Visas For Al Qaeda - CIA Handout - J. Springmann
Visas For Al Qaeda - CIA Handout - J. Springmann
J. Michael Springmann
AN INSIDER’S VIEW
© 2014
J. Michael Springmann
ISBN: 0990926206
ISBN 13: 9780990926207
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014919827
Daena Publications LLC, Washington DC
Author’s Note
Dedication
What Is This About?
Why Did I Write This Book?
III. Introduction
• Europe
• At Home
• The Third World and Present-Day Troubles
VIII. Iraq
• Who’s the Terrorist Now?
• But What Drove This Train Wreck?
• Distressing Details about the Legion
• Plausible (?) Deniability
• SOME Iraqis Do Talk
• Summary
IX. Libya
• This Didn’t Always Work So Well
• Lacking in CNN’s Report Was Any Sort of Background to the
Situation
• Here They Come Again (With More Help)
• Cui Bono?
• It’s All about Control
• Impenetrable Transparency
• Summary
X. Syria
• Train Those Terrorists!
• And They Might Come Home!
• Garbage about Garbage Trucks, Nonlethal Bombs, and
“Intelligence” Services
• The Ottoman Empire Strikes Back
• Balkan Links
• Extra Help
• Plans for the New Syrian Disorder
• A Lose-Lose Situation
• A Myriad of Myrmidons
• Summary
Bibliography
“It is error alone which needs the support of government. Truth can
stand by itself.”
H
aving just joined the “real” Foreign Service (after stints in the State-
Commerce Exchange Program and the Foreign Commercial
Service), I was assigned to Jeddah, the “Grandmother of Cities.”
(Eve, the grandmother of us all, is reputedly buried in it.) There, I
learned that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was a mysterious and
exotic place, but it was nowhere near as exotic and mysterious as
the American consulate general on Palestine Road.
Upon arrival, I found, as a new visa officer, I was expected to
winnow more than one hundred applications a day, separating them
into “issuances,” “refusals,” and what turned out to be “free passes
for CIA agents.” However, none of the clean-cut young fellows at the
consulate (or even any of the pudgy, “been around too many blocks”
types) bothered to clue me in on this special class of applicants.
However.
One day, Eric Qualkenbush, the CIA Base Chief, stopped me
while I was walking on the consulate’s huge compound (which
included a nine-hole golf course). He had a request. Could I issue a
visa to one of his agents, an Iranian whose family owned an Oriental
rug store? Eric said, “Mike, make it look good (wink, wink). We want
him in Washington for consultations.”
Flabbergasted, I said, “Sure.” Up to that point, I had had almost
a daily battle with Jay Freres, the Consul General, along with other
CIA officials, who demanded visas for peculiar people, that is, people
whom law and regulation required me to refuse. I also had running
fights with visa applicants who told me to approve their paperwork or
they would complain to Freres and have him overrule me.
Why, I wondered, did Qualkenbush clearly explain what was
coming? And why didn’t he tip me the wink about the others, instead
of leaving me to fight continued violations of rule and directive all by
myself?
I was even more flummoxed when Eric’s agent appeared in line
before me while I was on my stool behind the visa section’s armored
window. Secure in my industrial-strength cinderblock office, I went
through the interview: Memo on company letterhead explaining trip
and customers to be visited? Check. Properly filled out visa
application form DS-156? Check. Clean passport with no hidden
notations of previous travel refusals? Check. Coherent,
comprehensive, clear account of travel purpose? Check. Previous
US visa stamps? Check. Appropriate responses to my questions
about proposed journey? Check.
I issued the visa and wished I had more applicants like him.
And yet…
I had heard in Washington about all sorts of abnormal problems
tied to visas in Jeddah. None of it made sense at the time, but the
office atmosphere after my arrival was increasingly poisonous as I
invoked the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Foreign Affairs
Manual in preventing scruffy types from apparently trying to emigrate
to the United States. Despite my questioning people in the office, I
began to suspect that something wasn’t quite right. I knew it wasn’t
right when the State Department later fired me without explanation
and then stonewalled my efforts to learn why.
The following story is what I learned about what was really
happening in Jeddah, how I got there, and the dreadful
consequences of what I learned to be American policy.
Prelude
Ghost Busters
While the Foreign Service is filled with people who do not work
for the Department of State, Jeddah was my first experience with a
majority-spook post. (Intelligence officers, in State Department slang,
are spooks because they’re invisible beings from another world.)
According to both a former CIA station chief (head of undercover
operations in a country) who asked not to be named, and Jay
Hawley, now a retired FSO, the average percentage of intelligence
officers to real diplomats at a given Foreign Service post is about
one in three. My experience in Jeddah, Stuttgart, and New Delhi
might place it higher—at least 50 percent, if not more. According to
the Anti-CIA Club of Diplomats: Spooks in U.S. Foreign Service [sic],
a twelve-page, 1983 Canadian publication (see namebase.org), the
percentage is 60 percent. At Jeddah, to the best of my knowledge,
out of some twenty US citizens assigned to the consulate, only three
people, including myself, worked for the Department of State. The
rest were CIA or NSA officials or their spouses. (NSA creates and
breaks ciphers, listens to telephone calls, and reads e-mails. This
allegedly makes US government communications more secure and
those of American citizens and other nations less so. One of the
languages it teaches its analysts is “Special Arabic”—that is,
Hebrew, helping conceal Israel as being a target of NSA activity.)
Things rapidly went from bad to worse.
My name was on the visa plate that stamped applications to
enter the United States, making me personally responsible for my
actions. After opposing questionable demands for visas, I began to
inquire about what was really going on. First, I asked Jean Bradford,
the head of the Citizens’ Services branch of the consular section.
She told me that “Jay Freres (the source for most of the illegal visa
pressure) just likes giving candy to babies.” I then tried Justice (given
name) Stevens, head of the consular section. He told me to keep
quiet and do what Freres wanted. I later discussed the matter with
Stephanie A. Smith (a former French citizen) who was Counselor for
Consular Affairs in Riyadh, the capital. Another one of those listed as
a CIA official in Anti-CIA Club of Diplomats. Spooks in US Foreign
Service, she told me that Freres’ and others’ demands for illegal
visas were “very bad.” She later advised me to raise the issue with
the Bureau of Consular Affairs on my next trip to Washington
Eric Qualkenbush5, the CIA base chief at Jeddah, whose cover
was head of the Political/Economic Section, came up with a new
demand: he or his staff had to examine and approve all visas that my
staff and I had issued before the stamped passports were returned
to the applicants. I had to wonder if this practice originated from his
experience as a Clandestine Service officer at the CIA station in New
Delhi or as station chief in Sofia, Bulgaria, prior to Jeddah, where
one European diplomat told me he served? (Eric’s assignment after
Jeddah was Bonn.) According to retired consular officers, this
requirement was highly unusual. Another, who asked that I withhold
his name, informed me that the CIA often trolled visa application files
or sought specific information about visa-seekers.)
I myself became suspicious of Qualkenbush’s nerve: amazingly,
he once made an unnecessary point of having me issue a visa to
one of his Iranian contacts, an Oriental rug merchant in Jeddah. Eric
stopped me one day on the compound and told me he was sending
me one of his agents (foreign nationals recruited and controlled by
CIA case officers), asking me to make the visa interview “look good,”
because the CIA wanted the Iranian in Washington for consultations.
Afterward, I thought, why was Eric doing making this request? The
Iranian had a legitimate business, was going to the United States to
meet real carpet buyers, and had been issued several visas before.
Exorcists Needed
A Questionable Question
Jay Freres did more than help questionable people get visas. He
helped the Saudi government put expatriates in jail. This seemed to
be in keeping with his questionable past, such as his assignment to
Kabul in 1979 when the American Ambassador, “Spike” Dubs, was
kidnapped and killed. As the Afghan security forces blazed away at
the people holding Dubs within Room 117 in the Kabul Hotel,
somehow Freres, head of the Economic/Commercial Section, was
situated outside the space. Dean Henderson, a writer, columnist, and
blogger, asserts that Dubs was also CIA chief of station, unlikely in
knowledgeable people’s opinions. However, a European diplomat
opined that Dubs, and likely Freres, were State Department officials
co-opted by the Agency. Freres later became Political Counselor in
Ankara in 1982. (Other than his service as consul general in Jeddah,
these were his only assignments that I could find in the State
Department’s Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts booklet.)7
Not long after I arrived and began making contacts around town,
consular officers from two European consulates took me to lunch.
Over good food and “Saudi champagne” (sparkling water, apple
juice, and citrus slices), they asked my help in identifying and
publicizing the actions of a fellow of indeterminate nationality having
multiple passports. They said this man possessed an arrangement
with the Saudi government to import and sell liquor and drugs.
According to my interlocutors, he would hold parties in alcohol-free
Jeddah, generously supplying intoxicants, liquid and otherwise. As I
understood it, he would then provide the names of his guests to the
Saudi authorities who, on occasion, would raid the events, arresting
as many attendees as they could catch. In return, he got to keep his
profits (and stay out of jail). Subsequently, at one of the consulate’s
“pool parties,” I happened to meet a man, an American citizen, who
had been to one of the raided functions. Appearing to be in his fifties
and far out of shape, he told me he ran out the back door as the
police came in the front. Despite his age and physical condition, he
said, he was up and over the wall at the rear of the house faster than
a teenage athlete.
