Introduction:

Statutes- meaning- parts of a statute- general and special statutes- commencement, operation and
repeal of statutes interpretation- meaning and scope- need for interpretation

Definition of a statute

 3 branches of government- legislature, executive and judiciary.

 Legislature- consist of elected representatives of the people.
 Generally, when the government (central/state) wants to combat some evil or make some
benefits available to the people, it directs the law secretary of state/central with the aid of
law minister, chief law officer (attorney General or advocate general of state), concerned
department and law commission to prepare a set of rules for that purpose.
 If it has important ramifications, the draft is referred to a committee consisting of
members of legislature (government and opposition), experts, law professors, social
workers- who would study the subject.
 The rules prepared by the law secretary are modified according to those
recommendations of the committee which the government accepts- then rules are
put in a form called a bill.
 The bill is the placed before the legislature.
 The bill is then scrutinised clause by clause by members of the legislatures- both
government and opposition.
 It is then voted upon with or without modifications.
 Bill is then sent to the second house and goes through the same procedure.
 The final result is then sent to the President/Governor
 When the President/Governor signs the Bill, it becomes an enactment of the law
which is then binding on everyone on India/state- the law is said to have been
passed.
 Simply put, statutes mean- will of the legislature- a law enacted by the legislature- which the
court seeks to interpret.
 A statute is a written law passed by a legislature on the state or federal level.

Why is there a need for interpretation or construction?

 The function of the court is to interpret the laws enacted by the legislature according to the
intention of the legislature.
 It is not always possible to transform the intention of the legislatures into written words.
 Since laws are drafted by legal experts, it could be expected that the language used will leave
little room for interpretation or construction- in reality courts and lawyers often spend time
in resolving inconsistencies due to ambiguous words and expression.
 Interpretation is done to avoid: Uncertainly, anomaly, injustice, absurdity, inconsistency,
inconvenience, repugnancy etc.
 In the process of interpretation, several aids are used:
 Statutory aids: General clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions contained in
individual aids.
 Non statutory aids: illustrated by common law rules of interpretation and case laws.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION:

1. Meaning of interpretation:
  Interpretation is the process employed by the judiciary to ascertain the meaning of legal
provisions, the process by which the Courts give true expression to the intention of the
legislature.
 According to Salmond: Interpretation or construction is meant the process by which the
courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative
forms in which it is expressed.
 Cross- Interpretation is the process by which the Courts determine the meaning of statutory
provisions for the purpose of applying it to the situation before them.
 Blackstone- The most fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the
intention of the legislature through texts, subject-matter, the effect and consequences, or
the spirit and reason of law.

Difference between interpretation and construction:

 Cooley- Interpretation differs from Construction. The former is the art of finding out the true
sense of any form of words. That is, the sense which their author intended to convey and of
enabling others to derive from the same idea which the author intended to convey.
Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusion of respective subjects that lie
beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known from and given in the text,
which are in the spirit though not within the letter of the law.
 Open for debate
 White J: even where there is abstract distinction between the two, in common usage both
have the same significance.
 Both are used interchangeably and synonymous.

2. Intention of the legislature:

 A statute is an established rule, formal regulation or ordinance of the legislature.

 Interpretative function is to seek the true intention of the legislature.
 According to Salmond: “The duty of the judicature is to act upon the intention of the
legislature”
 There are some settled principles of interpretation:
 The court must start with the presumption that the legislature did not make any
mistake.
 The court must adopt a construction which will carryout the obvious intention of
the legislature.
 If there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court
would not go beyond its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could
not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially
when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. Only when it becomes
necessary to prevent a provision form being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute, words may be
added, altered or modified.
 Determination of legislative intent is relevant only when there is ambiguity or literal
construction would be contrary to legislative purpose. In the absence of any ambiguity in the
statute, resorting to an interpretation negating the legislative intendment is not justified.
 If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to very
careful in choosing that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature-
to discern the “true meaning” or “legal meaning”.
  Difficulties:
 Words: not a scientific symbol having definitive meaning- but an imperfect medium
to convey ones thought.
 Impossible for the legislature to ascertain all the circumstances that may emerge
after enacting a statute where its application maybe called for.
 Function of the court is only to expound- not legislate- numerous interpretations
formulated by courts are expressed differently by different judges- may result in
contradictory propositions.
 Statute cannot be explained by the individuals or group of legislatures- legislatures
cannot interpret.
 Fringe meaning of words:
 Certain objects or situations may without any controversy fall within the
content of a word- but there may be many others on or near the borderline
in respect of which it may be a matter of doubt and serious argument
whether they are within or outside the connotation of the word.
 Eg: the structure in which the court is located is a building, but what about
open platform having no wall or roof- is it a building?
o State of Bombay v. Venkat Rao Krishna AIR 1966- Chaburahs (open
spaces without walls or roofs) held to be building.
o State of Bihar v. SK Roy AIR 1966- brick kiln (a pit dug in the ground
with bricks by its side) not a building
o International Airport Authority Employees Union v. International
Airports Authority of India AIR 2001- parking areas of the airports
held to be ‘building’

