Module 8
Module 8
liberal Interpretation –Penal and Taxing Statutes - Illustrations - Rule of Harmonious construction –
Mimansa rules of interpretation
Rules of interpretation:
There are various rules of interpretation used in Law- application depends on the subject
matter.
Can be divided into 2 categories:
Primary Rules of interpretation
Secondary Rules of interpretation
The golden rule is a deviation from the literal rule- only applicable when literal rule fails.
This rule is used to modify the language of the statute to accord with the intention of the
legislature – if adhering to literal rule would lead to absurdity.
Modified form of the principle of literal meaning is called Golden rule.
This rule is regarded by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson as “golden rule”.
The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of
the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may
be modified so as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency, but no further.
The golden rule modifies the language of the words in a statute to successfully interpret
the actual meaning of the legislation.
The rule may be used in 2 ways:
Narrow sense:
most frequently used when there is some absurdity or ambiguity in the
words themselves.
Lee v. Knapp (1967) 2 Q.B. 442
ᴏ Sec. 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 states that:
□ In any case, owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a
road an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a
vehicle other than that motor vehicle, the driver of the
motor vehicle shall stop and, if required so to do by any
person having reasonable ground for so requiring, give his
name and address and also the name and address of the
owner and the identification marks of the vehicle
ᴏ Defendant hit a parked car- stopped and then drove off.
ᴏ Issue in regards to the word “stop”.
ᴏ Court held, literal interpretation of the word stop is absurd-
requirement of the act not fulfilled because the driver did not stop
for a “reasonable time” so that interested parties can make inquiries
about the accident.
State of MP v. Azad Bharat Financial Company (1967)
ᴏ Truck belonging to defendant- put on hire- was carrying apple- found
a parcel of opium.
ᴏ Vehicle impounded- defendant contended that he had no
knowledge that opium was present in the truck
ᴏ Sec. 11 of MP Opium Act, 1878 states that vehicles transporting
contraband articles “shall” be impounded and articles confiscated.
ᴏ Defendant made an application of release of the truck.
ᴏ Magistrate and sessions court held that the word “shall” in that
section gives him no option but to confiscate.
ᴏ Sch held- the word “shall” is not always mandatory, depends upon
the context in which the word occurs- deviating from literal rule, SC
held that it would be unjust to confiscate the truck of a person who
has no knowledge that the truck was used for transporting opium.
State of Punjab v. Quiser Jehan Begum (1963)
ᴏ period of limitation was prescribed for, under section 18 of land
acquisition act, 1844, that an appeal shall be filed for the
announcement of the award within 6 months of the announcement
of the compensation.
ᴏ The respondents were not informed about the acquisition and were
not present at the time of the award.
ᴏ The Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 96 per acre
but the respondents a year later contended the valuation of their
lands. The senior subordinate judge rejected their application as it
was already 6 months since the sale and was thus beyond the period
of limitation as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
ᴏ SC held that the period of 6 months shall be counted from the time
the appellant received the notification of award.
Wider sense:
Most frequently used when there exists only one possible interpretation of a
word- avoid absurdity.
Bedford v. Bedford: (1935)
ᴏ Son murdered his mother.
ᴏ Mother did not make a will.
ᴏ Court had to rule on who inherits the estate- mothers family or son
ᴏ Under the Administration of justice Act, 1925- the estate would be
inherited by the next of kin- i.e., her son.
ᴏ Even though there was no ambiguity, could held that literal rule
should not be applied and that golden rule should be used to
prevent repugnant situation
ᴏ Court held that if son inherits the estates, it would amount to
profiting from a crime that would be repugnant to the Act.
Mischief rule:
The rule laid down in Heydon’s case ―Mischief Rule- means to prevent the misuse of
provision of a statute.
The main objective of this rule is to determine the mischief or defect that the statute in
question intends to remedy.
The Rule enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act:
What was the law before the making of the Act?
What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide?
What is the remedy that the Act has provided?
What is the reason of the remedy?
Attempts to determine the legislator’s intention by considering the 4 steps in interpreting
the statute.
The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy.
Focuses on identifying the “mischief” or problem that the statute was intended to remedy.
Narrower in application than the golden or literal rule.
Can be only used when a statute was passed to remedy a defect.
Gives more sensible outcome.
Smith v. Hughes 1960
Street offences Act, 1959.
Sec 1(1)- it shall be an offence for a person aged 18 or over to persistently loiter or
solicits in the street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.
The defendant was a prostitute who lived in London.
The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was:
ᴏ to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some
metal object and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath
her and
ᴏ having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to
come inside the premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up
here a little while?’ at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the
premises.
