is the webpage
Odnoklasniki (classmates), which is very popular in Russia and other former Soviet,
Russian-speaking countries of Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.
The second half of the 1990s has numerous examples of emerging platforms built on
a similar principle, for example, SixDegrees.com (founded in 1997). But the real social
network revolution started at the beginning of the 2000s when the Friendster website
was launched. After just one year it had gathered a community of three million users
(the first site with such a big audience). “Participatory culture” became a buzzword,
enhanced by dynamic technological development. Different platforms were founded,
using different “sociality” models. A particularly interesting example is Linked-In (2003)
which is a platform for professional networking, where one’s contacts were not friends

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

but professional connections. It is interesting to

note that LinkedIn has kept this particular character
until the present day.
One year after LinkedIn was launched, Mark
Zuckerberg and his Harvard University classmates,
created the site thefacebook.com which evolved
into one of the most powerful and successful social
media platforms in the world with over 2 billion ac-
tive users in September 2016. [1] It is user-friendly,
with many easily accessible features, it has become
a global brand, deserving the recognition: if you
are not on Facebook, very likely you don’t exist.
Facebook also introduced the “like” click, which was
an excellent addition, allowing users to easily ex-
Beata Biały is a senior expert at the NATO press their emotions, thereby underlining the plat-
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. form’s social character. [2]
She is a graduate of the Warsaw University in
Created in 2006, Twitter focused on network con-
French Philology and Business Administration
versation. Thanks to the introduction of a “hashtag”
and completed an MBA program of the Univer-
feature, users’ 140-character messages can be easily
sity of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Before her
tracked and grouped, which is vital on a site where
civil service career, she worked as a manager
every second an average of 6000 tweets are posted
in Polish media for 15 years. Beata was deputy
(about 200 billion tweets per year). Among its 313
CEO for one of the leading dailies publishing
million active users [3] (over 1.3 billion accounts) are
groups and deputy director of Polskie Radio
politicians (according to some statistics, 83% of
Channel One. As a civil servant, she worked in
the world leaders have an account on Twitter [4]),
the Polish Ministry of Transport where she was
journalists (24.6% of all accounts [5]), information
in charge of EU affairs, and later as director of
agencies, and companies.
Public Affairs Department for the Ministry of
National Defence. She was responsible for cre- At more or less the same time, the online com-
ating the Strategic Communication structure in munity witnessed the creation of such platforms
the Polish MOD and represented Poland in the as Myspace, YouTube, and Google+, closely followed
NATO STRATCOM COE Steering Committee. Beata by Instagram, Snapchat, and dozens of others. The
has been pursuing her passion for literature by recent appearance of mobile technology has strongly
writing books, and translating more than twenty affected users’ behavior and forced social media
French and English literature books. platforms to adapt to this new environment by in-
troducing mobile applications. At the beginning of
2016, more than 2.3 billion people were using
social media: of these, 1.9 billion users were access-
ing social media via their mobile phone. [6] Mobile

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 BEATA BIAŁY

technology enhanced in particular the development of photo- and video-sharing plat-

forms, such as Instagram or Snapchat, entertainment location apps (e.g. Foursquare),
dating services (like Tinder), and last, but not least, direct messaging applications (like
WhatsApp). [7]
The social media landscape is far from stable. For the last few years, companies
like Facebook, Twitter and Google have been massively investing in new platforms. Big
acquisitions have taken place—Instagram and WhatsApp were purchased by Facebook,
Twitter acquired Vine (in October 2016, Twitter decided to close the service when it
did not meet expectations), and Google purchased YouTube. The social media landscape
has been evolving from relatively small local services (initially Facebook was dedicated
exclusively to Harvard University students) to powerful companies with global reach.
From more than 2.3 billion social media users (data from 2016) [8] nearly 1.6 billion
have chosen Facebook, giving it the clear position of market leader. In the US, 79% of
online adults (68% of all adults) use Facebook, 32% – Instagram, 31% – Pinterest, 29% –
LinkedIn, and 24% – Twitter. [9]

Over time, social media platforms have become huge pools of data for advertising
and marketing companies. Within the last three years, Facebook alone noted a 120%
increase of brands placing paid promotion on the platform. Social media companies
have also developed e-commerce features, allowing their users to shop directly from the
social media website, following the example and advice of social network “friends”. [10]
Social and commercial activities have become two powerful drivers of social media
platform development.

