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Unit 10 Legal Interpretation

Unit 10 covers legal interpretation, focusing on the judiciary's role in interpreting laws made by Parliament. It outlines various rules and principles of statutory interpretation, including the literal, golden, and mischief rules, as well as the importance of context and aids in understanding legislative intent. The unit emphasizes the shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy in Namibia, highlighting the protection of fundamental rights under the Constitution.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
41 views76 pages

Unit 10 Legal Interpretation

Unit 10 covers legal interpretation, focusing on the judiciary's role in interpreting laws made by Parliament. It outlines various rules and principles of statutory interpretation, including the literal, golden, and mischief rules, as well as the importance of context and aids in understanding legislative intent. The unit emphasizes the shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy in Namibia, highlighting the protection of fundamental rights under the Constitution.

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john
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Unit 10

Legal Interpretation

Lecturer: Mrs. Angelique L. Zender

Copyright: alzender@2023
Unit 10: Lesson outline
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Rules of Statutory Interpretation
10.3 Aids of Interpretation
10.4 Presumptions of Statutory
Interpretation
10.1 Introduction
 As we know by now, Parliament has the powers to
make laws (Art. 44).
 The judiciary is tasked with the interpretation of these
laws.
 Legislation/statutes contain provisions which are
articulated in the words of the official language of a
jurisdiction.
 In Namibia, the official language is English, although
the mother tongue of most Namibians are not English.
The language of an Act may not always convey the intended
message with mathematical precision.
So quite often courts have to grapple with the problem of
determining the meaning of words.
Furthermore, statutes are intended to regulate factual
situations which will occur in future.
It may happen that Parliament has not considered every
kind of case.
As circumstances change in the course of time, problems
arise as to the applicability of statutory provision to new
conditions.
 In all these situations, the role of the courts is not simply
interpretive; it is also creative.
 The court‟s primary task is to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature as provided for in the words of the statute.
 The ascertainment of the intention of Parliament and the
meaning of the provisions of a statute require a great deal of skill,
common sense and the application of interpretation or
contraction developed by the courts,
 The process involves looking up the meaning of a word in the
dictionary and if the dictionary meaning is not satisfactory, the
judge may look for the meaning in the context of the whole statute
and even at earlier legislation dealing with the same subject-matter.
 This is as it is assumed that when Parliament passed
an Act, it probably had the earlier legislation in mind
and probably intended to use words with the same
meaning as before.
 This latter rule that requires the meaning to be
sought in the context of the whole statute is
sometimes expressed in the Latin maxim noscitur a
sociis.
 Noscitur a sociis: means a word may be known by
the company it keeps.
 The court may also refer to the definition section of
a particular statute which assigns special meanings
to some of the words in the statute to ascertain the
meaning of certain words in the statute.
 In addition to the interpretation or definitions
section of a particular statute, there is also the
Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 37 of
1920, which serves as a standing legal dictionary
of some of the most important words used in the
statute.
10.2 Rules of Statutory
Interpretation
Meaning of “legal interpretation”
Process by which courts interprets (finds
meaning) to the provisions of a legal
instrument.
 This is necessitated by the fact that at times
words used in legal instruments can have
ambiguities that needs to be clarified.
# Example:
Ex parte; Attorney General in re: The
Constitutional relationship between the
Attorney-General and the Prosecutor General
[1995] NASC 1 (13 July 1995)
 Whether the AG, in pursuance of Article 87 of the
Constitution and in the exercise of final responsibility
for the office of the Prosecutor-General has authority
to:
(i) to instruct the PG to initiate prosecution; decline or
terminate a pending prosecution in any matter.
PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION:
''The cardinal rule of legal interpretation is to
determine the intention of the legislature. This
can be determined by having regard to the
words of the legal instrument and the context
in which the words are used in that particular
legal instrument.''
Meaning of
Statute/legislation:
Written law enacted by a
body/person with the
authority to do so
E.g. Parliament/Legislature
# What is Statutory Interpretation?

