Memorial For Petitioner Team Code - L-1
Memorial For Petitioner Team Code - L-1
TEAM CODE- L
IN THE MATTER OF
Versus
UPON SUBMISSION TO
OF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………….……IV
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………...…V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………………………….....IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………………..X
ISSUES RAISED………………………………………………………………………………XII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………….....XIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………………..…….…1
2.2 The decision of the chief wildlife warden suffered from irrationality…………………....9
3.1 That the High Court was well within its power when passing the interim
order……………….13
3.2 The High Court Can interfere with the discretionary power under Article 226………....16
PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………………...26
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Const. Constitution
Corpn. Corporation
Govt. Government
Hon'ble Honourable
Intn’l International
Ltd. Limited
SC Supreme Court
v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
3. Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1044
4. Centre for Wildlife and Environment Litigation v Union of India, 2020 S.C.C. OnLine
NGT 1228.
5. Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. 32 (2007) 4 SCC 669.
6. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669.
7. Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) AC 374.
10. Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v Delhi Admn., (1992) 4 S.C.C. 99.
12. Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185.
13. Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti, [2004] 2 S.C.C. 392
14. Express Newspaper (P) ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133.
17. Gopal Das Mohata v. U.O.I., AIR 1955 SCR (1) 773
20. H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312.
21. Hall & Ltd. v. Shoreham by Sea U.D.C., 12 (1964) 1 WLR 240.
22. Himmat Singh Shekhawat v State of Rajasthan, ALL (I) NGT REPORTER (1) DELHI
24. JasbhaiMotibhai Desai v Roshan Kumar, Haji BasherAhmed &Ors 1976 AIR 578
25. K. Krishna Reddy v. Spl. Dy Collector, Land Acqn. Unit II, LMD Karimnagar 1988 AIR
2123.
30. Muthuraman v Union of India, 2015 ALL (I) NGT REPORTER (2) DELHI 170.
33. Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd. o Bangaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. A. 1994
Del 322.
34. Rae Bareli K.G. Bank v. Bhola Nath, (1997)3 SCC 657.
35. Reliance Energy Ltd. v Maharashtra State Board of Development Corpn. [(2007)8 S.C.C.
1].
36. S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors., A.I.R. 1982 SC 149
38. Simranjit Singh Mann v. The Union of India and Anr1(1992) 4 SCC 653.
43. Tribunal on its own motion v Union of India, 2014 S.C.C. OnLine NGT 3294.
44. Union of India v. Shatabdi Trading & Investment (P) Ltd. (2001)6 SCC 748.
45. Vimal Bhai v Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2011 S.C.C. OnLine N.G.T. 16.
46. Wilfred J. v Union of India, 204 ALL (I) NGT REPORTER 2013.
LUCKNOW 2017).
1. Abuse of Administrative Discretion - A Detailed Study, 2022 S.C.C. OnLine Blog OpEd
53
3. Karanth K.K., Gopalaswamy A.M., Defries R. and Ballal N. (2012). Assessing patterns of
human-wildlife conflicts and compensation around a central Indian protected area. PLoS
O.N.E., 7(12).
Amravati. Source:KishoreRithe.
5. Kopnina, H., Washington, H., Taylor, B. et al. Anthropocentrism: More than Just a
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9711-1
6. A brief discussion on this issue with respect to Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve relocation
process can be found here - Rucha Ghate, Relocation versus Wildlife Preservation, 40 No.
8. Gulati S, Karanth KK, Le NA, Noack F. Human casualties are the dominant cost of
STATUTES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has approached the Hon'ble High Court under the jurisdiction of Article 226 1 of
the Constitution of Yolatengo.on account of violation of Fundamental Rights of the citizens and
the animals, who have been profoundly impacted by the existing human-wildlife conflict
occurrences in the Sloucher. The interests of the farmers are being represented by the
1
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Courtshall
have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person
orauthority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs,including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any
ofthem, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or
personmay also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which
thecause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of
suchGovernment or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner,is
made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without—
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim
order;and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation ofsuch
order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or thecounsel
of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the dateon which it
is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later,or where the
High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards onwhich the High
Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry ofthat period, or, as
the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on
theSupreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
BACKGROUND-
1. Sloucher is the most biologically diverse State of Yolatengo, with a variety of endemic
species of flora and fauna. Thousands of tourists flock to Sloucher every year to visit its
reputed National Parks and Sanctuaries. Agriculture and tourism are the primary sources of
2. Sloucher has many native species which are interconnected through the intricate food chain.
In the past, the introduction of hostile and invasive species, such as the Bane Toad to control
insect pests has led to the extinction of some native species, giving rise to a cascading effect,
3. Authorities then, under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 ("W.P.A., 1972"), of Yolatengo,
tried balancing interests of both parties. Immediately after the Bane Toad invasion in 2001, it
was the timely decision of the Government to declare it as 'vermin' and subsequent issuance
of hunting orders that prevented further damage to the ecosystem and agricultural produce.