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

When it comes to data, it is worth dedicating a few lines to the concepts of Big Data
and social media mining. As the authors of the book “Social Media Mining” state, “social
media data is undoubtedly big,” [11] which is only one of many challenges that must be faced
by those who want to explore it. The others are the unstructured character of data, its nois-
iness, and social relations hidden there with friends, connections, following—followers.
These particular characteristics call for data analysis methods, which can encompass
an understanding of user-generated content, including a wide range of social relations.
This technique, termed social media mining, draws on the different disciplines of com-
puter science, machine learning, social network analysis, statistics, sociology, and many
others, as well as interdisciplinary concepts and theories.
Social media mining “searches for hidden patterns and relationships correlations, in
addition to interdependencies that exist within large databases that the traditional infor-
mation gathering methods (…) may fail to notice”. [11] It aims at discovering the relations
between “social atoms” (individual users),
Social media mining, “social entities” (content, sites, networks),
and interactions between the two previous
draws on the different categories. [13] It helps to identify communit-
disciplines of computer ies on a social network and determine who
the most important people are in a social
science, machine learning, network (the influencers).
social network analysis, Such analysis is useful for marketing pur-
poses, by targeting users who are likely
statistics, sociology, and to effectively disseminate brand awareness
many others. and increase the reach of potential custom-
ers. In a similar way, social media mining
can be used by other actors, who aim to build advocacy for their narrative. Some experts’
claim that it is useful for predicting future behavior of given groups (e.g. terrorists),
based on a special algorithm. [14] In any case, Big Data and social media mining are two
emerging concepts with a breathtaking future.

FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO SEARCHING FOR CONTENT

The appearance of social media offered Internet users an unprecedented opportunity
to connect with other people. The exchange of memories, experiences, opinions, views
and agendas became easy and—over time—very cheap. Suddenly, one could find former
classmates and reestablish regular contact and also discover new “friends” in dynamically
growing social networks. And these “friends” could come from any part of the globe with
Internet access, which means from almost all over the world.

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 BEATA BIAŁY

Obviously, there can be various motivations for using social networks. In April 2015,
Global Web Index published a report presenting the reasons why people use social media
(see the next chart). Among the top ten, reason number one is clearly “social”—“to stay
in touch with what my friends are doing”. There are also other responses on the list, like
sharing one’s opinion or details of one’s private life, sharing pictures or videos, networking
with people, meeting new people, and being there “because a lot of my friends are on it”—
all of these show high social motivation. But it is worth noting number two on the list—
“to stay up-to-date with news and current events”, which has nothing to do with the social
character of “social networking services” (as it was stated in the survey question). Looking
for information, not necessarily about friends, but for information in general, has been a
growing trend among social media users. Social networks are more and more considered
a source of content, although this content is generated by the users themselves.

Figure 1. Source: http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/top-10-reasons-for-using-social-media

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

OFTEN ABOUT 6-IN-10 AMERICANS

18% GET NEWS FROM SOCIAL MEDIA
% of U.S. adults who get news
on a social networking site
NEVER
38%
SOMETIMES 62% get news on social media
26%

HARDLY
EVER
18%

Figure 2. Source: Survey conducted January 12- February 8, 2016. "News Use Across
Social Media Platforms 2016" Pew Research Center

This trend was also observed by researchers from SWOCC (research organization linked
to the department of communication studies at the University of Amsterdam). Their study,
carried out in 2016, showed that users’ perceptions of social media had changed consid-
erably. Some platforms are perceived as being less “social”, and more “informative” (e.g.
Twitter). Other research from 2016, conducted by Pew Research Center, concludes that
62% of US adults are getting their news from social media. The growing trend seems
obvious, in 2012, this number was 49%.
Although it would be risky to say that social media platforms have become a direct
competitor to mainstream media, their role in the flow of information is prominent. What
is more, they have become a source of content for traditional media. Information agencies
and journalists establish their Twitter or Facebook accounts not only to disseminate their
message but also to hunt for news posted by other social media users. In such a way,
information generated by a “grassroots journalist” [15] can obtain an unexpectedly large
reach. This can become problematic if the news appears to be inaccurate or simply fake.
An excellent example of such misinformation is the “Senator Cirenga case”; a sensational
post on the Facebook account of a non-existent Italian senator, which was used and covered
by several newspapers, and turned out to be untrue. [16]
The above-mentioned example shows how challenging and risky it is for an Internet
user to consider social media a source of information. Easy access, the possibility of
anonymity, and no gatekeepers are a dangerous mix. In traditional media, journalists
are supposed to observe the rules of the profession, and editors check if an article
meets the standards of accuracy, and reliability, then decide if it can be published.
On social media, anybody can become a ‘journalist’ and, anything can become ‘news’.