“The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was
soliciting in a street or public place”
legislative intent- to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by prostitutes.
Claimed not guilty as they were not on the “streets”.
Court applied mischief rule- ‘the windows and balconies of their homes would count
for an extension of the word and would come within the ambit of the word ‘street’.
held that defendants were guilty as the intention of the Act was to cover the
mischief of harassment from prostitutes.
Corkery v Carpenter (1951):
The defendant was riding his bicycle whilst under the influence of alcohol- he was
arrested.
S.12 of the Licensing Act 1872- a person found drunk in charge of a “carriage” on
the highway can be arrested without a warrant.
According to the plain meaning rule a bike is not a carriage.
Legislative intent: to avoid danger to the road users on account of drunker.
Court applied mischief rule and held bicycle could constitute a carriage.
Commissioner of Income Tax, MP v. Sodra Devi AIR 1957:
A partnership was entered between the assessee and her 3 major sons for the
purpose of business.
3 minor sons of the assesse were admitted to the benefits of the partnership.
The question was in regards to sec. 16(3) of Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
ᴏ “In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of
assessment, there shall be included (a) so much of the income of a wife or
minor child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly….”
The question before the court was whether the word “individual” as used in the sub-
section meant only a male or also included a female.
Justice Bhagwati observed: “It is clear that the evil which was sought to be remedied
was the one resulting from the wide spread practice of husbands entering into
nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers admitting their minor children to
the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. This evil was sought
to be remedied by the enactment of Section 16(3) in the Act. If this background of
the enactment of Section 16(3) is borne in mind there is no room for any doubt that
howsoever that mischief was sought to be remedied by amending the Act, the only
intention of the legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the
wife or minor child, in computation of the total income of the male assessee, the
husband or the father, as the case may be, for the purpose of assessment.”
Avishek Goenka v. UOI (2012)
SC while interpreting rule 100(2) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which
provides that the glass of the windscreen and rear window of every motor vehicle
shall be such, and shall be maintained in such a condition, that the visual
transmission of light is not less than 70%, and on side windows, not less than 50%,
and shall conform to Indian Standards [IS: 2553 – Pt 2 – 1992]
held that the use of black films of any density on the windscreen and windows of a
motor vehicle is impermissible.
Legislative intent - Due significance to "public safety “.
The basis of the principle of harmonious construction is that the legislature never intends to
contradict itself by providing two repugnant provisions in the same statute.
The Act has to read as a whole and its provisions have to be harmonised giving effect to all
of them.
The rule of harmonious construction says that when two or more provisions of the same
statute are repugnant, the Court tries to construe these provisions in such a manner, if
possible, as to give effect to both by harmonising them with each other.
The court may do so either by holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as
dealing with separate situations or by holding that one provision merely provides for an
exception of the general rule contained therein.
Although it may be very difficult to determine whether separate provisions of the same
statute are overlapping or are mutually exclusive but the court tries to harmoniously
construe them.
In the process of harmonizing the provisions, the court must read the entire statute as a
whole, then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word, and
the relevant provisions must be read harmoniously.
An effort should be made to give effect to all the provisions of a statute and for that purpose
any provisions of the statute should be construed with reference to the other provisions so
as to make it workable.
A particular provision cannot be interpreted to defeat the other provision made in that
behalf under the statute.
Each word in enactment must be allowed to play its role, however significant or insignificant
it may be in achieving legislative intent and promoting legislative object.
Where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of
harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding rendering any provision as
inoperative or ineffective.
The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless
it is impossible to reconcile the same.
Illustration:
Raj Krishna v Binod (1954):
In this case, there was a conflict between sections 33(2) and 123(8) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951.
According to section 33(2), a government servant may nominate or second
a candidate seeking election. Whereas according to section 123(8), a
government servant is not entitled to assist a candidate in an election in
any manner except by casting his vote.
The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be
harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government servant was entitled
to nominate or second a candidate seeking election to the State Legislature
Assembly.
This harmony could be achieved only if section 123(8) of the Act is
interpreted as conferring power on a government servant of voting as well
as of proposing and seconding a candidature and forbidding him from
assisting a candidate in any other manner.
Calcutta Gas Co Pvt Ltd v State of W Bengal (1962):
The Legislative Assembly of West Bengal passed the Oriental Gas Company
Act in 1960.
The respondent sought to take over the management of the Oriental Gas
Company under this Act.
The appellant challenged the validity of this Act by holding that the State
Legislative Assembly had no power to pass such an Act under Entries 24 and
25 of the State List because the Parliament had already enacted the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 under Entry 52 of the
Central List dealing with Industries.