The process of interpretation


involves the use, application
and reliance of aids, rules,
maxims, and presumptions
as tools in determining the
meaning of legal provisions.
In other words, it is a process by which the courts find the
meaning of words/concepts in a Statute/Act of
Parliament/Legislation by employing rules and principles
of interpretation.
These are generally referred to as the "principles of legal
(statutory) interpretation.“
It comprises of three broad strands, namely:
• Statutory interpretation
• Constitutional interpretation
• Interpretation of International instruments
# What rules and principles?
 These rules and principles are derived from the
common law.
 It is also contained in the Interpretation of Laws
Proclamation 37 of 1920.
 When it comes to interpretation of statutes, there are
two types of theories:
 Text based
 Context based
 In the first place you must refer to the text of the
statute.
 Secondly, you must refer to the context.
 Lastly, certain presumptions may sometimes play a
role.
 The rules and presumptions of statutory
interpretation are all called “canons of construction”.
 E.g. Golden rule or the presumption against
retrospectivity
 These cannons of construction are not hard and fast
rules for statutory interpretation.
 They serve merely as aids in the reading of
statutes in accordance with the Constitution.
 Presumptions are by nature rebuttable.
 The presumptions and rules are derived from
the common law and are therefore subject to the
Constitution.
 We will now differentiate between the text and
context based approaches and discuss the
various rules of statutory interpretation.
Rules of statutory interpretation:
Literal Rule
 The literal rule is derived from the text-based approach
which seeks to derive answers from the words of the statute
itself.
 It seeks to give effect to the plain meaning of the words,
even if the results would be absurd or contrary to the spirit
of the legislation.
 The application of this rule simply entails reliance on the
common understanding of the language of the text and the
use of sources such as dictionaries to discern the meaning of
the words of the statute.
 The understanding is that in construing a statute, the object is to
ascertain the intention which the legislature meant to express
from the language which it has employed.
 The literal method of interpretation relies on the language of the
statute as a whole and when words used therein are clear and
unambiguous, to place upon them their grammatical
construction and give them their ordinary effect.
 The essence of the literal rule is to rely exclusively on the
language used without paying any regard to the consequences of
the interpretation.
 If the consequences of the interpretation are unfair, unjust,
absurd or harsh, it is not the concern of the interpreter.
 Venter v R 1907 TS 910 at 913:

“If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them,
even though they lead to an absurdity. The Court has
nothing to do with the question whether the legislature
has committed an absurdity.
Hoexter JA in R v Tebetha (1959(2) SA 337 (A))
pronounced that “jus dicere non dare” is the function of
the court, and the language of an Act must neither be
extended beyond its natural sense and proper limits in
order to supply omissions or defects, nor strained to meet
the justice of an individual case.”
 Various reasons have been advanced for the
application of the literal rule by the courts.
 One commonly advanced is that judges do not want
to be seen as usurping the functions of the
legislature.
 Judges also don‟t want to be accused of making
political judgments that are at variance with the
purpose of Parliament when it passed the Act.
Cases: Deem v Miliken, S v Kola, S v Werner; S v Adams;
Setrak Avakian (HC), etc
Golden rule
 If the so-called “plain meaning” of the words is
ambiguous, vague or misleading, or if the strict
literal interpretation would result in absurd
results, then the court may deviate from the
literal meaning to avoid such absurdity.
 The court will then turn to the so-called
secondary (or internal) aids of construction, e.g.
long title / headings to chapters and sections in
Act.
 The essence of the Golden Rule is that the
starting point to interpretation is the literal
meaning, but this is subject to the consequences.
 If the consequences lead to a glaring absurdity or
to a result so outrageous that the legislature
could not have intended. it, the literal meaning
must be abandoned in favour of some other
meaning that the court will arrive at by
employing other aids to interpretation.
 R v Takawira & Others 1965 RLR 162

• This case illustrates what may constitute an absurdity.


• In that case the statute concerned, without any
qualification or exception, made it an offence to be in
possession of subversive material.
• If interpreted literally this would mean that „the
policeman who took possession of the subversive
statement, the public prosecutor who tendered it as
evidence, the judicial officer who examined it at the
trial‟ would all be guilty of offences.
• It would thus never be possible to secure a conviction
under the statute at all.
• The intention of the legislature would be completely
frustrated.
• In these circumstances it would be permissible to
qualify the literal meaning by reading into the clause
words such as “without lawful authority” so as to
permit officials to be in possession of the statement in
the exercise of their duties‟.
Cases: Setrak Avakian (appeal case); Riggs v Palmer
Mischief rule
 It seeks the attainment of the purpose behind a
particular statute or provision by reference to the
'mischief' it sought to remedy.
 Here the Court will ask “what mischief / disease /
defect did Parliament attempt to redress by the
statute”.
 The origins of the mischief is often traced to the
Exchequer Court's decision in Reydon decided in
1584, in which the formulation of the mischief rule
was made.
 The classic formulation of the mischief rule appears
in Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637 as follows:

According to Sir Edward Coke‟s view, to get the real


meaning in the legislative instrument, the interpreter
(i.e. the court) should consider four things:
1. What was the Common Law before making the Act;
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the
Common Law did not provide;
3. What remedy hath the Parliament resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth; and
4. What was the true reason for the remedy.