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 BEATA BIAŁY

FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

Over the last six years, the number of social media users increased more than twofold
(0.97 billion in 2010 to 2.34 billion in 2016 [17]). These numbers, together with changing
usage patterns, have made social media a very attractive communication channel. Low
access cost, various target audiences, global reach, and the unprecedented speed of
information flow—all these factors encourage different actors to use social media for their
purposes. Marketing experts discovered its potential very quickly and placed social media
in the heart of their promotion campaigns. But they were not the only ones.
Because, apart from its monetizing potential, social media has also become an excellent
channel to mobilize support, disseminate narratives, wage information operations, or even
coordinate military operations in the real world. States and non-state actors have started
to extensively use social media to influence perception, beliefs, opinions and behaviors
of their target audiences. Although social media has been a very useful communication
channel to support legitimate and worthy actions (such as humanitarian aid in disaster
areas), it is more and more used for other, far less noble aims. The chart below, from Dr.
Rebecca Goolsby’s article on social cyberattacks [18], shows how social media conversations
can be used for different purposes.

ON CYBERSECURITY, CROWDSOURCING, AND SOCIAL CYBERATTACK

CRISIS RESPONSE COMMUNITY DIALOGUE INFLUENCE SOCIAL CYBERATTACK

Disaster Relief Anti-Propaganda Propaganda Crowd Manipulation

Humanitarian Assistance Rumor Squelch Rebellion Cry Hysteria Propagation

Crisis Monitoring Community Outreach Hate Messages

PROMOTES: PROMOTES: PROMOTES: PROMOTES:

Order and Discourse Discussion Expansion Special Point of View Chaotic Mass Behavior

Cooperative Behavior Spread of Verifable Information Bandwagon Effects Escalation of Rumor

Information Sharing Conflict and Argument Confusion, Panic and Violence

Mass Protests

Figure 3. Source: Office Of Naval Research Arlington VA http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA580185

The recent conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine demonstrated that social media
could be a very useful means to support military operations. Since then, it has been
exploited to such an extent that it seems justifiable to call social media an information
confrontation battlefield. Obviously, there are many different ways of using social media

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

for supporting military objectives. Tomas Elkjer Nissen identifies six of them: intelligence
collection, (geo-) targeting, cyber operations, command and control, defense, and psycho-
logical warfare (inform and influence). [19]

QShape
Weaponization of Social Media QInform
by Thomas Elkjer Nissen QInfluence
QManipulate
QMislead
Targeting QExpose
QDiminish
QPromote
QDeceive
QMonitor Intelligence Inform and QCoerce
QCollect Collection Influence QDeter
QExploit Weaponization QMobilize
of Social Media QConvince
(activities and effects)
QDetect QDeny
QPrevent Defence Operations QDisrupt
QSecure QDegrade
QProtect QBreach
QFacilitate Command and QDestroy
QCoordinate Control
QSynchronise

Figure 4. Source: Social Media as a Toll of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communications Centre
of Excellence, Riga, July 2016, p. 11

Intelligence collection—monitoring and analyzing the information that can be found

in social networks, such as social media profiles, specific social media communities, con-
versations’ content and temperature. The collected information can be useful for target
audience analysis, which is crucial for planning information operations. It is also helpful
for planning kinetic activities on a given theater.
(Geo-) targeting—exploring virtual reality (in this case, social media) to identify targets
for military operations carried out in the real world. Such analysis uses geo-tagged
pictures, the content of users’ conversations, and geo-located data. The risk of geo-target-
ing has been recognized early-on by different actors. For example, in 2014 the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh prohibited its Mujahideen from switching-
on the original Twitter geo-tagging function. [20]
Cyber operations—breaching passwords, hacking social media or email accounts,
altering the content or making some accounts unusable. Cyber operations can be carried
out to collect intelligence, prevent other actors from using social networks, sow disinfor-
mation and confusion. The picture below shows an example from April 23, 2013 when the
Associated Press Twitter account was hacked to disseminate a false claim of explosions
at the White House. [21]

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 BEATA BIAŁY

Figure 5. Source: Twitter @AP The Associated Press

The temporary suspension of the AP account was only a minor effect of this operation.
The violent reaction of the Dow Jones Index (see the chart below) is a perfect illustration
of serious impact.

