Consti RP
Consti RP
1. DECLARATION …………………….…………………………………………………………..…..01
2. ACKNOWLDEGEMENT...…………………………………………………………………………03
3. ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………….….04
4. A. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………...………………..05-20
CHAPTER 1…………………………………………………………………………………………..20-23
CHAPTER 2……………………………………………………………………………………..……24-28
CHAPTER 3…………………………………………………………………………………………..29-30
CHAPTER 4…………………………………………………………………………………………..30-31
5.C. RECOMMENDATIONS……………...………………………………………………………….....32
6. D. CONCLUSION ….………………………………………………………………………………....33
8. E. BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………..34
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN INDIA MUSKAN GUPTA
ABSTRACT
This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the Council of Ministers in India,
examining its inception, evolution, legal framework, and contemporary relevance. The study delves
into the constitutional provisions, collective and individual responsibilities, and the dynamics
between the Council and the President. Through a critical review of literature, legal precedents, and
recent developments, the paper aims to elucidate the significance of the Council in India's
parliamentary democracy. The research also addresses criticisms, surveys public perceptions, and
offers supporting references to present a holistic view of the subject.
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A. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the Council of Ministers in India has its roots in the British colonial administration,
where executive authority was exercised by the Governor-General with the assistance of an
Executive Council. This structure was adapted into the Indian constitutional framework post-
independence to ensure a parliamentary system of governance.
Article 74 of the Indian Constitution establishes the Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at
its helm, to aid and advise the President in the exercise of their functions. Initially, the Constitution
did not explicitly state whether the President was bound by this advice, leading to ambiguities
regarding the extent of presidential discretion.
To address this, the 42nd Amendment in 19761 amended Article 742 to explicitly mandate that the
President "shall act in accordance with such advice" provided by the Council of Ministers, thereby
removing any ambiguity about the binding nature of the advice. Subsequently, the 44th Amendment
in 19783 introduced a proviso allowing the President to return the advice for reconsideration once.
However, if the Council of Ministers reiterated the same advice, the President was obliged to act in
accordance with it.
These amendments have solidified the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in India's constitutional
framework, ensuring that the elected representatives, through the Council of Ministers, effectively
wield executive power while maintaining the President's role as a constitutional head.
1
The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976.
2
India Const. art. 74.
3
The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
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The Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, is the cornerstone of India's executive branch,
playing a crucial role in shaping the nation's policies and governance. Understanding its significance
is vital for several reasons:
1. Policy Formulation and Implementation: The Council is responsible for crafting and
executing policies that address national issues, ensuring the government's agenda is
effectively translated into action.
5. Foreign Policy Direction: It plays a pivotal role in shaping India's foreign relations,
determining the nation's stance and interactions on the global stage.
Studying the Council of Ministers provides insights into the functioning of India's parliamentary
democracy, the balance of power within the executive branch, and the practical application of
constitutional provisions. This understanding is essential for comprehending how policies are
formulated, decisions are made, and governance is executed in the world's largest democracy.
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The primary objectives of this research paper on the Council of Ministers in India are:
1. To Analyze the Constitutional Framework: Examine the provisions within the Indian
Constitution that establish and define the roles, responsibilities, and powers of the Council of
Ministers, particularly focusing on Articles 74 and 75.
3. To Explore the Functional Dynamics: Assess how the Council of Ministers contributes to
policy formulation, legislative processes, and administrative governance, ensuring effective
implementation of government policies.
5. To Identify Contemporary Challenges: Highlight current issues and challenges faced by the
Council of Ministers in the evolving political and socio-economic landscape of India,
including coalition dynamics and administrative efficiency.
By achieving these objectives, the study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
Council of Ministers' pivotal role in India's parliamentary democracy, contributing to the broader
discourse on effective governance and constitutional practices.
