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Under the shadow: Forced labour among sea fishers in Thailand

Article in Marine Policy · June 2016

DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2015.12.015

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 Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Under the shadow: Forced labour among sea fishers in Thailand

Supang Chantavanich a,n, Samarn Laodumrongchai a, Christina Stringer b
a
Asian Research Center for Migration Institute for Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
b
Department of Management and International Business, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Thailand's fishing industry relies almost exclusively on migrant workers to fill its hazardous, low-paying
Received 20 October 2015 jobs. Recently, the industry has come under increased scrutiny due to the prevalence of forced labour and
Received in revised form illegal fishing practices. This paper discusses the findings of a large-scale survey (n ¼ 596) undertaken
17 December 2015
with fishers – Thai, Cambodian and Myanmar – in four coastal provinces in Thailand. The majority of
Accepted 17 December 2015
fishers worked on short-haul vessels in the wild-capture sector. Using the indicators developed by the
International Labour Organizations Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, 16.9% (n ¼101)
Keywords: of respondents identified as being victims of forced labour for human trafficking. The survey results give
Thailand's fishing industry important insight into the existence of deceptive and coercive recruitment practices, exploitative
Forced labour
working conditions, and forced labour in the fishing industry. A concerted approach by governments and
Migrant fishers
buyers is needed to eliminate forced labour practices.
Human trafficking
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction fish stocks. Fishing operators are increasingly catching low value
or juvenile fish to feed, in part, the demand for the aquaculture
In June 2015, the Daily Mail reported on how Myint Naig, a sector. Faced with reduced revenues, operators continually seek to
Burmese fisherman, had spent 22 years forced to work on a Thai reduce operating costs and according to the Environmental Justice
fishing boat in Indonesia, during which time he suffered extreme Foundation ([11], 6) “the collapse of fishing stocks in Thailand's
mental and physical abuse. The story was eerily reminiscent of marine capture fisheries has directly contributed to the wide-
media coverage of other Burmese and Cambodian fishers, also spread use of modern slavery”. The industry relies almost ex-
forced to work on Thai boats catching shrimp, squid, tuna, and clusively on irregular migrant workers-especially those from
other fruits of the sea. On board these vessels, many migrant Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar – to fill its hazardous, low-paying
fishers were subjected to frequent beatings, and who were jobs. The working conditions many migrant workers experience in
starved, denied wages and on sold. Some fishers were killed or Thailand's fishing industry are such that fishers are often referred
thrown overboard [7,14,26,34,]. Such abuse is not solely targeted to as victims of human trafficking for forced labour. Phil Robertson,
at migrant workers as Thai fishers themselves have also been the Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division, views
victims of forced labour abuses [20]. forced labour as being systemic in the industry, and the relation-
Thailand's seafood industry makes a key contribution to its ship between migrant fishers and the Thai boat captains who buy
economic development. Thailand produces in the vicinity of them as “predatory” [14]. In recent months, Thailand's manage-
3.8 million tons of seafood every year; 71% of which is destined for ment of its fishing industry has come under increased interna-
export markets [12]. Over the last four decades, the industry has tional scrutiny due to the prevalence of forced labour as well as
experienced significant growth and today ranks third after China illegal fishing practices.
and Norway in terms of exports of fish and fishery products [13]. While media reports, importantly, capture readers' attention,
However, the majority of exports are aquaculture products or fish they are not a substitute for in depth empirical research. Such
products, which are imported for processing and then re-exported. reports do not unpack the frameworks within which the working
The wild-capture sector is characterized by over-fishing as well as conditions and labour exploitation occurs and do not provide
illegal fishing practices, which has resulted in the degradation of sufficient and robust empirical data to inform policies in the
fishing industry on how to minimise or eradicate the abuse of
n fishers. This is the purpose of this empirically-motivated paper.
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: chansupang@gmail.com (S. Chantavanich), The paper presents the findings of a large-scale survey detaili-
Samarn.L@chula.ac.th (S. Laodumrongchai), c.stringer@auckland.ac.nz (C. Stringer). ng the employment practices and working conditions in the

