M1 - Micro 1 - Lecture 1
M1 - Micro 1 - Lecture 1
Federico Trionfetti
M1 2024-2025
Micro I
Table of content
Agents have ‘preferences’ in the sense that they are able to choose be-
tween alternatives. The alternatives consists typically in consumption
bundles (denoted x, y, z, etc.). We use the following notation to express
preference relations.
Preference relations:
x ľ y : means x is no worse than (or at least as good as) y.
x ą y : means x is preferred to y.
x „ y : means x is indifferent to y
We assume preferences to be rational. This is the minimum require-
ment. We also assume a number of additional properties that are very
convenient for analysis of agents decision. We analyze these properties
beginning with rationality.
1
Throughout the course I will use V and MCWG to refer, respectively, to the
textbook by Varian and the textbook by Mass-Collel, Whinston, and Green.
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 4 / 107
Preferences Rationality
Rationality
Definition 1
Preferences are rational if they possess the following properties:
1 Completeness. For all x and y in X, either x ľ y or x ĺ y or
x „ y.
2 Transitivity. For all x, y, and z in X, if x ľ y and y ľ z, then
x ľ z.
Proof.
Skipped
Other properties.2
A number of very convenient assumptions are adopted in applications of
microeconomics. Here is a list:
Continuity. For all y in X the vectors tx : x ľ yu and
tx : x ĺ yu are closed sets. Therefore the sets tx : x ą yu and
tx : x ă yu are open sets. It says that the bundle no worse than y
and those no better than y are separated by only one bundle, y
itself. Hence, continuity of preferences.
Weak Monotonicity. x ě y implies x ľ y. At least as much of
everything is at least as good.
Monotonicity. x " y implies x ą y. More of everything is better.
Strong Monotonicity. x ě y ^ x ‰ y implies x ą y. At least as
much of everything and strictly more of at least one thing is better.
2
Since notation varies across textbooks it is useful to define our own. Click here .
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 10 / 107
Preferences Other properties
Bupxq
(2)
Bxi
...
dpx2 {x1 q M RS
σ“ (9)
x2 {x1 dM RS
Intuitively, the elasticity of substitution measures the easiness with which
a consumer is willing to substitute one good with another and be equally
happy.
Graphically, the elasticity of substitution measures the curvature of the
indifferent curve.
To compute it, it is convenient to rewrite it as follows:
M RS
x2 {x1
σ“ dM RS
(10)
dpx2 {x1 q
a1 x2 ´ρ
ˆ ˙
dMRSCES
“ ´p1 ´ ρq (16)
dpx2 {x1 q a2 x1
and then
´ ¯1´ρ ´ ¯´1
MRS
x1 {x2
´ aa12 x2
x1
x2
x1 1
σ“ “ ¯´ρ “ (17)
dMRS 1´ρ
´
dpx2 {x1 q ´p1 ´ ρq aa12 x2
x1
Therefore, the only way that u can remain constant is that dx2 “ 0 for
any dx1 .
In either case the MRS and σ are both zero. Try a graphical represen-
tation.
f pxq “ ai pxi q ρ
, ρă1 (22)
i“1
where ai ą 0. Let’s
ř now impose that the coefficients ai are weights in the
sense that and ni“1 ai “ 1. Then the function (22) is a weighted power
mean. The elementary ‘unweighted’ power mean occurs for ai “ 1{n.
which is a Cobb-Douglas.
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 35 / 107
Correspondence between CES, CD, and Leontief
Therefore
«
n ˆ ˙ρ ff ρ1
ÿ xi
lim f pxq “ lim xk ai (29)
ρÑ´8 ρÑ´8
i“1
xk
“ xk r0s0 “ xk (30)
Therefore
lim f pxq “ mintxi u. (31)
ρÑ´8
which is a Leontief.
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 36 / 107
Correspondence between CES, CD, and Leontief
Check Point
End of Week 1.
Incidentally, notice that the “=” sign implies that we assumed strict
monotonicity.
BLpλ, xq Bupxq
“ 0 ùñ “ λpi @i (34)
Bxi Bxi
BLpλ, xq
“ 0 ùñ px “ m. (35)
Bλ
The solution of this system is a vector x˚ and a scalar λ˚ . The vector x˚
is known as the vector of demands because each element is the quantity
of a good demanded.
The functions x˚i pp, mq are the demand functions. Sometimes they are
called the ‘Marshallian’ or ‘market’ demand functions.
pi Bupxq{Bxi
“ (36)
loop
moj on Bupxq{Bxj
looooomooooon
Economic R.S. ´M RS
pi Bupxq{Bxi
“
loop
moj on Bupxq{Bxj
looooomooooon
Figure 15: Utility maximization. Economic R.S. ´M RS
3
Ă means proper subset.