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The Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, serves as the executive authority in India's
parliamentary system, responsible for policy formulation and administration. Its contemporary legal
relevance is underscored by several key aspects:
i. Legislative Initiatives and Legal Oversight: The Council plays a pivotal role in introducing
and amending legislation that addresses current societal needs and challenges. For instance,
recent legislative efforts, such as the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025 4, highlight the Council's
involvement in reforming laws governing religious endowments to enhance transparency and
accountability. This bill aims to introduce non-Muslims onto waqf boards and increase
government oversight, purportedly to combat corruption and enhance diversity. However,
critics argue it could undermine Muslim rights and lead to the confiscation of historic
mosques and properties.
ii. Collective Responsibility and Legal Accountability: The principle of collective
responsibility5 ensures that the Council operates as a unified entity, with decisions binding on
all members. While ministers are collectively accountable to the Parliament, the Indian
Constitution does not explicitly provide for their legal responsibility. This means that courts
are generally precluded from inquiring into the advice rendered by ministers to the President,
thereby delineating the boundaries of judicial scrutiny over executive decisions.
iii. Interface with Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties: The Council's decisions and
policies have significant implications for fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
Actions perceived as infringing upon freedoms of expression, association, or religion have
prompted legal challenges and debates about the balance between state authority and
individual liberties. For example, the government's measures affecting civil society
organizations and media outlets have raised concerns regarding the potential stifling of
dissent and the narrowing of democratic spaces.
iv. Judicial Interpretations and Evolving Jurisprudence: The judiciary plays a crucial role in
interpreting the extent and limits of the Council's powers, thereby shaping the legal landscape
within which it operates.
4
Pritam Baruah, “Executive Accountability and Constitutional Structure,” NUJS Law Review, Vol. 7(2).
5
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, No. 21 of 2025, Acts of Parliament, 2025 (India).
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Constitutional Framework
Articles 74 and 75 of the Indian Constitution establish the Council of Ministers to aid and advise the
President, with the President acting on such advice. The Council is collectively responsible to the
Lok Sabha, ensuring accountability. The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act of 2003 limits the
Council's size to 15% of the Lok Sabha's membership to promote efficiency and prevent excessive
appointments.
1. Cabinet Ministers: Senior members heading key ministries, forming the core decision-
making body.
Budget Preparation: Crafting the national budget and overseeing financial management.
Gender Representation
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This study aims to explore the multifaceted role of the Council of Ministers in India's parliamentary
democracy by addressing the following research questions:
1. Constitutional Framework and Evolution: How have the constitutional provisions outlined
in Articles 74 and 75 shaped the formation, powers, and functions of the Council of Ministers
since India's independence?
3. Functional Dynamics: How does the Council of Ministers facilitate policy formulation and
implementation within the Indian governmental structure?
4. Accountability Mechanisms: In what ways are the principles of collective and individual
responsibility manifested in the functioning of the Council of Ministers, and how effective
are these mechanisms in ensuring ministerial accountability?
5. Contemporary Challenges: What are the significant challenges faced by the Council of
Ministers in the current political and socio-economic landscape of India, and how do these
challenges impact its efficacy and governance?
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While the Council of Ministers is pivotal in India's parliamentary democracy, existing literature
reveals several areas that warrant further scholarly attention:
Addressing these research gaps would deepen the understanding of the Council of Ministers' role
and enhance the discourse on governance and democratic processes in India.
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The Council of Ministers serves as the executive authority in India's parliamentary democracy,
tasked with policy formulation and governance. Despite its constitutional significance, several
challenges impede its optimal functioning:
1. Accountability and Transparency: Ensuring that the Council operates transparently and
remains accountable to the Parliament and the public is essential. Mechanisms to measure
and enhance these aspects are critical for good governance.
4. Size and Efficiency: The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act of 20036 capped the size of the
Council at 15% of the Lok Sabha's strength to enhance efficiency. 7 However, assessing the
impact of this limitation on governance effectiveness remains an area of concern.
Addressing these issues is crucial for strengthening the Council's role in promoting effective and
representative governance in India.
6
The Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Act, No. 36 of 2003, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
7
Subhash C. Kashyap, “Coalition Politics and the Council of Ministers,” Indian Journal of Public Administration, 2016.
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A.8 HYPOTHESIS
This research posits that the composition, adherence to collective responsibility, and mechanisms
ensuring accountability and transparency within the Council of Ministers significantly influence its
effectiveness and efficiency in India's parliamentary democracy. Specifically, it hypothesizes that:
1. Composition and Representation: A Council that mirrors India's diverse society in terms of
gender, caste, religion, and regional backgrounds is likely to make more inclusive and
equitable policy decisions.
By examining these hypotheses, the study aims to elucidate the factors that contribute to the optimal
functioning of the Council of Ministers and offer insights for potential reforms to enhance its role in
India's parliamentary system.
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Objective:
To trace the constitutional and political evolution of the Council of Ministers from 1950 till present-
day India.