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.12.015
0308-597X/& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 S. Chantavanich et al. / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7

commercial fishing sector in four coastal provinces in Thailand. bondage in order to pay this fee; a situation described by O'Neill
The findings are based on a joint research project between the [22] as “compulsion by necessity”. They borrow from a variety of
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Asian Research sources, including the broker themselves, and agree to pay the
Center for Migration at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand [18]. debt over time. Robertson [25] highlights “a direct connection
The paper is set out as follows: the Section 2 discusses the between this kind of “travel now, pay later” system and the traf-
trajectory to forced labour in the fishing industry. This section is ficking of men onto fishing boats.”
followed by an overview of research methods. In total 596 fishers While there are labour brokers who abide by regulations and
were surveyed, the majority of whom worked on short-haul ves- acceptable standards and practices, there are also those who are
sels operating in Thailand's waters. The key findings of the study perpetuators of labour abuses. The latter will typically target in-
are then presented in Section 4 where the recruitment of the experienced and vulnerable individuals to work on fishing vessels
fishers along with working conditions on board the vessels are [21]. The labour supply chains are such that fishers can be hired
discussed. There is evidence that forced labour is occurring par- through a cascade system of unscrupulous intermediaries, which
ticularly in the long-haul sector. Section 5 comprises a discussion “provides space…to extract economic rent from vulnerable
and conclusion. workers through coercive practices involving debt bondage and
entrapment” ([2], 4). Robertson [25] found that due to the diffi-
culty in recruiting workers willing to work in the fishing industry
2. Forced labour practices in the fishing industry “many of the brokers involved in recruiting fishermen are also
involved in human trafficking”.
Increased global competition within the fishing industry due, in Work in the industry can be extremely hazardous. Officers will
part, to over-fishing and declining fish stocks has resulted in use abuse and coercion in order to maximise labour productivity.
fishing operators reducing operating costs in order to remain Severe human rights abuses – physical, psychological and sexual –
competitive. Further, commodity-oriented global value chains are common in many aspects of the fishing industry
(GVCs), such as fishing, are dominated by lead firms, who pressure [8,19,21,27,36]. Crew members can be subjected to substandard
suppliers to maximise supply and who “can transmit commercial living conditions, including the lack of basic necessities such as
pressures on conditions of price and supply along the length of drinking water, food, clean bedding and hygienic facilities. Long
value chains” ([24], 251). Many fishing operators “consider cost working hours are common, with extreme shifts being reported;
savings on crews from developing countries to be a legitimate and commonly fishers are only permitted short breaks of 3–4 h
lever in achieving competitive rates” ([19], 24). Such pressures can [9,27].
exacerbate conditions for labour. In Crane's [6] view “primary in- While fishers may voluntarily enter into an employment
dustries that have become uncompetitive because of low market agreement, they can subsequently find they were deceived and in
prices … might perceive the necessity of coerced labor brought as actuality are in a forced labour situation. Once employed, they can
close as possible to zero cost to survive”. Fishing companies across be threatened with a “runaway insurance” being imposed if they
the globe are increasingly relying on migrant labour from devel- leave their employment before the completion of their contract
oping countries, particularly in Asia. Thailand is no exception. [29,32]. Their ability to leave is often “precluded by the continual
According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and overriding threat of destitution” ([24], 247) or through vio-
(UNODC) (2011) forced labour is prevalent in labour-intensive lence or threats of violence which “can be considered a ‘menace of
stages of production in industries incorporated into GVCs, in- penalty’ under the definition of forced labour, because they instill
cluding fishing. In recent years there has been an emerging body fear into people to remain at work” ([23], 84). Thus deception,
of research into forced labour practices in the fishing industry (see coercion and vulnerability can occur along the labour chain from
for example: [8,17,27,29,30–32,36]). The ILO Convention No. 29 recruitment through until the exit stage [22,28,29]. Importantly
(1930) defines forced labour as “all work or service that is exacted Barrientos et al. [3] contends that it is the “unfreedom at the point
from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which of exit” that is critical to understanding the nature of forced labour
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (Article 2(1)) (see also [24]).
([16], 5). There are two key components to this definition:
(1) menace of penalty; and (2) lack of consent. The ILO recognises 2.2. Forced labour practices in the Thai fishing industry
that “many victims enter forced labour situations initially out of
their own choice, albeit through fraud and deception, only to The most widely reported cases of forced labour practices in
discover later that they are not free to withdraw their labour” the fishing industry globally have occurred in the Thai fishing in-
([16], 6). dustry. Such cases have most often been reported in the media (cf
[1,5,14]) or in studies undertaken by researchers for inter-gov-
2.1. Trajectory to forced labour ernmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) (cf [4,8,10,15,17,23,25,33]). Thailand is a major des-
Forced labour can take different forms and can occur at dif- tination country for migrant workers – both documented and
ferent stages within the labour chain: for example at the entry undocumented – of which many migrate under extremely pre-
stage, during the labour process, and/or at the exit stage [3,29]. A carious conditions that make them vulnerable to forced labour
feature of contemporary labour practices is the use of labour intermediaries ([4,18,23]). Pearson [23] found that the majority of
brokers at the recruitment stage – this can involve multiple layers migrants enter Thailand through the use of informal agents and
of networks including formal and informal or unregistered inter- are thus classed as undocumented migrants. Robertson [25], in an
mediaries accessing a cheap and ready source of labour in devel- International Organization for Migration (IOM) report, detailed the
oping countries. According to Verite ([35], 4) the use of “labor recruitment, living and working conditions of fishers in the Thai
brokers brings with it troubling issues of fragmented and opaque fisheries industry and their trajectory into forced labour. Each of
social accountability” thereby increasing the risk of workers en- these authors described forced labour practices in the Thai fishing
tering into forced labour chains. In the fishing industry, the em- industry that occur on a continuum from recruitment through to
ployment arrangement is often facilitated by brokers who supply rescue.
labour to the fishing vessels. The brokers require workers to pay a However, with few exceptions, in-depth academic research on
recruitment fee and many migrant workers enter into debt migrant fishers in Thailand is limited. A notable exception—in
 S. Chantavanich et al. / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7 3

