SUMMER 2022

THE
BACK
TO THE
FUTURE
ISSUE

DAVID A. BELL ON HOW HISTORICAL ERAS BEGIN | M.E. SAROTTE ON THE NEW IRON CURTAIN
SHIVSHANKAR MENON ON THE RETURN OF NONALIGNMENT | NINA TANNENWALD ON
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE | ADAM TOOZE ON TACKLING INFLATION | HAL BRANDS ON
ANOTHER ARMS RACE | PRIYA SATIA ON GANDHI’S LESSONS FOR TODAY
The Lionel
Gelber Prize
2022 Winner
The American War in
Afghanistan: A History
By Carter Malkasian
Oxford University Press

“After two decades and four presidential administrations,

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>˜`Vœ“«iÝÜ>Àpœ˜iÌ >̈ÌՏ̈“>ÌiÞœÃÌ°˜The
American War in Afghanistan: A History]˜œÌi` ˆÃ̜Àˆ>˜
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The call for submissions for the 2023 Lionel Gelber Prize is now open.
CALL FOR Deadline for submissions is October 31, 2022. For eligibility criteria please visit
SUBMISSIONS
www.munkschool.utoronto.ca/gelber
 Features
26 Back to the Future
D AV I D A . B E L L

30 A New Iron Curtain

SUMMER 2022 M .E . SAROT TE

34 The Return of Nonalignment

SHIVSHANKAR MENON
Arguments
4 Why the World Isn’t Really 36 Is Nuclear Still Taboo?
N I N A T A N N E N WA L D
United Against Russia
H O WA R D W. F R E N C H 39 The Art of the Arms Race
8
HAL BRANDS
The New Cold War Is Here
ANGELA STENT 44 The 1970s Weren’t
What You Think
12 Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage
ADAM TO OZE
Is Desperate for Help
L AU R A BA L L M A N 49 Learning to Rule Ourselves
14
P R I YA S AT I A
Beijing Is Used to Learning
From Russia’s Failures
ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO Review
AND DEREK SCISSORS
79 Happily Ever After
16 Don’t Ignore India’s Delusions The Dragon Daughter and Other Lin Lan
SUSHANT SINGH Fairy Tales, edited by Juwen Zhang

19 Bolsonaro Has Been M A R I A TATA R

Watching Trump 83 Liberalism, More Or Less

OLIVER STUENKEL Yascha Mounk’s The Great
Experiment and Francis Fukuyama’s
22 Stop Private Oil Companies Liberalism and Its Discontents
From Dictating Energy Policy JA M E S T R AU B

86
G R E G O RY B R E W
The Art Thieves
24 The World Bank Needs a Bénédicte Savoy’s Africa’s Struggle for Its Art
New Approach on Africa NOSMOT GBADAMOSI
V I JAYA R A M A C H A N D R A N
A N D A RT H U R BA K E R 90 Who Got China Wrong?
Aaron L. Friedberg’s Getting China
Wrong and C. Fred Bergsten’s
Essay The United States vs. China
B O B D AV I S
52 The Intellectual Catastrophe
of Vladimir Putin
PAU L B E R M A N
Decoder
94 ‘Protocol’ in Ghana
A N A K WA D WA M E N A

Cover illustration by ORLANDO AROCENA SUMMER 2022 1

FEATURED CONTRIBUTORS
Nina Tannenwald is a senior Howard W. French is a professor
lecturer in political science at Brown at the Columbia Journalism School
University. Her book The Nuclear and columnist at FOREIGN POLICY.
Taboo: The United States and the His latest book is Born in Blackness:
Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Africa, Africans, and the Making
Since 1945 was awarded the of the Modern World, 1471 to the
Lepgold Prize in 2009. Second World War.

Anakwa Dwamena is a Ghanaian Angela Stent is a nonresident

American journalist based in Accra, senior fellow at the Brookings
Ghana. He is the books editor at Institution. She is the author
Africa Is a Country and a Fulbright- of four books, including Putin’s
National Geographic fellow. His work World: Russia Against the West
focuses on the African diaspora and and With the Rest.
Indigenous knowledge systems.

Shivshankar Menon is the chair Priya Satia is the Raymond

of the Ashoka Centre for China A. Spruance professor of
Studies and a visiting professor international history at Stanford
at Ashoka University. From 2010 University. She is the author
to 2014, he served as national of three award-winning books,
security advisor to Indian Prime including Time’s Monster:
Minister Manmohan Singh. How History Makes History.

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2
 FROM THE EDITOR

HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF, WE’RE OFTEN TOLD. And it seems as

if it’s happening more than usual these days. Interstate
war is back. The world is once again worried about nuclear
weapons. A pandemic has killed millions of people and
shut down commerce—just as it did a century ago. Infla-
tion has hit levels unseen since the 1970s. The world is
running out of food. There’s an energy crisis. In a replay of
the Cold War, the United States is aligning nations against
Russia—and once again, despite unity in the West, several
large countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America would
rather stay out of the tussle.
But as much as our current moment feels marked by
echoes from the past, there is plenty about our world today Remember “duck and cover”? The reality is that the aver-
that is better described as unprecedented. Perhaps it’s the age FP reader is now too young to have memories of a world
rapid rise of a country as large as China, a phenomenon when we worried about nuclear war. Nina Tannenwald,
without any real historical parallel; maybe it’s the bite who wrote The Nuclear Taboo to much acclaim in 2007,
of climate change, a truly transnational challenge that revisits her research to warn us of a “whiff of nuclear for-
is already changing our planet (and on which countries getting in the air” (Page 36).
simply must cooperate); or it could be the rise of artificial Nobody is forgetting inflation, obviously. But trying to
intelligence and all the change it promises to usher in. draw too many parallels with the 1970s won’t help us, FP
Our Summer 2022 issue tries to find ways to make sense columnist Adam Tooze writes (Page 44). Calling on cen-
of current affairs by delving into the past. If the cover looks tral bankers to continue with only mild monetary inter-
familiar, it’s meant to: It is, of course, inspired by the 1985 vention, he points out that the cost of living will likely
summer blockbuster Back to the Future, in which a high plateau by next year.
school student inadvertently finds himself transported Switching gears a bit—in our custom-built DeLorean,
three decades into the past—and then realizes his actions of course—Hal Brands explains why the world has a new
could alter the future. FOREIGN POLICY hasn’t quite fig- arms race on its hands and why that might not be a bad
ured out time travel, but we reckoned we could assemble thing (Page 39). “An arms race is only futile if you lose,” he
some of the smartest historians and experts we know to writes, before laying out a plan for the United States to win.
try to explain our world today—and perhaps impact the Lastly, as a coda to our package of feature essays,
course of policy. Priya Satia scours recent history to find a cure for the
David A. Bell kicks things off by taking on the many world’s present maladies (Page 49). She draws on the
commentators who have called Russia’s war on Ukraine example of Mohandas Gandhi and his nonviolent strug-
the start of a new era in history (Page 26). How do we gle to suggest we should seek to remake ourselves rather
know when a historical period ends or begins? Doesn’t it than the world. In practice, Satia writes, that would entail
all depend on the perspective from which the historian sustained civil disobedience to confront broken systems
writes? M.E. Sarotte builds on that theme in her essay and political injustice.
about a new Iron Curtain (Page 30). The collapse of the As every character in a time travel fantasy learns, chang-
Soviet Union is often portrayed as a set of events that took ing something in the past transforms a future timeline.
place in one day. But, she writes, if you see the world as Maybe adapting our understanding of history can help
Russian President Vladimir Putin does, the humiliations us rethink policy today. Or, at the very least, we can pro-
of Nov. 9, 1989, never really ended. The West has inflicted vide you with a thought-provoking read.
a thousand perceived cuts that explain his actions today. Lots more in this issue. Enjoy!
There’s a danger here of seeing the world purely from As ever,
a Western lens. Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian
ORIANA FENWICK ILLUSTRATION

national security advisor, gives us a different perspec-

tive. Many countries in the global south, he writes, share
a “basic disquiet at having to choose sides” between Bei-
jing, Moscow, and Washington (Page 34). You can call it
strategic autonomy, as is the fashion today, but it could
also be the return of Cold War-era nonalignment. Ravi Agrawal

SUMMER 2022 3
ARGUMENTS
CHINA | ASIA | AMERICAS | MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA
EUROPE

The opening of the

first United Nations
session in New York
on Oct. 23, 1946.

Why the
A
s Russian President Vladi- to block any measure it disapproves of.
mir Putin’s army reduced The calls for U.N. reform this pro-

World Isn’t
one Ukrainian city after voked came against the backdrop of
another to rubble, many another source of Western displeasure.

Really United
observers in the rich After exuberant claims in Washington
world bemoaned the dysfunction of and European capitals that the world

Against Russia the United Nations for being unable to

overcome an obstacle written into its
was united against Russia’s brutal and
unprovoked invasion of its neighbor,
charter: Russia, like the Soviet Union people who paused to take more care-
AFP/GETTY IMAGES

before it, is one of the U.N. Security ful stock of the situation began to note
Council’s five permanent members and, that, in fact, much of the world was sit-
By Howard W. French as such, enjoys veto power—allowing it ting on the sidelines.

4
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 Setting aside China because of its Japan, for its part, was disgusted by independent African states, the league—
special relationship with Moscow, this the league’s failure to address notions at European direction—challenged self-
included large nations, such as India, of racial hierarchy then so dear to the rule in Liberia and Ethiopia, claiming a
and small nations—and left no con- West. As scholar G. John Ikenberry humanitarian obligation to do so because
tinent spared. In fact, a tally of their noted in his book A World Safe for of alleged enslavement in those states.
collective population would show that Democracy: Liberal Internationalism As political scientist Adom Getachew
governments representing a majority of and the Crises of Global Order, then-U.S. wrote in her book Worldmaking After
the human population have not taken a President Woodrow Wilson “projected a Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Deter-
position in a conflict many see as hav- vision of universalism in rights and val- mination, “That the charge of slavery
ing familiar echoes of previous contests ues, but quickly compromised when it became the idiom through which black
between East and West. was expedient.” When the Japanese put self-government would be undermined
Instead of mere coincidences, what forward a resolution affirming equal- should strike us as deeply perverse not
if these two issues were deeply con- ity among nations with no distinctions only because of Europe’s central role in
nected? An examination of the history based on race or nationality, Washing- the transatlantic slave trade and slavery
of the institutions at the heart of what ton backed down in deference to Brit- in the Americas but also because of the
we casually refer to as the international ain, which saw the idea as a threat to the labor practices that characterized colo-
community provides powerful but over- legitimacy of its settler colony project nial Africa in the twentieth century.” At
looked reasons to believe just that. in Australia. This may have been the the time, and for decades to come, Euro-
This is a history that far predates the operative rationale, but it should not be pean powers brutally imposed forced
alienating contests of the Cold War. And forgotten that the United States at the labor on their African colonies to ensure
it’s one that reveals an international time was itself a country that practiced high production rates of coveted raw
political infrastructure that from its very legally enforced white supremacy and materials such as rubber and cotton.
inception in the early 20th century con- separatism. Wilson himself praised the The next big opportunity for a West-
signed the nations of the so-called Third Ku Klux Klan and oversaw the segrega- ern-led international community to
World to all but permanent second- tion of the federal work force. introduce more democracy and equity
class status—or what Indian historian Yet as bad as the humiliations that in global governance came after the
Dipesh Chakrabarty has called “the China and Japan suffered were, they next world war. Similar lofty rhetoric
imaginary waiting room of history.” were of a categorically smaller nature ensued, as did similar compromises at
The proximate birth of today’s inter- than the insults delivered to then- the expense of the world’s colonized
national civil society should probably still-colonized lands. The League of people. After even greater sacrifices—
be situated at the end of World War I Nations gave powerful endorsements measured in the lives of colonial sol-
when the Treaty of Versailles was to Western imperialism, granting Euro- diers fighting in European wars—and
signed, eventually leading to the for- pean countries the authority to extend greater extractions of wealth were
mation of the League of Nations amid their control over broad stretches of ter- made to keep the imperial powers’
much high-flying rhetoric. ritory under the guise of the league’s economies afloat, expectations were
The League of Nations failed for many so-called mandates. still higher this time, especially among
reasons, not least that the United States, These arrangements especially tar- Africans, that the great powers would
an early proponent of a new system of geted Africa. African colonies had just support their independence.
international governance, never joined. supplied hundreds of thousands of Amid renewed rhetoric about free-
Much less famous, though, are the many troops and invaluable economic sup- dom, accountability, and timetables for
ways that the progressive-sounding port to their European masters during self-rule, the discussions that produced
diplomacy begun at Versailles failed a World War I, and returning African vet- the Atlantic Charter fueled this opti-
vast majority of the world’s people by not erans clamored for independence. In mism. But much as Wilson had done
prioritizing—or even considering—their response, European powers argued that with Japanese expectations of an
interests. China’s Nationalist govern- Africans had not yet reached a level of enshrined equality among nations,
ment, to take one example, was surprised civilization required to begin contem- U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
to learn that due to horse-trading among plating self-rule. The irony was lost on principally concerned with the emerg-
Britain, France, and Italy, the league the Europeans, who themselves had just ing great-power rivalry with the Soviet
granted legitimacy to Japan’s takeover emerged from what was arguably the Union, bowed to the interests of Brit-
of its territories that Germany had con- most barbarous war in history. ain and other European imperialist
trolled before World War I. As a result, This was not the end of the insults. nations in deferring talk of universal
China refused to sign the treaty. To impose their authority on the few self-government and independence.

6
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As Harvard University professor Caro- brought to the New World from Africa begun to speak of Russia’s invasion of
line Elkins points out in her book Leg- than from Europe, and it was the labor Ukraine in these terms—as a portal to a
acy of Violence: A History of the British of these enslaved millions of people— new, if as-yet-undefined, global order.
Empire, in the aftermath of the charter producing commodities such as sugar Few, however, have begun to address the
Roosevelt wasted no time saying that and cotton on a vast scale, clearing unfinished business of the major reor-
the promises made to colonized people lands, and performing all kinds of other derings of the 20th century, which left
were aspirational, merely “pronounce- unpaid labor—that made the Ameri- the people of the Third World completely
ments” that would have to wait. can colonies profitable for Europe and out of the picture. Can this be justified
A sense of the spirit in the halls of the so-called Old World new and rich. based on civilization or race? Or is it a
Western power in this moment when This may feel like ancient history to matter of raw wealth or sheer power in
a new global order was being designed some, but the subordination of justice which might is allowed to make right?
can be felt through the words of one of for the colonized—and especially for Morality aside, few of the big prob-
its most important architects: econ- peoples and lands subjected to slavery— lems facing humanity this century are
omist John Maynard Keynes. As del- is of a piece with every other chapter of amenable to being managed well based
egates from 44 nations gathered in history discussed here, and this topic on exclusion on such a scale—not pros-
New Hampshire to design a new inter- won’t magically go away because peo- perity and inequality, not global warm-
national monetary system, Keynes ple wish to ignore it or find it intracta- ing, not migration, not even war and
groused about the presence of represen- ble or bothersome. peace. Q
tatives from what would soon become In fact, the current structure of the
known as the Third World. As histo- United Nations, whose impotence HOWARD W. FRENCH is a professor at the
rian Vijay Prashad notes in his book The in the face of a moral horror like Ukraine Columbia Journalism School and
Darker Nations: A People’s History of the some bemoan today, is lodged in the columnist at FOREIGN POLICY.
Third World, Keynes denounced the special rights of a select few through the
composition of the delegates as “the U.N. Security Council. This arrangement
most monstrous monkey-house assem-
bled for years” and said the representa-
is little different from the Wilsonian-
era arguments that colonized peo- The New Cold
War Is Here
tives of the poorer and weaker nations ple were inadequately civilized to be
“clearly have nothing to contribute and granted full rights.
will merely encumber the ground.” The Security Council was democra-
The two-track nature of the world tized to some extent by China’s entry as
being built would soon become fully a permanent member in 1971. But other

R
evident. The United States devoted bil- than China, whose size made it difficult By Angela Stent
lions of dollars to rebuilding Europe to deny, the Security Council is com- ussian President Vlad-
after World War II. Left unaddressed—at posed of predominantly white nations imir Putin made four
the time and ever since—was the West’s whose history is bound up in imperial major miscalculations
obligations toward the world’s newly rule. The United States is the only one before invading Ukraine.
decolonized countries. As I argue in with a very large population, currently He overestimated Russian
my book Born in Blackness: Africa, third in the world. Russia, whose econ- military competence and effectiveness
Africans, and the Making of the Mod- omy is roughly the size of Italy’s, will and underestimated the Ukrainians’
ern World, 1471 to the Second World War, soon drop out of the top 10 most popu- will to fight back. He assumed a dis-
the extraction of wealth and labor from lous countries. France and Britain trail tracted West would be unable to unite
Africa alone over centuries played a cen- far behind. Where is India? Where is politically in the face of the Russian
tral yet still largely unacknowledged Nigeria, which is projected to have more attack and that the Europeans and
role in modern European prosperity. citizens than the United States by the Washington’s Asian allies would never
Indeed, the pillaging of Africa of middle of this century and will likely trail support far-reaching financial, trade,
human beings created what we call only India and China by 2100? Where is and energy sanctions against Russia.
“the West.” Although few stop to define Brazil or Mexico or Indonesia? But he did get one thing right: He
it these days, this means the con- In his book The World That FDR Built: correctly estimated that the non-Western
dominium between Atlantic-facing Vision and Reality, historian Edward world—what I call “the Rest”—would
Europe and that continent’s colonies Mortimer writes, “A world war is like a not condemn Russia or impose sanc-
and, later, allies in the Americas. Until furnace, it melts the world down and tions. The day the war broke out, U.S.
1820, four times as many people were makes it malleable.” Many people have President Joe Biden said the West would

8
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make Putin a “pariah on the interna-
tional stage”—but for much of the world,
Putin is not a pariah.
For the past decade, Russia has culti-
vated ties with countries in the Middle
East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa—
regions from which Russia withdrew
after the Soviet Union’s collapse in
1991. And the Kremlin has assiduously
courted China since annexing Crimea
in 2014. When the West sought to iso-
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with U.N. Secretary-General
late Russia, Beijing stepped in to sup- António Guterres at the Kremlin in Moscow on April 26.
port Moscow, including by signing the
“Power of Siberia” gas pipeline deal.
The United Nations held three major abstained on U.N. votes condemning Putin defeated. Hence, despite China’s
votes after the war began: two to con- Russia and voted against the resolution discomfort at the scale of violence and
demn Russia’s invasion and one to sus- to suspend it from the Human Rights brutality in Ukraine and the risks of
pend it from the Human Rights Council. Council. Chinese media reiterate Rus- escalation, it remains unwilling to speak
These resolutions passed. But tally up sian propaganda about “denazifying” out against Russia.
the populations of the countries that and demilitarizing Ukraine, blame the Major Chinese financial institutions
abstained or voted against the resolu- United States and NATO for the war, have largely complied with Western
tions, and it amounts to more than half and question whether Russian troops sanctions, though, as China’s economic
of the world’s population. committed atrocities such as the mas- stake in relations with Europe and the
The world is not united in the view sacre in Bucha, Ukraine. United States is far larger than that with
that Russia’s aggression is unjustified, There is some equivocation in the Russia. Moreover, given the extensive
nor is a significant part of the world Chinese position. They have called Western sanctions against Russia,
willing to punish Russia for its actions. for an end to hostilities and reiterated Beijing must wonder what the West-
Some countries are seeking to profit their belief in the territorial integrity ern reaction might be should it invade
from Russia’s situation. The Rest’s and sovereignty of all states—includ- Taiwan and is undoubtedly studying
reluctance to jeopardize relations with ing Ukraine. China has been Ukraine’s the sanctions carefully.
Russia will complicate the West’s abil- top trading partner, and Ukraine is part The other major holdout against criti-
ity to manage ties with allies and oth- of the Belt and Road Initiative, so Bei- cizing Russia has been India, the world’s
ers both now and when the war is over. jing cannot welcome the country’s eco- largest democracy and a U.S. partner
Leading the Rest in refusing to con- nomic devastation. in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
demn Russia is China. Without the Nevertheless, Xi has chosen to ally India abstained on the three U.N. res-
understanding that China would sup- with fellow autocrat Putin, and they olutions and has refused to sanction
port Russia, Putin would not have share deep grievances against a U.S.- Russia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra
invaded Ukraine. The Russian-Chinese dominated world order they believe Modi called reports of atrocities against
joint statement on Feb. 4, signed when has neglected their interests. They are civilians in Bucha “very worrying,” and
Putin visited Beijing at the beginning of determined to create a post-Western India’s ambassador to the United Nations
the Winter Olympics, extols their “no global order, though they differ in what said the country “unequivocally con-
limits” partnership and commitment to this order should look like. demn[s] these killings and support[s] the
VLADIMIR ASTAPKOVICH/SPUTNIK/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

push back against Western hegemony. For Xi, it would be a rules-based order call for an independent investigation”—
According to the Chinese ambassador in which Beijing has a much greater role yet neither blamed Russia.
to the United States, Chinese President in setting the agenda than it currently Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar
Xi Jinping was not informed of Putin’s does. For Putin, it would be a disrup- called Russia a “very important partner
plans to invade Ukraine when the two tive world order with few rules. Both in a variety of areas,” and India continues
met in Beijing. What Putin said to Xi— are allergic to Western criticisms of their to purchase Russian arms and oil. India
whether a wink or something more domestic systems and human rights obtains two-thirds of its weapons from
explicit—we will probably never know. records, and both need each other in Russia and is Moscow’s top arms cus-
Yet China has undeniably supported their joint quest to make the world safe tomer. U.S. Undersecretary of State Vic-
Russia since the invasion. Beijing for autocracy. Xi would not like to see toria Nuland admitted this stems partly