Meaning:

 Legislation in modern state is to bring some policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate
some public benefit.
 The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the legislature based on
information derived from the past or present experience.
 It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems in the future-
however, it is impossible to anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in which the
application of the legislation in hand maybe called for, giving rise to controversial questions
of construction due to lack of clarity or definition of such ‘referent’ words.
 The duty of the judges is to expound and not to legislate- a fundamental rule, but this is
merely an ‘aspiration’- in reality, interpretation implies a degree of discretion and choice.
 There is a marginal area in which the courts ‘mould or creatively interpret legislation’ and
they are thus held as ‘finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in
a state requiring varying degrees of further processing’. Example:
 That telephone is "telegraph" within the meaning of that word in Acts of 1863 and
1869 when telephone was not invented (Attorney-General v Edison Telephone Co,
(1880) 6 QBD 244)
 That "repair" does not include cleaning and oiling (London & North Eastern Rly Co v
Berriman, (1946) 1 All ER 255 (HL))
 As a guiding principle to the judiciary, the intention of the Legislature thus assimilates two
aspects-
 Meaning: which tells what the words mean
  Purpose and object: the reason behind enacting the statute
 Therefore, the process of interpretation combines both literal and purposive approaches-
meaning legislative intent is derived from considering the meaning of the words in light of
the purpose and object behind.
 JUSTICE GAJENDRAGADKAR said "The first and primary rule of construction is that the
intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself."
 The question is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said:
 JUSTICE HOLMES: ‘I don’t care about what their intentions are, I only want to know
what the words mean’
 LORD BROUGHAM: “If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed
clearly; much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the
Legislature intended pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for judges
to invent something which they do not meet within the words of the text”.
 opinions stresses on the aspect of intention- what the words mean.
 Therefore, when words are capable of giving a plain meaning, courts should not busy
themselves with “supposed intentions”.
 However, there are several cons in emphasising only on the meaning:
 Words used by the Legislature do not always bear a plain meaning - Judges quite
often differ on the issue whether certain words are plain- Even when there is an
agreement that the words are plain, difference of opinion may result on the
question as to what the plain meaning is.
 A bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of a legislative
intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and
beneficent legislation to futility.
 Therefore, the secondary rule of Construction - It is always safe to have an eye on the object
and purpose of the statute, or reason and spirit behind it.
 Judges cannot interpret statutes in light of their views but they can adopt a purposive
interpretation.
 The correct interpretation is one that best harmonises the words with the object of the
statute.
 According to BLACKSTONE, the most fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by
exploring the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs
which are "either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence,
or the spirit and reason of the law”.
 Any interpretation contrary to the legislative intent should be rejected.
 Picking up of only one word from one particular provision and analysing it in a manner
contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neither permissible nor warranted.
 The Courts cannot allow a party to pick and choose to avail the benefit of a provision from
a chain of provisions which is favourable to the party. A provision in a statute ought not be
read in isolation.
 The application of a given legislation to new and unforeseen needs and situations broadly
falling within the statutory provision is within the interpretative jurisdiction of courts.
 Limitations:
 Courts are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of
interpretation- Courts must avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the
meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological
structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted.
  Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 – K Ramaswami J., tried to include female
descendants into the word “male descendants” to ameliorate their condition but
was termed ultra-activist by majority opinion. Madhu Kishwar v State of Bihar, AIR
1996 SC 1864
 In the words of CARDOZO, "the Judge is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.
 Therefore, in their task of interpreting and applying a statute, judges have to be conscious
that in the end the statute is the master and not the servant of the judgment and that “no
Judge has a choice between implementing the law and disobeying it.”

ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS

 Judges have more freedom – has to be contained within permissible limits – not unlimited
powers- Judges must remain "circumspect and self-disciplined in the discharge of their
judicial functions” to preserve judicial independence.
 Constitution is an ongoing/living document which should be liberally and purposefully
construed- zee telefilms Ltd v. UoI (2005) SC
 Recourse to the spirt of the constitution is permissible only when the letter is not clear- PA
Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) SC
 The judiciary, through its power of judicial review cannot assume the power of the
legislature conferred by the Constitution to a strained construction or judicial overreach even
if government abuses its power.
 Such abuses have to be left to be taken care of by public criticism and ultimately by the
people. As such is Democracy preserved and cherished.
 The rules of interpretation are not rules of law and are not to be applied like the rules
enacted by the Legislature in lieu of a statute.
 They serve as guides and such of them which serve no useful purpose now can be rejected
by courts and new rules can be evolved in their place.
 By boldly rejecting outmoded rules, by substituting, if necessary, new rules in their place,
and by avoiding unnecessary generalization the superior courts can help in the task of
rationalization of the rules.
 An intelligent application of the rules and the solution in each real difficulty depends upon
the individual skill of a Judge.
 The judges of the superior courts who form a dissenting minority on a question of
construction of a statute are not ignorant of the rules of construction; the difference of
opinion results mainly because of the spirit in which each Judge applies the rules and how-
far he can go to make the words promote the object and policy which the statute was
designed to achieve.
 By combining knowledge, wisdom and experience, great judges develop the instinct of
finding out that solution which harmonizes the words with the policy or object behind
them.

3. Statute must be read as a whole in its context:

 Whenever the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is

proper and legitimate to read that provision in its context.
 The context here means, the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other
statutes in pari materia i.e., on the same matter, the general scope of the statute and the
mischief which it intends to remedy.
 To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the court must look at the whole statute, at
what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself.
 Why?
 A word may mean one thing in one context and another thing in another context.
 the same word used in different sections of a statute or even when used at different
places in the same clause or section of a statute may bear different meanings.
 example:
 Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274 –
 appellant, a partner of a firm of merchants with head office in Madras.
 1947- failure to pay the sales tax assessed under Madras General Sales Tax
Act, 1939.
 course of business- Firm receives orders from Calcutta- goods dispatch to
Calcutta- railway receipts or bill of lading, insurance policies taken in the
name of firm.
 Bills forwarded to the firms’ bankers in Calcutta who then delivers the goods
to the consignee on payment of price and other charges.
 Appellant argued that the title of the goods sold passed only in Calcutta,
because the documents of titles were taken in the name of the sellers and
delivered to the purchaser on payment or price in Calcutta- therefore not
liable to pay tax in Madras.
 In construing the word "sale", the Supreme Court held that the definition of
"sale" as it then stood laid stress on the element of transfer of property and
that the mere fact that the contract for sale was entered into within the
province of Madras did not make the transaction, which was completed in
another province, a sale taxable within the meaning of the Act.
 The Supreme Court in arriving at that conclusion referred to the title,
preamble, definition and other enacting provisions of the statute as also to
the subsequent amendments made in the statute.
 Attar Singh v Inder Kumar, AIR 1967 SC 773 –
 The landlord wanted the tenant out of the premises- reason- landlord
wanted to erect a residential house on the property.
 Objective of sec 13- to protect the tenants from eviction.
 Section 13(a)(ii) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, enables a landlord
to obtain possession in the case of rented land if-
ᴏ (a)he requires it for his own use;
ᴏ (b) he is not occupying in the urban area for the purpose of his
business any other such rented land; and
ᴏ (c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause
after the commencement of the Act in the urban area concerned".
 In reversing the High Court order granting permission to evict the tenant,
base on (a) the Supreme Court held that all the three clauses were to be
read together and clause (a) was restricted to business use as were clauses
(b) and (c) – (a- inoperative- interest of the tenants)
 According to Lord Greene:
 To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute the courts must look at the whole
statute, at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself
and the method of construing statutes that I prefer, is to read the statute as a whole
 and ask oneself the question: In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-
matter, what is true meaning of that word?
 Viscount Simon:
 I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its
context, and I use context in its widest sense as including not only other enacting
provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other
statutes in pari materia and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate
means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy.
 It is an established rule that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the
statute as a whole.
 If the language used by the legislature is plain or ambiguous, the conclusion can be truly
arrived after studying the statute as a whole.