Learning about this scam, I felt I should post details of this
mysterious dealer to warn American citizens in our consular district,
the Hejaz. A simple notice, mailed to those registered with the
consulate, would be the easiest way to protect our citizens. When I
suggested this to Freres, as head of the consulate, he refused. He
said it would offend the Saudis, and he ordered me to keep silent.
While I didn’t work in Citizens Services at the consulate, which
deals with the welfare of US nationals and handles any
imprisonments, I still thought it only prudent (and my duty) to quietly
pass the word to people I knew about this subject, Freres be
damned.
Alcohol was a big deal in Saudi Arabia where, if you drank and
were caught, you were (1) arrested, (2) flogged, (3) deported. Yet,
despite our efforts to “conceal” alcohol use at the consulate (by
crushing bottles and beer cans, for example), the Saudis knew all
about what the Americans were doing. Saudi citizens and
government officials attended receptions at my house where I served
forbidden drinks. They also attended pool parties and functions at
the Marine House8 where alcohol was provided. Saudi citizens and
government officials attended events at the Brass Eagle, several
rooms that served as the consulate’s private bar. And, if they didn’t
spill the beans about alcohol consumption, a movable Saudi “traffic”
camera overlooked the compound with its parties, and provided a
bird’s-eye view of what went on there, including drinking and mixed-
sex dancing.
Shortly after Lonnie Washington, the only State Department
Communicator (who sent and received official messages) and I
arrived, we learned about the Brass Eagle. Begun by former
consular officer Brad Braford’s wife, it was a remarkably dreary and
sparsely attended place used mostly by CIA officials. We two, with
our household effects still in transit, decided to invite official and
unofficial contacts to this bar. Selling tickets for the local equivalent
of ten dollars for five drinks, we filled the Brass Eagle to overflowing
in no time and made a pretty good profit for the American Employees
Family Support Association (AEFSA) (which may have been a CIA
front). The Agency really didn’t like that we brought non-Americans
to the consulate. So, in retaliation, they put roadblocks into the
otherwise smooth operation of our parties.
Later, after the CIA grasped what a good idea it was to ply
expatriates with alcohol, it began organizing parties around the
consulate swimming pool. The parties, with two hundred or more
guests, generated about one million dollars per annum for said
AEFSA, an alleged nonprofit organization.9
The Marine House was another watering hole. Invitations were
highly prized, and guests tried to compensate for a booze-free week
by drinking as much as they could in a few hours. Many departing
guests staggered out onto Palestine Road, fronting the consulate, in
various stages of drunkenness. (I had arrived in Jeddah too late to
enjoy the Marine House’s “Tarts and Vicars” party, where the female
guests displayed abundant intoxicated skin as they left the grounds
—a blatant violation of Saudi mores.) Sometime later in my tour, a
Marine Corps inspection team arrived to question such consumption
of alcohol and earnings from its sale.
Jay Freres and his “Don’t Offend the Saudis” program had as
many holes as a piece of Swiss cheese hit by a shotgun blast.
Again, in Saudi Arabia, Islam is the only religion permitted. People of
other faiths get their prayer books, hymnals, and other religious
articles seized at the border, and if they act blatantly enough, can get
themselves deported. Yet Freres, a Roman Catholic, had an
undercover priest10 say Mass at his official residence on Sundays for
coreligionists from inside and outside the consulate. Protestant
expatriates were allowed to hold services in the auditorium in the
consulate’s main building, something FSOs, such as myself, were
ignorant of. After Freres retired, Tim Hunter, a devout Catholic, told
me that he (Hunter) had been ordered to discourage attendance at
the Holy Church of the Consulate. When he objected, he was
savaged by US government officials.
Keep That Lid On (So the Whole Mess Doesn’t Boil Over and
Dirty the Stove)
Very stupid.
If I had been informed of what the CIA, the State Department,
and Osama bin Laden were doing in Jeddah, I may have been dumb
enough at the time to have gone along with this policy. After all, I
trusted my government. The CIA and the State Department would
have saved themselves negative publicity, law suits, and twenty
years of painful truth-telling from me.
Another example of gross incompetence at Jeddah was the
inability of the CIA and NSA to learn about a real security issue: the
delivery of Chinese Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to
Saudi Arabia. A major story in 1988, US spooks had no idea the
things were actually being delivered. Until I told them.
After several of my European contacts came to my house for
drinks before dinner out, I learned the IRBMs were being off-loaded
from ships in the harbor. I was told that one of my sources had
actually seen not only the missiles but also the Saudi attempts to
conceal the missiles from prying eyes by blocking sight lines with
shipping containers. The next morning, I surprised the Air Attaché
with the story. He immediately worked to secure reconnaissance
photos of the missiles. I managed to irritate Karen Sasahara and the
CIA Base, along with the consul general’s secretary, Jill Johnston, by
demanding a classified cable be sent out to Washington immediately.
(Married to the NSA chief, Johnston had told me she used to work
for the CIA and was disgruntled at having to come to work on her
day off.) I learned from a contact in the US embassy in Riyadh that
my message had been included in the American president’s daily
intelligence briefing.
Aside from my scoop on the IRBMs, I did a goodly amount of
reporting on political and economic issues, to the extent that Joe
O’Neill, then one of the Inspectors, told me I had generated more
analytical cables than the political officer or the Political/Economic
Section. I had written about Saudi businesswomen (unheard of thirty
years ago), my travels throughout our consular district, and the
reasons why people came to America. I also visited American
citizens imprisoned in Saudi jails and identified dead bodies (harder
than it sounds when the passport picture is out of date and the
corpse was three days dead before it was discovered).
I managed this despite wrangling daily with the intelligence
officers who staffed and ran the consulate. These were the people
who arranged for recruiting and training what were then the
mujahideen, who later became al-Qaeda, who then transformed
themselves into ISIS. I saw, but didn’t recognize, their start at
Jeddah. We’ve all seen their later development and what happens
when the intelligence services control foreign policy and diplomacy:
the people they assembled aided the breakup of Yugoslavia, the
destruction of Iraq, the collapse of Libya, and the savaging of Syria.
In high school, after having read William J. Lederer and Eugene
Burdick’s book, The Ugly American, a damning account of American
arrogance, incompetence, and corruption overseas, I became very
interested in international affairs. This motivated me to attend
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. In the 1960s,
this was the only such undergraduate program in the country. Like
most of my fellow graduates, I would enter the Department of State.
Coming from a working-class family, and despite having read
Lederer and Burdick’s book, I was really ignorant of the true nature
of the Foreign Service and its respected members. I would later
learn that most are an inbred, hidebound group of pseudo–upper
class cookie-pushers more concerned with advancing their own
careers than in formulating and carrying out an ideology-free,
intelligent American foreign policy.
My 1967 oral interview for a post in the Foreign Service was
conducted by three Foreign Service officers (FSOs), one of whom
was Ellsworth Bunker (one-time ambassador to South Vietnam and
a war hawk). While I had no problems with the history and
geography questions, my answers to queries such as “Do you play
bridge?” (No) or “Do you subscribe to the New Yorker?” (No) did not
sit well with the three examiners: I was not of the elite. It got worse
when, asked for an example of an American foreign policy problem, I
replied “Vietnam.” I added that I found it strange to learn that the US
government was keeping information about its bombing attacks on
Southeast Asia from the American people while the Thai,
Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese, who were being bombed,
all knew what was going on. My interview went downhill from there. I
thought I had walked into the 1955 Gary Cooper movie, The Court-
Martial of Billy Mitchell, centered on the grilling of a nonconformist.
My impression after that was, if I spoke my name, it would surely be
challenged. Clearly, they didn’t like me from the beginning and were
looking for any excuse to get rid of me. How dare I question the
basis for our disastrous war? Were I Jesus Christ on rollerskates, I
would still have failed.
So I went to graduate school at Catholic University, again in
international affairs, and joined the Commerce Department’s
International Trade Administration. In 1969, I again sat for the
Foreign Service exam, once more passing the written but failing the
oral, now set up to supposedly resemble a real day at the office.
After another failure, I retook the test in 1984, emphasizing how
much I wanted to work for the State Department and noting my work
abroad in the Department of State–Department of Commerce
Exchange Program, a way to provide Washington assignments for
FSOs and overseas assignments for civil servants. This time, I
passed.
Or, so I thought.
The medical office of the State Department decided that my
admittedly lousy feet should disqualify me from of the Foreign
Service. When I sued for discrimination, the Department fought back
for two years, even though the law requires an employer to provide
“reasonable accommodation” to an employee or job applicant with a
disability. Although I needed no special accommodation for my feet,
the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in Medical Services, Paul A.
Goff, MD, wrote that I shouldn’t be hired because I couldn’t run away
from terrorists’ bullets.
It ought to have been apparent to me right then that the State
Department simply ignores laws it feels are inconvenient. I learned
more about this later on when I was ordered to issue visas to
terrorists.
A-100—Basic Training for FSOs
Stuttgart
Ha!