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 44 / 107
Indirect utility
tp : vpp, mq ď ku . (37)
Proof. skipped.
BLpλ, xq Bupxq
“ 0 ùñ pi ´ λ “ 0 @i (40)
Bxi Bxi
BLpλ, xq
“ 0 ùñ upxq ´ u “ 0. (41)
Bλ
The solution to this problem is a vector x˚ .
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 46 / 107
Expenditure minimization Hicksian demand functions
Bepp, uq
hi pp, uq “ @i. (42)
Bpi
Proposition 2
The expenditure function is homogeneous of degree 1 in p. That is, for
any scalar t we have eptp, uq “ tepp, uq.
Proof.
The constraint of the expenditure minimization problem, upxq “ u, is
insensitive to price changes. Therefore, the solution vector x˚ remains
unchanged when prices change proportionally. But the sum we spent
before the price change is no longer sufficient to afford x. We now need
a sum eptp, uq “ tpx˚ . But the latter is exactly tepp, uq.
Proposition 3
The expenditure function is non-decreasing in any pi . That is, if
p1 ě p ^ p1k “ pk @k ‰ i, then epp1 , uq ě epp, uq.
Proof.
Let x1 be the solution of the expenditure minimization problem for
prices p1 . Then
Proposition 4
Proof.
Let tx, x1 , x2 u be the expenditure minimizing consumption vectors for,
respectively, tp, p1 , p2 u. By definition we know that
Bupxq
eq. (40) for i pi ´ λ “0
Bxi
Bupxq
eq. (40) for j pj ´ λ “0
Bxj
pi Bupxq{Bxi
eq. (36) “
loopj on
mo Bupxq{Bxj
looooomooooon
Economic R.S. ´M RS
Yet condition (36) was obtained from utility maximization while (40)
were obtained from expenditure minimization. This fact raises the sus-
picion that the solution of the U-max and E-min are related. We discuss
these matters in the following slides.
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Exp. Min. ô to U. Max.
Proof.
U-max ñ E-min. We want to show that x˚ solves E-min. Suppose
not and let x1 be the solution to E-min; therefore by the statement of
the E-min problem px1 ă px˚ and upx1 q “ u˚ “ upx˚ q. But continuity
and non-satiation make that there exists a bundle x2 close enough
(slightly preferred) to x1 such that px2 ă px˚ “ m and that
upx2 q ą upx˚ q. But this contradicts the assumption that x˚ is the
solution of U-max.
Proof.
U-max ð E-min. We want to show that x˚ solves U-max. Suppose
not and let x1 be the solution to U-max; therefore by the statement of
the U-max problem upx1 q ą upx˚ q and px1 “ px˚ “ m˚ . (To
understand these two equalities remember that the U-max problem
corresponding to the E-min is one in which the income is equal to the
least expenditure. Therefore, the equality px1 “ m˚ comes from the
hypothesis that x1 is utility maximizing and px˚ “ m˚ comes from the
fact that x˚ is cost minimizing). Since, px˚ ą 0 and utility is
continuous, there exist a t P p0, 1q such that ptx1 ă px˚ “ m˚ and that
uptx1 q ą upx˚ q. But this contradicts the assumption that x˚ is the
solution of E-min.
The expenditure function and the indirect utility function are linked.
This can be seen by writing the two problems in a compatible way.
Let x˚ be the solution to this problem and let u˚ “ upx˚ q be the asso-
ciated utility. Now let’s write the E-min problem as
These two problems have the same solution x˚ . A set of identities follows
from this result.
Check Point
End of Week 2.
The problem with the indirect utility is that we are unable to measure
the level of utility, the problem with the expenditure function is that it
depends on utility, which is not observable. Thus, interpersonal com-
parisons are not meaningful because they are based on different units of
measure.
4
Which corresponds to the popular expression “to put one’s wallet where one’s
mouth is.”
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Money metric utility functions
So, what is the least sum needed for a happiness equal to upxq at prices
p? Formally, the problem is
The solution to this problem is the expenditure function epp, upxqq. This
particular expenditure function is known as the money metric utility
function and it is usually denoted by mpp, xq; i.e.,
Quick test:
1 Two individuals are asked how much utility they derive from a cer-
tain vector x. One says 15 the other says 9. The same individuals
are asked to tell how much money they need at prices p to be as
happy as by consuming x. Both individuals say they need 3 €. Is
this answer consistent with the previous ones? Is it possible that
they have the same preferences?
