Green Revolution in India
Green Revolution in India
T
While the green revolution has been criticised on he systems of agricultural production in India started
political, economic, and ecological grounds, it undergoing a remarkable change beginning in the late
1960s. The New Agricultural Strategy adopted by the
undeniably played a critical role in increasing crop yields
Government of India in the Third Five Year Plan period, which
and ensuring food security. This paper critically engages later translated into the green revolution, resulted in this
with the recent “revisionist histories” that downplay the change. In essence, the strategy aimed to expand the country’s
qualitative shifts and dismiss the quantitative agricultural production by improving crop yields using mod-
ern science and technology, aided by appropriate institutional
achievements of the green revolution. Through an
interventions by the state.
analysis of agricultural statistics from 1950–51 to The effects of the green revolution in India went far beyond
2021–22, we underline the contours of the change in its immediate impact in terms of foodgrain production. It was
agricultural production brought about by the green instrumental in the absorption of modern science and technology
into the process of agricultural production. These developments
revolution in India.
undoubtedly changed the position of India on the global map
in terms of food security and national sovereignty as well as in
the capacity for creating new knowledge and technology and
utilising it for agricultural production. The New Agricultural
Strategy also ushered in the development of capitalist agricul-
ture in India at a rapid pace and in an irrevocable fashion.
The green revolution, being one of the most substantial in-
terventions in agriculture in the country, has since been sub-
ject to a lot of scrutiny, academic debates, and criticism. Many
consequences and limitations of the green revolution have
been identified by such discussions (Rudra 1978; Rao and
Storm 1998; Pingali 2012). However, after the initial two dec-
ades or so, most literature on it has generally worked with the
premise that green revolution greatly improved agricultural
production and productivity, leading India to be self-reliant in
foodgrain production, notwithstanding the disagreements
over the other aspects of the phenomenon.
More recently, a discourse that seeks to revise the history
and effect of green revolution has been pushed by a section of
researchers (Stone 2019). This discussion, often self-identified
as “new histories” (Stone 2019) or “revisionist histories” (Sharma
2019), amplifies the well-known political, economic, and eco-
The authors would like to thank R Ramakumar, Takashi Kurosaki, logical criticisms of the green revolution. However, they addi-
Madhura Swaminathan, and the participants of the RIEB Seminar, tionally tend to negate the qualitative shifts and dismiss the
Kobe University and the 37th Annual Conference of the Japanese significant increases in agricultural production and productiv-
Association for South Asian Studies for their comments. ity that accompanied the green revolution. Stone (2019, 2022),
Deepak Johnson (deepakjohnson91@gmail.com) is JSPS postdoctoral for instance, having found “no sign of revolution” in foodgrain
fellow, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Japan. production, qualifies these achievements as the “legend of
Sandipan Baksi (sandipan@fas.org.in) and C A Sethu (sethu@fas.org.in) India’s Green Revolution.” Similarly, Kumar (2019) characterises
are with the Foundation for Agrarian Studies, Bengaluru.
the achievements in foodgrain production and availability as
58 december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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“the game of numbers.” And in a similar vein, Sharma (2019) We follow two approaches: (i) a graphical examination of
claims that yield increases due to the green revolution “were the annual statistics and (ii) a comparison of growth rates over
not all that dramatic.” time periods and various groups (such as regions and crops).
It is indeed striking that these revisionist histories often base We consider both the annual observations and long-term
their claims on the same statistics that had been used to argue trends arrived at using non-parametric regression (LOESS
for the positive changes in agricultural production. These [locally estimated scatterplot smoothing]) methods while
contradictory readings of the statistics on the green revolution plotting our graphs.1 Since there is no complete agreement for
form the point of departure of this paper. We analyse the estimating growth rates and periodisation, we use two sets of
trends in statistics that have been subject to reinterpretations recent studies—Bhalla and Singh (2009, 2012) and Chand and
and examine the existing literature on the subject to understand Parappurathu (2012)—for our study. Bhalla and Singh (2009,
the nature of change in agricultural production that accompanied 2012) categorised 1962–65 to 1980–83 as the initial phase of
the green revolution. green revolution, 1980–83 to 1990–93 as its maturing, and
Our analysis highlights the fact that the green revolution 1990–93 to 2003–06 as the post-liberalisation period. We
ushered in a qualitative change in agricultural production. broadly follow this timeline, extend the periodisation to the
Growth in agricultural production was increasing due to present, and consider five phases for our analysis: 1950–51 to
growing yields, and not expansion in area. It also led to a situ- 1964–65, 1965–66 to 1982–83, 1983–84 to 1992–93, 1993–94
ation where availability of food in the country was no longer to 2005–06, and 2006–07 to 2021–22. Since we have annual
dependent on imports from the developed world. The green observations, we estimate both the semi-log growth rates
revolution was accompanied by significant expansion in state- using the regression log(y) = α + βt + ε (like Chand and
led institutional capacities for agricultural research and edu- Parappurathu 2012).2
cation, which were instrumental in sustaining the agricultural The survey of literature helps us in obtaining a detailed
advancements over a longer term. and disaggregated perspective. We align fi ndings from the
With regard to the nature of quantitative expansion, our literature with the periodisation that we adopt for the na-
study reveals the gradual and slow advance of the green rev- tional-level analysis. By using multiple approaches, we at-
olution in terms of its regional and crop-wise spread in India. tempt to put together a comprehensive picture of reality. But
The incremental nature of its adoption implied that the ef- given the complexity of this process, we also reflect on the
fect of the green revolution on the national-level statistics on implications of our approach while discussing the fi ndings
agricultural growth was not evident till the early 1980s, al- from our analysis.