Data Sources:
Key judgments (e.g., S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab8)
Method:
Chronological mapping of legislative and political changes to understand shifts in the role and power
balance within the CoM.
Table:
8
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.
9
Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations.
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Objective:
To visualize influence, hierarchy, and internal clustering within the Council of Ministers.
Tools:
Method:
Ministers are nodes; shared decisions, cabinet memberships, reshuffles, and co-sponsorships act as
edges.
Findings Visualized:
Title:
Objective:
To capture real-world perception of the CoM’s functionality, democratic health, and
accountability.
Tools Used:
Telephonic Interviews
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Survey Questionnaire:
Survey Table:
PM dominates CoM
60% 25% 10% 3% 2%
disproportionately
Collective Responsibility is
20% 35% 25% 15% 5%
practiced
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Respondent
Designation Q1. Q2. Q3. Q4. Q5.
Name
Associate
Professor of Strongly
R1 Agree Neutral Agree Neutral
Political Science, Agree
JNU
Research Scholar,
Strongly
R3 Centre for Public Neutral Neutral Disagree Neutral
Disagree
Policy
Senior Journalist,
R4 Agree Agree Neutral Agree Disagree
The Hindu
Ethical Considerations
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Examination of relevant judicial decisions shaping the role and accountability of the
CoM.
Tracing the evolution of the Council from 1950 to the present day.
Emphasis on landmark amendments (42nd, 44th, and 91st) and changes during key
political periods.
5. Comparative Insights
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Surveys were conducted among academics, public administration students, and retired
officials, excluding current ministers and bureaucrats due to unavailability or
institutional constraints.
Social network metrics are reliant on publicly available data and media reports, which
may not fully capture informal political dynamics or behind-the-scenes negotiations.
The study focuses predominantly on post-2014 governance trends, which may not
universally reflect earlier or future patterns.10
While combining doctrinal, empirical, and analytical approaches adds depth, it also
creates challenges in ensuring consistency across data interpretation and theoretical
frameworks.
10
Tarunabh Khaitan, “The Rise of Executive Power in India,” Oxford Human Rights Hub, 2022.
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The Council of Ministers (CoM) lies at the core of India's parliamentary executive system, anchoring
the link between the political executive and the constitutional head—the President of India. Its
functioning is defined under Articles 74 and 75 of the Constitution of India, which establish the
framework for ministerial advice, appointments, and responsibilities. This chapter decodes the
evolution, constitutional foundation, legal obligations, and judicial interpretations related to the
CoM.
When the Constitution was adopted in 1950, Article 74(1) stated that "there shall be a Council of
Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his
functions."11 However, the binding nature of this advice was not explicitly mentioned, giving rise to
interpretative ambiguities regarding the discretionary powers of the President.
To address this, the 42nd Constitutional Amendment 12 introduced the phrase “the President shall, in
the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice,” thereby reinforcing the
Westminster parliamentary principle that the real executive power lies with the elected Council, not
the President.
The 44th Amendment13 added a subtle but important check by permitting the President to return
advice once for reconsideration, but if reiterated, the President was bound to act upon it.
Mandating that ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President (interpreted as per
the advice of the Prime Minister).
Requiring collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha, which underpins the accountability of
the executive to the legislature.
Stating that the Prime Minister is appointed by the President, who then appoints other
ministers on the PM’s advice.
11
India Const. art. 74, cl. 1.
12
The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, No. 101 of 1976, INDIA CODE (1976).
13
The Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, No. 44, Acts of Parliament, 1978 (India).
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Although the President is the nominal executive, the CoM holds real decision-making authority. The
President's role is largely ceremonial and constitutional—bound by the advice of the Council except
in rare, exceptional circumstances like:
Yet, even these moments are constitutionally bounded, and judicial rulings have consistently
emphasized the supremacy of ministerial advice.
The concept of collective responsibility, embedded in Article 75(3), is a defining feature of the CoM.
It ensures that:
All ministers must publicly support Cabinet decisions, even if they privately disagreed during
internal deliberations.
If a vote of no-confidence is passed in the Lok Sabha, the entire Council (including the PM)
must resign.
Indian courts have played a pivotal role in defining and reinforcing the limits and powers of the
CoM. Key judgments include:
Background:
This case dealt with the constitutionality of the appointment of Indira Gandhi as Prime
Minister without a formal election to the office of the leader of the majority party.
