Philosophia

DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9891-3

On the Scientific Methods of Kuhn and Popper:

Implications of Paradigm-Shifts to Development Models

Christopher Ryan Maboloc 1

Received: 29 April 2017 / Revised: 16 July 2017 / Accepted: 27 July 2017

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Abstract One of the most enduring contributions of Sir Karl Popper to the philosophy
of science was his deductive approach to the scientific method, as opposed to Hilary
Putnam’s absolute faith in science as an inductive process. Popper’s logic of discovery
counters the whole inductive procedure that modern science is so often identified with.
While the inductive method has generally characterized how scientists commence their
work in laboratories, for Popper scientific theories actually start with generalizations
inside our mind whose validity the scientific method must test until those come to be
falsified. A step further in the scientific method is the function of paradigms that
Thomas Kuhn’s revolutionary science has developed. Kuhn’s community and
consensus-based approach and Popper’s hypothesis-based approach are both important
in the development of science as it is. This paper seeks to show how models of
development may be integrated in the above debate in order to derive insightful
implications that are crucial to the understanding of economic progress and human
development.

Keywords Scientific method . Falsification . Corroboration . Paradigm . Development

theory

1 Deduction and Karl Popper’s BLogic of Discovery^

In order to evaluate the shifts in the development paradigm that has dominated the
global order, it is important to determine those crises that have given birth to the
prevailing economic models used both in the West and the developing world. This is
important in order to analyze and critically learn why hegemonic relations still govern
the pursuit of progress and development. Beyond that objective, however, I have set as

* Christopher Ryan Maboloc

ryanmaboloc75@yahoo.com

1
Ateneo de Davao University, Roxas Ave, Davao City, Philippines
 Philosophia

my initial goal in this paper the task to comprehend the important thematic concepts in
the philosophy of science. I will do so by drawing heavily on Karl Popper’s Blogic of
discovery^ and Thomas Kuhn’s Brevolutionary approach.^ The latter will serve as the
underlying theme in realizing the central goal of this paper which is to consider the
function of Bparadigm shifts^ to different models of development.
At the outset, scientific knowledge may be viewed as conventional. According to
Semiha Akinci, conventionalism refers to that train of thought Baccording to which the
simplicity of nature is grounded upon the way we choose to describe nature, since there
are alternative ways of describing nature, and we can choose one or another of these at
will.^ 1 Popper’s falsification method rests in the way scientists make appropriate
justifications on many of our epistemic judgments. In contrast to the inductive view
that science begins with observation, Phil Parvin explains that science for Popper was
Bnot an inductive process, but a deductive one.^ 2 For Popper, science starts with
positing intelligent conjectures about the world. What scientists really do is Bto identify
certain problems in the world, propose theories to resolve them, and then seek to falsify
these theories.^3 In this regard, Parvin tells us that science for Popper Bdoes not begin in
observation, but in the positing of theories about problems.^4 The idea is that scientists
have to attack any theory until one unassailable alternative emerges that can withstand
falsification.
In Popper’s Blogic of discovery,^ the scientific method may be construed as some
kind of intellectual guess work. Predictability characterizes scientific knowledge.
Scientists make the actual observations and then do the math. Normative practice
demands that in order for scientific claims to be validated, they will have to be tested
against all other claims. A new theory is confirmed until proven otherwise. Any form of
contradiction that is found later will mean that some observation statements about the
theory or the corresponding computations are somehow problematic. Then, new tests
are done and are repeated until new results come to be validated by a kind of pattern or
regularity. New findings may therefore mean the withering away of an old theory.
What differentiates Popper from others is that for him, Bthat the longstanding view
that scientists should seek to derive generalizable laws of nature from specific events or
facts in the world is mistaken and futile.^5 Popper thinks that the Blogic of discovery^ is
a highly abstractive procedure. The testing of the validity of any theoretical abstraction
is like some form of logical examination. 6 As explained above, any tentative idea
should be put up against another hypothesis in which conclusions are drawn by means
of the deductive process. 7 For Popper, a theory should prove to be a consistent
explanation, both mathematically and in actual practice, otherwise it will be falsified.
Popper thinks that science does not begin with observations. Parvin says that Popper
rejects the inductive method of science because Bno rule can ever guarantee that a

