Introduction

There have been many cooperatives organized in the Philippines, especially, when late
President Corazon C. Aquino on March 10, 1990, signed two laws, RA 6938, creating an
organic law for cooperatives, and R. A. No. 6939 establishing a Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) under the Office of the President. But apparently, only few of these
cooperatives thrived for development purposes. Many failed because of problems that
plagued in their respective operations. In Maguindanao alone, there were 1,010 cooperatives
registered at the Cooperative Development Agency (CDA), Provincial Office from 1990-
1998, but unfortunately, only few survived: Many floundered, and later just “die” a natural
death, defeating the very essence of cooperativism, that is, for self reliance and self
sufficiency (Sam, 2002).
This cooperative trend in the province calls for some kind of closer review: Why only few
could implement viable projects, many failed, despite of a completely the same environment
they worked with.

Puzzled about this cooperative trend in the province, the author pursued a study which
closely examines the success and failure experiences of these cooperatives by analyzing four
of them operating in the conflict affected areas in Maguindanao. The study is hoped to
compare, and subsequently, shed lights on the distinct characteristics of those few, whose
operations were quite successful, despite of the province’s unstable peace and order condition
in contrast to those that failed in their operations. Specifically, the study addresses the
following questions: First, how do the following organizational factors such as purposes and
objectives, organization and management, project/activities, resources, and leadership affect
the operations of these cooperatives? Second, how do networks of cooperatives and
assistance extended by the national government agencies, local government units, non-
government organizations, coop federation and unions and international organizations
contribute for operations of these cooperatives? Third, do the economic, political, and
social environments affect the coop operations in the province? and fourth, what policy
implications for the regional and provincial cooperative development programs result from
this study?

Review of Literature

Development of Cooperatives in the Philippines

The strengthening of cooperatives in the Philippines did not take place without legal basis. In
1915, a law was created to address the problem of usury. With this law, Rural Credit
Cooperative Associations were organized in order to pool funds and to extend credit to

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507
members at reasonable terms for exclusively agricultural operations. In 1940, a cooperative
law was enacted. This law provided for the organization of all types of cooperatives,
authorized the creation or designation of a government agency to promote and supervise
them, established a national cooperative fund, and allowed a minimum of fifteen persons to
form a cooperative that would then be exempted for the first five years of its existence from
all government taxes and fees (BCOD 1987).

Twelve years later, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 821 was passed. This law created the
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). It was supposed to
provide loans to the members of Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association (FACOMA)
members without requiring any collateral from them (BCOD 1987).

Notwithstanding these aforementioned policies, the cooperative movement grew slowly. On

14 April 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 175 seeking to
strengthen it. The decree stated as state policy the creation and growth of cooperatives as a
means of increasing the income and purchasing power of the poor, thereby promoting a more
equitable distribution of income and wealth. Presidential Decree 175 repealed all previous
laws on cooperatives, and assigned to the Department of Local Government and Community
Development, through the BCOD, the task of issuing regulations for the effective
implementation of the decree. The program conceived and implemented under this decree
was premised on the following:

1. That cooperatives facilitate the redistribution of wealth and income, and should
thus be accorded special consideration by the government;
2. That cooperatives are instruments for rural development;
3. That cooperatives must be built from the bottom up; and
4. That cooperatives must be systematic and system-oriented.

This strategy was to be realized in four distinct phases or stages:

1. The organization and development of the Samahang Nayon (a form of pre-

cooperatives);
2. The organization and development of Kilusang Bayan (the full-fledged
cooperative);
3. The organization of consumer cooperative markets; and
4. The integration of all cooperatives into one coordinated system (BCOD, 1986).

The ascendancy to power of Corazon C. Aquino after the EDSA Revolution in l986 saw
another breakthrough in the development of the cooperative movement. Specifically, the
1987 Constitution (Article XII, Section 15) mandates the State “to create an agency to
promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as instruments of equity, social justice, and
economic development.” Thus, President Aquino, on March 10, 1990, signed two laws, R. A.
No. 6938 creating an organic law for cooperatives, and R. A. No. 6939 establishing a
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) under the Office of the President. Both laws
sought to establish and strengthen cooperatives as forces for social change. They
institutionalized the cooperative movement as an instrument of state policy.

