United Nations S/2024/499

Security Council Distr.: General

8 July 2024

Original: English

Letter dated 3 July 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)
addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the fifteenth report of the Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526
(2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1988 (2011), in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution
2716 (2023).
I should be grateful if the attached report could be brought to the attention of
the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Counc il.

(Signed) José Javier De La Gasca

Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1988 (2011)

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Letter dated 31 May 2024 from the Analytical Support and

Sanctions Monitoring Team addressed to the Chair of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1988 (2011)

I have the honour to refer to paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2716
(2023). In that paragraph, the Security Council requested the Monitoring Team to
submit, in writing, an annual comprehensive, independent report to the Committee,
on the implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1
of the resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation
of the measures and possible new measures.
I therefore transmit to you the Monitoring Team’s fifteenth comprehensive
report, pursuant to the above-mentioned provisions of resolution 2716 (2023).
As described in the report, travel by the Monitoring Team in 2024 in support of
the present report was severely constrained by the Secretariat’s liquidity crisis. The
Monitoring Team worked to mitigate the impact by making best use of regional
meetings, consultations with Member State delegations in New York or by
videoconference, and through the expanded use of written requests for information,
which were sent to Member States.
The Monitoring Team notes that the document of reference is the English
original and that all information considered for the report was put forward no later
than 28 May.

(Signed) Justin Hustwitt

Coordinator
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

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Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions

Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2716 (2023)
concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and
entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security
of Afghanistan

Summary
The Taliban have strengthened control across Afghanistan as the group
transitions from an insurgency to the de facto authorities. Hibatullah Akhundzada has
consolidated power in his position as Amir, extending his particular model of Islamic
governance throughout most of the country.
The consolidation of power has improved peace and stability internally and
resulted in other positive benefits such as reduced corruption, decreased opium
cultivation and enhanced revenue generation, thereby helping to sustain the weak
Afghan economy.
Member States are concerned, however, that despite current stability,
Afghanistan will remain a source of insecurity for Central Asia and the region in most
scenarios. They questioned whether this model of Taliban governance can address the
many significant and ongoing challenges, including mass migration, natural disasters,
the management of regional water issues, climate change and the humanitarian crisis,
in addition to the heightened impact of terrorism in the region and beyond.
Despite some success in operations against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-
Khorasan (ISIL-K, QDe.161), that group poses a manifest and serious threat within
Afghanistan, the immediate region and further afield. Member States remain
concerned about the Taliban’s capabilities to combat effectively the sophisticated
threat represented by ISIL-K, and the risks of ISIL-K terrorism spreading.
Further, the Taliban have proved unable or unwilling to manage the threat from
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP, QDe.132) whose attacks into Pakistan have
intensified. Taliban support to TTP also appears to have increased.
While the Taliban have done much to constrain the activities of Al-Qaida
(QDe.004) and their affiliates, Member States remarked that its reorganization and
training activities, as well as new travel into Afghanistan, indicate that the group still
uses Afghanistan as a permissive haven under the Taliban, raising questions about
Al-Qaida’s intent.
Member States communicated concerns that Taliban spending on security and
armed forces was disproportionate, given the significant domestic challenges and
human needs, and questioned whether it was well tailored to counter-terrorism
requirements. They also noted Taliban ambitions to acquire new military capabilities
and the challenges they face in controlling small arms and light weapons currently in
circulation. Terrorist access to weapons from Afghanistan poses substantial threats to
regional States in particular.
As a result of sizeable stockpiles, the trade in narcotics continues to be
significant, notwithstanding the ban on the cultivation of opium poppy. It is still too
early to judge the impact of that ban. Senior Taliban continue to profit, and farmers
are struggling to make up the shortfall with alternative crops. These all appear to have
been factors in recent unrest in Badakhshan Province.

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While there is not yet an agreed and functioning mechanism to engage the wider
international community in a multilateral framework, the Taliban are progressing
pragmatic bilateral and regional engagement, securing accredited diplomatic missions
in some countries without formal recognition.
At least 61 sanctioned individuals are now in, or associated with, the higher
echelons of the de facto authorities.
The Committee has received regular requests for travel ban exemptions, but no
assets freeze exemption requests. The Monitoring Team recommends measures to
clarify when an assets freeze exemption request is required in parallel with travel ban
requests. There is no provision for exemptions to the arms embargo.

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Contents
Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Status of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Taliban leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Internal dynamics and divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. Ability to govern as de facto authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
D. Competency to provide security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
E. Situation of minorities and officials of the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan . . . . 11
III. Taliban finances and narcotics situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
IV. Assessment of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
V. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
VI. Other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
VII. Sanctions implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Travel ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Asset freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. Arms embargo and related issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
VIII. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
IX. Work of the Monitoring Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. Evidence base and cooperation with Member States, United Nations bodies and civil
society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B. Contributing to the public debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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I. Overview
1. In the past year the Taliban strengthened control as the de facto authorities in
Afghanistan. Their leader (or Amir al Mu’minin), Hibatullah Akhundzada (not listed),
has consolidated his own position and this means that his particular model of Islamic
governance, as detailed in the fourteenth report of the Monitoring Team (S/2023/370),
is now dominant throughout most of Afghanistan.
2. Positive consequences of that consolidation of power include improved peace
and stability (though conflicts remain, active hostilities have largely stopped),
significant reductions in petty corruption and opium poppy cultivation, the provision
of some public services, and a weak economy that has not failed.
3. The transition to responsible and effective governance is slow, however, and
many interlocutors questioned whether the Taliban’s governance model under
Hibatullah can address the problems the country faces if it does not substanti ally
adapt. In addition to terrorism, these challenges include the needs and expectations
of an Afghan population facing a socioeconomic crisis, repeated natural disasters and
climate change, acute famine, widespread dependence on humanitarian aid, potenti al
mass migration, land disputes, and expectations regarding the rights, education and
productivity of women, and of ethnic and religious minority groups.
4. Some pragmatic engagement with the de facto authorities has proved possible,
principally for regional States, on matters of mutual interest. But the policies and
behaviours of the Taliban continue to leave neighbouring States with a long list of
concerns. There is not yet a common understanding between regional and
non-regional States regarding the future of Afghanistan. Nor has a mechanism yet
been established for the Taliban to engage with the wider international community in
a multilateral framework, to identify a path towards recognition. Taliban
non-participation in the second meeting of special envoys on Afghanistan, held in
Doha in February 2024 (often referred to as Doha II), was indicative of Hibatullah’s
dominance.
5. Many Member States expressed concern that in most scenarios, Afghanistan will
remain a source of insecurity for Central Asia and the region. Continued Taliban
tolerance of a range of terrorist groups, based across many Afghan provinces, sets the
conditions for terrorism to project into neighbouring States, causing large loss of life.
The country continues to be perceived as permissive or friendly territory by terrorist
groups, which also aspire to project threats globally. In addition, the increasing
importance of the management of water rights in the region, and an ongoing
humanitarian crisis, mean that stability does not yet mean broader security.
6. Member States credit Taliban efforts to counter the threat from Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) but question the Taliban’s counter-terrorism
capabilities and have concerns about continued ISIL-K recruitment and dispersal.
Member States also judge that the Taliban have significantly constrained Al -Qaida
(QDe.004) and associated groups but are concerned about the intent behind continued
low-profile activity in what it regards as a haven. Despite significant pressur e, the
Afghan Taliban have proved unable or unwilling to manage the threat posed by
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP, QDe.132), whose attacks in Pakistan continue to
increase.
7. While recognizing that the Taliban need security capabilities if they are to
address these threats, Member States have raised concerns that the level of the de
facto authorities’ security spending is disproportionate and poorly tailored to the
country’s domestic needs. The projected size of the armed forces, the capabilities

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being protected and developed, and the equipment being sought have raised concerns
among Member States about the Taliban leadership’s true intent for these forces.

II. Status of the Taliban

A. Taliban leadership

8. The Taliban continue to transition from insurgency to governing authority. How

far they are down this road, and the extent to which they have been willing to adapt
their theocratic policies to the demands of governance at the national and international
levels, are key questions flagged by Member States. Most noted Hibatullah’s steady
consolidation of his hold on power and thus political and religious ideology, and a
distinct theocratic method of governance. This continues to resemble closely the
leadership of his predecessor, Mullah Omar (TAi.004), both during the insurgency
and during the Taliban’s brief hold on power in the late 1990s (see S/2023/370). While
his position is more stable and secure, this strategy is not well suited to managing the
problems faced by the Taliban as the de facto authorities, nor does it meet the needs
and expectations of the broader Afghan population, neighbouring States or the
international community. It is the cause of continued tensions within the Taliban
leadership, between the clerical and tribal circle close to Hibatullah and some of those
loyally trying to deliver security and public services, develop the Afghan economy
and build international relationships.
9. Some Member States commented on how striking Hibatullah’s consolidation of
power has been. He has achieved it through a broad range of measures, including a
constant shuffling of senior and mid-ranking positions, with loyalty to Hibatullah
being a key criterion. He has extended and reshaped the influence and reach of the
provincial ulama councils to guarantee a direct reporting line to the Amir, while
recognizing that this does not amount to absolute control. He has inserted loyal
placemen into senior positions in line ministries in Kabul in order to monitor activity
and ensure compliance with his will. He has made effective use of the de facto
Directorate for Implementation and Oversight of the Amir’s Decrees, established in
March 2023. He also empowered the de facto Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue
and the Prevention of Vice and the Chief Justice (the head of the Supreme Court),
with respect to the enforcement and review of compliance with the Amir’s decrees by
various institutions and the public. He established and used both the “Purging
Commission” and the Commission for the Collection of Arms and Military Equipment
(hereinafter the Weapons Registration Commission) as tools of authority and control
and created mechanisms to monitor and ensure loyalty and compliance from senior
figures, including within the powerful General Directorate of Intelligence. There
seems to be vanishingly little room for loyal disagreement. The workings of
Hibatullah’s inner circle in Kandahar remain opaque to Member States.
10. The leadership group remains non-inclusive and predominantly Pashtun (see
annex). The past year has seen the widespread imposition of Taliban policies and
ideology, which are more narrowly defined than notions of Pashtun identity. The drive
to create “jihadi madrasas” in each province is an example of this, designed arguably
to train and indoctrinate young students into Taliban ideology. Pashtun dominance is
still causing stress within the social fabric of a multi-ethnic country. There are also
inevitable tensions between Pashtun Taliban groupings along tribal and political lines,
for example a growing sense that individuals who are close to Hibatullah in some way
regularly achieve preferment over others. Loyalty to, and alignment w ith, Hibatullah
is now the defining factor in intra-Taliban tensions.

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11. Member States agree that there is no credible challenge to Hibatullah’s authority
in the medium term, at least from within Taliban ranks. This means a degree of
stability and, by extension, relative peace and security. One interlocutor described the
situation better as “metastable”. It is fragile, and several Member States see
significant risk of a catalytic event, be that a natural disaster, public demonstrations
and disorder, or a major shock to a weak economy, causing a rapid return to violence
and insecurity.
12. There was no consensus among Member States consulted on a likely successor
to Hibatullah but most thought that the leadership would secure continuity and
stability, for example with de facto Chief Justice (currently Sheikh Abdul Hakim
Haqqani, not listed), as temporary leader until a new Amir was appointed.

B. Internal dynamics and divisions

13. Hibatullah reduced the gaps between Kandahar and Kabul (see S/2023/370,
para. 11) and has secured Taliban unity in the past year. Nevertheless, divisions and
tensions continue along well-established lines related to ethnicity, geography and
factional loyalty, rather than over policy. Access to Hibatullah remains carefully
controlled and his personal protection force has been strengthened in the past year.
14. Key figures perceived to have been rivals to Hibatullah’s authority are now less
so. Mullah Mohammad Yaqub Omari (Mullah Omar’s son, not listed, de facto
Minister of Defence) and Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144, de facto Minister
of Interior) had no option but to accept Hibatullah’s placemen within their ministries
and have promoted unity and obedience to the Amir. Nevertheless, some senior
Taliban figures continue to publicly criticize Hibatullah’s policies.
15. Member States noted that figures such as Sadr Ibrahim (not listed, Noorzai, de
facto Deputy Minister of Interior and head of the “Purging Commission”) and Abdul
Qayyum Zakir (not listed, Alizai, de facto Deputy Minister of Defence) are extremely
influential and feed resentment over preferment of those close to Hibatullah. The
tribal dynamics are complex and should not be overstated, but some mid-ranking
Taliban from other tribes feel that they have been passed over. Veteran commanders
also resent the promotion of clerics. Complaints from rank-and-file Taliban escalated
around activities of the “Purging Commission” and pose a unique problem for the
leadership. The stated purpose of the Commission was to curb nepotism within the
ranks of the security forces and allow Taliban fighters who served during the insurgency
access to certain state benefits and official employment. The implementation has
instead led to a backlash by those who feel that their loyalty is being questioned by the
de facto administration. 1 This has prompted fears of disillusioned Taliban fighters
deserting to join ISIL-K.
16. Some Member States stressed the importance of the General Directorate of
Intelligence, led by Abdul-Haq Wassiq (TAi.082), Taj Mir Jawad (not listed) and Hajji
Najib Rahmatullah (not listed, since 28 May 2024 also serving as de facto Deputy
Minister of Interior for Administration, and Head of the Weapons Registration
Commission), as a significant power base. It has large numbers, strong intelligence
capabilities, extensive powers, political influence, and presence throughout the
country at the provincial and district levels. Hibatullah has exerted greater control
through the establishment of the Batar and Zulfiqar units, which report directly to
him. Among the Batar unit’s functions, it oversees the directors of the General
Directorate of Intelligence to ensure that activities are aligned with the Taliban
__________________
1
In April, Taliban fighters were filmed burning Purging Commission certificates and calling them
“an insult to their struggles during the holy war in the last 20 years”.

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interpretation of sharia, by having clerics accompany and supervise directors on

international travel. The unit also educates employees of the General Directorate as
to the importance of the Deobandi perspective of Islam in intelligence work.

C. Ability to govern as de facto authorities

17. Member States observed that the Taliban provide their form of governance
across the country with an improved degree of order and control. Though there were
notable exceptions, corruption receded, primarily in the general administration and at
border checkpoints. Central and significant policy decisions, such as the response to
deportations of Afghans from Pakistan, the management of the economy or national
security are dealt with by the Taliban leadership inner circle in Kandahar, while
administrative and microeconomic decisions are retained in Kabul by the “interim
government”, organized in a cabinet with line ministries.
18. Domestic governance challenges faced by the Taliban are considerable: a fragile
economy, extreme poverty and dependence on humanitarian aid, climate change,
water and power issues, land disputes and the repeated impact of natural disasters. On
the issue of water, the Qush-Tepah canal is a flagship Taliban project on the Amu
Darya River. Member States raised concerns that it could affect water distribution
widely in the Central Asian region, with economic and social impact, causing regional
tension. Many Member States noted with concern the high percentage of revenues
allocated to security spending by the Taliban (see below), with some describing it as
excessive. Some Member States expressed concerns that the Taliban gives insufficient
priority to the funding of domestic needs, thereby exacerbating aid dependency.
Member States noted that all these factors entailed threats to regional peace and
stability, including the risk of large-scale migration, radicalization and recruitment to
terrorist organizations.
19. There are no indications of the Taliban adopting a new Afghan constitution.
Governance through sharia and the Amir’s decrees has been strengthened over the
past year. Equally, there is no single coherent legal framework, nor what could be
described as an independent judiciary. All judges are ultimately accountable to
Kandahar and Hibatullah, who exercises control by reshuffling positions within the
Darul-Ifta (Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence), provincial ulama councils and the
Supreme Court, appointing Pashtun in provinces largely populated by Hazaras, and
by removing Jafari (Shia) jurisprudence from university curricula.
20. While the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked by Hibatullah in late
2023 to formulate a foreign policy, no such blueprint has emerged publicly and there
has been reporting of the Amir taking a different view from the cabinet members in
Kabul regarding international engagement. The Taliban declined to participate in the
Doha II meetings in February 2024, and it remains to be seen whether they will engage
further through this forum. Meanwhile the Taliban have pursued pragmatic bilateral
engagement with a range of regional and other States, and a degree of “mini -
lateralism”. They have secured accredited diplomatic missions in some countries
without achieving formal recognition. Some regional States have removed the Taliban
from their domestic listing of terrorist organizations or are considering so doing. In
short, the Taliban are progressing pragmatic engagement on mutual interests in the
absence of a grand deal.

D. Competency to provide security

21. The security situation in Afghanistan has improved over the past 12 months and
is relatively stable. Incidents of violence have reduced considerably year on year and

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there is no meaningful armed opposition force threatening Taliban control,

notwithstanding the operations of the National Resistance Front and the Afghanistan
Freedom Front. Though there are significant cross-border tensions, there is no
immediate external military threat to Taliban rule over Afghanistan. The greatest
internal threat to the authority of the Taliban and to peace and security within the
country comes from ISIL-K.
22. Taliban operations against ISIL-K, both for their own reasons and in response
to international pressure, have had a significant effect. But Member States described
this as tactical rather than strategic. While Taliban intent is clear in meeting what they
perceive as an existential threat, their counter-terrorism capabilities are deficient to
meet the nature of that threat, requiring a more sophisticated response. Member States
supported, to some extent, Taliban claims to have pushed key ISIL-K personnel across
borders. However, while the extent of ISIL-K infiltration into Pakistan, the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Central Asian States requires clarification, this displacement had
negative implications for regional security. Nevertheless, ISIL-K continues to operate
on a distributed model across Afghanistan, with a cell structure and high levels of
operational security (see sect. V below). While their frequency has decreased, it
continues to stage attacks to undermine confidence in the Taliban’s ability to
guarantee security (see S/2023/370).
23. International perceptions of commitments under the Agreement for Bringing
Peace to Afghanistan between the United States of America and the Taliban (Doha
Agreement) to constrain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan still matter to
some Taliban, but as they wish to define them. While they have constrained members
of Al-Qaida and affiliated groups and forced them to reduce their profile within
Afghanistan, the relationship continues to be close. Nevertheless, some Member
States report ongoing Al-Qaida efforts to reorganize, recruit and train in Afghanistan
and note new, small-scale inward travel to Afghanistan in connection with Al-Qaida.
The intent behind these activities is not clear, nor are the consequences for the group’s
capabilities, but the activities cause significant concern. The number of terrorist
groups operating in Afghanistan has not reduced, with Al-Qaida and associated
groups considering the country as friendly territory (see sect. IV below).
24. TTP continues to operate at significant scale in Afghanistan and to conduct
terrorist operations into Pakistan from there, often utilizing Afghans. Member States
described this as too big a challenge for the Afghan Taliban to manage, even if they
wanted to. The Taliban do not conceive of TTP as a terrorist group: the bonds are
close, and the debt owed to TTP significant. Member States continue to detail ad hoc
support to, and tolerance of, TTP operations, including the supplying of weapons and
permission for training and support from Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
in particular.
25. Mullah Yaqub has approved a phased increase in the size of armed forces to
200,000, but Member States differ on its actual size. One judged the number to have
reached 170,000 by October 2023. This is a large number, raising questions about the
force’s purpose. Despite the high proportion of funds allocated to security (assessed
as up to 40 per cent of the budget by one Member State), the Taliban are struggling
to pay salaries.
26. As part of his drive to consolidate both his personal security and “special” forces
under his own control in Kandahar, Hibatullah sought to unify under a single
command in Kandahar the suicide bombing capability previously under disparate
commanders. This was expected to create a larger force of trained bombers, though
one Member State assessed that desertion, with men returning to their former

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commanders 2 means that only half of the anticipated number will remain under the
loyal Helmandi commander Maulvi Abdul Ahad Talib (not listed). With the Taliban
in power as the de facto authority, one internal critic questioned the purpose of this
force.
27. Badakhshan remains one of the key provinces for the Taliban owing to concerns
over a potential resurgence of ISIL-K, threats posed by armed opposition groups, and
ongoing intra-Taliban tensions. During November and December 2023, the de facto
Prime Minister, Mohammad Hassan Akhund (TAi.002), ordered a series of provincial
security and political reshuffles to strengthen Kandahar’s influence. Internal Taliban
disputes in the province have reportedly arisen owing to directives from Kandahar
being disregarded, including on opium ban enforcement, prompting Taliban fears over
increasing insecurity in the province. Similar struggles to secure control over
non-Pashtun Taliban elements in other areas of northern Afghanistan such as Baghlan
and Takhar are evident. While local demonstrations have largely been contained and
have dissipated for now, this could be the sort of catalytic event that challenges the
Taliban’s ability to sustain internal security.

E. Situation of minorities and officials of the former Islamic Republic

of Afghanistan

28. Member States continued to report Taliban crackdowns on perceived Salafists,

including allegations of extrajudicial killings, the destruction of mosques and forced
instruction in Deobandism. These reports included the activities of the Batar unit
within the General Directorate of Intelligence, who sought to educate ISIL -K
detainees in order to persuade them to reject Salafism and convert to Deobandism.
Member States also reported, however, that Taliban leadership actions against
Salafists were tempered by a fear that they could push individuals to join ISIL -K
ranks.
29. Taliban ideology continues to have negative consequences for mino rity groups
such as the Hazara. While some officers of the former government continue in service,
including within the General Directorate of Intelligence, Member States reported
continued targeting of former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
personnel, judges and prosecutors. Specific reports of arbitrary detentions,
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances could not be attributed, but there was
no systematic Taliban process to prevent such incidents.

III. Taliban finances and narcotics situation

30. Since the Taliban’s return to power, the economy of Afghanistan has been in
perpetual crisis, with real gross domestic product (GDP) contracting by 26 per cent
over the past two fiscal years. Afghanistan is heavily dependent on foreign assistance,
cash imports and informal payment methods, with hawala still accounting for 90 per
cent of financial transactions. The fragile sector has been further challenged by the
recent involuntary return of Afghans (more than 2 million in 2023) and natural
disasters (multiple floods and the earthquake in Herat, in October 2023), further
reducing GDP growth. Simultaneously, 24 million Afghans remain in need of
humanitarian assistance, with poverty, food insecurity, high unemployment and
underemployment all rampant. Despite the struggling economy, import levels in 2023
remained strong, and $2 billion in remittances and foreign exchange contributed to a
__________________
2
These commanders enjoyed great autonomy in combat decisions at the operational and tactical
levels and have had direct relations with foreign terrorist groups.

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26 per cent appreciation of the afghani. United Nations cash shipments to support
humanitarian assistance continue to help stabilize the Afghan currency.
31. With full control of all institutions of government, the Taliban have effectively
enhanced revenue collection. Funds from customs, tariffs on cross-border trade and
taxes are routinely collected and deposited into the de facto authorities’ single account
and budgeted for government expenses by the de facto Ministry of Finance. General
Directorate of Revenue figures for the period from 21 March 2023 to 20 March 2024 3
indicate a total of $2,930,894,456 (210,731,000,000 afghanis) in official revenue
collected, representing a 30 per cent increase as compared with the previous fiscal
year total of 193,661,000,000 afghanis ($2,240,189,084). Tax revenue in the amount
of $1,004,674,377 (72,239,000,000 afghanis) and customs revenue in the amount of
$1,194,148,265 (85,858,000,000 afghanis) both increased significantly, while non-tax
revenues (all other funds collected by Taliban agencies such as fees for various
government services, including newly registered right-hand drive vehicles, consular
revenues, licence subscriptions, passport issuances, royalties, road tolls, etc.)
amounting to $702,360,796 (50,499,000,000 afghanis) remained relatively stable.
32. The Taliban have consolidated control over finances. 4 Revenue management,
budgetary allocations and macroeconomic policies have been revised, and
development works have come under increased focus, particularly under the
leadership of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (TAi.024). In addition to imposing flat -
rate taxes, the de facto authorities have levied taxes on salaries, rent, mobile phone
credit and the profits of small, medium and large businesses, all of which affect
average Afghans. Customs duties and royalties on the extraction of and trade in
minerals, along with taxation levied on farmers, have increased revenues but add to
this burden on the population. Foreign direct investment has been a priority of the
Taliban, but the de facto authorities are frustrated by limited success, especially in the
country’s rich minerals sector, leading the Taliban to focus on private investors rather
than foreign governments. Extraction remains challenging owing to poor
infrastructure and a lack of clarity on legal property titles.
33. The de facto authorities are acknowledged to have reduced petty corruption at
the administrative level (such as road tolls imposed by local groups and police
extortion), but corruption continues at the upper echelons of the Taliban. In addition
to mining, interlocutors reported the exploitation of other natural resources of
Afghanistan through the allocation of lucrative contracts or posts in relevant
ministries as common practice, though probably less acute than under the former
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Member States noted, as a caveat, that it re mains
unclear whether this has reached senior levels of the de facto authorities in Kandahar,
as there was a lack of fidelity in their understanding of the workings around the Amir.
34. Member States credit the Taliban with taking significant steps to eradicate drug
production following the April 2022 decree banning both the cultivation and trade of
opium and the October 2023 drug law. According to the Afghanistan Opium Survey
2023 published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 5 opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 95 per cent (from 233,000 ha in 2022 to
10,800 ha in 2023). One Member State noted Taliban reports of more than 1,500
anti-narcotics operations in 2023, the seizure of 8,000 tons of drugs, the arrest of

__________________
3
Based on information provided by a Member State which will be assessed by the World Bank.
4
Information on the de facto authorities’ revenues is regularly reported. There is though little
visibility regarding expenditure by the Taliban. Budget outlays and the allocation of funds for
goods or activities outside of official government functions lack transparency provided by
Taliban agencies collecting taxes, etc.
5
Available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_
opium_survey_2023.pdf.

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8,500 people and the destruction of 834 laboratories and 14,000 ha of crops. But
Member States also noted significantly less progress in limiting heroin trafficking and
synthetics (methamphetamine) production and trade, with the Taliban continuing to
receive significant revenue from narcotics trafficking.
35. Opium stockpiles remain to the extent that no noticeable difference in exports
of the drug can be detected from seizure data. Estimates of the scale of stockpiles
vary, but it could be several years before the effect of the cultivation ban can be
assessed fully. Meanwhile, well-connected traders continue to profit while farmers
struggle to find alternative cash crops. Member States note that efforts to eradicate
poppy cultivation, destroy laboratories and seize chemicals favour the Taliban
establishment, serving to consolidate control of Kandahar tribes by providing Noorzai
and Ishaqzai cartels with significant revenue while targeting non-Taliban rivals. The
Governor of Nangarhar, Mohammad Naim Barich Khudaidad (TAi.013), controls the
eastern route, and the Governor of Balkh, Yousuf Wafa (not listed), who is a relative
of Hibatullah’s, administers the northern route. Numerous de facto authority figures
are involved with and profit from continued drug trade, while the Haqqani Network
(TAe.012) maintains long-established middlemen to promote their interests in heroin
trafficking and the more profitable methamphetamine market.
36. Alongside opium, methamphetamine seizures have continued to increase, and
recently fentanyl has appeared and been recorded in significant quantities. Farah,
Herat and Nimroz are the main hubs for producing methamphetamine, with active
labs in Bahramcha, Dishu district, and Helmand Province. Methamphetamine has
been seized with heroin in Kandahar and Nangarhar, suggesting that trafficking of the
two drugs may be through the same networks.

IV. Assessment of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan

37. Al-Qaida remains strategically patient, cooperating with other terrorist groups
in Afghanistan and prioritizing its ongoing relationship with the Taliban. The group
continues to operate covertly in order to project the image of Taliban adherence to the
provisions of the Doha Agreement to prevent the use of Afghan soil for terrorist
purposes. Despite a reduced profile, Al-Qaida disseminates propaganda to increase
recruitment while working to rebuild its operational capability. Al-Qaida capacity to
conduct large-scale attacks continues to be limited, while its intent remains firm,
bolstered by its affiliates’ abilities to carry out external operations. The status and
location of the Al-Qaida Amir and the strength of the group in Afghanistan have not
changed (see S/2024/92, para. 73).
38. Al-Qaida figures located in Afghanistan continue to engage with warlords,
propagandists, recruiters and financiers. Experienced instructors have travelled into
Afghanistan to enhance the security of dispersed cells. Al-Qaida prioritizes outreach
and recruitment, particularly among those who previously worked alongside it or had
been operational members prior to August 2021. One Member State reported that
Al-Qaida had sought to establish cooperation with the Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement (QDe.088), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP), and
with Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) (not listed), in order to intensify activities and strengthen
positions within Taliban military structures in the north to conduct joint operations
and move the centre of terrorist activity to Central Asia.
39. Member States note that Al-Qaida cells are operating in multiple Afghan
provinces, mainly in the south-east of the country. Several Member States noted that
facilities with Al-Qaida associations are mainly for training local fighters along with
TTP operatives, with newly reported training base locations and safe houses in

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various Afghan provinces, including former camps in Jalalabad and in Kandahar

Province, and in Kunar, Nuristan and Takhar Provinces.
40. Katiba Umer Farooq 6 developed under the leadership of Abu Ikhlas al-Masri,
with a fresh inflow of some Arab fighters. Abu Ikhlas al-Masri (not listed) had been
taken into protective custody by the General Directorate of Intelligence in late
November 2023, reflecting Taliban concerns that foreign intelligence agencies were
looking for him. Other Al-Qaida operatives, including two weapons engineers, were
taken into protective custody or otherwise hidden by the de facto authorities in Kabul.
Pakistani authorities arrested Amin Muhammad ul-Haq Saam Khan (QDi.002, alias
Dr. Amin), for illegal possession of weapons while crossing from Afghanistan into
Pakistan in March 2024.
41. Member States noted the arrival of several ethnic Arab Al-Qaida members in
Kunar and Nuristan for training and to facilitate communication between Mohammed
Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidane, (QDi.001, alias Sayf al-‘Adl) and Al-Qaida core
figures, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and certain elements of the
Taliban. The presence of Abdelazim Ben Ali (not listed), a Libyan Al-Qaida member
belonging to the Shura Council of Abu Salim in Darnah, Libya was also reported,
serving at the de facto Ministry of Interior with no clear job description and issued
with Afghan passports under the name of “Abd al-Azim” and “Ali Musa bin Ali
al-Darsi”.
42. Directorate 31 within the General Directorate of Intelligence, responsible for
liaison with foreign terrorist fighters, reportedly informed all Arab fighters to avoid
Kabul or face detention. Nevertheless, the Taliban requested all Al-Qaida rank-and-
file members to come to Kabul for biometric registration, but senior Al-Qaida figures
were reported to have declined.
43. AQIS, with a strength of 180–200 fighters, is located in Farah, Herat (media
apparatus), Helmand, Kandahar and Nimroz Provinces. It assists TTP in conducting
terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, with Tehrik-e Jihad Pakistan (TJP, not listed)
claiming responsibility so as to relieve pressure on the de facto authorities. The group
publishes high-quality digital magazines highlighting the AQIS version of Islam
focusing on Bangladeshi, Kashmiri and Rohingya issues, with a view to recruitment.
Reportedly, AQIS fighters and their families received some financial support from the
de facto authorities.

V. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan

44. Despite the loss of territory and attrition among senior and mid-tier leadership
figures, ISIL-K remains a major threat in Afghanistan, the region and beyond. While
the Taliban have made consistent claims to have defeated ISIL-K, attacks continue,
with the Taliban leadership divided over approaches in dealing with both the group
and Salafist communities sympathetic to it. ISIL-K exploits sectarian fault lines and
attacks targets of opportunity, such as religious minorities. ISIL-K has adopted a more
theologically tolerant approach to recruitment, focusing on attracting members from
other terrorist groups and the Taliban, including non-Salafists who were not
previously known to authorities.
45. Since mid-2022, the Taliban have increased operations against ISIL-K. During
2023–2024, the General Directorate of Intelligence reportedly conducted over 100
operations against ISIL-K elements and cadres in Kabul and other cities. In response
to high attrition rates, ISIL-K limited operations in Afghanistan and expanded its

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6
See S/2023/370, para. 41.

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external operations, with skilled operatives and suicide bombers encouraged to travel
to Europe, the Russian Federation and other neighbouring countries. ISIL-K capacity
remains strong, and the group has conducted high-impact, well-planned attacks that
caused large numbers of casualties in 2024.
46. Member States assessed that ISIL-K efforts to delegitimize the Taliban are
driven by its opposition to the concept of the nation State as espoused by the de facto
authorities. ISIL-K is using Afghan nationals to conduct attacks in Pakistan, Pakistani
nationals to conduct attacks inside Afghanistan, Tajik nationals to conduct attacks in
Iran (Islamic Republic of) and the Russian Federation, and has used a Kyrgyz national
to carry out an attack in the Taliban’s heartland of Kandahar. The more the de facto
authorities claim that foreign terrorists do not use its territory to threaten other
Member States, the more ISIL-K is determined to prove them wrong, advancing the
notion of “wider Khorasan”.
47. Several Member States estimate that ISIL (Da’esh) affiliates in the region,
including Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP) and Islamic State Hind Province
(ISHP), in addition to ISIL-K, have increased from 4,000 to 6,000 fighters, while
others assessed ISIL-K core strength to remain at 2,000-3,500. ISIL-K were reported
to have successfully infiltrated the main ministries of the de facto authorities
(Ministry of Interior, Defence and General Directorate of Intelligence). The group has
sought to embed members covertly in other groups such as TTP, TJP, Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (QDe.010), and JA, making it difficult to estimate
numbers of ISIL-K members, as well as to which group individuals were loyal.
Recruits entering from the north were stated to do so as JA, and those entering from
the south were facilitated by TTP from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
Balochistan Province of Pakistan, as well as through South Waziristan. This was
assessed as being a pragmatic approach to avoid direct contact with the Taliban while
simultaneously receiving access to welfare benefits, weapons and training.
48. Sanaullah Ghafari (alias Shahab al-Muhajir, QDi.431) remained ISIL-K leader
following a failed attempt by the General Directorate of Intelligence to arrest him
during a raid in Kunar in June 2023, driving him further into hiding. One Member
State noted that the group had dispersed from its core area of Kunar and Nangarhar,
one faction having migrated to Badakhshan in northern Afghanistan, and others to
Herat and Nimroz Provinces, and that operatives were also in mountainous areas of
Balochistan and undercover in major cities, including Kabul. Some ISIL-K operatives
reportedly moved to the Islamic Republic of Iran in mid-2023.
49. ISIL-K has strengthened in northern regions of Afghanistan, increasing
recruitment within Tajik and Uzbek communities and stockpiling arms and explosives
in remote mountainous areas. One Member State assessed that ISIL-K is planning to
establish territorial control over certain areas of Afghanistan and infiltrate into
neighbouring Central Asian States. Routes northwards are used to transfer ISIL -K
fighters into the Russian Federation and Central Asia.
50. Since March 2024, the Al-Azaim Foundation of ISIL-K has distributed a
specialized publication, entitled “Sado-yi Khorasan”, on the Internet for ethnic Tajiks
living in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan. Propaganda intensified through other
ISIL (Da’esh) outlets such as Al-Naba. One Member State noted that recent arrests of
ISIL-K members highlighted the use of the Zangi messenger application due to
concerns that Telegram might be compromised. Other applications mentioned were
TeleGuard and Element.
51. One Member State reported that ISIL-K leaders have focused on attracting
financial support and received about $2.5 million in 2023 from various sources to
destabilize some regional countries, some of which might have been used to conduct
the attack on 22 March 2024 in the Crocus City Hall near Moscow. ISIL (Da’esh)

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core claimed responsibility for this attack, releasing on Telegram the e-book Moscow
Attack: The Courage of Warriors. The attack, part of the campaign to “kill them
wherever you find them”, resulted in a number of European countries raising terrorist
threat levels.
52. According to two Member States, ISIL-K leaders sought to destabilize the
situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran through the establishment of a “special
operations team” to target attacks against Shia shrines, clergy, police officers and
foreign citizens in the Islamic Republic of Iran, using Tajik and Uzbek nationals. One
reported that the team numbers about 300, operating mainly in the Iranian provinces
bordering Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Iraq, and that it is led by Mustafa Rigi, a former
Jaysh al-Adl (not listed) member of Iranian Baluchi background.
53. Member States noted that the attack claimed by ISIL (Da’esh) on 3 January
2024, in Kerman Province, southern Islamic Republic of Iran, revealed ISIL -K
trademark modus operandi, including detailed planning and the use of suicide
bombers for initial attacks and follow-up attacks on first responders. One Member
State reported that of the two suicide bombers, one was a Tajik national who had
undergone training in Badakhshan Province, while the second was likely an A fghan
national.

VI. Other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan

54. Notwithstanding continuing assertions by the Taliban that there are no foreign
terrorist groups in Afghanistan other than ISIL-K, Member States reported that over
two dozen groups still operate in the country, enjoying freedom of manoeuvre under
the de facto authorities with oversight from the General Directorate of Intelligence.
55. TTP remained the largest terrorist group in Afghanistan, with an estimated
strength of 6,000–6,500 fighters. One Member State expressed concern that greater
collaboration between TTP and Al-Qaida could transform TTP into an “extraregional
threat”. Al-Qaida support of TTP includes the sharing of Afghan fighters for its
tashkils (in this context, military staffing or a formation) and training camps in
Afghanistan. Training provided by AQIS has resulted in TTP shifting tactics and high-
profile attacks against hard targets. One interlocutor noted the role of an individual
connected to Sirajuddin Haqqani in weapon transfers to TTP, as well as arranging for
ISIL-K prisoners to be released provided they join TTP.
56. One Member State detailed how the Taliban exerts pressure on TTP through
funding, reportedly providing 3.5 million afghanis ($50,500) on a monthly basis to
TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud (QDi.427), while also directing him to garner
additional sources of revenue from donors. Nevertheless, the de facto authorities
remain concerned that excessive pressure might push TTP towards collaboration with
ISIL-K. Mehsud is considered to maintain a backdoor line of communication with
ISIL-K to keep options open.
57. TTP has intensified attacks against Pakistan, significantly increasing from 573
in 2021 to 715 in 2022 and 1,210 in 2023, with the trend continuing into 2024. The
largest TTP attack occurred on 9 September 2023, when more than 1,000 TTP fighters
launched a coordinated attack against two military posts in north -western Chitral
district, Pakistan, to take and hold territory. TTP fighters were reportedly aided by
AQIS members, numbering in the hundreds. One Member State provided details of a
Taliban commander responsible for directing Afghan fighters into Pakistan. Some
Member States attributed responsibility for the 26 March 2024 attack against Chinese
nationals working on a hydropower dam project near the city of Besham in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa to TTP.

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58. Following the attack in Chitral, the de facto authorities imposed new restrictions
on TTP in November 2023, forbidding them from carrying weapons in cities.
However, the de facto authorities struggle to respond to both the internal and external
pressures that the group’s presence and activities pose. Consequently, there have been
continual amendments and changes to TTP weapons allowances.
59. Member States reiterate that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) calibre
weapons, especially night vision capability, that have been provided to TTP since the
Taliban takeover, add lethality to TTP terrorist attacks against Pakistani military
border posts.
60. Taliban policy regarding relations with the TTP shifted in mid-2023. The
General Directorate of Intelligence facilitated three new guest houses in Kabul for
TTP leaders and reportedly issued passes to senior TTP figures to facilitate ease of
movement and immunity from arrest, as well as weapons permits. The more positive
relationship with TTP was intended to assure continued alliance with the Taliban and
to dissuade defections to ISIL-K. On 5 March 2024, Noor Wali Mehsud informed
media outlets that he had recently met Hibatullah, prompting immediate denials by
the Taliban.
61. Nonetheless, managing TTP and related groups is challenging for the Taliban.
Sirajuddin Haqqani appears to have been sidelined as a mediator between Pakistan
and TTP when, in January 2024, the de facto Governor of Kandahar, Mullah Shirin
(not listed), a Hibatullah loyalist, led a delegation to Pakistan for discussions.
62. The status of ETIM/TIP remains largely unchanged (see S/2024/92, para. 84).
Several Member States noted ETIM/TIP cooperation with TTP, with training camps
in Kunar being used by TTP fighters. One Member State reported ETIM/TIP assisting
de facto authorities in the fight against anti-Taliban forces and in tax collection and
is collaborating with TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army to target Pakistan-
China interests. Along with TTP, IMU and JA, ETIM/TIP continued to use Afghan
territory as a base for attacks against neighbouring States in order to destabilize
Central Asian countries. Despite ideological differences, there was reporting of
ETIM/TIP links to ISIL-K at the organizational level.
63. ETIM/TIP has strengthened the process of “localization” in Afghanistan,
integrating into Afghan society and engaging in mining and other activities so as to
gain a stable foothold in Afghanistan. The group has increasingly produced audio
and/or video footage inciting violence in additional languages (Kyrgyz and Bahasa
Indonesia) in order to reach a wider international audience and has exploited recent
attacks in Pakistan and the Russian Federation to promote fundamentalist ideology.
64. The status of IMU, the Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119), Khatiba Imam
al-Bukhari (QDe.158) and JA in Afghanistan remains unchanged (see S/2024/92,
para. 83). JA has reportedly strengthened relations with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (QDe.152)
and Jaysh al-Fursan.

VII. Sanctions implementation

65. Under resolution 1988 (2011), 135 individuals and five entities are subject to
the mandatory sanctions of an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. As of the
end of May 2024, the Monitoring Team has confirmed that at least 61 sanctioned
Taliban members are associated with the de facto authorities (see annex).
66. The Monitoring Team, as mandated in resolution 2255 (2015), has currently
under way its annual review of entries on the sanctions list established pursuant to
resolution 1988 (2011). The 2023 position paper of the Security Council Committee

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established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) (S/2023/467) tasked the Monitoring

Team with undertaking a thorough review of the list, prioritizing individuals who lack
identifiers or are reportedly deceased, and entities reported or confirmed to have
ceased to exist.

A. Travel ban

67. Under paragraphs 19 and 20 of Security Council resolution 2255 (2015), the
Committee is authorized to consider requests for exemptions to the travel ban
imposed under paragraph 1 (b) of the resolution. All international travel by listed
individuals must receive Committee approval in advance of travel as set out in
resolution 2255 (2015) and the Committee’s guidelines. The Committee approved 17
requests from seven Member States for travel by listed Taliban members from April
2023 to May 2024. The purpose of the travel was for medical treatment (5 requests
for four individuals), to perform hajj (1 request), to participate in international
meetings (9 requests), or for bilateral consultations (2 requests).
68. As previously noted, exemption requests have been received by the Committee
subsequent to or concurrent with the listed individual’s travel, requiring expedited
procedures for Committee consideration. In order to address these issues, the
Committee has corresponded with specific Member States hosting listed Taliban
members, as well as with all Member States to remind them of requirements for the
advance submission of travel ban exemption requests.
69. Recent exemption requests have raised questions as to whether travel entailing
the use of funds under the direction of a designated individual, for example for
medical treatment, also requires an asset freeze exemption request. The travel ban
exemption request form includes a section for a combined asset freeze exemption
request, which is often not completed by applicant States.

B. Asset freeze

70. The Committee did not receive any requests for exemptions to the asset freeze
from Member States from May 2023 to May 2024. The Monitoring Team believes, as
noted above, that some travel ban exemption requests could have required parallel
asset freeze exemption requests (for example, where the listed individual is directing
assets for medical treatment, irrespective of whether the funds are his or her own).
71. Likewise, any support to listed individuals provided by hosting States beyond
basic travel expenses requires an exemption to the asset freeze. The Committee may
wish to consider giving further direction to the Monitoring Team as to how to better
capture assets being made available for the benefit of the Taliban.