CURRENT CONFLICT-
1. In Sloucher the PSB village expanded around the PSB forest which led to the conversion of
hectares of forest into farmland. The villagers have tried practicing agroforestry for welfare
2. The Horsehead Boar, a native wild mammal, is one of the species whose natural habitat has
been damaged. In its natural habitat, the Boar performs a key role, both as the prime prey of
the Sloucher Leopard and as an efficient herbivore that keeps a check on the spread of a
poisonous shrub named the Kadwaa Santra. The Horsehead Boar was also part of Schedule II
3. Due expansion of human settlement the Boar started invading human territory and feeding on
Nice Dal crop instead of its usual food of tubers and plants. This caused a dent on the
livelihood of the villagers and they requested the Chief Wildlife Warden of Sloucher to
4. The Chief Wildlife Warden after deliberation decided not to take any action against in the
said matter. Following which the farmers filed a writ of mandamus in this Court praying
5. The High Court passed an interim order directing the Chief Wildlife Warden to hunt the
boars. Now the Trust of Wildlife Conservation ("T.W.C.") filed an intervention application in
the PSB Farmer's Association's writ petition, seeking vacation of the interim order.
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE 1
ISSUE 2
ULTRA VIRES?
ISSUE 3
ISSUE 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly submitted that in the present petition, T.W.C. should not be allowed to intervene in
the writ petition as there is no sufficient locus standi in the present petition [1.1]. There is no
violation of the fundamental rights of the respondent rather there has been an infringement of the
fundamental rights of the farmers.[1.2] There is an alternative remedy available to the Petitioner
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the decision of the chief wildlife warden is
amenable to judicial review.[2.1]. It is also submitted that the decision of the chief wildlife
warden suffered from irrationality. (or was not reasonable) [2.2] The action of the wildlife
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the High Court was well within its rights
when it passed the interim order [3.1]. The High Court has the required power to interfere with
the discretionary order of the chief wildlife warden so that the interest of the villagers could be
saved [3.2]. Moreover, the interim order also doesn't suffer from any procedural defects and also
In the present case no alternative course of action can be resorted to other than the proposed
solution of temporary hunting order.[4.1] The alternative solutions contemplated would not be
feasible and wouldn't address the urgency of the situation.[4.2] It is also brought forth that there
are no existing policies of H.W.C. mitigation and there cannot be an action to the effect without a
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
PETITION?
1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble High Court that the T.W.C. should not be allowed
to intervene in the writ petition on the grounds that T.W.C. has no sufficient locus standi in
the present case.[1.1] There has been no violation of Fundamental Rights, contrary to the
claims of the respondent [1.2] and also, the respondent has not exhausted other alternative
2. In the present matter, the respondents do not have the requisite locus standi. Locus standi
means a place of standing, signifying the right of a person to bring an action and to be heard2.
Further, a person acquires a locus standi when he suffers a legal injury by reason of the
violation of his legal right by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any
other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of a threatened violation of his
3. A person must have a sufficient interest to sustain his standing to sue4 , but in the present
case, T.W.C. does not have a sufficient interest to maintain its standing before the Court. The
Hon'ble Court in the judgment of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v Roshan Kumar, Haji Basher
2
Aiyar Ramantha P ‘The Law Lexicon’ (2nd edition, Reprint 2000).
3
S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors., AIR 1982 SC 149
4
Gopal Das Mohata v. U.O.I., AIR 1955 SC (1) 773
Ahmed &Ors,5 considered a locus standi to be necessary to invoke the writ of certiorari and
the Petitioner should be an aggrieved person. Likewise, in the present case, the respondents
cannot invoke the writ of mandamus. In case he is found to be a stranger, the Court will, in
4. The counsel further seeks reference to the case of Simranjit Singh Mann v. The Union of
India and Anr,6 where the question regarding the locus standi of a third person who is a total
stranger to the case was answered negative. Furthermore, a person acquires a locus standi
when his personal or individual right has been violated or threatened to be violated7. It is
submitted that the subject matter of the dispute fails to fall within the class of violation of
fundamental rights' mentioned under Art. 226, which is necessary for a party to have a locus
standi.
5. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the interim order of the Hon'ble High
Court of Sloucher is tenable in the eyes of law, as the interim order qualifies as a reasonable
restriction imposed in the interests of the security of the State, public order and the general
public8.
6. It is brought to the attention of Hon'ble Court that Article 226 is a remedy available for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights but the remedies enunciated under this article cannot be
availed if one's fundamental rights have not been violated. Thus, the jurisdiction vested in the
High Court is exercisable only for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part
7. This can be further substantiated by Joseph Raz's saying, "rights cannot be accorded to
animals as they only have an instrumental value and do not have any interests or the kind of
mental development as humans do". Likewise, if all animals are recognised as legal beings, it
follows that they can sue or be sued for damages. Should they be able to sue or be sued?
They are live beings for which the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act has been enacted.
8. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the instant case does not warrant an Art.