After striking out with GAO and the House Committee, I called
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its parent, the Justice
Department. No one wanted to talk with me. After the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, fifteen of whom, according to the Los Angeles
Times, got their visas at Jeddah, I again called the FBI (at Joe
Trento’s suggestion).39 After being passed from office to office, I was
told to ring up their Washington Field Office. I did and was told
“someone would get back to me.” I’m still waiting. It’s probably just
as well, otherwise I would be at Guantanamo Bay or in a secret
concentration camp somewhere else in the world. The Associated
Press wasn’t interested. I called Craig Whitlock at the Washington
Post and was ignored. I met with a journalist at the Los Angeles
Times’ Washington bureau, providing him with copies of all the
information I had, including the denizens of the Jeddah CIA Base.
Nothing came of that other than a lunch on their dime.
Over more than twenty years, I’ve written to the Chairmen of the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees (John D. Rockefeller and
Jane Harmon), the Democratic Leader of the House of
Representatives (Nancy Pelosi), the Chairman of the House
Government Operations Committee, and so on. I never received a
response from any of them.
What Does This All Mean?
Transition
Having gotten this far, Esteemed Reader, you now have the
background to understand the sordid history of US foreign policy.
You’ve read the thumbnail sketches of State Department and
intelligence service personnel. I hope you can see that there are
failures to formulate a realistic, rational, ideology-free foreign policy
based on tact and common sense, as well as universal human
rights.
The visas issued in Jeddah for the mujahideen and, ultimately,
al-Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL, were not a one-off program. My experience
was only part of the picture. I was in at the beginning of a sordid,
grim, and very dangerous shift in American foreign policy. Prior to
the Afghan war against the Soviets, the United States destabilized or
overthrew governments on an ad hoc basis. With the creation of the
“muj,” who morphed into “al-Qaeda,” who then became “ISIS/ISIL,”
the American government developed a cadre of radicals. The
government also did its best to get rid of anyone, like me, who came
close to examining what was really happening.
Please bear this situation in mind throughout the following
sections dealing with American involvement in other countries’
internal affairs since 1945, which led to the Arab-Afghan Legion and
its use in destabilizing governments and countries on Uncle Sam’s
“enemies list.” My experience was not unique, but it helped lead to
what the government was and is really doing.
T
he US government has a long history of destabilizing or planning to
destabilize countries and their rulers, not just in the Third World but
in Europe and at home in the US. Here are but a few, truncated
examples, providing a small taste of what was to come later.
Europe
In Italy, roughly one hundred people were blown up, first in Milan
(in 1969) and then, Bologna (1980), ostensibly by anarchists but, in
reality, by Italian military intelligence—at the behest of American
covert organizations. General Vito Miceli, chief of Italian military
intelligence, attested “that the [institution that did the bombings]…
was formed under a secret agreement with the United States and
within the framework of NATO.” Paolo Taviani, onetime Italian
defense minister, stated “that during his time in office [1955–1958]
the Italian secret services were bossed and financed by ‘the boys in
Via Veneto’—that is, the CIA agents [sic] in the US Embassy in the
heart of Rome.” Years later, Italian secret service General Gianadelio
Maletti said “that the CIA gave its tacit approval to a series of
bombings in Italy in the 1970s to sow instability and keep
communists from taking power…The CIA wanted, through the birth
of an extreme nationalism and the contribution of the far right—to
stop [Italy] sliding to the left.’”52
Italy was part of NATO, an “ally.”
At Home
…it would not have been the first time that the
American people were subject to the hard sell of a
threat to national security only to discover that the
threat was overblown or nonexistent. The Soviet
military threat to the U.S. after World War II is now
widely known to have been a fabrication that was
hyped for political and financial gains.59
Can anyone believe the lies that the US government and those
of its “allies” put out about being attacked by “terrorists”? The United
States and the United Kingdom created the problem they use to
justify repression at home and endless war abroad.
Although there is no clear date when the United States decided
to employ these fighters all around the world, it is most likely that the
decision to do so was taken during the Afghan war against the
Soviets. However, as Peter Dale Scott says (and history shows),
Jihadi Muslims connected to al-Qaeda continued to be used for
Western causes throughout the 1990s. In Azerbaijan in 1993, former
KGB strongman Heydar Aliyev seized control of the country with
Agency help. His backing came from hundreds of jihadis recruited by
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and shipped to Azerbaijan. To aid Aliyev as
quickly as possible, they flew on an airline set up by CIA veteran Ed
Dearborn. Funds for this allegedly came in part from Western oil
companies who paid to collect the jihadis. In 2003, the US State
Department designated Hekmatyar, a Pushtun rebel commander, as
a “terrorist”.
Jihadis also took part in two Balkan campaigns in the 1990s, on
the same side as the United States and NATO. Scott adds, “In
Bosnia, in the mid-1990s, NATO and al-Qaeda were on the same
side…”125
The efforts to destabilize and destroy the Soviet Union were
practiced and perfected in the Balkans and Iraq. Additionally, the
propaganda used to cover US actions was fine-tuned during those
conflicts.
First, the USSR was a nation of many different ethnicities,
religions, and tensions. The CIA managed to exploit them, causing
upheavals in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, etc.
Langley used its influence with the American news media and
politicians in the United States to depict the crises the CIA had
created as homegrown, the result of problems inherent in a
totalitarian state. As Peter Bergen explains in his book Holy War,
Inc.:
Scott adds:
Saddle Tramps
Summary
S
cott notes that America, following the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, ended up with a “disposal problem.” What happens to
“the well-trained militants if their long-established channels of
support were suddenly broken off”? To avoid justified anger and
redirect their attention elsewhere, “an easy solution was to divert its
Arab-Afghans to Bosnia.” A writer for the Independent (a British
newspaper), Andrew Marshall, penned, “In December 1992, a US
Army official met one of the Afghan veterans from Al-Khifah [in
Brooklyn] and offered help with a covert operation to support the
Muslims in Bosnia, funded with Saudi money, according to one of
those jailed for assisting with the New York bombings.”134
Stone adds that “many of the US-backed jihadis who had fought
against the Soviets in Afghanistan joined the Islamist cause in
Chechnya, Bosnia, Algeria, Iraq, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Kashmir, and elsewhere.”135 What is also known is that they were
likely initially used in Bosnia, in the first “war of humanitarian
aggression.” That self-contradictory phrase aptly described the idea
of President William J. Clinton (D-AK) to justify attacking Serbia. He
grounded this on questionable claims of genocide and “ethnic
cleansing” (something Israel has been engaged in for decades).
Breaking Up Is Easier to Do
Saudi Arabia did more for the destruction of Bosnia than its
close “ally” the United States of America has let on. According to
Schindler, the CIA believed that one-third of Islamic charities
engaged in Bosnia, especially the IIRO, had “facilitated the activities
of Islamic groups that engage in terrorism.” Moreover, the Saudi
High Commission for Relief for Bosnia, set up in 1993, had
distributed about $500 million in aid. Where it went is unknown, but
after the September 11, 2001, attacks, raids on its Sarajevo office
turned up before and after pictures of the World Trade Center and
information on how to counterfeit US State Department identification
badges. Seized records also disclosed minutes of meetings with
Osama bin Laden.167 (N.B. When I was in Jeddah, 1987–1989,
Saudi charities and aid to Muslims abroad were part of the US
mission’s reporting plan; that is, the American government wanted to
learn as much as possible about them. Now we know why.)
As Schindler notes, Mustafa Kamel Suleiman, a veteran of both
Afghanistan and Bosnia, received orders from an unspecified source
and went from Afghanistan, where he had been living, to Bosnia with
a group of recruits. First, he traveled to Saudi Arabia, progressing
from there to Croatia and then to Bosnia with his mujahideen. A
Bosnian military group met them at the Zagreb airport, getting them
accredited as “Islamic relief workers” by the Croatian foreign
ministry. Other of the “muj” masqueraded as UN staff and
journalists.168 Furthermore, it’s Schindler’s claim that Osama bin
Laden, in Bosnia, transformed the original al-Qaeda from
Afghanistan into the “flexible, well-funded multinational jihadi
organization it became.”169
Did he do so with or without American and Saudi and other
help? The Third World Relief Agency, which was set up “to spread
radical Islam,”170 funded the war in the Balkans. Between 1992 and
1995, it passed on $2.5 billion in Islamic aid to the Party of
Democratic Action, a Muslim political party in Bosnia.171 Schindler
does not specify the sources of the aid other than to note it came
from “governments who wished to mask their support for
radicalism.”172 Nor does he say exactly where it went. However,
Pakistan’s ISI, long a supporter and pass-through for the covert cold
war against the Soviets, provided antitank missiles to the Bosnian
Muslims. Additionally, help came from UN forces in Bosnia, such as
Turkey, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. They sold large quantities of
ammunition to Bosnian Muslim fighters.173 The “muj” ran a training
camp outside Milan, Italy, which provided refresher instruction when
necessary. Some of those trained were traveling with Italian
passports.174 On November 20, 2005, the waynemadsenreport.com
noted that additional monies for the Albanian and Bosnian guerrillas
in the Balkan war came from an entity titled “The Bosnian Defense
Fund,” a body created with a special account in the “Bush-influenced
Riggs Bank and directed by Richard Perle and Douglas Feith.”