C. Arms embargo and related issues

72. The Taliban control large stockpiles of weapons and expanded that control to
other weapons in circulation through the Weapons Registration Commission. The
Taliban have addressed the maintenance of their existing stockpiles and pursued the
acquisition of additional military equipment and drone capability. According to one
Member State, ETIM/TIP focuses on unmanned aerial vehicle and drone combat
methods, reportedly flight-testing drones with bombs attached.
73. A delegation led by Mullah Yaqub visited the International Maritime Defence
Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX) arms exhibition in Doha in March 2024,
seeking to secure contracts for maintenance services, spare parts for vehicles, and air

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defence systems that would allow the Taliban to combat drones operating in Afghan
airspace. All Taliban ministries had therefore been instructed to set aside a percentage
of their allocated budgets for a special fund to be used for purchases of new weapons
systems. The failure to secure such contracts was a blow to Taliban ambitions for their
military capabilities. The Advanced Weapons Commission is discussing the
production of enhanced drones.
74. The Taliban seek private contractors to service four-wheel-drive vehicles and
helicopters, but Member States are not aware of payments for such equipment or
services. Taliban discussions with potential suppliers were believed to be in
preparation for an eventual lifting of sanctions. Taliban interest in operational air
capability reflected a desire to counter ISIL-K, as many Taliban commanders
understand what air power can achieve against a ground insurgency.
75. There have been at least three operations in which Taliban forces successfully
used existing Mi-17 transport helicopters, Mi-24 attack helicopters and MD-500 light
attack helicopters. The Taliban claim 60 aircraft in service, increasing from 40 last
year. Securing spare parts to enable aircraft to remain operational is challenging.
76. The Weapons Registration Commission has caused tension and suspicion,
especially in northern Afghanistan, as it is viewed as an instrument for consolidation
of the leadership in Kandahar. Directives are that any heavy weaponry secured should
be shipped to Kandahar. The Taliban’s own assessments suggest that about half of the
weapons they estimated to be in the possession of the Afghan National Defence and
Security Forces by August 2021 remained unaccounted for. However, the true number
of weapons possessed by the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces at that
time is unknown and probably significantly higher. The dynamics of the Commission
represents a power play by the ruling clerics and Hibatullah that has been described
as setting a dangerous precedent in taking away weapons and legitimacy from
established power bases, including the Haqqani Network.
77. In addition to concerns that the Taliban supplied weapons to TTP (see para. 59
above), a Member State reported that the Taliban have provided JA fighters on the
border with Tajikistan with new military vehicles, weaponry and other equipment,
amid an ongoing military build-up on both sides of the frontier. Tajik fighters based
in the northern Province of Badakhshan possess United States and NATO weaponry
and vehicles.
78. Sales of small arms and light weapons through numerous gun markets in
Afghanistan remained localized to the south, where terrorists can purchase such
weapons without restriction. Authorities intercepted a large shipment of small arms
and light weapons from Afghanistan to South America, destined for narcotics traders.

VIII. Recommendations
79. The Monitoring Team recommends that, when seeking any exemption to
sanctions measures, Member States be encouraged to attach a copy of the passport,
photograph, financial details or any other relevant documentation, where possible, to
enable appropriate amendments to listings. Variations of listed names, and their
transliteration, on new travel documents cause difficulties for Member States in
enforcing the travel ban.
80. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Chair of the Committee write to
Member States to clarify that when a travel ban exemption request is submitted for
medical treatment or other health reasons that incur costs to the listed individual, the
sanctions measures must be fully respected and, where necessary, a request for an
asset freeze exemption should be submitted simultaneously to the travel ban request.

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Member States concerned are welcome to approach the Committee or the Monitoring
Team prior to the submission of such requests to discuss the process.
81. The Monitoring Team stands ready to support the Committee’s proposal of
convening a special meeting with Member States interested in better understanding
the travel ban exemption process, which could usefully take the form of a works hop.
Member States are invited to bring to the Committee’s attention any recommendation
that could strengthen the implementation of sanctions measures and enhance mutual
cooperation between the Committee and Member States.
82. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee authorize it to respond
positively to requests received from Member States in Central Asia concerning
sanctions regime processes and queries, subject to the availability of funds. The Team
would welcome the Committee’s support in requesting UNODC assistance and
support in such initiatives.

IX. Work of the Monitoring Team

A. Evidence base and cooperation with Member States, United Nations
bodies and civil society

83. The Monitoring Team travelled extensively in support of the present report in
the second half of 2023. Owing to exceptional financial constraints, in 2024 the Team
was not able to travel as widely as it normally would. It mitigated the situation by
making best use of regional meetings, convening the security and intelligence
authorities of a significant number of Member States. These included some countries
neighbouring Afghanistan, those engaged directly with the Taliban and those which
have retained some diplomatic presence in Kabul. Some Member State delegations
visited the Monitoring Team in New York, and others were consulted during
videoconferences.
84. The Monitoring Team also sent more written requests for information to
Member States than is the norm. Member States that responded were generous and
timely, providing a strong, diverse and balanced information base for the present
report. There was striking consistency of analysis across the contributions made by a
wide range of Member States.
85. As briefed to the Committee, the Monitoring Team did not visit Afghanistan
during the reporting period and retains the ambition to do so when circumstances
permit. The Team continues to engage with international and regional organizations
to supplement its work, including several United Nations entities, the Regional
Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the
Anti-Terrorism Centre of the Commonwealth of Independent States, among others.
The Team remains appreciative of the excellent cooperation with these bodies. In
addition, the Monitoring Team also engaged with academia, think tanks and
representatives of civil society, both Afghan and international, on the Taliban and
Afghan affairs.
86. The Monitoring Team notes that reliable data on the numbers of fighters aligned
with groups affiliated with Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da’esh) are difficult to obtain,
particularly from conflict zones. Individuals can be aligned with more than one group.
The figures used in the present report reflect either consensus or a range of estimates
made by contributing Member States, with a potential margin of error. Where
possible, the Team sought to disaggregate fighters from family members or other
affiliates.

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B. Contributing to the public debate

87. The Monitoring Team welcomes feedback on the analysis and suggestions
contained in the present report, which can be sent by email (1988mt@un.org).

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Annex
Individuals in the de facto administration subject to sanctions
imposed by the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1988 (2011)

According to the Monitoring Team’s assessment in April 2023, 58 members of

the Taliban-announced “interim government” were also listed under the 1988
sanctions regime (see the fourteenth report of the Monitoring Team, S/2023/370).
That number is now 61. At the time of writing, among the 61 identified listed
individuals, 35 hold cabinet-level appointments, 1 including the Prime Minister and
his three deputies. Among the remainder, 14 are “acting ministers” and 7 have roles
that combine business functions with advisory activity. In total, there are 135
individuals and five entities on the sanctions list of the Security Council Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). A total of 31 listed individuals are
reported or confirmed deceased; in 14 cases this has not yet been reflected in the list. 2
As of May 2024, it is likely that 74 listed individuals (including three “reconciled”
ones) are alive.
Two listed individuals had previously reconciled with the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and then rejoined the Taliban following their return to power; three
reconciled listed individuals have not rejoined the Taliban and accordingly are not
included in the list of individuals below.

Cabinet-level positions in the Taliban de facto administration

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

1. Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund Pashtun TAi.002

2. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Abdul Ghani Baradar Abdul Ahmad Turk Pashtun TAi.024
Affairs
3. Deputy Prime Minister for Administration Abdul Salam Hanafi Ali Mardan Qul Uzbek TAi.027
4. Deputy Prime Minister for Political Abdul Kabir Mohammad Jan Pashtun TAi.003
Affairs
5. First Deputy Minister of Defence Fazl Mohammad Mazloom Pashtun TAi.023
6. Director-General of Intelligence (General Abdul-Haq Wassiq Pashtun TAi.082
Directorate of Intelligence)
7. Acting Minister for Hajj and Religious Noor Mohammad Saqib Pashtun TAi.110
Affairs

__________________
1
The definition of “cabinet-level” includes the Prime Minister and his three deputies for
administrative, political and economic affairs; the 24 “acting ministers” and their deputies; and
the 18 “ministers of state” or “independent directors-general” and their deputies, who head the
Taliban’s intelligence service, the Central Bank, the Red Crescent Society, or the state -owned
railway and electricity company, and who participate in cabinet meetings.
2
Entries TAi.004, TAi.006, TAi.011, TAi.015, TAi.016, TAi.021, TAi.022, TAi.025, TAi.040,
TAi.051, TAi.057 (reportedly deceased in early July 2023), TAi.063, TAi.069, TAi.075, TAi.078,
TAi.083, TAi.096, TAi.097, TAi.099, TAi.100, TAi.106, TAi.107, TAi.108, TAi.111, TAi.136,
TAi.146, TAi.159, TAi.164, TAi.168, TAi.171 and TAi.174.