2269 petition since there is no legitimate cause of action for the Petitioner to move this
Hon'ble Court. In order to seek relief under Art. 226, there must be a violation of
fundamental or any other legal rights. In the present case, there has been no infringement of
any of the fundamental rights mentioned under Art. 2110 of the Const. by the actions of the
Hon'ble Court. In fact, the interim order has been instrumental in protecting the public
interest.
9. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Section 11(1)(b) of W.P.A. 1972 the
Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer may if he is satisfied that any wild animal
specified in Schedule II, Schedule III, or Schedule IV, has become dangerous to human life
beyond recovery, by order in writing and stating the reasons therefore, permit any person to
hunt11 [such animal or group of animals in a specified area or cause such animal or group of
animals in that specified area to be hunted]. In the present case, the Horsehead Boar part of
Schedule II of the W.P.A., 197212has caused a dent on the livelihood of the PSB Villagers,
and the interim order of temporarily hunting Horsehead Boar is well within the ambit of law.
9
INDIA CONST, art. 226.
10
INDIA CONST, art. 21.
11
2. Subs. by s. 9, ibid., for “such animal or cause such animal to be hunted” (w.e.f. 1-4-2003)
12
Para 6, Moot proposition.
10. In the present case, the T.W.C. had the opportunity to approach the N.G.T., which is a
specialised administrative body for the effective and expeditious disposal of cases relating to
where matter is civil in nature and has affected or is likely to affect or damage the
environment, it falls under the substantial question of environment13 and that to approach
N.G.T., it is not required that a person should be directly or personally affected by such
damage14.
11. The present matter raises a substantial question related to the environment i.e., human-
wildlife conflict. It has been held in a recent case of Tribunal on its own motion v. Union of
India15 that wildlife is a part of the environment and any action that causes damage to
wildlife, could not be excluded from the purview of the tribunal. The tribunal has been
addressing a plethora of cases relating to Human-Wildlife Conflict in the present times and is
12. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble High Court that, the demands made by the
respondents in the interest of wildlife do not hold good in the present circumstances, as such
measures would adversely affect the right to livelihood of the people of the PSB village. It
would lead to the resettlement of villages and their farmlands. Thus, there is no option left to
permit the villagers to hunt the Horsehead Boars in the areas where PSB's agricultural lands
are situated.
13
Goa Foundation v Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590.
14
Vimal Bhai v Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2011 SCC OnLine NGT 16.
15
Tribunal on its own motion v Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine NGT 3294.
16
Centre for Wildlife and Environment Litigation v Union of India.
13. A tribunal substitutes H.C.s as an alternative institutional mechanism for judicial review and
thereby aims at reducing the burden on H.C.s. In L.Chandra Kumar v U.O.I., 17 the Hon'ble
Court has held that the State employees must approach the administrative tribunals before
coming to the H.C. under Art. 226. Furthermore, the tribunal is competent and is vested with
14. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the decision of the chief wildlife
warden is amenable to judicial review.[2.1]. It is also submitted that the decision of the chief
wildlife warden suffered from irrationality. (or was not reasonable) [2.2] Action of the
15. Section 11(b) of the W.P.A. confers the chief wildlife warden with the power to grant
hunting orders for animals in Schedule II if he finds there to be enough damage to property
and humans. This requires the warden to satisfy himself with relevant conditions on the
plight of farmers and Horsehead Boars. On the warden's failure to consider the relevant
consideration and non-application of mind by the warden about the farmers' plight, a judicial
17
L.Chandra Kumar v Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125
18
Wilfred J. v Union of India, 204 ALL (I) NGT REPORTER 2013; S. P. Muthuraman v Union of India, 2015 ALL
(I) NGT REPORTER (2) DELHI 170 ; Himmat Singh Shekhawat v State of Rajasthan, ALL (I) NGT REPORTER
(1) DELHI 44
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the famous case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India19
has held that "the judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive
functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial
intervention; the other covers the scope of the Court's ability to quash an administrative
discretion on its own merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over
administrative action."20 Judicial review has been declared an integral component of the basic
17. Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Hall & Ltd.v.Shoreham by Sea U.D.C. 22, where the action
of the concerned administrative authority was overturned for being unreasonable, despite the
fact that the authority in question was acting within the purview of its power, and had taken
all relevant considerations into account while ignoring all irrelevant considerations. While
exercising its discretionary power, if an administrative authority turns a blind eye to relevant
considerations, its acts will be considered null and void. Authority should always take heed
18. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that although the chief wildlife warden had
the power to give or not to give the order of hunting to the villagers of the PSB, relevant
circumstances were not taken into effect while exercising this power, as the interests of the
villagers were not kept in mind. The warden had failed to propose any alternative solution to
mitigate the conflict, showing there was no concern metted out for the farmers, thereby
ignoring their considerations. "If an action taken by any authority is contrary to law,
19
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651
20
Supra note 5.
21
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 177
22
Hall & Ltd. v. Shoreham by Sea UDC, 12 (1964) 1 WLR 240.
23
Abuse of Administrative Discretion - A Detailed Study, 2022 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 53.
with such action by exercising the power of judicial review24. The High Courts, in the
exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226, may not merely confine themselves to
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety; they have to delve deeper into the matter,
which requires deeper scrutiny, as said by the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India25.