Richard Perle had been Assistant Secretary for Defense, 1981–
1987; Feith had been Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 2001–
2005. The Fund collected monies, according to a later Wayne
Madsen report, from various Arab and Muslim countries (such as the
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar). Amounting to
hundreds of millions of dollars, the cash was managed by Feith’s law
firm, Feith and Zell, the Riggs Bank, and the Central Bank of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in Sarajevo.175
Riggs, like BCCI, was a remarkably dirty bank, with questionable
clients ranging from African and Latin American despots such as
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Saudi Arabian diplomats
(Prince Bandar bin Sultan). One major customer was the CIA, with
an unknown number of bank accounts. Fined $25 million for banking
violations and investigated by the US Justice Department, Riggs
went out of business, with PNC Bank buying the remnants in 2005.
Prosecution appeared to evaporate when the bank’s ties to
American government officials, hush-hush agencies, and US covert
operations began to surface. For example, Bandar and his wife
denied money laundering or financing 9/11 hijackers but he “fund[ed]
the Contras at the behest of the White House, support[ed] the
Afghan rebels against the Soviet Union, and serv[ed] as a go-
between in the mending of the Libya-US relationship.”176
Madsen further reported that there was a pipeline carrying
money between Osama bin Laden and Bosnia at a time when
French intelligence reported that bin Laden and his cohort were in
Darunta, Afghanistan, and still under the control of the CIA and
British intelligence around 1993. Madsen noted the importance of
this link: bin Laden had apparently visited Bosnia and carried “at
least one Bosnian diplomatic passport” and had dealt with Bosnian
diplomats in Vienna. This money link between Bosnia and bin Laden
included the Third World Relief Agency, a Saudi businessman, a
Bosnian, the Sarajevo Deposit Bank, and the First Austrian Bank.177
“America’s financial support for ‘Al Qaeda’” also tied the Clinton
Administration to backing al-Qaeda training in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Rahm Emanuel, at the time assistant to the president for political
affairs, was deeply involved in Clinton’s foreign policy machinations
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Emanuel asserted that Clinton went to both
regions to handle al-Qaeda instruction. (Certainly, Clinton supported
al-Qaeda training in both areas.) Madsen added that there were
believable Serbian reports that fugitive financier Marc Rich (later
pardoned by Clinton) had been engaged in arms smuggling to
Bosnian Muslims.178
While the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
poured money into financing the destruction of the Balkans, it fell to
Prof. Michel Chossudovsky to illuminate another dark corner of the
war’s bankrolling: drugs. In a Global Research article,179
Chossudovsky recalls past CIA covert operations such as those in
Central America, Haiti, and Afghanistan. Illicit dope funded the so-
called “Freedom Fighters” Langley sponsored in those areas. As an
example, Chossudovsky noted that Iran-Contra rebels and the
Afghan “muj” got their funds through “dirty money” being transformed
into “covert money” by way of shell companies and the lending
structure. Weapons and drugs and money flowed across the borders
of Albania with Kosovo and Macedonia. For hefty commissions,
“respectable” European banks, far removed from the fighting, dry-
cleaned the dirty dollars. The drugs went one way, and the
greenbacks another, helping pay the fighters and their trainers.
Writing in Global Research,180 Prof. Chossudovsky added to our
knowledge of the sources of support for the Bosnian Muslim Army
and the KLA—opium-based drug money direct from the Golden
Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran).
Worse,
Then there were the shadowy American aircraft that flew into
Bosnia.
A Norwegian helicopter pilot, Captain Ivan Moldestad, reported
the landing of a mysterious C-130 (Lockheed’s large cargo plane)
with a fighter escort at Tuzla airbase in Bosnia. When he reported
this to NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, the
organization told him no planes had landed, he was entirely
mistaken in what he had seen, and then it hung up. However, other
Norwegians witnessed similar occurrences and made written reports.
Still the talk on the flightline and among intelligence and special
operations personnel was that these were American aircraft and that
Washington was secretly arming the Bosnians. On a subsequent
visit to Zagreb, Moldestad ran into three American officers who knew
of his reports. Displeased, they took him to a fifth floor hotel balcony
and suggested “things could get messy” if he stuck with his story.184
The Americans had more help from their client state, the Federal
Republic of Germany. Its external intelligence service, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), had helped arm the Muslims during
the war. Additionally, BND officers had penetrated UN and European
programs and sent firearms and other deadly devices to the Muslims
through “peacekeeping channels.” Moreover, “[T]he head of
Germany’s team of EU peace monitors was actually a BND officer,
and the Germans shipped munitions in food packages, with shells
hiding in boxes of powdered milk.”185
Schindler’s Unholy Terror goes on to link the Americans and
their Bosnian operation to the September 11, 2001, attacks on New
York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It seems that Khalid
Sheikh Muhammad, alleged mastermind behind those events, had
fought in Afghanistan (after studying in the United States) and then
went on to the Bosnian war in 1992. In addition, two more of the
September 11, 2001, hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-
Hazmi, both Saudis, had gained combat experience in Bosnia. Still
more connections came from Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who
supposedly helped Mohammed Atta with planning the World Trade
Center attacks. He had served with Bosnian army mujahideen units.
Ramzi Binalshibh, friends with Atta and Zammar, had also fought in
Bosnia.186 This is yet another clear-cut example of officially unofficial
US government support for terrorism. Also, it was one more example
of the treachery of the American government, both against its own
citizenry and its employees. Give the terrorists the tools and means
to do the job, even if it means killing people en masse and then
prosecuting the crooks afterward for taking care of business. This
was also true of Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, death squad leader,
human rights abuser, and CIA asset in Haiti. They’re like Kleenex—
use them for their intended purpose and then throw them away.187
Unofficially but officially sending Americans to fight in someone
else’s war is celebrated in real-life fiction. In 1941, US Army Air
Corps pilots resigned their commissions to fly first-line US fighter
planes (the P-40 Warhawk) for the Chinese government. They fought
against Japan while it was still at peace with America. Yet, the words
“covert operation” never seem to be used in connection with this
activity, and no one ever seems to question the ends resulting from
such means.
Indeed, according to Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, there is reason
to believe that the CIA struck a deal with Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-
Qaeda jihad group leader. If he and his band of men did not attack
US interests in the Balkans, al-Qaeda would be free to engage in
anti-American operations elsewhere in the world, including in the
United States. Ahmed notes that al-Qaeda (the Arab-Afghans)
appeared to accept the arrangement.188
In sum, “If Western intervention in Afghanistan created the
Mujahideen, Western intervention in Bosnia appears to have
globalized it.”189
Summary
The people of Iraq not only had to contend with the Arab-Afghan
Legion, they had to deal with the New Mongols, who employed them.
Not since Hulugu, grandson of Genghis Khan, destroyed Baghdad in
AD 1258, killing nearly a million people and annihilating the Abbasid
Caliphate and Islam’s Golden Age, has the Land Between the Dijla
and Furat had to contend with such barbarity—until the Americans
invaded and occupied the country in 2003.
At the Palestine Center’s September 3, 2014, briefing on Iraq in
crisis, Sami Albanna, Raed Jarrar, and Adil Shamoo (the last a
professor at the University of Maryland and Associate Fellow at the
Institute for Policy Studies) squarely blamed the United States for
Iraq’s troubles. According to Shamoo, America created the internal
dissensions and sectorial divisions, now rampant in the country, with
its 2003 invasion. Continuing, he indicted Europe, Israel, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States for making matters worse.
Shamoo asserted that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is
made up of former Ba’athists, al-Qaeda members, and Sunnis who
lost their positions of influence. ISIS funding, he declared, comes
from the Saudis and the Gulf states, along with the Islamic State’s
sales of oil at $25 a barrel, one-quarter of the 2014 world price.
Jarrar, suddenly critical of the United States in public (perhaps
reflecting a new job with the American Friends Service Committee),
blamed America’s invasion and occupation of Iraq for Mesopotamia’s
problems.
Sami Albanna also jumped on the “Bash America” bandwagon,
contending that the CIA had been behind previous coups d’état in
Iraq. He emphasized that Langley brought on the 1958 revolt that
abolished the British-installed monarchy and later put the Ba’ath
(Resurrection) Party into power in 1963. Albanna also stressed that
the Kurdish Peshmerga is a US creation.
More to the point, the foreign fighters got to Iraq because they
had been recruited as terrorists. In a July 24, 2013, telephone call
with Bob Baer, former CIA case officer in the Middle East and South
Asia, he told me the Arab-Afghans had not been directly recruited by
the Agency, but that their gathering had been “outsourced” for
“plausible deniability.” Milt Bearden, former Pakistan station chief
and field officer in Afghanistan; Vince Cannistraro, former case
officer and chief of operations and analysis at the CIA’s
Counterterrorist Center; and Larry Johnson, former CIA analyst and
State Department official had all told the author that the CIA only
recruited Afghans. All omitted any discussion of their instruction.