10
 ARGUMENTS
from Washington’s reluctance to supply with Russia that enables Israeli forces Russia.” Brazil remains highly depen-
India with more weapons. The United to strike Iranian targets in Syria. Israel dent on imports of Russian fertilizer.
States is now contemplating stronger fears that antagonizing Russia could More disturbing was Mexico’s refusal
defense cooperation with India. endanger its ability to defend its north- to present a common North American
Modi has several other reasons for ern border. It has sent a field hospital front with the United States and Canada
refusing to condemn Russia. The China and other humanitarian assistance to and condemn the invasion. President
factor is key. India views Russia as an Ukraine as well as some nonlethal mil- Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s Morena
important balancer against China, and itary equipment. Israeli Prime Minister party even launched a Mexico-Russia
Russia acted to defuse Indian-Chinese Naftali Bennett even briefly acted as a Friendship Caucus in the lower house of
tensions after border clashes in 2020. mediator between Russia and Ukraine, the country’s Congress in March, invit-
Moreover, India’s Cold War tradition but his efforts proved unsuccessful. ing the Russian ambassador to address
of neutrality and skepticism toward the Middle Eastern countries’ stances the caucus. Traditional leftist 1970s-style
United States has created considerable toward Russia are also shaped by their anti-Americanism may explain a large
public sympathy for Russia in India. skepticism of the United States as a reli- part of this embrace of Russia, and it
India must balance its traditional secu- able partner and their irritation at U.S. presents Russia with new opportuni-
rity relationship with Russia against criticisms of their human rights records. ties to sow discord in the West.
its new strategic partnership with the The only truly pro-Russia country is The Rest may represent more than
United States in the Quad. Syria, whose leader, Assad, would be long half of the world’s population, but it is
One of Putin’s major foreign-policy gone if not for Russian military support. the poorer half, composed of many less
successes has been Russia’s return to Russia’s return to Africa and the sup- developed countries. The West’s com-
the Middle East, reestablishing ties port the paramilitary Wagner Group bined GDP, economic power, and geopo-
with countries from which post-Soviet gives embattled leaders there have litical heft far outweigh the influence of
Russia withdrew and establishing new produced a continent that has largely those countries that have refused to con-
ones with countries that had no previ- refused to condemn or sanction Russia. demn the invasion or sanction Russia.
ous ties with the Soviet Union. Most African countries abstained in the Nevertheless, the divisions between
Russia is the only major power that vote condemning Russia’s invasion, and the West and the Rest will shape what-
talks to all countries in the region— many voted against suspending Rus- ever world order emerges after the war.
including Sunni-led countries such sia from the Human Rights Council. The two key countries are China and
as Saudi Arabia, Shiite-led countries South Africa, a democratic member of India, which will ensure Putin is not
such as Iran and Syria, and Israel— the BRICS group of emerging econo- an international pariah after the con-
and has ties with all groups on all sides mies, has not criticized Russia. flict ends. Indonesia, which hosts the
of every dispute. This cultivation of Many African countries see Russia G-20 Summit in November, has said it
Middle Eastern countries has been as the heir to the Soviet Union, which will welcome Putin’s presence, though
evident since the outbreak of the Rus- supported them during their anti- it has also invited Ukrainian President
sia-Ukraine war. colonial struggles. The Soviet Union Volodymyr Zelensky.
Although most Arab countries voted was a major backer of the African In the aftermath of the war, the
to condemn Russia’s invasion in the first National Congress during the apart- United States will have enhanced its
U.N. vote, the 22-member Arab League heid era, and the current South Afri- military presence in Europe and will
subsequently did not. Many Arab coun- can leadership feels gratitude toward likely permanently station troops on
tries abstained in the vote suspending Russia. As in the Middle East, hostility NATO’s eastern flank. If Putin wanted to
Russia from the Human Rights Coun- toward the United States also influ- weaken NATO, his war against Ukraine
cil. Staunch U.S. allies including Saudi ences African views of the invasion. has achieved the opposite: reviving the
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Even in the United States’ own back- alliance, giving it new purpose after
and Israel have not imposed sanctions yard, Russia has its cheerleaders. Cuba, Afghanistan, and, with Sweden’s and
on Russia. Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Venezuela, and Nicaragua have sup- Finland’s potential accession, possibly
Mohammed bin Salman have spoken at ported Moscow—as expected—but expanding it. NATO will return to a pol-
least twice since the war began. others have also refused to condemn icy of enhanced containment of Russia
Israel’s position is largely determined the invasion. Brazil, a BRICS member, as long as Putin remains in power and
by Russia’s support for Bashar al-Assad’s declared a stance of “impartiality,” and possibly thereafter, depending on who
regime in Syria, where both Russian President Jair Bolsonaro visited Putin the next Russian leader is.
and Iranian forces are present. Israel in Moscow shortly before the invasion In the new Cold War, non-Western
negotiated a deconfliction agreement and declared himself “in solidarity with countries will refuse to take sides as

SUMMER 2022 11
many did during the original Cold In addition to refugee assistance and During the last 25 years, starting as a
War. The nonaligned movement will armaments, the Biden administration foreign correspondent in Ukraine soon
reemerge in a new incarnation. This should publicly emphasize and activate after its independence from the Soviet
time, the Rest will maintain their ties its extensive cultural property protec- Union, later as a CIA officer overseas,
to Russia even as Washington and its tion resources and experts who know and more recently as the head of intel-
allies treat Putin as a pariah. how to safeguard treasures during times ligence for the FBI’s Art Crime Team,
Russia’s economy will be diminished, of war. Doing so will foil Putin’s gro- I came face to face with anti-demo-
and if it succeeds in creating a “sover- tesque mission to wipe Ukrainian her- cratic forces that defiled, stole, and
eign internet,” it will demodernize and itage off the map. Failing to do so will destroyed cultural symbols. Rarely were
become ever more dependent on China. advance Moscow’s monstrous goals, the perpetrators signatories to the 1954
But it will remain a country that many help rob the world of historic treasures, Hague Convention, which obliges Rus-
states will be content to do business and undermine Washington’s leader- sia, Ukraine, the United States, and all
with—and careful not to antagonize. Q ship in cultural diplomacy—which other signatories to protect cultural
helped win the Cold War in the last cen- objects during times of war. Most per-
ANGELA STENT is a nonresident senior tury and may do so again this century. petrators were nonstate actors, such as
fellow at the Brookings Institution Consider what Putin has done thus the Islamic State, or criminal traffick-
and the author of Putin’s World: far to Ukraine’s heritage. Within the first ers who sold objects for hard currency.
Russia Against the West and With four days of the invasion, Russian forces Not since Nazi Germany has a pow-
the Rest. incinerated the Ivankiv Historical and erful European nation so blatantly
Local History Museum and its trove of targeted a people’s cultural objects for
Ukrainian folk art, located northwest of destruction. Putin, like Nazi dictator

Ukraine’s the capital, in staggering violation of the

1954 Hague Convention for the Protec-
Adolf Hitler, understands that sup-
pressing and destroying a society’s

Cultural tion of Cultural Property in the Event of

Armed Conflict. A few days later, Mos-
cultural objects quickens the suppres-
sion and destruction of its people. Rus-

Heritage Is
cow damaged the Holocaust memorial sia’s behavior is all the more shocking
at Babyn Yar, where Nazis slaughtered because just five years ago, on March

Desperate
nearly 34,000 Jews in 1941. Russian 24, 2017, the U.N. Security Council
soldiers subsequently looted the Popov unanimously adopted its first resolu-

for Help
Manor House museum complex and con- tion focused on cultural heritage pro-
tinue to obliterate Ukrainian cultural tection as a peace and security matter.
treasures unabated. So threatened are The timing is right for the White
they by Ukrainian cultural expression House to convene federal agencies,
that they bombed an art school. scholars, and practitioners from the

A
By Laura Ballman Even, or perhaps especially, amid cultural heritage community for a
mid the enormous suf- gruesome battles and the fog of war, Ukraine emergency response summit.
fering inflicted on the world must protect art, antiqui- Drawing on lessons learned in other war
Ukrainians, another ties, monuments, and other cultural zones, the White House should appoint
less heralded tragedy is properties that are the tangible expres- a National Security Council official to
unfolding. Russian Pres- sions of a society and its existence. drive a coordinated response.
ident Vladimir Putin is attempting to There are seven UNESCO-designated Washington already is well positioned
not only wipe Ukraine off the map but World Heritage sites in Ukraine, one of and resourced to contribute, so the White
eliminate the cultural objects that frame which, in Crimea, has been under Rus- House won’t need to create a new pol-
the country’s national narrative. sian control since 2013 and the rest of icy apparatus. Facing global condem-
Although immediate human needs, which are vulnerable. The world risks nation after U.S. military personnel
the equipping of Ukraine’s military, losing the 11th-century gold-domed passively watched looters ransack the
and the quest for an end to the war St. Sophia Cathedral; 15th-century Iraq Museum in 2003, the U.S. govern-
inevitably capture global attention, wooden churches; medieval coins; ment established a loose but effective
Ukrainian cultural objects also should Renaissance-era religious icons; early coalition of federal agencies, nonprofits,
be protected and preserved. This is 20th-century ceramics from Kosiv, and scholars who protect cultural
another form of resistance against Ukraine; contemporary paintings; and objects around the world. As an exam-
Putin’s assault on democracy. hosts of other Ukrainian cultural objects. ple, the U.S. Defense, State, and Justice

12
 ARGUMENTS
departments as well as the U.S. intelli- vulnerable cultural property as well which specializes in military and cul-
gence community together dismantled as securing and evacuating objects in tural institution collaboration. Like the
the Islamic State’s so-called Ministry of areas where fighting is minimal or non- U.S. Army’s World War II “monuments
Antiquities, which looted and trafficked existent. The greatest immediate need men,” who rescued thousands of art-
Syrian cultural objects to finance terror- seems to be technical assistance identi- works stolen by the Nazi regime, the
ism. The U.S. Treasury Department sanc- fying the location and condition of cul- team out of Fort Drum knows how to
tioned Syrian cultural objects to thwart tural heritage objects, protecting those speak both military and cultural insti-
their black market sales. The Smithso- that remain intact, and documenting tution languages.
nian trained foreign museum profession- evidence of destruction and theft. The State Department, with its Cul-
als on how to preserve collections under The Smithsonian’s Cultural Res- tural Heritage Center and Ambassa-
threat from shelling. Scholars assisted cue Initiative (CRI), a crown jewel in dors Fund for Cultural Preservation,
the FBI with identifying and repatriat- the cultural heritage community, pro- has long supported cultural property
ing stolen art and antiquities. The Met- vides a useful example of how Washing- protection inside Ukraine. Now, Foggy
ropolitan Museum of Art in New York ton can help from afar. The CRI today Bottom should elevate the topic to the
provided a venue for U.S. officials to pres- offers emergency technical advice via U.N. Security Council and diplomatic
ent evidence, including satellite photos, internet and remote video to museum negotiating table. It also should press
and discuss potential solutions with art professionals still inside Ukraine, such UNESCO and other international mem-
trade specialists. All this and more can as those with the Lviv-based Heritage ber organizations to direct funding
be done to help Ukraine maintain its Emergency Response Initiative. The toward the situation in Ukraine. For
cultural patrimony. CRI also has transferred field-expedi- example, the State Department should
At the outset, U.S. government cul- ent packing materials to wrap, ship, and urge the International Council of Muse-
tural property programs must connect store significant art collections. ums to prepare an emergency “Red
with Ukrainian counterparts to under- One can presume that the Penta- List” for Ukraine, which international
stand what type of aid they require. In gon has already mapped significant law enforcement agencies can use to
some regions of Ukraine, it may be too cultural sites and objects in Ukraine identify (and therefore seize) cultural
late to safeguard cultural property from that are off-limits to military attack, property likely to be trafficked during
Russian aggression. However, Wash- as this is a routine part of war-plan- and after the war. The department
ington can, without putting Americans ning exercises today. Pentagon lead- should consider establishing a mobile
inside Ukraine, support people who ers should share this information with app that would permit Ukrainian civil-
are urgently posting the Blue Shield NATO and Ukraine as well as engage ians to document the state of cultural
emblems (like Red Cross symbols) on Fort Drum’s Cultural Resources unit, property on the ground by uploading
images anonymously.
Finally, without siphoning scarce
resources, the U.S. intelligence com-
munity has a role to play. The govern-
ment’s full spectrum of intelligence
assets should collect information about
Russian plans and operations against
cultural targets in Ukraine and should
share this information with Kyiv and
NATO allies. Likewise, the U.S. Justice
Department and Department of Home-
land Security should share what they
already know about transnational crim-
inal trafficking networks that feast off
vulnerable cultural objects in Europe.
ALEXEY FURMAN/GETTY IMAGES

Amid this emergency, I’m reminded

of when I lived in Ukraine in the mid-
1990s and a museum tour guide named
Masha told me that Moscow had forced
A woman walks by a church damaged by Russia’s devastating her to lie to survive. She’d had to blame
but unsuccessful attempt to seize Kyiv in Malyn, Ukraine,
on the outskirts of the capital, on May 4. murderous Christians for the skulls on

SUMMER 2022 13
display in the Monastery of the Caves, But China’s leadership turned its anxiety Russia’s failures is front and center. Putin
a UNESCO World Heritage site in Kyiv. into action about 10 years ago, deliber- probably did not have an open and hon-
After independence, she told the truth, ately working to fix many of the prob- est communication channel with the
that the remains belonged to Chris- lems and minimize the risks currently military, which was fearful of providing
tians, buried within one of the Eastern plaguing Russia in Ukraine. unfavorable information to the erratic
Orthodox Church’s most important One result is that the Chinese mili- leader. Russian troops were largely con-
cultural sites. When the war ends, tary is more likely to perform well even sidered incompetent, but Putin thought
Ukraine’s cultural property will serve though it has not fought a war since superior technology could overcome
as an important link to Ukraine’s past 1979, when it lost thousands of troops in human deficiencies.
and inspiration for its future. I hope a punitive but brief invasion of Vietnam. Chinese President Xi Jinping identi-
Masha will still live in a democracy and Adding to that, China’s economy is both fied similar training and competency
be free to tell its truth. Q far larger and deliberately more diver- issues in the People’s Liberation Army
sified than Russia’s, making sanctions (PLA) 10 years ago. But under his com-
LAURA BALLMAN is a former CIA much harder to sustain against China. mand, the PLA has been proactively
operations officer. These two observations do not mean implementing significant reforms to
deterrence won’t hold, only that the avoid similar pitfalls. And unlike Putin,
unfolding events in Ukraine will likely who apparently believed technology
do little to make Beijing more cautious. could overcome deficiencies in person-
China’s military once had many of nel, Xi came to the opposite conclusion.
CHINA the same deficiencies Russia has shown When he came to power, he took one look
in Ukraine. Over the past decade, it has at the military and recognized that with
embraced significant reforms, creating all its fancy equipment, the PLA proba-
a much more capable fighting force that bly could not fight and win wars and per-
should give even the United States pause. form the missions it had been assigned.
First, while Russia allowed its con- Of particular importance, according
ventional capabilities to atrophy, Chi- to China’s national military strategy,
nese military spending has exploded was to fight local wars under infor-
over the past three decades, increas- mationalized conditions. This meant
ing by 740 percent (in comparison to that the network between platforms

Beijing Is Used
Russia’s 69 percent) from 1992 to 2017. and people—the ease of connectivity—
According to data from the Stockholm was the main feature of modern warfare.

to Learning International Peace Research Institute,

in 2020 China spent almost four times
China needed the best equipment; an
advanced command, control, comput-

From Russia’s
as much as Russia did on its military ers, communication, intelligence, sur-
($244.9 billion to $66.8 billion). veillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

Failures In 1999, less than 2 percent of its

fighter jets were fourth-generation, 4
network; and tons of precision-guided
munitions. But perhaps most impor-
percent of its attack submarines were tantly, it needed troops that could lever-
modern, and none of its surface ships age these systems to conduct seamless
were. Twenty years later, not only did operations across services and top down
By Oriana Skylar Mastro China have much more of everything, through the chain of command.