19. To understand the abuse of discretion the relevance test is proposed wherein the judiciary can
apply the test by asking the following questions: (1) Whether the considerations which
support the decision are germane to the purposes of the statute? (2) Whether all relevant
considerations have been taken into account by the authority? (3) Whether irrelevant
considerations have also been taken into account along with relevant considerations, and if
so, whether the relevant considerations alone would be sufficient to sustain the order? It can
easily be seen that in answering these questions the judiciary has to decide, keeping in mind
the policy and scheme of the statute, what should have been the relevant factors ought to
have been considered by the authority, though the question is often asked the other way
round, i.e., whether the considerations taken into account by the authority were relevant. 26 So
here not all consideration was taken up. The farmers' plight was unseen, and the severe
impact of their livelihood and right to life, in general, was neglected by the chief wildlife
warden's decision. It is also imperative to note that the essence of the Wildlife Protection Act
of Yolatengo was striking a balance between human and wildlife interests which was not
followed through27.
24
Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669.
25
Supra note 23.
26
Limits of Judicial Activism Vis-a-Vis Administrative Discretion: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 JILI (1984) 55.
27
Moot proposition no. 3.
20. The apex court in the case of Reliance Energy Ltd. v Maharashtra State Board of
Development Corpn.28has reiterated that the grounds of judicial review are (1) illegality, (2)
irrationality, and (3) procedural impropriety. Non-application of mind may be a good ground
illegality and procedural impropriety30. It is permissible to strike down an action if there are
reasonable man will contemplate31. The power is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive
functioning. Restraint has two contemporary manifestations, viz, one is the ambit of judicial
intervention and the other covers the scope of the Court's ability to quash an administrative
21. It is clearly evident that the wildlife warden, pursuant section 11 of the Wildlife Protection
Act, ought to have permitted the farmers to hunt the Boar, which used to crop raid their
produce as it caused a threat to their livelihood and property. The loss of livelihood would
also have a great impact on their lives at large as well. To prevent the chief wildlife warden
ought to have taken some steps to mitigate the human-wildlife conflict, but on lack of any
coercive action the only recourse was under section 11 for the farmers. An administrative
action where it fails to take action as per the parent act renders such action to be brought
22. Orders passed by the executive, when challenged, have to be tested on the touchstone of
28
Reliance Energy Ltd. v Maharashtra State Board of Development Corpn. [(2007)8 S.C.C. 1].
29
Gurnam v Financial Commissioner, Co-op, Punjab (2006)12 SCC 456.
30
State of A.P. v McDowell & Co. (1996)3 S.C.C. 709
31
Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd. o Bangaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. A. 1994 Del 322.
32
Supra note 21
33
Noida Enterprises Assn. v. Noida, (2007)10 SCC 385.
Service Union v. Master for the Civil Service34held, "Judicial review provides the means by
which judicial control of administrative action is exercised. The subject matter of every
judicial review is a decision made by some person or body of persons who are the decision-
makers. To qualify as a subject for judicial review, the decision must have consequences
which affect some person other than the decision maker, although it may affect him too. The
decision of the chief wildlife warden in the present case affected the livelihood of the farmers
as agriculture and tourism are the primary sources of employment for most of the population
in the Sloucher. The horsehead boar was affecting the livelihood of the farmers by eating
their most commonly grown crop, i.e. Nice Dal.35 The villagers even practice agroforestry so
2.2 THAT THE DECISION OF THE CHIEF WILDLIFE WARDEN SUFFERED FROM
23. Judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making
decision as a matter of fact. It is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision is made.36 Lord Diplock opined: "by 'irrationality', I mean what can by
which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible
person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.
Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and
experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong
34
Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) AC 374.
35
Moot proposition. No. 7
36
H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312.
with our judicial system.37 A decision rendered by the wildlife warden to not take any action
even when there was the aggrieved party who had their fundamental right infringed leads it
to be an irrational decision as no person would refrain from taking any action when the
24. The proceedings arising under Article 226 are in the nature of the judicial review, and such
review could only be in respect of the process of decision and not the decision itself. 38In the
present case, the Hon'ble High Court exercises this very right to rectify the mistakes of the
chief wildlife warden so that the right to livelihood of villagers could be saved.
25. An order passed by the statutory authority, particularly when by reason whereof a citizen
would be visited with civil or evil consequences, must meet the test of reasonableness so as
to satisfy the requirements of Arts, 14 and 21 of the Constitution as explained in D.K. Yadav
v. J.M.A. Industries39. Article 21 clubs' life with liberty, the dignity of the person with means
of livelihood without which the glorious contents of dignity of person would be reduced to
animal existence.
26. The duty of the courts is to confine itself to the question of legality. In the present case the
chief wildlife warden who is the decision-making authority, had committed an error of law
when he didn't give the order of hunting to the villagers of PSB as their right to livelihood
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution was infringed. The question that had to be
answered by the chief wildlife warden was the necessity question i.e., whether the means
used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the
objective, and this was not in the present case. The chief wildlife warden could have
37
Supra note 39.