Baer told me that US policy was to have the Saudis handle the
recruitment program. They were the ones who located the
Palestinians, Pakistanis, etc. 248 The Saudi official in charge was
Ahmed Badeeb, chief of staff to Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of the
Saudi Intelligence Presidency. Badeeb had also been a teacher to
Osama bin Laden.249
Badeeb was also a well-connected bagman. To support
operations in Pakistan, he once arrived in Karachi aboard a Saudia
Airlines flight with “a little extra.” Besides his personal baggage, he
was carrying $1.8 million in freshly printed currency, imported directly
from the United States. Badeeb conveyed this money in person to
Pakistan’s president, Zia Ul Haq, and a group of his generals in
Rawalpindi. It was part of a payment for Chinese-made, rocket-
propelled grenade launchers.250 The Saudis also channeled funds
delivered by Badeeb and others through religious charities to support
their intelligence functions. Ultimately, the money went to Afghan
commanders outside of ISI or CIA control. Badeeb also set up safe
houses for himself and other Saudi intelligence officials with the aid
of these charities.
Saudi involvement also kept the beneficiaries of this aid from
learning how closely the Americans were involved, the reasoning
being that the fighters objected to direct contact with Westerners.251
The watchword was plausible deniability. Baer added that
outsourcing in all this plausible deniability was so effective that
everyone concerned was unaware of US involvement, including
American intelligence involvement. They believed that this was a do-
it-yourself jihad. Besides the Saudis, recruitment was also handled
by the ISI, who worked with the Haqqanis (a US-designated terrorist
group) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Training was outsourced as well. ISI could do this because its
“military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats, undercover agents
and informers” were thought to total about one hundred and fifty
thousand men.252
According to a January 7, 2008, Christian Science Monitor
article, “the bulk of foreign fighters [operating in Iraq] originate from
countries with whom the United States is allied…”253 Citing a report
produced by the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military
Academy at West Point, the article noted, however, that the
individuals fighting in Iraq come also from Libya, Algeria, Morocco,
Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. They entered Iraq through Egypt, Syria,
Germany, and Turkey (with the exception of Syria, all countries
involved in helping to destabilize the Middle East). The authors of the
report, Lt. Col. Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman (neither of whom
would speak with me) said that those fighting in Iraq got there
through “very established routes,” a clear tipoff that the United States
is involved.
John Schindler amplified this information, noting that Bosnians
had gone on to fight in Iraq. He said that the German BND Director,
August Hanning, had confirmed this. According to Schindler, a
mosque in Sarajevo operated as the local recruiting station for “muj”
bound for Iraq and Chechnya. Not quite twelve hundred volunteers
had followed this connection with Iraq in the years between 2007
and 2011. Abu Anas al-Shami, a Jordanian and second only to Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi in managing fighters in Iraq, had come from
Bosnia after his mid-1990s service there.254
Summary
Cui Bono?
Impenetrable Transparency
Summary
Central Asia, the Balkans, and Iraq were not the only places the
Arab-Afghan Legion was employed. The North African street
protests provided an opportunity to overthrow Libya’s longtime
director, Moammar Gaddafi. Players included his opponents, such as
radical militants, as well as Gulf monarchies and NATO allies. A
leader in the plot was Anas al-Liby, who was later given political
asylum in Great Britain despite suspicions that he was a high-level
al-Qaeda operative. He was trained in terrorism by the triple agent
Ali Mohamed while Mohamed was still on the payroll of the US Army.
The United States of America had been providing more than two
thousand al-Qaeda fighters with arms and other support in parts of
eastern Libya. These guerillas were “Salafists.” The anti-Gaddafi
combatants came from Afghanistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as reliable Libyan journalists stated.
These were the same origins and fit the same pattern as the warriors
who had fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Iraq.
“Justification” for American and European misadventures in
Libya came down to cock and bull stories concocted for the “fawning
corporate media,” such as
Y
et, this was not the beginning. First in Egypt, then in Syria, American
and British intelligence services worked to overthrow men and
governments they didn’t like. First, there was that “socialist” Nasser,
president of Egypt, whom they tried to get rid of in 1956 and 1958.
When that failed, they took aim in the late 1950s at Syria for not
being anti-communist enough. Their means? They did what they do
so well—buying potential revolutionaries (as is being done today in
Thailand, the Ukraine, and Venezuela). Unfortunately for the plotters,
the Syrian intelligence officers didn’t stay bought and the coup failed.
(See the end of this book: “Let’s Wrap This Up, If We Can”).
Still, practice makes perfect. If, at first you don’t succeed, try, try
again.
Building on extensive experience, successful practice, and
perfected propaganda, used and refined in Afghanistan, the Balkans,
Iraq, and Libya, the United States, aided by repressive governments
in the region, again moved against the Syrian Arab Republic, using
its favorite cat’s paw, the Arab-Afghan Legion. The attack began, if
not in concert with the alleged “spontaneous” uprising in March 2011,
then not long afterward.
Indeed, in George Will’s Washington Post column of June 19,
2014, he flatly said, “The [NATO] intervention [in Libya] encouraged
peaceful protesters in Syria to use violence in the hope of attracting
an intervention. This increased the rate of killing there tenfold. And
since Gaddafi fell, sophisticated weapons from Gadhafi’s arsenal—
including up to fifteen thousand man-portable, surface-to-air missiles
unaccounted for as of 2012—leaked to radical Islamists throughout
the region.”
Balkan Links
Extra Help
A Lose-Lose Situation
A Myriad of Myrmidons
Summary
T
he man from Missouri created the CIA and the NSA, organizations
that believe they have carte blanche to overthrow governments and
spy on American citizens and others. They operate without
executive, legislative, or judicial control.
The current foreign policy train wrecks are nothing new.
American international relations was a disaster in the first half of the
twentieth century. Following the so-called professionalization of the
State Department’s Foreign Service and its merger with the CIA’s
not-very Clandestine Service in the late 1940s, it then became an
unmitigated disaster. Consider just a few operations in the past that
I’ve earlier mentioned and draw the ties to, and the parallels with, the
present. Think of the progressives who say, “Why do we need to talk
about the past? There is no link to the present.” Recall:
Now, given the tall tales told by the news media, particularly the
Washington Post about the Arab-Afghan Legion, and the Fourth
Estate’s vicious attacks on gallant, courageous men such as Edward
Snowden, John Kiriakou, and Thomas Drake, we should not be
surprised. Operation Mockingbird is obviously still alive and flying
high, dropping its guano on Americans and others. Certainly, the
cold shoulder by journalists I have approached about my dismissal
from the Foreign Service supports that.
The extent of Langley’s ability to control the federal government
(and organizations outside it) can best be seen in Alyssa Röhricht’s
article about John Kiriakou in the January 6, 2014, edition of
CounterPunch.373 Kiriakou, a former CIA analyst, revealed to ABC
News in 2007 that the Agency used torture as official policy. After
investigating and hounding him for years, the US government
prosecuted and convicted him, sentencing him to jail for thirty
months in federal prison in February 2013. (The torturers
themselves, who were “just following orders” have been ignored, if
not rewarded, for their actions.)
According to Röhricht, the Agency’s aim is to “either dismiss
[any] leaks and their importance…[then] discount the heroic efforts of
the leakers [like Kiriakou or Snowden, turning] them into crazed
homosexuals…a hacker without a cause…or a tool for the enemy.”
The charge of “aiding the enemy” is most effective since it helps
keep fear alive among citizens. This provides a semblance of “peace
of mind” to those who dread imaginary terrors and “happily ignore”
illegal governmental activities carried out “to protect them.” As a
result, the sheeple “fall into line and cry traitor” when prompted.
Besides being impoverished by loss of his pension and
staggering legal bills, Kiriakou, Röhricht said, has been blocked from
seeing his family. The United Services Automobile Association
(USAA) also cancelled his car and home insurance, asserting that
they insure neither felons nor their families. (USAA, which insures
mainly military and diplomatic personnel, has as its motto: We Know
What It Means To Serve.)
Americans, even educated ones, readily believe the lies, half-
truths, and evasions of fact put out to support the existence and the
excesses of the Arab-Afghan Legion. Frank Zapatka, a retired
professor at American University in Washington, DC told me June 1,
2013, that Syria’s hands are not clean because it is being helped by
Hezbollah. By implication, there is nothing wrong, then, with the
United States, France, Britain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Legion
aiding the alleged “Free” Syrian Army in its effort to overthrow
Bashar al-Assad’s government. Of course, Americans sometimes
have help in reaching their beliefs. On September 15, 2013, while
attending a program at WHUT (Howard University Television), I
heard American University’s Mohamed Abu Nimer, a professor of
International Peace and Conflict Resolution, spout the government
line on Syria, urging Arabs to join the fight against Bashar al-Assad.
Nimer holds two degrees from Hebrew University in occupied al-
Quds (Jerusalem).374 (N.B. The sesquicentennial of the War
Between the States is under way. In the 1860s, the Union was
vehemently opposed to Britain and France backing the Confederate
States’ struggle to free themselves from what they saw as an overly
centrist and controlling government in Washington.)
The propaganda put forth in support of “regime change” in Syria
even comes from supposedly knowledgeable, trustworthy sources,
such as The Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, a magazine
that asserts on its masthead: Telling the Truth for More Than 30
Years. In the June/July 2013 issue, one author, Pat McDonnell Twair,
wrote about a university panel discussing what she termed the
“Crisis.” In it, she noted the need for “diplomatic engagement” in
Syria, using Yemen as an example. She quoted a university
professor from Buenos Aires, Ricardo Arredondo, who seemed to
argue for an invasion of Syria. The academic compared Syria to
Yugoslavia, saying that, in a state that won’t protect its people, such
as Kosovo, the UN approved the intervention of other governments.