It was observed by the Supreme Court that there are so many subjects in
three lists in the Constitution that there is bound to be some overlapping
and the duty of the court in such a situation is to try to harmonise them, if
possible, so that effect can be given to each of them.
Entry 24 of the State List covers entire industry in the State. Entry 25 of the
State List is limited to only the gas industry. Therefore, Entry 24 covers all
industries except gas industry which is specifically covered by Entry 25.
Corresponding to Entry 24 in the State List is Entry 52 in the Union List.
Therefore, by harmonious construction it became clear that gas industry
was exclusively covered by Entry 25 of the State List over which the State
has full control. Therefore, the State was fully competent to make laws in
this subject.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishan (1979):
Under section 46(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958,
criminal prosecution of the respondent partners was sanctioned in this case
by the Commissioner when even after repeated demands the assessee did
not pay the sales tax.
The respondent challenged this provision on the ground that there were two
separate provisions under the Act, namely, sections 22(4-A) and 46(1)(c)
under which two different procedures were prescribed to realise the
amount due but there was no provision of law which could tell as to which
procedure was to be followed in which case.
According to the Supreme Court, reading of the two provisions revealed
that out of the two the procedure prescribed under section 46(1)(c) was
more drastic.
It was held by the Supreme Court that by harmonious construction of these
two provisions, the conclusion drawn is that the Commissioner had a
judicial discretion to decide as to which procedure was to be followed in
which case.
Whenever the Commissioner will fail to act judicially, the court will have the
right to intervene. However, here in this case, the Commissioner had
correctly decided that the more drastic procedure under section 46(1)(c)
deserved to be followed because of the failure of the assessee firm in
paying sales tax despite the repeated demands by the sales tax officer.
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v Dixitulu (1979):
In this case, on attaining the age of fifty years, Deputy Registrar of the High
Courts and a subordinate judge were compulsorily retired by the Chief
Justice of the High Court and the State Government respectively.
Respondent filed petitions against this before the Administrative Tribunal
constituted under Article 371D of the Constitution by the President of India
by the Administrative Tribunal Order 1975.
The Tribunal held the retirement of the Deputy Registrar illegal being an
arbitrary order violative of Article 311(2) and that of subordinate judge also
illegal because as the High Court was their appointing authority, retirement-
order could not be passed by the government.
But before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that the officers and
servants of the High Court as well as members of the judicial services were
not subject to Article 371D. Therefore, the Administrative Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to deal with such cases.
It was held by the Supreme Court that when more than one construction is
possible, then effect must be given to that interpretation which ensures a
smooth and harmonious working of the statute.
The rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent, or obviously
repugnant provisions of an Act, the courts should make an effort to so interpret the
provisions as to harmonise them so that the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and
both the provisions may be allowed to operate without rendering either of them futile.
On a conspectus of the case-law, the following principles are discernible:
(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on-clash between two sections of the
Act and to construe the provisions which appears to be in conflict with each other in
such a manner as to harmonise them.
(2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other
provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two
conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the
essence of the rule of harmonious construction.
(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of
the provisions to ―a dead letter or ―useless lumber is not harmonious
construction.
(5) Provisions should be construed with reference to each other to ensure their
consistency with the object sought to be achieved.
(6) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it futile
Illustration:
Beni Prasad v. Hardai Bibi (1892) Allahabad HC- a case of how English judges applied
mimamsa rules to resolve a dispute regarding adoption under uncodified Hindu law- applied
Jaiminis sutra
Jaimini stated that where the sentence of a shruti gives reasons for injunction, the
entire sentence must be considered not as obligatory injunction (vidhi) but only as
praise/eulogy (Atharvada)- according to Mimamsa tradition, only the injunctive part
is authoritative- supplementations are not.
An Atharva is not independently authoritative but derives its authority only
supporting an injunction.
Other sentences which are merely descriptive or eulogistic are considered relevant
only as subordinate to the injunctive statement of vedas.
Jaimini exemplifies this principle in a statement in vedas: “he performs the sacrifice
by a winnowing basket, it is by it that food is made”
Whether obligatory injunction or mere arthaveda?
According to Jaimini, this is not to be interpreted as injunction but praise.
Concludes that where a statement contained a reason for an injunction, it
is to be treated merely as praise.
The allahabd HC applied this principle in resolving a doubt with regards to a smiti
text pertaining to adoption. The relevant part of the smriti text,
Let no man give or accept an only son, nor though a numerous progeny
exist, should an eldest son be given.
The question before the court was whether adoption of an only son is null and void.
Court held that the text was not injunctory- only an Atharva- and the adoption of an
only son is not null and void.
Progressive interpretation?
But apart from using Mimamsa rule of interpretation in religious text, how do we apply these
rules in secular statues?