38
Union of India v. Shatabdi Trading & Investment (P) Ltd. (2001)6 SCC 748.
39
D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, (1993)3 SCC 259.
prescribed some alternative remedy instead of denying permission to hunt to the villagers,
27. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that in the landmark case of Council of
Civil Service,40it has been said by the Court that the power of judicial review is restricted to
illegality, irrationality and impropriety "if the power has been exercised on a non-
regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power is exercised on the basis of facts which do not
exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. The
decision rendered by the chief wildlife warden reeks of non-application of mind on relevant
factors. All the relevant factors, like the order of the killing of horsehead boar, sought only
for the area where the agricultural lands of the PSB were situated to protect their crops and
property, which would act as a deterrent measure to prevent crop raiding in future and also
will protect the livelihood and economic interest and food security of the Yolatengo at large.
28. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the order of chief wildlife warden
suffers from procedural ultra vires as relevant circumstances were not taken into
consideration when the order was given. Exercise of power, whether legislative or
administrative, will be liable to be set aside if there is a gross error in the exercise of such
power or when the exercise of power is grossly arbitrary; any decision would be reasonable
only when relevant circumstances are taken into consideration which was not the case in the
present situation.
40
Supra note 39
29. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the laws of the procedure are meant to
regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of substantial and real justice and not to
foreclose even an adjudication on the merits of substantial rights of a citizen under personal
property and other laws. An administrative authority may be exercising a power for any
authorised purpose but if the authority fails to follow the required procedure, the actions of
the authority would be liable to challenge. Although the authority may be doing a right thing
for a good purpose but if it fails to comply with the required procedure than the decision
30. The doctrine of ultra vires can cover virtually all situations where statutory power is
exercised contrary to some legal principles. Where a public authority is held to act for
considerations, its action is ultra vires and void. 41 It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble
Court that the decision of the chief wildlife warden of not giving the decision of hunting to
the villagers suffered from procedural ultra vires as relevant circumstances were not taken
into consideration before giving the decision. It is also stated that section 11(1)(b) of W.P.A.
requires a reasoned decision with respect to subjective satisfaction to state whether the
animal will be translocated, tranquilised or captured to mitigate the H.W.C. It was well
known that the primary source of employment for most people in the Sloucher were tourism
and agriculture, and in the past also their agricultural crops had been affected by the attack of
Bane Toad.42 Therefore, the horsehead boar also was destroying their crops by eating their
most commonly grown crop i.e., Nice Dal, thereby causing a dent in the livelihood of the
PSB villagers.
41
Express Newspaper (P) ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133.
42
Page 1, Moot Proposition.
31. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the High Court was well within its
rights when it passed the interim order [3.1]. The High Court has the required power to
interfere with the discretionary order of the chief wildlife warden so that the interest of the
villagers can be saved [3.2]. Moreover, the interim order also doesn't suffer from any
3.1 THAT THE HIGH COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS POWER WHEN PASSING
32. It is humbly submitted that three conditions have to be satisfied before injunction. The first
one is whether the plaintiff has prima facie case, the second one is whether the plaintiff
would suffer irreparable injury if his prayer for temporary injunction is not granted, and the
third one is whether the balance of convenience is in favor of the plaintiff or not. These
conditions or rules are the three pillars on which the foundation of every injunction rest and
33. The scope of prima facie case has been explained by the Hon'ble Court in the landmark
judgement of Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N Banerjee44. The Supreme Court observed: "A prima
facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be
established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While
determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is
43
Dorab Cowasji Warden v. CommiSorab Warden, (1990) 2 SCC 117.
44
Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N Banerjee, 10 AIR 1958 SC 79.
whether the evidence led it was possible to arrive at a conclusion in question and not whether
that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence.
34. In the present case the villagers had a prima facie case as their right to livelihood was under
attack by the Horsehead boar as his diet shifted to Nice Dal from native tubers and plants,
which was the most commonly grown crop of the villagers and it was out of desperation that
the villagers appealed to the chief wildlife warden to allow the temporary hunting of the
boars so that their livelihood could be saved. Since a prima facie case should always precede
an order of injunction the Court will consider the other factors only when the prima facie
case is established. Therefore, in the present case, the villagers had sufficient prima facie
35. It is most respectfully submitted that the applicant also has to prove and satisfy the Court that
he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction that is prayed is not granted, and that there is
no other remedy available to him by which he can protect himself from the consequences of
the apprehended injury. The Hon'ble Court must be satisfied that refusal to grant an
injunction would result in irreparable injury to the party that is seeking the relief. The
36. In the leading case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd 45. the house of Lords has held
that "the governing principle is that the Court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff
were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunction, he would be
adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a
result of the defendant continuing to do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of
the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common
45
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd, 1975 AC 396.