In the same issue, Assistant Editor Dale Sprusansky reported on an
event hosted by the Middle East Institute (MEI), “Syria at the
Crossroads.” Former American Ambassador to Syria, Edward
Djerejian, a speaker there, stated that Bashar al-Assad, unlike his
father, can’t be trusted and that the United States should furnish
more military aid to al-Assad’s opponents. Explaining this, an expert
source on the region told me that the Middle East Report receives
substantial financial contributions from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
one of the financiers of the Syrian revolt.
(By way of background, MEI is composed of a number of former
State Department and other US government officials. Its president is
Wendy J. Chamberlin, past US Ambassador to Pakistan. The
chairman is Richard A. Clarke, previous holder of high “national
security” positions in the Defense Department, the State
Department, and the White House. Michael Ryan, an adjunct scholar
at MEI is also a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a group
closely connected to the Central Intelligence Agency. Ned Walker,
once Deputy Chief of Mission in Saudi Arabia when the Legion was
being recruited there, had been MEI president from 2001 to 2006.
Allan Keiswetter, Political Counselor in Riyadh when I was in
Jeddah, is another MEI scholar. Both Walker and Keiswetter did not
reply to letters asking about the Jeddah visas for the Legion’s
terrorist recruits from the kingdom. Perhaps, I should have asked
Walker in my letter about his appearance on a Fox News TV
program in Florida several years ago. He and Jay Freres had been
interviewed on terrorism. On the broadcast, both conveniently left out
any mention of the United States’ role in creating the Legion. (The
link to the show no longer exists on Google.)
Throughout the preceding pages, the reader has seen how the
American government has operated amid great secrecy. Not only did
the left hand not know what the right hand was doing, but each of the
fingers thereon did not know what was happening.
The attorney Pat Frascogna, a man with FOIA expertise, once
wrote about secrecy and its purpose: “Thus whether it be learning
the dirty and unethical business practices of a company or the
secrets of our government, the same deployment of denials and
feigning ignorance about what is really going on are the all-too-
common methods used to keep the truth from the light of day.”402
Langley recruited the Arab-Afghans so clandestinely that the
terrorists didn’t know they had been recruited. They thought that they
had found a battlefield on their own, or through the Internet or
through Twitter or through television. The Agency didn’t even bother
to tell the non-CIA Americans involved in giving them US visas about
they were doing, either out of sheer stupidity, an excess of caution,
or the bureaucratic mindset.
The secrecy was so pervasive it even covered religious rituals.
Jay Freres used the Holy Church of the Consulate for spiritual
services. Not only did he hide that from the Saudis (supposedly), he
hid it from the Americans. He also concealed the reasons why some
Americans at the consulate could buy liquor but not others. Freres
obscured consulate liquor sales to US firms, such as Mobil,
operating in the Hejaz. He camouflaged the real reason that the
University of Maryland could not teach college-level courses for
credit at the consulate. (He insisted that a “State Department”
employee, that is, a CIA employee, had to monitor each and every
course. This was entirely unacceptable to the school and the
prospective teacher, Jackie Black.) Additionally, the consulate had a
boat available for rent. However, it really belonged to the CIA Base
and the vessel was never free for use by nonspooks due to
“mysterious” problems: the engine needed work, the propeller had
lost a blade, etc. Even years later, the federal government wouldn’t
own up to what had happened, because, in one knowledgeable
contact’s phrase, “it’s still going on.” Ali Ahmad Jalali, the former
Afghan Interior Minister, army officer, and resistance planner, simply
wouldn’t talk. (As a likely CIA asset, that might offend his masters.)
The Iraqi puppet government and its embassy in Washington, DC
never replied to my questions about terrorist activity in that unhappy
country. Anes Shallal (who allowed his Busboys and Poets
restaurant to be used for arguing for greater US intervention in Syria)
didn’t respond to my earlier questions about the Legion in Iraq.403
Milt Bearden and Marc Sageman, Agency company men, wouldn’t
talk and kept telling me that the CIA hadn’t been involved in
recruiting the Arab-Afghans. Houeida Saad, who nursed them, and
Phyllis Bennis who knew or should have known of them, claimed
they didn’t exist. The well-informed Clovis Maksoud and the
Albannas, with their ties to the United States and other governments,
either professed unbelievable ignorance or said nothing. Yet they
were and are willing to speak on almost any subject regarding the
Middle East.
Somehow, there was always a “responsibility to protect,” either
secrecy or people, in Agency jargon, “R2P,” yet, somehow, the US
government hid what it was doing and concealed the real results.
This resulted in almost no “protection.”
In Libya, for example, more people died and more infrastructure
was destroyed by attacks from American, British, and French
warplanes than would have died or been destroyed if the new
colonialists had stayed home. Yet, America’s tame press never
published this information.
“Secrecy” harms everyone. I once had a client on an entirely
different matter, persecuted by the FBI and Justice Department for
seeking information on the welfare and whereabouts of a close
relative. The Justice Department, specifically Assistant US Attorneys
Harvey E. Eisenberg and Jason Weinstein, along with their FBI
friends, relentlessly harassed the client, her husband, and her
mother, eventually driving them out of the country. According to what
journalist Scott Armstrong told me at the time, one branch of the
government likely had the client’s relative for whom they were
searching, but hadn’t bothered to tell the rest of the alphabet soup
about its prisoner.404
“Secrecy” certainly harmed me. The federal government never
told me why it fired me. It never told me why I, despite my
qualifications, could not find a job for three years. It never told me
why my attempts to learn what had happened got classed as a threat
to “national security,” a concept used, more often than not, to hide
corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of authority, if not murder,
war crimes, and human rights violations.
“Secrecy” certainly covered how so-called progressives ignored
me and my writing. (I was, on occasion, told that some people
actually believed I worked for the CIA, despite the harm Langley did
to my career at State and my utter contempt for its activities.)
Although personally known to people opposing the out-of-control
intelligence services, I learn about their activities, meetings, and
receptions only from the daily newspaper. Initially able to publish
articles with ease on the Internet, I suddenly found that few, if any,
organizations had an interest in what I wrote. (Paul Craig Roberts, a
far more accomplished individual than I, once noted that he had
been almost completely frozen out of the mainstream media.)
In the past, CIA “Secrecy” was not seen as a good thing. Mel
Goodman wrote a glowing article for CounterPunch about the history
of the Pike and Church Committees investigating CIA assassinations
of Third World leaders and the Agency’s engaging in “regime
change.”405 The committees looked deeply into COINTELPRO. (This
was an FBI and CIA program to monitor, manipulate, and disrupt
domestic social and political activities in the 1960s, much like what
was recently done to the Occupy Movement). At one point, the
Committees noted that such actions, even if directed at known
criminals, would have been intolerable in a democratic society.
However, despite his experience as CIA division chief and
senior analyst in the Office of Soviet Affairs from 1976 to 1986,
Goodman professed to me no knowledge of what went on in
Afghanistan and the Middle East during and after Carter’s Proxy War
against the Soviet Union. Given his position, he should have had a
wealth of pertinent knowledge and contacts. He certainly used some
of that to draft another CounterPunch article. I In it, he remarked that
“CIA’s support for the anti-Soviet mujahideen in the 1980s proved
particularly damaging because the mujahideen provided weaponry to
fuel conflicts in the Balkans and the Sudan and trained the terrorists
who would attack us at home, including the bombing of the World
Trade Center in 1993.”406
The US Department of State and the CIA, while greatly prizing
such individuals as Kathy Hennessey, Andy Weber, Karen Sasahara,
Henry Ensher, and Greta Holtz, had no regard for people such as
myself—those of us who thought, who analyzed, who questioned,
and who engaged other cultures. Indeed, any employee who showed
initiative at State somehow didn’t make it. The kind of mentoring,
training, and tutelage that well-run organizations normally use to
improve their workforce is not found at State or in its consulates and
embassies around the world.
The Department of State, the intelligence services and the
politicians who allegedly control them, certainly have a remarkably
poor track record. Spooks manipulating foreign policy is a guarantee
of disaster. Look at Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, Libya, and Syria
(if not Pakistan and Yemen). America, a country of supposed
“democratic values” seems to have a history of supporting repressive
governments and overthrowing those of nontotalitarian states. Yet,
the clearly biased propaganda that supports these policies always
depicts the despots as “allies” who are “Western oriented” with
“democratic” or, at least, “representative” governments. Somehow,
these “allies” oppose variously oriented “Axes of Evil” without
permitting any sort of free and open societies at home, viz. Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Israel. In America’s lexicon, persecution,
religious fanaticism, and violence are the hallmarks of countries and
governments, usually Arab and/or Muslim, that need regime change.
The fawning corporate mainstream media happily repeat the lines
given them, such as “the Free Syrian Army” or the “Kosovo
Liberation Army” who are battling the “insurgents” engaged in mass
atrocities and uncountable Viagra-fueled rapes. America and its
allies have a “clear responsibility to protect (R2P)” those resisting the
“freedom fighters.”