terms of both depth of ethnographic detail and theoretical framing the portrayal of these individuals as “victims of trafficking” or
of the issue—is a paper by Annuska Derks [9] on Cambodian “victims of forced labour” misses the complexity of migrant
fishers working on Thai boats. Derks documents the experiences of worker mobility and employer relations, which are bound by dif-
Cambodian migrants working as fishers in Thailand arguing that ferent circumstances at each stage of employment on a fishing

Fig. 1. Data collection sites.

4 S. Chantavanich et al. / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7

boat. Her research illustrates the opposing tensions that lead to others and limited opportunities to complain or escape. These are
the “immobilizaton” of such migrants within a competitive sys- perhaps the most vulnerable of the workers.
tem, given both the costs and shifting mechanisms for official re-
gistration of migrant workers in Thailand and the need for an
employer to establish control over their movements so as to 4. Employment practices in Thailand's fishing industry
maintain a productive workforce. Whereas migrants may tend to
be transient in an industry characterized by harsh and dangerous In this section, the profile of the fishers is presented before a
working conditions, employers who have invested in them (e.g., discussion on recruitment strategies and working conditions on
via sponsorship for temporary work permissions in Thailand or the vessels. The section then analyses the findings in terms of
arranging for protection from police raids) may utilise control of deceptive and coercive labour practices, which can be considered
movement, withholding of pay, and confiscation of identity indicators of forced labour.
documents as means to ensure a consistent labour force with
minimal trouble from authorities. Through this lens, Derks argues 4.1. Profile of fishers
for a more nuanced interpretation of labour in the fishing industry,
framing the starting point of analysis to that of “bonded labour” The type of work performed by fishers in the Thai fishing in-
rather than making an immediate leap to “human trafficking” or dustry can be broken down into short-haul fishing, which occurs
“forced labour”. The next section discusses research methods. near the coast with typically less than one month spent at sea, and
long-haul deep sea fishing, wherein the vessels are at sea for more
than a month. Over 80% of the respondents were short-haul
3. Research methods fishers, nearly two-thirds (63.7%) of whom worked on purse seine
net boats. Nearly half of the long-haul fishers worked on single or
A questionnaire developed by researchers at the Asian Research twin-trawlers. More than half (55%) of the fishers interviewed
Center for Migration at Chulalongkorn University, in collaboration possessed no documentation, while 34% had begun the process for
with the ILO's Bangkok Office, was used to interview the fishers. regularisation which entails a nationality verification process
The research was undertaken in consultation with number of needed to apply for a work permit. The remaining migrant fishers
stakeholders including the Thai Ministry of Labour, the Depart- held a temporary travel document. Of the 55% of migrant fishers
ment of Fisheries, the National Fisheries Association of Thailand, who possessed no documents, the primary explanation was that
the Thailand Overseas Fishing Association. The questionnaire was their employers had not registered them, or would not allow them
administered to Myanmar, Thai and Cambodian fishers, in four to register as boat owners were reluctant to pay the costs of re-
coastal provinces in Thailand: Rayong, Samut Sakhon, Ranong and gistration due the high turnover of crew members. 15% of those
Songkhla (see Fig. 1). In total 596 fishers were interviewed and with no documentation, who had attempted to register with the
completed the survey. The fishers were selected using stratified, government, had been unable to do so before the registration