1
Semiha Akinci, BPopper’s Conventionalism,^ in Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, edited by Philip Catton
and Graham Macdonald. (London: Routledge, 2004), 32.
2
Phil Parvin, Karl Popper, (New York: Continuum, 2010), 39.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., 37
6
Karl Popper, BThe Logic of Scientific Discovery,^ in Philosophy of Science, edited by Richard Boyd, Philip
Gasper and J.D. Trout. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 100
7
Ibid.
Philosophia

generalization inferred from true observations, however often repeated, is true.^ 8

Popper’s procedure in this respect is the reverse of the inductive process. Akinci adds:

Popper is a realist and for this reason believes that theories are true or false. There
is no part of a physical theory that cannot be falsified. In fact according to Popper
not just the geometry of a scientific theory, but every part of a scientific theory
can be falsified except logic. Indeed not only universal statements, but also
singular statements that express the facts can be falsified, because the conjectural
element is present in every part of our knowledge and there is always a possibility
that this knowledge might not correspond to reality.9

Popper’s theory of falsification starts from the logical (since only logic cannot be
falsified) comparisons of conclusions. 10 But I think we might need to define falsifi-
ability first. According to Arnold Kluge, falsificationism Bis the philosophy that
knowledge increases through a process of exposing false hypotheses.^ 11 The basic
reason for this is that scientists need some form of systematic consistency. 12 This
systematic consistency implies that any new idea must fall within a particular logical
framework. We may call this logical framework as the Brules of the game^ that
scientists must adhere to.
The next step is to determine the theory’s logical form.13 Tautological claims, being
merely formal, have to be rejected as these are without solid backing. For Popper,
tautologies possess no truth content. 14 They are neither empirical nor scientific. The
meaning of a tautology, as analytic philosophy claims, is strictly formal. Being formal,
they are bereft of any empirical content. We can only derive proper observation
statements from matters of fact. Popper is saying that it is when a proposed theory
survives the various strict tests that it may then advance as a scientific claim.15 Popper’s
method requires that for any claim to be logically valid, it simply has to go through a
well-defined process. This process will determine for scientists, as well as for other
theorists, the norm for theoretical validity.
For Popper, scientific work becomes the basis of our background knowledge of the
world. For example, Niels Bohr’s research on the structure of the atom was firmly
grounded in the correctness of the Planck’s constant, discovered in 1900, which
described the relation between energy and frequency, also known as the Planck-
Einstein relation (E = hv). Kluge says that this Bbackground knowledge does not
include falsified theories, nor otherwise admitted false assumptions. Thus, once a
theory is falsified, it can no longer serve as background knowledge.^16 Scientists often
do come up with novel knowledge or findings about the world. These may or may not
challenge an existing theory. The truth of any theory in this respect is tentative unless

8
Parvin, Karl Popper, 36
9
Akinci, BPopper’s Conventionalism,^ 35
10
Popper, BThe Logic of Scientific Discovery,^ 100
11
Arnold Kluge, BPhilosophical Conjectures and their Refutation,^ Syst. Biol. 2001, 50(3): 323.
12
Popper, BThe Logic of Scientific Discovery,^ 100
13
Ibid
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Kluge, BPhilosophical Conjectures and their Refutation,^ 325
 Philosophia