As journalist Wayne Madsen mentioned, to achieve this, the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand have combined psychological operations with their
electronic deception programs, particularly on the World Wide Web.
These include alias development and masquerading
(which includes the employment of “sock puppet”
personae already in use by the US military to disrupt
and influence the Internet), mass messaging (or
spamming) and “call bombing” [jamming a phone with
myriad calls], propaganda, and “pushing stories.”
These tactics have been refined since the CIA and its
George Soros-financed nongovernmental organization
activist allies brought about the “Arab Spring”
overthrow of governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya,
and Yemen, as well as the bloody civil war in Syria.407
Political Costs
The War of the Words hasn’t been too favorable to the United
States. It’s not hard to see why. In a 2013 Pew Research poll on
global attitudes toward America, countries receiving Uncle Sam’s
money (but not the business end of his weapons) love the United
States. Israel, the Philippines, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South
Korea rate America highly (above 75 percent). While Iraq,
Afghanistan, Serbia, and Syria were not covered, some Arab and
Muslim states were. At the bottom of the pile, Pakistan, target of
drones, had an 11 percent favorable view of the United States.
Egypt, and the Palestinian Prison Camp, along with Jordan, had
ratings approving the United States ranging only from 14 percent to
16 percent. In a 2009 Gallup poll of Syria, just 15 percent of the
population held a positive opinion of America. In that same
questionnaire, Serbia clocked in at 14 percent, but Libyans were not
polled. According to an undated BBC online survey:
United Arab Emirates: Views of the United States in
the UAE are quite unfavorable, with a solid majority
(57 percent) saying they have a mostly negative view
of US influence in the world, and just one in four (25
percent) says they have a mainly positive view.
Emirates have largely negative views of the United
States on its foreign policy issues, though they are
somewhat less negative than other publics in the
region. Four in five disapprove of US handling of the
Israel-Hezbollah conflict (81 percent), the war in Iraq
(80 percent)…Emirates clearly see the US military
presence as a destabilizing factor in the Middle East:
66 percent says the United States is provoking more
conflict than it prevents, and only 17 percent says it is
a stabilizing force.
Material Costs
Shah added: “The authors of this report have warned that the
legacy of decisions taken during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
would dominate future federal budgets for decades to come.” What
was omitted from this report were the costs to the Afghans and Iraqis
of these wars. No words were directed toward the expenses of the
wars in the Balkans, Libya, and Syria, either. However, Libya was
“cheap” according to the Daily Beast, at “only” one billion dollars. 413
What is usually omitted from the puffery of the American
militarists, unchained spooks, neoconservatives, and their
supporters in the “fawning corporate media” is how far “only” one
billion would go toward rebuilding a failed United States.
First, there is health care for the forty-seven million uninsured or
underinsured Americans (2012 numbers. Obamacare deals only with
about seven million people, many already protected.). According to
the Kaiser Family Foundation, covering those forty-seven million at
an annual, individual cost of $5,884 would total nearly $277
billion.414 That’s a lot of money, but it’s still considerably less than
the price tag for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars plus the unknown
costs of continued fighting in Libya and Syria, and against the
allegedly “new” enemy, ISIS/ISIL/IS, in Iraq.
Next, here are some costs for refurbishing the United States’
collapsing infrastructure from an American Society of Civil Engineers
2013 estimate. Compare them with the money wasted on recruiting
training, and implementing the Arab-Afghan Legion in Afghanistan,
the Balkans, Iraq, Libya, and Syria:
So, Libya was a good country to attack and invade, using NATO
warplanes, spooks, and the Arab-Afghan Legion.
Syria was, too.
In 2010, the IMF estimated the Syrian population to be about
21,016,000, spread over 185,180 square kilometers, that is, 71,498
square miles (slightly larger than North Dakota; WorldAtlas. com),
with roughly 112 people per square kilometer (UN Data).
Indexmundi.com, citing the CIA World Factbook, added that there
were about nineteen thousand Israeli colonists in Syria’s Golan
Heights. With an armed forces paper strength of one hundred ten
thousand men, Syrian military strength does not really compare with
that of its enemies:418
1,369,000 USA
633,000 Israel
150,000 Saudi Arabia
130,000 France
127,000 United Kingdom
Nor does it compare with the estimated one hundred thousand
opposition fighters seeking the overthrow of Syria’s government.419
The largest sector of Syria’s economy has been agriculture,
followed by oil, industry, and tourism, sectors not really hard to
disrupt with modern weapons and strategy.420
In sum, then, the United States of America, backed by its
population of 318,500,000 (US Bureau of the Census), has waged
total war on the people of Afghanistan (15,300,000 in 1980, from
indexmundi.com); Yugoslavia (23,842,000 in 1990, from theodora.
com); Iraq (24,683,000 in 2003, from indexmundi.com); and Syria
(21,016,000 in 2010, from the IMF).
There is definitely a disparity in power and influence, especially
given the resources provided to the Arab-Afghan Legion on top of
American arms, weapons, and funds. In 2009, the World Bank said
Afghanistan’s gross national income per capita was US$460;
Yugoslavia’s $3,600 (from kushnirs.org); Iraq’s US$4,030; Libya’s
US$12,930; and Syria’s US$4,600 (from indexmundi.com). GDP per
capita in the United States in 2009 was US$48,040 (World Bank).
The story of David and Goliath has been turned round and stood on
its head.
The End
Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq. The War On Freedom. Joshua Tree, CA:
Tree of Life Publications, 2002.
Bergen, Peter L. The Osama bin Laden I Know. New York: Free
Press, 2006.
Grayling, A. C. Among The Dead Cities. New York: Walker & Co,
2006.
Stone, Oliver, and Peter Kuznick. The Untold History of the United
States. New York: Gallery Books, 2012.
Trento, Joseph. Prelude to Terror. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005.
Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance. New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998.
The World Factbook 2013–14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence
Agency, 2013.
1 Covert action is defined in US law as activity that is meant “to influence political,
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the US
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” 50 USC § 413(b)(e).
2 http://www.state.gov/m/ds/investigat/
3 Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game, How the U.S. Helped Unleash Fundamentalist
Islam (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2005) 290.
4 Ostensibly from the State Department for sustained excellence and initiative in
the substantive policy areas of the oceans, the environment, science; democracy,
human rights, and labor; population, refugees, and migration; and international
narcotics and crime. Greta Holtz, to my knowledge, never worked in any of these
areas.
5 Eric Qualkenbush’s biography is available at
http://www.tvworldwide.com/events/homelanddefense/040430/bush.cfm.
6 In “Our Man in Jeddah,” an article written in July 2004 by Margie Burns for
onlinejournal.com, Sasahara was linked to the CIA. Burns also noted Sasahara’s
undiplomatic behavior, yelling at a woman when she tried to get State’s assistance
in a parental kidnapping case. Sasahara’s husband, Michael Ratner, is listed as
consul general in Jerusalem at this writing.
7 This publication is now out of print and available only as a current issue online,
thus forestalling any such tracking of individuals.
8 The official residence for the consulate’s Marine Security Guard.
9 The million dollar figure came from the author’s conversation with Tim Hunter, a
former consulate official.
10 Roman Catholic priests operated in Saudi Arabia like they did in the time of
Henry VIII in Britain. They concealed their identity and secretly provided religious
services to the faithful. If discovered, then as now, they would be arrested and
jailed.
11 A slab of metal duplicating the consular officer’s signature and authenticating
the stamped visa.
12 After assignments as an FSO to Bonn, Germany (with Eric Qualkenbush),
Kazakhstan, and Hong Kong, Andy became Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. His official biography
notably omits his assignment to Moscow as a bio-weapons inspector where he
had been interviewed on-camera by former New York Times journalist Judith Miller
for the PBS show Bio-Terror.
13 Joseph P. O’Neill was Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at Khartoum when
Rahman got his visa. He says a spook issued the visa but blames a Foreign
Service national (local hire), according to The Association for Diplomatic Studies
and Training; Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. O’Neill added that there had
been another CIA agent who was slipped a visa without any explanation or blame.
He said he got his job in Khartoum through Frank G. Wisner, a member of a well-
known CIA family.
14 The same O’Neill who had been DCM in Khartoum when Omar Abdel Rahman
got his visa.
15 Obituary, Washington Post, July 6, 2014.
16 Temporary Duty Tehran, January–March 1979. His position was unspecified.
O’Neill criticized political officers who had been telephoning Washington to suggest
evacuation. He also aided the escape of Israeli embassy staff. O’Neill had had his
own problems with the Inspection Corps. His career summary shows a series of
strange assignments for an FSO, including the one in Bosnia. The Association for
Diplomatic Studies and Training; Foreign Affairs Oral History Project; Georgetown
University, May 19, 1998.
17 A term from America’s Wild West for nomadic gunslingers who hired out to fight
range wars.
18 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, (New York: Free Press, 2006)
25, 32, 33. NB: In an e-mail to me dated February 12, 2014, Bergen denied having
any more information than the above.
19 My conversation with Marc Sageman at his Rockville, Maryland, home, August
13, 2013; arranged by Matthew Hoh.
20 Arun Kundnani, The Muslims Are Coming (New York: Verso, 2014), 75, 76.
21 Ibid., 127. citing Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, “A Not Very Private Feud over
Terrorism,” New York Times, June 8, 2008.