R
and Derek Scissors but the majority was the most advanced, What followed was a series of slo-
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine modern versions available—with China gans—the two incompatibles, the
has been a double disas- exhibiting advantages over Russia even two inabilities, the two big gaps, the
ter for Russian President in combat aircraft, a traditional area of five incapables—all designed to point
Vladimir Putin, as he faces weakness for China. out the organizational and personnel
a poorly performing mili- Russia’s poor performance does issues of the military and focus leader-
tary combined with an inability to shield remind us that it takes more than just ship attention and resources on fixing
his country from economic punishment. a lot of fancy systems to win a war them. A massive military reorganiza-
Both of these possibilities historically (though having more advanced sys- tion followed with moves such as reor-
have also been sources of apprehension tems and more of them surely would ganizing effective combat units to be
for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). have helped). The human element of smaller so that they can mobilize more

14
 ARGUMENTS
quickly and can remain self-sufficient know it. Granted, it’s hard to know taken against China. Further, China
for long periods of time. This means, whether some of the outlandish claims has demonstrated greater capacity to
in contrast with the Russian military, in the Chinese media are true—that the weather extended economic blows. This
the PLA will likely have less reliance PLA Air Force would actually “be able combination of features reduces the will-
on generals at the front lines. to take out the Ukrainian air force in ingness of the United States and others
China also established theater com- one hour.” But one thing is for certain: to enforce durable sanctions, a fact that
mands to facilitate joint operations and The Chinese military is learning lessons Beijing well appreciates.
prioritized realism in its military exer- from Ukraine—whether it is to stock- The CCP survived three decades of
cises to help it prepare for real combat. pile more precision-guided munitions, worse poverty than experienced by the
Part of all of this was Xi’s demand that ensure solid command and control, or Soviet Union at the time, a self-inflicted
the military communicate its failures cut off internet access to prevent the depression in 1989-90 paralleling in
and weaknesses so that they could be leaking of information to the West— some respects the events that ended
addressed. Moreover, to improve com- which will only serve to improve its war- the Soviet Union, the global financial
mand and control, China has moved fighting capability in the future. crisis, and another partly self-inflicted
toward engaging in multidomain joint Fear of sanctions could still have an economic wound via China’s determi-
operations all while standing up a impact. As tempting as it is to make nation to maintain its zero-COVID pol-
new joint operations center that will snap observations in the case of Russia’s icy in 2021-22.
ensure that, unlike with the Russian invasion, the impact of economic sanc- During more recent events, Beijing
military, orders will be communicated tions cannot be properly evaluated over has been able to mobilize first greater
and understood at the lowest levels. a short time period. The need for a lon- capital resources than Moscow and then
Indeed, the main reason that Xi has not ger time horizon also applies to Russia- far greater. In 2020, the World Bank put
yet made a play for Taiwan is likely his China economic comparisons, as it will China’s gross fixed capital formation
desire to hone this command and con- generally require more extensive and at 20 times Russia’s. Xi attacked some
trol structure and practice joint oper- more durable sanctions to deter or com- of China’s richest citizens, as well as
ations in realistic conditions for a few pel China than it would Russia. other elements of the private sector, in
more years—a cautious and pragmatic Russia is thought, at least, to be highly part because he believed them too inter-
approach that the situation in Ukraine vulnerable to the sanctions applied to twined with foreign capital. These were
only encourages further. date. And it is certainly the case that voluntary steps by China that mirror
The PLA itself acknowledges that it China can be harmed by sanctions. how the world currently seeks to pun-
still has some distance to go with train- Beijing is more integrated in global ish Russia. Whatever their wisdom, Xi
ing, particularly with regard to joint trade and finance than Moscow and knows China can afford them, while
operations, but it looks as if the hard thus has more to lose. But integration Russia’s capability is in doubt.
work is paying off. The complexity and cuts both ways—compared with Rus- Some Russian foreign reserves have
scale of China’s national military exer- sia, more countries would be harmed been effectively frozen and some finan-
cises are eye-opening. It takes a great to a greater extent by equivalent actions cials excluded from the SWIFT banking
deal of planning, synchronization, and
coordination to take service-level oper-
ations to the joint level. China appears
to have made great strides in this
area. The United States has observed,
for example, China executing deep-
attack air operations in its exercises
that have combined intelligence, sur-
ALBERTO BUZZOLA/LIGHTROCKET VIA GETTY IMAGES

veillance, and reconnaissance with

multidomain strike; lift for rapid mobil-
ity; and advanced fighter maneuvers.
Russia has relied heavily on artillery
and tanks, now and historically, while
the PLA is showing a more balanced
approach to combined arms operations.
A flag bearing Ukraine’s national colors and a white dove
The PLA is structurally superior to is waved in opposition to Russia’s invasion during a protest in front
the Russian military. And the Chinese of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, Taiwan, on May 8.

SUMMER 2022 15
system, limiting international transac- tonnage, Russia accounts for a bit over 1 implement both a stronger package of
tions. In the short term, these steps could percent of the world’s commercial fleet, actions aimed at China and also a sec-
have a similar impact on China, but they while China accounts for more than 11 ond package aimed at minimizing the
would be much harder to sustain. percent. Banning Chinese ships would long-term cost of the first. Q
Beijing has conducted currency cause seaborne trade to noticeably con-
swaps with dozens of countries that tract, hitting supply chains that would ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO is a nonresident
will want their yuan to be useful. China already be strained by the diversion of senior fellow at the American
also holds foreign government bonds in Chinese goods. Enterprise Institute, where DEREK
amounts that countries cannot ignore. Even an area of clear Russian advan- SCISSORS is a senior fellow.
U.S. Treasurys see the largest hold- tage—lower import dependence—is
ings, but there are also sizable quanti- double-edged. Inhibiting Chinese
ties of Japanese government bonds, for imports of iron ore or integrated circuits, CHINA BRIEF: FP’s James Palmer
instance. With official Chinese reserves for example, would hit the country hard. explains the political drivers behind
upwards of $3 trillion, perhaps five But China is such a huge purchaser the headlines in Beijing and shows you
times Russia’s, a partial freeze would that many producers would refuse to the stories the West has missed. Sign up
quickly wear on governments and firms join a sustained embargo against it. As for email newsletters at ForeignPolicy.
looking for bond buyers. elsewhere, the barriers to Russian com/briefings.
For any SWIFT restrictions that inter- imports adopted thus far could hurt
fere with outbound U.S. portfolio invest- China only in the unlikely event that
ment, that volume stood at $85 billion they are maintained for many months.
in Russia and $1.15 trillion in China in From how to remain in power to how
ASIA
2020. The stock of U.S. direct invest- to advance on the international stage,
ment was 10 times higher in China than militarily and economically, the CCP
Russia—companies willing to exit Rus- has been learning what not to do from
sia would face leaving a lot more behind the Soviet and then Russian experi-
in a China contingency. Most broadly, ence for decades. Chinese strategists
the yuan can erode the role of the dol- are unquestionably evaluating whether
lar; the ruble certainly cannot. Beijing the nature of warfare has changed or
lacks the will to allow free movement if they failed to consider some critical
of the yuan and make it a true reserve factors necessary for success. Chinese

Don’t Ignore
currency, but heavy, durable sanctions economists are certainly looking to
might change that. identify missed vulnerabilities based
On the goods side, existing pressure
to spare Russian vital exports would be
on how the economic dimension of the
war in Ukraine plays out—and will work India’s
more intense in China’s case. The loss of
Russian oil and gas exports of $230 bil-
to address them to prevent exploitation
by the United States and others. Delusions
lion in 2021 threatens energy markets. Not that it will all be easy for Beijing.
Chinese exports are at least as import- But China is already better prepared
ant within chemicals, textiles, house- than Russia, economically and militar-

L
hold appliances, industrial machinery, ily. The steps to support Ukraine and By Sushant Singh
and consumer electronics. Would they punish Russia are immediately less eaders have long relied on
all be exempted? potent in a China contingency. And an manufactured history to
Certain Russian exports, such as pal- unfortunate side effect of the tragedy in justify invasions. Russian
ladium, play supply chain roles beyond Ukraine is that China has a relatively President Vladimir Putin
their direct financial value. As expected low-cost opportunity to learn—it may denied the existence of
from its manufacturing and export vol- become a more formidable challenger an independent Ukrainian state in
umes, China’s supply chain participa- than it would’ve been otherwise. The his bid to take over the country and
tion is far larger than Russia’s, extending United States and its allies should real- restore Russia’s perceived greatness.
from inputs crucial to global pharmaceu- ize that their effectiveness with regard Chinese President Xi Jinping argues
ticals to processed rare earths crucial to to Russia is highly unlikely to translate. that China must recover what his party
clean-energy applications. Russian ships In a Taiwan contingency, the United sees as historical territory to overcome
have been banned from some ports. By States must be able to immediately its so-called century of humiliation.

16
 ARGUMENTS
Neither leader seems to care that Rus- “Hindu nation”—even if it remains a con- National Register of Citizens, raising
sia and China were never previously stitutional republic. This does not bode fears among Muslims that they could
politically contiguous states. well for India’s democratic values. Modi be denied citizenship. The same year,
Others around the world harbor sim- has often presented himself as a Hindu Modi’s government stripped Jammu
ilar irredentist dreams, and we ignore ruler, a shift accompanied by increased and Kashmir—India’s only Muslim-
these ambitions at our own peril. For violence against Muslims in India. majority state—of its autonomy, bring-
decades, India’s Rashtriya Swayamsevak Beyond India, this ideology could ing it under direct federal rule.
Sangh (RSS)—a Hindu-nationalist orga- also be dangerous for the region: It The idea of Akhand Bharat also shapes
nization with close links to the ruling is likely to breed further insecurity the current Indian government’s rela-
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—has put in nuclear-armed Pakistan and will tionship with its neighbors. Within India,
forward the idea of Akhand Bharat, or weaken India’s position against China, Modi refers to the country as Vishwa
“unbroken India.” The proposed entity its more powerful regional rival. Fur- Guru, or “teacher to the world”; right-
stretches from Afghanistan on India’s thermore, although the notion of a wing propaganda suggests that only he
western flank all the way to Myan- Hindu Rashtra may seem far-fetched can restore the greatness of Hindu India.
mar to the east of India, encompass- today, the same was said of Putin’s He has paid high-profile visits to temples
ing all of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tibet, expansionist ambitions until recently. in Bangladesh, Nepal, and elsewhere to
Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Mal- The very public desire of Hindu nation- suggest that those countries fall under
dives. Indian Prime Minister Naren- alists to create a new, unbroken India Hindutva’s umbrella. Under Modi, India
dra Modi himself has mentioned it: In could have global ripple effects—and has also selectively raised diplomatic
a 2012 interview, while chief minister of it must be taken seriously. objections about the ill treatment of Hin-
Gujarat, he argued that Akhand Bharat Although often assumed to undo the dus in neighboring countries; it pledged
referred to cultural unity. British partition of India in 1947, the idea to fast-track visas for Hindus and Sikhs
In April, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat of Akhand Bharat invokes an Indian from Afghanistan after the Taliban took
told a public gathering that India would kingdom from more than 2,000 years over last year.
become Akhand Bharat in 10 to 15 years, ago. An RSS textbook teaches that India Despite this narrative, most histori-
providing the first timeline for a Hindu- once included “Brahmadesh [Myanmar] ans figure that present-day India never
nationalist pipe dream. Besides heading and Bangladesh to the east, Pakistan and included Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal,
the RSS, Bhagwat is a very powerful fig- Afghanistan to the west, Tibet, Nepal Tibet, or Sri Lanka, even in ancient
ure in today’s India because of his per- and Bhutan to the north, and Sri Lanka times. The areas that did belong to
sonal relationship with Modi. The BJP is to the south.” The text uses its own San- India—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and
one of a few dozen institutions under the skritized names for oceans and seas, Pakistan—never fell under the same
direct control of the RSS. Modi was a full- ridding them of any perceived Islamic direct leader, except while under Brit-
time RSS campaigner before it assigned influence: The Bay of Bengal becomes ish colonial rule. Even then, the gov-
him to the BJP, and he considers Bhag- the Ganga Sagar (sea of the Ganges). ernment operated through numerous
wat’s late father to be a mentor. Indian An RSS publishing house produces a princely states with their own limited
corporate leaders and foreign diplomats map in which Afghanistan, Myanmar, sovereignties. To treat India as a much
recognize Bhagwat’s clout, visiting him Sri Lanka, and Tibet are also given new older political entity is a powerful act of
at RSS headquarters in Nagpur, India. names. This nomenclature dates at least revisionism. South Asia’s history is one
His words must be engaged with seri- to the 1960s, when the second RSS chief, of a multiplicity of kingdoms with rul-
ously, not dismissed offhand as the fan- M.S. Golwalkar, included it in his book. ers of various ethnicities who spoke dif-
tasies of an old man. Policies enacted by Modi’s govern- ferent languages. Their states occupied
The idea of Akhand Bharat is a core ment increasingly reflect this desired parts of present-day India, Pakistan,
tenet of Hindutva ideology, a century- political geography, which asserts that and Bangladesh—often concurrently.
old doctrine of Hindu nationalism. Now, Hindutva goes beyond India’s current Furthermore, India’s past is not one
with its own map and nomenclature, it borders. In 2019, India passed the Citi- of perpetual conflict along sharp reli-
is being taught to students in RSS-run zenship Amendment Act (CAA), which gious lines. Hindu leaders historically
schools. Modi’s government seems to selectively creates a path to citizenship employed Muslim generals to fight Mus-
assert that this political geography tran- for religious minorities—mainly Hin- lim rulers and vice versa. But by describ-
scends present-day borders. Its propo- dus—from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, ing India as having suffered under 1,200
nents imply that achieving Akhand and Pakistan and excludes Muslims. years of Muslim rule, as Modi did after
Bharat will come after India is refash- Indian Home Minister Amit Shah then his 2014 election, RSS ideologues argue
ioned as a de facto Hindu Rashtra, or linked the CAA criteria to a countrywide that India is a Hindu nation that must

SUMMER 2022 17
be restored to its supposed former glory. be either removed or finished, but India proclamations are bound to increase
This idea of a linear path to glorious will not stop. Now, a vehicle is on the insecurity in the region, breeding anger
Hindu rule ended by Muslim invaders move, which has an accelerator but no and hatred against India. Recent events
was, in fact, a British colonial construct brakes. No one should come in between. in Bangladesh could be a harbinger of
intended to divide and rule the region; If you want to, come and sit with us, or what’s to come: Last year, Modi visited
the RSS has lapped it up. stay at the station.” In another speech, Dhaka and was met with violence and
Hindu nationalists have deployed Bhagwat said if Hindus want to remain protests against his anti-Muslim policies,
their distortion of history to support Hindus, then India must be “unbroken.” leaving at least 12 people dead.
divisive policies and even violence Akhand Bharat has long been a part of The RSS has especially focused on
against India’s more than 200 million Hindu-nationalist ideology, connected Pakistan, with its leaders calling for
Muslims. This religious persecution to the core RSS principles of sangathan undoing the reality of partition. Such
has recently reached alarming levels. (organized unity) and shuddhi (purifi- rhetoric has contributed to the per-
Hindu-nationalist campaigns have cation of race). Local RSS units observe sistent animosity between the two
targeted Muslim Friday prayers, BJP Aug. 14—the day before India and Paki- neighbors, and it appears in Modi’s
leaders have conflated Muslims with stan became independent countries own embellished history. In 1999,
criminals in campaign speeches, and in 1947—as Akhand Bharat Sankalp then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Muslim students have been barred from Diwas (Pledge Day for an Unbroken Vajpayee visited the Minar-e-Pakistan
class for wearing headscarves. Follow- India). In 1948, Mohandas Gandhi’s monument in Lahore, Pakistan—where
ing communal violence targeting Mus- RSS-linked assassin, Nathuram Pakistan declared independence. It was
lim neighborhoods, authorities have Godse, told the jury during his trial that seen as a signal that the Hindutva ideo-
bulldozed houses, shops, and religious he killed Gandhi because he held him logues had accepted Pakistan’s exis-
structures—despite an order by India’s responsible for “the cursed vivisection tence. But Modi has now diminished
Supreme Court temporarily banning of India.” Before he was hanged, Godse Vajpayee’s narrative: When he claims
such demolitions. Modi has remained shouted, “Akhand Bharat amar rahe,” that nothing was achieved in the 70
silent on the matter, instead using or “Long live unbroken India.” years before his own premiership, Modi
a recent speech to demonize a 17th- Likewise, Bhagwat’s recent rhetoric does not exclude the late BJP leader.
century Mughal emperor. around achieving the goal of Akhand In any case, the idea that a nuclear-
Bhagwat has expressed satisfac- Bharat is troubling. “We will talk about armed Pakistan would somehow
tion with these recent events without nonviolence, but we will walk with a become part of a unified India—
naming them explicitly. Having already stick. And that stick will be a heavy one,” because Bhagwat’s followers wield a
declared India a Hindu Rashtra, he he said in his April speech. Small coun- heavy stick—is ridiculous. To include
recently described the country’s tra- tries in South Asia are already concerned Tibet in the equation is even more so,
jectory: “Those who want to stop it will about India’s hegemony; Bhagwat’s given that Chinese soldiers have denied
Indian patrols access to the disputed ter-
ritory in nearby Ladakh for nearly two
years. The relative difference in power
between India and China has only wid-
ened under Modi’s watch; a demand
that Tibet become part of Akhand
Bharat would certainly provoke Bei-
jing. Akhand Bharat propaganda could
further weaken India’s position in the
neighborhood, where China has suc-
cessfully challenged India’s influence
in countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal,
MONEY SHARMA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

A bulldozer
demolishes a and Sri Lanka.
structure during an Scholars of the RSS say that as a
anti-encroachment
drive led by North secretive organization, it hasn’t pub-
Delhi Municipal licized any official document related
Corp. in New to Akhand Bharat. Its contours must
Delhi’s Jahangirpuri
neighborhood be gleaned from speeches, books, or
on April 20. interviews from the organization’s top

18
 ARGUMENTS
leaders. Public communications from what the nature of this dangerous idea the outgoing president’s political for-
the RSS and the BJP also diverge on the portends for India and beyond. Q tunes and complicate the U.S. Repub-
issue: Akhand Bharat has, at times, been lican Party’s future.
described as a cultural entity, a political SUSHANT SINGH is a senior fellow at the A year and a half later, however, the
group with a single military and a com- Centre for Policy Research in New way Brazilians interpret that day and
mon president, a federation, or a polit- Delhi. its meaning has changed as the Repub-
ical monolith. By speaking in different lican Party—which failed to condemn
voices, RSS propaganda leaves enough Trump and now propagates an increas-
wiggle room for these leaders to escape SOUTH ASIA BRIEF: Michael Kugelman ingly revisionist narrative about the Jan.
uncomfortable questions while camou- writes a weekly digest of news and 6 events—looks set to take back control
flaging their actual idea. analysis from India and seven of the U.S. Congress in November’s mid-
But the devil lies in the details of RSS neighboring countries—a region that term elections. Guga Chacra, an influ-
rhetoric. Last February, Bhagwat said comprises one-fourth of the world’s ential Brazilian political commentator,
tensions between Afghanistan and Paki- population. Sign up for email newslet- flatly stated in an analysis this January
stan had arisen because they had been ters at ForeignPolicy.com/briefings. that “we were wrong” to assume Trump
separated from India, “the energy of life,” would be ostracized in the attacks’ after-
adding that “we are open to treat them as math, pointing out that “the Capitol inva-
our own as they were before.” Other RSS sion didn’t debilitate Trump.” This shift
ideologues have explained that refers to in perspective among Brazilians is but-
the period before Islam came to South AMERICAS tressed by the real possibility of Trump
Asia—a crafty way of saying that India’s returning to the White House in 2025.
neighbors should accept their Hindu Today, Trump’s decision to incite a
origins. At its core, the idea of Akhand violent mob to disrupt an electoral cer-
Bharat is not a confederation of sover- tification process no longer looks like a
eign states where all citizens are equal; high-risk gamble but one of several care-
it rejects the Westphalian state system fully planned steps to consolidate the
for a revanchist vision of an expansionist false narrative of a rigged election among
Hindu nation. That should be clear from his followers and maintain control of the
the track record of the RSS, which treats
India’s religious minorities poorly and Bolsonaro Republican Party. Indeed, while the Dem-
ocratic Party is currently in power at the

Has Been
appears hellbent on destroying India’s national level, Trump retains de facto
secular, democratic constitution. control of the Republican Party and its
No political leader would dare attempt
to carry out the RSS idea of a Hindu Watching agenda. On Feb. 4, the party declared the
Jan. 6, 2021, riots “legitimate political dis-
Rashtra today, but those blinded by
manufactured nostalgia and religious Trump course” and censured Reps. Liz Cheney
and Adam Kinzinger for taking part in
zeal will go to any extent to pursue what Congress’s inquiry into the attacks.
they see as a righteous cause. Sharing Taken as a whole, the remarkable suc-
the stage with Bhagwat in April, a Hindu cesses of Trump’s party in controlling the