though the expansion in growth numbers was apparent A comprehensive evaluation of the effect of the green revo-
when disaggregated by state and crop. A consolidation of ag- lution on food production and productivity in India must
ricultural growth at the national level may have begun in the address many conceptual and methodological issues. There
1980s, which, however, was stymied by the neo-liberal turn exists an extensive scholarship on the topic, which has exam-
in India’s development. ined several aspects, including absolute changes in foodgrain
The new histories of the green revolution while looking at production, growth and variability in production and yield
the statistics seem to completely neglect these nuances. This levels, the right indicator to study the effect of technical
neglect manifests into some noteworthy issues pertaining to change, the methodology of calculating growth rates, and
the conceptual and methodological framework of the revi- the starting point and periodisation for green revolution
sionist histories—(i) limited reading of the nature and scope (Alagh and Sharma 1980; Bhalla and Singh 2012; Chand and
of the green revolution; (ii) selective analysis of indicators, Parappurathu 2012; Chand et al 2012; Dev 1987; Ghosh 2002;
data sources, and time periods without examining sub-com- Kumar and Rosegrant 1994; Krishnaji 1980; Murgai 2001;
ponents and methodological issues; and (iii) lack of engage- Prajneshu and Chandran 2005; Reddy 1978; Rao 1968; Rao
ment with other approaches studying the green revolution and Thamarajakshi 1978; Ray 1981, 1983; Rudra 1978; Vaidy-
and not considering their implications in drawing conclu- anathan 1977, 1980). Reconciling different sets of opinions
sions from the aggregate data. from prior studies is a difficult task. However, we believe it
is possible to abstract out some common elements through
Methodology our approach.
For our analysis, we focus on the data on agricultural produc-
tion from 1950–51 to 2021–22 (72 years). We examine the sta- Qualitative Shift in the Nature of Food Production
tistics on foodgrain availability published by the Economic The foremost question that guides us is the following: How do
Surveys and area, production, and yield estimates for we characterise the nature of change in the trajectory of agri-
foodgrain production published by the Ministry of Agriculture cultural growth in India that accompanied the green revolu-
and Farmers’ Welfare. In addition to this exercise, we carefully tion? Was it a continuation of a process of agricultural devel-
evaluate findings from other long-term studies on the topic. opment that was witnessed in the first decade-and-a-half in
We assume 1965–66 as the broad starting point for the green independent India, albeit at a changed pace that can be meas-
revolution. This allows us to have a long-term view encom- ured through a simple examination of quantitative change in a
passing more recent years. set of variables? Or did it entail, in some sense, a break from
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Figure 1: Area under Cultivation, Yield, and Production of Foodgrains in Figure 1. It is clear that the area under cultivation stagnated in
India, 1950–51 to 2019–20, Index Numbers (1950–51 = 100)
the years following the green revolution. The yield growth ac-
600
counted for much of the growth in agricultural production. In
other words, the yield growth, and not area expansion, was
Index numbers (1950–51 = 100)
500
instrumental in improving the production of foodgrain in
400 India for the most part, especially after the 1970s.
Figure 1 calls for an examination of the changes in how yield
300
(rather than total production) has improved and whether
there is any difference between different time periods. In our
200
calculations, we find that the yield of foodgrains grew by 2.1%
100 per annum between 1950–51 and 1964–65. This increased to
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021 2.5% per annum from 1965–66 to 1982–83, and to 2.9% per
Year
annum from 1983–84 to 1992–93. The growth of area had been
linetype Area Production Yield
The trend lines (dark lines) are fitted with LOESS (non-parametric) method. 1.4%, 0.5%, and -0.5% per annum respectively for these periods.
Source: Government of India (2022). While the yield growth rate slowed down in the subsequent
the then existing process of agricultural advancement? The periods, it continued to be much higher than the area growth rate.
latter case would naturally imply a qualitative change in the This shift from an area-expansive to a yield-centric ap-
conceptualisation of agricultural development, and its corre- proach to agricultural growth is central to understanding
sponding measures. A simple examination of the quantitative the effect of the green revolution on Indian agriculture and its
change in the earlier measures, without taking into account contribution to the Indian economy as a whole. In this sense,
the nature of the qualitative shift, will portray a limited and the green revolution changes the context of agricultural pro-
often erroneous picture of the phenomenon. duction in the country. Any effort to estimate the quantitative
The revisionist works do not seem to consider the possibility changes brought about by the green revolution must take into
of any qualitative shift. Stone (2022: 181–82), for instance, fits a account this changed context.
linear trend for foodgrain production from 1950 to 1985, and does This aspect of the qualitative shift, of course, was not with-
not find a deviation from the pre-green revolution growth rates in out its limitations. For instance, it led to shifting cropping
years following the green revolution. He goes on to say that only patterns at large scales with the concentration of some crops
wheat saw a break in trend between and after the introduction (Kurosaki 1999), which in turn had adverse implications for some
of the green revolution (we deal with this aspect of crop bias in important aspects of environmental health, ecological balance,
a later section). The absence of a trend shift in foodgrain pro- and food and nutritional diversity (Pingali 2012). Nevertheless,
duction implies that the green revolution did not bring about this qualitative shift undoubtedly led to certain outcomes that
any qualitative change in production. But our analysis reveals were critical from the perspective of both the developmental
that such an interpretation is misleading. The green revolution needs of a poor nation and environmental sustainability.
ushered in a qualitative change in foodgrain production in more
than one way. Most importantly, it brought about a necessary Land spared from food production: It is evident that in the
and irrevocable change in the source of agricultural growth. absence of this qualitative shift brought about by the green
The literature on agricultural productivity identifies various revolution, the area-expansive approach to increasing agricul-
factors that contribute to agricultural growth, such as expan- tural production (or the foodgrain production, in particular)
sion in area, improvements in yield, increased input intensity, would have reached its limits in due course, with no alternative
shifts in cropping pattern, and response to prices and other impetus for growth.