Figure 6. Source: http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/23/4257392/ap-twitter-hacked-claims-explosions-white-house-

president-injured

Command and Control (C2)—using social media platforms for internal communication
and coordination. Depending on their objectives, different actors can use more or less
open networks to synchronize their operations. An especially interesting example is the
PlayStation game network used by Daesh for coordination of its actions. [22] Obviously,
different social media platforms represent varying levels of security. For this reason,
actors like terrorist organizations often choose closed networks for their communication.
For example, Daesh uses the adaptive structure of its network to defend it against possible
infiltration or external influence.

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

Defense—all kinds of activities whose objective is to protect a given social network

against being penetrated by adversaries. This includes such activities as encryption,
anti-tracking, IP concealing, or the above-mentioned use of adaptive structures. Joseph
Shaheen describes this technique as a DEER process: Dissemination (of public propa-
ganda); Deletion or suspension of the account (by an adversary); Evolution of (network)
structure or methods; Expansion of influence or methods; Replenishments of accounts
and resources. [23] Defense also means making social media users aware of the risk they
encounter by communicating via different social media platforms. An example of such
“instruction” is the guide circulated by Daesh in January 2016 (see the chart below) giving
Daesh followers’ clear indications of platforms considered “safe” and “unsafe”. [24]

Figure 7. Source: The Wall Street Journal (SITE Intelligence Group)

Psychological warfare (inform and influence)­­—using social media as the channel for
disseminating messages whose objective is to influence (change) target audiences’ opin-
ions, beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors. It means achieving some military effect in the
cognitive domain using misinformation (including disinformation) and propaganda.
Without minimizing the importance of the first five above mentioned hostile activities,
we will examine closely the last one­­—psychological warfare on social media.

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 BEATA BIAŁY

SOCIAL MEDIA­—INFORMATION WARFARE BATTLEFIELD

Psychological warfare on social media can take different forms—overt or covert, depend-
ing on the target audience and objectives. Overt methods consist of acting via official
social media accounts and channels. Covert methods involve creating false accounts, using
social media trolls (called by some experts “hybrid trolls [25]) or bots, addressing closed
social networks. The second category of activities is abundantly explored by those actors
who do not observe democratic legal and ethical standards, such as terrorists or au-
thoritarian states. On the other hand, there are democratic countries and organizations
acting according to democratic values and principles, which exclude these kinds of
covert activities carried out in peace time.
For example, the NATO Allied
Joint Doctrine for Psychological Op- The social media landscape has
erations states that “PSYOPS may
be conducted … across the full spec- been evolving from relatively
trum of military operations.” [26] In
the same document, Information Op-
small local services to powerful
erations are defined as “a staff func- companies with global reach.
tion that analyzes, plans, assesses
and integrates information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding
and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries, and North Atlantic Council (NAC)
approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives.” [27] Ergo, psychological
operations may only take place in the context of military operations, and the target audi-
ences need to be approved by the highest NATO decision-making body.
In the case of terrorist organizations or authoritarian states, the boundaries between
war and peace are often blurred, and covert influence activities are used even if no war
has been officially declared. This kind of approach lies at the basis of Russia’s informa-
tion warfare theory. As Dr. Jolanta Darczewska at the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies
remarked, this theory had been built in opposition to the western concept of cybersecurity.
The latter is mostly about using technology for military and intelligence purposes. Russia’s
theory understands information warfare as “influencing the consciousness of the masses
as part of the rivalry between the different civilizational systems adopted by different
countries in the information space by use of special means to control information resources
as ‘information weapons’”. [28] Military and non-military orders are muddled up, and dis-
crepancies between “civilizational systems” are a sufficient justification for carrying out
psychological operations in the information space.
In information warfare, actors use different tactics. Ben Nimmo, Information Defense
Fellow at the Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, singles out four such meth-
ods, situating them in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, and calling this set of tactics
the “4D Approach”. [29] The four Ds stand for dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay.