22 Griffin was right about Jane. According to my contacts, Whitney used to steal
spoons from her staff and had taken paintings from the consulate. After Jane went
to Perth, Australia, as consul general, retired FSO Fred Galanto told me what he
had heard from Jim Gray, once in Jeddah, later one of the FSOs in Perth. Besides
misappropriating $40,000 in government funds to decorate her office and
residence, Gray said, Whitney had so outraged her staff, both American and
Australian, that they wrote the ambassador, threatening to resign en masse unless
he got rid of her. The State Department then let her retire on a full pension. When I
tried to learn the specifics of the matter through a Freedom of Information Act
request, State refused to provide any information because “it would violate
Whitney’s privacy.”
23 The Marine Security Guard told me Bryant placed classified documents on his
secretary’s desk after hours so that she would get a security violation. Enough
violations and you lose the clearance and can’t work. The secretary’s name was
Elizabeth Otey, a truly wonderful, helpful person.
24 Intelwire.com, citing a cable written by Albert Thibault, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Riyadh. I had known Al as political officer in Delhi. Also, in Dec. 2013, in response
to a letter to Griffin about Jeddah’s visa issues, “Steve,” a supposed son, called
and harangued me for fifteen minutes about my questions. While Steve said he
didn’t know the facts, he insisted that Jeddah was a State Department consulate
“with only a few” CIA employees. Steve asserted he was a GAO analyst and knew
the State Department and Langley through travel with his parents. Steve also
alleged that he had once applied to join the Agency but it did not accept him
because his scores on the written test were not high enough.
25 Jones moved on to become Counselor for Political Affairs in Bonn and then to
head the US Mission to Berlin. While there, in April 1994, he publicly criticized
German domestic policy as being racist, earning a rebuke from Donald Kursch,
Charge’ d’Affaires ad interim [Acting Ambassador]. Jones didn’t reply to my letter
asking about his involvement in my termination.
26 According to record-keepers, Schlierer and the “Reps” got fourteen seats and
nearly 10 percent of the vote for the Baden-Württemberg parliament in March
1996. “Baden-Württemberg. Results of the Elections from 1964–2011.”
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg.
27 After Stuttgart’s closure, she took a position with the American consulate in
Munich.
28 Mount did not reply to my letter about his efforts to ensure I became
unemployed and stayed that way.
29 Miss Hennessey went on to become Counselor for Consular Affairs at the US
Embassy in Madrid.
30 An organization seemingly obsessed with using fear of increasing but vaguely
defined hate groups in America to generate greater donations for its work of
monitoring “extremists.” It has been said to equate anti-Zionism with “anti-
Semitism.” Muslim-American writers have tied the organization to the Jewish Anti-
Defamation League, both of which have a record of spying on private citizens, and
to the US Department of Homeland Security’s “fusion centers” that collect personal
data on Americans. Cf. SourceWatch.org.
31 We were shown what were called “happy snaps,” unusually good overhead
imagery (e.g., a photo of Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles, apparently taken at an
altitude of several hundred feet and about half a mile’s distance). In reality, it was
from a satellite camera several hundred miles in space and three thousand miles
away. Another picture was of men and women walking down the steps of the US
Capitol building. Taken from hundreds of miles in the heavens, its detail could
distinguish between the two sexes. I also saw photographs of a Brazilian military
airfield on film a bit larger than the normal 2¼ x 2¼ format. The resolution was so
good that I could almost count the rivets on the parked aircraft. Being an on-again,
off-again photographer, I asked about image sharpness, something tied to the size
of the film and camera. I was told that it wasn’t an issue since the camera was the
size of a railroad boxcar.
32 In A-100, our orientation class, we had been told that only really bad apples
were tossed out because the selection process was so stringent. The comment
had been made by John Tkacik that the people whose appointments were
terminated knew it well in advance because it was perfectly clear to them that they
didn’t measure up.
33 William Claiborne, “Two Held in Visa Fraud Case,” March 20, 2000.
34 These records were never shared with me, then or since. Lindover never
responded to my April 13, 2014 letter about the foregoing, nor did she return a
May 12 telephone message about the correspondence.
35 Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, former General Counsel at the CIA and NSA, once
told me at an American Bar Association meeting that the intelligence services have
a good relationship with Martin. Martin, in a class I attended at American
University’s Washington College of Law, told me that she believes the
government’s “theory” about September 11, 2001.
36 Nick Pope with John Burroughs, USAF (ret.) and Jim Penniston USAF (ret.),
Encounter in Rendlesham Forest (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2014), 226.
37 Audubon Society v. U.S. Forest Service, 104 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1997).
38 There is a pattern to Walton’s behavior on the bench. On September 26, 2014,
the Washington Post carried an article written by Lisa Rein: “FDA whistleblowers’
lawsuit over surveillance dismissed.” Reggie B. Walton did not address the merits
of the scientists’ case, based on the government’s spying on their official and
personal e-mail accounts. Instead, Walton ruled that “the scientists failed to
exhaust [their] administrative remedies.”
39 According to varied Internet sources, including Linked-In, 9/11 Commission
Documents, History Commons, as well as Jon Gold, author and advocate for 9/11
Justice, Shayna Steinger issued most of these visas. Although she only had a
master’s degree, the State Department commissioned her as an FSO-4, a high
rank for someone hired just out of Columbia University with no prior experience.
The Congressional Record shows her name at her 1999 commissioning as
Shayna Steinger Singh. Despite her issuing visas to terrorists and giving equivocal
answers to the 9/11 Commission, Steinger is still an FSO.
40 Daniel Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland, Mohammed Atta & the 9/11 Cover-Up
in Florida (Venice, FL: The MadCow Press, 2004, 2007).
41 Ibid., 253.
42 Peter Lance, Triple Cross (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), xxiii.
43 2013 e-mail from Hunter to me.
44 Michael Parenti, The Sword And The Dollar, Imperialism, Revolution, and the
Arms Race, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) 195.
45 The Road to 9/11. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007) 154.
46 Triple Cross, 6.
47 Ibid., 68–69.
48 Ibid., 116, citing 9/11 Commission Staff Statement, 15.
49 Ibid., 146.
50 Ibid., 243, citing Matthew I. Wald, “Fate of Flight 800: The Overview: Jet’s
Landing Gear Is Said to Provide Evidence of a Bomb,” New York Times, July 31,
1996. Don Van Natta Jr., “More Traces of Explosives in Flight 800,” New York
Times, August 31, 1996. Sylvia Adcock and Knut Royce, “Two Traces Found,”
Newsday, August 31, 1996.
51 Triple Cross, 389.
52 Road to 9/11, 180–181, citing Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies:
Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2005), 63–83. Philip Willan, Puppetmasters: The Political Use of
Terrorism in Italy (London: Constable and Company, 1991), 122–131, 160–167,
26. William Scobie, Observer, August 11, 1990. “Italian General Alleges CIA Link
to Bombings,” Reuters, August 4, 2000.
53 James Bamford, Body of Secrets (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 82–83.
54 Cf. http://www.globalresearch.ca/hillary-clinton-we-created-al-qaeda/5337222.
55 Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, “Hillary Clinton: ‘We Created Al Qaeda,’” Global
Research, June 1, 2013.
56 Communicated in a 2013 e-mail to the author.
57 “For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all
people are upon us,” John Winthrop, Governor, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1630.
58 Kevin Robert Ryan, Another 19, Investigating Legitimate 9/11 Suspects,
(Microbloom, 2013), 179–200.
59 Ibid., 179, citing John Glaser, “CIA Documents Drastically Overestimated Soviet
Capabilities,” Antiwar.com, September 28, 2011.
60 Ibid.
61 Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick; The Untold History of the United States (New
York: Gallery Books, 2012), 258; citing Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954 Vol. 10, US Govt. Printing Office 1989, 80.
62 Ibid. 260, citing Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New
York: Doubleday, 2007), 86.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 259 and 260.
65 Ibid., 262, 263, citing Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan
Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991), 150. “The Guatemalan Cancer,” New York Times, June 8, 1951.
“Red Cell in Guatemala,” Washington Post, March 4, 1952.
66 Ibid., 262, 263, citing Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime
Change (New York: Times Books, 2006), 134–135.
67 Ibid., 262–263, citing Peter Chapman, Bananas; Richard H. Immerman, The
CIA in Guatemala; Stephen C. Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The
Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala.
68 Parenti, Sword And The Dollar, 198, citing Jeff McMahon, Reagan and the
World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985), 13. Also Stephen Kinzer and
Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in
Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982).
69 Stone and Kuznick, 263–265, citing Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 461; Young,
“Great Britain’s Latin America Dilemma,” 588.
70 William Blum, Killing Hope, U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War
II (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2004), 77.
71 D. Armstrong and J. Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb (Hanover, NH:
Steerforth Press, 2007), chapter 5.
72 Ibid., 90.
73 “A man of legendary cruelty,” he “was known…to patrol the bazaars of Kabul
with vials of acid, which he would throw in the face of any woman who dared to
walk outdoors without a full burka covering her face.” He was also remembered for
skinning prisoners alive. See following note.
74 Stone and Kuznick, 459, citing James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism