dreurisprudence

PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (Articles 1-34, Family Code)

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, ROMERO, July 19, 1996

FACTS

The case involves allegations against respondent judge, Hernando C. Domagtoy, pertaining to

two instances of irregularities in solemnizing marriages. First, on September 27, 1994, he

officiated the wedding of Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite knowing that Tagadan

was only separated from his first wife. Second, on October 27, 1994, it is claimed that he

performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario

outside his court's jurisdiction, violating Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code.

Respondent judge argues that he relied on an affidavit from the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,

Samar, confirming Tagadan's separation. In the second charge, he contends that Article 8 of the

Family Code applies and justifies the marriage solemnization.

The complaint was not referred for investigation, and respondent judge's countercharges of

sinister motives and fraud were not proven. The certified marriage contract of Tagadan and

Borga states "separated," but respondent judge presented an affidavit claiming Tagadan's first

wife's presumptive death after years of separation. The decision rejects this argument, stating

that the joint affidavit is insufficient proof of presumptive death, questioning the judge's

justification for proceeding with the marriage ceremony.

ISSUE

1. Whether the marriage of Tagadan and Borga is valid.

2. Whether the respondent judge erred in solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction.

RULING

The court ruled that the respondent judge, Hernando C. Domagtoy, committed grave errors in

solemnizing marriages. In the first case, where Gaspar Tagadan married Arlyn Borga, despite

being separated from his first wife, the court emphasized the mandatory requirement of a

summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death before contracting a subsequent
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

marriage, which was not fulfilled. The marriage was declared bigamous and void under Article

35 of the Family Code.

In the second case, where the judge solemnized a marriage outside his jurisdiction, the court

clarified the requirements of Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code. It highlighted that the

exceptions for solemnizing a marriage outside the judge's chambers or courtroom did not apply

in this situation. The respondent judge's lack of understanding of basic legal principles, resulting

in the misuse of authority, led to a finding of gross ignorance of the law.

As a consequence, the court suspended Judge Domagtoy for six months and issued a stern

warning, emphasizing the need for him to be more circumspect in applying the law and to

cultivate a deeper understanding of legal principles. The ruling serves as a reminder of the

importance of judicial competence and adherence to legal procedures in the solemnization of

marriages.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (Articles 1-34, Family Code)

RAQUEL G. KHO, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO

G.R. No. 187462, PERALTA, J., June 01, 2016

FACTS

The petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, claiming that her marriage to

the respondent on June 1, 1972, in Arteche, Eastern Samar, was null and void ab initio because

it was solemnized without the requisite marriage license. The petitioner alleged that the

marriage ceremony took place in the early morning hours of June 1, 1972, and that no marriage

license was applied for or obtained due to the short period between the arrangement and the

actual ceremony.

The petitioner presented evidence, including a certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of

Arteche stating the absence of a record or copy of a marriage license for the petitioner and

respondent. The respondent countered, asserting that they personally appeared before the local

civil registrar, secured a marriage license, and presented it before the solemnization.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition, declaring the marriage null and void ab

initio based on the absence of a marriage license. The RTC relied on Articles 53(4), 58, and

80(3) of the Civil Code.

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the RTC decision,

holding that the actual solemnization of marriage creates a presumption of a valid marriage

license. The CA ruled that the absence of an indication in the marriage certificate about the

issuance of a marriage license is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law and does not

invalidate the marriage.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

ISSUE

Whether the marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring the marriage between the parties null and

void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license. The court rejected the procedural
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

argument raised by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the issues were factual and

not suitable for review on certiorari, stating that conflicting findings by the lower courts justified a

review.

The court emphasized the importance of a marriage license under Article 53 of the Civil Code

and Article 58, stating that no marriage shall be solemnized without such license. It clarified that

marriages of exceptional character, as enumerated in Articles 72 to 79, did not apply to the

petitioner's and respondent's case.

The court considered the certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting to the absence

of a marriage license, coupled with the respondent's failure to present the alleged license, as

sufficient evidence to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. The court cited

precedents to support the probative value of such certifications in proving the absence of a

marriage license.

Despite the OSG's argument that the certification should categorically state the absence of the

document despite diligent search, the court held that the certification of due search and inability

to find the record sufficed. It emphasized that the burden of proving a valid marriage rested on

the party alleging its validity, and the respondent failed to provide evidence of the alleged

marriage license.

The court rejected the CA's reasoning that the absence of a license was a mere defect,

emphasizing that the law explicitly deemed marriages without the required license as void. The

court reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court, declaring the marriage null and void.

The court granted the petition, reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated

the decision of the Regional Trial Court, declaring the marriage between the parties null and

void ab initio.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (Articles 1-34, Family Code)

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,

INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,

respondent.

G.R. No. 133778, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., March 14, 2000

FACTS

Pepito Niñal married Teodulfa Bellones, and after Teodulfa's death, Pepito married Norma

Badayog without obtaining a marriage license. They executed an affidavit claiming exemption

from the license requirement, stating they had lived together for at least five years. The

petitioners, born from Pepito's first marriage, filed a petition for the nullity of Pepito's second

marriage, arguing that the absence of a marriage license rendered it void and could affect their

successional rights.

Norma moved to dismiss, contending that the petitioners lacked a cause of action under Article

47 of the Family Code. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, citing the Family Code's

alleged insufficiency and stating it should have been filed before Pepito's death, applying Article

47 by analogy.

The petitioners sought Supreme Court review, asserting the second marriage's nullity due to the

absence of a marriage license. The Supreme Court reinstated the petition, clarifying that the

applicable law was the Civil Code, emphasizing the significance of a valid marriage license and

its absence rendering the marriage void ab initio.

The Court discussed exceptions to the license requirement, such as Article 76 allowing

exemption for couples living together exclusively for at least five years before marriage.

However, the Court found Pepito and Norma did not meet these exceptions.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled the lack of a marriage license voided Pepito and

Norma's second marriage. The petitioners were recognized to have a cause of action, leading to

the case's remand for further proceedings.

ISSUE
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

Whether the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage after his death.

RULING

The court ruled that the marriage between petitioners' father (Pepito) and respondent Norma

was celebrated without a marriage license. The critical issue was the nature of cohabitation

under Article 76 of the Civil Code, determining whether it required both parties to be capacitated

to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or if it was sufficient for them to

have lived together exclusively as husband and wife during the period, regardless of legal

impediments.

The court concluded that the five-year cohabitation period should be based on a legal union,

considering exclusivity and continuity, with the absence of the marriage contract being the only

missing element. Pepito and Norma's cohabitation did not meet this standard, as Pepito had a

subsisting marriage at the beginning of their cohabitation. Consequently, their second marriage

was deemed void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license.

The court also addressed the petitioners' standing to file a petition for the declaration of their

father's marriage after his death. It rejected the application of Article 47 of the Family Code by

analogy and clarified that the grounds and periods for annulment specified in Article 47 did not

apply to petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The court emphasized the distinction

between voidable and void marriages, stating that void marriages, being void ab initio, could be

questioned even after the death of either party.

The court granted the petition, overturning the dismissal of the case by the Regional Trial Court.

It declared Pepito and Norma's second marriage void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage

license. The court also affirmed the petitioners' standing to file a petition for the declaration of

nullity of their father's void marriage after his death. The case was ordered reinstated for further

proceedings.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (Articles 1-34, Family Code)

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners vs. LUIS G.

ANSON, Respondent

G.R. No. 204494, REYES, J., July 27, 2016

FACTS

Luis Anson filed a complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado, Gerard Salgado, Maria Luisa Anson-

Maya, and Gaston Maya seeking the annulment of Unilateral Deeds of Sale and a Deed of

Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate involving properties acquired during his marriage to the late

Severina de Asis-Anson. Luis claimed that the properties were part of their conjugal partnership

and were unlawfully transferred without his knowledge. Jo-Ann and Gerard countered that Luis

and Severina had only a common-law relationship, terminated by a Partition Agreement, and

disputed the validity of the marriage. The trial court denied their demurrers to evidence.

Subsequently, the court upheld the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage, declared the

unilateral deeds of sale void, and ordered the restitution of the properties to the conjugal

community. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, noting the lack of evidence presented

by Jo-Ann and Gerard to dispute the marriage's validity. The Spouses Salgado appealed,

questioning the CA's affirmation of the RTC decision.

ISSUE

Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the

marriage between Luis and Severina valid.

RULING

The court ruled that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void due to the

absence of a marriage license. The petition raises a question of law regarding whether the

absence of a marriage license can be proven based on a marriage contract that states no

license was exhibited due to the marriage being of an exceptional character. The court held that

the marriage is not of an exceptional character, as it does not meet the requirements of Article

77 of the Civil Code.

The marriage contract, a public document, is considered prima facie evidence that no marriage

license was exhibited. Luis, who opposed the petition, failed to prove the existence of a
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

marriage license, relying on the presumption of the validity of marriage. The court emphasized

that the absence of a marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, and in this

case, the contract stated that no license was exhibited.

The court also addressed the validity of the Partition Agreement between Luis and Severina,

stating that the agreement is valid and that the provisions of co-ownership under the Civil Code

apply. Luis' attempt to annul the agreement was rejected, and the court concluded that the

partition was validly done without requiring judicial approval.

The court ruled in favor of declaring the marriage void due to the absence of a marriage license,

upheld the validity of the Partition Agreement, and dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No.

69611.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (Articles 1-34, Family Code)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

G.R. No. 175581, CHICO-NAZARIO, J., March 28, 2008

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

G.R. No. 179474, CHICO-NAZARIO, J., March 28, 2008

FACTS

Two consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474, involve challenges to the

Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, declaring the marriage

between Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio.

Jose and Felisa were married on 24 November 1986, with no marriage license. Instead, they

executed an affidavit stating they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

In 1993, Jose filed for the annulment of the marriage, claiming it was a sham, and his consent

was obtained through fraud.

Felisa opposed the complaint, denying Jose's allegations and asserting the validity of their

marriage. She contended they had a pre-existing relationship and accused Jose of bigamy,

filing a complaint against him.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Jose's complaint in 2000, ruling the marriage was

valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in 2005, stating the action for annulment had

prescribed and rejecting the claim of fraud.

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the exemption from a marriage license was

improperly applied. The Court of Appeals reversed its decision in 2006, declaring the marriage

void ab initio.

The Court of Appeals relied on Niñal v. Bayadog, emphasizing the five-year cohabitation period

should be exclusive and continuous. Felisa sought reconsideration, but it was denied.

The Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 175581) and Felisa (G.R. No. 179474) separately

petitioned the Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the petitions in August 2007.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

The central issue revolves around the validity of Jose and Felisa's marriage, considering the

absence of a marriage license and the applicability of the exemption under Article 76 of the Civil

Code. The Court is tasked with determining whether the marriage is void ab initio or if it should

be declared valid and subsisting.

ISSUE

Whether the marriage, celebrated without a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code,

was void ab initio due to the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation.

RULING

The Court held that the minimum five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 76 is

mandatory, and the marriage is void if this condition is not met. Despite arguments from the

Republic and reliance on the presumption of marriage, the Court emphasized the importance of

adhering to the specific requirements of the law.

The Court rejected the Republic's claim that the falsity of the affidavit should not affect the

marriage's validity since essential and formal requisites were allegedly complied with. It clarified

that the absence of a marriage license, coupled with the false statements in the affidavit,

rendered the marriage void.

Moreover, the Court dismissed arguments based on equity, estoppel, and the assertion that

Jose's action was barred by prescription. It reiterated that an action for nullity of marriage is

imprescriptible when the marriage is void ab initio.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision, declaring the marriage between

Jose and Felisa void ab initio. The ruling emphasized the strict interpretation of Article 76 and

the importance of upholding the legal requirements for a valid marriage.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 35-36, Family Code)

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200233, SERENO, CJ, JULY 15, 2015

FACTS

Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced charges of bigamy four months after their

marriage on July 29, 1997. Santos, already married to Estela Galang since June 2, 1974,

convinced Santiago to marry him despite warnings from her relatives. Santiago, a 43-year-old

widow at the time, pleaded "not guilty" to the bigamy charge, arguing that she believed Santos

was single. The prosecution presented evidence that Santiago met Galang before the marriage,

but Santiago denied this.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Santiago guilty of bigamy, considering the undisputed fact

that she married Santos while he was still married to Galang. The RTC rejected Santiago's

defense, stating it was incredible for her to be duped by Santos. The court also noted that their

marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, relying on Article 34 of the Family Code,

and imposed a penalty of six months and one day of Prision Correctional to six years and one

day of Prision Mayor.

Santiago moved for reconsideration, arguing that her marriage to Santos was void because it

lacked compliance with Article 34 of the Family Code. The RTC refused to reverse the

conviction, stating that Santiago's argument required a judgment on the validity of her marriage,

which the court couldn't do without a judicial decree of annulment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Santiago's conviction, emphasizing the credibility

of Galang's testimony and dismissing Santiago's claim of the marriage's nullity due to the lack of

a marriage license as a vain attempt.

ISSUE

Whether Santiago is guilty of bigamy.

RULING

The court clarified that in the crime of bigamy, joint liability of both spouses depends on the

second spouse's awareness of the first marriage. It affirmed that petitioner, Leonila Santiago,
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

knew of her husband's first marriage based on credible evidence. However, the court disagreed

with the principal penalty imposed, asserting that the second spouse should be treated as an

accomplice, not a principal.