 Lord Coke added that the task of judges is always


to construe legislation so as to suppress the
mischief/defect and achieve the remedy.
Holy Trinity Church v. United States

• The Holy Trinity Church was a corporation duly organized


and incorporated as a religious society under the laws of
the state of New York.
• Walpole Warren was, prior to September, 1887, a foreigner
residing in England.
• In that month the plaintiff in error made a contract with
him, by which he was to relocate to the city of New York,
and enter into its service as rector and pastor; and, in
pursuance of such contract.
• Warren did so relocate and enter upon such service.
• It was claimed by the United States that this contract
on the part of the plaintiff was forbidden by chapter
164, 23 St.p.332; and an action was commenced to
recover the penalty prescribed by that Act.
• The circuit court held that the contract was within the
prohibition of the statute, and rendered judgment
accordingly.
• The Church appealed and the question the Supreme
Court had to determine was whether or not the circuit
court erred in that conclusion.
#The relevant section of the Act proscribing that
type of act provided as follows:

“Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the


United States of America, in congress assembled, that from and after
the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, company,
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the
transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or
migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the
United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, under
contract or agreement, parole or special, express or implied, made
previous to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens,
foreigner or foreigners, to perform labour or service of any kind in the
United States, its territories, or the District of British Columbia.”
• The Supreme Court of the United States, guided by the
mischief rule, reversed the judgment of the circuit court on the
grounds that the intent of Congress in passing the Act in
question was the prohibition of the importation and
immigration of unskilled labourers.
• In the words of Justice Brewer who delivered the opinion of
the court:
“the title of the Act, the evil which was intended to be remedied,
the circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the
reports of the committee of each house, all concur in affirming
that the intent of congress was simply to stay the influx of this
cheap, unskilled labour.”
#More cases on rules of interpretation:
 Graceland Architects CC v Haward &
Chamberlain Architects & Another 2018 (1) NR
34 (HC) (literal rule)
 S v Van Zyl & Others 2016 (4) NR 1000 (HC)
(Golden Rule)
 Van Rensburg v Government of the Republic of
Namibia 2009 (2) NR 431 (HC) (Golden Rule)
 Claud Bosch Architects CC v Auas Business
Enterprises Number 123 (Pty) Ltd2013 (1) NR 155
(SC) (Mischief rule)
Purposive Approach
 At independence Namibia adopt a Supreme
Constitution with an entrenched Bill of Rights.
 Parliamentary sovereignty was replaced with
Constitutional supremacy.

 Parliamentary/ Legislative Sovereignty


Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law
whatever, and no person or body has the right to
override or set aside legislation made by Parliament.
 Constitutional supremacy
• The Constitution is the supreme law (Art. 1(6))
• The adoption of the Constitution with an
entrenched Bill of Rights effectively replaced the
doctrine of Legislative/Parliamentary sovereignty.
• Leg. Sov. is therefore limited by the supremacy of
the Constitution.
• Everything and everybody is subject to the
Constitution.
I.e. all other laws, conduct, traditions, rules,
perceptions, bodies, people and government.
• It also means that Parliament derives its
authority from the Constitution and the exercise
of legislative functions is subject to Constitution.
• The Namibian judiciary was provided with the
constitutional leverage to promote the principles
of the rule of law and constitutionalism,
including the protection and advancement of the
fundamental rights and freedoms.
Article 25

Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and


Freedoms

(1) Save in so far as it may be authorised to do so by this


Constitution, Parliament or any subordinate legislative
authority shall not make any law, and the Executive
and the agencies of Government shall not take any
action which abolishes or abridges the fundamental
rights and freedoms conferred by this Chapter, and
any law or action in contravention thereof shall to the extent
of the contravention be invalid: …
(2) Aggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental
right or freedom guaranteed by this Constitution has
been infringed or threatened shall be entitled to
approach a competent Court to enforce or protect
such a right or freedom, and may approach the
Ombudsman to provide them with such legal
assistance or advice as they require, and the
Ombudsman shall have the discretion in response
thereto to provide such legal or other assistance as he
or she may consider expedient.
(3)Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court
referred to in Sub-Article (2) hereof shall have the power
to make all such orders as shall be necessary and
appropriate to secure such applicants the enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms conferred on them under the
provisions of this Constitution, should the Court come to
the conclusion that such rights or freedoms have been
unlawfully denied or violated, or that grounds exist for the
protection of such rights or freedoms by interdict.
Also see Article 18 (Administrative Justice provision)
 The aforesaid implies that Courts must adopt an
interpretive attitude that promotes the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
 Matiso v The Commanding Officer, PE Prison
1994 (3) BCLR 80:
“The interpretive notion of ascertaining the
“intention of the legislature” does not apply in a
system of judicial review based on the supremacy of
the Constitution.
Both the purpose and method of statutory
interpretation in our law should be different
from what it was before the commencement of
the Constitution…
The purpose now is to test the legislation and
administrative action against the values and
principles imposed by the Constitution…”
 Where a court is called upon to examine
the meaning of a right or freedom in the
Bill of Right, it must regard the purpose
for which the right or freedom was
enacted.
 In other words, the right or freedom must
be understood in light of the interests it is
meant to protect.
 De Ville writes that for the Constitutional and
statutory interpretation:
“such an approach would involve inter alia setting out
the broader historical and social context of the
enactment, paying attention to the language used in
the enactment within the context it is used,
establishing and giving concrete effect to the values
of the Constitution by harmonising the statute
concerned with those values, taking the perspective of
the marginalised…”
 In the Namibian context, the Supreme Court
pronounced itself a number of times on
interpretation of statutes in a constitutional
dispensation.
 To that end our Courts appeared to have
embraced and adopted a purposive approach to
the interpretation of statutes
Minister of Defence v Mwandingi 1992
(2) SA 355 (NmSC)
In this case the Namibian Supreme Court approved the
following dictum in S v Acheson 1991 NR 1:
“T)he Constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which
mechanically defines the structures of government and the
relations between the government and the governed. It is a
mirror reflecting the national soul, the identification of the ideals
and aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values bonding
its people and disciplining its government. The spirit and tenor of
the constitution must therefore preside over and permeate the
processes of judicial interpretation and judicial discretion.”
Government of the Republic of Namibia &
Another v Cultura 2000 1993 NR 1
In this case the late Mahomed CJ reiterated the
approach to the interpretation of the constitution by
stating that:
“A constitution is an organic instrument. Although it is
enacted in the form of a statute, it is sui generis. It must
broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted so as to
avoid the „austerity of tabulated legalism‟ and so as to
enable it to continue to play a creative and dynamic role in
the expression and the achievement of the ideals and
aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values
bonding its people and disciplining its Government.”
• Considering the aforesaid, it may be deduced
that Courts and juristic writers recommend a
“broad contextual approach” to
interpretation.
• Indeed, since the traditional rules and
presumptions of statutory interpretation are
derived from the common law, they are