A
saint said, “Undivided India is the dream By Oliver Stuenkel narrative surrounding Jan. 6 since his
of all in the country, and this dream will s millions of Brazilians tumultuous exit from the White House
certainly be realized during the tenure watched in disbelief the makes emulating his strategy seem all
of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.” If the live images of the U.S. the more attractive—and far less risky.
RSS did not control the levers of power Capitol insurrection on Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro
in India, these ideas could be dismissed Jan. 6, 2021, many com- is no doubt watching closely. Bolson-
as fantasies. But Bhagwat’s yearning mentators in the United States and Bra- aro has never hidden his authoritarian
to change the map comes with a cost. zil were quick to agree that then-U.S. ambitions and admiration for Trump,
Under Modi’s influence, India will suffer President Donald Trump had over- whom he described as his greatest
more bigotry and violence as its heritage played his hand. They believed the international ally. Ahead of the 2020
and democratic values are squandered attack—which failed to accomplish its U.S. presidential election, Bolsonaro
in the pursuit of Akhand Bharat. Instead objective of obstructing a democratic often expressed his hope that Trump
of ignoring it, the world must recognize transition of power—would damage would win reelection. This October, the

SUMMER 2022 19
“Trump of the Tropics,” as Bolsonaro to “[kill] all the police inside or the con- college, Bolsonaro and his supporters
is often called abroad, is headed into a gressmen they all hate.” also cannot bully lowly state officials into
presidential election of his own. But now, the second coming of submission to sow confusion about an
In addition to frequently embracing Trump’s party may lead Bolsonaro and electoral result’s legitimacy. Moreover,
Trump’s argument that the 2020 election his advisors to believe that rejecting the Brazilian president lacks firm con-
was rigged, Bolsonaro has eagerly pro- electoral results—even if futile where trol over a large national political party,
moted conspiracy theories about Brazil’s maintaining power is concerned—could which Trump has achieved. And Brazil’s
electoral system in recent years, leading provide him with long-term benefits, multiparty landscape may make it more
electoral officials to say they consider a including by helping to consolidate a difficult for Bolsonaro to monopolize his
challenge by Bolsonaro to the outcome core cadre of loyalists. After all, the fact influence among conservative voters.
of October’s vote “inevitable.” In partic- that the Republican Party today remains Still, if Bolsonaro loses October’s elec-
ular, Bolsonaro seeks to systematically in lockstep with Trump despite his 2020 tion and refuses to accept the result—
discredit electronic voting, which has electoral loss suggests Bolsonaro could which I believe to be the most likely
been used across Brazil since 1996. utilize his own “Stop the Steal” myth scenario—he may succeed in turning
Bolsonaro frequently argues without to prevent the emergence of rival pol- support for his narrative into a proxy
evidence that Brazil’s electoral system is iticians on the right, labeling anyone for patriotism in the eyes of his follow-
susceptible to fraud, calling for the rein- who accepts his opponent’s victory as ers. Erstwhile Bolsonaro allies in Brazil
troduction of paper ballots. After the a traitorous false conservative. who broke with him to position them-
Jan. 6 riots, Bolsonaro warned support- Put differently, Bolsonaro may now selves as center-right presidential can-
ers, “If we don’t have the ballot printed reason that even if he incites an armed didates are so far faring just as badly as
in 2022, a way to audit the votes, we’re revolt that ultimately fails to prevent Republicans who questioned Trump’s
going to have bigger problems than the transition of power after an elec- claim that the 2020 election was stolen.
the U.S.” Pro-Bolsonaro WhatsApp toral loss in October, doing so could still Both Sergio Moro, Bolsonaro’s former
and Telegram groups are rife with fear- be worth it. justice and public security minister, and
mongering about election fraud. Pollsters agree that Bolsonaro’s João Doria, the former governor of São
For Bolsonaro, the events of Jan. 6 chances of winning reelection in Octo- Paulo—whose views are comparable to
initially held more lessons of what to ber against his likely opponent, leftist those of the Republican Party’s moder-
avoid than what to emulate. To succeed former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ate wing—are currently stuck in a polit-
where Trump had not, the Brazilian pres- Lula da Silva, are relatively low. Sur- ical no man’s land, vilified by both the
ident would have to co-opt the armed veys show Lula, who governed Brazil left and Bolsonaro’s supporters. Despite
forces, further erode public trust in the from 2003 to 2010, well ahead of the Doria’s notable successes as governor—
electoral system, and mobilize a larger far-right incumbent. Yet despite the including taking the lead on vaccine
number of followers to act. Although Bolsonaro government’s numerous procurement while Bolsonaro embraced
all of these options seemed possible, woes—a pandemic response likened COVID-19 denialism—few Brazilians
they could have posed serious risks for to a “crime against humanity” by some supported his presidential bid, and he
Bolsonaro and his family, such as being Brazilian lawmakers and a sluggish eco- dropped out of the race in May.
prosecuted for sedition or losing control nomic recovery—polls have tightened Even without an insurrection, Bol-
over Brazil’s conservative camp. in recent months, and even Lula allies sonaro’s quest to undermine public trust
In the aftermath of Jan. 6, Bolsonaro’s publicly acknowledge that the presi- in the Brazilian electoral process poses
son Eduardo—a congressman—focused dent’s approval ratings are likely to a severe threat to the country’s democ-
on the attackers’ mistakes while presid- improve as public spending increases racy. Assuming he will cry fraud if he
ing over the Brazilian Chamber of Dep- ahead of the election. A narrow loss, loses in October, millions of Brazilians
uties’ Commission on Foreign Affairs then, would make Bolsonaro’s claims will not consider the president’s succes-
and National Defense. The younger of voter fraud seem more credible in sor legitimate. A poll conducted last year
Bolsonaro said that if the invaders had the eyes of supporters. confirms that the percentage of Brazil-
been better organized, “they would have Granted, Brazil’s electoral system is ians who share Bolsonaro’s concerns
taken the Capitol,” ominously adding different from the United States’. Unlike about electronic voting—seen by the
that if the rioters—described as “good the United States, Brazil has a Superior vast majority of specialists as baseless—
citizens” by Ernesto Araújo, Brazil’s for- Electoral Court, which concentrates the is on the rise, at more than 45 percent.
eign minister at the time—“would have authority to confirm electoral results What is particularly worrisome in
had a minimal war power … [none of and is less vulnerable to outside pres- this context—and what makes copying
them] would have died,” allowing them sure. Due to the absence of an electoral Trump’s strategy even more attractive to

20
 ARGUMENTS
Bolsonaro—is that parts of Brazil’s armed declaring a state of emergency should country, which worries many observers.
forces are eagerly embracing Bolsonaro’s protests break out. Some generals have Bolsonaro and his allies do not even
narrative about possible voter fraud and publicly criticized the president, yet need to study Trump’s strategy from
his call for electoral reform to reintro- generous budget increases and access to afar. Brazil has become a global bat-
duce paper ballots. Last year, Brazil’s power have ensured that most continue tleground for the proliferation of U.S.
then-defense minister, Gen. Walter to support Bolsonaro, who likes to refer alt-right values, and Trump strategists
Souza Braga Netto, reportedly told the to the military as “my armed forces.” and supporters such as Steve Bannon,
president of the Chamber of Deputies, There are currently more than 6,000 Jason Miller, and Mike Lindell have
Arthur Lira, that the Bolsonaro govern- members of the armed forces working established an ample dialogue with
ment would not allow the 2022 election in the Bolsonaro government, about the Bolsonaro administration.
to go ahead without the reform. The day half of whom are active duty, and some At an August 2021 symposium orga-
before Brazil’s National Congress voted are concerned that Lula could adopt a nized by Lindell and attended by Edu-
on the proposal—introduced by a Bol- “revanchist” posture vis-à-vis the armed ardo Bolsonaro, Bannon described
sonaro ally—the armed forces organized forces if elected. The former president’s Brazil’s upcoming presidential election
a military parade outside the legislature, attempts to reach out to the armed forces as the “second-most important election
a gesture largely understood as another have so far been unsuccessful. In Jan- in the world” (presumably after elections
thinly veiled threat. Refusing to be bul- uary, Lula commented that the armed in the United States) and predicted that
lied, lawmakers rejected the measures, forces would return to the barracks in Jair Bolsonaro would win unless the elec-
which experts believe would have sown his government—meaning, many would tion were “stolen.” Donald Trump Jr.,
the seeds of chaos on election day. lose their political appointments. who also attended the meeting remotely,
Brazil’s armed forces are unlikely to Just as in the United States, countless argued that Brazil provided “hope for the
support a classic self-coup that involves Bolsonaro supporters are thus suscep- conservative movement.”
surrounding the National Congress and tible to considering a violent post-elec- Although it’s tempting to focus on
the Supreme Federal Court with tanks. tion insurrection not as an attack on Brazil’s risk of experiencing its own Jan.
However, provided that the election is democracy but as a heroic attempt to 6 in the aftermath of its 2022 presiden-
close, a narrative about voter fraud sim- defend a righteous leader from a cor- tial election, the true lesson Bolsonaro
ilar to that promoted by Trump in the rupted system. In this context, Bolson- derives from Trump’s staying power is
United States may allow pro-Bolson- aro’s attempts to centralize power over that eroding democracy is a long-term
aro elements in the security forces to the military could be interpreted as set- effort, involving years of systematically
frame their support for the president ting the stage for a coordinated uprising sowing seeds that may produce tan-
as a defense of democratic order. This after the election, if needed. The Bra- gible results down the line. The spec-
may involve appealing the results in zilian president has also overseen the ter of a Trump-dominated Republican
court, asking for a rerun of the vote, or deregulation of gun ownership in the Party triumphing in November could
thus provide even greater inspiration
to Bolsonaro and other populists with
authoritarian tendencies than the 2016
election that brought Trump to power—
or even the 2021 insurrection that saw
him out. Q

OLIVER STUENKEL is an associate

professor of international relations
at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in
São Paulo.
MIGUEL SCHINCARIOL/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

LATIN AMERICA BRIEF: Catherine Osborn

in Rio de Janeiro traces the contours of
debates that shape the region’s future,
from geopolitics to business to human
A man takes part in a demonstration in support of Brazilian President rights. Sign up for email newsletters at
Jair Bolsonaro in São Paulo on Sept. 7, 2021, Brazil’s Independence Day. ForeignPolicy.com/briefings.

SUMMER 2022 21
Stop Private Oil
the energy needs of its allies in Europe, and making the United States depen-
and take action to mitigate global cli- dent on foreign oil.

Companies
mate change, all without causing neg- They claimed the United States could
ative economic repercussions. History be made self-sufficient—“energy inde-

From Dictating
suggests that expecting corporate actors pendent,” as it would later be known—
to meet public needs will not be suffi- provided the domestic industry received

Energy Policy
cient for tackling these problems—and sufficient support and prices stayed high
could even endanger U.S. national secu- enough to sustain investment in new
rity by subordinating it to the narrow production. What the independents
commercial interests of a single industry. wanted, in effect, was federal policy to
Throughout the 20th century, con- subsidize domestic drilling.

I
By Gregory Brew cerns over impending oil shortages fre- The federal government was pulled
n the wake of Russia’s invasion quently compelled U.S. policymakers in two directions. President Dwight D.
of Ukraine, concerns over energy to push U.S. oil companies to increase Eisenhower’s special energy commit-
security have surged. The price production at home and abroad. tee concluded that restricting imports
of crude oil soared past $120 per In the wake of World War I, as U.S. oil would be necessary “in the interest of
barrel, while the average price of production experienced a brief decline national defense,” since domestic pro-
a gallon of gasoline in the United States after years of high wartime demand, U.S. duction would be needed in the event
exceeded $4. Despite the looming threat officials encouraged private companies of a war against the Soviet Union, which
of climate change and the need to decar- to expand their activities. During World would likely make overseas oil unob-
bonize the economy, Sen. Joe Manchin War II, U.S. companies received backing tainable. But relying on domestic sup-
and other congressional lawmakers from the State Department to develop plies in the short term would drain U.S.
argue that the best way for Washington their holdings in the Middle East. To sup- reserves and leave Washington more
to address the current crisis is to increase port their operations, the U.S. Treasury vulnerable to outside pressure once
domestic oil and gas production. allowed the companies to deduct taxes domestic output was maximized. It
On the surface, that appears to make paid to Middle Eastern governments. would also harm consumers by keeping
sense. Fossil fuel production is inti- As a result of this public-private part- the price of oil at home artificially high.
mately linked to energy security—that nership, cheap oil flowed to the indus- The State Department was irate, com-
is, a nation’s ability to meet its energy trial West, fueling a postwar economic plaining that “domestic political pres-
needs with steady supplies at manage- boom. The State Department saw the sures” were now dictating foreign policy
able prices. The more oil a nation pro- companies as effective tools for further- “under the guise of a narrow concept of
duces, the less vulnerable it is to outside ing the national interest and strength- national security.”
supply shocks. ening energy security. But differing Ultimately, pressure from the com-
But unlike other major oil-producing commercial priorities among the com- panies won out. Eisenhower initiated
nations such as Saudi Arabia or large panies frequently produced conflict that voluntary import quotas in 1957. Rep-
consumers such as China, the United threatened national security or warped resentatives from the Independent
States depends on private companies— policy to serve commercial interests. Petroleum Association of America, a
rather than state-owned entities—to After World War II, the large “majors,” lobbying group for the smaller compa-
execute the exploration, production, such as Exxon, Mobil, and Chevron, nies, appeared before Congress in 1958
refining, transportation, and market- began importing oil from their cheap calling for mandatory quotas. Accepting
ing of its energy products. And unlike reserves in the Middle East. Smaller more imports, they argued, would dev-
those state-owned entities, which pur- U.S.-based oil companies, such as Sin- astate U.S. production and “lay the free
sue commercial opportunities in ser- clair Oil, Marathon, and Atlantic Rich- world helpless at Russia’s feet.” Eisen-
vice of national priorities, private oil field, sought protection from these hower made import quotas mandatory
companies are motivated only by profit. imports, which could outcompete oil the following year.
Although the partnership of public produced at home. Whether the companies could actu-
interest and private capital has worked to In the early 1950s, these “indepen- ally protect national security came
meet U.S. energy needs in the past, Wash- dents” lobbied Congress for an import under heavy scrutiny during the 1970s
ington’s traditional approach may not ban. Rather than make commercial energy crisis. As domestic consump-
be enough for its current dilemma. The arguments, the companies argued that tion increased, production declined,
United States faces a triple problem: how imports undermined national security and domestic reserves were drained.
to supply the country with energy, meet by hurting the domestic oil industry Eisenhower’s quotas had not kept the

22
 ARGUMENTS
industry competitive, and in 1973 they ensuring that producing states such as by 2030. Such supplies would require
were abandoned, facilitating a flood of Saudi Arabia continued to pump oil in increased investment in U.S. production.
imports to meet rising demand. That adequate quantities to guarantee accept- Like their predecessors in the 1950s,
October, major U.S. companies lost con- able prices back in the United States. however, private U.S. oil and gas compa-
trol of Middle Eastern oil fields as Arab Energy security now looked like dereg- nies are putting their commercial inter-
governments cut production and placed ulating energy at home while using the ests ahead of national security. Drilling
an embargo on the United States while U.S. military to secure it abroad. in the United States has been a perilous
raising the price of oil by 400 percent. While Washington spent decades business, with price collapses from 2015
The oil companies became deeply pursuing elusive energy-related goals to 2016 and again in 2020. The oil and
unpopular and were subjected to exten- in the Middle East—spending trillions gas industry is more interested in offer-
sive congressional investigations, where of dollars on wars while arming petro- ing stock buybacks and maximizing
powerful Democrats such as Sen. Henry states, with little apparent impact dividends, focusing on restoring prof-
M. Jackson accused them of price goug- on oil prices—high prices pushed itability and rewarding shareholders,
ing. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger domestic U.S. companies toward new rather than growing supply.
regarded oil company executives as extraction methods. In the so-called Industry leaders want unequivocal
“idiots” and preferred to forge closer shale revolution, private firms drove support from the federal government—
relationships with the king of Saudi a rapid recovery in U.S. oil production including looser environmental regula-
Arabia and the Shah of Iran. In 1973, through hydraulic fracturing and hori- tions and fewer restrictions on pipeline
President Richard Nixon called for gain- zontal drilling. Between 2010 and 2019, construction—before they’ll agree to
ing independence from oil by devel- U.S. oil production grew from 5.5 mil- invest in more production.
oping alternative energy sources and lion barrels per day to 12.3 million bar- As private companies make these
increasing efficiency; his successor, Ger- rels per day. Combined with natural demands, the Biden administration,
ald Ford, passed sweeping legislation gas liquids, the United States produced like its predecessors, is being pulled in
in late 1975 that created the Strategic enough oil in 2021 to become a net different directions. The Democratic
Petroleum Reserve and gave Washing- exporter for the first time since 1948. Party is committed to policies that com-
ton the power to intervene in oil mar- This new status as an energy exporter bat climate change. But high gas prices,
kets in an emergency. Public anger at has brought private companies back to the threat of a global supply crisis, and
the companies culminated in windfall the forefront of U.S. national security pressure from industry allies within the
profit taxes that cut into their earnings. thinking. As the European Union seeks party such as Manchin have pushed the
Yet at the same time, the embargo to end its decades-long dependence on administration toward a policy more
and the ever rising price of oil pushed Russian energy, the Biden administra- openly supportive of boosting domes-
policymakers to support proposals that tion wants to help fill the gap, pledging to tic production.
would boost domestic production, such increase shipments of liquefied natural Even after Russia’s invasion of
as expanding offshore drilling and open- gas to Europe by 15 billion cubic meters Ukraine, President Joe Biden has said
ing up Alaska’s North Slope. After years by the end of 2022, with the goal of 50 he hopes to reduce the United States’
of price controls that protected consum- billion additional cubic meters per year dependence on oil. A good first step is
ers from the global price shock, President the plan he announced on March 31 to
Jimmy Carter, a progressive Democrat, inject oil into the market via the Strate-
carried out the “decontrol” of oil prices in gic Petroleum Reserve while using the
1979. This policy allowed oil companies Defense Production Act to accelerate the
to charge more at the pump as an incen- development of batteries used in elec-
tive to invest in domestic exploration. tric cars and renewable energy systems.
While deregulating the oil industry at But the administration could go fur-
home, Carter laid the foundation for a ther by expanding its authority to over-
permanent U.S. military presence in the see energy development.
Middle East through the declaration of The most extreme course would be the
the Carter Doctrine and the creation of so-called public option put forward by
JOE RAEDLE/GETTY IMAGES

the Rapid Deployment Force (what would Sen. Jackson during the 1970s: in effect,
later become U.S. Central Command). nationalizing the oil and gas industry so
Carter’s policy and that of subsequent that it can better serve the public good.
administrations aimed at securing Mid- A pump jack casts a shadow as it Such action may be necessary if Wash-
pulls oil from the Permian Basin in
dle Eastern oil through military power, Odessa, Texas, on March 14. ington wants to avoid the worst effects

SUMMER 2022 23
of climate change, though it is certain greater fossil fuel production is ulti- development: the World Bank, which
to be unpopular with most Democrats mately conducive to U.S. security. Both provides loans and grants for develop-
and an absolute nonstarter for Republi- history and the encroaching threats of cli- ment projects, and the International
cans. However, Washington can still do mate change suggest this is a risky course Monetary Fund (IMF), which helps poor
much to encourage private investment for the United States to take. Instead of countries overcome currency crises and
along channels that meet the country’s allowing the oil and gas industry to dic- keep their finances stable.
real national security needs and not the tate energy policy, the United States Now, however, both institutions are
parochial views of fossil fuel executives. should take the initiative and define under pressure from their rich donor
If the Biden administration wants national security on its own terms. Q governments to sideline economic devel-
to augment oil production in the short opment and poverty reduction and shift
term, it could adopt a plan put forward GREGORY BREW is a postdoctoral fellow focus to reducing carbon emissions. In
by the advocacy organization Employ at Yale University’s Jackson Institute April, the IMF set up a Resilience and
America and use the Defense Produc- for Global Affairs. Sustainability Trust to help countries
tion Act and other methods to reduce oil tackle climate change, where support
price volatility by easing supply chain could be contingent on recipient coun-
bottlenecks, particularly for equipment tries’ plans to reduce emissions. Sim-
and raw materials needed to expand MIDDLE EAST ilarly, the World Bank has unveiled a
domestic production. climate action plan promising to align all
Limiting energy exports while expand- AND AFRICA future projects with the Paris Agreement.
ing waivers for the Jones Act—which Already, the World Bank has severely
would allow domestic producers to ship restricted investments in natural gas
energy products between U.S. cities projects, no longer funding exploration,
much more easily—and freeing domes- development, production, or transpor-
tic energy to meet domestic needs would tation of gas in the developing world.
strengthen energy security while still In their zeal to reach emissions tar-
allowing private companies to market gets, rich countries are conflating two