Emphasizing the essential requisites for a bigamy conviction, the court corrected the oversight

of lower courts regarding the absence of a marriage license. It highlighted that petitioner and her

husband did not meet the cohabitation requirement for exemption from a marriage license. The

court criticized their deceptive act of securing a false Certificate of Marriage, aiming to escape

criminal prosecution.

The court rejected petitioner's attempt to use her illegal actions for acquittal and affirmed her

guilt for bigamy as an accomplice. It emphasized that the sanctity of marriage should not be

compromised by allowing individuals to deliberately create flawed marriages to evade legal

consequences.

Contrary to a cited case, where lack of a marriage license led to acquittal, the court

distinguished that petitioner and her husband fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage. It

upheld the conviction, stressing the importance of protecting marriage as a fundamental social

institution.

The court modified the penalty, sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate term as an

accomplice, taking into account the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The

conviction for bigamy was affirmed, underscoring the importance of upholding the sanctity of

marriage.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 35-36, Family Code)

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY

TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 183805 PERALTA, J., July 3, 2013

FACTS

Petitioner was charged with bigamy for contracting a second marriage while the first was still

valid. He filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, citing a pending civil case for the declaration

of nullity of the second marriage. The RTC suspended proceedings. Meanwhile, the RTC of

Antipolo City declared the second marriage void. Petitioner moved to dismiss the bigamy case,

which the RTC granted.

Private respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC's decision. CA remanded the

case for further proceedings. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, leading to this

petition for review.

Petitioner argued that the CA erred in disregarding existing jurisprudence and misinterpreting

the RTC's decision on the nullity of the second marriage. He also contested the CA's view on

the grounds for nullity and the application of the Tenebro case. Moreover, petitioner claimed the

illegality of respondent's use of the "Capili" surname.

ISSUE

Whether the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal

of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING

The Court ruled against the petitioner in a bigamy case. The elements of bigamy were

established, including the fact that the second marriage was contracted while the first marriage

was still valid. The RTC of Antipolo City had declared the bigamous nature of the second

marriage. The Court emphasized that the subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second

marriage does not bar the prosecution for bigamy, as the crime is consummated when the

second marriage is celebrated during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. Jurisprudence

supports the idea that the parties cannot judge for themselves the nullity of a marriage, and
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

criminal liability for bigamy arises when a person contracts a second marriage before the judicial

declaration of the first marriage's nullity. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals, denying the petitioner's plea.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 35-36, Family Code)

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 150758, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., February 18, 2004

FACTS

Veronico Tenebro married Leticia Ancajas in 1990, but later revealed that he was previously

married to Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro, upon showing Ancajas a photocopy of the

marriage contract, left her to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, Tenebro married Nilda Villegas

while still legally married to Villareyes. Ancajas, upon learning about the third marriage,

confirmed from Villareyes that she was indeed married to Tenebro. Ancajas filed a complaint for

bigamy against Tenebro, who pleaded not guilty. Tenebro argued that his marriage to Villareyes

was not valid, claiming it was for work-related benefits. The trial court found Tenebro guilty of

bigamy, sentencing him to four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years and

one day of prision mayor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and Tenebro's motion for

reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether Tenebro may still be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the subsequent judicial

declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING

The Court affirmed the conviction of Veronico Tenebro for bigamy. Tenebro argued that the

declaration of nullity of his second marriage to Leticia Ancajas retroactively invalidated the

marriage, thus negating the crime of bigamy. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating

that the nullity of the second marriage due to psychological incapacity does not affect criminal

liability for bigamy. The Court found sufficient evidence proving Tenebro's first marriage to Hilda

Villareyes, meeting the elements of bigamy. The ruling emphasized that the crime was

consummated upon contracting the second marriage during the subsistence of a valid first

marriage. The penalty imposed was an indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of

prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 35-36, Family Code)

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant, vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 181089, PERALTA, J., October 22, 2012

FACTS

In 1976, the respondent married Socrates Flores, and during the subsistence of this marriage,

she married Silverio V. Cipriano in 1983. In 2001, the respondent filed a petition for the

annulment of her marriage with Socrates, which was granted in 2003 and became final.

Subsequently, in 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter, filed a

complaint for bigamy against the respondent, alleging that she failed to disclose her existing

marriage with Socrates. The respondent filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that

her first marriage had been declared void ab initio in 2003, and thus, the basic element of

bigamy, two valid marriages, was absent. The RTC initially denied the motion but later reversed

its decision, quashed the information, and dismissed the case, stating that the absence of a

judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused. The prosecution filed a motion for

reconsideration, but the RTC, in its January 2, 2008 resolution, upheld its decision, emphasizing

that the judicial declaration of nullity rendered the second marriage valid and non-criminal.

ISSUE

Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the

pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid

defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the

Family Code.

RULING

The court ruled that the petition challenging the dismissal of the bigamy case was filed by the

private complainant instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), but decided to give due

course to the petition. The court referred to past cases where it accepted similar actions despite

the absence of proper representation by the OSG.

The court reiterated the elements of bigamy and emphasized that for the charge to prosper, the

first marriage must be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. The court cited
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

previous cases, including Mercado v. Tan, to highlight that the subsequent judicial declaration of

nullity of the first marriage does not absolve a person from bigamy charges if the second

marriage was contracted while the first was still subsisting.

Respondent argued that the declaration of nullity of her first marriage came before the filing of

the Information, unlike in the cases cited by the prosecution. However, the court rejected this

argument, stating that the crucial factor is whether the second marriage was contracted while

the first was still valid. The court also dismissed the argument that Article 40 of the Family Code,

which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before contracting a

subsequent marriage, should not apply retroactively. The court held that procedural laws,

including Article 40, can be applied retroactively, and remanded the case to the trial court for

further proceedings. As a result, the RTC's order to quash the Information and dismiss the case

was set aside.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 35-36, Family Code)

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES, THE PETITIONER, VS. NILDA B. TAMPUS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 214243, PERLAS-BERNABE, J., March 16, 2016

FACTS

Nilda B. Tampus, the respondent, married Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three

days after the marriage, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was assigned

to Jolo, Sulu, leaving Nilda. Dante's departure marked the beginning of a prolonged absence,

and Nilda, having heard no news from him, made efforts to locate him but was unsuccessful. In

April 2009, after thirty-three years without communication, Nilda filed a petition before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) to declare Dante presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage.

Due to the absence of any oppositor, Nilda presented her evidence ex parte. The RTC, in a

decision dated July 29, 2009, granted the petition, declaring Dante presumptively dead for all

legal purposes. The RTC considered Dante's long absence, the lack of communication, and

Nilda's diligent efforts in its decision.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a

petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), challenging the RTC decision. The CA, in

a decision dated June 17, 2013, upheld the RTC ruling, emphasizing Nilda's efforts to find her

husband and the thirty-three years of his unexplained absence. The CA reasoned that if Dante

were alive, he could have easily communicated with Nilda during these years. The OSG's

motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, leading to the filing of the present petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively

dead.

RULING

The petition is granted as the Court finds merit in challenging the decision that declared Dante

L. Del Mundo presumptively dead for all legal purposes. The judicial declaration of presumptive

death requires four essential requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code: (1) the absent

spouse's continuous absence for four consecutive years; (2) the present spouse's desire to
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

remarry; (3) the present spouse's well-founded belief in the absentee's death; and (4) the filing

of a summary proceeding for the declaration.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to establish the fulfillment of these requisites.

The "well-founded belief" in the absentee's death necessitates diligent and reasonable efforts to

locate the absent spouse, reflecting an active rather than a passive approach. Mere absence,

lack of communication, or general presumption of absence is insufficient.

In this case, Nilda, the present spouse, testified that she inquired about Dante's whereabouts

from his parents, relatives, and neighbors but did not take further steps to actively locate him.

The Court finds her efforts inadequate, as she could have sought information from the Armed

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or authorities and failed to present corroborative evidence or

witnesses. The Court concludes that Nilda did not meet the stringent standard of due diligence

required to establish a "well-founded belief" in Dante's death. Consequently, the decision

declaring Dante presumptively dead is reversed and set aside, and Nilda's petition is denied.

The petition is granted, and the decision declaring Dante L. Del Mundo presumptively dead is

reversed and set aside. Nilda B. Tampus's petition to have her husband declared presumptively

dead is denied.
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 37-44, Family Code)

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

G.R. No. 141528, AZCUNA, J., October 31, 2006

FACTS

In 1995, Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha

Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the

petition, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. After the decision became final, Mallion

filed another petition in 1999, asserting that the marriage was null and void due to the absence

of a valid marriage license. The RTC dismissed this second petition, citing forum shopping and

multiplicity of suits, as Mallion had previously sought nullity on different grounds. The RTC's

decision was based on the principle of res judicata, which holds that a matter adjudged in a final

judgment can't be pursued again. Mallion appealed, arguing that the causes of action in the two

cases were distinct and that there was no violation of forum shopping or the rule against splitting

a cause of action.

ISSUE

Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite

prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage

is being impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the

Family Code?

RULING

The court rejected the petitioner's contention that the second petition for the declaration of

nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of a marriage license was not barred by res judicata.

Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged or a thing judicially acted upon or decided. It is

based on public policy, necessity, and the interest of the state in putting an end to litigation.

In this jurisdiction, res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of

Court. Section 47 (b) refers to the bar by prior judgment or estoppel by verdict, while Section 47

(c) pertains to conclusiveness of judgment.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

The court outlined the requisites for res judicata: (1) the former judgment is final, (2) rendered

by a court having jurisdiction, (3) a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) identity of parties,

subject matter, and causes of action between the first and second actions.

The petitioner did not dispute the first three requisites but contested the presence of the fourth.

The court emphasized that the causes of action in both petitions were related to the validity of

the marriage. While the grounds differed (psychological incapacity in the first and lack of a

marriage license in the second), the court considered them as different grounds for the same

cause of action – the declaration of nullity of marriage.

The court noted that the alleged absence of a marriage license could have been raised in the

first case but was not. The petitioner was bound by his admission in the first case that the

marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with the law. The court stressed

that parties cannot evade the application of res judicata by varying the form of their action or

adopting a different method of presenting the case.

In conclusion, the court held that the present action for the declaration of nullity of marriage on

the ground of the lack of a marriage license is barred by the previous decision of the RTC,

Branch 29, dated November 11, 1997, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. The petition was denied

for lack of merit, and costs were imposed against the petitioner.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 37-44, Family Code)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189538, PERALTA, J., February 10, 2014

FACTS

The respondent discovered, while applying for a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) for her

upcoming marriage, that she was supposedly married to a Korean national named Ye Son

Sune. She denied the marriage, stating that she did not know the alleged husband, did not

appear before the solemnizing officer, and claimed that the signature on the marriage certificate

was not hers. Respondent filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,

specifically those in the wife portion. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and the alleged

husband were impleaded in the case.

During the trial, respondent testified that she was working in Makati at the time of the alleged

marriage and could not have appeared before the solemnizing officer. She denied knowing the

supposed husband but recognized the named witnesses. She believed that her name was used

by someone else, and a document examiner testified that the signature on the marriage contract

was forged.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition, directing the Local Civil Registrar to cancel

the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract. The court found that the

signature was not respondent's and granted the correction to rectify the mistake.

The petitioner (Republic of the Philippines) moved for reconsideration, arguing that there were

no clerical errors and that canceling the entries in the wife portion effectively declared the

marriage void ab initio. The RTC denied the motion, asserting its jurisdiction under Rule 108 of

the Rules of Court for correction of entries, even on substantial errors, as an appropriate

adversary proceeding.

Contrary to the petitioner's argument, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to address cases for

correction of entries involving substantial errors, considering that respondent's identity was used

by an unknown person in contracting marriage with a Korean national. Respondent could not

feasibly institute an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage, as it did not fall under the

void marriages enumerated in the Family Code.

dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

ISSUE

Whether granting the cancellation of “All the Entries in the Wife portion of the alleged marriage

contract” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab ignition.

RULING

The petitioner raised a pure question of law regarding whether the cancellation of entries in a

marriage contract, effectively nullifying the marriage, may be undertaken in a Rule 108

proceeding. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the cancellation or

correction of entries in the civil registry.

The Court emphasized that Rule 108 is the appropriate adversary proceeding for substantial

corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. It allows for both summary and adversary

proceedings, with the latter being applicable when the rectification affects the civil status,

citizenship, or nationality of a party.

In this case, the respondent sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage

certificate, claiming that her signature was forged, and she was not the one who contracted the

marriage. The trial court conducted a proper adversary proceeding, complying with the

procedural requirements of Rule 108, and concluded that the signature in the marriage

certificate was forged. The court found that, based on the evidence presented, no such

marriage was celebrated.

The Court clarified that while Rule 108 cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage,

the proceedings before the trial court were not nullified. The respondent sought the correction of

the record to reflect the truth, not the nullification of a marriage that did not exist. The Court

affirmed the Regional Trial Court's decision and order, denying the petitioner's appeal for lack of

merit.

The petition was denied, and the Regional Trial Court's decision and order in favor of the

respondent, regarding the cancellation of entries in the marriage certificate, were affirmed.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 37-44, Family Code)

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON,

Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE

QUIAZON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189121, PEREZ, J., July 31, 2013

FACTS

The case involves a petition for letters of administration filed by respondents, the common-law

wife and daughter of Eliseo Quiazon, who died intestate. The petitioner, Amelia Garcia-Quaizon,

to whom Eliseo was legally married, opposed the petition. The primary issue revolves around

the venue for the settlement of Eliseo's estate.

Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, claimed to be Eliseo's natural

child, seeking letters of administration for his estate. Elise contested the validity of Eliseo's

marriage to Amelia, alleging it was bigamous, as Amelia was still married to another person at

the time.

The petitioners opposed the venue of the petition, arguing that, based on Eliseo's death

certificate, the proper venue should be Capas, Tarlac, not Las Piñas City. They also contended

that Elise had no legal and factual basis for her appointment as administratrix.

The RTC ruled in favor of Elise, stating that the venue was properly laid in Las Piñas City. The

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, recognizing the evidence presented by Elise that Eliseo

and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife in Las Piñas City. The Court of Appeals upheld

the conclusion that Eliseo was a resident of Las Piñas City for the purpose of settling his estate.

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, recognizing Las Piñas City as the proper

venue for settling Eliseo Quiazon's estate, and upheld the appointment of Elise as

administratrix. The petitioners' arguments against the venue were dismissed, and the decision

stands.
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring that Amelia Garcia-Quiazon was not

legally married to Eliseo Quiazon due to preexisting marriage.

RULING

The Court upholds Elise's right to impugn Eliseo's marriage to petitioner Amelia Garcia-Quaizon

even after Eliseo's death. The Court distinguishes between void and voidable marriages,

asserting that a void marriage can be attacked even beyond the lifetime of the parties. In this

case, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute

nullity of the void marriage between Eliseo and Amelia.

The Court rejects the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition

for Letters of Administration. Elise, being a compulsory heir, is deemed an interested party, and

the evidence on record supports her filiation to Eliseo. Thus, the Court affirms the appointment

of Elise as administratrix of Eliseo's estate.

In conclusion, the Court denies the petition for lack of merit and affirms the decisions of the

Court of Appeals and the RTC.

The Court dismisses the petition, affirming the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC.
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 37-44, Family Code)

ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented

by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA

G.R. No. 104818, ROMERO, J., September 17, 1993

FACTS

Delia Soledad A. Domingo initiated a petition for the "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and

Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo, asserting that their marriage was void due to

his undisclosed prior marriage. She also claimed ownership of properties acquired through her

earnings, alleging that Roberto administered them without her consent. Roberto's Motion to

Dismiss, arguing the unnecessary nature of a separate nullity petition, was denied by the trial

court, citing the need for a judicial declaration based on precedent. Instead of answering,

Roberto filed a special civil action alleging grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals

dismissed Roberto's petition, emphasizing that nullity of marriage and separation of property

can be pursued together, and the denial of the motion to dismiss was a matter of law to be

addressed during trial and appeal. The decision affirmed the trial court's stance on jurisdiction

and necessity for a judicial declaration of nullity.

ISSUE

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the

affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

RULING

The court rejected the petitioner's argument for the dismissal of the petition for the declaration of

nullity of marriage and separation of property, emphasizing a shift in jurisprudence and the

explicit requirement in the Family Code for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. The court

refuted the petitioner's reliance on previous cases, highlighting the need for a formal declaration

to protect against charges of bigamy and to uphold the sanctity of marriage as a legal institution.

Additionally, the court clarified that the term "solely" in Article 40 of the Family Code does not

restrict the grounds for declaring a previous marriage null and void solely for remarriage

purposes. The ruling ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision and upheld the legitimacy of

the petitioner's case.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOID MARRIAGES (Article 37-44, Family Code)

RENATO A. CASTILLO vs. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO

G.R. No. 189607, SERENO, CJ, April 18, 2016

FACTS

In 1972, Lea P. De Leon Castillo married Benjamin Bautista, and later, on January 6, 1979, she

married Renato A. Castillo. Renato filed a petition to nullify his marriage with Lea, citing her

existing marriage to Bautista and alleging psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the

Family Code. Lea countered by contesting the validity of her marriage to Bautista due to the

absence of a marriage license and the non-membership of the solemnizing officer in the

required denomination. Subsequently, Lea sought a separate action to declare her first marriage

null and void, which the court granted with a Certificate of Finality issued on January 22, 2003.

Despite Renato's demurrer to evidence being denied by the RTC, a decision on March 23,

2007, declared Renato and Lea's marriage null and void ab initio due to bigamy. Renato's

motion for reconsideration on property distribution was also denied. Both parties appealed, and

in April 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's decision, asserting the validity of the

marriage under the Civil Code as Lea's marriages occurred before the effectivity of the Family

Code in 1988. Renato, dissatisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari, challenging the Court

of Appeals' decision.

ISSUE

whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration

of nullity of the second marriage.

RULING

The court rejected the petition filed by Renato A. Castillo, affirming the validity of his marriage to

Lea P. De Leon Castillo. The court underscored the principle that the law in effect at the time of

marriage governs its validity, and as Lea's marriages took place before the Family Code's

implementation, the Civil Code applied. The court distinguished between void and voidable

marriages under the Civil Code, asserting that no judicial decree is required to establish the

invalidity of a void marriage. Precedents such as People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and

Odayat v. Amante were cited to support the contention that no judicial declaration is necessary
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

for void marriages under the Civil Code. The court clarified that the requirement of a judicial

decree of nullity applies to marriages after the Family Code's enactment, but for marriages

before its implementation, the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon persist. Since Lea's

second marriage occurred in 1979, predating the Family Code, the court concluded that no

judicial declaration of nullity for the first marriage was necessary. The prior RTC decision

nullifying Lea's first marriage further supported the validity of her second marriage to Renato,

and thus, the Court of Appeals' decision was upheld, denying Renato's petition.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 45-54, Family Code)

FERNANDO AQUINO vs. CONCHITA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-15853, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J., July 27, 1960

FACTS

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint seeking the annulment of his marriage to Conchita Delizo,

alleging fraud. He claimed that Conchita concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of

their marriage and gave birth about four months later. The trial court dismissed the complaint,

citing the absence of a birth certificate showing the child was born within 180 days after the

marriage and stating that pregnancy concealment does not constitute fraud for marriage

annulment. Fernando sought to present additional evidence, including birth and delivery

certificates, but the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals

acknowledged excusable neglect in presenting proof of the child's birth, questioning the

credibility of Fernando's claim that he didn't notice Conchita's pregnancy. Despite Fernando

filing a motion for reconsideration with supporting affidavits and documents, the Court of

Appeals remained unconvinced. Dissatisfied, Fernando appealed to the Supreme Court through

a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the concealment of pregnancy at the time of marriage, a ground for annulment.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Fernando Aquino, finding that the dismissal of his

complaint for the annulment of marriage was not justified. It emphasized that, under the new

Civil Code, concealment by the wife of being pregnant by a man other than her husband at the

time of marriage constitutes fraud and is grounds for marriage annulment. The court

distinguished this case from a precedent where the wife was in an advanced stage of

pregnancy, noting that at more than four months, pregnancy may not be readily apparent,

especially in naturally plump individuals. The court criticized the conjectural statement by the

appellate court and found no support for the claim that the child could be the petitioner's. The

court concluded that the evidence sought to be introduced, along with existing evidence, would

sufficiently support the alleged fraud, and thus, the denial of the motion for a new trial was
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

deemed inappropriate. The court set aside the decision and remanded the case to the trial court

for a new trial.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 45-54, Family Code)

AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930, REYES, J.B.L., J., November 26, 1970

FACTS

The case involves a complaint for the annulment of marriage filed by Aurora against Fernando.

Aurora alleged that Fernando concealed a pre-marital relationship with a close relative, revealed

only after marriage, constituting fraud under Article 85(4) of the Civil Code. Fernando denied the

allegations, claiming no fraud and no intention to live with Aurora, referencing a previous case

that upheld the marriage's validity. Aurora argued that Fernando courted her to avoid marrying

his relative, asserting he never intended to fulfill marital duties and secretly courted another

woman during litigation. The court, finding Aurora's fraud allegation legally insufficient, cited

Brown vs. Yambao and required her to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed.

Unsatisfied with Aurora's response, the court issued an order on October 7, 1966, dismissing

the complaint and denying reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another

woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

RULING

The court ruled that the complaint for the annulment of marriage based on fraud is not valid

under the circumstances presented. It pointed out that the Civil Code explicitly defines the

grounds for annulment based on fraud in Article 86, limited to specific circumstances such as

misrepresentation of identity, non-disclosure of the other party's criminal record, and

concealment of pregnancy by a woman. The non-disclosure of the husband's pre-marital

relationship, not falling within the enumerated circumstances, is excluded by law. The court

emphasized its duty to adhere to the clear legislative intent, regardless of agreement.

Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to introduce a new cause of action in the

reply, stating that such claims should have been included in the original complaint, and any

allegation regarding the husband's intention not to fulfill marital duties is time-barred.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, and no costs were

imposed.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 45-54, Family Code)

FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA

40 OG 263

FACTS:

Felix Sarao and Pilar Guevarra got married in Manila on June 3, 1936. On the same day, Sarao

attempted to engage in sexual intercourse with Guevarra, but she experienced pain and

requested to postpone it until the evening. Later that day, when they tried again, Guevarra

complained of genital pain, and Sarao noticed a foul-smelling purulent discharge. Subsequent

attempts by Sarao were unsuccessful due to Guevarra's pain. Acting on a physician's advice,

Guevarra underwent surgery on August 7, 1936, during which her uterus and ovaries were

removed with Sarao's consent. Although the operation made Guevarra incapable of procreation,

she remained capable of engaging in sexual intercourse. However, Sarao claimed that

witnessing the surgery caused him to lose all desire for intercourse with Guevarra and he

refrained from doing so.

ISSUE

Whether incapacity to procreate can be construed as “physically incapable of entering into the

married state,” and is a valid ground for annulment.

RULING

No, the court ruled against the annulment. According to the prevailing marriage law at the time,

and consistently applied in the provision of Article 45(5) of the Family Code, a marriage could be

annulled if "either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the

married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable." The court

emphasized that the test of impotency is the ability to copulate, not the ability to procreate. In

this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time of marriage, as confirmed by a doctor's

opinion that the fibrous tumor in her ovaries did not necessarily render her incapable of

copulation or procreation. Although the removal of her uterus and ovaries made her sterile, it did

not render her unfit for sexual intercourse. Therefore, the defendant's sterility was not a valid

ground for annulment, as the law specifically addresses the incapacity to copulate, not

procreate.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 45-54, Family Code)

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON

G.R. No. 116607, PUNO, J., April 10, 1996

FACTS

The case involves a petition for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage between

Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason (private respondent) and Emilio R. Tuason (petitioner). Private

respondent initiated the petition, citing various grounds such as psychological incapacity,

physical abuse, drug use, womanizing, and financial mismanagement. The petitioner denied the

allegations, attributing their marital problems to personal differences starting in 1982. The

Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial had previously annulled their marriage, a decision upheld

by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. However, during the presentation of the

petitioner's evidence, a motion for postponement was granted due to the principal counsel's

unavailability. On the rescheduled date, the petitioner failed to appear, leading the court to

declare a waiver of his right to present evidence. The trial court subsequently declared the

nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity and awarded custody of the children to

the private respondent. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment, which

was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, prompting the

petitioner's appeal.

ISSUE

Whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case.

RULING

The court ruled against the petitioner, denying the petition for relief from judgment. The

petitioner argued that the decision annulling his marriage was null and void due to a violation of

his right to due process, contending that he was denied this right when the trial court deemed

him to have waived his right to present evidence for not appearing at two scheduled hearings.

The court found the decision had become final and executory as the petitioner failed to appeal

within the allowed period. The petitioner's claim of being confined for medical reasons was

deemed insufficient, especially when his former counsel did not inform the court of this fact. The

court emphasized that relief from judgment is an equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

cases where no other remedy is available. In this case, the petitioner had other remedies, and

his loss of these remedies resulted from his own negligence. The court addressed the

petitioner's claim of a valid defense, noting his active participation in the proceedings and the

absence of collusion between the parties. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the

Court of Appeals, denying the petition.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 45-54, Family Code)

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA

MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115640, MELO, J.,March 15, 1995

FACTS

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding entered into a common-law relationship in 1984,

later getting married on October 7, 1987, with two children resulting from their union. The

marriage faced difficulties, leading to their separation in 1990, with Teresita returning to

California and Reynaldo bringing their children to the Philippines. Teresita, fearing arrest due to

a bigamy case filed by Reynaldo, delayed her return to the Philippines and filed a habeas

corpus petition on December 8, 1992, seeking custody of their children. The trial court

dismissed the petition on June 30, 1993, granting sole parental authority to Reynaldo. The Court

of Appeals, on February 16, 1994, reversed the decision, awarding custody to Teresita with

visitation rights for Reynaldo. Petitioners contested the decision, arguing that it overlooked the

trial court's factual findings and relied on speculations.

ISSUE

Whether to who (mother or father) should the custody of the two children be awarded.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu, overturning the Court of Appeals'

decision. The Court criticized the automatic application of age-based presumptions in resolving

custody issues, emphasizing the paramount consideration of the child's welfare. The court

clarified that the age-based presumption is not conclusive and can be overcome by compelling

reasons. The Court highlighted the error of the Court of Appeals in relying on abstract

presumptions rather than a careful consideration of relevant facts, emphasizing that the child's

best interests should guide the decision. In this case, with both children over seven years old,

the Court found that the trial court appropriately considered their preferences and relevant

factors in awarding custody to Reynaldo. The Court also dismissed Teresita's arguments and

affirmed the trial court's findings regarding her questionable morality and unsuitability as a
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

custodial parent. Overall, the decision prioritized the welfare of the children and reinstated

Reynaldo's custody rights.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

LEGAL SEPARATION (Article 55-67, Family Code)

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.

