Prop Law Proj
Prop Law Proj
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................2
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................3
JUDGEMENT .......................................................................................8
-Neelesh Ganguly
INTRODUCTION
The case in appellate jurisdiction to the High Court in second appeal against the
order and decree of the District Judge, which was a slightly modified order of the
District First-Class Magistrate.
LEGAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The main essence of the matter deals with Section 53 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882. Section 53 provides a rule against fraudulent transfer of property.
The Bare Act enshrines the section as:-
Nothing in this sub-section shall impair the rights of a transferee in good faith
and for consideration.
Nothing in this sub-section shall affect any law for the time being in force
relating to insolvency.
For the purposes of this sub-section, no transfer made without consideration shall
be deemed to have been made with intent to defraud by reason only that a
subsequent transfer for consideration was made.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The entire happenings of the case unravelled from 1949 to 1952. The following
points encompass the crux of the entire case.
The High Court of Madras, while hearing the case on second appeal, framed the
following two issues:
However, the Ramaswami, J. prefaced his statements by stating that the factors
which make up a fraudulent transfer must necessarily depend upon the
circumstances and merits of each case.
1 Halsbury's Laws of England (Simonds Edition), Volume 17 page 657 (para 1269).
contains an unnecessary statement to the effect that it was made without a
fraudulent intent; that the conveyance contains a false recital, though this
will not be conclusive against a party who did not know that the recital was
false: or that the grantor reserved to himself a power of revocation.2
2 Twyne's case (1602) 1 Smith LC (13th Edn.) 1 (A); Morris v, Morris, (1895) AC 625 (B); Sanders v. Crossley, (1919)
2 Ir R 71 (C); Perry-Herrick v. Attwood, (1857) 27 LJ Ch 121 (D); Re Hirth; Ex parte Trustee, (1899) 1 QB 612 (E);
Re Troughton, (1894) 71 LT 427 (F); Alton v. Harrison; Poyser v. Harrison, (1869) 4 Ch A 622 (G); Edmunds v.
Edmunds, (1904) P. 362 (H): Pearce v. Bulteel, (1916) 2 Ch 544 (1): Re Baker, (1936) Ch 61 (J); Re Hooker's
Settlement (1954) 3 All ER 321 (K).
3 Daulat Ram Dhodi, “Law of Fraud and Fraudulent Transfers in India”, Second edition, page 205.
(10) Lack of passing of consideration mentioned its the deed when taken
with other facts may go to show the deed to be a sham one, not passing
anything.
The Court applied these principles in the present case. Ramaswami, J. found the
following incidents which, in his opinion, pointed to a fraudulent transfer:
3. In the sale deed Ex. A-1 no provision has been made for discharging the
decree debt of Muniammal.
4. The vendee plaintiff has been evading alternately that he made no enquiries
about the indebtedness of the vendor and that the vendor informed him of his
indebtedness. In either event the fraudulent intent of this vendee stands made out.
5. It has been established that Baby Soda Factory was worth Rs. 1,000 and
more but has been purported to be sold for Rs. 500.
6. Prior to this alleged purchase, possession of the Soda Factory has been with
the vendor, managed through his son.
Keeping these incidents in mind, the Court held that it was clear that this was a
case of fraudulent transfer/conveyance of property and therefore section 53 of the
Transfer of Property Act is attracted. The transfer was deemed voidable at the
instance of Ms. Muniammal.
With regard to Mr. Thyagaraja’s claim of equitable relief, the court applied the
maxim "he who seeks equity must do equity". In this case the sale deed itself is
not supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 500. On the other hand, the
evidence as seen and analyzed by the District Munsif clearly shows that cash
consideration of Rs. 345 did not pass.
The importance of this landmark judgment can also be seen from the fact that it
is referred to by nearly all books and commentaries on Property Law in India in
glowing terms. Justice Ramaswami’s dicta, “It is surprising how human nature is
the same all the world over, irrespective of colour, creed and race” is well
representative of the human race and the role of the property law in securing
justice and restoring equity in society.