always subject to the Constitution.
10.3 Aids of Interpretation
 These are determinants which judges
sometimes use to assist it in attaining the
intention of the legislature.
 Two forms:
 Internal Aids of Interpretation; and
 External Aids of Interpretation
 Internal Aids of Interpretation:
 Preamble of the Statute
 The long title of the legislation
 Definitional clause
 Express purpose clause and interpretative guidelines
 Headings to chapters and sections
 Schedules
 Short title
 Regulations made in terms of a particular legislation
 External Aids of Interpretation:
 Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 37 of 1920
 Dictionaries (including legal dictionaries)
 Hansard (explanatory notes or parliamentary debates on
bills).
 Reports of Commission of Enquiries
 Surrounding circumstances and/or historical background
 Earlier Statutes: Statutes in pari materia (on the same
subject matter) – Statutes that are in pari materia must
be construed together.
 International Treaties and Conventions
Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 37 of 1920
 An aid of interpretation that sets out certain
principles that are to have general application in the
event a law is not specific, vague or lacks
clarification.
 It complements the basic principles of
interpretation.
 It consist of fourteen (14) broad sections that sets
our some interpretative guidance on law
[legislation].
Distinction: Directory & Peremptory
Provisions
 Directory provisions:
 It is a provision that requires substantial compliance
only.
 Peremptory provisions:
 Is a statutory provision that requires exact compliance.
 In other words, the provision is obligatory/mandatory.
 Failure to comply with a peremptory provision will
leave the ensuing act (action or conduct) null and void.
 Words with imperative or affirmative character
indicate a peremptory provision. E.g. 'shall' or
'must„.
 Words that are permissive such as 'may' indicate a
discretion and is interpreted as being directory.
As a general rule statutory requirements are often
categorized as peremptory or directory.
These are concise and convenient labels used for the
purposes of differentiating between the two
categories.
 However, the clear cut distinction between them, namely
exact compliance in instances of peremptory provisions
and substantial compliance in instances of directory,
seems to have blurred over time.
 The two distinctions are important in discerning the
degree of compliance necessary and in establishing the
consequences of non or defective compliance.
 The general propositions are as outlined and adopted by
our courts from the "old" South African Appellate Division
decision in Sutter v Scheepers 1932 AD 165 at 173-
174:
i. The word 'shall' when used in a statute is rather to be
considered as peremptory, unless there are other
circumstances which negatively affect such a
connotation.
ii. If a provision is couched in a negative form, it is to be
regarded as a peremptory rather than a directory
mandate.
iii.If a provision is couched in a positive language and there
is no sanction added in case the requisites are not carried
out, then the presumption is in favour of an intention to
make the provisions only directory.
iv. If when we consider the scope and object of a
provision, we find that its terms would, if strictly
carried out, lead to injustice and even fraud and if
there is no explicit statement that the act is to be
void if the conditions are not complied with, or if no
sanction is added, then the presumption is rather in
favour of the provision being directory.
v. The history of the legislation will sometimes also
give insight as to whether a provision will be
peremptory or directory.
 As a general rule directory and peremptory terms
should be used and understood in their literal
meanings: this is the cardinal rule or position.
 The Courts have however adopted a flexible approach
by relaxing the stringent meanings given to
peremptory terms and directory terms, especially
where the literal interpretation and application of
those terms would lead to absurdities and irrational
outcomes.
 The guiding principle in diverting from the literal
meaning is the intention of the legislature rooted in
the overall objective and purpose of the provision.
Cases on the distinction between
Directory and Peremptory provisions:
 Torbitt & Another v International University of
Management 2017 (2) NR 323 (SC)
 Hailulu v Director, Anti-Corruption Commission
& Others 2016 (4) N$ 1110 (SC)
 Kanguatjivi & Others v Shovoro Business and
Estate Consultancy & Others 2013 (1) NR 271
(HC)
10.4 Presumptions of Statutory
Interpretation
 Statutory Presumptions:
These are assumptions that the courts take into
account in interpreting statutory provisions.