GANDIONCO

G.R. No. 79284, PADILLA, J., November 27, 1987

FACTS

The case involves a legal separation complaint filed by the legal wife (private respondent)

against the petitioner, citing concubinage as grounds. Simultaneously, a criminal case for

concubinage was initiated by the wife. The wife sought provisional support pendente lite in the

legal separation case, and the court granted the support order. The petitioner argued for the

suspension of the civil action for legal separation and related incidents, based on the pendency

of the criminal case for concubinage. Relying on the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the

petitioner contended that the civil action should be suspended, citing the case of Jerusalem vs.

Hon. Roberto Zurbano. However, the court rejected this, clarifying that the amendment to the

rules specified suspension only applies to a civil action "to enforce the civil liability arising from

the offense." The court emphasized that a civil action for legal separation can proceed

independently of the criminal action for concubinage, as it addresses the spouses' conjugal

rights and legal consequences. Additionally, the court dismissed the petitioner's argument that

his conviction for concubinage should precede success in the legal separation action, stating

that legal separation does not hinge on a prior criminal conviction for concubinage.

ISSUE

Whether a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case

for Concubinage.

RULING

The court ruled against the petitioner, emphasizing that a criminal conviction for concubinage is

not a prerequisite for obtaining a legal separation decree. It clarified that legal separation can be

granted based on preponderance of evidence in the legal separation action, without the need for

a criminal proceeding or conviction. The court modified the previous doctrine in Francisco vs.

Tayao, noting that the present Civil Code does not require establishing guilt through a final
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

judgment in a criminal action. The petitioner's resistance to paying support pendente lite was

rejected, with the court finding no proof of grave abuse of discretion in the respondent Judge's

order. The court affirmed the discretionary nature of support pendente lite, advising the

petitioner to file a motion to modify or reduce the support amount if necessary. The petitioner's

request to disqualify the respondent Judge was deemed without merit, as a mere difference of

opinion between the judge and counsel is insufficient grounds for disqualification. The court

found the judge's disposition of motions to be sound, dismissing the petition and imposing costs

against the petitioner.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

LEGAL SEPARATION (Article 55-67, Family Code)

LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge

of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMEN G. RAMOS

G.R. No. L-34132, FERNANDO, J., July 29, 1972

FACTS

The petitioner, Lucy Somosa-Ramos, filed a certiorari petition challenging the decision of the

Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge Cipriano

Vamenta, Jr. The main issue was whether Article 103 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the trial

of an action for legal separation within six months of filing the petition, also prevents the court

from ruling on a motion for a preliminary mandatory injunction filed as an ancillary remedy to

such a suit. Lucy Somosa-Ramos initiated Civil Case No. 5274 against her husband, Clemente

G. Ramos, seeking legal separation on grounds of concubinage and an attempted assault on

her life. Concurrently, she filed a motion for a preliminary mandatory injunction to reclaim her

claimed paraphernal and exclusive property managed by Clemente Ramos. The respondent

Judge, citing Article 103, ordered the suspension of the hearing on the motion for a preliminary

mandatory injunction. The petitioner contested this ruling through the certiorari petition, seeking

to overturn the order. The respondents argued that hearing the motion could hinder the

reconciliation of the spouses. A manifestation from the parties on January 12, 1972, indicated

their submission of the matter without further arguments.

ISSUE

Whether the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six

months from the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary

mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such suit.

RULING

The court ruled that Article 103 of the Civil Code, mandating a six-month waiting period before

trying an action for legal separation, does not serve as an absolute bar to considering a motion

for a preliminary mandatory injunction within that period. While recognizing the importance of

the waiting period to facilitate possible reconciliation between spouses, the court clarified that

certain ancillary motions, particularly those related to property management, need not be
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

delayed during this period. It noted that Article 103 does not prevent the appointment of an

administrator for conjugal property or addressing issues related to property management. Given

the husband's continued management of the petitioner's claimed paraphernal property amid

accusations of concubinage and attempted assault, the court found the petitioner's motion for a

preliminary mandatory injunction justified. Consequently, the court granted the certiorari petition,

overturned the order suspending the injunction hearing, and directed the respondent Judge to

proceed with the motion without delay.

dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

LEGAL SEPARATION (Article 55-67, Family Code)

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., October 23, 2006

FACTS

Lucita G. Ong filed a legal separation complaint against her husband, William Ong, citing

physical violence, threats, intimidation, and grossly abusive conduct in their marriage, detailing

instances of slapping, kicking, hair-pulling, and even pointing a gun at her. The Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Dagupan City granted legal separation based on frequent quarrels, physical

violence, and abusive conduct, finding Lucita's testimonies and medical evidence credible.

William, disputing the claims, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC

decision, emphasizing the straightforward and credible testimonies supporting Lucita's

allegations and the injuries documented by Dr. Elinzano. The CA found sufficient evidence of

physical violence and grossly abusive conduct, justifying legal separation, and denied William's

motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether Lucita's departure constituted abandonment without justifiable cause.

RULING

The Court denied William Ong's petition challenging the legal separation decree granted to his

wife, Lucita Ong. William's claim that Lucita's motive was to gain control of conjugal properties

was deemed implausible, and the Court upheld the lower courts' findings, emphasizing Lucita's

detailed and credible accounts of William's physical violence and abusive conduct. The Court

dismissed William's argument of potential damage to his reputation, asserting that any harm

would result from his own actions. The Court rejected the claim that Lucita's departure

constituted abandonment without justifiable cause, as she left due to his abusive conduct. The

decision reaffirmed the constitutional commitment to strengthen the family institution and upheld

the Family Code's provisions on legal separation. Consequently, the petition was denied for lack

of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

LEGAL SEPARATION (Article 55-67, Family Code)

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033, FELIX, J., December 28, 1956

FACTS

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, married Leonila Ginez on August

27, 1949. After their marriage, Leonila left and informed Benjamin that she had gone to live with

her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, later moving to Dagupan City for college. Benjamin

received letters, some anonymous, alleging Leonila's infidelity. In October 1951, Benjamin

sought advice on legal separation due to the alleged infidelity, leading to consultations with the

Navy Chaplain and legal department. In August 1952, Benjamin found Leonila in Asingan, and

they stayed together briefly. However, when Benjamin questioned her about the alleged

infidelity, she left, confirming his suspicions. Despite efforts to locate her, Benjamin filed a

complaint for legal separation on November 18, 1952. The court scheduled a hearing for June

9, 1953, during which Benjamin testified. However, after his testimony, Leonila's counsel orally

moved for dismissal, and the court ordered a written motion, giving Benjamin 10 days to

respond.

ISSUE

Whether a complaint for legal separation may be dismissed on the ground of Condonation.

RULING

The court dismissed the legal separation case filed by Benjamin Bugayong against his wife,

Leonila Ginez, based on the ground of condonation. The court ruled that Benjamin's actions,

specifically his reconciliation with Leonila by living together as husband and wife for two nights

and one day, constituted condonation, implying forgiveness of the alleged acts of infidelity. The

court emphasized that a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse after knowledge of the

offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation. As a result, the court affirmed the lower

court's order of dismissal, stating that Benjamin, as the allegedly offended spouse, was

deprived of any legal action for legal separation against his wife. The decision concluded that

there was no merit in the appellant's contention that condonation was not a proper ground for
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

dismissal, as it was raised in the motion to dismiss, supplementing the issues raised in the

answer.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

LEGAL SEPARATION (Article 55-67, Family Code)

ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and

ROSA S. BUSUEGO

G.R. No. 196842, PEREZ, J., October 9, 2013

FACTS

Rosa S. Busuego filed a complaint against her husband, Alfredo, accusing him of concubinage,

violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children), and

grave threats, detailing a troubled marriage marked by infidelity, abuse, and threats. The

marriage, beginning in 1975, faced challenges from 1983 onwards, with Rosa discovering

photographs and love letters indicating Alfredo's extramarital affairs. Despite deteriorating

relations, Rosa worked in the US, where her sons eventually joined her, while Alfredo allegedly

had affairs with Emy Sia and Julie de Leon. The Ombudsman, after a clarificatory hearing,

impleaded Sia and de Leon, finding probable cause to indict Alfredo and Sia for concubinage.

Alfredo challenged this decision, asserting procedural errors, condonation, and lack of probable

cause. The Ombudsman rejected his arguments, maintaining probable cause. Alfredo appealed,

alleging grave abuse of discretion and contesting procedural issues, condonation, and the

alleged lack of probable cause.

ISSUE

Whether Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for

Concubinage.

RULING

In this case, the court upheld the Ombudsman's discretionary authority in determining probable

cause during a preliminary investigation. The petitioner's arguments against the automatic

inclusion of individuals as party-respondents, the failure to refer the complaint to the Department

of Justice (DOJ), and the alleged condonation by his wife were rejected. The court emphasized

the Ombudsman's rule-following and concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ. The court dismissed

the condonation claim, stating that the wife's knowledge of the husband's general behavior did

not constitute condonation of specific acts of concubinage. The court also rejected the

petitioner's reliance on a witness's affidavit of recantation, noting the general disfavor of

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

retractions. Lastly, the court affirmed the Ombudsman's finding of a prima facie case, dismissing

the petition and underscoring the importance of addressing such issues in court rather than

challenging the Ombudsman's discretionary authority.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 68-73, Family

Code)

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263, TRENT, J., November 2, 1916

FACTS

In this case, the wife filed an action against her husband seeking support outside the conjugal

domicile after leaving the marital home due to alleged maltreatment and lewd demands. The

husband demurred, contending that he cannot be compelled to provide support unless there is a

judicial decree of divorce or separation. The court sustained the demurrer, dismissing the case

when the wife declined to amend the complaint. The court held that the facts presented did not

establish a cause of action for support outside the conjugal domicile without a judicial decree of

divorce or separation.

ISSUE

Whether Eloisa can compel Jose for support outside the conjugal home.

RULING

The court ruled that marriage, being a contract with civil effects, establishes a conjugal

partnership with specific duties between spouses. While the court acknowledged the apparent

resemblance to ordinary contracts, it stressed the unique nature of marriage as a state-

regulated relation for societal benefit. Examining legal provisions related to marital duties, the

court rejected the absolute nature of Civil Code Article 149, emphasizing that the supporting

spouse's option to pay a fixed pension or provide support at home is not unconditional. The

court cited a Spanish Supreme Court decision but distinguished it, asserting that the Philippines

follows different substantive laws, notably having adultery as the sole ground for divorce. It

affirmed that a judgment for separate maintenance enforces the husband's duty without

equating to a penalty or debt, serving societal peace, the wife's protection, and preserving the

sanctity of marriage based on public policy and the unique nature of marital obligations in the

Philippines.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 68-73, Family

Code)

MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014, STREET, J., August 11, 1921

FACTS

In the case of Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo, the couple married in 1910

but faced marital troubles leading to Dolores leaving in 1920. Mariano filed a legal action to

compel her return, while Dolores sought a decree of separation, conjugal partnership liquidation,

and alimony, citing her husband's alleged cruel treatment. The trial court ruled in favor of

Dolores, allowing her to live separately, granting alimony and attorney's fees. Mariano

appealed, claiming the decision was unjust. The appellate court disagreed with the trial judge,

finding evidence that Dolores' jealousy aggravated marital issues and that both spouses were

free from infidelity. The court concluded that the tales of cruelty were exaggerated, declaring

Dolores' abandonment lacked sufficient justification.

ISSUE

Whether the court may compel the return of Dolores into the conjugal home enforcing

cohabitation by process of contempt.

RULING

The court rejected the defendant's cross-complaint for separate maintenance, underscoring that

such relief should only be granted in cases of imperative necessity resulting from the fault of the

husband. Citing precedents such as the Davidson vs. Davidson case and the Evans vs. Evans

decision, the court cautioned against the inherent dangers of de facto separation. Regarding the

plaintiff's claim for restitution of conjugal rights, the court asserted that it cannot compel spouses

to cohabit, citing the impracticality and questionable policy of enforcing such orders. The

decision highlighted the limited attempt in Louisiana to enforce cohabitation through contempt

and emphasized the rejection of such attempts in other states. Ultimately, the court reversed the

judgment, instructing the wife to return to the marital home, absolving the plaintiff from the

cross-complaint, and making no special pronouncement on costs.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 68-73, Family

Code)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO,

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP,

JOHN DOES and JANE DOES

G.R. No. 139789, PARDO, J., July 19, 2001

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO

G.R. No. 13980, PARDO, J., July 19, 2001

FACTS

Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed a habeas corpus petition with the Court of Appeals in 1999 to gain

custody of her husband, Potenciano Ilusorio. The petition was dismissed in April 1999 due to a

perceived lack of unlawful restraint or detention. Erlinda appealed via certiorari to the Supreme

Court, and this case was consolidated with another involving Potenciano and his children

appealing a visitation rights order for Erlinda. In May 2000, the Supreme Court dismissed the

habeas corpus petition but granted the nullification of the Court of Appeals' ruling on visitation

rights. Erlinda filed a motion for reconsideration, leading to a preliminary conference in October

2000. The Court addressed issues, including a proposed physical and medical examination of

Potenciano, and encouraged amicable settlement. While compliance with settlement

discussions was noted in November 2000, the Court eventually denied Erlinda's motion for

Potenciano's examination in January 2001, a decision reaffirmed with finality in March 2001.

ISSUE

Whether a wife can secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in

their conjugal dwelling.