The World
their products. At the same time, tougher things, both of which are crucial to avoid
regulations on emissions, particularly the worst effects of climate change. Mit-
methane leaks at production sites and in
midstream operations, would help clean Bank Needs a igation—the reduction of emissions—
mostly needs to take place in rich and

New Approach
up U.S. fossil fuel production. middle-income countries, which are
Washington should also reduce fossil responsible for the vast majority of car-
fuel consumption by expanding fund-
ing for renewable energy. Biden’s now- on Africa bon emissions. Adaptation—improv-
ing resilience to a warming climate—is
stalled Build Back Better plan included lifesaving in poorer, more vulnerable
billions of dollars in support for clean countries. Adaptation requires invest-
energy, and there is currently lim- ments in better housing, transporta-
ited progress toward a new bipartisan By Vijaya Ramachandran tion, education, infrastructure, water

W
energy bill in the Senate that would and Arthur Baker management, agricultural technol-
include provisions supporting car- ith more than ogy, and other sectors. And it requires
bon capture technology and nuclear 3 billion people reducing poverty—so that more peo-
energy. Immediate cuts to consump- still living on ple have the resources to cope with
tion could be achieved by champion- less than $5.50 weather-related extremes. Until now,
ing efficiency measures such as heat a day, poverty these kinds of investments have been
pumps. The EU may soon require its reduction is central to human flour- the bread and butter of the World Bank
members to implement conservation ishing. It’s also key to preventing the and other development institutions. By
and efficiency measures to reduce its worst effects of climate change—people shifting development funding to emis-
dependence on Russian energy. The are much less vulnerable to climate sions reduction, they are taking money
United States should do the same while shocks if they aren’t poor. from the poor and making them less
helping NATO allies meet their needs That should be the main task of the resilient than they would otherwise be.
in the absence of Russian imports. two key multilateral institutions tasked The shift of focus from poverty
The current strategy assumes that with reducing poverty and promoting to climate is unjust, ineffective, and

24
 ARGUMENTS
disastrous for the world’s poor. It’s countries for adaptation. Nigerian Vice
unjust because rich countries are forcing President Yemi Osinbajo has eloquently
the World Bank and IMF to deprioritize described why a ban on financing of fos-
poverty reduction despite this mission sil fuels would be devastating for Africa.
being vital to protect developing coun- And in a TED Talk that has been viewed
tries from the climate shocks caused by 1.4 million times, Rose Mutiso, a Ken-
rich countries’ emissions. It’s ineffec- yan activist and scientist, said forcing
tive because poor countries make up emissions mitigation on the world’s poor
only a tiny fraction of global emissions— is widening economic inequality and
and their share will remain small, even equivalent to “energy apartheid.” She
if they grow rapidly using fossil fuels. Senegalese President Macky Sall shakes continued: “Working in global energy
And it will be a disaster for the 3 billion hands with Kristalina Georgieva, the and development, I often hear people
managing director of the International
people struggling to escape misery Monetary Fund, at a conference in say, ‘Because of climate, we just can’t
because every dollar spent on the new Diamniadio, Senegal, on Dec. 2, 2019. afford for everyone to live our lifestyles.’
carbon reduction mission is a dollar that That viewpoint is worse than patroniz-
could instead go into education, med- ing. It’s a form of racism, and it’s creat-
ical services, food security, and critical Prioritizing carbon mitigation over ing a two-tier global energy system, with
infrastructure. adaptation and poverty reduction in energy abundance for the rich and tiny
Rich countries—the majority share- low- and lower-middle-income countries solar lamps for Africans.”
holders of both agencies—are respon- stands the relationship between climate To address climate change, rich coun-
sible for pushing the shift away from change and development on its head. tries must cut their emissions while
poverty alleviation. The Biden admin- The basic fact is that the world’s poorest supporting the poorest countries to
istration states that the World Bank are also the least resilient to the effects of reduce poverty and become more resil-
should be at the forefront of cutting global warming. Rich countries, on the ient. To achieve this, poverty reduction
emissions and minimize support for other hand, have the resources to protect must remain central to the mission of
fossil fuels. Germany argues that the their citizens. Nothing illustrates this the World Bank and IMF. A coherent
climate co-benefits of development better than the rapid decline in deaths strategy on climate change would dif-
projects must be increased to at least from weather-related events—such as ferentiate among countries. The poor-
30 percent—a vague metric whose floods and storms—in developed coun- est countries eligible for concessional
meaning Berlin has not specified. Swe- tries. Such deaths have plummeted to financing should not be forced to pivot to
den wants the World Bank to take on a a tiny fraction of their historical levels emissions reduction to qualify for loans.
transformative role to align developing because citizens no longer live in slums Climate action in these countries should
countries with global temperature and and shacks, seas and rivers are largely focus on poverty reduction, increasing
net-zero targets. While most of these contained by well-engineered dikes, hos- energy access, and building resilience
proposals mention adaptation, they pitals have a reliable source of electric- through investments in housing, trans-
show little understanding that making ity, and emergency services are there portation, infrastructure, and agricul-
poor countries more resilient will entail when needed. If organizations ostensibly tural technology. Q
energy-intensive investments in hous- committed to development take funding
ing, transportation infrastructure, and from climate resilience and adaptation VIJAYA RAMACHANDRAN is the director
agricultural technology. Resilience also to spend on reducing carbon emissions, for energy and development at
goes hand in hand with economic devel- they will exacerbate the harms of climate the Breakthrough Institute. ARTHUR
opment and higher incomes, which in change for the world’s poor. BAKER is an associate director
turn require the availability of cheap, Developing countries are on the at the University of Chicago’s
reliable, and abundant energy. record rejecting these changes. By Development Innovation Lab.
The countries hit hardest by the new pushing climate mitigation on African
priorities will be the world’s poorest, countries, the West will “forestall Africa’s
SEYLLOU/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

which are eligible for highly conces- attempts to rise out of poverty,” Ugandan AFRICA BRIEF: Nosmot Gbadamosi
sional World Bank loans. Emissions President Yoweri Museveni warned last rounds up essential news and analysis
from these countries will remain very October. Malawian President Lazarus from Algeria to Zimbabwe and
low for decades to come, even if their Chakwera reminded rich countries that countries in between. Sign up for email
economies grow rapidly and without they are responsible for the climate cri- newsletters at ForeignPolicy.com/
action to reduce emissions. sis and must provide resources to poor briefings.

SUMMER 2022 25
BACK TO THE

FUTUREI S T H I S R E A L LY A N E W P E R I O D I N H I S T O R Y ?
BY DAVID A. BELL

NONCOMISSIONED OR SECONDARY CREDIT TK

26 Illustration by SEÑOR SALME

SUMMER 2022 27
E arlier this year, a student asked me how I thought
historians would characterize the period of
world history he believed had just begun with
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I couldn’t resist
replying: “I have no idea. I just hope they
won’t be calling it the ‘prewar period.’”

But are we, in fact, at the beginning of a new period in his-

tory? Many have been quick to affirm the idea. Even before
the invasion began, the Wall Street Journal columnist Gerard
Baker was opining that “the crisis over Ukraine … marks the
definitive end of the post-Cold War era.” And no sooner had
Russian forces crossed the Ukrainian border than the Brook-
ings Institution’s Daniel S. Hamilton agreed: “The post-Cold
War period has ended. A more fluid and disruptive era has
predictions it elicited on this occasion have, for the most part,
stood up quite well. But did 2020 really mark the start of a
new era? Today, with the initial shock having receded and
with COVID-19 possibly (hopefully) descending to the level
of an endemic but manageable disease, its world-changing
character seems at least somewhat less apparent.
Even moments of particularly massive, violent upheaval
do not necessarily constitute transition points between dis-
begun.” A few days later, the political scientist Sean Illing tinct eras. Adolf Hitler’s invasion of Poland on Sept. 1, 1939,
called the invasion a “world-historical event,” adding that might seem one such moment. But many historians argue
“the effects of it will likely ripple out for years to come.” All that World War II had a crucial prologue in the Spanish Civil
three were confident that one day, historians would begin War that began in 1936. Asian historians often date the start
new chapters in their textbooks with the year 2022. of the war to 1931 and Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. Some
Historians themselves, though, have never had a single, historians, including Princeton University’s Arno Mayer, have
obvious, agreed-on way of slicing up history into distinct seg- lumped together both world wars, and the years between
ments, and they quarrel endlessly about how to do so. Some them, as the “Second Thirty Years’ War.” The pie of history
speak of a “long 18th century” that stretches from 1688 to 1815 gets endlessly resliced.
and others of a “short 18th century” that runs only from 1715 It is the end of wars, and the collapse of regimes, that most
to 1789. Did the Middle Ages end with the Italian Renaissance reliably marks the end of an era. Historians frequently cite
in the 14th century or with European voyages of exploration British statesman Edward Grey’s remark, at the start of hos-
in the 15th? Or perhaps the Reformation in the 16th century? tilities in 1914, that “the lamps are going out all over Europe.”
Was there such a thing as a “Global Middle Ages,” or does But at the time, most Europeans expected what became World
that term impose a European concept on areas of the world War I to last no more than a few months and for it not to cause
unsuited for it? As long as historians disagree about the rela- regime change. It was the end of the war in 1917-18, and the
tive importance of different factors of historical change—i.e., collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and
forever—they will disagree about periodization. Russian empires, that—pace Mayer—marked the clear end
It’s worth remembering that it has been only two years of one era and the start of another. A similar point could be
since the start of another world crisis that many observers made about the end of the Cold War in 1989-91.
understandably thought had inaugurated a new era in world The end of the post-Cold War period is far harder to mea-
history. “The pandemic,” FOREIGN POLICY itself proclaimed sure. Indeed, it has already been proclaimed many times:
in March 2020, “will change the world forever.” The actual with the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999; with 9/11; with

28
 2001
The 9/11 attacks
and the end of the
post-Cold War period.
1931
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria 2020
—one pivotal prologue The COVID-19
to World War II. pandemic.

Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia; with Russia’s 2014 annex- emerge. Will the war in Ukraine degenerate into another frus-
ation of Crimea; with the election of Donald Trump as U.S. trating, low-level frozen conflict like so many others around
president. I would not be at all surprised if, 10 years from now, the world? Will it lead to new and even more destabilizing
following some new international horror, a fresh chorus of aggression by Russia? To nuclear war? Will it cause Putin’s fall
instant analysts declares it over yet again. Some periodiza- from power? At the end of 1991, we knew that whatever else the
tions are simply more convincing than others. Social scien- future held, the pre-1989 communist bloc would not be part
tists frequently call our current era one of “late capitalism,” of it. We don’t have even that degree of certainty about Putin’s
although that phrase has been in common use since at least invasion of Ukraine. Its outcome, still enormously unpredict-
the mid-1970s. But as capitalism has stubbornly refused to able, is what will ultimately determine whether it deserves to
end, they have no alternative. mark the end of an era—or something else entirely.
Of course, historians do need ways to organize their mate- The story used to be told that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai,
rial chronologically. The pie does need to be sliced. But pre- on being asked in the early 1970s about the meaning of the
mature expostulations about how a new era has started all French Revolution of 1789, replied: “It is too early to tell.”
too often amount to nothing but empty rhetorical gestures, It has since come to light that he was really talking about
reflecting what can only be called “Fukuyama envy.” (You, the French student revolts of 1968, but there is a reason the
too, can have your name forever attached to “the end of” story’s original version struck such a chord. It takes time—
something!) Worse, they flatter the egos of dictators like often a very long time—for the effects of an event to come
Vladimir Putin, who want nothing more than to be seen as into reasonable focus. And even then, historians will con-
world-historical figures, bending the course of human events tinue to produce competing interpretations, depending on
to their superhuman will. They also generally require attrib- the perspective they write from and the questions they ask.
uting to earlier periods a degree of stability that observers We should also remember that history all too often offers
at the time singularly failed to perceive. Calling the era that up unpleasant surprises. The coming year could be the year
supposedly began this February more fluid and disruptive of a plague that overshadows even COVID-19. It could be the
than the one that preceded it plays down the enormously year of a stock market crash and a second Great Depression.
disruptive effects attributed at the time, with reason, to the We could, in fact, currently be living in the “prewar period.”
breakup of Yugoslavia, to 9/11, to the Iraq War, to Trump’s Until we know for sure, we won’t know what to make of the
election, and to much else. past few months, either. Q
In the shock and horror that accompany events like the
invasion of Ukraine, it is easy to forget the obvious point that DAVID A. BELL is a professor of history at Princeton
observers most often can start to gauge the true significance of University and the author of, most recently, Men on
an event only once its long-term consequences have begun to Horseback: The Power of Charisma in the Age of Revolution.

SUMMER 2022 29
 On paper, the Soviet Union
A NEW IRON collapsed in one day.
In reality, it is still collapsing.
C U RTA I N BY M.E. SAROTTE

EARLY IN THE BLOCKBUSTER FILM Back to the Future, Dr. Emmett oneself in the throes of struggles seemingly past, of despair at
Brown, a wacky but lovable scientist who goes by “Doc,” slumps being robbed of a promising future: These feelings have once
to his death after an attacker pumps multiple bullets into his again dawned—not in comic Cold War-era fiction but tragic
chest at short range. This surprisingly violent moment disrupts post-Cold War reality. In the short space of time since Feb. 24,
what was, until then, an upbeat teen comedy released to enter- Russian President Vladimir Putin has catapulted the world
tain Americans during the Fourth of July holiday in 1985. Doc’s backward into a dangerous past, one characterized by local-
young protégé Marty McFly escapes the same gruesome death ized bloodshed under the shadow of potential global nuclear
only by fleeing in the scientist’s newly built time machine. As a confrontation. This dizzying dislocation induces many ques-
result, Marty unexpectedly finds himself stuck in a frightening tions: Why now? What’s coming next? And is there a way back?
past—without a way to get back to a future that had seemed so Putin himself has provided some partial justifications for
full of promise only moments before the murder. why he dragged Europe backward by amassing troops on
Sudden feelings of profound disruption, of panic at finding Ukraine’s border late in 2021 and then launching a major and

30 Illustrations by GEORGE WYLESOL

unspeakably brutal invasion. In his opinion—vehemently outpost once protesters showed up there as well. Seeking
rejected by Ukrainians—Moscow has an unlimited right to armed support, he called the Soviet military forces in Dres-
dominate Kyiv, thanks to the long, tangled histories of Rus- den. The person who answered the phone refused to grant
sians and Ukrainians. He needs to assert his domination now, Putin’s request, however, without explicit permission from
he claims, because of the way Ukraine and Russia’s other Moscow—and then added, “Moscow is silent.”
neighbors created threats on Russian borders by joining, or Putin decided to act on his own. He walked toward a
cooperating closely with, the European Union, NATO, or both. small crowd that had gathered at the front gate in what a
Among the many problems with Putin’s justifications, how- witness later described as a slow and calm manner. After
ever, is that they are not new. None of these developments a brief conversation during which the protesters were sur-
arose in late 2021 or early 2022. In other words, the Russian prised to hear his fluent German, he informed them that
president’s statements don’t answer the question, why now? if they entered, they would be shot.
The answer to that question lies instead in biography, both of The protesters paused, murmured, and decided to join their
Putin and of the Soviet Union, and they are closely intertwined. friends at the Stasi headquarters instead. Putin returned to the
house, where, according to his own account, he and his crew
PUTIN’S PAST ACTIONS SHOW that he considers the dates of sig- “destroyed everything,” burning “papers night and day” until
nificant events in his life—and in the life of the former Soviet “the furnace burst”—it was the final humiliating act of a man,
empire—as occasions meriting displays of violence. Although and an empire, in retreat. Soon thereafter, Putin carried out
the decision to shed blood on these dates is Putin’s personal his own personal retreat, from a collapsing East Germany to
choice, such emphasis on anniversaries is not unusual among a collapsing Soviet Union. He struggled to find a future and
Russian leaders. They routinely conduct parades and commis- was reduced, by his own admission, to working as a taxi driver.
sion artworks and installations to mark historical dates. World Throughout, the phrase “Moscow is silent” continued to
War II commemorations remain common nearly 80 years after haunt him and gave rise to a lasting personal conviction. As
that conflict ended. And while the significance of June 22 is he later put it, “Only one thing works in such circumstances—
often lost on Westerners, Russians rarely forget the Nazi inva- to go on the offensive. You must hit first and hit so hard that
sion of their country that took place on that day back in 1941. your opponent will not rise to his feet.” As he saw it, “We
Putin takes the observation of anniversaries and birthdays would have avoided a lot of problems if the Soviets had not
to gruesome new lows, however. The killing of the human made such a hasty exit from Eastern Europe.”
rights activist and journalist Anna Politkovskaya was achieved Political events inside the Soviet Union itself in the years
with a gunshot, likely fired by a professional, at close range on immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall were, in Putin’s
Oct. 7, 2006—Putin’s birthday. The leaking of emails hacked view, even more damaging. What he calls the “sovereignty
from the account of John Podesta, aimed at undermining parade” of 1991—the sequence of declarations of indepen-
the campaign of U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, dence by Soviet republics—had tragic results. These decla-
occurred on Oct. 7, 2016—Putin’s birthday a decade later. And rations meant that “millions of people went to bed in one
the large-scale cyber-interference in the 2016 U.S. presiden- country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming
tial election came the same year as the 25th anniversary of the ethnic minorities,” Putin said in a speech announcing Russia’s
Soviet Union’s collapse. Given that Putin has described that annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russians became, in his opin-
collapse as the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the previ- ion, “the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by
ous century, he was clearly not going let its 30th anniversary borders”—with the most painful division being the split
in December 2021 simply pass without comment. Instead, he between Russia and Ukraine after the latter’s December
spent it massing troops on the border with Ukraine. 1991 referendum on independence, which Ukrainians over-
Why does Putin care so much about this anniversary? whelmingly supported.
Because of the close links between the history of the Soviet As Robert Strauss, the U.S. ambassador to Moscow at the
Union’s collapse and of his personal humiliation during time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, advised Washington,
that era. To understand, it is necessary to go back to 1989 in “The most revolutionary event of 1991 for Russia may not be
what was then East Germany, where Putin was stationed at the collapse of communism but the loss of something Rus-
the KGB outpost in Dresden. When, after the Berlin Wall’s sians of all political stripes think of as part of their own body
unexpected opening on Nov. 9, peaceful protesters flooded politic and near to the heart at that: Ukraine.” The so-called
the nearby headquarters of the Stasi, the East German secret color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia in the 2000s exac-
police, Putin resolved not to let the same happen to his erbated Putin’s sense of grievance. The announcement by