Cooperative Principles and Characteristics of a True Cooperative

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507
The operations of cooperatives are primarily guided by principles that are patterned after the
“Rochdale Principles” developed by the Rochdale Pioneers (BCOD, 1986). These basic
principles, as specified in the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, are as follows:

1. Open and voluntary membership – Membership in cooperatives shall be voluntary

and available to all individuals regardless of their social, political, racial, or
religious background or beliefs.
2. Democratic control – Cooperatives are democratic organizations. Persons elected
or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members shall administer their
affairs. Members of primary cooperatives shall have equal voting rights on a one-
member-one-vote principle: provided, however, that in the case of secondary and
tertiary cooperatives, the provisions of article 37 of R.A. No. 6938 – The
Cooperative Code of the Philippines, shall apply.
3. Limited interest in capital – Share capital shall receive a strictly limited rate of
interest.
4. Division of net surplus – Net surplus arising out of the operations of a cooperative
belongs to its members and shall be equitably distributed for cooperative
development, common services, indivisible reserve fund, and for limited interest
on capital and/or patronage refund in the manner provided in the law and specified
in the article of cooperation and bylaws of the cooperative.
5. Cooperative education – All cooperatives shall make provision for the education
of their members, officers, and employees, and of the general public on the
principles of cooperation.
6. Cooperation among cooperatives – All cooperatives, in order to best serve the
interest of their members and communities, shall actively cooperate with other
cooperatives at local, national, and international levels.

Verzosa (1991) reinforced the aforementioned principles when he emphasized that true
cooperatives are identified by their observance of a few simple rules. They are:

1. Open membership – all people who can benefit from the services of a cooperative
are admitted to membership;
2. Democratic control – a member is entitled to only one vote regardless of the
number of shares or other forms of capital he or she holds;
3. Limited interest to paid-up capital – money invested in a cooperative is allowed
only a normal and modest rate of return;
4. Surplus earnings are distributed in proportion to the volume of transactions made
from the services offered by the cooperative. What is normally paid out as profit
to shareholders in other businesses is returned to those who created the surplus in
a cooperative.

Furthermore, he pointed out additional principles that he did not consider to be essential but
that he said commonly characterized cooperatives. They were: political neutrality; business
carried out in cash in preference to credit; and goods and products handled at current market
prices.

Constraints in the Development of Cooperatives in the Philippines

In the Philippines, the cooperative movement has a long way to go to make a significant
improvement in the lives of the people. Pagdanganan, in his observations, specified the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

constraints that for him stymied the full development of the cooperative movement in the
country. He listed them as follows:

1. Government intervention

The hand of government plays a determinant role in the success or failure of cooperatives. In
countries with a healthy and progressive cooperative movement, such as the United Kingdom
and Germany, the government maintains a “respectful distance” from the cooperative
movement but holds out a helping hand in times of need. In the UK, the Rochdale Pioneers
went founded and developed the first successful cooperatives because “government was
indifferent” to their plight. Because of this indifference, the Pioneers strengthened their
association and learned to depend on their individual and group resources. As in Germany,
the UK pioneers sought government intervention, in so far as the legalities of their
associations required them, but otherwise went about their affairs without any direct
intervention from government.

In the case of the Philippines, the passage in 1990 of R.A. Nos. 6938 and 6939 seemed to
herald a new wave of progress for cooperatives. The laws provided a legal framework for
development, emphasizing cooperative principles and providing tax incentives. However, he
considered some practices to actually have negative effects on cooperatives, these being:

a. Dole-out oriented approach. Many government agencies have encouraged a dole-

out mentality that violates a basic principle of the cooperative movement.
“Organize cooperatives and we will give you grants or loans as you need them” is
the common government bait. Such a beginning often spelt doom because the easy
money from government was rarely paid back. Often, they were even used for
purposes not originally intended. The principles of self-help, self-responsibility,
and self-actualization are not at all encouraged by this dependence on government
largesse.
b. Excessive government interference. One example was the issuance of PD 175 by
then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos obliging cooperatives to register as Samahang
Nayon. This was done in support of Marcos’ political grand design of a “New
Society.” Less than 10 percent of the more than 20,000 Samahang Nayon created
eventually survived. Those that persisted did so only because they seriously
applied the principles of the cooperative movement.