RULING

In its ruling on Erlinda K. Ilusorio's motion for reconsideration, the Court reiterated key points

from the previous decision, emphasizing that Erlinda's petition, despite her denial, sought
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

custody of her husband, Potenciano Ilusorio. The Court found unproven allegations of illegal

restraint by Potenciano's children during the Court of Appeals hearing. Erlinda's argument about

Potenciano's mental capacity lacked convincing evidence, and the Court upheld lower court

findings as conclusive. While acknowledging spouses' legal obligations to live together with love

and respect, the Court noted the absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano,

separated since 1972. Ultimately, the Court denied the motion, declaring the case moot due to

Potenciano's passing on June 28, 2001.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 68-73, Family

Code)

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-19671, REYES, J.B.L., J., November 29, 1965

FACTS

Vicenta Escaño, a 27-year-old college student, secretly married Pastor Tenchavez without her

parents' knowledge. Despite initial deep love, their engagement broke, and Vicenta briefly

accepted another suitor. However, she reconciled with Pastor, and they planned to marry and

elope. The elopement did not occur, leading to Vicenta's confession to her parents. Her parents

sought priestly advice, suggesting a marriage recelebration, which didn't happen. Vicenta's

father received a letter alleging an affair between Pastor and another woman, Pacita Noel.

Vicenta and Pastor attempted reconciliation but failed. Vicenta filed for an annulment, later

switching to a divorce, and married an American, Russell Leo Moran. Tenchavez filed a

complaint seeking legal separation and damages, while Vicenta claimed a valid divorce. The

court ruled in favor of Tenchavez, stating that their valid marriage remained undissolved under

Philippine law, rejecting the foreign divorce's recognition and emphasizing the country's

restrictive policy on divorce.

ISSUE

1. Whether the divorce sought by Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the

Philippines.

2. Whether the charges against Escaño’s parents were sufficient in form.

RULING

1. The marriage between Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez remains undissolved

under Philippine law. Despite obtaining a divorce decree and marrying another man in the

United States, the Philippine law does not recognize these actions as valid since both were still

Filipino citizens at the time of the divorce. The acts of Vicenta, including not fulfilling wifely

duties, deserting her husband, and obtaining a divorce for the purpose of remarriage, constitute

willful infliction of injury to the husband, allowing Tenchavez to seek legal separation on the

grounds of adultery.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

2. No, Pastor Tenchavez's charges against Vicenta's parents are not supported by credible

evidence. Tenchavez's claim of animosity from the Escaño family appears to be mere

conjecture and exaggeration, contradicted by his own letters written before the lawsuit began.

An action for alienation of affections against the parents is not justified without proof of malice or

unworthy motives on their part. However, Tenchavez's false charges against Vicenta's parents,

including racial or social discrimination and pressuring her to seek annulment and divorce,

caused them unrest and anxiety. This entitles Vicenta's parents to recover damages.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 74-87, Family

Code)

EFREN PANA vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR.

G.R. No. 164201, ABAD, J., December 10, 2012

FACTS

Efren Pana, along with his wife Melecia and others, faced murder charges in Criminal Cases

4232 and 4233 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City. While Efren was

acquitted due to insufficient evidence, Melecia and another person were found guilty and

sentenced to death by the RTC. The guilty parties were ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral

damages, and actual damages to the victims' heirs. On appeal, the convictions were affirmed,

but the penalty was modified to reclusion perpetua, and monetary awards were upheld with the

deletion of actual damages and substitution with temperate damages. Exemplary damages

were also awarded, and the decision became final and executory. When the heirs sought

execution, the RTC ordered the writ, leading to the levying of real properties registered in Efren

and Melecia's names. The spouses claimed the levied properties were conjugal assets, but the

RTC denied their motion to quash the writ. The Court of Appeals dismissed Efren's petition for

certiorari for failure to show grave abuse of discretion, and the subsequent motion for

reconsideration was also denied. Efren filed a petition for review on certiorari with the present

court.

ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can

be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

RULING

The court ruled that the civil indemnities imposed on Melecia Pana, stemming from her criminal

liability in a murder case, can be enforced against the conjugal assets of the spouses Efren and

Melecia Pana. Dismissing Efren's claim that their marriage fell under the conjugal partnership of

gains, the court held that their property regime was governed by the Civil Code, and Article 256

of the Family Code did not automatically convert their conjugal partnership into absolute

community property. Emphasizing the principles of the conjugal partnership of gains under
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

Article 142 of the Civil Code, the court rejected the argument that Article 256 retroactively

altered their property regime, highlighting that post-marriage modifications are limited to specific

circumstances not applicable in this case. Regarding the enforcement of Melecia's criminal

indemnities, the court invoked Article 121 of the Family Code, allowing such obligations to be

charged to the conjugal partnership without prior liquidation, and affirmed with modification the

Court of Appeals' resolutions. The Regional Trial Court was instructed to ensure coverage of

responsibilities under Article 121 before enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal

properties of the spouses.

dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 74-87, Family

Code)

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A.

LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the

REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN

G.R. No. 122134, TINGA, J., October 3, 2003

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by

JIMMY LOCQUIAO

FACTS

This case involves a petition for review seeking to annul a joint Decision and a Resolution of the

Court of Appeals, concerning two consolidated cases: one for the annulment of title and the

other for ejectment, both related to a 4,876 square meters land in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The

land was initially owned by spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao, who, in 1944, gifted

it to their son Benito Locquiao and his wife Tomasa Mara through a deed of donation propter

nuptias. Disputes arose among heirs after the parents' death, leading to a Deed of Partition in

1973 and a Compromise Agreement in 1976. In 1983, petitioner Constancia filed an annulment

action, later dismissed, and in 1985, respondent Benito sought ejectment of petitioner

Constancia, resulting in a 1985 decision ordering her to vacate. Petitioners Romana and

Constancia then filed a complaint for the annulment of the title in 1985, alleging fraud and

irregularities. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint in 1989, citing prescription and

laches. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decisions in 1994, concluding that the cause of

action had prescribed and rejecting claims of nullity of the donation. A Motion for

Reconsideration was denied in 1995, leading to the current petition.

ISSUE

1. whether the donation propter nuptias is authentic;

2. whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required;

3. if so, in what form should the acceptance appear, and; (4) whether the action is barred

by prescription and laches.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

RULING

The court ruled in favor of the respondents, upholding the validity of the donation propter

nuptias and dismissing the petitioners' claims. The key arguments by the petitioners challenging

the authenticity of the Inventario Ti Sagut were deemed insufficient, with the court emphasizing

that the absence of a notarial record does not automatically invalidate the document. The court

also highlighted references to previous donations in the deed of partition and compromise

agreement, reinforcing the authenticity of the earlier document. Additionally, the court

addressed the admissibility of these documents, stating that objections should have been raised

during the pre-trial, and since they were not, it was too late to question their admissibility. The

court clarified the applicable formal requirements for donation propter nuptias, asserting that the

Old Civil Code provisions should be applied due to the 1944 execution date. It concluded that,

regardless of the legal angle, the petitioners' action for reconveyance was barred by

prescription, citing the 10-year limit under the Old Code of Civil Procedure. Laches was also

cited as a ground for dismissal, given the delay in asserting rights despite knowledge of the

alleged donation propter nuptias. The court affirmed the lower court decisions, finding no

reversible error and imposing costs against the petitioners.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 74-87, Family

Code)

CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES

G.R. No. L-28771, FERNANDO, J., March 31, 1971.

FACTS

The case involves a dispute over the validity of a donation made by Felix Matabuena, the

deceased, to Petronila Cervantes, his common-law partner. The appellant, Cornelia Matabuena,

who is the deceased's sister, argues that the donation, made while Felix was living maritally

without the benefit of marriage, is void. On the other hand, Petronila Cervantes asserts the

donation's validity. The lower court ruled in favor of Cervantes, stating that the donation,

executed on February 20, 1956, was made before their marriage on March 28, 1962. The court

based its decision on Article 133 of the Civil Code, which declares a donation between spouses

during the marriage as void. The court considered the donation valid since it was made before

the marriage took place. The appellant challenges this decision, contending that such donations

between common-law spouses are null and void as contrary to public policy, citing a 1954

decision by the Court of Appeals. The lower court's judgment, based on stipulated facts, favored

Cervantes, prompting the appellant to appeal the case.

ISSUE

Whether the ban on donation between spouses during the marriage apply to common-law

relationships.

RULING

The court reversed the lower court's decision, declaring the donation made by the deceased,

Felix Matabuena, to Petronila Cervantes void. The court held that the prohibition against

donations between spouses during marriage, as stated in Article 133 of the Civil Code, should

also apply to common-law relationships. The court cited a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,

Buenaventura v. Bautista, which emphasized the policy of prohibiting donations between

spouses to prevent undue influence. The court reasoned that the same rationale applies to

common-law relationships, where the potential for undue influence is heightened by the lack of

formalities. Consequently, the court recognized the rights of both parties as pro indiviso heirs to
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

the disputed property, with Petronila Cervantes being entitled to one-half as the widow and the

plaintiff, Cornelia Matabuena, as the surviving sister, entitled to the other half. The case was

remanded to the lower court for appropriate disposition in line with the court's decision. No

pronouncement was made regarding costs.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ARTICLES 74-87, Family

Code)

CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C.

TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA,

RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE

G.R. No. 146683, MENDOZA, November 22, 2001

FACTS

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became registered owners of a property in

1956. Following Zosima's death, Francisco executed an extrajudicial partition, waiving Juliana

Bustalino Montallana's share. In 1991, elderly and bedridden Francisco executed a "Deed of

Donation Inter Vivos," assigning a portion of the property to Cirila Arcaba, who had been

assisting him for over a decade. After Francisco's death in 1991, his nephews and nieces

contested the donation, alleging Cirila was Francisco's common-law wife, rendering the

donation void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The trial court voided the donation, citing

documents with the signature "Cirila Comille" and testimonies, ordering Cirila to deliver the

property to the plaintiffs and pay attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed, considering

evidence such as witnesses' testimonies, documents reflecting Cirila's use of Francisco's

surname, references to her as Francisco's common-law wife in another case, and her lack of

regular cash wages. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, and Cirila's motion for

reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances

of this case.

RULING

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's

declaration of the donation made by Francisco Comille in favor of Cirila Arcaba as void under

Article 87 of the Family Code. The ruling was based on evidence presented by both parties,

including testimonies, documents signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille," and references

to Cirila as Francisco's common-law spouse in legal documents. The Court concluded that Cirila
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, rendering the

donation void under the Family Code.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY (ARTICLES 88-104, Family Code)

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA

G.R. No. 193038, VILLARAMA, JR., March 11, 2015

FACTS

The case involves Shirley B. Nuega (respondent) and Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner). Shirley,

previously married to Rogelio Nuega, acquired a house and lot with him during their marriage.

Shirley filed for legal separation due to Rogelio's extramarital affairs, leading to the dissolution

and liquidation of their community property. During this process, Rogelio sold the property to

petitioner without Shirley's consent. Following legal separation, Shirley filed a complaint against

petitioner and Rogelio for rescission of sale and recovery of the property. The trial court ruled in

favor of Shirley, ordering the rescission of the sale and directing petitioner to reconvey a portion

of the property or pay its present market value. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,

which affirmed the decision with modification, declaring the entire deed of sale null and void and

instructing petitioner to reconvey the entire property. Petitioner challenged this finding, asserting

she was a purchaser in good faith, and disputed the modification in the present petition after the

appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Deed of Sale between Rogelio and Josefina Nobleza was valid.

RULING

The court ruled against petitioner, Josefina V. Nobleza, affirming the decision of the Court of

Appeals. The court rejected Nobleza's claim of being an innocent purchaser for value,

emphasizing that buyers must exercise due diligence beyond relying solely on the title. The

court found that Nobleza failed to make sufficient inquiries, especially considering her sister's

proximity to the property and warnings about legal issues. Addressing the sale's validity, the

court determined that the property was part of the absolute community of Shirley and Rogelio

Nuega, rendering Rogelio's sale during the marriage without Shirley's consent void. The court

also dismissed Nobleza's claim for reimbursement from Shirley, as there was no evidence the

sale proceeds benefited the family. The petition was denied, affirming the Court of Appeals'
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

decision, and holding that Nobleza was not an innocent purchaser for value, with the sale being

declared void and Shirley not obligated to reimburse Nobleza.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY (ARTICLES 88-104, Family Code)

ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO

G.R. No. 183984, CARPIO, April 13, 2011

FACTS

Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores, secured by a real estate mortgage on a property

owned by Edna and her husband, Enrico Lindo, Jr. When Edna defaulted on payments, Flores

filed a foreclosure complaint. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled against Flores, stating that

the mortgage lacked Enrico's consent and authority, advising Flores to file a personal action

against Edna. Flores' motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a sum of money

complaint against Edna, contested by Edna and Enrico, who cited improper venue, res judicata,

and forum-shopping based on the previous RTC decision. The RTC rejected the motion to

dismiss, asserting that res judicata didn't apply. The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC's

orders, claiming that Flores waived his personal action by pursuing foreclosure, as both

remedies couldn't proceed concurrently. The CA held that Flores had only one cause of action,

and filing for foreclosure waived his right to a personal action. Flores' motion for reconsideration

with the CA was denied, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for

collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.