incentives (Kurosaki 1999; Minhas and Vaidyanathan 1965; To illustrate the idea of limits to an area-expansive approach
Narain 1977; Ranade 1986; Sagar 1980). Broadly, we can con- to agricultural growth, we examine the projections based on
sider changes in the levels of production to consist of changes the growth rates from the pre-green revolution period. Between
in area under cultivation and yields (or production per unit 1950–51 and 1964–65, the area under foodgrains in India grew
area cultivated). While both these variables can be influenced at an average annual rate of 1.4%. In 1964–65, the area was
by other factors, we confine ourselves to these two compo- 118.1 million hectares. If the area had expanded at the same
nents for the sake of simplicity. rate until 1982–83, it would have reached approximately 153
Prior to the green revolution, growth in both area under cul- million hectares, 22% more than the actual area under cultiva-
tivation and yield had contributed to the growth in foodgrain tion (125.1 million hectares). Projecting it further would result
production, but with more contribution from area growth. in an area of 254 million hectares by 2019–20, when the actual
Since the green revolution, the contribution of yield growth area under foodgrain cultivation was only half of it (127 mil-
has been very large, making area growth an almost negligible lion hectares). In comparison, the actual total cropped area
source of growth in production. To illustrate the point about (accounting for all crops, including foodgrain) of India was
the differential contribution of components in overall produc- 211.4 million hectares in 2019–20.
tion growth, we plot the index numbers of area, yield, and Another way to look at this is by constructing a counterfac-
production of foodgrain in India from 1950–51 to 2019–20 in tual for area using production and yield levels. To illustrate,
60 december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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the actual foodgrain production in 1992–93 was 179.5 million Figure 2: Per Capita Foodgrain Production and Availability, India, 1950–51
to 2021–22
tonnes. The yield grew at 2.1% per annum prior to the green
225
revolution. If we were to project yield based on this growth rate,
the yield would have been 1,288 kg per hectare in 1992–93.
200
If India had to produce the same amount of foodgrain at this
mental aspirations imply that it could not have continued in- 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021
definitely on a path of extensive agriculture that prioritised Year
foodgrain crops at the expense of other economic activities linetype Availability Production
(including cultivation of other crops). Expanding the cultivated The trend lines (dark lines) are fitted with LOESS (non-parametric) method.
Source: Various issues of Economic Surveys.
area substantially would have entailed significant sacrifices,
including hindering industrialisation efforts, disrupting eco- changes in government stocks of foodgrains, divided by popu-
logical balance, and encroaching upon natural habitats and lation.5 It must also be appreciated that although foodgrain
biodiversity. There are natural limits even to expanding the availability is an important measure from the point of view of
gross cropped area through increasing irrigation leading to food security in general, the statistics on the matter in India
higher cropping intensity. Such an approach would also have have been the subject of some criticism. The issues relate to
led to adverse ecological consequences. The shift to a yield- the actual use of a larger share of foodgrains for other purposes
centric approach in agricultural growth, enabled by the green than what is assumed, the quality of data from government
revolution, not only increased foodgrain production but also procurement and distribution operations and changed food
had a “land-sparing” effect (Ramakumar 2023), freeing up habits (Dreze and Oldiges 2024).
vast tracts of land from being used for foodgrain production. Figure 2 plots per capita foodgrain production and per capita
foodgrain availability from 1950–51 to 2021–22. It shows
Increased foodgrain production and availability: An obvi- considerable variability in both per capita foodgrain produc-
ous implication of the green revolution was an increased domes- tion and availability across time. However, we can delineate
tic capacity to continuously enhance foodgrain availability. It two distinct phases in the relationship between per capita
is, therefore, striking that the statistics on foodgrain availabil- foodgrain availability and production. From 1950–51 to the
ity have been used by revisionist histories to point to a failure mid-1980s, per capita production was less than per capita
of the green revolution. availability. This reversed after the mid-1980s, with produc-
The following comment by Kumar (2019) is illustrative of tion being greater than availability in most years since. Both
the revisionist narrative on the question of food availability: per capita foodgrain availability and production can be seen as
In fact, India’s food availability per capita increased from 144.1 kilo- gradually trending up, except for a brief stagnation around the
grams (kg) per person per annum in 1951 to 171.1 kg per person per 1990s when major policy shifts happened in India. Noticeably,
annum in 1961 … In 2009, the food availability per capita was 162.1 kg the growth in production has been substantially higher than
per year, yet no one thought there was a crisis.4 availability in the more recent past.
Variations of this can also be seen in other sources as well By construction, per capita foodgrain availability and pro-
(Stone 2019; Subramanian 2015). However, this impression duction are dependent on population figures. Figure 3 (p 62)
gives an incomplete picture. First, not accounting for the vola- presents the index numbers for foodgrain production and pop-
tility in agriculture can lead to misinterpretations. For in- ulation in India from 1950–51. A growing divergence between
stance, if we simply take 1952, 1962, and 2022 as the reference the two, as we see in the figure, indicates improvement in per
years instead of 1951, 1961, and 2009, it would appear that capita foodgrain production over time. In other words, the
foodgrain availability improved from 140 kg to 168 kg to 188 kg figure confirms that foodgrain production has been growing at
per year per person—a diametrically opposite picture from a rate faster than the population, implying that over time more
what was argued in Kumar (2019). Neither gives us the com- foodgrain per person is produced. This growing divergence
plete story. This is because there is substantial volatility in per has quelled the Malthusian threats to India voiced by some in
capita availability from year to year. It is also noteworthy that the developed world.