falsified. This is the normal state of science. So the basic point herein is that if a theory
continues to stand out against potential rivals, then the theory prevails. Ptolemy’s
geocentric model proved to be successful pending the arrival of the Copernican model.
When Galileo, using a telescope, discovered that moons revolved around Jupiter, it
confirmed that the geocentric model no longer fits.
But the scientific method and the truth should not be confused. Science is about
method. The truth is out there and scientists are to simply validate their truth claims.
Thus, what Popper’s position tells us is that scientific truth proceeds from a particular
methodic standard. Any truth-claim that fails this standard can be dismissed as unscien-
tific. Any conjecture, to be considered as scientific, must withstand the rigorous testing of
falsification. Popper explains: BThe purpose of this last kind of test is to find out how far
the new consequences of the theory—whatever may be new in what it asserts—stand up
to the demands of practice, whether raised by purely scientific experiments, or by practical
technological applications..^17 Akinci maintains that for Popper,

theories are conjectures that explain reality and for this reason they must be true
or false. When a theory asserts that atoms exist, it tries to describe reality.
Although the concept of atom is in the third world – that is in the world of
concepts – there is a counterpart to it in the first world, the physical world.18

The contestability of any theory is always the case as scientists continue with their work
every day. Knowledge is finite. Knowledge is never complete or absolute. This means
that it either expands or is put aside in favor of what is more palatable to researchers.
The scientific practice involves maintaining the efficacy of certain theories which
testing validates. Let me cite an example. Isaac Newton’s Theory of Universal Grav-
itation (UG) worked in explaining objects with a large mass, one that began with
Newton’s contemplation about what has kept all heavenly bodies from falling toward
each other. This universal theory would then serve to unify all three laws of motion.
Now, for a very long time it can be said that Newtonian physics has passed the criterion
of falsifiability until 1905, the very year that Albert Einstein published his paper on
special relativity. Below, Einstein describes for us how Newton’s work is no longer
sufficient to explain our universe:

The Newtonian theory is unsatisfactory in the following respect: if one considers

motion from the purely descriptive, not from the causal, point of view, it only
exists as relative motion of things with respect to one another. But the acceler-
ation which figures in Newton’s equations of motion is unintelligible if one starts
with the concept of relative motion.19

Parvin notes that BEinstein’s quantum theory was incredibly speculative and abstract,
and could not – Popper believed – be appropriately said to be based upon specific
observations at all.^ 20 Even Einstein himself doubted the practicality of quantum

17
Popper, BThe Logic of Scientific Discovery,^ 100
18
Akinci, BPopper’s Conventionalism,^ 34
19
Albert Einstein, On the Theory of Relativity, (London: King’s College, 1921), 2
20
Parvin, Karl Popper, 42
Philosophia

mechanics. In this sense, the demands of practice tells us that for Popper, the conven-
tional way of maintaining the power of science is its perpetual game of testing. Popper
thinks that it is only when Bscientific statements do not call for any further test, and that
they can be regarded as finally verified, that they retire from the game.^ 21 What this
amounts is a kind of environment or culture which then becomes normative for a given
community of scientists. Popper explains that Bthis method of detecting and resolving
contradictions is applied also within science itself, but it is of particular importance in
the theory of knowledge.^22

2 Thomas Kuhn’s Revolutionary and Normative Science

The basic idea in Popper’s method of falsification is that all scientific theories that are
operative are simply deducted from observable phenomena. Our theoretical assumptions
about the world are gathered by means of continuous experimentation and testing under
particular conditions.23 It is a normative tradition that scientists share among their peers.
Kuhn calls this whole process Bculture^. For Kuhn, the elements of science, including
facts, theories, and method form one big normative behavior. Kuhn sums up his point in
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: BScientific development becomes the piecemeal
process by which these items have been added, singly and in combination, to the ever
growing stockpile that constitutes scientific technique and knowledge.^24
Normal science creates paradigms. Paradigms for Kuhn are practically indispensable.
This means that working under the auspices of a particular paradigm is linked to the
practice itself. For Kuhn, the Bwork under the paradigm can be conducted in no other
way, and to desert the paradigm is to cease practicing the science it defines.^ 25 Kuhn
says that Bto scientists, at least, the results gained in normal research are significant
because they add to the scope and precision with which the paradigm can be applied.^26
For example, the neoclassical economic theory behind globalization has been continu-
ally assailed by the old reformist tradition of development theory. Since modernization
has not really resulted to the trickle-down effect that it was supposed to do, the focus is
now on the equitable distribution of wealth. As noted by Joseph Stiglitz, Bthe West has
driven the globalization agenda, ensuring that it garners a disproportionate share of the
benefits, at the expense of the developing world.^27 Given this claim, there exists a kind
of disorder or imbalance in the field which may necessitate a revolutionary shift.
Kuhn thinks of the scientific method as some kind of puzzle-solving. For him,
scientific problems are just like puzzles out in the field. Stephen Hawking’s questions
about the origins of the universe, popularized in his A Brief History of Time, might elicit
curiosity more than the need for rigor or reflection. However, while research is truly
nothing but anticipating certain solutions to particular problems, a level of intellectual
competence is needed. The actual computations done by scientists are not an easy task.