RULING

The court ruled that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-

debtor, which is to recover the debt, allowing the creditor to either file a personal action for the

collection of the sum of money or institute a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

The election of one remedy bars recourse to the other to prevent multiple suits. In this case, the

petitioner filed a foreclosure action, which was ruled against due to a void mortgage. However,

the court emphasized the possibility of recovering the loan amount from Edna through a

personal action. The court noted errors in declaring the mortgage void and highlighted the

subsequent validation through a Special Power of Attorney. Despite procedural lapses, the court

applied the principle of unjust enrichment, considering Edna's admission to obtaining a loan and
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

directing the trial court to proceed with the case for the recovery of the loan amount. The ruling

upheld the single cause of action principle while applying the principle of unjust enrichment in

the specific circumstances of the case.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY (ARTICLES 88-104, Family Code)

ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ vs. SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ

GR 19565, CASTRO, January 30, 1968

FACTS

Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint in 1958 against her husband, Severino de la Cruz, alleging

abandonment and mismanagement of conjugal properties. She sought separation of property,

monthly support, attorney's fees, and costs. The court initially granted alimony pendente lite,

which was later reduced upon the defendant's motion. In 1961, the trial court ordered the

separation and division of conjugal assets, directing the defendant to pay P20,000 as attorney's

fees. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme

Court due to the significant value of conjugal assets. The uncontested facts included the

couple's marriage in 1938, the birth of six children, and the acquisition of real estate and

business assets during their marriage, including the Philippine Texboard Factory. Both spouses

were also indebted to banks, securing loans with various properties. The defendant raised nine

errors against the trial court, disputing findings related to visits, alleged concubinage, strained

relations, abandonment, failure to discuss business activities, mortgage transactions,

evidentiary issues, the order for separation of conjugal properties, and the award of attorney's

fees.

ISSUE

1. whether the defendant's separation from the plaintiff constituted legal abandonment

justifying separation of conjugal properties and

2. whether the defendant's failure to inform the plaintiff about business enterprises

amounted to an abuse of administration of conjugal partnership warranting division of

matrimonial assets.

RULING

In this case, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint in 1958 against her husband, Severino de la

Cruz, alleging abandonment and mismanagement of conjugal properties. The trial court granted

separation and division of assets, ordering Severino to pay P20,000 as attorney's fees. Estrella

claimed Severino abandoned her and their children to live with a concubine, Nenita Hernandez.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

However, the court ruled in favor of Severino, stating there was no real abandonment as he

continued to support his family financially despite living separately. Regarding mismanagement,

the court found insufficient evidence of willful disregard by Severino and reversed the separation

of property while reducing attorney's fees to P10,000. The court emphasized the potential harm

of legal separation to family unity and urged reconciliation, directing Severino to pay P3,000

monthly for support until reconciliation.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (ARTICLES 116-133, Family Code)

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA, and PACITA VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA

G.R. No. 143286, CARPIO, April 14, 2004

FACTS

Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya and defendant Nicolas Retuya were legally married, with five

children, and acquired various properties during their marriage, including income-generating

assets. In 1945, Nicolas left his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, resulting

in an illegitimate son, Procopio Villanueva. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, and Procopio

managed the properties. Despite failed reconciliation attempts, Eusebia filed a complaint

seeking the declaration of conjugal nature of the properties and transfer of administration to her.

The trial court ruled in her favor, declaring the properties conjugal, ordering the transfer of

administration, and reconveying specific properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed, deleting the

attorney's fees award. The case centers on determining the conjugal nature of properties

acquired during the marriage and rightful administration amid changed family dynamics due to

Nicolas' separation and incapacitation.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in sustaining the declaration of the trial court that the

properties listed are conjugal properties of Nicolas Retuya and Eusebia Retuya although

this was not one of the causes of action in Eusebia’s complaint.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the presumption that properties acquired

during the existence of the marriage of Nicolas Retuya and Eusebia Retuya are

conjugal.

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the presumption under Article 148 of

the Family Code in favor of co-ownership between Nicolas Retuya and Pacita

Villanueva.

ISSUE

The court dismissed the petitioners' contention that Eusebia's complaint failed to state that the

subject properties are conjugal, emphasizing that the complaint explicitly maintained the
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

conjugal ownership of the properties, deeming such arguments baseless and criticizing the

cluttering of the appeal with useless arguments. On the issue of prescription and laches, the

court agreed with the Court of Appeals, noting that the petitioners raised these defenses in their

answer but failed to include them in the pre-trial order. The court held that the determination of

issues during pre-trial bars the consideration of other questions during trial or on appeal.

Despite the allowance for raising defenses not pleaded in the answer, the court clarified that this

does not apply when parties raise an issue in the answer but fail to include it in the pre-trial

order. The court stressed that parties are bound by the delimitation of issues during pre-trial

because they agreed to it, rejecting the argument that it had reviewed matters raised for the first

time on appeal in exceptional situations. In this case, where petitioners actively participated in

the trial without raising necessary objections, they were held bound by the stipulations made at

pre-trial, and the court ruled that, since petitioners did not raise the defense of prescription and

laches during the trial, they cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (ARTICLES 116-133, Family Code)

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe

Oscar Schuetze vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. L-34583, VILLA-REAL, October 22, 1931

FACTS

The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), as the administrator of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's

estate, appealed a judgment from the Court of First Instance of Manila that absolved Juan

Posadas, Jr., the Collector of Internal Revenue, from a complaint filed by BPI. The complaint

sought to recover P1,209, paid under protest, as an inheritance tax on a P20,150 life insurance

policy where the deceased's estate was named the beneficiary. The alleged errors in the

judgment included issues related to the domicile of the deceased, the validity of the imposed tax

under the Administrative Code, the classification of one-half of the insurance proceeds as

community property, and the constitutionality of imposing an inheritance tax on the insurance

policy. The stipulated facts revealed that Schuetze, a German residing in Germany, died in the

Philippines, leaving an estate administered by BPI. The insurance policy proceeds were taxed,

leading to the legal dispute. Both parties reserved the right to present additional evidence on

certain points.

ISSUE

Whether an insurance policy on said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's life was, by reason of its

ownership, subject to the inheritance tax, it would be well to decide first whether the amount

thereof is paraphernal or community property.

RULING

The court ruled that the proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to the insured's estate,

where premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property. In this

case, half of the proceeds belong to the husband and the other half to the wife exclusively. Even

if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds follow

the same proportion. Furthermore, if the proceeds, payable to the insured's estate as the

beneficiary, are delivered to the testamentary administrator as part of the deceased's estate

under probate administration, they are subject to inheritance tax. The court held that the
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

Collector of Internal Revenue has the authority to collect inheritance tax on such proceeds,

regardless of the insured's domicile. The judgment was reversed, and the defendant was

ordered to return half of the tax collected on the insurance policy proceeds to the plaintiff.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (ARTICLES 116-133, Family Code)

MOISES JOCSON vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,

ERNESTO VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-55322, MEDIALDIA, February 16, 1989

FACTS

The case revolves around a dispute over the validity of three documents executed by Emilio

Jocson, who died intestate, involving the sale of properties to his daughter, Agustina Jocson-

Vasquez. The petitioner, Moises Jocson, contests the validity of these documents, claiming they

are null and void due to fraud, deceit, undue pressure, and other illegal machinations. The

contested documents include a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," a "Kasulatan ng Ganap na

Bilihan," and a "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale." The trial court

declared the documents null and void, asserting simulated considerations with the intention to

exclude Moises from inheriting the properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial

court's decision, citing prescription for some exhibits and concluding that the contracts were not

simulated, emphasizing registration dates and determining that Moises's share had not been

prejudiced by the partition with sale.

ISSUE

1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL

COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE

OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW,

MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS?

II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY

PRESCRIPTION?

III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS

INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN REVERSING

THE DECLARING DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT?

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

RULING

The Court of Appeals addressed two key issues in its ruling. Firstly, it found that Moises

Jocson's causes of action, initially based on fraud, had prescribed concerning Exhibits 3 and 4

due to the lapse of the four-year period from the registration date. However, the court noted that

Moises Jocson had also challenged the deeds on the ground of simulated price, asserting that

they lacked consideration. The court clarified that an action for the judicial declaration of nullity

based on simulated price does not prescribe, and therefore, Moises Jocson's claim on this

ground is imprescriptible.

Secondly, the court discussed the lack of proof for the simulated price, emphasizing the burden

of proof on Moises Jocson. It highlighted contradictions in Moises Jocson's claims regarding

Agustina Jocson-Vasquez's income sources and pointed out insufficient evidence to support the

allegation that the questioned documents were without consideration. The court further

dismissed claims of inadequacy of price, asserting that there was no proof of gross inadequacy,

and any difference in market value and purchase price was slight, considering the filial

relationship between father and daughter.

Lastly, the court addressed Moises Jocson's argument that the properties in Exhibits 3 and 4

were conjugal. The court held that the certificates of title, registered in the name of "Emilio

Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were insufficient proof of conjugal ownership. It

emphasized that registration does not confer title and that the presumption of conjugal

ownership under Article 160 requires proof of acquisition during the marriage, which Moises

Jocson failed to provide. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, affirming the decision

of the Court of Appeals.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (ARTICLES 116-133, Family Code)

WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO

JOVELLANOS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for and in her

behalf, and in representation of her two minor daughters as natural guardian, ANA MARIA and

MA. JENNETTE, both surnamed JOVELLANOS

G.R. No. 100728, REGALADO, June 18, 1992

FACTS

The case involves a petition for review on certiorari challenging the decision of the Court of

Appeals. The dispute centers around a property covered by a lease and conditional sale

agreement between Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company

(Philamlife). After Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Daniel, he donated the

property to his children from his first marriage. A legal dispute arose after Daniel's death,

initiated by his second wife and their minor children, claiming that the property was part of the

conjugal partnership from the second marriage. The trial court ordered the liquidation of the

partnership, declared Annette Jovellanos as a pro-indiviso owner of half the property, and

recognized exclusive ownership of another structure by the spouses Gil and Mercia Martinez.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, applying Article 118 of the Family Code for property rights

resolution. The petitioners contested the lower court's classification of the property as conjugal

and the application of Article 118.

ISSUE

Whether the Family Code should be applied in determining the successional rights of the parties

to the estate of Daniel.

RULING:

The court ruled that the Family Code should be applied in determining the successional rights of

the parties to the estate of Daniel Jovellanos, specifically addressing a "Lease and Conditional

Sale Agreement" between Daniel and Philippine American Life Insurance Company. The court

concluded that the agreement was essentially a contract to sell, with ownership transferring

upon full payment. As Daniel Jovellanos acquired full ownership in 1975 while married to

Annette H. Jovellanos since 1967, the property belonged to their conjugal partnership. The court
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

rejected the argument against retroactive application of the Family Code, emphasizing that

Daniel's right to the property only became vested upon full payment. The court also addressed

reimbursement under Article 118, requiring repayment of conjugal funds used for the property.

The Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed, finding no reversible error.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (ARTICLES 116-133, Family Code)

MARCELO CASTILLO, JR., FELICISIMO CASTILLO, ENCARNACION CASTILLO, AMELIA

CASTILLO, JAIME CASTILLO, RONALDO CASTILLO, VICTORIA CASTILLO, LETICIA

CINCO, LEVI CINCO and DANIEL CINCO vs. MACARIA PASCO

G.R. No. L-16857, REYES, J.B.L., J., May 29, 1964

FACTS

Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, co-owners of a fishpond, sold the property to Marcelo

Castillo and Macaria Pasco on December 22, 1932, for the amount of P6,000 payable in three

installments. The Court of Appeals ruled the fishpond was paraphernal property, as Macaria

Pasco, the wife, contributed exclusive funds. Marcelo Castillo's primary income was a salary,

and he lacked substantial assets. Macaria Pasco contributed P600 from a debt, P400 in cash

from nipa lands sale, and obtained a loan for the initial payment. The second installment of

P2,000 came from a loan secured by a mortgage on the fishpond. The last installment of P3,000

was obtained through a loan secured by a mortgage on two parcels of land in Macaria Pasco's

name. After Marcelo Castillo, Sr.'s death, Macaria Pasco consigned P12,300 towards the

mortgage debt, completing the payment with a second consignation of P752.43. The Court of

Appeals determined that, as Marcelo Castillo's estate had insufficient assets, the consigned

amounts rightfully belonged to Macaria Pasco.

ISSUE

Whether the fishpond be considered conjugal property of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria

Pasco.

RULING

The court ruled that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the classification of the fishpond as

conjugal or separate property depended on the source of funds for its acquisition. The sale in

1932 involved both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and Macaria Pasco, as buyers. The Court of

Appeals found the initial P1,000 payment was made from Macaria Pasco's private funds,

rejecting the argument that the P600 debt owed to her was conjugal. However, the court

disagreed that loans secured by mortgages on Macaria's paraphernal property were her

exclusive obligation, citing the Palanca vs. Smith Bell & Co. case. It concluded that two
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

installments totaling P5,000 were paid with conjugal funds, while the initial P1,000 installment

came from the wife's exclusive funds. The fishpond was deemed both conjugal and separate

property, and the court ordered a remand for partition and liquidation proceedings.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (Articles 121-133, Family Code)

BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO

YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the name and style of A & L INDUSTRIES)

G.R. No. L-61464, GUTIERREZ, JR., May 28, 1988

FACTS

In 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo obtained a loan of P591,003.59 from the petitioner,

allegedly with the authority granted by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, through a special power of

attorney. Augusto had abandoned Lily and their children two months prior to securing the loan.

The petitioner filed a complaint based on the promissory note, seeking payment of the debt and

attaching properties of the spouses. Lily, in her answer with counterclaim, asserted that Augusto

had abandoned them before the loan, they were already separated when the promissory note

was executed, and she never authorized Augusto to transact business for A & L Industries. Lily

claimed her signature on the power of attorney was forged, and she did not receive any funds

from the loan. She argued that the illegal attachment forced the closure of A & L Industries,

impacting its assets.