SUMMER 2022 31
NATO in 2008 that both of those countries would become served in Germany alone—will become a reality once again.
members inspired Putin to turn to violence. As they once did in divided Germany, these troops will deepen
Russian troops essentially seized disputed regions of Geor- not just military but also cultural and personal connections
gia during a short war in 2008. Putin also began using force across the Atlantic, this time in places such as Poland and
against Ukraine in 2014—creating the fiction that Moscow Romania. And thanks to the ongoing decoupling of Russia
was not involved, however, by having troops without identi- from the Western world, there will once again be an Iron
fying markers, known colloquially as “little green men,” cross Curtain, although farther east, brushing much more of Russia’s
Ukrainian borders. He then escalated the violence to a new borders than the old one as it sweeps shut. The biggest change
level this February, this time employing the fiction that he will almost certainly be the addition of an 830-mile stretch of
needed to “denazify” the country. border between Russia and Finland, which will cause NATO’s
In short, to understand why Europe is at war now, it is essen- land border with Russia to more than double.
tial to understand that 2008, 2014, and 2022 are not separate There will be, as a result, a much longer front line with
incidents. Rather, they are links on a chain of events meant Russia on land; for that and other reasons, the new cold war
to undo what Putin sees as his and his country’s intertwined will not look exactly like the old one. New forms of cyber- and
histories of loss going back to 1989. space conflict will also add layers of complexity. But there
As the military analyst Michael Kofman has rightly put it, will be strong similarities, most notably in the biggest risk:
the Ukraine invasion is the latest in the wars of Soviet suc- nuclear war. It is therefore essential to relearn how Cold War
cession. These wars began in Chechnya in 1994 (and esca- deterrence helped prevent such an escalation in the past.
lated there in 1999), continued in Georgia and Ukraine, and This is a tricky balancing act. On the one hand, Putin is a
have now reached a new level. Put differently, even though thug who will go as far as allowed, so resistance—such as the
the Soviet Union collapsed on paper in one day, in reality it is astonishingly courageous and fierce kind offered by Ukraine—
still collapsing. Its component parts continue to go through is necessary. But, on the other, he often likes to talk about how
violent agonies as Moscow tries to claw back lost territory. a cornered rat will lash out. He would presumably do the same.
In awareness of this risk, the West must deter Russia without
THE MOST RECENT OF THESE WARS, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, is giving rise to escalation, as it did during the Cold War.
by far the most important because it is so much larger in scale This won’t be easy, not least because of Russian failures in
than any of the preceding conflicts. It has already reordered the early weeks of the 2022 war. Moscow’s hopes of swiftly
international relations profoundly and will continue to do so, seizing Kyiv and toppling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zel-
much like the 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea. A ensky proved delusional. Multiple retrenchments have now
saying emerged after the outbreak of that conflict: The Korean yielded a grinding land war for small pockets of territory in
War put the “O” in NATO. To be sure, the Atlantic alliance eastern Ukraine. Yet even the jaw-dropping courage of Ukrai-
already existed, having come into being with the 1949 Wash- nians cannot undo the reality that Americans and Europeans
ington Treaty. But the Korean War inspired that new alliance find themselves trapped in a past they’d hoped never to revisit.
to prepare for a similar invasion across Europe’s own main line Yet revisit it they must, because the sad reality is that there
of division, namely the one between East and West Germany. is no easy way back. Even if Putin decides tomorrow to cease
Putin’s 2022 attack is having a similarly catalytic effect. Just all military operations on what was Ukrainian territory prior
as the 1950 Korean invasion created a willingness among West- to 2014—an extremely unlikely development—Americans
ern Europeans to overcome their bitter memories of combat and Europeans will not, as a result, find themselves trans-
with Nazis and allow West Germans to become NATO allies, so ported back to the future they were expecting prior to Feb.
too has Russia’s war on Ukraine changed minds in profound 24. It would still not be possible to agree to some kind of
ways. Among other consequences, it has created a willingness settlement for Ukraine’s, or Europe’s, future as if the attack
for NATO’s further enlargement to countries that had long had never happened. Just as Marty discovers in Back to the
avoided such a move: Finland and Sweden. Turkey is, at the Future, Western leaders are now grasping that once you return
time of writing, blocking their accession, but Turkish objec- to the past, you inevitably change the future.
tions are more about extracting gains for Ankara than any- And just as it’s unlikely for Putin to change course, it’s also
thing else, and there is little doubt that the alliance will find a unlikely that someone who does want to change course will
way to address Turkey’s concerns and add two new members. come to power in Russia, as desirable as that may be from the
Moreover, extensive, long-term deployments of U.S. forces to Western point of view. While there is a precedent for such a
Europe—during the Cold War, more than 15 million Americans development—the rise of the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail

32
 1991
Ukraine declares independence
from the Soviet Union.

1989 2000s
The color revolutions in Georgia
The fall of the Berlin Wall. (above in 2003) and Ukraine.

Gorbachev—the very existence of that precedent makes the contacts in the hope of avoiding, at a minimum, dangerous
rise of another reformer less likely because of how Putin and miscalculations that might lead to a widening of the war.
other contemporary Russian leaders still regret the conse- If there is any silver lining to developments since Feb. 24,
quences of Gorbachev’s reforms. it is that the crisis in Ukraine has created a sense of cohe-
To understand the shadow cast by Gorbachev’s legacy, it’s sion inside the EU and NATO. Despite recent suggestions of
useful to consider Russia’s neighbor China. The Chinese Com- cracks in alliance unity, fundamentally there’s a new shared
munist Party paid close attention to the collapse of its fellow sense of the imperative to push back hard against what Putin
Communist Party in the Soviet Union. For years afterward, is doing. Even problematic member states and allies such
Beijing funded extensive research into, and distribution of as Hungary and Poland are acquiescing in workarounds to
the findings about, the causes of that collapse. enable measures such as an EU oil embargo.
Among other party outputs from this research is a kind As they push back in the short term, it’s important for West-
of training video, specifically for viewing by party officials. ern diplomats to maintain an awareness that Russia achieved
The goal of this video is to teach a new generation of Chi- democracy once and may be able to do so again. In other words,
nese leaders that the terrible Communist collapse ultimately when dealing with Russia now, keep in mind those who dis-
arose from Gorbachev’s misdeeds. The takeaway from the sent from Putin’s rule. They most certainly do not have the
training video is clear: Gorbachev was simultaneously stupid upper hand at present; for now, Bondarev is a lonely exception
and evil—and similar reformers must not come to power if in his public actions. Such people exist, nonetheless, and they
the current leadership is to survive. Presumably leaders in symbolize a better Russia, one that had admittedly imperfect
Moscow have the same view. In short, the fact that there was democratic governance within living memory—but in the
a Gorbachev in the past makes the likelihood of a new Gor- long term may be able to achieve it once again.
bachev coming to power in the future much lower. But, for now, dealing with the Russian leadership means
A period of prolonged hostility with Russia is now likely. dealing with precisely those individuals who ordered the
The sheer uncertainty about the scope of the current con- unspeakable slaughter in Bucha and elsewhere in Ukraine.
flict—will it go chemical, biological, or nuclear, as some of It is impossible to forget their violent and repressive actions,
Putin’s more hard-line advisors are reportedly urging—is but it is necessary to deal with them to avoid escalation—the
paralyzing. Eliminating that uncertainty, by doing every- classic Cold War conundrum.
thing possible to move away from violent conflict toward There’s no escaping the reality that, 30 years after the end
what will presumably be contentious but at least nonviolent of the Cold War, Moscow and Washington still control more
relations with Russia, is an urgent need. than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. The conflict
This won’t be straightforward. With the odd exception— in Ukraine raises the chance of their use, which is what West-
such as Boris Bondarev, a Russian diplomat in Geneva who ern countries need to reverse—because if there’s a nuclear
chose to resign rather than defend his country’s “warmonger- exchange, there will be no future to go back to at all. Q
ing, lies and hatred”—Moscow’s diplomats seem willing to
employ whatever rhetorical strategies their leaders prefer. For M.E. SAROTTE is the Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis
Western diplomats to have to sit and listen to them will be an distinguished professor of historical studies at the Johns
excruciating process—although nowhere near as excruciating Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. She
as what Ukrainians are suffering. But there is no way around is the author of, most recently, Not One Inch: America,
this process. The diplomats will need to focus on what remains Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate, on
of mutual benefit, such as resuming military-to-military which parts of this essay are based.

SUMMER 2022 33
 AT FIRST GLANCE, THE POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT may seem irrel-
evant in today’s increasingly polarized world. The Western
alliance is more united than since the Cold War, with even
Finland and Sweden abandoning neutrality to join NATO.
Other sharpening divides—between democracies and autoc-
racies, rich and poor—dominate international affairs and
contribute to the fragmentation of economies and polities.
Yet after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, nonalignment
has become an attractive option for countries in the global
south. Several states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have
displayed ambiguity toward the Western coalition, a reluc-
tance to endorse sanctions against Russia, and discomfort
with the idea of a new cold war. For these countries, the
existing order does not address their security needs, their
existential concerns about food and finances, or transna-
tional threats such as climate change.
The international system is in transition between orders.
The unipolar moment that followed the Cold War was pre-
dictable, but the rise of China and other countries in Asia
has redistributed economic power. The result is a globalized
world where the sole but reluctant military superpower oper-
ates in an economically multipolar context. In such uncer-
tain times, nonalignment—or, to use its more fashionable
contemporary name, strategic autonomy—attracts lead-
ers who see global polarization as harming their interests.
Nonalignment took shape as the world divided into two
competing blocs at the start of the Cold War. The global
order was shifting rapidly: The United States had just used
weapons of unprecedented mass destruction for the first
time, and freedom was in the air for the world’s colonized

THE majority. For newly independent India, Indonesia, Egypt,

Yugoslavia, and many other countries, joining neither
NATO nor the Warsaw Pact increased their bargaining

RETURN OF power with both blocs and limited their entanglement in

others’ quarrels.
India was one of the earliest advocates of nonalignment;
NONALIGNMENT it was a natural impulse to protect the freedom of deci-
sion-making that came with its independence in 1947. It
was also a realistic policy response, since neither NATO
Why a growing number of countries nor the Warsaw Pact was ready to meet India’s develop-
want to avoid getting stuck in ment or security concerns. Competition to prevent India
a great-power tussle—again. going over to one side or the other ultimately resulted in
some of its needs being addressed. Meanwhile, New Delhi
benefited by cooperating with countries from either bloc
BY SHIVSHANKAR MENON that showed congruence with Indian policies.
Nonalignment gained the most traction in the 1950s and
early 1960s, when the policy achieved major successes in
decolonization, disarmament, and fighting racism and
apartheid. The Bandung Conference, a meeting of Asian

34 Illustrations by GEORGE WYLESOL

and African countries held in Indonesia in 1955, included upgrading of Japan’s and South Korea’s roles in the U.S.
U.S. allies such as the Philippines and Iraq and Soviet allies alliance system, and the changing function of the Quadri-
such as China. In 1961, the policy was partially institution- lateral Security Dialogue all reflect a rebalanced effort to
alized in the Non-Aligned Movement, which today has 120 protect a rules-based and open Indo-Pacific region that is
member states and 20 observers. not dominated by any single power.
For Cold War crusaders such as John Foster Dulles, non- Whether this approach can coexist with or accommo-
alignment was immoral—an attitude that has echoes today date China’s ambitions seems doubtful. Judging by Bei-
in some U.S. commentary as well as hard-line Chinese opin- jing’s rhetoric and propaganda, the conflict in Ukraine and
ion. During the Cold War, the United States, as the stron- the Western reaction to it have only strengthened the Chi-
ger superpower, adopted a “with us or against us” attitude. nese Communist Party’s conviction that the United States
Even before the death of its leader Joseph Stalin, the weaker is determined to contain and prevent China’s rise. Strate-
Soviet Union instead quickly realized that cooperation with gic competition between the United States and China has
and co-option of the nonaligned countries were more pro- sharpened; other countries, reluctant to choose between
ductive than working against them. their major economic and security partners, are more likely
After the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and the U.S.-China to look for a third way and seek self-reliance. In any case,
rapprochement in the 1970s, the international context for China and the United States represent two of the biggest
nonalignment changed. The economic pressures of glo- trading partners for many countries—losing one or the
balization and a marked decline in the effectiveness of the other is simply not a viable option.
multilateral system—its primary area of focus—meant that Furthermore, Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted
nonalignment was less relevant to the immediate concerns the fraying of the international nonproliferation regime.
of its adherents and less capable of delivering real-world Moscow has made nuclear threats, leading to widespread
outcomes. Export-led growth and new alignments in Asia discussion about the possible use of nuclear weapons. The
replaced multilateral solutions. The end of the bipolar Cold invasion has exposed the ineffectiveness of the 1994 Buda-
War era cemented these trends; after 1991, some Indian pest Memorandum, in which Russia, the United States, and
thinkers even argued that the entire world was nonaligned. the United Kingdom pledged to respect Ukrainian territorial
Three decades later, the world again appears divided as integrity and sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine’s acces-
it was at the start of the Cold War, with local balances of sion to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and giving up
power shifting rapidly, particularly in Asia. This time, the nuclear weapons on its soil.
binary has appeared between the United States and the West When the international system is failing or absent, and
on one side and China and Russia on the other. But at the when it seems to be each country for itself, it is no surprise
same time, the reaction of most countries in Asia, Africa, that leaders turn to nonalignment. The more the United
and Latin America to the Russian attack on Ukraine sug- States, Russia, China, or other powers pressure other coun-
gests a basic disquiet at having to choose sides. tries to choose sides, the more those countries will be drawn to
Even regimes close to or dependent on Moscow or Wash- strategic autonomy, which could create a poorer and crueler
ington have balked at or resisted calls to vote a certain way world as countries reduce external dependence and consol-
or to join in condemnation of the other side. Several of idate their homefronts.
these states are preoccupied with the widespread debt cri- As long as countries see nonalignment as a logical com-
sis in developing countries, which the pandemic and the plement to such policies, it is likely to find new adherents.
war in Ukraine have only exacerbated, and by the overall How far governments and leaders take this logic will greatly
state of the world economy. The current world order—or influence our future. In the longer term, Russia’s war in
its absence—does not seem to address their interests, and Ukraine and the consolidation of the Western alliance today
they seek alternatives. could lead to a new incarnation of the ideas, approaches,
In Asia, the rise of China and a limited U.S. pushback have and policies pioneered by nonaligned countries more than
led countries on China’s maritime periphery to improve half a century ago. Q
their own capabilities and to begin unprecedented security
and intelligence cooperation with each other in the last 15 SHIVSHANKAR MENON is the chair of the Ashoka Centre for
years. The United States should welcome this development, China Studies, a visiting professor at Ashoka University,
which means more capable and willing partners to counter and a former national security advisor to Indian Prime
China. The transformation of U.S.-India security ties, the Minister Manmohan Singh.

SUMMER 2022 35
 IS NUCLEAR
ST I L L TA B O O ?
The world is starting to forget the realities of nuclear weapons.
BY NINA TANNENWALD

IN MARCH 1990, THE NEW YORKER PUBLISHED a cartoon by Jack the world’s two superpowers receded, and many hoped that
Ziegler that captured the optimism at the end of the Cold nuclear weapons, although they would still exist, would no
War. The cartoon shows an executive sitting at his desk as longer be central to international politics. Mikhail Gorbachev,
a worker enters the office carrying a large bomb with fins. the Soviet Union’s last leader, declared in June 1991 that “the
“Bring that H-bomb over here, will you, Tom, and just slip risk of a global nuclear war has practically disappeared.”
it into my ‘out’ box,” the executive says. “Sure thing, boss!” Today, more than 30 years later, nuclear bombs are back
the worker responds. in the inbox. Fear of nuclear war between the United States
The image of putting nuclear bombs “in the outbox” was and Russia has returned with a vengeance. As a result of
emblematic of the hope many had that a new era of coopera- Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine and Russian officials’
tion between the United States and the former Soviet Union alarming nuclear threats, the world is closer to the use of
was emerging. The fear of a nuclear war breaking out between nuclear weapons out of desperation—or by accident or

36 Illustration by SEÑOR SALME

miscalculation—than at any time since the early 1980s. the scare of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States and
The Russia-Ukraine war serves as a harsh reminder of the Soviet Union also pursued arms control agreements to
some old truths about nuclear weapons: There are limits help stabilize the “balance of terror.” These norms of nuclear
to the protection nuclear deterrence provides. (Usable con- restraint helped foster the now nearly 77-year tradition of
ventional weapons may get you more protection.) In a crisis, nonuse of nuclear weapons, the single-most important fea-
deterrence is vulnerable, not automatic and self-enforcing. ture of the nuclear age.
There is always the chance that it could fail. But today, most of these arms control agreements have been
In the first decades after World War II, many U.S. military torn up, and nuclear-armed states are once again engaged in
and political leaders, and much of the public, expected or costly arms races. We are in a period of nuclear excess rather
feared that nuclear weapons would be used again. Hiroshima than restraint. All of this brings us to the current moment and
and Nagasaki made the horrors of atomic bombings visible the big question suddenly on everyone’s minds: Do Russian
for all. The notion that nuclear war could happen at any leaders share the nuclear taboo? Would Russian President
moment permeated American society. Many Cold War-era Vladimir Putin use a nuclear weapon in the war in Ukraine?
buildings—including schools, airports, and even motels— He certainly wants the world—and in particular the United
were constructed with a fallout shelter in the basement. The States—to at least think he might. On the day he announced
instruction to “duck and cover” in the event of a nuclear the beginning of a “special military operation” in Ukraine,
attack (rather than run to a window to look out) became part Putin warned that any country that attempted to interfere
of U.S. civil defense drills that every U.S. citizen, including in the war would face “such consequences that you have
schoolchildren, was encouraged to practice. never experienced in your history,” which many took to be
Movies such as On the Beach (1959), a piece of post-apoca- a veiled nuclear threat. Other Russian officials have made
lyptic science fiction, depicted a world annihilated by nuclear similar statements over the course of the war.
war. Military strategists such as Herman Kahn, one of the his- So far, it is likely that these threats are more about deterring
torical inspirations for the madman title character of Stanley NATO than actual use. Russia has apparently not increased
Kubrick’s classic black comedy Dr. Strangelove, proselytized the alert levels of its nuclear forces but rather activated a
about “thinking the unthinkable”—the need to think about communications system that could transmit a launch order.
how we would fight and survive a nuclear war. Events such Russian officials are certainly aware that any use of nuclear
as the Cuban missile crisis made these fears palpably real. weapons would bring devastating consequences for Russia
For 13 days in October 1962, the world came the closest it and for Putin himself, including widespread condemna-
ever has to nuclear war. Many people at the time believed tion and global opprobrium. As Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s
the world was about to end in mushroom clouds. ambassador to the United States, claimed in early May, “It is
Yet, during the same period, norms of restraint devel- our country that in recent years has persistently proposed to
oped. A nuclear taboo—a normative inhibition against the American colleagues to affirm that there can be no winners
first use of nuclear weapons—emerged as the result of both in a nuclear war, thus it should never happen.” Still, the risk
strategic interests and moral concerns. A global grassroots that Putin would use a nuclear weapon is not zero, and the
anti-nuclear movement, along with nonnuclear states and longer the war goes on the more the risk goes up.
the United Nations, actively sought to stigmatize nuclear The United States and NATO have reciprocated neither
weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction. After the discourse of Russian officials (nuclear threats) nor the

1950-60s
Duck-and-cover drills
1962
The Cuban
in case of nuclear attack missile crisis.
(as practiced by New York
schoolchildren in 1963).