accidental sampling according to province and nationality to en- deadline.
sure coverage of the composition of major groups of migrant and Over half of all the fishers (51%) were between the ages of 18–
Thai fishers in the industry. Rayong is a fishing town near the 28 years old, thus reflecting the physical nature of the work being
Cambodian border where Cambodian migrant sea fishers are performed. Only 15% of the fishers were over the age of 40. Mi-
employed predominately in fisheries. Samut Sakhon, Ranong and grant workers formed a sizeable majority in all age groups. The
Songkhla provinces are host to more migrant fishers from Myan- study found 33 cases of child labour – those 17 years and younger
mar as they are situated near the Myanmar border. Workers from – according to Thai law and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention,
both short-haul (n¼ 490) and long-haul (n ¼106) fishing boats 2007 (No. 188). Seven of the fishers were younger than 15 years
were included in the sample. and the remaining 26 aged between 15 and 17 – this age category
The fishers were surveyed between March and July 2012, with represents a grey area in regards to child labour. Thailand's Min-
additional data collection through December 2012. In total, 306 istry of Labour's Ministerial Regulation No. 10 on Sea Fisheries
Myanmar, 241 Cambodian, and 49 Thai fishing crew were inter- Work (1998) stipulates that persons under 16 years of age may
viewed. Fishers were recruited from docked fishing boats and only work on fishing boats if either accompanied by or having the
around dock areas. The interviews were conducted in private (e.g., written consent of a parent or guardian. The majority of children
at nearby coffee shops or at private residences), away from the were from Myanmar.
influence of others on the vessel, and in the interviewee's native The vast majority of the fishers interviewed were deck hands
language with the help of interpreters. Further, ten in-depth in- (n ¼493, 82.7%), with the remaining 17.3% holding senior crew
terviews were undertaken with government officials from the positions. All semi-skilled or senior positions were held by Thai
Ministry of Labour, National Police, Ministry of Transport and nationals. Job mobility in the fishing sector was very high-over
other related ministries. Civil society groups who work to protect two-thirds of all fishers had worked for their current employer for
workers' rights and representatives of Sea Fisher Associations less than one year. Just over one-third of the respondents had
were also interviewed. The researchers used the qualitative re- worked in fishing for less than one year and 32% had one to five
sponses primarily to give depth and comparison to the quantita- years of experience working in the industry. Only 10.7% of fishers
tive data. had worked in the industry for more than ten years; senior crew
The study faced a key limitation. It proved difficult to access made up the majority of these fishers (57%).
fishers from the long-haul vessels due to the long periods they
spend at sea and the fact that their schedules for returning to 4.2. Recruitment of fishers
shore are uncertain. Thus more fishers from short-haul fishing
boats were interviewed. Moreover, when the long-haul boats do There are three methods through which fishers are recruited.
reach shore, officials are not necessarily notified, as these boats are First, through brokers in the migrant's country of origin or in
not always members of Thailand Overseas Fishing Association or Thailand. The brokers either charged an upfront fee or deducted a
the National Fisheries Association of Thailand. It is likely that those recruitment fee from the fisher's wages until the amount owed
fishers at sea for longer periods are more likely to be in ex- was paid in full. Fees varied from THB2000 to 20,000 (US$660–
ploitative working conditions because of limited interactions with 6660). Furthermore, brokers received a commission from the
 S. Chantavanich et al. / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7 5