ISSUE

Whether the A & L Industries, a sole proprietorship registered in the name of the wife Lily Yulo

should be held liable for the loan obligations contracted by the husband Augusto Yulo.

RULING

In summary, the court ruled that A & L Industries, registered as a single proprietorship under

private respondent Lily Yulo's name but established during the marriage, is presumed conjugal

property. However, for the conjugal property to be liable, the obligation must benefit the conjugal

partnership. As the loan obtained by Augusto Yulo did not redound to the family's benefit due to

his abandonment and false pretenses, the court held that A & L Industries could not be held

liable for the debt. The decision emphasized that conjugal partnerships are only liable for debts

contracted by the husband for the family's benefit.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (Articles 121-133, Family Code)

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY vs. MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C.

MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA

G.R. No. 143382, CORONA, J., November 29, 2006

FACTS

The case involves a credit accommodation agreement between respondent Mar Tierra

Corporation and petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Respondent corporation availed

of ₱9,952,000 from the credit line but failed to pay the balance due to business reversals. The

bank filed a complaint for a sum of money, securing a writ of attachment on the conjugal house

and lot of individual respondent Wilfrido Martinez. The trial court held both the corporation and

Martinez jointly and severally liable for ₱5,304,000, but it lifted the attachment on the conjugal

property, stating that the obligation did not benefit the family. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision, leading to petitioner's appeal. The main issues involve the amount availed by the

corporation and the conjugal liability of Martinez.

ISSUE

Whether the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the

husband to accommodate a third party.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's decision.

The Court emphasized that factual findings of the lower courts, supported by evidence, are

conclusive. Regarding the amount availed by respondent corporation, the Court held that

petitioner was bound by its own judicial admission and the findings of the lower courts. The

principal issue revolved around the conjugal liability of individual respondent Wilfrido Martinez

for the obligation incurred by respondent corporation. The Court clarified that an obligation must

be contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership to hold it liable. In this

case, since the credit line agreement and the indemnity agreement were for the benefit of the

corporation, petitioner failed to prove that the conjugal partnership benefited from the

transaction. The Court affirmed that holding the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

pertaining to the husband alone would defeat the objective of the Civil Code to protect the

solidarity and well-being of the family. Therefore, the petition was denied.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (Articles 121-133, Family Code)

ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely:

MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G.

RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR.

G.R. No. 160347, CHICO-NAZARIO, J., November 29, 2006

FACTS

Quirino de Guzman, a stockholder and corporate officer of Mabuhay Broadcasting System

(MBS), filed a complaint against the Spouses Carandang, who are also stockholders and

officers of MBS, seeking to recover ₱336,375. De Guzman claimed that part of the payment for

the spouses' subscriptions to the increased capital stock of MBS was made by him. The

spouses Carandang refused to pay, asserting the existence of a pre-incorporation agreement

wherein de Guzman promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of Arcadio Carandang, the

husband, in exchange for technical expertise and equipment. The trial court ruled in favor of de

Guzman, ordering the spouses Carandang to pay the claimed amount, interest, attorney's fees,

and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the spouses Carandang's motion for

reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the court ruling provides clarification on the status of the conjugal partnership of gains

between the spouses Carandang and addresses any legal implications or considerations related

to this partnership in the context of the judgment, particularly concerning the alleged loans and

the modified financial obligations ordered by the Court of Appeals.

RULING

The court ruling addresses the challenge by the spouses Carandang against the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) decision, asserting its voidness due to non-compliance with Section 16, Rule 3 of

the Rules of Court, which mandates informing the court of a party's death and appointing a legal

representative. The court rejects this argument, finding that the heirs waived jurisdiction over

their persons and the lack of further proceedings requiring the deceased's counsel. The ruling

also dismisses the procedural issue of non-inclusion of Milagros de Guzman in the complaint,

stating she is not an indispensable party. Regarding the main dispute over alleged loans, the
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

court upholds the RTC decision, emphasizing the spouses Carandang's failure to prove a pre-

incorporation agreement as a defense. The Court of Appeals modifies the judgment, ordering

the spouses Carandang to pay ₱336,375.00 plus interest and attorney's fees to Quirino de

Guzman's heirs.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (Articles 121-133, Family Code)

Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO vs. LEONARDO YAMANE

G.R. No. 160762, PANGANIBAN, CJ, May 3, 2006

FACTS

The case involves a 750-square-meter parcel of land in Baguio City registered in the name of

Muriel Pucay Yamane, the wife of respondent Leonardo Yamane. The property was levied and

scheduled for public auction to satisfy attorney's fees owed by the Pucay sisters in a separate

case. Respondent filed a third-party claim, asserting the property's conjugal nature, but the

auction proceeded, and the property was sold to petitioners Josephine and Henry Go.

Respondent filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale, and another complaint

for damages. The trial court initially ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring the property as

paraphernal and dismissing the case. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the auction sale null

and void, considering the property conjugal and finding no benefit to the conjugal partnership

from the transaction between the Pucay sisters and their attorney.

ISSUE

Whether the the parcel of land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership or paraphernal.

RULING

The court ruled that the parcel of land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of

Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane, as it was acquired during their marriage. The New Civil

Code's Article 160 presumes that all property acquired during marriage is part of the conjugal

partnership, unless proven otherwise. The court emphasized that the presumption can only be

rebutted with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. The unilateral declaration by

one spouse regarding the property's nature does not change its legal status. The fact that the

Deed of Absolute Sale was in Muriel's name alone does not negate its conjugal nature. The

court rejected the argument that the failure to redeem the property after the auction sale

indicated non-ownership by respondent, emphasizing that such non-redemption was consistent

with his claim that the sale was invalid. The court also ruled that the charging lien of Atty.

Guillermo de Guzman could not be enforced against the conjugal property, as the legal services
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

were acquired for the exclusive interest of Muriel and her sisters. The court concluded that the

conjugal asset cannot be used to pay for Muriel's personal obligation, and therefore, the

property cannot be levied upon.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (Articles 121-133, Family Code)

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 124642, CALLEJO, SR., J., February 23, 2004

FACTS

On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) secured a

₱9,000,000.00 loan from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC), with the PBMCI's Executive

Vice-President Alfredo Ching and others executing a continuing guaranty as security. The loan

was renewed multiple times. The ABC filed a complaint on August 21, 1981, seeking payment

of ₱12,612,972.88 and requesting a writ of preliminary attachment. Initially denied, the

attachment was later granted on the grounds of alleged fraud and disposal of properties by the

defendants. The PBMCI and Ching subsequently filed for suspension of payments with the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC issued an order placing PBMCI under

rehabilitation, suspending actions against it. Despite opposition, the trial court partially

suspended proceedings only regarding PBMCI, directing individual defendants, including Ching,

to answer. Ching later sought the dismissal or suspension of proceedings based on the SEC

order. The ABC moved to reduce the preliminary attachment bond, which was granted in 1988.

In 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching filed a motion to set aside the attachment, claiming the levied

stocks were acquired during her marriage with Alfredo Ching from conjugal funds, and the debt

did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE

Whether the shares of Citycorp stocks owned by Alfredo Ching a conjugal property.

RULING

In this case, the court ruled that the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal

partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband's execution of a

continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement for the loans obtained by Philippine Blooming

Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) from the private respondent, emphasizing that the contract of loan

was solely for the benefit of PBMCI, and no presumption could be inferred regarding the

conjugal partnership's benefit. The court rejected the argument that the husband's roles as a
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PBMCI director and stockholder would benefit the conjugal partnership, stating that such

benefits must be directly resulting from the loan, and not merely by-products. The court

distinguished cases where the husband borrows for his own business, asserting that in this

case, the husband acted as a surety for PBMCI's loan, not for his personal business, and held

that the conjugal partnership was not liable for the loans due to the lack of direct benefits.

Consequently, the court granted the petition, setting aside the Court of Appeals' decision, and

affirmed the trial court's orders.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PATERNITY AND FILIATION (Articles 163-182, Family Code)

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their

mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUSB vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON,

ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN

DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,

FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL

ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 142877, VITUG, J., October 2, 2001

FACTS

The case involves the petition of Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, born

during the lawful marriage of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus, who claim to be

the illegitimate children of Juan G. Dizon based on his notarized acknowledgment. Following

Dizon's intestate death, the petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and

Accounting" of the estate. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Dizon,

sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that it aimed to change the status of the petitioners

from legitimate to illegitimate children. The trial court initially denied the motion to dismiss, but

later, after various motions and proceedings, dismissed the complaint, stating that a declaration

of heirship should be made in a special proceeding. Petitioners challenge this decision, relying

on the acknowledgment as sufficient proof under the Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo doctrine, while

respondents argue the inapplicability of Divinagracia and cite the Sayson vs. Court of Appeals

case, stating that legitimacy issues should be addressed in a separate action.

ISSUE

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent.

RULING

In this case involving the filiation of illegitimate children born during the marriage of Danilo B. de

Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus, the court ruled that the due recognition of illegitimate

children in a record of birth or any authentic writing is a consummated act of acknowledgment,

and no further court action is required. However, the court emphasized that this rule is

applicable when the acknowledgment is within the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

court or record, or an authentic writing. In this instance, where the petitioners sought to establish

their illegitimate filiation to the deceased Juan G. Dizon, the court held that their claim to be

illegitimate children, in effect, impugns their legitimate status as the children of Danilo de Jesus

and Carolina Aves de Jesus, born in lawful wedlock. The court emphasized that the

presumption of legitimacy is strong and conclusive, and impugning it requires a direct suit

specifically brought for that purpose. As such, the court denied the petition, stating that the issue

of illegitimate filiation cannot be adjudicated without an action first instituted to impugn their

legitimacy as children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PATERNITY AND FILIATION (Articles 163-182, Family Code)

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor

JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS

G.R. No. 165546, CALLEJO, SR., J., February 27, 2006

FACTS

The case involves the entitlement of Rosanna H. Aguas, the surviving spouse, and her minor

children, Jeylnn and Janet Aguas, to Social Security System (SSS) death benefits following the

death of Pablo Aguas, a pensioner. Initially, Rosanna claimed the benefits, but Pablo's sister,

Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, contested the claim, alleging that Rosanna had abandoned the

family and lived with another man, resulting in the suspension of the benefits. The SSS denied

the claim based on an investigation, asserting that Jeylnn was not Pablo's legitimate child, and

Rosanna's marriage to Romeo dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo disqualified her as a

dependent spouse. The Social Security Commission (SSC) upheld the denial, but the Court of

Appeals reversed it, emphasizing the binding nature of public documents like birth certificates.

The central issue is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn, and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits,

considering questions about legitimacy and the dependent status of Rosanna.

ISSUE

Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the

death of Pablo.

RULING

The court ruled that only Jeylnn H. Aguas is entitled to the Social Security System (SSS) death

benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The decision emphasized that Jeylnn

sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension through her birth certificate, which bears

the signature of Pablo and was verified by the Civil Registry. The court recognized the

presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code, which holds that children born

during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. However, the court found that Janet's date of

birth was not substantially proven, and her status as a dependent child could not be confirmed.

Additionally, Rosanna, despite being the legitimate spouse, failed to prove her dependency on
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

Pablo at the time of his death, as evidence suggested they had separated. Therefore, only

Jeylnn is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PATERNITY AND FILIATION (Articles 163-182, Family Code)

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE

G.R. No. 123450, CORONA, J., August 31, 2005

FACTS

This case involves petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa

Almonte, who were married in 1989 and had a child named Jose Gerardo in 1990. Gerardo later

sought the annulment of their marriage, alleging that Ma. Theresa was previously married to

Mario Gopiao. The trial court annulled Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's marriage, declared Jose

Gerardo illegitimate, and granted custody to Ma. Theresa with visitation rights for Gerardo. Ma.

Theresa contested the visitation rights and sought a change of Jose Gerardo's surname to

Almonte. The trial court upheld visitation rights, and the Court of Appeals initially affirmed it.

However, after reconsideration, the appellate court reversed its decision, stating that Jose

Gerardo was the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao, making Gerardo's claims

invalid. The court dismissed the weight of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's admissions and birth

certificate, asserting that only the law determines legitimacy. Gerardo's motion for

reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the child in question is the legitimate child of Gerardo Concepcion.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of maintaining the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo, the child in question,

based on the presumption under Article 164 of the Family Code that a child born during the

marriage is legitimate. The court emphasized the quasi-conclusive nature of this presumption,

requiring evidence beyond reasonable doubt to rebut it. Gerardo, who sought to contest Jose

Gerardo's legitimacy, was deemed to lack legal standing as he was never the lawful husband of

Ma. Theresa, and only the husband or his heirs can contest the legitimacy of a child. The court

dismissed Gerardo's reliance on Ma. Theresa's statements, emphasizing the legal prohibition

against a mother disavowing her child's legitimacy. The court upheld Jose Gerardo's legitimacy,

granting him the right to bear the surnames of both his parents and emphasizing the paramount

consideration of the child's welfare. Gerardo was denied visitation rights as he lacked a legally
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

demandable right to visit the child. The court highlighted the need for a separate proceeding to

address changes in the child's name and civil registry entries regarding paternity and filiation.