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

Dismiss—undermining the opponent, denigrating him, or simply denying uncom-

fortable facts. An interesting example of this tactic is the use of the term “Russophobe”
by Kremlin supporters. If somebody criticizes Russia, he/she automatically becomes
Russophobe, which means ignorant, one whose opinions are grounded in prejudices,
and therefore not worth noting.

Figure 8. Source: Sputnik’s Twitter account

Distort—twisting facts, misinterpreting and putting them out of context, or last but not
least, producing a partly or totally false version of reality. This tactic is abundantly used
by Kremlin partisans, and its extreme form is the “rewriting of history” extensively
present in social media messages posted by pro-Russian users. Another example of
this tactic is Daesh propaganda videos disseminated on YouTube, which aims to convince
the Islamic audience how expertly organized is the “Islamic State’s” healthcare, and
how much the “ISIL” cares about its citizens and supporters. [30]
Distract—turning the audience’s attention away from the actor’s activities, and focusing
it on activities of the opponent. For example, pointing out that NATO is an aggressive
organization that is sending troops all over the world, or accusing the US of expansion-
ist policy when the social network discussion is about Russian annexation of Crimea.
Dismay—frightening the target audience with verbal warnings or disturbing pictures
and videos. The Kremlin has mastered this method and uses it broadly both towards the
internal and international audience. Kremlin statements about the “adequate response”
that will be given by Russia to NATO’s or US “aggressive policy” are willingly taken up
and repeated in social network discussions. Another example is Daesh propaganda videos
showing crucifixions or beheadings of the “unfaithful”.

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 BEATA BIAŁY

Figure 9. Source: Twitter

Figure 10. Source: Twitter

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

Although Ben Nimmo assigned the 4D Approach specifically to Russia, these tactics
are also used by other actors, and social media is a very convenient platform for their
application. Internet users who more and more frequently consider social media as their
main source of information are an attractive target for those who do not hesitate to manipu-
late or falsify facts and present their version of reality, supporting their particular agenda.
To increase effectiveness, they use a variety of techniques and methods, examined below.

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

One of the most striking characteristics of social media is the high speed of information
flow combined with unlimited range, cost-efficiency and availability 24/7. The conversa-
tions in social networks can be conducted almost in real time, and—as has already been
mentioned—the quantity of messages (posts) appearing on the user’s screen can make
his/her head swim. This is a big challenge for somebody who wants their message to be
visible. Therefore, one of the techniques used by different actors on social media is posting
automatically generated content or human generated content which is automatically
spread through fake accounts using bots and apps. Within the last few years, the
number of these social media accounts has noticeably increased—according to different
studies, at least 8 percent of Twitter accounts [31] and between 5 and 11 percent of Face-
book accounts are bots. [32] According to The ISIS Twitter Census, 20% or more of all Daesh
tweets are created using bots or apps. [33] Although social and IT scientists have been in-
venting more and more effective tools for the detection of bots, the other side has not
remained passive with bots becoming more sophisticated, more ‘human’, and therefore,
difficult to discover and eliminate.
It is important to note the exten-
Low access cost, various target sive use of mobile technology to
convey messages directly to users.
audiences, global reach, and The mobile revolution mentioned at
the unprecedented speed of the beginning of this article creates
a great opportunity for those who
information flow—all these want to effectively spread their
message. The mobile app Dawn of
factors encourage different Glad Tidings was distributed by
actors to use social media. Daesh to supporters in 2014 and
enabled them to use their Twitter
accounts to automatically tweet Daesh-related content. This was the first attempt by the
organization to use a mobile app for the automatic distribution of its messages. Although
it was closed down by Twitter pretty quickly, it was able to mobilize 40,000 people to
sign up for the app. Currently, a new Android app is in place allowing the Daesh radio
Al-Bayana to broadcast outside the boundaries of their operating territory. In May 2016,