2009 in particular was a drought year, thus adversely affecting This is a basic and clear result of the green revolution, which
the foodgrain availability. still stands more than half a century later. However, while
A comprehensive view of the qualitative shift emerges upon India’s per capita foodgrain production has undeniably in-
examining the two parameters—foodgrain production and creased since the onset of the green revolution, it is important to
availability. Foodgrain availability per capita is defined as net recognise that the current levels are not exceptionally high
production of foodgrains plus net foodgrain imports minus when compared to global averages. The improvement reflects
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 61
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Figure 3: Foodgrain Production and Population in India, 1950–51 to Figure 4: Net Imports as a Share of Net Availability of Foodgrains, India,
2021–22, in Index Numbers (1950–51 = 100) 1950–51 to 2021–22 (%)
15
600
500 10
Index numbers (1950–51 = 100)
300
0
200
-5
100
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021 -10
Year
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021
linetype Availability Production Year
The trend lines (dark lines) are fitted with LOESS (non-parametric) method. The trend line (dark line) is fitted with LOESS (non-parametric) method.
Source: Various issues of Economic Surveys. Source: Various issues of Economic Surveys.
progress, yet India’s per capita production remains modest at production at the national level, even in a world defined by
the world stage. international trade in agricultural commodities, cannot be
According to FAOSTAT (2024), India’s per capita cereal pro- overstated for poor and developing countries. Thanks to the
duction stood at approximately 245 kg per person in 2020, up green revolution, India today does not face the food insecurity
from 159 kg per person in 1965.6 To put this in perspective, the that is still common in many African countries due to disrup-
world average moved from 299 kg per person in 1965 to tions in food supply because of their over-dependence on inter-
around 383 kg in 2020. Developed nations reported much national trade for food security.
higher, larger figures. Emerging economies like Brazil and Finally, the green revolution also led to the consolidation of
China are doing better than India in this regard. Brazil’s per cap- the public institutions of agricultural research and education
ita production of cereals went up from 240 kg to nearly 590 kg and the community of agricultural scientists in India. The
between 1965 and 2020. China produced 219 kg of cereals per basic framework for agricultural research and education in India
person in 1965 and 425 kg per person in 2020. was founded in the last few decades of British colonial rule.
Brazil and China, both with large populations and similar The achievements in practice, however, were, at best, halting.
developmental challenges, have managed to achieve signifi- A more systematic application of modern science into agricul-
cantly higher per capita production levels. This disparity sug- tural production began in independent India but gained mo-
gests that despite the progress made since the green revolution, mentum in the context of the green revolution. This was
India’s agricultural productivity has not kept pace with that of reflected in the significant rise in public expenditure on agri-
other emerging economies. While India has made substantial cultural research and extension after the late 1960s (FAS 2022).
progress in enhancing per capita foodgrain production, there The strengthening of the National Agricultural Research System
is still considerable scope for improvement. (NARS) in India proved to be an important asset to the cause of
agricultural advancement in India (Evenson and Jha 1973;
Strengthened sovereignty: The other facet of the qualitative Evenson et al 1999; Mruthyunjaya and Ranjitha 1998; Parayil
change has been the reduction of dependency on the developed 1992).7 The technological developments following the early
world for food, a strategic good of paramount importance. phases of the green revolution were all products of this research
Figure 4 portrays the net foodgrain imports in India as a pro- system. It is also noteworthy that India’s NARS contributed im-
portion of net availability of foodgrains. It shows the source of mensely to the growth of agricultural science and research
the relatively steady levels of foodgrain availability. It is clear institutions in different parts of the globe, particularly in the
that the trend prior to the green revolution was of high depend- developing world (Alberts 2023; Bong 2023; Denning 2023;
ence on imports. At its peak in the mid-1960s, imports contrib- Janaiah and Mohanty 2018)8.
uted to about 14% of the foodgrain availability in the country.
This was a significant burden to the limited foreign exchange Nature of Quantitative Expansion in Agricultural Growth
reserves of India. The constraint of foreign exchange was, in In light of an expansion in domestic foodgrain production,
fact, a major component of the crisis of the Indian economy in ushered in by the green revolution through a yield-centric
the mid-1960s (Athreya 2018). Subsequently, there has been a approach, it is natural to expect a marked and secular in-
mostly steady decline in food imports. After the 1990s, when crease in the aggregate growth rate of foodgrain production
major policy shifts took place, the share of imports turned neg- in the years since the mid-1960s. However, the green revolu-
ative, indicating that more foodgrains are exported from than tion did not show such a pattern. In fact, the initial reach of
imported to the country. the phenomenon was marked by what has been termed in the
This transition depicts a clear picture of growing self-reli- scholarship as crop, region, and class biases (Rao and Storm
ance in food. The criticality of achieving self-reliance in food 1998). The intervention was limited in the beginning and it
62 december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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took a lot of time to consolidate the efforts and to make tech- rice and wheat. These arguments, however, do not take into
nological access more widespread, which became increasingly account the development and adoption of HYVs in these crop
evident in the 1980s. The biases of the green revolution had groups over time. While the area under their cultivation re-
important implications on agricultural growth, which we duced or did not rise as much as other crops, the production of
explore in this section. coarse cereals and pulses actually increased over time with the
aid of better yields provided by the HYVs (Janaiah et al 2005).
Spread of green revolution: A consistent and largely valid crit- Apart from foodgrains, technical advancements and improve-
icism of the green revolution has been about it having a crop and ments in production have happened in other crops and sectors
region bias, with an excessive focus on wheat and rice concen- (such as relating to livestock and fisheries) within agriculture.
trated in the north-western states of Punjab and Haryana.9 It is A recent publication from the Indian Council for Agricultural
true that the most impressive change as part of the green revo- Research (ICAR) notes the release of “more than 6,000 varieties
lution was the enormous growth of wheat production, and this for cereals, oilseeds, pulses, fibre crops, forage crops, sugar crops
increase concentrated in north-western India in the initial and other crops” after India’s independence (Mohapatra et al
years. But did it only result in an immense growth in wheat 2022). Big jumps in production were also achieved for oilseeds
production in one region?10 In today’s context, when we have and sugar over different periods in time (Mohapatra et al
access to long-term data pertaining to the green revolution, 2022). With respect to edible oil, production increased from
how justified is it to characterise the phenomena as just a nearly 11 million tonnes in 1985–86 to about 25 million tonnes
“Wheat Revolution,” one that, as Kumar (2019) and Stone (2022) in 1998–99. Sugar cane production increased from about 57
emphasise, flourished at the expense of other crops? million tonnes in 1950–51 to 405.42 million tonnes in 2019–20.