Ultimately, the court prioritized the best interests of the child and upheld the presumption of his

legitimacy.
dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PATERNITY AND FILIATION (Articles 163-182, Family Code)

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother

and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz

G.R. No. 171713, CHICO-NAZARIO, J., December 17, 2007

FACTS

The case involves a complaint filed by Jinky C. Diaz, representing her minor daughter Joanne

Rodjin Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong for compulsory recognition and support. Jinky claimed that

she and Rogelio cohabited from January 1994 to September 1998, during which time Joanne

was conceived and born. Rogelio initially provided support but later denied paternity, leading to

the legal action. After Rogelio failed to respond, the trial court declared him in default and

rendered a decision in favor of Jinky. Rogelio sought a new trial, and the court granted it,

eventually ruling that Joanne is Rogelio's illegitimate child. Rogelio appealed, urging a DNA test

for paternity determination. The Court of Appeals granted the appeal, remanding the case to the

trial court for DNA analysis due to Rogelio's death during the appeal. The court emphasized the

reliability of DNA testing in settling paternity disputes.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for a DNA

Analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.

RULING

The court denied the petitioner's plea to set aside the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed

the ruling in favor of conducting DNA testing to determine the paternity of the minor, Joanne

Rodjin Diaz. The court emphasized the importance of resolving the issue of filiation for the

purpose of support and noted that DNA testing, being a scientifically valid technique, could

provide a definitive answer. The court explained that the death of the petitioner (Rogelio G.

Ong) did not bar the conduct of DNA testing, and there were still biological samples available for

analysis. The decision highlighted the reliability of DNA testing in determining parentage and

rejected the petitioner's argument against the remand of the case for DNA analysis. The court

referred to its previous rulings affirming the acceptability of DNA testing in cases involving

paternity disputes and emphasized its role in ensuring a fair and correct adjudication.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PATERNITY AND FILIATION (Articles 163-182, Family Code)

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND

FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR

G.R. No. 105625, PUNO, J., January 24, 1994

FACTS

This case involves a dispute over the administration of the estate of Vicente Benitez and Isabel

Chipongian, a married couple who owned various properties, especially in Laguna. Vicente died

intestate in 1989, following the death of Isabel in 1982. The fight for estate administration

ensued, with private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's

sister and nephew) filing a petition for letters of administration, contesting the legitimacy of

petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua, who claimed to be the legitimate daughter and sole heir of

the spouses. The trial court initially ruled in favor of Marissa based on Articles 166 and 170 of

the Family Code, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring Marissa not the

biological daughter of the spouses and consequently not a legal heir. The appellate court

directed the trial court to proceed with the administration of the estate accordingly, rejecting the

application of the aforementioned articles of the Family Code.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply the provisions of Articles 164, 166,

170 and 171 of the Family Code and in adopting and upholding private respondent's theory that

the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child.

RULING

The court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family

Code in asserting her legitimacy as the child of Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The

court clarified that these articles are intended for situations where a husband denies the

legitimacy of a child born to his wife, not for cases where the child is alleged not to be

biologically related to the couple. The ruling emphasized that the evidence presented by the

petitioner, including her birth certificate, was insufficient to establish her biological relationship

with the spouses. The court highlighted discrepancies, such as the questionable circumstances

of her birth, the absence of medical records supporting Isabel's pregnancy, and the
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

contradictory statements in the extrajudicial settlement executed after Isabel's death, which

declared her as childless. The court concluded that the totality of evidence supported the

appellate court's finding that Marissa Benitez was not the biological child of Vicente and Isabel,

dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Articles 209-233, Family Code)

LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA

BEDIA

G.R. No. 113054, ROMERO, J., March 16, 1995

FACTS

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse, got married in 1986,

and their union resulted in one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. Due to financial constraints, the child

was placed in the temporary custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia,

who claimed to have shouldered the hospital bills and the child's support. Julia Bedia-Santos,

the child's mother, went to the United States to work, sending financial support to her parents

for the child. In 1990, petitioner allegedly abducted the child from the Bedia household in Iloilo

City, prompting the grandparents to file a petition for custody. The trial court awarded custody to

the grandparents, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner contends that he is

a fit father, disputing the reasons given by the grandparents, while they argue that, as maternal

grandparents, they are in the best position to promote the child's welfare, emphasizing their

financial support and the petitioner's use of deceit in taking the child.

ISSUE

Whether to whom should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., granting him custody over his minor

son, Leouel Santos Jr. The court emphasized the inalienable and joint parental authority vested

in the father and mother, recognizing their duty and entitlement to keep their unemancipated

child in their custody and company. The Court of Appeals' decision to award custody to the

maternal grandparents was deemed inappropriate, as there was no evidence establishing the

petitioner as an unfit or unsuitable parent. The court rejected considerations such as financial

status and the grandparents' demonstrated love, asserting the primacy of the natural parent's

right to custody. The petitioner's past inattention was criticized but not construed as

abandonment, and his efforts to rectify the situation were acknowledged. The court concluded

that granting custody to the father would strengthen the parent-child bond and provide an
dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

opportunity for the petitioner to prove his love and support for his son, overturning the lower

court's decision in favor of the grandparents.

dreurisprudence
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ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Articles 209-233, Family Code

TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE,

G.R. No. 116773, TORRES, JR., J., January 16, 1997

FACTS

Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married in 1984 and had two children,

Leslie and Angelica. After Reynaldo's death in 1990, petitioner Maria intended to bring Angelica

to Pampanga, but respondent Teresita Eslao, Reynaldo's mother, persuaded her to entrust

Angelica's custody to her. Maria later entered into a relationship with Dr. James Manabu-Ouye

and migrated to the United States. In 1993, Maria returned to the Philippines to reunite with her

children and bring them to the United States. She informed Teresita about her plan to take

custody of Angelica and have Dr. Ouye adopt both children, but Teresita resisted, accusing

Maria of abandonment. Maria sought legal assistance, and after an unsuccessful demand for

custody, she filed an action. The trial court granted Maria's petition, directing Teresita to transfer

Angelica's custody to Maria. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE

Whether the private respondent Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, did not abandon minor, Angelica

Eslao, to the care and custody of the petitioner Teresita Sagla-Eslao.

RULING

The court, in considering the petition for custody of the child Angelica, weighed the arguments

presented by both parties, the petitioner being the child's natural mother and the respondent

being the child's grandmother. The court acknowledged the petitioner's genuine desire to be

with her child and her improved financial situation, as well as the willingness of the petitioner's

husband to adopt both children. However, the court found that the living conditions in the

respondent's house were less favorable due to overcrowding and limited facilities. The court

emphasized that in controversies involving the custody of minors, the paramount criterion is the

physical and moral well-being of the child, considering the respective resources and social and

moral situations of the contending parties. The court rejected the petitioner's claim of

abandonment, asserting that the grandmother's previous entrustment of custody to the

petitioner did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority, as parental

dreurisprudence
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are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

authority is an inherent and inalienable right. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court,

granting custody of Angelica to the respondent and dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Articles 209-233, Family Code)

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., June 19, 2001

FACTS

Petitioner Bonifacia Vancil, mother of the late Navy serviceman Reeder C. Vancil, initiated

guardianship proceedings over her grandchildren, Valerie and Vincent, in Cebu City, claiming

their residence in the Philippines and an estate from their father's death pension benefits.

Bonifacia was appointed legal and judicial guardian in July 1987. However, Helen Belmes, the

minors' natural mother, opposed the guardianship, asserting she had filed a similar petition in

Pagadian City. Helen subsequently moved for the removal of Bonifacia as guardian, citing

improper venue and alleging Bonifacia's U.S. residency. The trial court rejected Helen's motion,

but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, emphasizing the parents' designation as natural

guardians and finding no reason to deprive Helen of her legal rights as the mother. The

appellate court dismissed the guardianship proceedings initiated by Bonifacia.

ISSUE

Whether to whom between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his

guardian.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, emphasizing the preference

for the natural mother over the grandmother as the guardian of minor Vincent. The ruling is

based on Article 211 of the Family Code, which grants the parents joint parental authority over

their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision prevails, but in the

absence of a judicial order, the mother has the right to custody. The Court rejected the

petitioner's claim for guardianship based on substitute parental authority, as the surviving

grandparent can exercise such authority only in cases of the parents' death, absence, or

unsuitability. The petitioner failed to prove the respondent's unsuitability, and the petitioner,

being an American citizen residing in Colorado, was deemed unfit to perform the responsibilities

of a guardian in the Philippines. The Court affirmed that guardians residing outside the

jurisdiction may find it difficult to protect the wards, and the preference for the natural parent
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

remains a fundamental principle. The decision was modified to exclude Valerie from the

guardianship, as she had reached the age of majority.

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Articles 209-233, Family Code

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA

MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115640, MELO, J., March 15, 1995

FACTS

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding began a common-law relationship in 1984 while

residing in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. They got married in 1987, and their two children were born

in 1986 and 1988. The couple's relationship soured, leading to separation in 1990, with Teresita

returning to California. Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines, leaving them with his

sister. Teresita, fearing arrest due to a bigamy case filed by Reynaldo, delayed her return. In

1992, she filed a habeas corpus petition for custody of the children, sparking legal proceedings.

The trial court, in 1993, granted sole parental authority to Reynaldo. However, the Court of

Appeals, in 1994, reversed this decision, awarding custody to Teresita with visitation rights for

Reynaldo on weekends.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appelas erred in concluding that custody of the children should be given to

respondent Teresita.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu, reversing the decision of the Court of

Appeals and affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The case involved the custody

of minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu, whose parents had separated. The court criticized the

lower court for mechanically applying statutory presumptions regarding the age of the children

and the preference for the mother's custody. Emphasizing that the paramount consideration

should be the children's welfare, the court held that the presumption in favor of the mother is not

conclusive and can be overcome by compelling reasons. The court found that Reynaldo, the

father, was a fit parent and that the evidence supported the conclusion that Teresita, the

mother, was morally unfit, emotionally unstable, and incapable of providing for the children's

welfare. The court considered the children's preferences, psychological evaluations, and social

welfare reports in determining that custody with the father was in their best interests.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Articles 209-233, Family Code)

HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON

ROQUE A. TAMAYO, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR Branch CXXXI1 Makati,

Metro Manila, MARIA LOURDES SANTOS, and SIXTO SALUMBIDES

G.R. No. L-68374, CONCEPCION, JR., J., June 18, 1985

FACTS

The case involves a child custody dispute over Shirley Santos Salumbides, an illegitimate child

born to Maria Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides. Shirley's biological parents gave her to the

petitioners, Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna, a childless couple, shortly after her birth. The

Lunas raised Shirley as their own, enrolling her in school and planning a trip abroad with her.

However, when the Lunas sought the respondents' consent for Shirley's U.S. visa application,

the respondents, Shirley's biological parents, refused. Subsequently, the Lunas left for their trip

without Shirley, leaving her with the respondents. Upon their return, they discovered that Shirley

had been transferred to another school, and the respondents refused to return her. Legal

proceedings ensued, resulting in conflicting decisions from the trial court and the Court of

Appeals. The Supreme Court initially denied the Lunas' petition for review, leading to the

enforcement of the Court of Appeals' decision in favor of the respondents. The Lunas then filed

a motion to set aside the writ of execution, citing Shirley's emotional and psychological

condition. Despite Shirley's expressed desire to stay with the Lunas and her threats of self-harm

or escape if separated from them, the trial court denied the motion. The Lunas appealed to the

Intermediate Appellate Court, which dismissed their petition, leading to the current Supreme

Court recourse.

ISSUE

Whether procedural rules, specifically the obligation of lower courts to implement a final decision

from appellate courts in child custody matters, should take precedence over the expressed

desire of a child to remain with her grandparents rather than her biological parents.

RULING

The court ruled that while the general principle is that lower courts must only carry out the

ministerial duty of executing judgments from higher courts, exceptions may arise, such as in
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

cases where a stay of execution is necessary to achieve justice. In this specific case, the

petitioner argued that the child's expressed intent to harm herself or run away if forced to live

with her biological parents constituted a supervening event justifying the cancellation of the

execution of the Court of Appeals' final decision. The court agreed, emphasizing the paramount

importance of the child's welfare in custody matters. The threat made by the child, coupled with

her negative depiction of her biological parents, led the court to conclude that returning her to

the custody of the private respondents would be traumatic and against her best interests. As a

result, the court granted the petition, setting aside the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate

Court and maintaining the original decision granting custody to the petitioners.
dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, - versus - JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

G.R. No. 166676, Quisumbing, J., September 12, 2008

FACTS

Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,

Laguna, seeking the correction of entries in her birth certificate. Born as a female, she

developed male characteristics due to Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition

resulting in both male and female traits. Cagandahan, having embraced a male identity,

requested a change in gender from female to male, along with a name change from Jennifer to

Jeff. The RTC granted the petition, acknowledging Cagandahan's medical condition and his

chosen male identity. The court ordered corrections in the birth certificate and related records.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently filed a petition seeking to reverse the

RTC's decision.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of

respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical

condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of

the Rules of Court.

RULING

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES G.R. No. 174689,

dreurisprudence
PLEASE NOTE: Please DO NOT share this to anyone as I am not confident with my digest. (Maghirap din silang mag basa
ng full text please.) I am sharing this to you so we may compare the correct jurisprudence per topic. Rest assured that these
are all fresh digests and are not copied on the digest online (except on the case of FELIX SARAO vs. PILAR GUEVARRA – as I
do not have a copy of its full text). LASTLY, this is the exact digest that I will be submitting, (hindi mor in siguro gusto na
magkapareho tayo ng content). Kung may mali man po sa digest ko, sana mapatawad nyo pa rin ako. Hope this will help
lessen the burden of reading and writing. This is not yet done since I am still reading the last two cases. Kaya natin ito!