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 BEATA BIAŁY

a new app was developed to teach the alphabet to children, but one can find a large number
of references to weapons and jihad. [34]
Another technique used to increase the exposure of
a given narrative on social media is trolling. However, it The most striking
is important to note the fundamental difference between
a “classic” internet troll and a “hybrid” troll. The first characteristics of
category has been present in digital media from the very
beginning and designates a particular kind of social
social media is
media user who, for purely personal reasons (frustra- the high speed of
tion, unhappy life, and psychological problems), tries to
disrupt social network conversation by offending other
information flow
users, provoking, and posting unpleasant comments or combined with
comments out of context. The other one is a kind of social
media warrior, hired by a state or a non-state organization unlimited range,
for supporting this organization’s cause and executing cost-efficiency
its agenda. [35] These “information spetsnazes”, as they are
called by one of the eminent Russian theorists of infor- and availability.
mation warfare, Igor Panarin [36], are tasked to post comments to either promote the nar-
rative of their patron or to destroy the narrative of his opponents. They overwhelm social
media with a huge volume of posts, using different manipulative techniques and methods
which have enabled researchers to discern a couple of interesting categories of hybrid
trolls: “bikini troll”, “Wikipedia troll”, “aggressive troll”, “attachment troll”, and “conspir-
acy troll” (also called “blame the US troll”). [37] The good news is that social media users
are not defenseless against hybrid trolls, and a minimum level of awareness and practice
can help to detect and expose them. In one of its reports, the NATO Strategic Commu-
nications Centre of Excellence published an “Internet Trolling Identification Tutorial” [38]
presenting a four-step approach which can help in countering hybrid trolls’ activity.
Trolling (especially “attachment trolls”) can also be used for conducting cyber
operations, such as intelligence collection. The Latvian Information Technology Security
Incident Response Institution (CERT) discovered that pro-Russian trolls were using the
comments sections of Latvian web portals to disseminate propaganda and encourage
other users to click on web links containing spying malware. [39]
An effective method of increasing the impact of a narrative or specific messages is
the coordinated use of multiple channels—open and closed. The communication goes
through public conversation platforms, such as Twitter, and within closed networks, such
as encrypted messengers or—as it was mentioned earlier—even via PlayStation Network
which is extremely challenging for decryption, and more difficult to track than WhatsApp.
Documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 revealed that the NSA and CIA attempted

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

to infiltrate terrorist conversations by taking part in games like World of Warcraft. [40]
Public networks are mainly used for spreading propaganda or misinformation, while
closed social networks may be an efficacious channel for coordination of activities (C2),
recruitment and the mobilization of support.
An interesting mutation of the above-mentioned technique is the Kremlin’s cross-
media communication approach broadly used in the Ukrainian conflict. The idea con-
sists of feeding the mainstream media with information, mostly fake, posted on social
media or­—vice-versa—disseminating materials made by pro-Kremlin media (e.g. TV chan-
nels controlled by Kremlin or pro-Kremlin websites) via social media conversations.
A striking example of this method is the case of “Doctor from Odessa”, an alleged emer-
gency physician who described on his Facebook account a dramatic story of his fight
to save wounded civilians. In the post, the “Doctor from Odessa” he depicted, in a very
emotional way, the cruelty of pro-Ukrainian extremists who stopped him from tending
to his patients. Although bloggers investigating the “Doctor’s” case discovered that such
a person did not exist, and the Facebook account was blocked, the story immediately
became very popular and was covered by the media. [41]
For spreading a given message even further, the cross-media communication approach
can also be combined with other techniques, such as the use of botnets. And last, but not
least, it has become a general rule to integrate pro-Kremlin online media: Russia Today,
and Sputnik with social media (Twitter, etc.).

DAESH COMMUNICATION PRODUCTS (%)

Sound File 15%

Literature 11% Video 70%

Newsletter 11%

Magazine 2%

Figure 11. Source: NATO StratCom COE report The DAESH Strategic
Narrative, June 2016

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 BEATA BIAŁY

To be effective on social media, attractive, memorable, and emotional content is

essential. Different actors, such as Daesh, understand the primacy of visual content
over verbal messages; it is much easier to capture the audience’s attention and achieve
its engagement when using images—the most engaging posts on Facebook are photos. [42]
The majority of Daesh products are pictures, videos, games, and music.
An interesting example of such content is Nasheeds, chants which are a mixture of
religious and social narratives inspiring Daesh supporters. Nasheeds are available on
the YouTube “Best Nasheed Channel”, and have recently started to appear in different
European language versions. [43]
Visual content has two major functions - to impress or to dismay. It rarely has a purely
informative character. It is also interesting to note the significant role played in psy-
chological warfare by humoristic drawings and pictures. A famous example is the pic-
ture montage tweeted by the Russian deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin (see below),
illustrating the “different values and allies” (original tweet: Y нас разные ценности и
союзники) of Russia and the USA, which became rather popular (retweeted 2500 times).