Table 1 Table 3a
Recruitment practices. Conditions of pay.

Recruitment method Total (%) Thai Cambodian Myanmar Total

Broker in home village 26.4 % N % N % N % N

Friend in home community 13.1
Broker in Thailand 3.2 Share of catch 46.9 23 58.9 142 26.5 81 41.3 246
Friend in Thailand 4.6 Basic wage plus share of 49.0 24 36.9 89 57.2 175 48.3 288
Found work by himself 37.4 catch
Came with family/employer/crew 12.1 Basic wage 4.1 2 4.2 10 16.3 50 10.4 62
No response 3.2 Total 100.0 49 100.0 241 100.0 306 100.0 596
Total 100.0

as a point of comparison, between THB246–300 per day (or US

employers for recruiting workers. Second, employers recruit $246–300 per month). 43.3% of the fishers received US$167–333
through brokers and bear the cost of recruitment (as opposed to per month while only 4.9% received between US$333–667 per
the migrants) themselves. Third, migrants find work through so- month and 1% received over US$667 per month.
cial networks including friends and acquaintances who have Most wages are calculated as a proportion of the sale of the
worked in the fishing industry. catch (41.3%), or else as basic wage plus a proportion of the catch
Our findings show that brokers and social networks play a (38.9%). A small proportion of fishers received only the basic wage
central role in the recruitment of fishers. While 37% of fishers (10.4%). Employers use a “share of catch” to motivate the workers
found employment by themselves, nearly 30% were recruited while at sea, as well as to provide a modest salary to retain
through brokers (see Table 1). The majority of fishers who used workers. By nationality, more Myanmar and Thai workers were
broker services (72.5%) paid their brokers up front, with only 24% paid by a combination of salary and a share of catch (57.2% and
having the recruitment fees deducted from their monthly wages. 49% respectively), whereas Cambodian migrants were more likely
For one fisher his wages were fully withheld until the broker's to be paid by share of catch alone (58.9%) (see Table 3a). The dif-
debt was paid. For 69 of those fishers who paid the brokers fee up ference in the systems of payment between Cambodian and
front, making this up front payment was only possible through Myanmar fishers is because many Myanmar fishers, in contrast to
securing a loan. The majority obtained loans from their employer Cambodian fishers, were aware of wage exploitation and refused
(40.6%) and a smaller number turned to family (24.6%) and brokers the catch share option.
(15.9%). Such arrangements with employers and brokers may be Thailand Ministerial Regulation on the Protection of Sea Fishers
indicative of debt bondage situations, depending on the terms of (2014) states that wages should be paid on an at-least monthly
repayment. basis, unless it is in the interest of the fisher to do otherwise.
Approximately two-thirds of respondents (63.4%) received pay-
4.3. Working Conditions ment monthly, while 12.9% received quarterly payments, and for
12.2% payment was received at the end of the voyage (see
The findings showed that fishers usually worked long hours on Table 3b). More of the long-haul fishers surveyed received
both long-haul and short-haul boats (see Table 2); thus corrobor- monthly payments – their employers transferred payment to the
ating Derks' [9] earlier study. A quarter of fishers reported working fisher's or family member's bank account as a means of support for
17–24 h per day and almost half of the fishers (41.1%) had in- the family. Thai workers were far more likely to receive payment
definite working hours. According to local law and the ILO Con- on a monthly basis (81.6%) than the migrants surveyed (61.8%).
vention No. 188, workers on board vessels fishing for more than There was very little difference in the regularity of pay among
three days should receive a minimum of 10 h rest in any 24-h senior crew members and labourers.
period, and 77 h in any seven-day period. The Convention allows The practice of wage withholding reflects Derks' [9] findings
for some flexibility in cases where fishing operations must con- that employers are concerned with worker retention, and fear that
tinue, but time worked must be compensated. Over one-third of if they pay short-haul fishers monthly the crew will leave after
fishers (36.6%) were typically allowed less than five hours of rest in being paid. Nearly 15% of the short-haul fishers in the study were
each 24-h period. At the other end of the scale, 37.1% reported paid quarterly. These were crew from vessels fishing in Thai ter-
resting for indeterminate periods of time each day. ritorial waters, which were out at sea for weeks at a time. By of-
Sea fishing is not included under Thailand's Labour Protection fering payment every two, three, or six months, the captains
Law due to the unique characteristics of the industry. The mean sought to retain crew members for multiple voyages. Captains also
wage of fishers in the study was US$216 per month. Nearly half of would withhold a percentage of wages for up to one or two years.
the fishers (47.7%) received a monthly salary of less than US$167, If the fisher left the vessel early, the balance of payment was
which in turn is less than half the average monthly salary for Thai withheld (interview with NGO, Rayong). These findings were
nationals of US$417 (in 2010) (National Statistical Office, 2012).
corroborated by representatives of local agencies, who said the
While the Thai minimum wage does not apply to fishing, the
minimum wage in the four provinces during the study period was, Table 3b
Frequency of wage payments.
Table 2
Working hours. Total %