We argue that the characterisation of the green revolution High growth rates for output of spices and condiments, fruits
as a wheat-centric phenomenon may have been true for the and vegetables, and dairying sector were seen in the years as-
initial years after the green revolution, but is far away from sociated with the wider spread of productivity-enhancing
reality today. measures (Chand and Parappurathu 2012).
We begin by examining the adoption of high-yielding variety As issues related to crop concentration were addressed partly,
(HYV) seeds, one of the key technologies that enabled the green growth in new crops started contributing to the overall food
revolution.11 Long-term agricultural statistics show that the situation in India. This is seen to an extent in food balance
area under HYV increased from 9% in 1970–71 to 41% of gross sheets and consumption patterns (comprising more commodi-
cropped area in 1998–99, the last year for which we have com- ties than just foodgrains). An analysis of the food balance
parable data. For wheat, the area under HYVs was only 4% of sheet for India from 1960 to 1995 shows an increased supply
the gross cropped area in 1966–67 (Government of India of vegetables, fruits, starchy roots, sugars, vegetable oils,
1996). It increased to about 88% in 1993–94. The share of rice milk, and meat (Hopper 1999). The household consumer
increased from nearly 3% to 69% in the same period. For other expenditure surveys from the 1980s also show an actual increase
food crops, such as jowar and bajra, the increases were from in average intake of fruits, vegetables and animal products
nearly 1% to more than 50% (Government of India 1996). (Government of India 2022). This increase in consumption
These numbers show that the dispersion of seed technology was, of course, concentrated in some sections of the population,
increased over time, even though the initial years of the green partly explained by their rising incomes and accessibility to
revolution saw a very small area devoted to HYVs. In absolute increased imports. However, that should not be an argument to
terms, the gross cropped area under HYVs for four foodgrains negate the contribution of production in improving availability.
(wheat, rice, jowar, and bajra) increased from nearly 2 million What are the implications of temporal and crop-wise growth
hectares in 1966–67 to about 61 million hectares in 1998–99. rates for variations across regions? Bhalla and Singh (2009)
Within foodgrains, the coverage of HYVs in gross cropped area show that the initial phase of the green revolution period
increased substantially after the 1970s, with the introduction of (1962–65 to 1980–83) saw the total value of output for 44
more HYVs and their increased adoption. For rice, Janaiah et al crops grow at a rate of 3.4% per annum in north-western region,
(2006) found that 50% of 620 modern varieties released in higher than the national average (2.4%) or any other regions.
India between 1965 and 2000 were in use among farmers and However, the subsequent period (maturing of the green revo-
these together accounted for nearly 81% of rice area planted in lution, from 1980–83 to 1990–93), saw a higher agricultural
1998–2000. Among those rice varieties adopted, nearly half growth rate in the eastern region (3.6% versus 3.4% for India).
were released after 1985, indicating a continuous adoption and Much of this growth was because of the land reforms initiated in
replacement of seed technology in rice. West Bengal (Rao and Storm 1998). While this institutional fac-
Given the gradual spread of these modern varieties, it is clear tor was not present in other regions, the spread of the green revo-
that any long-view assessment of the green revolution must lution did contribute to some agricultural growth. For instance,
continue until at least the early 21st century and not limit itself to the central region saw a growth rate of 3.3%, comparable to the
the 1980s. This spread of HYVs has to also be seen from the all-India average. There were considerable variations across
perspective of relative changes to area, yield, and production. It states before and after the introduction of the green revolu-
is argued that the green revolution was a setback to the pro- tion, but delayed acceleration of growth rates in several states
duction of coarse cereals and pulses, as more land came under shows that there was a “catching-up” effect in many regions.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 63
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It is possible that high growth rates for specific sub-sectors the previous section, many states experienced substantially
within agriculture and regions are due to the low base effect. higher growth rates in this phase, which coincided with the
But the gradual spread of HYVs and spatial characteristics spread of the green revolution. Bhalla and Singh (2009, 2012)
contributed to these staggered phases of growth rates. The case of note that this phase was marked by an increased use of inputs,
rice provides an interesting example. The adoption of modern including tractors, pump sets, and fertiliser consumption.
rice varieties ranged from 78% of the planted area in western Third, the growth achieved during the maturing (or wider
region (Maharashtra and Gujarat) to 89% of the planted area spread) of the green revolution was halted in the 1990s. We
in the southern region in 1998–2000 (Janaiah et al 2006). How- saw a lower growth rate of less than 1% per annum at the all-
ever, the larger adoption of HYVs was not guided by the suita- India level in the 1990s. This is also characteristic of regional
bility of the HYVs to the regions where they were cultivated. Much trends: Punjab saw a reduction in the growth rate from over
of the varieties that were adopted in the eastern region (states 4% per annum in the 1980s to less than 2% per annum in the
such as Bihar and West Bengal), with more rainfed conditions, 1990s (Bhalla and Singh 2009, 2012). Similarly, Tamil Nadu’s
were developed for the irrigated conditions of the southern annual growth rate plummeted from 4% to -1.5% in the same
Indian region. While the cultivation of these varieties did not period (Bhalla and Singh 2009, 2012). The onset of neo-liberal
result in yield levels comparable to irrigated conditions, these did reforms and a decline in public investment in agriculture have
contribute to the increase in yield growth over time within the contributed to these trends in this period (Ramachandran and
specific region. High-yield growths were also experienced for Rawal 2010). These were corrected to an extent after the mid-
some other crop–region combinations, such as sorghum in 2000s. We saw the growth rate improve in 2006–07 to 2021–22,
Maharashtra, which saw yield more than triple with an increased to around 2.4% per annum. Growth rates in per capita fig-
share of area under HYVs or hybrids (Janaiah et al 2005). ures are different from the total production, but the broad
If we take up crops and regions separately, we see a positive pattern is similar.