14
U.N. Rao v. Indira Gandhi, (1971) 2 S.C.C. 63.
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Issues:
Whether a person could be appointed Prime Minister without being formally elected as the
leader of the majority party in the Lok Sabha.
Judgment:
The Court held that under Article 75(1), the President has the discretion to appoint the Prime
Minister, and the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. The
President is not bound to await a formal election in the party, as long as it is evident who
commands majority support.
Further, the Court clarified that even a single Minister, if duly authorized, can advise the
President and bind the executive, reinforcing the legitimacy of ministerial advice under
Article 74(1).
Significance:
Reinforced the idea that constitutional conventions, though unwritten, are vital to the smooth
functioning of parliamentary democracy.
This landmark case arose after Indira Gandhi’s victory in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections was
challenged by Raj Narain on the grounds of electoral malpractices under the Representation
of the People Act, 1951. The Allahabad High Court found Gandhi guilty of using state
machinery during the election and invalidated her election.
Issues:
2. The constitutionality of the 39th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1975, which inserted Article
329A to validate Gandhi’s election and bar judicial review.
15
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1.
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Judgment:
The Supreme Court struck down Clause (4) of Article 329A as unconstitutional, holding that
Parliament could not immunize elections from judicial review in violation of the basic
structure of the Constitution. However, the Court allowed Indira Gandhi to retain her seat due
to procedural limitations.
Key Doctrines:
Significance:
The judgment was a stern rebuke to the abuse of constitutional amendments to suit political
interests. It preserved the independence of the judiciary and ensured the electoral process
remained fair and just. It also laid the groundwork for later reaffirmations of the basic
structure doctrine in Minerva Mills and Kesavananda Bharati.
The Council of Ministers (CoM) in India is a tiered executive body that reflects not just
constitutional mandates but also the political dynamics of the ruling party or coalition. This chapter
explores the internal composition of the CoM, the distinctions between different types of ministers,
the rationale behind their selection, and the crucial role of the Prime Minister in maintaining
coherence and control.
The Council of Ministers is broadly classified into three categories, as recognized by convention and
practice, though not rigidly codified in the Constitution:
They head key ministries like Home, Finance, Defence, and External Affairs.
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These ministers may be given independent charge of smaller ministries or function under the
supervision of a Cabinet Minister.
For example, the MoS (Independent Charge) for AYUSH may operate with full
administrative authority but without Cabinet membership.
These are junior functionaries, assigned to assist either Cabinet Ministers or MoSs.
Though rarely appointed in recent decades, they play a role in legislative coordination and
administrative support.
The Prime Minister enjoys wide discretion in recommending ministerial appointments to the
President. While merit and expertise play a role, political considerations often dominate:
Loyalty and Experience: Trusted party leaders or alliance partners are often rewarded.
Major portfolios like Finance, Defence, and Home typically stay with the leading party.
Allied parties are given control of ministries relevant to their regional interests or ideological
goals. For example, in UPA or NDA coalitions, DMK or Shiv Sena leaders were given
ministries like Telecom or Heavy Industries.
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Pre-poll agreements
Post-poll bargaining
2.4 Role of the Prime Minister as Primus Inter Pares (First Among Equals)
The Prime Minister (PM) is constitutionally described as the "head of the Council of Ministers"
(Article 74), but his/her actual power extends beyond formal text:
Leadership Role:
Authority in Practice:
Over time, especially during the tenure of leaders like Indira Gandhi or Narendra Modi, the
PM’s role has transformed from being a "coordinator" to a "central executive force."
In contrast, during coalition eras (e.g., Manmohan Singh’s tenure), the PM had to balance
authority with consensus-building.
The PM's position as primus inter pares means that while formally equal with other Cabinet
colleagues, he/she dominates the executive narrative through political mandate, control over
appointments, and public legitimacy.
India’s parliamentary democracy rests on the foundational principle of responsible government. The
Council of Ministers (CoM), while wielding executive authority, is ultimately accountable to the Lok
Sabha, the directly elected house of the Parliament.
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The concept of collective responsibility underpins the entire structure of parliamentary executive
accountability. As per Article 75(3) of the Constitution16:
“The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People.”
This implies that the entire Council, including the Prime Minister, sinks or swims together.
If the Lok Sabha withdraws its support (e.g., through a no-confidence motion), the entire
Council must resign.
Policy decisions taken by the Cabinet are binding on all ministers, regardless of personal
opinions or dissent.