21
Popper, BThe Logic of Scientific Discovery,^ 100
22
Ibid, 105
23
Parvin, Karl Popper, 35
24
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 1–2
25
Ibid, 35
26
Ibid, 36
27
Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, (London: Norton and Co., 2002), 7.
 Philosophia

While mature students of science, including researchers, are to solve their problems
based on textbook knowledge, the ability to do research is crucial as only qualified
researchers may continue the difficult roles left by their colleagues. Kuhn says:

The existence of this strong network of commitments—conceptual, theoretical,

instrumental, and methodological—is a principal source of the metaphor that
relates normal science to puzzle-solving. Because it provides rules that tell the
practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and his science are like, he
can concentrate with assurance upon the esoteric problems that these rules and
existing knowledge define for him.28

For Kuhn, scientific paradigms underscore the normative rules for research. Coherence
in the activities of scientists cannot be assumed on the basis of an arbitrary choice of
protocols. These rules are carefully laid down on the basis of discussions among peers
in the field. In determining what works and what does not, scientists come into an
agreement about how their work is to proceed. Consensus in the community, in this
regard, is the basis for a working paradigm that unites scientists in their task. Parvin
explains:

Scientific discovery, like the growth of knowledge in other areas, is unpredict-

able, often complicated, messy, and problematic; it does not always follow a set
pattern and, even if it does, it is not clear that we could predict this pattern
beforehand; and it emerges from a process of trial and error, and of rational,
critical discussion among a community of peers. The growth of knowledge – in
science as elsewhere – is thus a public process.29

Kuhn is uncompromising when he suggests Bthat scientists do not usually ask or debate
what makes a particular problem or solution legitimate tempts us to suppose that, at
least intuitively, they know the answer.^30 Clearly for Kuhn, scientific Bparadigms may
be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that
could be unequivocally abstracted from them.^ 31 Paradigms in this regard determine
how scientists must proceed with their work. The public nature of science means that
scientists need to work together as peers in order to advance a common goal. This is
how scientists are able to generate and expand the growth of human knowledge.
But let us define normal science in this regard. Based on what we have enunciated
above, normal science structures the way how scientific research is done. Normal
science is that condition in which scientists work together on a set of problems based
on a theory that serves as an umbrella under which new problems are examined.
Putnam rightly opines in an essay that Bwithout commitment to a paradigm there could
be no normal science.^ 32 Beneath this assertion, we may connect Kuhn to Popper.
Popper’s method or way of doing science may be considered as doing normal science.

28
Ibid, 35
29
Parvin, Karl Popper, 43
30
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 46
31
Ibid
32
Ibid, 100
Philosophia

For Kuhn, so Blong as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of
solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply
through confident employment of those tools.^ 33 I think that Popper’s criterion of
falsifiability acts as some form of a unifying function of what works within a paradigm.
The issue that separates Kuhn from Popper rests in the concept of incommensura-
bility. It is that situation in which a theory becomes questionable because of an anomaly.
Kuhn explains that Ball crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm and the consequent
loosening of the rules for normal research.^ 34 An anomaly is a discovery that puts to
question the truth-claim of an existing paradigm. According to Alexander Bird, Ban
anomaly occurs when an entity often a thing but may be an event) is discovered whose
classification demands violation of some hierarchical principle.^35 The next section will
take up and will try to elaborate this.