law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in financial position to pay them,
no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff's claim
37. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that in the present case as the human
increased and the villagers were protective of the forestland surrounding their village, as well
as of the co-inhabiting flora and fauna and for this the villagers tried practicing agroforestry
so that the impact could be limited to minimum extent. Moreover, its because of the diet of
the horsehead boar that shifted from native tubers and plants to Nice Dal that caused the
problem to the livelihood of the villagers and for this all villagers needed was the temporary
order of killing the Boar not the permanent one. Thereby causing grave injury to the farmers
38. The respondent humbly submits that balance of convenience must be in the favour of the
applicant i.e., the inconvenience and hardship caused will be greater to the applicant than the
opposite party. The Court should be fully satisfied that the comparative mischief or
inconvenience which is likely to be caused to the applicant by refusing the injunction will be
greater than the other party. In the present case it has been clearly mentioned that the primary
sources of employment for most of the population in Sloucher is agriculture and tourism and
the horsehead boar was destroying the said livelihood of the villagers by eating their crops.
39. The Hon'ble Court in the case of F.C.I. v.Yadav Engineer & Contractor47 has said that
"Interlocutory proceedings are incidental to the main proceedings. They have a life till the
disposal of the main proceeding. As the suit or the proceeding is likely to take some time
46
Supra note 53.
47
F.C.I. v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor (1982) 2 SCC 499.
before the dispute in the suit is finally adjudicated, more often interim orders have to be
made for the protection of the rights of the parties." In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, 48 the
apex court held that while granting or refusing to grant injunction the Court should exercise
sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial injury which is likely to be caused
to the parties. The Petitioner is suffering substantial amount of injury in the present case and
moreover, the order of the high Court was not the permanent one but the interim in this case
and the order of hunting was only for the specific area.
3.2 THAT THE HIGH COURT HAS THE POWER TO INTERFERE WITH THE
40. The power of the High Courts to give relief under article 226 is a discretionary power. This is
especially true in the case of a power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Discretion is
exercised by the courts according to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Hon'ble
Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Digambar49has held that the "power of the High
Court to be exercised Under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise
41. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the interim order can always be passed by a
High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction to maintain the status quo in aid of the relief
claimed so that at the time of final decision of the writ petition, in such situation the relief
42. In the present case it was because of the development purposes that the forestland was
converted into farmland and to limit its negative impact the villagers were practicing
48
Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719.
49
State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683.
50
Benedict Denis Kinni v. Tulip Brian Miranda, CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1429-1430/2020.
agroforestry. Moreover, the order of hunting was required by the villagers only for a
temporary basis and that too for the limited area where the agricultural lands of the PSB
villagers were situated. Hence, the villagers out of desperation appealed to the chief wildlife
43. The Petitioner humbly contends that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the
High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after
considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously
and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay
should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the
44. The Petitioner humbly contends that where a statute confers discretionary powers upon the
executive authority and the authority acts in an arbitrary manner, its action would be bad in
law and liable to be struck down by the courts. But the validity and the constitutionality of
such power cannot be judged on the assumption that the executive or such authority will act
45. It is humbly submitted that granting or refusing of temporary injunction rests on the sound
exercise of discretion by the Court. Such exercise of discretion cannot be lightly interfered
with by the appellate Court unless it is shown that such exercise of discretion is unreasonable
or capricious. In the present case, under section 11(1)(b) of the W.P.A., 1972, the chief
wildlife warden has the power to permit the hunting of the animals specified under Schedule
II, III, and IV if it has become dangerous to human life or property. It is also submitted that
51
Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185.
52
D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp SCC 20.
there has previously been a history of granting temporary hunting orders in the State to
protect the ecology, for instance, in the case of the bane toad.53
46. In the light of the aggravating circumstances in the State where there was a rising human–
wildlife conflict which resulted in a grave loss of rights for one party, the High Court ought
to have interfered to maintain the status quo as the Boar had caused heavy losses to the
farmers and if left to the warden's decision, the losses would have continued with no end in
sight and further pave the way for retaliatory actions on the farmers' end.
47. The concept of the doctrine of proportionality is used as a criterion of fairness and justice in
correct balance between the restrictions imposed by a corrective measure and the severity of
the nature of the prohibited act. Courts have the power of judicial review over administrative
actions. It means the Court can adjudge the legality and correctness of particular actions
48. The doctrine ordains that administrative measures must not be more drastic than is necessary
for attaining the desired result. If an action taken by an authority is grossly disproportionate,
the said decision is not immune from judicial scrutiny. Apart from the fact that it is an
improper and unreasonable exercise of power, it shocks the conscience of the Court and
amounts to evidence of bias and prejudice. The doctrine operates both in procedural and
substantive matters.
49. Proportionality is a principle where the Court is concerned with the process, method or
manner in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or
53
Moot proposition no. 2
relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case. The doctrine of
proportionality thus steps in focus the true nature of the exercise—the elaboration of a rule of
permissible priorities.54
50. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the interim order of the Hon'ble High
Court doesn't infringe the test of proportionality as the villagers only wanted temporary
hunting of the boars and that too for the specific part where the agricultural lands of the
villagers were situated, the Boar was affecting the property of the villagers by eating their
crops. The villagers even practised agroforestry so that the ecosystem could be saved from
destruction, and hence the villagers took measures to preserve the environment around them.