Difficulty in application of the technical rules of Mimamsa rules to current statutory
interpretations.
Some courts have attempted to use the rules for resolutions of conflicts- however, it is highly
contested.
Illustrations:
Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan v. state of UP (1992)
The petitioner and respondent were appointed as clerks in a college.
The court had to determine their seniority.
The petitioner relied upon UP Directorate of education Ministerial Service
Rules, 1983.
ᴏ Sec. 3(1)(b)- if 2 or more teachers are appointed on the same date,
their seniority shall be fixed on the basis of age.
Learned judge held that the rules had no application as it is related only to
teachers.
However, despite these findings, the court applied atidesha principle
(analogy) of Mimamsa and applied this rule to non-teacher.
ᴏ Atidesha principle according to Jaimini: if what is prescribed as a
duty with regard to one subject, applies to another object”.
Reasoning given by Katju: since there was no express rule as to how the
seniority of non-teaching employees in educational institutions appointed
on the same day was to be considered, the court could justifiably use the
atidesha principle to apply the rule which was framed in respect of
teachers- open for criticism.
atidesha is a principle applied by Jaimini in interpretations of vedic text
relating to sacrifice.
Shruti lays down a model of sacrifice called Prakriti- 2 technical terms were
used by him: Prakriti and Vikriti.
ᴏ Eg. A model of sacrifice has 1-50 steps to be performed as
prescribed by shruti.
ᴏ Another sacrifice which consists of only some similar steps would be
called vikriti (40-50 steps were different)
ᴏ In such a situation, Jaimini advocates the extrapolation of required
steps prescribed in prakriti to vikriti- application of atidesha.
In the given case, which one is prakriti and which one is vikriti? Legislation
does not define nor give any indication.
Open to criticism- application of atidesha would be wholly arbitrary.
Udai Shankar Singh v. Branch Mangar, LIC Bharwari (1993)
Petitioner took 2 insurance policies of LIC.
While travelling in 2 wheeler, he met with a accident- led to amputation of
one leg (above the knee) and paralysis or right hand.
LIC repudiated its liability stating that his disability is not “permanent
disability” as defined in the policy- therefore petitioner not entitled to
payment for permanent disability.
Policy defines permanent disability as:
ᴏ The amputation of both hands or at above the writs, or the
amputation of both feet at or above the ankles, or in the
amputation of one hand or above the writs and one foot at or
above the ankle shall be deemed to constitute permanent
disability.
Victim suffered only amputation of one leg and paralysis of one hand, does
not fall under the definition of ‘permanent disability’.
Court referred to several rules of interpretation given by scholars including
Nyaya school of Indian logic on lakshana- figurative meaning.
Held the sentence ‘amputation of hand’ should be construed to mean “the
hand becoming useless”- whether by amputation, paralysis or otherwise.
LIC liable to pay petitioner.
Even if judgement is right on equity- it is contested that the application of
Mimamsa rule is not justified.
One of the Mimansa principles is the gunapradhan.
Guna means subordinate or accessory, while pradhan means principal.
The gunapradhan states: if a word or sentence claiming to express a subordinate
idea clash with the principal idea, the former must be adjusted to the latter or must
be disregarded altogether.
This principle is also expressed by the popular maxim known as matsya nyaya, ie,
bigger fish eats the smaller fish.
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v Essar Power Ltd (2008):
interpretation of sections 174 and 175 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was in question.
ᴏ Section 175 of the Electricity Act, 2003 states that the provisions of
the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law.
(imply that arbitration act will also apply to disputes)
ᴏ Section 174 provides that the Electricity Act, 2003 will prevail over
anything inconsistent in any other law. The inconsistency may be
express or implied
section 175 has to be read along with section 174 and not in isolation.
At first glance, there is an apparent inconsistency between sections 175 and
174.
The Supreme Court held that in this case Mimansa principles of
interpretation would be of great utility
It was held that the gunapradhan principle applies to this case
Section 174 is the Pradhan (principle) whereas section 175 is the guna
(subordinate)
If section 175 is read in isolation, then of course the submission that section
11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act applies, would have to be
accepted.
But section 175 cannot be read in isolation, it has to be read along with
section 174, and reading them together, section 175 has to be adjusted to
make it in accordance with section 174.
Held that when there is any express or implied conflict between the
provisions of the Electricity Act and any other Act then the provisions of the
Electricity Act will prevail, but when there is no conflict, express or implied,
both the Acts are to be read together.
correct application of Mimamsa rules would require precise knowledge of Sanskrit language-
particularly the rules and principles of its grammar. Any attempt to understand Mimamsa
without good working knowledge of Sanskrit would be counterproductive.