2. Cultural factor

In countries with successful cooperatives such as the UK, Germany, and Japan, people are
committed to excel in their fields of endeavor and are driven by “higher goals” beyond the
immediate satisfaction of their own or their family’s needs. In the Philippines, the prevalence
of a crab mentality, coupled with a sub-culture of graft and corruption, have worked against
the success of the cooperative movement.

3. Natural element

Developed countries are mostly in the temperate climatic zone, which may be a factor for the
success of cooperatives, and of planning in general. The warm and humid climate of the
tropics seem to invite “no compelling reason” to urgently solve a problem, much less making
cooperatives succeed.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

 4. Lack of or poor education of cooperators

Education in the cooperative principles plays a crucial role in the success of cooperatives, as
experience has shown. In the case of the UK, America, Germany, Japan, and Canada,
education is a big part of training. They have also established centers devoted to the study of
cooperatives, and to the imparting of skills necessary for business and finance, and for
managing a growing network.

5. Not strict adherence to the cooperative principles

The literature on successful cooperatives is replete with the admonition of the need to commit
oneself to the cooperative principles of self-help, democratic control, independence, and self-
reliance (Pagdanganan, 1999: 290-294).

The aforementioned observations are further bolstered by the results of a study conducted by
the Cooperative Development Authority (1992) that lists the following reasons for the failure
of cooperatives (as cited in Turingan 1995):

1. Lack of education and training, information, and practical know-how on the

principles, nature, and operations of the cooperative organization, which led to
incompetent management;
2. Non-internalization of cooperative principles and practices by the members;
3. Insufficient working capital;
4. Inadequate marketing facilities;
5. Political interference, particularly in the collection of overdue accounts; and
6. Inadequate and ineffective supervision by government agencies entrusted with the
development and promotion of cooperatives.

It was further pointed out that, while government support of the cooperative movement
reaffirms its commitment to the vital role of cooperatives for socio-economic development,
such support has had negative effects, such as:

1. Dependence of cooperative leaders on government for direction and financial

support has bred a culture of patronage that does not encourage self reliance and
self-management among cooperatives;
2. Dependence on government made cooperatives mere extensions of government
plans and programs, thereby hampering their growth as autonomous people’s
organizations; and
3. Intervention by government has discouraged peoples’ participation. Worse,
government officials have had occasion to use cooperatives for their own political
purposes.

Key Factors that Led to the Success of Cooperatives in Other Countries

Former Bulacan province Governor, Roberto “Obet” Pagdanganan, (Bulacan is considered

the cooperative capital of the Philippines) has made a thorough analysis of the factors
responsible for cooperative success in some countries. He traveled abroad, particularly to
Germany in 1991 and 1999 through the sponsorship of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, for a
close up view of successful cooperative experiences and pointed out the following:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