4. statute to be construed to make it effective and workable- ut res magis valeat quam.

 A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and
operative" on the principle expressed in the maxim: “Ut res magis valeat quam pereat"- that
it may rather become operative than null.
 It is an application of this principle that courts, while pronouncing upon the constitutionality
of a statute start with a presumption in favor of constitutionality and prefer a construction
which keeps the statute within the competence of the Legislature.
 A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to
secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.
 The courts tend to be strongly against a construction which reduces statute to be
ineffective or futile.
 A statute should also not be declared to be void for sheer vagueness.
 Therefore, whenever alternative constructions are possible, the court must give effect to that
which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has
been enacted and not to that which would put hindrances or obstacles in its way
 it is a cardinal rule of construction that normally no word or provision should be considered
redundant or superfluous in interpreting the provisions of a statute.
 the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part of it with a purpose and
the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect
 Justice Farwell:
 Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with
them, I should be bound to find some meaning, and not to declare them void for
uncertainty.
 Example:
 In Tinsukia Electric Supply Co Ltd v State of Assam, (1990) SC
 Nationalization- acquisition of electric supply companies by state
government
 The petitioner granted licence in 1928 to supply electricity in Tinsukia and
Dibrugarh under Indian electricity Act, 1910 with certain terms and
conditions with the option of purchase by state after expiry of 50 years and
thereafter on the expiry of every 20 years.
 In 1954- another license was granted with the option of purchase on expiry
of 20 years and thereafter on the expiry of every 20 years.
 Negotiation for purchase went on for several years.
  On sept 1971- governor promulgated 2 ordinances for the compulsory
acquisition of the 2 companies.
 Subsequently, ordinance was replaced by Indian Electricity (Assam
Amendment) Act, 1973 and Tinsukia and Dibrugarh Supply Undertaking
(Acquisition) Act, 1973.
 The two legislations, one amending the provisions of Section 5(2), 6(7) and
7-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the other providing for the
acquisition of the two undertakings through the Tinsukia Dibrugarh Electric
Supply Undertaking (Acquisition) Act, '1973 - Challenged by writ-petitioners
on several grounds.
 Petitioner- legislations were not bona fide- the two legislations have no
direct or reasonable nexus to the objectives envisaged under Art. 39(b)
 Respondent- electrical energy has been a material source of the community,
any legislative measure to nationalise the undertaking fell squarely within
the ambit of Art. 39(b)- entitled to Art. 31 (c) protection given to legislation
 it was held that the courts strongly lean against a construction which
reduces the statute to a futility.
 A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make
it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim: ut res
magis valeat quam pereat.
 If a statute is absolutely vague and its language is wholly intractable and
absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness.
 SC dismisses the writ stating that the writs are protected by Art. 31-C.
 Avtar Singh v State of Punjab (1955)-
 appellant prosecuted for theft of electrical energy- convicted- appealed
 appellant did not challenge the finding that he has committed the theft-
contended that his conviction was illegal based on sec. 39 of Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 states that "Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes
or uses any energy shall be deemed to have committed theft within the
meaning of the Indian Penal Code" – hence punishment under sec. 379 of
IPC.
 sec. 50 of the Act provides that "No prosecution shall be instituted against
any person for any offence against the Act.... except at the instance of the
Government or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the
same."
 appellant contented that his prosecution was not instituted at the instance
of any of the persons mentioned under sec. 50- he cannot be convicted.
 The Supreme Court applied the principle of ut res magis valeat quam and
held that since the crime is against the Act and not against the Code, the
requirement of section 50 must be followed- avoided the construction that
would have rendered sec. 50 inoperative.
 D. Salbaba v. the Bar Council of India (2003) SC
 The question of interpretation of Section 48AA of the Advocates Act 1961
came before the Supreme Court in this case.
 The petitioner, a physically challenged advocate, was also running an STD
booth allotted to him in the handicapped person’s quota.
  A complaint was filed against him alleging professional misconduct. On
20.2.2001, the Bar Council of India directed him to surrender the booth but
he failed to do so within the specified time period.
 The Bar Council of India gave an order dated 31.3.2001 directing the State
Bar Council to revoke the advocate’s name from the roll of advocates.
 The advocate subsequently surrendered the booth and filed a review
petition against the order of the Bar Council.
 His petition was dismissed on 26.8.2001 on the ground that it was barred by
limitation.
 The advocate filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
 Section 48AA of the Advocates Act provides for the review of the
decision/order of the Bar Council of India within 60 days of the date of that
order.
 While construing Section 48AA, the Supreme Court held that the expression
‘sixty days from the date of that order’ must be read so as to mean the date
of communication, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order, sought to
be reviewed.
 While applying the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the Court thus
interpreted Section 48AA to make it truly effective.
 The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Bar Council of India and the
enrolment of the appellant was restored
 State of Gujarat v Justice RA Mehta (Retd), (2013) 3 SCC 1 –
 While interpreting section 3(1) of the Gujarat Lokayukta Act, 1986, which
provides that the Governor shall appoint the Lokayukta "after consultation
with Chief Justice of the High Court", the Supreme Court held that the
opinion of the Chief Justice has to be given primacy and can be overlooked
only for cogent reasons.