association between the adoption of green revolution techno- How do we make sense of these trends? It is true that different
logy and production figures. The lags across crop groups and methodologies and periodisation are bound to yield different
regions over time imply that the results would not be immedi- growth rates. The analysis of growth rates becomes further
ately reflected in the national-level statistics. But how did the complicated due to various factors, such as the need to account
delayed expansion of the green revolution actually correlate for fluctuations in annual production caused by weather
with agricultural growth? shocks (Dev 1987; Ray 1981). The idea of base effect, which
accounts for the increased difficulty in achieving higher growth
Agricultural growth rates: Our analysis suggests the follow- over a larger production base, adds yet another layer of com-
ing three points. First, the growth rate of foodgrain production plexity. Notwithstanding these complexities, however, it is evi-
seemed to have slowed down after 1965. Earlier studies that dent that broad trends without looking into the underlying
utilised index numbers of agricultural production showed that factors do not explain the reality sufficiently. The later phases
there was a deceleration in growth rates in the 1960s of the green revolution, marked by an improved spread of the
(Chakravarty 1987) and immediately after 1965 (Rao and technology, did show a higher growth rate at the national level.
Storm 1998). Our examination of data shows that the national But the pace of the spread of the green revolution, along with the
foodgrain production grew at around 3% per annum from growth rates in agricultural production, was curbed by the
1950–51 to 1964–65. However, a closer look at the growth rates coming of the neo-liberal reforms. While there was some
shows that the pre-green-revolution period was not character- course correction in the mid-2000s with increased public in-
ised by uniform growth. After high growth in the early years vestments in agriculture, the limitations in achieving a stable
after the independence, the growth rates had decelerated by and widespread growth indicate that the improvements
1965. This continued for many years even after the green rev- brought in by the green revolution have not sufficiently broad-
olution. This lack of high growth immediately after 1965 was ened to cover all excluded regions and classes.
a result of the very narrow base of the green revolution. This
trend has been pointed at by the revisionist line of scholarship, Discussion
without getting into the nuances of the underlying factors, to A relook at the propositions advanced by the revisionist histories
argue that “the growth rate of overall foodgrain production did and the evidence presented by data leads to the question: How
not increase at all” after the green revolution (Stone 2022).12 such utterly different interpretations can arise from the same
Second, the stagnation in foodgrain production growth source of data? While there are many reasons for this, including
was recovered to some extent, when the green revolution the underlying theoretical frameworks that inform the inter-
gradually spread to different regions. Rao and Storm (1998) pretations, we confine our discussion to three immediate issues
estimate that the growth rates recovered from 1981–82 to pertaining to the conceptual and methodological framework
1991–92, when it was 2.9% per annum as opposed to 2.2% from applied by this line of scholarship to make sense of the statistics
1967–68 to 1981–82. Although our examination of foodgrain on the green revolution. These are (i) limited reading of the
production does not show a similarly high growth rate, de- nature and scope of the green revolution and issues arising from
tailed analyses covering more crop groups do confirm such a it; (ii) selective analysis of indicators, data sources, and time
recovery in the 1980s (Bhalla and Singh 2009, 2012).13 As seen in periods without examining sub-components and methodological
64 december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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issues; and (iii) lack of engagement with other approaches does not account for the fact that the coming of HYVs created
studying the green revolution and not considering their the felt need and the motivation for improving irrigation facilities
implications in drawing conclusions from the aggregate data. via tube wells. It is this phenomenon, in its totality, that led to
private investment in developing groundwater irrigation with
Limited reading of the green revolution: The new histories the aim of realising higher cropping intensity. The green revo-
betray a narrow reading of the nature of the green revolution, lution established the importance of irrigation, among other
at the cost of ignoring its essential effect. Green revolution in inputs, in improving agricultural productivity (Vaidyanathan
India was an all-round policy package that included the develop- 1999). These series of individual developments were in essence
ment of various technologies and institutions to support the large- part of the larger process of the green revolution.
scale adoption of HYV seeds in agricultural production (Rudra Some of the interventions that were component parts of the
1978). The ultimate achievement of the phenomenon was a criti- New Agriculture Strategy, such as the policy for price support,
cal qualitative shift from an economically and environmentally were immediate in nature, while the others, such as the insti-
unsustainable area-expansive to a yield-intensive agricultural tutionalised practice of scientific research, kept evolving over
growth trajectory. The other, equally critical, facet of this qualita- time and expanding in scope. In this sense, the green revolu-
tive shift was the attainment of long-term food security at tion was very different from the one-time interventions, such
the national level based on domestic agricultural production. as the abolition of the zamindari system or repeal of taxes on
The expansion in the public institutional capacities of agricultur- land improvement, that were attempted during the early years
al research and education was yet another component of this of Indian independence. These efforts, while very important to
qualitative shift, which played an essential role in sustaining instil the spirit of enterprise, were limited and had a one-time
these achievements in the longer run. An empirical assessment of positive effect on agricultural growth that was non-replicable.