 In the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, a


statutory provision is taken to have the meaning
arrived at by employing the assumptions.
 Under our law the following presumptions are
recognized:
1. Where no date is specified, the legislation
comes into operation on the date of publication
in the Government Gazette
Commencement date:
Where date not specified, Act comes into operation on
day of publication in Government Gazette. – In terms of
s 12(1) of the Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 37 of
1920, and of art 56(1) of the Constitution, an Act of
Parliament which does not specify a particular date for
its commencement came into force on the day when it
was published in the Government Gazette.
Case: S v Nghitukwa 2005 NR 116 (HC).
2.The presumption against the alteration of the
common law more than is necessary
 In the absence of clear language, either by express words or
necessary implication, the courts will no rule that the
legislature intended a significant departure from the common
law. In other words, it requires statutes to be construed, as far
as possible, in conformity with the common law, rather than
against it.
 The presumption requires clear and unequivocal language to
alter the common law.
Cases: Du Preez v Minister of Finance 2012 (2) NR 643 (SC); Prollius v
Minister of Home Affairs & Immigration & One Similar case 2018 (1)
NR 118 (HC).
3. Presumption that the legislature does not
intend that which is harsh, unjust or
unreasonable.
 This is the presumption that legislation seeks to
achieve public good.
 The primary basis of this presumption is the natural
law thesis that law should be just.
 The passage of legislation presupposes that
Legislation is presumed not to have intended to
deprive an individual of an existing vested right.
4. The presumption of constitutionality
 An Act of Parliament is presumed to be
constitutional until the contrary is shown.
 This is because Article 1(6) of the Namibian
Constitution provides that the Constitution shall
be the supreme law of the land and that all laws as
such must be passed on the basis that they have
met the basic requirements of the Constitution.
 Therefore, if a provision is capable of more than one
meaning, with one of the possible interpretations falling
within the meaning of the Constitution while the other
does not, it will be presumed that the legislature intended
to act constitutionally and that one possible meaning
within the Constitution will be adopted.
 Where it is sought to be established whether or not a
provision is reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society, it is presumed that the provision is reasonably
justifiable and the onus lies on the challenger to prove
the contrary. (He who alleges must prove).
5. The presumption against retrospectivity
 In terms of this presumption, unless the contrary
intention is clear, a statute is not presumed to
have an intentional retrospective operation
contemplating or directing to the past.
 The presumption works on the assumption that
the law maker is presumed to legislate only for
the future.
 Exceptions: If the enactment expressly provides
for retrospective operation.
5. The presumption against retrospectivity
 In terms of this presumption, unless the contrary
intention is clear, a statute is not presumed to
have an intentional retrospective operation
contemplating or directing to the past.
 The presumption works on the assumption that
the law maker is presumed to legislate only for
the future.
 Exceptions: If the enactment expressly provides
for retrospective operation.
6. The presumption in favour of the
principles of natural justice
 When a statute authorizes judicial or quasi-
judicial powers which may influence individual or
property rights, there is a presumption that, in
the absence of an express provision or a clear
intention to the contrary, the powers so given are
to be exercised in accordance with the principles
of natural justice.
There are two main principles of natural
justice, namely:
i. Audi alteram partem rule (a person must be
given the right to be heard before an adverse
decision is made).
ii. Nemo judex in causa sua principle (a person
must not be judge in his/her own cause).
7. The Presumption against interpreting a
statute so as to oust or restrict the
jurisdiction of the courts.
 (I)t is a well-recognised rule in the interpretation
of Statutes that, in order to oust the jurisdiction
of a court of law, it must be clear that such was
the intention of the legislature.
 This is because, if contextualised in Namibia
Article 5 of the Namibian Constitution provides:
 (T)he fundamental rights and freedoms
enshrined in this chapter (Constitution) shall be
respected and upheld by the Executive,
Legislature and Judiciary and all organs of the
Government and its agencies and, where
applicable to them, by all natural and legal
persons in Namibia, and shall be enforceable by
the Courts in the manner hereinafter prescribed.
 Furthermore, Article 25(2) of the Namibian
Constitution provides:
 (A)ggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental right or freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution has been infringed or threatened
shall be entitled to approach a competent Court to enforce or
protect such right or freedom, and may approach the Ombudsman
to provide them with such legal assistance or advice as they require,
and the Ombudsman shall have the discretion in response thereto
to provide such legal or other assistance as he or she may consider
expedient.
Cases: Katjiuonjo v The Municipality Council of the Municipality of
Windhoek (I 2987/2013) [2014] NAHCM 311 (21 October 2014);
Swartbooi & Another v The Speaker of the National Assembly Case
SA 38/2021 (focus on the aspect on ouster of courts jurisdiction))
(both cases available on NAMIBLII)
8. The presumption that a statute will not be
interpreted so as to violate a rule of international law
or international obligations.
 This presumption requires the courts to seek an
interpretation of a Statute that will not make domestic law
conflict with international law.
 This is even more corroborated by the fact that in terms of
Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution, International law
forms part of the law of Namibia.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
 Article 27 – a State party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
9. Presumptions made in terms of the
Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 37 of
1920
 The Interpretation of Laws Proclamation provides for
several presumptions. Some of these include:
• Reference to law in legislation shall mean any law,
proclamation or any other enactment having the
effect/force of law.
• Persons, unless it is provided otherwise shall include
Municipal Council or likewise authority, it shall also
include any company registered, corporate or
incorporate. (Section 2 of the Proclamation)
• In every law unless the contrary intention appears,
words importing the masculine gender shall include
females. In addition, words in singular number shall
include plural and words in plural shall include
singular. (Section 6 (a) and (b) of the Proclamation).
• Where a law confers a power, jurisdiction or right or
imposes a duty on the holder of an office unless the
contrary intention appears, the power, jurisdiction or
right may be exercised, and the duty shall be
performed from time to time by the holder for the
time being of the office / the person occupying the
position. (Section 9 (2)).
The End of this course
• There will be a revision class.
• Read on all topics before the revision
class.
• Identify topics that you find
challenging for purposes of revision.
THE END
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

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