5. plain or ordinary meaning: literal interpretation

 Safest rule of interpretation.

 When the language of a statute is plain, words are clear and unambiguous and give only one
meaning, then effect should be given to that plain meaning only and one should not go in for
the construction of the statute.
 Courts should not be overzealous in searching for ambiguities or obscurities in words which
are plain- Courts cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or the intention when the language
is plain and unambiguous
 In Girdharilal and Sons v Balbir Nath Mathur 1986)- it was held that when the words of a
statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie, they are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences,
 justice Gajendragadkar: If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would
not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that
such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
 Sussex Peerage Case (1844):
 In 1772, British Parliament passes a Royal Marriages Act which basically declared
that every marriage or matrimonial contract of the descendants of the King without
consent, shall be null and void to all intents and purpose whatsoever.
  The Duke of Sussex marries Augusta Murray in Rome and again in England, without
the consent of the King. The marriage in England was annulled.
 But they cohabited together secretively and a son and daughter were born to them.
In 1843, the Duke of Sussex passed away.
 His son now claimed Peerage of Duke of Sussex, as his hereditary right.
 Claimed that the Royal Marriages Act, did not apply to the marriage in Rome and
hence could not be enforced against his parents’ marriage.
 Tindal CJ dismissing the claim held:
 “If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous,
then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural
and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best
declare the intent of the lawgiver.”
 MV Joshi v. MV Shimpi (1961) SC
 The appellant was selling butter which was found to be below the standard
prescribed.
 He was convicted under S. 16(1) read with S. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954
 He contended (i) that butter prepared from curd was not butter within the meaning
of r. A-11, 0. 5 of Appendix B to the Rules which defined butter to mean ’the product
prepared exclusively from milk or cream, and (ii) that the butter was not
adulterated as no foreign article bad been added to it
 Held the plain meaning of the words used in the rule indicated that butter prepared
from milk or cream, by whatever process, was comprehended by the definition.
 If the prescribed standard is not attained, the statute treats such food product, by
fiction, as adulterated food though in fact no foreign article is added to it.
 Oswal Agro Mills Ltd v CCE (1993)-
 it was held that where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there is no room
for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in
cases of ambiguity in the statute. The court would interpret them as they stand. The
object and purpose has to be gathered from such words themselves. Strictly
speaking, there is no place in such cases for interpretation or construction except
where the words of statute admit of two meanings. The safer and more current
course to deal with a question of construction of statute is to take the words
themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning, without in the first place,
reference to cases or theories of construction.
 Ramavtar v Assistant Sales Tax Officer (1961)
 Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the imposition of sales tax
on betel leaves.
 Appellant argued that betel leaves being vegetable was not subjected to sales tax.
 Reliance was placed on the dictionary meaning of the word “vegetable” as given in
Shorter Oxford Dictionary where the word is defined as “of or pertaining to,
comprised or consisting of, or derived, or obtained from plants or their parts”.
 SC rejected the contention and held that betel leaves could not be given the
dictionary, technical or botanical meaning when the ordinary and natural meaning is
clear and unambiguous.
 Being a word of everyday use, it must be understood in its popular sense by which
the people are conversant with it as also the meaning which the statute dealing with
the matter would attribute to it.
  Therefore, the sale of betel leaves was liable to sales tax.