the effect of the green revolution that neglects this larger change This was particularly so in the absence of thoroughgoing land
in the context of agricultural production may end up becoming reforms that could have sustained the enterprising spirit
an empty statistical exercise. The analyses by the revisionist among the peasantry and rendered an enduring quality to the
scholarship seem to completely miss this nuance. nature of agricultural growth.14
There is also a marked tendency in the revisionist works to
limit the scope of the green revolution. At the core of the green Selective analysis: The indicators, data sources, and the time
revolution was the modern or HYV seeds of wheat and rice, periods considered by the revisionist histories are often partial
transferred by international agricultural institutions through in nature. It is evident that these indicators and their construc-
research in Mexico and the Philippines, respectively. These semi- tion are often not examined in detail. We have provided two
dwarf varieties had several advantages over traditional as well illustrations to this tendency. There is an excessive focus on
as locally improved varieties at the time. They were highly foodgrain availability per capita, without giving due consider-
responsive to fertiliser inputs under controlled irrigation, which ation to the fact that foodgrain availability is an aggregate
led to higher yields per crop cycle. They had a shorter matur- measure, which changes according to production levels, net
ing period, which allowed a higher cropping intensity (more change in stocks, and net imports. A partial analysis in this
cropping cycles per year). The inputs required to grow these manner leads to a misinterpretation that the green revolution
seeds, including chemical fertilisers, irrigation infrastructure, did not lead to a perceptible change in the foodgrain situation
and farm machinery (such as tractors and threshers that allow in India.
for quick harvesting and land preparation), were essential to Similarly, the growth rates in total production are considered,
realising the potential of the HYV seeds. Equally essential were without any reference to the sources of production growth.
the state-led institutional mechanisms for providing support The significant shift from a trajectory of agricultural growth
to the farmers in terms of prices, credit, and marketing, as well led by expansion in area under cultivation to one led by yield
as research and extension services. The state procurement at growth is completely ignored. The importance of this shift for
assured prices for more produce led to sustained investments a developing country, that had a long way to go in terms of not
in the countryside, which in turn improved the productivity just foodgrain production but also industrial development,
realised at the farm level. Specifically, attributing a major and cannot be overstated. The shift also greatly contributed to
comprehensive transformation of this nature to a few factors saving natural habitats and forests, and was therefore equally
does not provide a sufficient explanation. important from the perspective of environmental sustainability.
The revisionist works often cite studies that analyse the im- There are a few other aspects related to data that have been
pact of some specific components of the New Agriculture highlighted in past studies but are glossed over by the critiques.
Strategy in isolation, to undermine the overall effect of the Our analysis proceeded with the implicit assumption that the
green revolution. As an example, Stone (2019) refers to Subra- aggregate data is sacrosanct and comparable across all time
manian (2015) to argue that “the primary cause of the wheat periods. But is this implicit assumption really valid? Various
boom was not Borlaug’s seeds or even the subsidised fertiliser, studies have used differing data sources and found differing
but the massive surge in private tube well construction” and growth rates even when the methods were similar, like what
“farmer adoption of the new seeds and increased fertiliser we encountered in estimating our own growth rates. Diverse
hinged on whether or not they had tube wells.” However, it sets of indicators (for example, value of output, production,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
and index numbers) have been used to overcome these data- local rice varieties was between 1.7 to 3.2 (Barker et al 1985).
related challenges. A useful illustration of the challenges involved Even in less optimal conditions, that is when weather and other
in estimating growth rates from the early years of the green factors influenced production, HYVs showed an advantage
revolution can be found in Mellor and Lele (1965) and Mellor over local varieties in terms of yields. The absence of such ef-
et al (1975). The implication of such discussions is that we fects, if it is presented as a counter to the established under-
should be cautious in drawing inferences and cross-check with standing, should be investigated thoroughly.
the previous work in obtaining correct conclusions. Prior stud-
ies have often resorted to a host of methods, such as comparison Conclusions
between triennial averages (or moving averages) and semi-log We would like to conclude by reiterating that we do not find
growth rates, to arrive at their findings. Any substantial revi- enough evidence for a different interpretation of the green revolu-
sion to an existing interpretation should be consistent with dif- tion in its role in improving agricultural production, as attempted
ferent methods of analysis. It is unfortunate that the new in- by the revisionist histories. These different interpretations are a
terpretations of data by new histories have come about with- result of a limited reading of the nature and scope of the green
out a sufficient engagement with this point, and do not attempt revolution, and a selective analysis of indicators, data sources, and
to triangulate revised findings with alternative methods. the time periods. They also betray a tendency to ignore other
A related aspect of the use of indicators concerns the time- approaches that have been used to assess the phenomenon.
line of the green revolution. The revisionist histories limit their The green revolution brought about a qualitative shift in
analysis to between the late 1960s and early 1980s. Given that agricultural production, which, in turn, implied a change in
the green revolution technology spread to more areas in the the conceptualisation of agricultural development, and the
later years, can a discussion on the green revolution put a sud- measures associated with it. The root of the issues pertaining to
den stop to the analysis in the 1980s? It is difficult to ignore the methodological and conceptual framework of the new his-
that during the initial years the seed-fertiliser technology was tories lies in its inability to account for this qualitative shift.
limited to certain key areas, and it became widespread only in New dimensions of agricultural advancement such as remarkable
the later years. Indeed, the lack of such spread, evident in the growth in crop yields, expansion in domestic agricultural pro-
mid-1960s to the 1970s, was criticised by some. Later researchers duction leading to reduced dependency on food imports, growth
noted improvements in foodgrain production after the mid- in public institutional capacities of agricultural research and
1980s, since “the major intercrop imbalances in growth wit- education, and development of state-led institutional mecha-
nessed in the early years of the green revolution have been re- nisms for providing support to the farmers in terms of prices,
dressed to some extent in more recent years” (Rao and Gulati credit, and marketing were some of the major dimensions of
1994). By choosing to confine their analysis to the early 1980s, this qualitative shift. And any objective assessment of the
the new histories end up ignoring this well-established reality. green revolution, therefore, must account for them.