Figure 12. Source: Dimitry Rogozin’s Twitter account

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT CAN WE DO?

Social media is one of the most dynamically developing communication platforms. It
has been subject to many significant changes, evolving from small, scattered, local com-
munity websites, to consolidated companies with global reach. Social media has also wit-
nessed a leap into mobile technology, which has had a tremendous influence on human
behavior, including social media usage patterns. Last, but not least, over time, users moti-
vations to participate in discussion on social media have also changed. The purely “social”
motivation has been gradually replaced by other motivations, such as the search for
information, which has situated social platforms much closer to traditional media.
A dramatic change took place in this information
Social media has also environment that can be called the weaponization
of social media, which means transforming social
witnessed a leap into networks into a field of hostile information activities
mobile technology, carried out on target audiences in the gray zone
between peace and war.
which has had a Thanks to its exceptional features, such as global
tremendous influence reach, high accessibility, low cost, huge volume
and speed of information exchange, and—to some
on human behavior. extent—user anonymity, social media is attractive to
multiple actors with hostile agendas. Paradoxically, what has been its big advantage, has
become a considerable weakness. Platforms which—by definition—were born to be “social”,
have witnessed a great number of activities having a clearly anti-social character.
Hence, it seems highly justifiable to call social media a battlefield on which an intense
fight for hearts and minds is taking place. It is a battlefield where we can observe differ-
ent military strategies and tactics, such as deception, disinformation, propaganda, threat-
ening opponents, mobilization of supporters, and coordination of actions. The development
of technology plays a prominent role, making all those activities easier and more effective.
Human actors are extensively assisted or even replaced by bots and apps, and the content
(message) becomes—thanks to the development of multimedia—more and more attractive.
The question then arises as to what the democratic world can do to counter hostile
activities on social media, and in the information environment in general, given that the
adversary does not observe the same legal rules and ethical principles as a democracy,
and does not share democratic values. Moreover, the adversary is cunning, fast, flexible
and adaptive, due to the particular character of its organization—authoritarian (Kremlin)
or dispersed (Daesh), whereas democratic countries and institutions are obliged to follow
specific procedures with lengthy decision-making processes.

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 BEATA BIAŁY

The challenge is enormous, but the future is not lost. Observation of the social media
environment and the activities of “bad actors” enable us to formulate a few key recommen-
dations.
Be present on social media with attractive, well-tailored content. It is a vital part
of the information environment, and it should be considered as an obvious element of
communication campaigns. Instead of choosing platforms, it is wiser to choose target
audiences, and to follow them—they have already chosen their platforms.
Use what technology offers. Our adversaries use it effectively, creating attractive con-
tent and disseminating it via multiple channels. “Think mobile” is not just a catchy slogan.
Neither is “cross-media activity”. But do not forget that “social media is about sociology
and psychology more than technology” [44].
Advance your own narrative and develop attractive branding. A well prepared off-
ense is usually a more certain path to victory than defense. When promoting your narrative,
be consistent and credible.
Build your brand and narrative advocacy. Find credible voices within the target
audiences that can speak for you. Humanitarian organizations’ experience with crowd-
sourcing can serve as a very useful model.
Immunize your audience against psychological operations. It is vital to raise citizens’
awareness of the influence activities used by our adversaries. There are two main lines
of defense: education and exposure of hostile activities. Education gives citizens (starting
from relatively young age) basic knowledge about media and social media that helps
build critical thinking and fact-checking habits. Exposure of hostile activities requires
tracking online deception, manipulation and disinformation, and neutralizing it with
the truth. Because however lofty it may sound, truth is a powerful weapon.