3 The Challenge from Hilary Putnam’s Idea of Corroboration

Putnam amplifies the debate between Popper and Kuhn. Putnam rejects Popper’s
deductive process. Science, he says, is inductive. Putnam further argues that a theory
that does not advance something definitive about the world or is waiting to be
thwarted by means of falsification is not really knowledge. A real theory for Putnam
is always what works. For him, a paradigm is simply the theory and its application.
However, I argue that Putnam’s position is based on some form of a misunder-
standing. Putnam thinks that Popper is a skeptic. Putnam could have done better in
his analysis had he focused on the normative aspect of science. Popper does not say
that theories do not make right claims about reality. Putnam’s argument suggests that
Popper’s position renders every scientific claim as an unfounded conjecture. Theo-
ries, Putnam says, need to be applied to reality.36 But what Putnam fails to consider
is that applicability forms part of the normative process. We do not just apply
theories. We are actually always looking for a better one. Once a theory no longer
fits, then it is up for revision. A theory that is no longer working does not serve the
role it is tasked to play, and for this reason, it must be replaced.
Putnam is correct in pointing out that BPopper does not deny that scientists state
general laws, or that they test these general laws against observational data.^37 Putnam
thinks that for Popper, scientific corroboration is a matter high probability. This means
that any particular theory must be subjected to severe tests and has particularly
withstood them.38 But Putnam criticizes Popper by saying that Bknowing that certain
'conjectures' (according to Popper all scientific laws are 'provisional conjectures') have
not yet been refuted means not understanding anything.^39

33
Ibid, 76
34
Ibid, 84
35
Alexander Bird, BWhat can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions,^ in Theoria 75 (2012): 303.
36
Hilary Putnam, BThe Corroboration of Theories,^ in Philosophy of Science, edited by Richard Boyd, Philip
Gasper and J.D. Trout. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 100
37
Ibid, 122
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
 Philosophia

Kluge explains that in Popper’s logic, probabilities are important in order to

determine which hypothesis must be valued. 40 Kluge thinks that Bif growth of
knowledge means increasing content, then surely high probability cannot be the goal
of science.^ 41 The basic idea here is that every hypothesis which has the highest
potential to be falsified is supposed to be rejected and only the hypothesis that passes
the test must be accepted.42 While it may be tentative pending further tests in the future,
this does not mean that such is without sound backing. What Popper intends to tell us is
that there is actually no 100% probability in life. But scientific probability stands out
against unscientific claims because of the high level of precision that the scientific
method guarantees. Einstein showcases this massive confidence in the precision of
scientific computation. Karen Fox narrates:

Einstein himself was asked what he would have done had the results of the
eclipse contradicted relativity. He responded that had such a thing occurred the
mistake would have been God’s, not his: BThe theory,^ he said, Bis correct.^43

It is by means of its normative methods in which science ensures the highest level of
precision of its predictions. Wenceslao Gonzales says that Bprediction appears as a test
of a theory: it could be used after the explanations and for theoretical reasons.^44 In this
respect, Popper also maintains that Bwe must produce theories that entail new predic-
tions, especially predictions of new effects, new testable consequences, suggested by
the new theory and never thought of before.^45 As we have stated at the outset, Putnam
regards Popper’s position as a form of skepticism. Putnam writes that Bthe distinction
between knowledge and conjecture does real work in our lives.^46 But I think Putnam is
mistaken here. Conjectures that are highly probable actually work in real life. Knowl-
edge is simply reasoned guesses. This is the reason why buildings have solid estimates.
Loads and weights are always based on computations. The strength of composite
materials is always indexed based on laboratory results. These standards have been
proven and are universally accepted. In fact, falsified guesses serve no purpose in terms
of our background knowledge about reality.47 Any false hypothesis in this sense will
have to be abandoned. Alternatively, Putnam offers the notion of scientific corrobora-
tion to Popper’s falsifiability. He explains:

Theory implies prediction (basic sentence, or observation sentence); if prediction

is false, theory is falsified; if sufficiently many predictions are true, theory is
confirmed. For all his attack on inductivism, Popper's schema is not so different:
Theory implies prediction (basic sentence); if prediction is false, theory is

40
Kluge, BPhilosophical Conjectures and their Refutation,^ 325
41
Ibid, 324
42
Ibid
43
Karen Fox, The Big Bang Theory, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 42
44
Wenceslao Gonzales, BThe Many Faces of Popper’s Methodical Approach to Prediction,^ in Karl Popper:
Critical Appraisals, edited by Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald. (London: Routledge, 2004), 81
45
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (London: Routledge, 1989), 249; as found in Gonzales, BThe
Many Faces of Popper’s Methodical Approach to Prediction,^ 81
46
Putnam, BThe Corroboration of Theories,^ 123
47
Kluge, BPhilosophical Conjectures and their Refutation,^ 325
Philosophia

falsified; if sufficiently many predictions are true, and certain further conditions
are fulfilled, theory is highly corroborated.48

To explain the above, Putnam is saying that what scientists corroborate are actually
those theories which pass strict tests of falsification. When a theory is falsified, it means
that scientists have eventually found nothing to corroborate. In this regard, the coop-
erative spirit within the scientific community still holds. Normal science in the sense of
Popper implies that any theory stands because it has passed certain tests. Putnam is
right though in saying that Bpredictions that one could have made on the basis of
background knowledge do not test a theory; it is only predictions that are improbable
relative to background knowledge that test a theory.^ 49 In fact, corroboration only
occurs when a theory is confirmed. An example may be warranted:

Such a new prediction was that planets would under certain circumstances deviate
from Johannes Kepler’s laws; or that light, in spite of its zero mass, would prove
to be subject to gravitational attraction (that is, Einstein’s eclipse-effect). Another
example is Dirac’s prediction that there will be an anti-particle for every elemen-
tary particle. New predictions of these kinds must not only be produced, but they
must also be reasonably often corroborated by experimental evidence, I contend,
if scientific progress is to continue.50

While he does not really offer any comforting position, Putnam compounds the
problem when he tackles Kuhn’s notion of revolutionary science. Indeed, he is
right in saying that Ba paradigm is simply a scientific theory together with an
example of a successful and striking application.^51 For Putnam, Bit is important
that the application—say, a successful explanation of some fact, or a successful
and novel prediction—be striking.^52 What this means ultimately is that the norm
of acceptability for any theory is that it must fit the needs of scientists in terms of
what actually works in practice. According to Putnam, BKuhn maintains that the
paradigm that structures a field is highly immune to falsification—in particular, it
can only be overthrown by a new paradigm.^ 53 This is precisely the point. The
theory that stands the tests of falsification is the theory that defines the current
paradigm at work. This connects rather than separate Popper and Kuhn, as I have
also maintained above. Kuhn’s concern in particular is what current rules of
convention can maintain the unity within the community of scientists. And
following Popper, what unifies them is the existing theory (while tentative) which
passed severe tests. Putnam, rightly so, concedes to such point:

A theory which is paradigmatic is not given up because of observational and

experimental results by themselves, but because and when a better theory is

48
Putnam, BThe Corroboration of Theories,^ 123
49
Ibid., 124
50
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 243; as found in Gonzales, BThe Many Faces of Popper’s Methodical
Approach to Prediction,^ 81
51
Putnam, BThe Corroboration of Theories,^ 127
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
 Philosophia

available. How does a paradigm come to be accepted in the first place? Popper's
view is that a theory becomes corroborated by passing severe tests: a prediction
(whose truth value is not antecedently known) must be derived from the theory
and the truth or falsity of that prediction must be ascertained.54