SUMMER 2022 37
claimed behavior (enhanced readiness of nuclear arsenals) because a small number of violations would likely destroy it.
but rather have funneled vast amounts of conventional Some might argue that the taboo and deterrence are robust
weapons to Ukraine while promising to pursue account- because no rational leader would see a benefit to starting a
ability for Russian war crimes. Despite scattered calls in the nuclear war. The prominent international relations realist
United States for the creation of a “no-fly zone” over some Kenneth Waltz, a proponent of nuclear deterrence, famously
or all of Ukraine, the Biden administration wisely resisted. wrote that nuclear weapons create “strong incentives to use
In practice, this would mean shooting down Russian planes them responsibly.” The problem is that, even if true some of
and risk igniting World War III. the time, this may not always be true. Not all leaders may be
Yet, as the war drags on, the United States may be sleep- rational or responsible. This view also overlooks the possibil-
walking into an expanded—and therefore more danger- ity that nuclear war could begin through accident, misper-
ous—war. Russia’s weak military performance has tempted ception, or miscalculation. In short, the nuclear taboo and
defense hawks and unrequited Cold Warriors to shift the deterrence are always at risk.
goals from simply helping to prevent Ukraine’s defeat to, Which brings us back to Putin. In 1999, Putin launched
as U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin suggested on April himself to power as Russia’s prime minister, overseeing
25, creating a “weakened” Russia. An alarming number of the country’s shockingly brutal second war in Chechnya.
foreign-policy commentators, including retired U.S. military Since then, Russia under Putin has shown itself willing to
officers and NATO supporters who should know better, have violate important international norms, including those
cavalierly urged the Biden administration to get much more against territorial conquest (Crimea, Ukraine) and against
aggressive in helping Ukraine or even pursue total victory, attacking civilian targets. Shredding the rules of war, the
despite the risk of nuclear escalation. Russian military has inflicted devastation and cruelty on
Using the war to reassert U.S. hegemony is a dangerous civilians in Chechnya, Syria, and now Ukraine. In Ukraine,
game. There is a whiff of nuclear forgetting in the air. One Russia shelled Europe’s largest nuclear power plant at Zapor-
reason the Cold War remained cold was that U.S. leaders rec- izhzhia, a reckless act that set part of the facility on fire.
ognized that confronting a nuclear-armed adversary imposes Such strikes risk nuclear disaster.
constraints on action. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary Russian officials have portrayed Ukraine’s national iden-
in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the United States refrained tity and existence as a threat to Russia and have employed
from responding with military force. Yet today there is an entire increasingly exterminationist language in their stated quest
generation (or more) of people for whom the scary realities to “denazify” Ukraine as well as to justify the war to the Rus-
of the Cold War and “duck and cover” are the stuff of history sian public. Coming on top of what appear to be appalling
books, rather than lived experience. As the historian Daniel Russian war crimes in the Ukrainian cities of Bucha, Kherson,
Immerwahr wrote recently, “This is the first decade when not Mariupol, and elsewhere, such talk raises the specter of geno-
a single head of a nuclear state can remember Hiroshima.” cide. Leaders who are willing to engage in genocide might
In making nuclear dangers vivid again, the Russia-Ukraine not feel many inhibitions about using a nuclear weapon.
war reminds us of not just the benefits but also the significant We do not know what is in Putin’s head, of course. But the
risks and limits of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence has likely worry is that if the war continues going badly for Russia, Putin
kept Russia from expanding the war to NATO countries such might reach for a tactical nuclear weapon—a low-yield bomb
as Poland and Romania. Russia’s nuclear arsenal has kept designed for use on the battlefield—out of frustration. While
NATO from intervening directly, but it has also failed to help smaller than the big city-razing strategic ones, they are still
Russia take or hold significant territory in Ukraine or compel tremendously destructive thermonuclear weapons with all
Kyiv to surrender. Most importantly, the war reminds us that the devastating effects of the Hiroshima bomb.
controlling escalation is a giant unknown. We have no idea The United States and Ukraine do not have identical inter-
what would happen if a nuclear weapon were actually used. ests in this war. While Russia’s aggression, protected by nuclear
The war also reminds us that norms are ultimately breakable. threats, must not pay, the United States has an obligation to
In the last few years, numerous norms that we once thought avoid a wider war that could increase the risk of direct U.S.-
were robust have been undermined. Norms of democracy are Russian confrontation. Of all the lessons of the past, the risk
under siege in the United States and elsewhere. Internationally, of nuclear war is one we forget only at our deepest peril. Q
states have eroded norms of territorial integrity, multilateral-
ism, arms control, and humanitarian law. The nuclear taboo, NINA TANNENWALD is a senior lecturer in political science at
while widely shared, is more fragile than other kinds of norms Brown University and the author of The Nuclear Taboo.

38
 THE ART OF
T H E A R M S R AC E
To avoid disaster, the United States must relearn crucial Cold War lessons.

BY HAL BRANDS

ARMS CONTROL IS DYING, and arms races are roaring back to new world will, in fact, be replete with challenges reminis-
life. Over the past two decades, key pillars of the superpower cent of an earlier era of rivalry. To avoid disaster, the United
arms control regime erected during the Cold War have col- States must relearn what it knew during the Cold War: how
lapsed, one by one: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Conven- to arms-race well.
tional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate-Range To be sure, arms races—in which two or more rivals com-
Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty. The most pete to secure a favorable military balance—have an awful
important U.S.-Russian agreement that remains, New START, reputation. At best, they are viewed as a mindless accumu-
may become a casualty of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s lation of weapons or the product of a sinister military-indus-
war in Ukraine. China, meanwhile, is rapidly building up its trial complex and, at worst, as a principal cause of spiraling
conventional and nuclear forces as part of a push for dominance tensions and cataclysmic war. “[T]he United States is piling
in the Pacific and beyond. Around the globe, emerging tech- up armaments which it well knows will never provide for its
nologies are promising dramatic advances in military power. ultimate safety,” U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower told
Welcome to a world primed for arms races—a world in his National Security Council in 1956, according to a memo
which tensions are sharp, the military balance is hotly con- of the meeting. “We are piling up these armaments because
tested, and there are ever fewer constraints on which kinds we do not know what else to do.”
and what quantity of weapons great powers can wield. This But arms-racing has unfairly gotten a bad name. As the

Illustration by SEÑOR SALME SUMMER 2022 39

geopolitical environment becomes nastier, it helps to take down the other side’s retaliatory barrage of missiles.) The
a more objective look. language of mutual assured destruction—the idea that no
As the United States’ sharpest Cold War thinkers under- one could win a nuclear arms race and that it was dangerous
stood, arms-racing is hardly mindless. Preserving a favor- to try—became pervasive. “We do not want a nuclear arms
able balance of power against an aggressive adversary is the race with the Soviet Union,” U.S. Defense Secretary Robert
best means of deterring war, not an incitement to it. An arms McNamara declared in a 1967 speech. “The action-reaction
race, moreover, is a deeply strategic interaction that can be phenomenon makes it foolish and futile.”
shaped through smart investments and tilted in one’s favor
over time. Arms control, finally, is properly seen not as an BUT IN REALITY, THINGS WEREN’T SO SIMPLE. “The armaments
alternative to arms-racing but as a vital component of a strat- race,” Eisenhower acknowledged to U.S. Secretary of State
egy for attaining a competitive edge. Today, the United States John Foster Dulles in 1957, “was a result rather than a cause”:
has a chance to thrive amid intensifying military rivalries— The superpowers armed themselves because they were ene-
but doing so will require Washington to reacquaint itself with mies, not vice versa. Winning the arms race—or at least not
the art of the arms race. losing it—was imperative: The threat of war, or simply of a
Western geopolitical collapse, would surely increase if an
ARMS RACES ARE TIMELESS, but the term became commonplace expansionist rival attained a decisive military edge. The
only in the early 20th century. New technologies, such as the shrewdest observers realized, moreover, that arms-racing
dreadnought battleship and the airplane, were creating the was not a foolish, robotic endeavor. It was a discipline that
potential for rapid shifts in the military balance. Intensifying rewarded creative thinking and strategic insight.
great-power tensions made the search for military superiority This more sophisticated U.S. approach to arms-racing was
more urgent. In the decades before World War I, for instance, epitomized by Andrew Marshall, a longtime defense intellec-
the competition between Britain and a rising Germany played tual who became the first director of the Office of Net Assess-
out in a feverish contest to build the most and best battleships. ment, the U.S. Defense Department’s in-house think tank that
Yet it was during the Cold War, with the advent of nuclear rigorously assessed the military balance. Marshall argued
weapons and the rise of strategic studies as an academic dis- that McNamara’s “action-reaction” model was too simplistic:
cipline, that our understanding of arms races really matured. Soviet and U.S. arms programs reflected historical legacies and
Scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington and Colin S. Gray bureaucratic biases as much as any tit-for-tat process. More
sharpened the definition of an arms race—essentially, an importantly, since Washington could not responsibly avoid
open-ended, back-and-forth contest in which rivals sought to a military competition with Moscow, it needed to shape that
dominate the military balance and reap the strategic rewards interaction to its advantage. “[T]he United States will have to
that followed. In government and academia, analysts studied outthink the Soviets,” Marshall wrote in 1972, since it could
the development of the U.S. and Soviet military arsenals and not “continue to outspend them substantially.” The key was
the degree to which moves by one side influenced moves by making Soviet costs rise and difficulties multiply by identify-
the other. Amid a long bipolar struggle for supremacy, the ing “areas of U.S. comparative advantage” and steering “the
intricacies of the superpower arms race became a veritable strategic arms competition into these areas.”
obsession for intellectuals and policymakers alike. Case in point was the U.S. strategic bomber program.
The U.S.-Soviet military competition, of course, soon Moscow, Marshall pointed out, had an exaggerated fear of
took on terrifying proportions. And as Moscow and Wash- aerial attack, because Adolf Hitler’s Luftwaffe had destroyed
ington each acquired the ability to destroy human civili- much of the Soviet air force on the ground in 1941. By build-
zation with nuclear weapons, “arms race” became a term ing even a modest bomber fleet, Washington could—and,
of opprobrium. The nuclear arms race was often seen as indeed, did—goad the Kremlin to invest heavily in air
an exercise in absurdity—a reminder of how the search for defenses, diverting resources from offensive capabilities
security could cause existential insecurity instead. more threatening to the West. And during the decisive final
The arms control pacts of the 1970s and later were, in part, decade of the Cold War, Marshall’s logic was pervasive: An
an effort to reduce this insecurity by capping the superpowers’ array of targeted U.S. military investments put great strain
nuclear arsenals and constraining those capabilities that were on the Soviet Union by negating plans and capabilities that
considered destabilizing, such as missile defense systems. Moscow had assembled at enormous cost.
(The theory was that one side might more readily consider The development of precision-guided munitions, low-flying
launching a nuclear first strike if it had the ability to shoot cruise missiles, and stealth aircraft upended the Soviet concept

40
 1950-60s
1906
The HMS Dreadnought ushers
In response to the U.S. strategic bomber
program, the Soviet Union invests in air defense
—including S-25 surface-to-air missiles
1980s
The United States leaps
in a naval arms race between deployed in a ring around Moscow. ahead in the development
Britain and Germany. of high-accuracy ICBMs.

of operations in Europe by giving the Pentagon the ability to will threaten NATO for years to come. China is following
wreak havoc deep in the enemy’s rear. The deployment of highly a similar playbook by developing power-projection capa-
accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), along bilities to coerce its neighbors, anti-access and area denial
with improved targeting capabilities, threatened Moscow’s capabilities to keep U.S. forces at a distance, and a growing
plan to keep its leaders alive during a nuclear war by sheltering nuclear arsenal to deter U.S. policymakers from interven-
them in a fantastically expensive bunker complex. U.S. Presi- ing in the first place. Russia and China have been arming
dent Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative—a plan for themselves to support their determined programs of geo-
a space-based missile shield—posed a potentially dire, if dis- political revisionism—and they have absorbed many les-
tant, peril to the efficacy of the land-based missile force Mos- sons about arms-racing the United States has forgotten.
cow had spent decades developing. U.S. defense programs, a For years, Beijing did not try to match Washington’s military
1982 Pentagon planning document stated, should “impose platform-for-platform. It invested in specific capabilities—
disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military anti-ship missiles, air defenses, and anti-satellite weapons,
competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment.” to name a few—that threaten the aircraft carriers, communi-
Contrary to most predictions, aggressive arms-racing actu- cations satellites, and regional bases the United States uses to
ally enabled historic arms control: Reagan’s strategic buildup project power worldwide. Beijing, in other words, has taken
gave Moscow an incentive to make deep, disproportionate Marshall’s advice to heart: It is forging a Chinese way of war
cuts in its arsenal of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and that could make the American way of war obsolete, much as
heavy ICBMs. It also put an economically and technologically Washington made Moscow’s way of war obsolete in the 1980s.
declining Soviet Union at such a steep competitive deficit that There isn’t much relief in sight. If current trends con-
its leaders eventually opted to sue for peace. “If we won’t budge tinue, Washington will confront not one but two nuclear
from the positions we’ve held for a long time, we will lose in peer challengers by decade’s end. Notwithstanding Russia’s
the end,” Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev conceded in 1986. losses in Ukraine, the balance of conventional forces along
“We will be drawn into an arms race that we cannot manage.” the Eurasian peripheries of the U.S. alliance system will be
For the United States, winning the superpower military com- fraught—if not unfavorable. As during the Cold War, a dan-
petition was a prerequisite to winning the larger Cold War. gerous military imbalance could tempt U.S. rivals to forci-
bly contest the status quo, or it could simply eat away at the
WASHINGTON’S APTITUDE FOR ARMSRACING declined after the foundation of confidence on which the U.S. alliance network
Cold War ended: The United States possessed such mili- rests. Preserving U.S. interests will once again require run-
tary dominance that it seemingly had less need for a cre- ning an arms race—and winning it.
ative, ruthless strategy. Yet that generous margin of safety Victory will be partially a matter of money. Even the most
is now gone, which means that Washington must master an brilliant brains cannot forever compensate for a dearth of dol-
old discipline anew. lars. The Pentagon will require greater defense spending to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marked the culmination of preserve a conventional edge vis-à-vis China and Russia simul-
a two-decade buildup of conventional and nuclear forces taneously. It will also need a larger nuclear arsenal to deter two
meant to allow Moscow to batter its neighbors while using nuclear peers rather than one. Major outlays may be necessary
the threat of nuclear escalation to hold Washington at to turn tantalizing technologies—artificial intelligence, quan-
bay. Russia’s military may have performed abominably in tum computing, synthetic biology—into real capabilities that
Ukraine, but its conventional and nuclear capabilities— can be fielded at scale. Military outlays equivalent to at least
paired with Putin’s increasingly aggressive behavior— 5 percent of GDP, as compared with the less than 3.5 percent

SUMMER 2022 41
CHINA
SECURITY
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
GEOPOLITICS
RUSSIA that the United States currently spends, will probably be the
minimum price of peace through this decade and beyond.
FOREIGN & PUBLIC DIPLOMACY But even if the money flows, Washington must also out-
CLIMATE CHANGE think its rivals in order to outperform them.

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA OUTTHINKING ONE’S RIVALS first requires not deceiving oneself.

EUROPE Arms control advocates sometimes argue that Washington

should unilaterally limit its own capabilities—whether the
MILITARY development of thermonuclear weapons in 1950 or military

POLITICS applications of AI today—in hopes that adversaries will do

likewise. This almost never works.
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT We now know that a U.S. decision to defer building the

AFRICA hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s would simply have allowed
the Soviet Union to build it first. When McNamara halted
IRAN the U.S. strategic buildup during the 1960s, Moscow raced
forward to claim a position of parity. “When we build, they
SOUTHEAST ASIA build. When we cut, they build,” U.S. Defense Secretary Har-
ECONOMICS old Brown quipped in 1979. The particular technologies
change, but the hard truth doesn’t: Securing restraint from
UNITED NATIONS an autocratic adversary typically requires demonstrating
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY that it can’t run an arms race unopposed.
Second, arms-racing effectively requires knowing the
NORTH KOREA enemy intimately. One of Marshall’s insights was that under-
HUMAN RIGHTS standing what made the Soviets tick was vital to throwing
them off balance. Similarly, there is no good way to make
INDIA decisions about present-day U.S. military programs without

SOUTH AMERICA grasping what Russia and China want, what they fear, and
how they intend to operate. There are, alas, no shortcuts:
During the Cold War, it took a generational investment in
Sovietology to get inside the enemy’s head.
This knowledge is so important because an arms race

Stay on top neither requires nor rewards competing equally every-

where. The United States doesn’t need to emulate every Chi-

of the most nese breakthrough in hypersonic weapons. These weapons

can’t provide, at a reasonable cost, the volume of firepower

important Washington would need in the Western Pacific. The Pen-

tagon also shouldn’t match the Kremlin’s vast short-range

foreign-policy nuclear arsenal: The United States simply needs enough

limited nuclear options to keep adversaries from feeling
emboldened to probe the space between U.S. conventional
news and analysis. forces and the strategic nuclear arsenal.
The better approach is to think asymmetrically—to use
distinct U.S. advantages to disrupt the enemy’s theory of vic-
Never miss a story tory and drive up its costs. The way to devalue China’s mili-
tary buildup vis-à-vis Taiwan, for example, is for Washington
with alerts. and its allies to exploit a key advantage: Defending a rugged
island surrounded by rough seas is far easier than conquering
it. They should do so by fielding overwhelming numbers of
anti-ship missiles, sea mines, unmanned aerial and underwater
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FOREIGNPOLICY.COM/NEWSALERTS

42
vehicles, and other cheap capabilities that can turn a cross- nology, advertising the ability to sink Soviet nuclear missile
strait invasion into a bloody nightmare for Chinese forces. submarines, dramatically revealing (and sometimes exagger-
Likewise, if Beijing wants to run an intermediate-range missile ating) the effects of precision-guided munitions—to manipu-
race, Washington can use its network of allies to turn a present late Moscow’s perceptions of the military balance. This time
Chinese advantage into a future liability. After all, U.S. inter- around, the United States may try to instill caution in Russia
mediate-range conventional missiles based on allied territory or China by demonstrating some sophisticated new capabil-
can easily reach the Chinese mainland, whereas Chinese inter- ity—or lure them into unrewarding areas by making them
mediate-range missiles cannot reach the United States. And fear some technological breakthrough that has not in fact
as China pours more money into aircraft carriers and other occurred. New technology creates new possibilities, with the
large vessels, Washington can hold a generation’s worth of cyber field particularly ripe for deception because the true
naval modernization at risk by maintaining its edge in under- balance of capabilities is so difficult to know.
sea warfare. By consistently challenging Beijing’s plans and All this implies a sharper, tenser competition. Yet a final
depreciating its capabilities, Washington can eventually force lesson from the past is that arms-racing can go hand in hand
Chinese leaders to question what an arms race will achieve. with arms control. Sometimes, the latter abets the former:
Here, a related rule is helpful: Don’t forget the defensive During the 1970s, Washington used the Anti-Ballistic Mis-
side of the arms race. Today, as in the past, arms control advo- sile Treaty to slow the defensive arms race until the United
cates often claim that ballistic missile defenses are destabiliz- States had recovered from the Vietnam War and was better
ing, or simply useless, because they can be beaten by cheap prepared to sprint ahead. And the former can also lead to the
countermeasures. Yet U.S. missile defenses are improving latter, as Reagan’s experience in the 1980s showed.
rapidly, while the use of directed energy weapons (such as Arms control is still a good idea: The extension of New
lasers) and other new technologies may soon mitigate prob- START in 2021 made sense from an arms-racing perspective
lems such as the high cost and limited quantity of interceptors. because Moscow is better positioned to build up its strategic
Fielding limited ballistic missile defenses against Russia and nuclear forces in the near term, even if it will struggle to out-
China—not just rogue states like North Korea—can complicate pace an economically superior United States over time. And
Moscow’s and Beijing’s doctrines of nuclear coercion, which building up to build down is still the right formula. Trilateral
envision using a small number of nuclear strikes to disrupt or agreements to limit intermediate-range missiles, strategic
deter U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. It can also push nuclear forces, or the potentially destabilizing applications
Russian and Chinese costs skyward by forcing them to invest of AI and other new technologies may eventually become
more in expensive, novel nuclear delivery vehicles—such possible—but it will very likely require the United States to
as a nuclear-armed submarine drone and other doomsday demonstrate first that an unconstrained arms race will leave
device-like weapons Putin has brandished—that can defeat its rivals poorer and more vulnerable in the end.
missile defenses only at a very high price.
Arms races, of course, have both qualitative and quan- “THE TERM ARMS RACE,” Gray wrote in FOREIGN POLICY’s
titative dimensions. That reminds us of another principle: Winter 1972-73 issue, “suggests hostility, danger and high
Numbers are not the only things that matter. The key U.S. taxes.” Yet running an arms race may be necessary to avoid
achievement in the 1980s was to leap ahead even in a situ- uglier outcomes, such as defeat in war or the gradual loss
ation of numerical parity. Revolutionary improvements in of influence that results from military inferiority. And the
the accuracy of U.S. ICBMs made Soviet officials fear for the rewards of arms-racing can be substantial if an intelligent
survival of their nuclear forces. While it’s clear that Washing- strategy forces a revisionist adversary to adjust its approach—
ton’s nuclear arsenal will need to grow in the coming years, and perhaps even reconsider its long-term objectives. High-
maintaining a favorable balance will equally require exploit- stakes military competitions are already raging today, and
ing U.S. advantages in missile accuracy, ISR (the intelligence, the United States badly needs to shape them. An arms race
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that provide is only futile if you lose. Q
unparalleled global awareness), and other qualitative factors.
Deterrence, though, is a state of mind: It hinges entirely on HAL BRANDS is the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished
what one side thinks the other can and will do. So U.S. policy- professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School
makers should remember that perception is as important of Advanced International Studies and author of, most
as reality. During the 1980s, the Pentagon used crafty infor- recently, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War
mational strategies—dribbling out news about stealth tech- Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry Today.