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Cabinet-level positions in the Taliban de facto administration

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

8. Deputy Minister for Hajj and Religious Arifullah Arif Pashtun TAi.030
Affairs in charge of Administration and
Finance
9. Acting Minister for Information and Khairullah Khairkhah Pashtun TAi.093
Culture
10. Deputy Minister of Information and Saduddin Sayyed Pashtun TAi.087
Culture in charge of culture and art
11. Acting Minister for Refugee Return Khalil Ahmed Haqqani Pashtun TAi.150
12. Acting Minister of Borders and Tribal Nurullah Nuri Pashtun TAi.089
Affairs
13. Acting Minister of Civil Aviation and Hamidullah Akhund Sher Mohammad Pashtun TAi.118
Transport
14. Acting Minister of Economy Din Mohammad Hanif Tajik TAi.043
15. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Motaqi Pashtun TAi.026
16. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai Pashtun TAi.067
Padshah Khan
17. Acting Minister of Interior Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani Pashtun TAi.144
18. Acting Minister of Mines and Petroleum Shahabuddin Delawar Pashtun TAi.113
19. Acting Minister of Public Works Mullah Muhammad Isa Sani, listed as Pashtun TAi.060
Mullah Mohammad Essa Akhund –
(previously Deputy Minister for Energy
and Water)
20. Acting Minister of State for Disaster Abbas Akhund Pashtun TAi.066
Management
21. Deputy Minister of State for Disaster Mawlawi Abd al-Rahman Zahed Pashtun TAi.033
Management in charge of financial and
administrative affairs
22. Acting Minister of Communications and Najibullah Haqqani Hidayatullah Pashtun TAi.071
Information Technology
23. Acting Minister of Urban Development Hamdullah Nomani Pashtun TAi.044
and Lands
24. Acting Minister of Water and Energy Abdul Latif Mansur Pashtun TAi.007
25. Governor of the Central Bank of Mullah Hedayatullah Badri (Hidayatullah Pashtun TAi.147
Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Bank) Badri) listed as Gul Agha Ishakzai
26. First Deputy Governor of the Central Hajji Ahmad Zia Agha a.k.a. Noor Pashtun TAi.156
Bank of Afghanistan Ahmad Agha

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Cabinet-level positions in the Taliban de facto administration

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

27. Deputy Minister of Finance Abdul Qadir Haqqani listed as Abdul Pashtun TAi.128
Qadeer Basir Abdul Baseer
28. Acting Auditor General Ezatullah Haqqani Khan Sayyid Pashtun TAi.064
29. Director of National Procurement in the Abdul Wali Seddiqi Pashtun TAi.133
Office of Administrative Affairs
30. Deputy Minister for Martyrs and Disabled Abdul Razaq Akhund Lala Akhund Pashtun TAi.053
Affairs
31. Deputy Minister for Military Affairs of Said Ahmed Shahid Khel Pashtun TAi.028
the Vice and Virtue Ministry
32. Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Mohammad Zahid Pashtun TAi.127
Affairs
33. Deputy Minister of Industry and Qudratullah Jamal Pashtun TAi.047
Commerce
34. Deputy Minister of Borders and Tribal Ahmad Taha Khalid Abdul Qadir Pashtun TAi.105
Affairs
35. Deputy President of the Afghan Red Nooruddin Turabi Muhammad Qasim Pashtun TAi.058
Crescent Society

Administrative positions below cabinet level

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

36. Adviser to Amir Hibatullah on Financial Jan Mohammad Madani Ikram Pashtun TAi.119
Affairs
37. Senior Adviser in Ministry of Education Sayyed Ghiassouddine Agha Uzbek TAi.072
38. Deputy Commanding Officer – Helmand Abdul Samad Achekzai Pashtun TAi.160
Army Corps
39. Deputy Mayor of Kabul Sayed Esmatullah Asem Abdul Quddus Pashtun TAi.080

40. Director in Office of Administrative Mohammed Eshaq Akhundzada Pashtun TAi.101

Affairs (OAA)
41. Director General for Implementation and Shamsuddin a.k.a. Shamsuddin Shari'ati Tajik TAi.103
Supervision of Orders and Decrees
(formerly Attorney General’s Office)
42. Director in Ministry of Defence under the Abdul Jabbar Omari Pashtun TAi.088
Deputy for Technology and Logistics
43. Head of Education and Culture in the Mawlawi Abdul Rahman Agha Pashtun TAi.114
Taliban Army

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Administrative positions below cabinet level

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

44. Head of Higher Education Examination Abdul Baqi Haqqani listed as Abdul Baqi Pashtun TAi.038
Board Basir Awal Shah (formerly Acting
Minister of Higher Education, September
2021–October 2022, financial adviser of
the Haqqani Network (TAe.012))
45. Head of Internal Investigations at the Fazlullah Rabi listed as Fazl Rabi Pashtun TAi.157
Ministry of Higher Education
46. Head of Public Information for Ministry Rahmatullah Kakazada Pashtun TAi.137
of Interior
47. Director of Professional Development in Mohammad Ibrahim Omari a.k.a. Pashtun TAi.042
Ministry of Education Ibrahim Haqqani (Sirajuddin Haqqani’s
uncle)
48. Ministry of Interior, Special Adviser and Yahya Haqqani Pashtun TAi.169
in charge of suicide bombers
49. Professor of Islamic Studies at Kabul Mawlawi Abdul Quddus Mazhari Tajik TAi.135
University
50. Provincial Chief of Police, Kabul Wali Jan Hamza listed as Walijan Pashtun TAi.095
Province
51. Governor of Nangarhar Haji Gul Muhammad listed as Pashtun TAi.013
Mohammad Naim Barich Khudaidad
52. Governor of Logar Province Zia ur-Rahman Madani Tajik TAi.102
53. Third Secretary in Tehran, Islamic Mohammad Aleem Noorani Pashtun TAi.138
Republic of Iran, Afghan embassy
54. Deputy Director of Vocational Training Nik Mohammad Dost Mohammad Pashtun TAi.019
Institute in Kabul

Advisory roles around the de facto administration

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

55. Adviser of the Haqqani Network Muhammad Taher Anwari Pashtun TAi.005
(TAe.012)
56. Senior Adviser to Minister of Interior Shams ur-Rahman Abdul Zahir Pashtun TAi.008
Sirajuddin Haqqani (TAi.144)
57. Adviser to Minister for Refugee Return, Mohammad Moslim Haqqani Pashtun TAi.073
Khalil Ahmed Haqqani (TAi.150) Muhammadi Gul

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Advisory roles around the de facto administration

Permanent
reference
No. Appointment/role Name Ethnicity number

58. Official in Kandahar Province Directorate Mohammad Rasul Ayyub Pashtun TAi.104
of Borders and Tribal Affairs, adviser to
Governor of Kandahar
59. Businessman (narcotics) Abdul Habib Alizai a.k.a. Agha Jan Pashtun TAi.148
Alizai
60. Businessman (finance) Faizullah Khan Noorzai Pashtun TAi.153

61. Logistics and contractor for Governor of Malik Noorzai Pashtun TAi.154
Kandahar

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