Amount Long-haul (%) Short-haul (%) Total (%) Monthly 63.4

Every two months 2.3
o5 h 10.8 4.7 9.7 Every three months 12.9
5–8 h 8.2 5.7 7.7 Every six months 3.7
9–16 h 15.7 15.1 15.6 Every 2 days receive THB100 (primarily short haul) 3.5
17–24 h 25.3 28.3 25.8 Paid before going to sea 1.8
Irregular 40.0 46.2 41.1 The end of each voyage 12.2
6 S. Chantavanich et al. / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7

problem they hear most often from employers concerned with situation. All the Thai fishers were working willingly in the fishing
workers reneging on work agreements after having received an sector (n ¼49) whereas migrant fishers from Cambodia (9%
advance. This is considered a considerable hardship for larger (n ¼22)) and Myanmar 26% (n ¼79) were working against their
vessels crewed by 40 to 50 workers. Some fishers would disappear will.
after receiving their advance while others jumped ship when the A key reason why fishers could not leave their employment was
vessel was docked in port. When this occurs, the vessel may not be due to financial penalties (n ¼72); which included not being re-
able to head back out to sea due to insufficient crew on board munerated fully for work they had performed. While the catch
(interview with Marine Police of Samut Sakhon; interview with share system is widely practiced in the fishing industry and hence
Fisheries Association, Songkhla). for many fishers, there are delays in receiving wages, it is the in-
tentional withholding of workers' pay in order to constrain their
mobility that is considered indicative of forced labour. For 12% of
4.4. Forced Labour Practices
respondents, the financial penalty was too great and hence a
constraint on their freedom. The second key reason was fear of
In order to analyse forced labour practices, the 11 indicators
physical violence (n ¼ 18). A 14-year-old, deceived by a broker in
developed by the ILO's Special Action Programme to Combat
his home village, tried to escape because he was homesick, how-
Forced Labour (SAP-FL) were used. The indicators are: (1) abuse of
ever, he could not leave because of the threat of physical violence.
vulnerability; (2) deception; (3) restriction of movement; (4) iso-
Other penalties included threats of denunciation to the authorities
lation; (5) physical and sexual violence; (6) intimidation and
(n ¼5), threats against family members (n ¼1), withholding of
threats; (7) retention of identity documents; (8) withholding of
assets (n¼ 3), withholding of documents (n ¼1), and other forms of
wages; (9) debt bondage; (10) abusive working and living condi-
punishment (n ¼1). Twenty-four respondents (Thai 3; Cambodian
tions; and (11) excessive overtime. The set of indicators was de-
3; Myanmar ¼18) had previously been sold or transported without
signed to cover all possible aspects of forced labour. The presence
their permission to another vessel. This was predominately oc-
of a single indicator may imply that an individual is in a forced
curring in the long-haul sector where victims stay at sea
labour situation however, in most cases it is the combination of
indefinitely.
several indicators together that indicate forced labour (ILO SAP-FL,
The ILO describes abuse of vulnerability as “a means of coercion
2005). The questionnaire used in this study covered 8 of these 11 where an employer deliberately and knowingly exploits the vul-
indicators (see Table 4). Additionally, the ILO considers a subset of nerability of a worker to force him or her to work” (ILO SAP-FL,
forced labour indicators to be reflective of human trafficking for 2005). This can include threats of denunciation to the authorities.
forced labour. These indicators are marked with an asterisk in While the study did not measure abuse of vulnerability directly,