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 SOCIAL MEDIA – FROM SOCIAL EXCHANGE TO BATTLEFIELD

NOTES
1. http://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/.
2. http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/.
3. https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/.
4. https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/44-twitter-stats-2016/.
5. Ibidem.
6. Report New Trends in Social Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2016, 13.
All reports of NATO StratCom COE can be found here: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications.
7. Ibidem, 13.
8. Special Report: Digital in 2016, http://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016.
9. http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/.
10. Report New Trends in Social Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2016, 9.
11. Reza Zafarani, Mohammad Ali Abbasi, Huan Liu, Social Media Mining, Cambridge University Press, April 20, 2014,
http://dmml.asu.edu/smm/SMM.pdf.
12. Daniel Armstrong, Exploring Social Media’s Influence during Conflict and Crisis, Grounded Curiosity, November 2016,
http://groundedcuriosity.com/exploring-social-medias-influence-during-conflict-and-crisis/#_ftn37.
13. Reza Zafarani, Mohammad Ali Abbasi, Huan Liu, Op. Cit.
14. Catherine Caruso, Can a Social-Media Algorithm Predict a Terror Attack, MIT Technology Review, June 16, 2016, https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/601700/can-a-social-media-algorithm-predict-a-terror-attack/.
15. The concept of grassroots journalism was exquisitely developed by Dan Gillmor in his book We the Media, grassroots jour-
nalism by the people, for the people, O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2004.
16. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/q-a-walter-quattrociocchi-digital-wildfires?utm_content=buffer-
259d4&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.
17. https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/.
18. Rebecca Goolsby, On Cybersecurity, Crowdsourcing, and Social Cyber-Attack, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/rebecca-gools-
by-cybersecurity-crowdsourcing-and-social-cyber-attack.
19. Report Social Media as a Toll of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, July 2016,
13.
20. Report Network of Terror: How DAESH uses adaptive social networks to spread its message, NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2015, 9.
21. http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/23/4257392/ap-twitter-hacked-claims-explosions-white-house-president-injured.
22. Report Social Media as a Toll of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, July 2016,
17.
23. Report Network of Terror: How DAESH uses adaptive social networks to spread its message, NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2015, 21.
24. Report New Trends in Social Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2016, 32-33.
25. Report Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Latvia, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excel-
lence, Riga, January 2016, 10.
26. AJP – 3.10.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, 2014, section IV – Principles of PsyOps.
27. Ibidem, section III - PSYOPS within strategic communications and information operations.
28. Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare, the Crimea Operation – a Case Study, Point of
View, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2014, 11-12, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/the_anatomy_of_
russian_information_warfare.pdf.
29. http://www.stopfake.org/en/anatomy-of-an-info-war-how-russia-s-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-
counter-it/.

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 BEATA BIAŁY

NOTES
30. You can watch one of these propaganda films here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiY7JFadLm8.
31. Twitter Has Stopped Updating Its Public Tally Of Bots, William Alden, BuzzFeed, November 10, 2015, https://www.buzz-
feed.com/williamalden/twitter-has-stopped-updating-its-public-tally-of-bots?utm_term=.qy111VP6D#.pbYRR3mJZ.
32. Facebook estimates that between 5.5% and 11.2% of accounts are fake, Emil Protalinski, The Next Web, http://thenextweb.
com/facebook/2014/02/03/facebook-estimates-5-5-11-2-accounts-fake/.
33. Report Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, July 2016,
37.
34. Report New Trends in Social Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2016, 34.
35. Report Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Latvia, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excel-
lence, Riga, January 2016, 10.
36. Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare, the Crimea Operation – a Case Study, Point of View, Cen-
tre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2014, 16, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/the_anatomy_of_russian_infor-
mation_warfare.pdf.
37. For more information see the Report Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Latvia, NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, January 2016.
38. Report Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Latvia, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excel-
lence, Riga, January 2016, 42.
39. Report Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare, Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, July 2016, 31.
40. Appropriate fragments of the leaked documents can be found here: http://gawker.com/nsa-and-cia-spied-on-world-
of-warcraft-other-online-vi-1479458437.
41. Report Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign against Ukraine, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,
Riga, July 2015, 23.
42. Report New Trends in Social Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, December 2016, 23.
43. Report Daesh Recruitment, How the Group Attracts Supporters, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,
Riga, November 2016, 23-24.
44. Brian Solis’ quotation used in the article by Nicole Matejic 3 things Anthony Robbins reminded me about communication:
http://www.infoopshq.com/2016/10/02/3-things-anthony-robbins-reminded-me-about-communication/.

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