2 Two individuals are asked how much utility they derive from a cer-
tain vector x. Both say 10. Do they have the same preferences?
3 Two individuals are asked how much utility they derive from a cer-
tain vector x. Both say 10. Then they are asked how much money
they need at prices p to be as happy as by consuming x. One
says 2 €, the other says 5 €. Are these answers consistent with the
previous ones? Do the two individuals have identical preferences?
That is, µpp; q, mq measures how much money one would need at prices
p to be as happy as one would be facing prices q and income m.
The money metric utility function is very useful for the welfare evalua-
tions of changing economic conditions (such as a tax, a subsidy, change
in income, change in price, etc.).
We use the money metric utility and indirect utility to evaluate the
consequences of price changes on welfare. If we could observe the indirect
utilities than we would just measure the change in indirect utilities. But
we don’t. So, we resort to the money metric functions.
5
Varian, Ch. 10; Mass-Colell et al. Sect.3.I (p.80).
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 66 / 107
Welfare evaluation of price changes
Note that signpEV q “ signpCV q but the magnitude is not the same.
“ m0 (61)
¯¯ “ µpq ; q , m q0 1 1
(62)
Dashed-Green minus Solid-Red = income increase equivalent to the price
reduction.
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Welfare evaluation of price changes
¯¯ “ m1 (63)
“ µpq ; q , m q
1 0 0
(64)
Dashed-Red minus Dashed-Green = income to be taken away to com-
pensate for the price decrease.
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 71 / 107
Slutsky equation
Proof
Let x˚ be the u-max’ing vector at pp, mq and let u˚ “ upx˚ q. Then, by
identity 4 in page 58 we have
Proof cont’d
By differentiation of identity (66) we obtain
Incidentally,
Example 7
Study the Cobb-Douglas example in Varian Sect. 8.2
Check Point
End of Week 3.
Discrete Choice
Choice set (A). The choice set must have three features:
It must contain a finite number of alternatives.
It must be exhaustive.
The alternatives must be mutually exclusive.
Ui “ ui ` i (69)
Pi “ P r rui ` i ą uj ` j @j ‰ is . (70)
Pi “ P r rj ´ i ă ui ´ uj @j ‰ is (71)
LOGIT. In the LOGIT class of discrete choice model the typical as-
sumption is that the stochastic components are i.i.d. and distributed
as double exponential (Gumbel) or as a Fréchet. We use Gumbel: the
cumulative distribution and density function are, respectively
´ p ´η
µ q
F pq “ e ´e
(72)
1 ´ ´η ´η
´ ¯
´p µ q
f pq “ e µ
e´e (73)
µ
The scale parameter of the distribution is µ while η is the location pa-
rameter (the mode). The mean of the distribution is η ` µγ where γ
is the Euler constant (« 0.58). We set the mean to zero by choosing
η “ ´µγ. We could scale the distribution by setting µ “ 1 but we do
not do it because below we’ll discuss the role of the scale parameter in
the choice probability.
We can now apply the double exponential to eq. (71). This will give the
LOGIT formula.6 Remember that an agent will choose item i over any
item j if ui ` i ą uj ` j for all j ‰ i. Thus,
Pi “ P r rj ă i ` ui ´ uj @j ‰ is (74)
ż8 N
ź
“ f pi q F pi ` ui ´ uj q di (75)
´8 j‰i
i `ui ´uj
ˆ ˙
N
1
ż8 ´
i
¯ i ´ `γ
´ µ `γ ´e´p µ `γ q ź µ
“ e e ´e
e di (76)
´8 µ j‰i
6
Logit is an abbreviation of “logistic probability unit.”
Federico Trionfetti Lecture I M1 2024-2025 Micro I 83 / 107
Discrete Choice
i `ui ´uj
ˆ ˙
N
p µi `γ q ź 1 ´
ż8 ´ `γ
´
i
¯
´ µ `γ
Pi “ e ´e
e ´e
e µ
di (77)
´8 j‰i
µ
Now do the following: ” ´ ¯ ı
Operate the change of variable δ “ exp ´ µi ` γ
´ ¯
i
´ `γ
Note that dδ “ di “ ´ µ1 δdi ă 0
´ µ1 e µ
ż8 ˜ řN ¸
´δ j“1 yj
Pi “ exp dδ (79)
0 yi
We observe that
1
lim Pi “ (82)
µÑ8 N
1 if ui ą max uj , @j ‰ i
"
lim Pi “ (83)
µÑ0 0 otherwise
The first limit above tells us that when the variance is infinite (µ Ñ
8) each alternative gets the same chance. The second limit tells us
that when the distribution is degenerate (µ Ñ 0) only the deterministic
component matters and only one and the same alternative will be chosen
by all agents.