 1. Merging and consolidation of primary cooperatives resulted in economies of
scale, and improved productivity and competitiveness. There were more than
50,000 cooperatives with about 6.5 million members in Germany in the early
1930s. As of December 1998, there were only 7,607 cooperatives but membership
had ballooned to 15.6 million.
2. Professionalization of management. Training and education are a must in these
countries, not just for members but also for auditors and directors. They make full
use of modern technology in information and communications.
3. Training and education programs. They have established excellent training centers
and research and education facilities, and have developed appropriate curriculum
for members and management.
4. Effective auditing system. Auditors are required to undergo special training before
they can be accredited. Auditing by the Cooperative Federation is compulsory in
Germany. This has improved overall management systems and provided
protection to investors.
5. Strong federation of cooperatives. Cooperatives in Germany, Japan, Korea, North
America, and other progressive countries have developed strong federations.
These provide support in terms of consultancy services, auditing, and lobbying for
a supportive policy environment. The federations are instrumental in establishing
business enterprises, such as the BayWa in Germany, procuring supplies for
member needs, and marketing the products of cooperatives.
6. Cooperative federations have also established modern training facilities and
systems, as well as insurance firms and convenience stores. Membership in
federations is mandatory in Germany and other countries. The Bavarian
Federation of Cooperatives is an outstanding example of such a federation.
7. Centralized banking system for cooperatives and cooperative banks. The DG bank
in Germany, the RABO Bank in Holland, the CWS Retail Bank in the UK, and
similar banks in the USA, Japan, and other countries are very effective in
managing the liquidity of cooperatives and cooperative banks. They also offer
members the whole line of banking services, e.g. access to local and international
financing, markets, redistributing, checking accounts, ATM facilities, credit cards,
debentures, and others.
8. Government support to cooperatives based on the principle of subsidiarity.
Cooperatives are greatly affected by their relationship with the state. The
government determines the legislative framework within which cooperatives must
operate. They set policies in taxation and socio-economic matters. In successful
countries, the government has generally respected the autonomy and
independence principles of cooperatives. They see cooperatives as partners in
development, and have supported rather than exploited them (Pagdanganan,
1999: 287-289).

Methodology

Research Design

This study uses case study method in comparing successful cooperatives from the non
successful ones. The choice of the design is prompted by the need to come up with an in-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

depth analysis of why some cooperatives in Maguindanao have remained active and
functional while others have not.

Selection of Cooperatives for Case Analysis

It took some doing to “sift the chap from the grain” as it were, that is, to pick which of the
cooperatives registered at the CDA Maguindanao should be considered successful and which
not. After consulting with CDA officials, a list was made up classifying the cooperatives into
successful and non-successful or failed coops. The main criteria used to designate successful
or non-successful coops was whether or not the cooperative was continuing to render
services and implement activities for its member-farmers, that is, whether or not it was still
active as a cooperative. In particular, failed coops were those that had been previously active
but had since ceased to operate. Out of the 1,010 multipurpose-agriculture cooperatives
registered at the CDA Maguindanao from l990 to l998, only about eight (less than 1 percent
of the total) were found to be still active. The others had apparently suspended or stopped
operations altogether. A number had registered but never managed to begin operations.

In order to assess at firsthand the state of those cooperatives identified in the list, visits to
those organizations were made and their officials interviewed. It was then decided to choose
two of them, based on their income, the nature of services they offered, and the size of their
membership, to represent the successful or viable coops. One was picked from the first
district of Maguindanao and the other from the second district. Two others were chosen that
had once been active but had now become inactive because of one problem or another, one
from each district as well. There were then a total of four cooperatives to be included in the
study, namely, Woodland Integrated Farm Resort Multipurpose Cooperative in Sultan
Kudarat and Brar Communal Irrigators Multipurpose Cooperative in Talayan, both active
coops, and Kurintem Farmers’ Multipurpose Cooperative in Datu Odin Sinsuat, and
Kooperatiba sa Bayan ng Ampatuan, the problematic coops. In addition to the above
criteria, these four were chosen, in particular, because they consented to the study and were
willing to cooperate. Also, they were all fairly accessible and their membership consisted
mainly of farmers.

Data Gathering Techniques

The following techniques were used to facilitate the data gathering processes:
1. Key Informants (KIs)

a. Interviews with the officers of the cooperatives.

A series of interviews was conducted with the organizations’ officers, particularly the
members of the Board and their respective committee members, as well as those directly
involved in the operation of the cooperative such as the Manager, Secretary, Treasurer and
other responsible persons that had been appointed by the Board. The interviews centered on
the purposes and objectives, organization and management, projects/activities, resources, and
leadership and leadership styles in the particular cooperative.
b. Meetings with other key informants

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

Meetings with key informants were crucial in obtaining general information regarding
cooperative development in the province as a whole as well as in providing insights into the
external environment, social, political, policy, etc., in which the coops had to operate. Other
key informants included:
i. Administrators or heads of government and private institutions (LBP, DA,
CDA etc.) that were supposed to provide assistance to cooperatives in the
province;
ii. Local government officials both at the municipal and provincial levels;
iii. Officials of NGOs that had extended assistance to cooperatives.