 State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed (1977)
 Whether green ginger falls within the category of goods described as “vegetables”
 The Sales Tax authorities held that green ginger is used to add flavor and taste to
food and it is, therefore, not vegetable.
 The word ‘vegetable’ is not defined in the Act but it is well settled as a result of
several decisions of this Court that this word, being a word of everyday use, must be
construed not in any technical sense, not from any botanical point of view, but as
understood in common parlance.
 Held ginger to be vegetable.
 PA Thillai Chidambara Nadar v Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner, AIR 1985:
 Held coconut to be neither fresh fruit nor vegetable.
 Rananjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh, AIR 1954 SC 749 - Section 123(7) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, shows clearly that in order to amount to a corrupt practice the excess
expenditure must be incurred or authorized by a candidate or his agent and the
employment of extra persons must likewise be by a candidate or his agent – Father
employed “volunteers” to assist son in election.
 Arul Nadar v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms (1998)-
 where the language of the statute is unambiguous, it is not necessary to examine the
intent and object of the Act while interpreting its provisions.
 Jagdish Patnaik v. State of Orissa (1998):
 When language used in the statute is unambiguous and on a plain and grammatical
meaning being given to the words in the statute, the end result is neither arbitrary
nor irrational nor contrary to the object of the statute, then it is the duty of the court
to give effect to the words used in the statute because the words declare the
intention of the law-making authority best

Appraisal of the principle of plain meaning:

 It is not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are
studied in their context and construed.
 Therefore, in reality this plain meaning rule means that after construing the words when the
court comes to the conclusion that they bear only one meaning it is the duty of the court to
give effect to that meaning.
 When we have to decide whether certain words are clear and unambiguous, we must study
those words in their context. The word ―unambiguous means ―unambiguous in context. It
is not necessary that ambiguity should always be grammatical ambiguity, it may be one of
the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context.
 Here, the word context is used in a wide sense. It includes other enacting provisions of the
same statute, its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and
the mischief which by those and other legitimate means can be discerned that the statute
was intended to remedy.
 Judges’ opinion as to the true meaning of words is often different from each other but this
difference of opinion does not always indicate that the words are ambiguous. Sometimes all
the judges agree that the meaning of the words is plain but they differ on the question as
to what the meaning is
 Regarding Article 105(2) of the Constitution which provides that "no member of Parliament
shall be liable to any proceeding in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in
Parliament’.
  Tej Kiran Jain v N Sanjeeva Reddy (1970)- SC held that that the Article means what it
says in language which could not be plainer.
 Divergence created in PV Narasimha Rao v. state (1998)- all 5 judges agreed that a
member of Parliament who receives bribe for voting but does not vote can be
prosecuted for the offence of bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
it was held by a majority of three against two that a member who voted in
Parliament after receipt of bribe cannot be prosecuted as his prosecution would be
a proceeding in respect of vote given by him and barred by Article 105(2).
 Girdharilal and Sons v Balbir Nath Mathur (1986) SC- though a construction according to
plain language should be ordinarily accepted, such a construction should not be adopted
where it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities
 Plain meaning rule applies only when the words are construed in their context and the
conclusion is reached that they are susceptible of only one meaning, and the meaning so
derived is to be given effect to irrespective of consequences for no alternative construction is
really open.