51. The components of the doctrine of proportionality are - First, the measures adopted must be
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or
objective. Secondly, the means must not only be rationally connected to the objective in the
first sense but should impair as little as possible the right to freedom in question. Thirdly,
there must be 'proportionality' between the effects of the measures and the objective. The
above three principles have been cited by the Hon'ble Court in the case of Om Kumar v
U.O.I55. In the present case, the measures that were adopted were not arbitrary or unfair as
the Boar was infringing on the right of livelihood of the villagers. The measure adopted
would have solved the conflict and would preserve the rights of the farmers. Moreover, the
54
Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. 32 (2007) 4 SCC 669.
55
Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689.
order of hunting was required for a temporary period and for a specific area. Therefore, the
remedy lies in tightening the procedure and not abolishing the procedure itself. 56
52. In K.V Sebastian v. State of Kerala,57 the Court permitted the boars to be hunted on a
temporary basis after considering the heavy losses that were incurred by the farmers in the
State by an interim order. Hence, there is indeed proportionality between the effects of
53. In the present case, no alternative course of action can be resorted to other than the proposed
solution of temporary hunting order.[4.1] The alternative solutions contemplated would not
be feasible and wouldn't address the urgency of the situation.[4.2] It is also brought forth that
there are no existing policies of H.W.C. mitigation, and there cannot be an action to the effect
54. In the present situation, the conflict between humans and wildlife rose to such a degree that
the right to livelihood of the farmers was deprived, which required urgent necessary
essential.58 It was held that unless the Government was satisfied "beyond reasonable doubt",
the laying of the pipeline was indispensable for the better management of wildlife.
Examples of such "necessary" destruction etc. wildlife/forest would be the cutting of trees to
prevent the spread of forest fires or an infestation or the culling of animals, or weed
56
I P MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 62 (EBC Publishing (P) Ltd., Lucknow 2017).
57
WP(C) No.21207/2020.
58
Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti, [2004] 2 S.C.C. 392
eradication.59 It is pointed out that such measures originate from the Chief Wildlife Warden
himself and are only for the purpose of enhancing wildlife and its habitat. Even this power
55. The hunting order granted was a temporary measure where the animals were to be hunted in
a localised area, that is, the farmlands, where the horsehead boars would crop, raid and come
into contact with the farmers. The other alternative measures cannot be adopted in the present
instance where the severity of damage is such that it requires an urgent solution to be made.
It is also seen that alternative remedies will not be feasible or ethical either.
56. In the present situation, the boars are only allowed to be killed which are in close proximity
to the farmers and has such a grave impact on their agriculture, affecting their livelihood and
has also caused a serious dereliction of their own foraging patterns for which its impact
continues to be still unknown, the action taken by the Hon'ble Court proves to be the only
existing remedy.
57. Anthropocentric bias cannot be attributed to the current decision that has been made by the
Hon'ble High Court in the present case as if done so; it would fail to differentiate between
legitimate and illegitimate human interests. If this very attribute permits the wildlife
mentioned in Schedule II and after to be hunted if it endangers human life and property60.
58. Man-animal conflict often takes place when wild animals cause damage to agricultural crops
and property, killing livestock and human beings. Human population growth, land use
transformation, species loss of habitat, ecotourism, too much access to reserves, increase in
livestock population bordering the forest, depletion of natural prey base, etc., are often stated
59
Ibid.
60
Kopnina, H., Washington, H., Taylor, B. et al. Anthropocentrism: More than Just a Misunderstood Problem. J
Agric Environ Ethics 31, 109–127 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9711-1.
to be reasons for such conflict.61. These mandates the Government to intervene at the right
time take precautionary measures, but the lack of policy and legislation with regard to
59. It also stated as per the precautionary principle coined in the landmark case of Narmada
Bachao Andolan v. Union of India62 , that the burden of proof shall lie on the person who
wants to change status quo will ordinarily apply in a case of polluting or other project or
industry, where the extent of damage likely to be inflicted is not known63. But in the same
judgment it is also stated that when the ecological damage is unknown it needs to be seen if
then there is any destruction and if any steps to mitigate it can be taken or else there can't be a
presumption that change that is to occur will be sure short recipe for an ecological disaster.
60. The courts have time and again reiterated the need to strike a balance between development
and the environment, and there can't be one leaning in favour of the others. The over-zealous
adverse effects of H.W.C. and applying stringent safeguards like a temporary hunting order
because one cannot lose sight of the need for the development of industries, irrigation
resources and power projects, etc. including the need to improve employment opportunities
61
E. Sheshan v. Union of India 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 2959.
62
Narmada BacahoAndolan v. Union of India 10 S.C.C.664
63
Ibid.
64
M.C Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 SCR (1) 819.