2. Focused Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focused group discussions with senior members of the cooperatives were undertaken in order
to get “ground level” feedback from the direct beneficiaries and actors of the organizations.

3. Review of Official Documents

A review of official documents and other materials was made. These came from the
cooperatives concerned, from the local government units, government development agencies,
private institutions, NGOs, and even international organizations involved with the
cooperatives under study. The documents included reports, programs, brochures,
publications, etc.
4. Field Observation and Documentation
Cooperative operations were observed and documented in order to cull information that could
contribute to the study.

Findings and Discussions

Successful cooperatives have the following characteristics:

1. Strong family-based leadership as a key factor for viable coop operation.

WIFRMPC and BCIMPC continue to operate partly because strong family leadership served
to bond the members together. In the case of WIFRMPC, the leadership provided by the
Pahm clan of educators and professionals gave the cooperative a solid vision as an impetus
for its growth and development. In the case of the BCIMPC, the Sultan family, a respected
traditional leading clan in the community, provided such leadership. In both cooperatives,
strong leadership encouraged unity and teamwork among the members and officers. It was
this kind of leadership that enabled the cooperatives to endure amidst the turmoil in
Maguindanao.

2. Dynamism and versatility in income generating activities lead to both coop productivity
and sustainability.

Flexibility in the pursuit of economic activities, coupled by the resolve of both members and
officers, appear to be critical for cooperative development. Both WIFRMPC and BCIMPC

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

sought to diversify their economic projects and sources of income. The WIFRMPC, in
addition to its fisheries, poultry, forestry, coffee, rice, and corn production activities, also
engaged in rice, corn, and oil trading. It also derived income from operating the resort’s
facilities. BCIMPC, on the other hand, engaged in trading to supplement its income from rice
and corn production. To conserve their resources, both cooperatives also stopped their
lending services after the crop failures that plagued their members. WIFRMPC focused its
resources on collecting on its receivables. BCIMPC, on the other hand, sought to become
independent of the Land Bank’s support for its programs.

3. Efficient utilization of resources (technical, financial and human) enhances coop

productivity and sustainability.

WIFRMPC and BCIMPC both benefited from the training exposures of their members.
Officers of WIFRMPC supervised their members’ farming activities to make sure that they
apply the technical know-how taught to them in training. In the BCIMPC, the Chairman took
the lead role, serving as a model in applying new technologies. As a result, both cooperatives
began to show positive earnings after an initial period of losses. They also both managed to
continue to deliver services to their members despite problems with unpaid loans.

4. Networks and linkages contribute to both coop productivity and sustainability.

Both cooperatives nurtured and sustained the networks and linkages they established with
institutions working for cooperative development. Their members were able to benefit from
these networks and linkages, acquiring new technologies and techniques for increasing
production.

5. Membership Expansion increases paid up capital, which subsequently enhances coop

productivity and sustainability.

Both cooperatives expanded membership, with WIFRMPC enjoying an average annual rise
of 93 percent and BCIMPC, a 70 percent increase. More members naturally meant
corresponding additions to paid-up capital that helped each cooperative enhance productivity
and sustainability.

On the other hand, the failed cooperatives were dragged down by the following
circumstances:

1. Leadership crisis leads to vulnerability and insensitivity to problems, dragging down

the coops to failure.

When coop officers fail to be responsible, the whole organization suffers. KMPCI officers’
limited knowledge of the concept of cooperativism made them entirely dependent on the
chairman to run the cooperative. When he left, the officers were at a loss. KBAI officers, on
the other hand, allowed the cooperative’s founder (the ex-priest) to manipulate the
organization for his personal ends, leading the cooperative to ruin. The democratic processes
that underpin the operations of cooperatives were never allowed to function properly.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

2. Failure in project implementation results in no return of investment, non-payment of
loans by the borrowers, and non-productive coop operations.

Both cooperatives failed in the implementation of their respective projects. Management

incompetence confounded the crop failures that plagued the cooperatives’ members: KMPCI
management’s laxity allowed its cashiers to steal from the coop store; KBAI fell to the wiles
of its founder who took funds from the cooperative for his personal use and whose action led
to the coop’s members refusing to repay their debts.