Putnam says that BKuhn stresses the way in which a scientific theory may be immune
from falsification, whereas Popper stresses falsifiability as the sine qua non of a
scientific theory.^ 55 I maintain however that falsifiability rests on high probabilities
and that for any theory to stand out by defying new or emerging anomalies, it must be
founded on firm or sound mathematical calculations. A theory works because the correct
mathematics is there. Without correct calculations, things would be very difficult to
predict. Indeed, Newton’s UG possessed this characteristic in explaining the role of
bodies moving against each other. Hawking attests to this claim, when he says that
BNewton not only put forward a theory of how bodies move in space and time, but he
also developed the complicated mathematics needed to analyze those motions.^56
I think the resolution to the question expressed by Putnam rests in revisiting the idea
of incommensurability. For Popper, incommensurability means that scientific truths can
be relative. In Kuhn’s position, an anomaly that results to a crisis calls for a revolu-
tionary shift which means the abandonment of an old theory in favor of a new one. Of
course, as long as the theory stands, then the theory remains part of normal science. In
Popper’s view, when a theory becomes falsified, then it becomes incommensurable
with reality. In what follows, I shall explain the relevance of the function of paradigms
in the field of development theory.

4 Paradigm Shifts and Development Models

According to M. Shamsul Haque, the conventional tradition in development theory had a

common theme, which considers Ball societal changes as gradual and incremental, and
exclude any fundamental social contradiction and revolutionary historical
transformation.^ 57 This major evaluation as regard to development models means that
Kuhn’s concepts on the function of paradigms is very applicable to mainstream econom-
ics.58 The deep intellectual evolution in the West provided the impetus for the growth of
industries by means of capital. Paradigm shifts are often noticeable given the challenging
times. The Neoclassical Theory ushered economic success through Bincreases in real
wages, profit rates, and technological progress.^ 59 This paradigm remains operative in
industrialized countries and among policy makers in developing nations. It is characterized
by the maximization of utility through consumption, increasing profit by reducing

54
Ibid.
55
Ibid., 132
56
Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time, (London: Bantam Books, 1988), 5.
57
M. Shamsul Haque, Restructuring Development Theories and Policies. (New York: State University of
New York, 1999), 48.
58
Jeremy Williams and Judith McNeill, BThe current crisis in neoclassical economics and the case for
economic analysis based on sustainable development,^ 2005 Universitas 21 (5): 6.
59
Haque, Restructuring Development Theories and Policies, 59.
Philosophia

production costs, and according to Haque, Bunder perfect competition, a condition of

equilibrium that can be achieved between households and firms.^60
During the Great Depression, a bigger role on the part of the government became
necessary. This is called the interventionist approach. This paradigm, which was used
by the Obama administration during the most recent US recession, was proposed by
John Maynard Keynes. The Keynesian theory suggested that Bgovernment should
borrow the excess savings and spend it on projects that would benefit the lower income
groups rather than the wealthy.^61 Then, right after the Second World War, Keynesian
economics became the dominant paradigm for Third World nations. The Keynesian
principle includes the idea of capital build up, the expansion of industries, and curbing
population growth. However, given the continued economic stagnation in the Third
World, theorists called for a more balanced growth, which led to the more prominent
paradigm known today as Modernization theory.
Modernization theory is a Western type of progress. It is a framework that has been
used in order to propel and realize growth and development in the Third World. In this
concept of growth, the social, political, and cultural implications of development are
emphasized. Theorists were quick to point out, however, that the prevailing realities in
the Third World are not that of democratization, but of ethnic conflict, inequality, and
power-struggles between the poor and the elite. In this sense, given that the character of
Modernization theory is Western, it has only resulted to hegemonic relations between
Third World countries and the West, and has not advanced sustainable growth and
human development. In this respect, its failure appeared imminent. According to
Jeremy Williams and Judith McNeill:

Paradigms collapse when pressing problems of the real world are either ignored
or treated as unimportant by the theoreticians. In the light of so much evidence to
the contrary, it is almost unconscionable that a group of economic theorists and
the textbook hegemony they exert, can advocate unlimited economic growth on
the basis that the environment is not a serious constraint.62