While collective responsibility addresses the Cabinet as a whole, individual ministers are answerable
for their personal conduct, departmental functioning, and decisions taken in their portfolios.
Ministers can be forced to resign over scandals, policy failures, or parliamentary disapproval.
Example: Ashwini Kumar’s resignation in 2013 over interference in a CBI report is often
cited as a case of individual responsibility.17
A powerful legislative tool available under Rule 198 of the Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure.
If passed by a majority of members present and voting, the CoM must resign.
2008: UPA survived a no-confidence vote post the Indo-US nuclear deal.19
16
India Const. art. 75, cl. 3.
17
Ashwani Kumar resigns over CBI affidavit row, The Hindu (May 10, 2013).
18
Vajpayee Govt Falls by One Vote, The Indian Express (Apr. 18, 1999).
19
UPA Wins Trust Vote, The Hindu (July 23, 2008).
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Adjournment Motion: Raised for urgent matters requiring the government’s attention and
explanation.
Calling Attention Motion: Allows members to call a Minister’s attention to a matter of public
importance.
Short Duration Discussions (Rule 193): Debates that allow scrutiny without a formal motion.
Parliamentary question hours and motions are perhaps the most consistent and direct methods of
legislative oversight:
Held at the start of each sitting, ministers are required to respond orally or in writing.
In recent years, decline in the number of questions answered, and suspension of Question
Hour during the COVID-19 pandemic sparked criticism.
An informal innovation, it enables MPs to raise urgent matters without prior notice.
These interrupt scheduled business to discuss emergency issues (e.g., disasters, policy
blunders).
Despite the availability of various mechanisms, parliamentary oversight has weakened in several
instances due to:
Party majoritarianism
Frequent disruptions
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Notable Cases:
2) Demonetisation21 (2016):
This consolidated chapter critically examines the internal and external factors that shape the
structural composition and operational efficacy of the Council of Ministers in India. Subdivided into
thematic sections, it integrates analysis of ministerial reshuffles, emergency governance, comparative
frameworks, and the evolving role of technology and representation.
Ministerial reshuffles are not merely instruments of bureaucratic realignment—they are powerful
tools of political signaling, administrative performance management, and coalition preservation.
Since independence, reshuffles have been driven by multiple factors: internal dissent, performance
reviews, regional or caste representation, and responses to political crises.
One of the most significant legal interventions in this domain was the 91st Constitutional
Amendment Act, 200323, which limited the size of the Council of Ministers to 15% of the strength
of the respective legislature.
20
Opposition Demands Pegasus Probe, Government Refuses Discussion, The Hindu (July 23, 2021.
21
PM Announces Demonetisation of ₹500, ₹1,000 Notes, The Hindu (Nov. 9, 2016).
22
Farm Bills Passed in Rajya Sabha Amid Chaos, Indian Express (Sept. 21, 2020).
23
The Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Act, No. 36 of 2003, INDIA CODE (2003).
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This sought to address the rise of “jumbo cabinets” that were often formed as instruments of political
patronage rather than necessity. Despite this ceiling, inventive political maneuvering continues, with
Ministers of State (independent charge) often used to circumvent direct control by cabinet ministers.
The Council of Ministers plays a constitutionally mandated advisory role during emergencies
declared under Articles 35224, 35625, and 36026. These powers, while rarely invoked, serve as a
barometer of the health of Indian federalism and democratic accountability.
The Emergency of 1975 marked the most dramatic example of centralized executive power, where
ministerial consent was largely symbolic, overridden by the Prime Ministerial will. More recently,
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Disaster Management Act, 2005 was utilized extensively.
Though not constitutionally classified as an emergency, the scale and scope of executive control
mirrored emergency conditions.
The CoM, through various task forces, oversaw lockdowns, vaccine rollout, and economic stimulus
packages—demonstrating how modern-day emergencies require swift yet constitutionally compliant
decision-making.
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To contextualize the Indian Council of Ministers’ structure, a comparative analysis with other
democratic systems offers instructive parallels and divergences.
In the United Kingdom, cabinet conventions are deeply entrenched though unwritten,
placing emphasis on collective responsibility and ministerial discretion.
The United States, with a presidential system, severs the executive-legislative link that is
central to the Indian model. Secretaries are appointed by the President and are not legislators,
which alters the accountability matrix.