3. Dole out mentality leads to unproductive (passive) coop.

Cooperative members, having been exposed to government dole-outs in the past, sought to
get out of repaying their loans by regarding them as nothing more than government largesse.
This irresponsible position also led them to effectively abandon their obligations as members
of their respective cooperatives.

4. Non-utilization of technical know-how acquired from training leads to non-productive

performance.

The failed coops were unable to profit from the technical skills they were taught in training.
For lack of resources, they were unable to provide the material support that their members
required to upgrade their production techniques.

5. Unsustained networks and linkages meant lack of support mechanisms that could
further enhance coop productivity and sustainability.

Neither cooperative was able to nurture and sustain the networks and linkages each had
established with development agencies working for cooperative development.

6. Deficient record-keeping meant absence of reliable information on the coops’

financial condition, making them vulnerable to further corruption.

Persons in responsible positions in both cooperatives failed to keep reliable records of their
respective business transactions. In the case of the KMPCI, the records maintained by the
records officer did not jibe with the records of disbursement by the cashier. The case with
KBAI was similar as releases were made without following proper procedures.

Conclusion

For cooperatives to successfully operate in conflict-affected areas such as in Maguindanao,

the following organizational factors appear to be critical: a) leadership, i.e. strong family-
based leadership; b) dynamism and versatility in income generating activities, illustrating
both a certain degree of flexibility but also highlighting the resolve of coop members to
succeed; and efficient utilization of resources (technical, financial, and human).

On the other hand, those traditional factors that are thought to generally apply to all
cooperatives, such as purposes and objectives, and organization and management may not be

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

critical at all. As the study showed, these factors did not have any bearing on the success and
failure of coop operations.

Institutional networks of cooperatives and assistance extended by national government

agencies and international organizations proved to be contributory factors for coops’
successful operations as long as the acquired technologies were applied productively.
However, links with non-governmental organizations, local government units and coop
federations and unions, were not critical for the survival of Maguindanao coops in contrast to
the more positive experience of cooperatives in Bulacan and Davao Del Sur (Gaffud, 1995).

In the experience of cooperatives in Maguindanao, the contributions of private institutions

proved to be critical in enhancing coop successful operations, contrary to the traditional belief
that they play no role. Private institutions assisted cooperatives in acquiring technical know-
how and in marketing their produce.

Finally, while the action environment (political, economic and social) appeared to negatively
impact on cooperative operations, their effect was not so great as to threaten coop survival or
freely operations. The cooperatives were able to apply compensating strategies to reverse
whatever stifling forces that may be attributed to such environmental factors.

References:

________. (1986). Bureau of Cooperative Development: A Manual on Cooperative

Operation and Development.

________. (1987). Bureau of Cooperative Development: A Manual on Cooperative

Operation and Development.

________. (1998). CDA Annual Report

Gaffud, R. B. (1995). Strengthening Market Leverage of Peoples Enterprise and Promoting

Self-Reliance: A Framework for Collaboration between Cooperatives and Local
governments (Focus on the experiences of cooperative and Provincial
Governments in Davao Province and Bulacan). Doctoral Dissertation. UP-CPA

Pagdanganan, R. (1999). A Call for Cooperative Revolution.

________. Republic Act 6938‐ Creating an Organic Law for Cooperatives in the Philippines

________. Republic Act 6939‐ Establishing a Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)

under the Office of the President

11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507

________. The l987 Constitution of the Philippines

Sam, R. A. (2002). “Farmers’ Cooperatives in conflict –Ridden Areas: The Maguindanao

Experience”, a dissertation research submitted to the National College of Public
Administration and Governance (NCPAG), University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.

Turingan, M.S. (1995). The Loaning Operations of claveria Agri-Based Multi-Purpose

Cooperative, Inc.: An Assessment, University of Santo Tomas, Manila.

Verzosa, M. F. (1991). A Government Machinery on Cooperative Promotion: focus on the

Cooperative Development Authority.

12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1560507