Modernization, which is anchored in neoclassical principles, is the operative concept

behind globalization, which has been challenged by important economists such as
Stiglitz. According to Stiglitz, Bglobalization can be reshaped, and when it is, when it is
properly, fairly run, with all countries having a voice in policies affecting them, there is
a possibility that it will help create a new global economy in which growth is not only
more sustainable and less volatile but the fruits of this growth are more equitably
shared.^63 Globalization will remain the dominant paradigm given how the movement
of goods and the mobility of people across economic borders define the relation among
countries. For this reason, a people-centered development framework that values the
dignity of each person would be the appropriate way forward. The equitable distribution

60
Ibid., 63
61
Ibid., 67
62
Jeremy Williams and Judith McNeill, BThe current crisis in neoclassical economics and the case for
economic analysis based on sustainable development,^ 11.
63
Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents, 22.
 Philosophia

of resources that cuts across economic walls and political barriers is the kind of
revolutionary shift that the world needs in this age.
A crucial part of the above comes from the element of cultural identity. For Kuhn,
consensus-building is important in order to sustain a paradigm. Social actions, move-
ments, and orientations legitimize the move toward inclusive growth and development.
There must be, in this regard, a context in which the various forces in society may be able
to work out a way toward the attainment of progress.64 The Protestant work ethic that the
sociologist Max Weber has famously elucidated is often cited as the model for the West.65
Cooperativism, however, may be the appropriate paradigm for the Third World. Society,
in this respect, must produce more dynamic ideas in order to counter the force of
domination that has prevailed over the marginalized, especially in the Third World.
Society, of course, develops through particular stages, in the same manner as scientific
research does. Economic progress and human development for that matter, should not be
an impossible proposition given the possibilities that inclusive and people-centered
economic reform may bring.

5 Conclusion

This paper is a short exploration of the argument behind Popper’s scientific method. It
sets out the contention that for Popper, scientific truth begins with our conjectures about
reality. In the process of determining the truth, the scientific method seeks to test our
claims about the world. This whole procedure acts as a normative practice. I have
argued in this paper that all scientific knowledge is simply reasoned conjectures
supported by empirical observation and the corresponding mathematical calculations
that validate them. For this reason, the many forms of scientific theories are tentative.
Nevertheless, this does not diminish the quality of scientific truth. It only indicates us
that human knowledge is finite. It must be noted though that it is the strict rigor of the
normative practices and the competence of the scientific community that guarantees the
acceptability of scientific truth claims.
But the other point advanced in this paper is that there is really no true issue between
falsifiability and corroboration. Mathematical probabilities make theories work perfect-
ly even if these theories cannot be perfect. In truth, any theory with a high probability of
being correct is one that is difficult to falsify. Putnam’s unnecessary distinction between
truth and conjecture can be easily put aside by suggesting that scientific truth-claims are
basic conjectures with sound mathematical backing. Corroboration, or the confirmation
by other scientists about a truth claim, does not really upend Popper’s deductive
method but rather, it actually needs Popper’s logic of discovery which is anchored in
consistent testing as a requirement for scientific acceptability.
Lastly, the research has also looked into the implications of the above in the
sustained paradigmatic changes in development models. By showing that Bparadigm
shifts^ have been occurring in economic theory which govern the growth and devel-
opment of any nation, it has been shown that Kuhn remains relevant and that the work
that he has done for the history of science indeed has important implications for

64
M. Shamsul Haque, Restructuring Development Theories and Policies, 77
65
Ibid.
Philosophia

development studies as well. While the emphasis of this paper is to highlight a rebuttal
to Putnam, the paper has also deepened its objective by emphasizing the applicability of
Kuhn’s views to the normative as well as the revolutionary practices in the field of
development. In fact, globalization is continually being challenged in all fronts.
Theories are not just abstract formulations. Being our means of understanding reality,
they have real world and human implications.

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