Guiding rules:

 Rule 1: ADDITION, DELETION AND SUBSTITUTION OF WORDS TO BE AVOIDED

 The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used,
which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has
not been said.
 As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or
substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be
avoided.
 In Bharat Aluminium Co v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc:
 Section 2(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is in Pt I of
the Act, provides that "This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is
in India".
 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Pt I
of the Act was also applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries on
the ground that in such a case certain word would have to be added to
section 2(2), which would then have to provide that "this part shall apply
where the place of arbitration is in India and to arbitrations having its place
out of India". This would amount to a drastic and unwarranted rewriting or
alteration of the language of section 2(2), and it is not permissible for the
court to reconstruct a statutory provision.
 In this case, the Constitution Bench prospectively overruled the decision of a
three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhatia International v Bulk
Trading SA. which had held that provisions of Pt I would apply to
international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless the parties,
by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions.
 KM Viswanatha Pillai v KM Sanmughan Pillai, AIR 1969 SC 493 –
 In dealing with Section 42(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which enacts
that "No owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the
vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a
permit granted or countersigned", it was held that the section did not make
it necessary that the owner of the vehicle himself should obtain the permit
 and that there was no justification for reading the words "to him" after the
words "permit granted“.
 Rule II: NOT TO SUPPLY CASUS OMISSUS
 A matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot
be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction.
 The principle of casus omissus is rooted in the idea that statutes should be
interpreted based on the words actually used by the legislature and courts should
not extend the scope of the law to cover omitted cases
 PK Unni v Nirmala Industries AIR 1990 SC:
 Regards to the construction of rule 89 of O 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
after the amendment of Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by Act 104
of 1976
 Rule 89 of O 21 provides that if any person, claiming an interest in the
property sold in execution of a decree, applies to have the execution sale set
aside and deposits within 30 days from the date of the sale, 5% of the
purchase money for payment to the purchaser and the amount payable to
the decree holder for recovery of which the sale was held.
 Art. 127 of the Limitation Act 1963 provided that period of limitation for
applying under rule 89 was 30 days. But by Act 104 of 1976, Article 127 was
amended and now the period was made 60 days because it was thought
that the period of 30 days was too short for arranging money for making the
deposit often causing hardship

 However, the
Parliament
omitted to make
 corresponding
amendment to
rule 89 of O XXI
of the CPC
 However, the
Parliament
omitted to make
 corresponding
amendment to
rule 89 of O XXI
of the CPC
 However, the Parliament omitted to make corresponding amendment to
rule 89 of O XXI of the CPC.

 Before the
Supreme Court it
was
 contented that
not only the
period of
limitation for
making the
 application for
setting aside the
 sale, but also
the period for
making the
deposit under
rule 89 must be
taken to have
been
 extended to 60
days.
 Before the Supreme Court it was contented that not only the period of
limitation for making the application for setting aside the sale, but also the
period for making the deposit under rule 89 must be taken to have been
extended to 60 days.
 This contention was not accepted and it was held that though an application
for setting aside the sale can be made within 60 days but the deposit to
support that application under rule 89 must be made within 30 days.
 Rule III: AVOID REJECTION OF WORDS
 As on the one hand, it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna,
on the other hand effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word
used by the Legislature.
 The Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a
construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted
except for compelling reasons.
 D Velusamy v D Patachaiamal, (2010) 10 SCC 469 –
  In holding that the words "relationship in the nature of marriage" as used in
Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
and Sec.125 of CrPC mean a relationship akin to a common law marriage and
not every live-in relationship, the SC observed that if the words include
simple live-in relationships, then, the Court would be legislating in the garb
of marriage.

Exceptions to guiding rules:

 In the interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted
every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute
should have effect".
 In discharging its interpretative function, the court can correct obvious drafting errors and
so in suitable cases "the court will add words, or omit words or substitute words".
 But "before interpreting a statute in this way the court must be abundantly sure of three
matters:
 (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question.
 (2) that by inadvertence, the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that
purpose in the provision in question.
 (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not
necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill
been noticed.
 Similarly, a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear
necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the Statute.