Canada and Australia, both following Westminster conventions, display innovations like
fixed ministerial terms, shadow cabinets, and strong bicameral negotiations, which could be
of relevance to Indian reforms.
Beyond legal and symbolic roles, the Council of Ministers is the core body driving national policy.
While legislative power resides with Parliament, the executive—through Cabinet committees and
ministerial coordination—shepherds policy from ideation to implementation.
Digital India: Led by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, but supported
by infrastructure, finance, and human resource departments.
National Education Policy 202027: Joint effort of HRD Ministry (now MoE), NITI Aayog,
and Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs.
Committees such as the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) and Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS) operate as hubs of deliberation and decision-making, highlighting
the Cabinet’s pivotal policy-making authority.
27
National Education Policy, 2020, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, GOV’T OF INDIA (2020).
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Despite India's social diversity, the composition of the Council of Ministers often fails to reflect
proportional representation. This section critically examines the participation of women, religious
minorities, and marginalized communities in ministerial positions.
Though leaders like Indira Gandhi, Sushma Swaraj, and Nirmala Sitharaman have held key
portfolios, broader trends suggest persistent tokenism. Women rarely cross 10–15% representation,
and certain regions (e.g., the North-East) or castes remain underrepresented.
Quantitative data between 2000 and 2024 shows marginal improvement in diversity, but without
institutional guarantees or quotas, representational justice remains elusive.28
The role of technology in modern governance has redefined the functioning of the Council of
Ministers. E-Governance, digital cabinet meetings, real-time file tracking, and data-driven policy
evaluation now form an integral part of administrative decision-making.
Initiatives such as Digital India, integration of AI in public services, and cybersecurity frameworks
(like the CERT-IN framework) are coordinated at the highest levels, often involving inter-ministerial
collaboration. This demands continuous upskilling of ministerial staff, better digital infrastructure,
and a clear legal framework for data ethics and AI governance.
The Ministry of Electronics and IT, in conjunction with Cabinet sub-committees, now plays a dual
role—as policymaker and enabler—making tech literacy a critical component of future Council
efficacy.
28
Punchhi Commission Report (2010).
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Define roles and responsibilities for each category of ministers—Cabinet, MoS (IC), and
MoS—through statutory rules or guidelines.
Codification can reduce ambiguity, particularly during reshuffles and delegation of duties.
Strengthen the Cabinet Secretariat with a constitutional status, empowering it to audit and
monitor ministerial performance periodically.
Amend Article 75(3) to clarify the operational meaning of “collective responsibility” in light
of modern coalition governments.
Introduce an internal accountability mechanism within the CoM to ensure alignment with
cabinet decisions.
Make it mandatory for ministers to testify before relevant committees on key policy
initiatives.
Strict enforcement of the 91st Amendment to ensure ministerial appointments are merit-
based, not politically motivated.
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D. CONCLUSION
The Council of Ministers is the keystone of India’s executive machinery, acting as the functional core
of democratic governance. Rooted in Articles 74 29 and 75 of the Constitution30, it upholds the
principles of collective responsibility, accountability to Parliament, and ministerial discretion.
This research has revealed that while the structure of the CoM is constitutionally sound, its
operational dynamics are increasingly influenced by centralization, political compulsions, and lack of
internal transparency. The shift toward a Prime Minister-centric model, growing concerns over
cabinet reshuffles, and opaque decision-making processes challenge the democratic ethos envisioned
by the framers of the Constitution.31
29
India Const. art. 74.
30
India Const. art. 75.
31
Rajeev Dhavan, The Supreme Court of India and Parliamentary Sovereignty.
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E. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
1. The Constitution of India, 1950.
Secondary Sources:
1. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, LexisNexis, 8th Edition.
2. D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, LexisNexis.
3. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation.
4. Rajeev Dhavan, The Supreme Court of India and Parliamentary Sovereignty.
5. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries.
Journals & Articles:
1. Pritam Baruah, “Executive Accountability and Constitutional Structure,” NUJS Law Review,
Vol. 7(2).
2. Tarunabh Khaitan, “The Rise of Executive Power in India,” Oxford Human Rights Hub, 2022.
3. Subhash C. Kashyap, “Coalition Politics and the Council of Ministers,” Indian Journal of
Public Administration, 2016.
Reports and Government Publications:
1. Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations.
2. Punchhi Commission Report (2010).
3. Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs – Cabinet Procedure Manual.
4. Lok Sabha Secretariat – Handbook for Ministers.
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