Moya v. Del Facts:. Del Fiero was declared as mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte.

Fierro 69 Phil. However, Moya, his rival, opposed contending that the liberal appreciation of the ballots was wrong.
199 (1939)
Issue: whether or not ballots should be read and appreciated with reasonable liberality.

Ruling: Yes, there should be no technical rules permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that
intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. In one ballot properly
counted for Del Fiero, the elector wrote the respondent’s name on the space for vice mayor, but,
apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the
word “mayor” (Alcalde) printed on the left side if the ballot. Here, the intention of the elector to vote
for the respondent for mayor was evident, in the absence of proof showing that the ballot had been
tampered with. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as
the ultimate source of the established authority. This is the reason for the rule that ballots should be
read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
The Diocese TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
of Bacolod v.
Comelec, 747 FACTS:
SCRA 1 (2015) On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10 ′) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark,
or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for
the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who
voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence
not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There
is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to
this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed
limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that
this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
political question brings.
Lacson v. FACTS:
Posadas, 72 A complaint was filed against Municipal Judge Posadas for the violation of the Election Code of 1971
SCRA 168 (Hearings for petitions for inclusion were hastily scheduled by the Judge without notice to the Board
(1976) of Election Inspectors). The Investigating Judge found him guilty, but found as extenuating the fact
that he acted in good faith. SC affirmed his guilt, but ruled that good faith is immaterial in this case
since the crime is mala prohibita. But since the President promulgated PD 443, which grants general
amnesty, then he is only admonished.

Abanil v.
Justice of the
Peace, 70 Phil
28 (1940)

RULING:
The SC held that the judgment appealed from
will accordingly be reversed and in the exercise
of their discretionary power, the case remanded
to the CFI of Negros Occidental with instruction
to hear and decide the petitions for exclusion of
the merits, giving the parties every opportunity to
present their respective evidence so that it may
thereafter make such corrections in the electoral
census of Talisay, Negros Occidental.
Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if
the Judge of the CFI is in the province, the
proceedings for the inclusion from the list of
 voters shall, upon petition of any interested party
filed before the presentation of evidence, be
remanded to the said Judge who shall hear and
decide the same in the first and last instance.
When, therefore, the attorneys for the
challenged voters moved the justice of the peace
of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion cases to
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
then presided over by two Judges, it was
mandatory on said justice of the peace to grant
the motion. In view of the nature of the
proceedings which affect public interest, it was
error for the aforesaid justice of the peace not to
have remanded all the petitions for exclusion to
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Garchitorena
v. Crescini, 39
Phil. 258
(1918)

Subic Bay FACTS:

Metropolitan
Authority v. On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992),
Comelec, 262 which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared
SCRA 492 national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
(1996) On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
 referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No.
2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law.

Issue:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which
governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as
a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in
said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them
at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right
reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative
body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation.
Abcede v.
Imperial, 103
Phil. 136
(1958)
Loong v.
Comelec, 305
SCRA 832
(1999)

Ututalum v.
Comelec, 14
SCRA 465
(1965
Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201
SCRA 210
(1991)

Abes v.
Comelec, 21
SCRA 1252
(1967)

Banaga v. Facts:
Comelec,
G.R. No. Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the City of
134696, July Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers proclaimed
31, 2000, respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s
336 SCRA 68,970 votes.
701
 Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to Declare
Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was replete with
election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous Election
Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be altered,
falsified or fabricated.

In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore, the incidents
were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be considered as the true will of the
people.

Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City
of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local elections.

Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied upon by
petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an
election protest.

Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without
any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.

Issue:

WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is considered as an
election protest.

WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition, in
the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi:

1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.’s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a special action
under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20
on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special
actions. Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as
failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.

2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition to
declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The petition to
declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions
necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election. There are
three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no
other recourse but to dismiss the petition
Nacionalista FACTS:
Party v. This is the special action for prohibition filed by the Nacionalista Party and its official candidates for
Comelec, 85 senators against Vicente de Vera, Chairman of the Commission on Elections, to enjoin him from sitting
Phil. 149 or taking part in the deliberations of said Commission in connection with the elections of November 8,
(1949) 1949, on two grounds: (1) that he is the father of Teodoro de Vera one of the candidates of the Liberal
 Party for the position of senator in the last election and, for that reason, he is disqualified from acting
on all matters connected with said elections; and (2) that his appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is a violation of the Constitution and, therefore, it is void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N that quo warranto and not prohibition is the proper remedy to inquire into validity of
respondent's appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

RULING:
Yes, In this jurisdiction the writ of prohibition cannot be availed of as a substitute for quo warranto.
The ground invoked by the petitioners would be proper in quo warranto proceedings but not in a
petition for prohibition. The writ of prohibition has been allowed in the Philippines, not only against
courts and tribunals in order to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent
them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but also, in appropriate cases, against
an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Thus, a writ of prohibition
has been issued against the Director of Posts who attempted to do the act that was offensive to the
Constitution (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201), or against the Commissioner of Civil Service who
attempted to conduct an investigation that was violative of the Constitution (Planas vs. Gil, G.R. No.
46440, Jan. 18,1939, 37 Off. Gaz., 1228), 1 or against the City of Manila, which attempted to enforce
an ordinance which was null and void (Rodriguez vs. city of Manila, 46 Phil., 171). but when the
petition for prohibition seeks to inquire into person's title to an office which he is holding under the
color of right, it has been denied upon the ground that quo warranto is the proper remedy.
Occena v. FACTS:
Comelec, 95
SCRA 775 The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
(1980) Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments proposed
are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the
Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done
was to revise and not to amend.

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution
is not the fundamental law. The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12,
1981.

ISSUE(S):

WON the 1973 Constitution is already in effect.

WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments.
WON the three resolutions are valid.

HELD:

Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It
then concluded: “This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.”

With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate
that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law
is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the
latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding
statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The
latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of
the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Yes. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim
Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
 regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions
vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by
the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of
such impotence its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the
amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

Yes. The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute amendments or revision is of no
relevance. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del
Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic
system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution.
The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one … is no argument
against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of the
entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.”
Baddiri v.
Comelec,
G.R. No.
165677, June
8, 2005
Jamil v.
Comelec,
283 SCRA
349 (1997)
Akbayan v.
Comelec,
355 SCRA
318 (2001)
Kabataan FACTS:
Party-list v.
Comelec, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system
777 SCRA for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through
574 (2015) the adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated
x x x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013.
Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications
for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the
biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement

of literacy and property.
Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015
violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of
 suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate.

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of
the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural
limitation on the right to vote.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply
with the registration procedure in order to vote.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that
is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s
ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

Presence of compelling state interest

Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly,
honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying
voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a
compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the
registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b)
present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints
recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit
themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo
the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that
he remains an active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right
to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be conducted

during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90)
days before a special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period
beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does not
mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period
which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and
other exigencies.
Domino v. Facts:
Comelec, Petitioner Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
310 SCRA Province of Sarangani indicating that he had resided there for 1 year and 2 months immediately
546 (1999) preceding the election. A petition to cancel his COC was filed by private respondents arguing that
Domino is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election. For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
 requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. COMELEC declared
Domino disqualified as candidate due to lack of the one year residence requirement. Previously,
Domino ran for the same position in Quezon City in 1995.

Issues Ratio:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May
11, 1998 elections
RULING:
NO, petitioner has not resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

The term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances.
In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991,
he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of
domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of
domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract of
lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in
the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district
one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.
Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.
Coquilla v. FACTS:
Comelec, Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
G.R. No. until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998,
151914, July he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several
31, 2002 trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November
10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which
was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the
winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the
COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering
such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This
is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.