How to puzzle your banqueters by violating IIA. The waiter arrives and says: I only have chicken or fish, we
had beef but it is finished. Everybody makes a choice, including you, and for instance you choose chicken.
The waiter goes to the kitchen and comes back to say says: Oh I actually have beef. And you say: “In that
case I will choose fish”.
Property 1
˜ ¸
maxtui u N
ÿ ui ´maxtui u
lim U pAq “ lim µ ln e µ e µ (86)
µÑ0 µÑ0
i“1
« ˜ ¸ff
ˆ maxtu u ˙ N ui ´maxtui u
i ÿ
“ lim µ ln e µ ` ln e µ (87)
µÑ0
i“1
˜ ¸
ˆ maxtu u ˙ N ui ´maxtui u
i ÿ
“ lim µ ln e µ ` lim µ ln e µ (88)
µÑ0 µÑ0
i“1
continues ...
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Discrete Choice
(91)
from which we have
lim U pAq “ max tui u ` 0 (92)
µÑ0
Property 2. Even when all options give the same utility (ui “ u @i)
the numerosity of A matters. Remember that
˜ ¸
ÿN ui
U pAq “ µ ln eµ
i“1
Simplifying we obtain
U pApuqq “ u ` µ ln N (93)
Now remember from (81) that the probability that alternative i is chosen
in the LOGIT model is:
ui
eµ
Pi “ ř uj
N
j“1 e
µ
1
Note that m cancels out. Now, let ai “ pai q ρ and µ “ 1´ρ
ρ . Then the
probability that item i is chosen becomes
1 ρ
ai1´ρ piρ´1
Pi “ 1 ρ (97)
řN 1´ρ ρ´1
j“1 aj pj
Example 0
Expenditure minimization for a Cobb-Douglas Utility
... suite
˙ 1´α
1´α α
ˆ
1
p1 “ αλ α (105)
p2
1 ´ α 1´α
ˆ ˙
α α
p1 “ α λ (106)
p2
and finally
´ p ¯α ˆ p ˙1´α
1 2
λ˚CD “ (107)
α 1´α
Substitute x˚1 and x˚2 in px and you will obtain the expenditure function
´ p ¯α ˆ p ˙1´α
1 2
˚
e pp, uq “ u. (109)
α 1´α
Example 1
` ˘α ´ x ¯1´α
Consider the utility function u “ xα1 2
1´α . Find the money
metric and the indirect utility function. You will find:
A similar example is in Varian Sect. 7.5. Observe that the utility func-
tion above and the one in Varian Sect. 7.5 are not the same, and yet the
resulting mpp, xq and µpp; q, mq are the same. Why?
Exercise 1
1
Consider the utility function upxq “ ra1 px1 qρ ` a2 px2 qρ s ρ .
Find the money metric and the indirect utility function.
Exercise 2
Additional exercises:
Varian Ch. 7: number 7.1, 7.3, 7.4.
Exercises from past exams. You will find past exams in Amétice.
Select the exercises related to this lecture and do them.
Do the exercises in the examples above without looking at the
slides.
Exercises in the course slides. They are marked by a blue color
text.
Practice these exercises again and again until you are able to do them
in without the least hesitation. This is important because in the exams
you will be under time constraint.
Exercise 3
Relationship between LOGIT and CES maximization.
1 Consider the case ρ Ñ 1. What happens to the elasticity of
substitution of the CES? What happens to di ? Now think in terms
of the LOGIT equivalent of CES maximization. What happens to
the probability that item i is chosen? What is the utility of the
choice set A ? Explain the result intuitively.
2 Consider the case ρ Ñ 0 What happens to the elasticity of
substitution of the CES? What happens to di ? Now think in terms
of the LOGIT equivalent of CES maximization. What happens to
the probability that item i is chosen? What is the utility of the
choice set A ? Explain the result intuitively.
3 Suppose ui “ u @i. What is the increase in utility of the choice set
A obtained by adding one more item to it? Suppose u “ lnpm{pq,
how much is a consumer willing to pay in order to have one
additional item in the choice set?
Self evaluation
Self evaluation. For the three utility functions studied above, students
must be able to easily do the following:
Utility maximization
Expenditure minimization
Verify that the indirect utility and expenditure functions have the
properties studied for general functions.
Verify the correspondence between Marchallian and Hicksian
demand functions.
Obtain the money metric utility and indirect utility functions.
If you have difficulties with this, you have a problem. If you do, let me
know.