Our analysis also reiterates that the green revolution, de-
Comparison with other approaches: Finally, the grasping of spite its significant potential, did not lead to a rapid and con-
the totality of the green revolution should go along with com- sistent increase in agricultural growth rates in India. The
parisons to other studies. One of the ways to control the effects advancement of the green revolution in terms of its regional
of the overall policy is to examine the evidence from other and crop-wise spread was slow and gradual, not enough to
countries, as well as local (village) level studies.15 Studies make a big dent in the levels of agricultural growth at the na-
across countries point to the fact that the introduction of HYVs tional level till the 1980s. However, the expansion in growth
have increased food production (Estudillo and Otsuka 2006; was certainly significant in crops and regions that could ab-
Gollin et al 2021; Hossain et al 2006; Ut and Kajisa 2006). Micro sorb the different dimensions of the green revolution. A con-
studies that looked at long-term changes in rural areas also solidation of these effects was beginning to be visible by the
show a similar pattern. Analysing the rice cultivation in the 1980s, but that momentum was curbed by the neo-liberal turn
North Arcot region (present-day Vellore and Tiruvannamalai mirrored by a withdrawal of the state from the arena of agri-
districts) in Tamil Nadu, Ramasamy et al (1991) conclude that for cultural development (and development in general).
rice the “yield increase has occurred since the late 1960s … and Our evaluation of the green revolution with respect to
can be attributed to green revolution inputs such as the high- foodgrain production is not an apology for the class bias that
yielding varieties (HYVs) and fertilisers.” While these increases was seen during its implementation. The agrarian structure
happened in the context of changing production technologies, that characterised India before the green revolution led to an
the impact of HYVs cannot be sidestepped citing the context. increased accumulation by the rich during its implementa-
This appears logical since HYVs, as the name suggests, had tion. It was also regionally concentrated for a long time and
better yields than traditional or local varieties. These varieties favoured several crop groups at various points in time. But
had better physiological properties to provide more grain per can we discredit the technological improvements brought
plant than local varieties. The fact that these yield advantages about by the green revolution for these reasons? Availability of a
were actually realised in the field was evident from the com- technology does not by itself ensure its equitable access, but
parison of yield data between HYVs and non-HYVs (local varie- lack of its availability certainly implies a lack of access. Our
ties). From 1968–69 to 1977–78, the ratio of yield of HYVs to standpoint is that while the process must be seen historically,
66 december 28, 2024 vol Lix no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
we have to be careful in not mixing up different facets of crucial, but limited purpose, that of ensuring food security at
the development brought about by the green revolution. That the national level based on domestic agricultural production.
the gains of technology were cornered by a predominant It was never designed to be a tool for progressive radical
section is not to be conflated with an intrinsic aspect of transformation of the Indian countryside. But the phenome-
the technology. non ended up leading to long-term changes that were far be-
This also raises a larger philosophical point. The development yond the scope of its design, and in fact, could not have been
of any technology, and its introduction to production under capi- predicted in advance. This uncertainty is part of any techno-
talism is, in the last instance, driven by profit motive. It therefore logical development that renders it relative autonomy from
reflects capitalist tendencies, leading to more concentration of the larger social structures that underlie its development at
wealth and more inequality. This is even more so when the tech- the final instance. Technological development, therefore, has
nology is introduced in an extremely unequal socio-economic a dialectical and not mechanical relationship with social de-
structure. But this does not take away from the real advance- velopment. We feel that the absence of such a nuanced view
ments and efficiencies leading from the application of technology. has led the critiques to find faults that are inconsistent with a
Even under capitalism, technological developments have more comprehensive explanation. The fallacies, perhaps, also
significant potential for progressive transformation. The point to deeper philosophical and theoretical issues, which
green revolution was a planned development project with a can be a subject of further enquiry.
Notes 7 Most studies use total factor productivity as an in- the pre-green revolution period while using pro-
dicator to examine the contribution of technology duction statistics (released by the Ministry of
1 For generating graphs, we use the R statistical
and research on agricultural production. However, Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare). Since we
software. We use geom_smooth function from
there are limits to such an approach that lumps are interested in long-term change, we do not
ggplot2 library and implement it using the
together different aspects of technological change. examine the sources of these discrepancies in de-
default options (particularly, method =
This is a striking gap in scholarship on the develop- tail. In all cases, the growth rate is maintained
“LOESS” and span = 0.75, that is using 75% of
ment of the agricultural research system in India, throughout the 1980s, even if not equalling the
data points for LOESS smoothing).
and its deep implications for agricultural devel- rate of the pre-green revolution years.
2 In our regression, y is production (in total or
opment in India and elsewhere. A more compre- 14 Green revolution may have proved to be a
per-capita terms), t is time (year), α and β are
hensive story of the evolution of agricultural tool to prevent the possibility of expansion of
parameters to be estimated (where β repre-
research in India remains to be told. land reforms in India, as it allowed agricul-
sents the growth rate), and ε is the error term.
8 Several personal recollections by some early ture to grow without disturbing the political
Our semi-log estimates are arrived at by fitting
scientists in this regard can be found in the and economic structure in the Indian coun-
separate regression models for time periods.
Review of Agrarian Studies, Vol 13, No 2, which tryside, and in turn, allowing some sections
Our method fits discontinuous lines between
pays tribute to the legacy of M S Swaminathan. to appropriate the gains (Dasgupta 1977;
periods as opposed to continuous lines using a
9 An equally important criticism of the green Frankel 1971; Rudra 1978). But it does not
kinked-exponential model (Boyce 1986). While
revolution, almost since its inception, has been take away from the fact that the green revolu-
this is an issue touched upon in the literature,
that its spread and the ensuing benefits were tion was a different type of intervention,
we do not consider the kinked-exponential
biased towards the rural rich (Patnaik 1988, 1990). without any precedent, and its effects were
model for the sake of simplicity. We also calculate
10 The characterisation of green revolution as permanent and far-reaching.
the compound annual growth rates (CAGR)
over triennial averages following Bhalla and “Wheat Revolution” is noted in some early litera- 15 This approach is also suggested by Farmer (1986).
Singh (2009, 2012). But since the broad trends ture as well. For example, T N Srinivasan wrote
were similar, we do not report our CAGR figures. in 1979 that “there is as yet no green revolution,
but it is still a wheat revolution” (Srinivasan 1979).
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