61. It is humbly submitted that the cost of resettlement of humans in terms of social and
economic value far surpasses the good that is to come from their relocation. The
rehabilitation should be such that on their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off
than what they were.65 It has been observed that during resettlement the displaced persons
encounter several problems relating to the location, quality and quantity of land and other
ancillary resources necessary for agricultural activities.66 The Indian agriculturists generally
have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves
nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall
62. It is also brought to the attention that the cost of resettlement would be very high as it would
mandate the provision of conditions similar to or even better to the displaced population. No
State of any country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects. That is why
it only approves its projects to the extent it is feasible. There also is no government policy as
to the rehabilitation of such farmers and thereby no such action can be proposed either.
63. Uprooting these villagers gives a responsibility to the govt. to ensure that some sort of
financial security is provided to them, which is not always possible as such communities do
not have, oftentimes, the required skill set to survive in urban settlements. These people
cannot be made to face the brunt of conservational activities, with just one side facing the
fruits of conservation.68
65
Supra note 4
66
Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Analysis of Judicial Policy, 55 JILI (2013) 346
67
K. Krishna Reddy v. Spl. Dy Collector, Land Acqn. Unit II, LMD Karimnagar
68
A brief discussion on this issue with respect to Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve relocation process can be found
here - Rucha Ghate, Relocation versus Wildlife Preservation, 40 No. 46 EPW 4807, 4808 (2005).
64. The right to livelihood cannot be subjected to the individual fancies of the persons in
authority. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching69.
One of the important aspects of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can
live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood.
65. It is further submitted that relocation leads to the development of inequities between
communities and pushes people, already suffering, over the edge as relocation programmes
are often, unfortunately, for the reasons cited above, inadequate and inconsiderate to the
social, economic & psychological conditions of these people. Like the intent of the W.P.A.
there needs to be balancing of human and wildlife interest70. There can't be a loss of either of
their rights so instead of aggravating human-wildlife conflict, the hunting order, which is not
indiscriminate only for a limited period in at localised area, would serve the purpose than
resettlement.
66. In parts of Maharashtra, a study finds blackbuck, nilgai and wild boar all damage jawar
crops. Wild Boar, in addition, raid potato, rice, bajari and ground nut crops; blackbucks enjoy
wheat, tomato and chilly crops; and nilgai raid oil-seed fields71. Farmers have tried a number
of solutions to the problem, without success. Attempts to plant johar and pulse crops in place
of cotton have not deterred crop raiding72. The Forest Department has tried other solutions
without success. A relocation attempt resulted in the death of six blackbucks; a planned safari
park failed when local panchayats refused to give up promised lands, and a shared-cost
69
Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v Delhi Admn., (1992) 4 SCC 995.
70
Moot Proposition no. 3
71
Preliminary Report on Crop Damage in Maharashtra by Nature Conservation Society, Amravati.
Source:KishoreRithe.
72
Ibid.
fencing plan proved too expensive for farmers. In the present case, Horsehead boar has stared
foraging on Nice Dal like in the above-mentioned instance and the other proposed possible
solutions are similar but the ground reality of their efficacy is often questionable. Agro
forestry is another possible solution has already been undertaken by the PSB villagers which
has not yielded much result either73. Also, on resettlement of the animals it has been found
that this does not mitigate the problem in many areas, even increasing the conflict in release
sites.74
67. Without ensuring alternative and remedies by the Government the pressure on the local
communities continue. This results in negative interaction between wildlife and humans.
There also exists resource constraints for people to meet these other resource of unpalatable
crop farming, fencing or other modern technology. Also due to a lack of alternative
livelihood, such incidents of livestock predation and crop depredation by wildlife hits the
local communities hard. Hence, it is crucial that the local institutions, central Government
and civil society bodies work together in tandem to ensure that not just ecological diversity
68. At present, there are no national policies which ensure H.W.C. mitigation. It is also beyond
the purview of the current W.P.A. Act to address any other possible solution apart from
temporary hunting orders for the problematic animal when the conflict has escalated to such
73
Moot proposition no. 4
74
(Nath and Sukumar, 1998; Athreya et al., 2011).
75
Karanth K.K., Gopalaswamy A.M., Defries R. and Ballal N. (2012). Assessing patterns of human-wildlife
conflicts and compensation around a central Indian protected area. PLoS ONE, 7(12):e50433
69. There exists a standing committee of the National Board of Wildlife (SC-NBWL) which is to
create a plan for human-wildlife conflict mitigation and to take chief wildlife wardens'
opinion into consideration for mitigation as well but the efficacy of it is still not
considerable.76
76
Gulati S, Karanth KK, Le NA, Noack F. Human casualties are the dominant cost of human-wildlife conflict in India.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2021 Feb 23;118(8):e1921338118. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1921338118.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the Issues raised, Authorities cited and Arguments advanced, it is most
humbly and respectfully requested that the Hon'ble High Court of Sloucher be pleased to:
1. DECLARE, that T.W.C. should not be allowed to intervene in the writ petition.
&
2. UPHOLD, the Interim order of the Hon'ble High Court to permit the farmers to hunt the
&
3. ISSUE DIRECTIONS to the Chief wildlife warden to grant a temporary permit to hunt
AND/OR
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE
PRAY.
The Petitioner
Sd/-