Table 4. the results show that the majority of migrants (55.3%) did not have
Some of the questions asked pertaining to forced labour in- identity documents and 16.8% had employers who did not allow or
cluded: (1) Are you working in the fishing sector against your support the worker's registering for identity documents, thus
will?; (2) If not willingly, why are you working in the fishing placing them in a vulnerable situation; the latter being an in-
sector?; and (3) What types of obstacles or threats made you dicator of human trafficking.
unable to leave your employer? The findings show that 101 fishers Various forms of abuse, including physical abuse, intimidation,
(16.9%) identified as being victims of human trafficking – they and the lack of adequate food and drinking water were identified.
were working against their will and could not leave their employer Myanmar fishers were more likely to have been severely beaten
because of the menace of penalty. Of these 101 fishers, 78% had (16.3%) than Thai (8.2%) and Cambodian fishers (6.2%). Myanmar
entered into the fishing sector by choice, while the remainder fishers are less fluent in speaking Thai; this could be a cause of
were deceived or coerced either by a broker in their home village poor communication and inability to follow orders leading to
or in Thailand. More long-haul fishers (25%) in comparison to abuse. Further, more Myanmar than Cambodian fishers work in
short-haul fishers (15%) reported being in a forced labour the long-haul sector where exploitative situations are more likely
to occur.
Table 4 Samboon (not his real name) was a victim of forced labour – he
Forced labour findings. was subjected to deceptive recruitment practices, exploitative
Indicators Total (%)
working conditions, and the inability to freely exit. Working at a
petrol station in Bangkok, Samboon was approached by a stranger
1. Abuse of vulnerability: about working as a fisher. He was promised good wages and was
 No identity documents 55.3 told he would return to shore every 15 days. Samboon first worked
 Employer did not allow/support registering for identity 16.8*
on a boat transferring supplies to deep-sea vessels and returning
documents
2. Deception: with catch. Shortly afterwards he was transferred to a deep-sea
 Deceived about the nature of work 4.9 fishing boat where he was required to work for two years before
3 Physical abuse: being allowed to return to shore. On board he was assaulted by the
 Physical violence/threats of violence (beaten on board) 3.8* captain and beaten with the tail of a stingray. Samboon worked on
4. Intimidation and threats:
 Financial penalty for leaving 12.1*
the boat for approximately two months before being transferred
5 Withholding of wage: by the captain to another vessel and subsequently to a third vessel.
 Wage payment at the end of each voyage 12.2* He was physically abused and threatened on all three boats. He
 Wage deduction for debt incurred from wage advances 15.4* escaped when the vessel was docked in Malaysia and was subse-
6. Debt bondage:
quently repatriated by the Thai Embassy to Thailand.
 Must work to pay debts 2.5
 Sold or transferred against worker's will 4.0
7. Abusive working and living conditions:
 No adequate food and drinking water 11.0 5. Discussion and conclusion
 Had serious accident and were injured while working on board 20.6
8. Excessive overtime:
The survey results give important insight into the existence of
 Long working hours (17–24 h and undefined) 66.9
deceptive and coercive recruitment practices, exploitative working
Note: *ILO indicators of trafficking for forced labour. conditions, and forced and child labour in the fishing industry. For
 S. Chantavanich et al. / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 1–7 7

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