SUMMER 2022 43
 THE 1970S WEREN’T
W H A T YO U T H I N K
Today’s repertoire of economic policy is a distillation
of the traumatic experience of that decade, but its
results were far from unambiguous.
BY ADAM TOOZE

SOME HISTORICAL ANALOGIES ARE PLAYFUL. Some require elabo- the lesson not to allow aggregate demand, the money supply,
rate academic justification. Others are native to our world. or global trade to implode. Those lessons informed economic
The lessons learned from them are so ubiquitous as to be policy in response to the crises of 2008 and 2020.
part of our intellectual furniture. They are built into our very The other formative moment for economic policy is the
institutions. The European Union, for instance, repeatedly 1970s. It is barely an exaggeration to say that today’s reper-
invokes the need to avoid anything that resembles the vio- toire of day-to-day economic policy is a distillation of the
lent European politics of the first half of the 20th century. traumatic experience of that decade. Between 1971 and the
NATO abides as an organization dedicated to, in the words early 1980s, the postwar monetary order anchored on Bret-
of its first secretary-general, keeping “the Russians out, the ton Woods fell apart, currencies gyrated, inflation surged,
Americans in, and the Germans down”—all three impera- and so too did unemployment. The disorder was brought to
tives learned from the experience of the early 20th century. an end after 1979 by the application of an unprecedentedly
For economic policy, there are two such formative moments. severe dose of high interest rates, which precipitated a major
One is the Great Depression of the 1930s, from which we learned recession both in the United States and much of Europe.

44 Illustrations by GEORGE WYLESOL

 In the subsequent decades, avoiding a return to the 1970s checked on both sides of the Atlantic by a truly powerful coun-
was the idée fixe of economic policy. And it seemed to have tervailing force in the form of organized labor. That power
succeeded, so much so that in the aftermath of the unprece- sometimes expressed itself with disruptive strikes, but labor’s
dented economic shock of the COVID-19 pandemic in early fight was a losing battle. Particularly in the United States, real
2021 we seemed finally to be escaping the grip of this historical wages fell over the decade, driven down by automation and
analogy. But history is moving fast. Since last summer, infla- digital technology, competitive pressures from globalization,
tion has been back with a vengeance. And once again refer- and price increases. Nevertheless, the trade unions exercised a
ences to the 1970s are everywhere. Policymakers and pundits voice in economic policy to a degree barely imaginable today.
fret that having left it too late central banks may now have to The 1970s also saw a rebalancing of the world economy,
hike interest rates so high that we will tumble into a recession. which had long favored the former imperial powers over
At a superficial level, the analogy is striking. As in the recently decolonized raw material exporters. The OPEC oil
1970s, commodity markets are disrupted by a war. In early boycott was no doubt a shock but could be read as an over-
2022, prices in the United States were rising by more than 8 due correction of those fundamental imbalances.
percent per year. As in the 1970s, fiscal policy and monetary When we say that economic policymakers learned les-
policy seemed stuck for too long in expansionary mode. But sons from the 1970s, what we typically mean is that they
these similarities hide huge differences below the surface. are focused on a conservative interpretation of their own
To view the 1970s as a data set from which to draw techni- ostensible failures during that decade. The ’70s were a time
cal lessons is to mistake for a laboratory experiment what when many of the West’s economic and political elites
was, in fact, a historic power struggle. That power struggle sensed they were losing their grasp on control after having
ended with the conclusive victory of the forces of disinfla- failed to sufficiently discipline oppositional forces both at
tion. It could perhaps have gone another way. But, for bet- home and in the world at large.
ter and for worse, there is no way back. According to this version of events, complacent policy by
central bankers and politicians in the late 1960s and early
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1970S informs today’s mainstream 1970s in the form of low interest rates and undisciplined
view that it is important to act preemptively to forestall the spending compounded the problems created by economic
buildup of inflationary expectations. This is crucial because shocks such as the OPEC price hike of 1973. This is said to have
it is the expectation of future inflation among workers and set in motion runaway inflation. Politicians were cornered by
industries that drives wage and price increases, which in powerful interest groups—forces such as the British National
turn generate further inflation. To ensure that the central Union of Mineworkers, which effectively challenged and
bank acts promptly to stop an acceleration of the inflation- toppled a Conservative government in 1974. The Trilateral
ary cycle, it is important that control over monetary policy Commission, formed in 1973 as a discussion group for lead-
be handed to an independent central bank staffed by techno- ers from Japan, Western Europe, and North America, warned
crats of a broadly conservative disposition and not beholden in ominous tones that democracy was becoming ungovern-
to voters, as they may prefer to avoid the pain of disinflation. able. Expectations of welfare and consumption were set too
Of course, the history from which we learn lessons is itself high for the economy and politics to satisfy. What was at risk
a matter of interpretation and argument. And this raises the was nothing less than the viability of capitalist democracy.
question, were the 1970s really that bad? It was against this dark backdrop that the independent
As far as the U.S. economy and world economies are con- central bankers appeared in the role of saviors. In Europe, the
cerned, the main damage was confined to 1973-75. Otherwise, Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, anchored a conserva-
growth was somewhat better than in subsequent decades. In tive commitment to low inflation throughout the decade. In
many countries, the 1970s were a period of social advance. October 1979, the U.S. Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker,
Welfare states and welfare rights expanded. Even inflation nominated as chair by President Jimmy Carter, pivoted to a
created winners: Anyone who owned a home financed with tougher stance. Hiking the federal funds rate to 19 percent, he
a mortgage did well, as did taxpayers, who by the 1980s were squeezed inflation out of the system by making credit scarce.
shouldering a much lower real value of public debt. It was As Rudiger Dornbusch and other master thinkers of con-
in the 1970s that the debts accumulated during World War temporary economic policy liked to proclaim, the aim of the
II by Britain and the United States were finally burned off. game was not simply to stop inflation but to roll back politi-
The decade was also a last high of trade union power. It cal influence, to put an end to what Dornbusch dubbed “dem-
was the last moment in which capitalist democracy was still ocratic money.” In inflicting the savage shock of 1979-80,

SUMMER 2022 45
the Fed, according to the likes of Dornbusch, demonstrated that the eurozone anchored disinflation across the EU, making
it stood above interest groups and would not be swayed by pub- low inflation secured by the European Central Bank (ECB)
lic opinion. That description is self-serving. It would be more into a quasi-constitutional requirement. By the early 2000s,
accurate to say that central banks delivered for the constitu- Ben Bernanke, soon to take over at the Fed himself, could
ency of savers, business owners, and investors—none of whom quip that the Great Inflation of the 1970s had given way to a
liked inflation—as well as a swath of conservative political opin- new era of the Great Moderation—a characterization more
ion that wanted stability restored. Independent central banks apt for those earning median or low wages than it was for
were not truly above politics; they were the extension of con- those at the top of the income distribution, whose wealth and
servative politics by technocratic and nondemocratic means. incomes soared. In 2006, billionaire investor Warren Buf-
The economic results of this counterrevolution were far fett succinctly summarized the history of economic policy
from unambiguous. Growth in the early 1980s slumped. since the 1970s: “There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my
Entire industrial sectors were rendered uncompetitive by class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning.”
soaring interest rates and surging exchange rates. Unemploy-
ment hit postwar records. It was painful, but on the conser- THE COMPREHENSIVE VICTORY of the disinflationary forces was
vative reading there was, as British Prime Minister Margaret undeniable. But rather than loosening up, the conservative
Thatcher liked to say, no alternative. If the struggles of the vision of the 1970s was now endlessly repeated as a mantra.
1970s had continued, she suggested, the result would have Implicitly, the suggestion was that unless central bankers
been a slide toward ever more rapid inflation and threats to remained on guard, there would be a constant risk of sliding
the institutional status quo. Ultimately, the Cold War order back to the future. Central bank economists habitually pro-
was in peril, and if avoiding that fate required turning mone- duced exaggerated forecasts of inflation, helping to impart
tary policy into a more blunt-force form of political struggle, a restrictive bias to policy. In 2008, even as the banking sys-
then so be it. In fighting the mineworkers into submission tems of Europe and the United States were collapsing, cen-
in 1984-85, she was waging war on enemies within, as she tral bankers called for rate rises to counter the rising price of
waged war on the Soviet enemy without. The prize was noth- commodities and energy. In 2011, in the midst of the euro-
ing less than a permanent shift in the balance of social and zone crisis, the ECB convinced itself to raise interest rates
economic power and the exclusion of alternatives to the rule for fear of runaway inflation.
of private property and markets. It was only in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 30
The alternative that Thatcher wished to rule out was exem- years on from the 1970s, that the paradigm seemed finally to
plified in France by the Socialist government of President be shifting. The recovery from the 2008 crisis was painfully
François Mitterrand, elected in 1981 with the backing of the slow, especially in Europe. Despite huge expansion in central
French Communist Party, which embarked on a social and bank balance sheets, inflation remained well below the central
economic experiment that included the nationalization of bank upper limit of 2 percent. In Europe, inflationary expec-
industry and finance. Through a state-directed program, the tations threatened to slide into negative territory, signaling
French Socialists hoped to restore growth and tame inflation Japan-style long-term stagnation. In 2013, economist Larry
in cooperation with the trade unions. It would have been a Summers in a highly influential address to the International
gamble under any circumstances. The high interest rate policy Monetary Fund recast the new era as one not of repressed infla-
being driven by the Fed and the Bundesbank, and the appeal to tion but of secular stagnation. The risk was not that prices and
global investors of the market revolution, further lengthened wages would surge but that investment would be insufficient
the odds. In 1983, under huge pressure from bond markets, to sustain economic growth. Without artificial stimulus from
Mitterrand abandoned the fight. Thatcher’s slogan “There the central bank, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and
Is No Alternative” was not so much a statement of fact as a monetary stimulus, the economy would slide into a slump.
performative act—a claim designed to sideline alternatives The better alternative, according to Summers at the time, was
and to encourage the bond vigilantes who killed them dead. government-financed investment, a line with which many on
In both Europe and the United States, the labor movement the left since the 1970s could have agreed.
never recovered from the deflationary shock of 1979. Global- This was a radical reworking of the post-1970s script. And
ization, which gathered pace in the 1970s, put downward it seemed to be borne out by the data. Between 2013 and the
pressure on wages and prices. Japan’s long boom came to a 2020 COVID-19 shock, central banks talked repeatedly about
sudden stop in 1991 with the bursting of the real estate bub- the “normalization” of monetary policy, trying to remove the
ble. The following year in Europe, the agreement to create stimulus they had created, but every time they did so, they

46
 1973 1970-80s
Young people crowd a job
Vehicles line up for petrol
in the United Kingdom center in Milan during a period
during the OPEC price hike. of record unemployment.

risked upsetting financial markets and tipping the econ- are rising. This sets alarm bells ringing at the Fed and ECB
omy into recession. Meanwhile, rather than launching irre- headquarters in Washington and Frankfurt.
sponsible spending plans, as they were accused of doing in But if inflationary pressures are now spreading, the rea-
the standard 1970s scenario, politicians, at least in Europe, sons for this upward drift are telling. In 2021 and 2022, on
systematically opted for tight fiscal policy. Wage and price both sides of the Atlantic, two factors have counted. One is
pressure was muted at best. the cost of inputs—raw materials and energy. The other is
In 2021, in the wake of the COVID-19 shock, which threat- profit margins. Firms are taking advantage of the surge in
ened not inflation but a gigantic global recession, both the demand to reap whatever advantage they can. What is missing
ECB and the Fed adopted new and more permissive inflation is any sustained wage pressure. Wages in the United States
targets. The ECB proposed to target 2 percent inflation—no have risen. But they have not kept up with prices. Real wages
more but also no less. The Fed adopted average inflation tar- in early 2022 were below the upward trend they appeared
geting, which allowed it to tolerate periods of higher infla- to have been on before COVID-19 struck. In Europe, trade
tion if that was necessary to offset periods of undershoot. unions are beginning to make more significant claims. But
Finally bidding adieu to the 1970s, Fed Chair Jerome Powell there, too, wage growth has lagged behind prices.
told journalists that on his watch he did not expect to see the What the facile 1970s analogy ignores is the basic shift in
kind of inflation that had characterized his younger years. the balance of social forces. Whereas in the 1970s the response
That was in January 2021. And it was, it seemed, a his- to inflation was strikes and loud demands for welfare state
toric turning point. But more than a year later, the picture expansion, today the cost of living crisis is a matter of media
has entirely changed. Inflation has accelerated to levels not reporting, Twitter campaigns, and philanthropic concern,
seen in 40 years, and the 1970s analogy once again screams not social protest or a workers’ struggle. In 2022, the radical
from countless op-ed pages. energy of the early Biden administration has largely dissi-
pated. In Europe, to address the hardship of the worst-off
THE TRIGGER TO OUR CURRENT INFLATION, it is commonly agreed, faced with the energy price hike, politicians promise reme-
was the unprecedented dislocation created by the COVID-19 dies in the form of price-fixing for energy or increased welfare
shutdown. Supply chains were disrupted and demand and payments. But when it comes to changes that might perma-
supply thrown out of balance. Nevertheless, some similari- nently alter the balance of wage negotiations, such as wage
ties to the 1970s are undeniable. Then as now, energy prices indexation or measures to strengthen the bargaining posi-
are driving the surge in the inflation indices. Then as now, tion of trade unions, the “lessons of the 1970s” are readily
a war is disrupting supply. In 2021, fiscal and monetary pol- at hand. Such mechanisms, central bank economists warn,
icy helped stoke demand, as fiscal and monetary policy did risk unleashing a spiral of higher prices and higher wages,
in the early 1970s. so-called second-round effects.
The critical questions are the extent to which the first It is important, sage central bankers remind us, to recognize
round of rising energy and commodity prices will spread that the shift in the balance between supply and demand in
to broader categories of goods and whether the increase in energy markets means that consumers must learn to live with
prices will become self-sustaining. All eyes are on inflation less purchasing power. The less fuss they make, the easier the
expectations, the anchor that broke loose in the 1970s. So far eventual stabilization will be. After all, no one would want to
this year, medium-term expectations over the five-year time have to repeat the bitter medicine dispensed by Volcker in
horizon have hardly budged, but short-term expectations 1979. Some central bankers, such as Andrew Bailey of the Bank

SUMMER 2022 47
 of England, come straight out and demand that employees
should refrain from asking for any wage increase, implicitly
advocating a real wage cut at a time that profits are surging.
Power your Tellingly, neither the ECB nor the Fed has so far indulged
in talk that smacks so openly of Buffett’s class war. The 1970s
day with analogies have remained mainly in the realm of punditry.

Morning
Sensibly, what the two leading central banks are betting on
is that the disruption is transient, that the basic economic
conditions of recent decades still hold, and that they will be
able to pull off a soft landing with only mild monetary inter-

Brief
vention. After all, in the last half-century, the Volcker shock
is the only instance of inflation that was suppressed by the
force of a savage interest rate hike. As the Fed and the ECB
edge interest rates upward, they are hoping simply that mar-
kets will do their job, prices will ease, and wage growth will
cool. This would allow them to achieve stabilization with-
out either ongoing losses in real income for workers due to
inflation or, on the other side, a surge in unemployment
provoked by a slide into recession. They are not vying for
a counterrevolution of the 1980s variety because they are
hoping the original one is still in effect.
As central banks tread this narrow path, inflation hawks
continue to urge that the greater risk lies in accelerating
inflation. The evidence for that is frankly slim. Practically
all serious forecasts predict a calming of inflation in 2023.
And if this proves correct, if the central banks stick to their
guns and succeed in bringing inflation under control, per-
haps we can finally acknowledge that for better and for worse
history has moved on and that the old balanced constitution
of democratic capitalism that is thought of as falling into cri-
sis in the 1970s is gone for good. In the new constitutional
economic order, the countervailing power of labor has been
permanently diminished, and the freedom for technocratic
action has been enhanced.
That would mark a loss for democracy and should provoke
calls for both a rebalancing of economic power and a democ-
FP’s flagship daily ratization of economic policy. But in the current moment,

newsletter with what’s the crucial priority is to ensure that those in charge of policy
do not slam on the breaks too hard. And to do that, it would

coming up around be good if we can rid ourselves of the ghosts of the past. If
in the face of inflation rising toward 10 percent the central
the world today. bankers hold their nerve and manage to engineer a soft land-
ing, perhaps then we can finally bury the 1970s analogy and
its mistaken portrayal of history. Q

ADAM TOOZE is a professor of history and the director of the

SIGN UP AT European Institute at Columbia University, as well as a
FOREIGNPOLICY.COM/AM columnist at FOREIGN POLICY. He co-hosts Ones & Tooze,
FP’s economics podcast.
 LEARNING TO
R U L E O U R S E LV E S
The Indian anti-colonial movement is not an
analogy from the past. It’s where we actually are in history.

BY PRIYA SATIA

EVERY HISTORIAN WORTH THEIR SALT knows that historical and false equivalences through which we inherit the past so that
local specificities ultimately render all analogies inaccurate. we might make new history in the present. Despite their own
Yet people navigating times of great change and uncertainty inevitable inaccuracy, fresh analogies help uncover the darker
habitually seek reassurance from the past. In 1852, Karl Marx historical truths obscured by the more flattering comparisons
observed how revolutionaries “anxiously conjure up the spir- that enabled them. The question is not so much whether to anal-
its of the past … to present this new scene in world history ogize but whether the analogies we invoke serve ethical ends.
in time-honored disguise.” By helping to legitimize major Today, the world faces climate crisis, a pandemic, vast
change, historical analogies have played a key role in the very inequalities, war—a litany of troubles that makes our time
making of modern history, including its ugliest episodes: seem unprecedented but also profoundly continuous with
The Nazis defended their camps, for instance, by pointing the past: The climate crisis is a product of the accumulated
to British concentration camps in the South African War at pollutants of the industrial age, and inequalities are partly
the turn of the 20th century. Much of what has transpired in the legacies of the historical processes of slavery and colo-
history has been justified by reference to some precedent. nialism that were never redeemed. If our goal is to identify a
Making new comparisons thus helps shift the paradigms and propitious historical analogy that will help us cope with and

SUMMER 2022 49
overcome polluting industrialism, racist oppression, and vio- The idea that struggle is meaningful itself, regardless of
lence, we might look to the Indian noncooperation move- its effects, pushed back against European colonizers’ claims
ment that began in the 1920s—not as something done, over, that history is a story of progress in which evils such as colo-
in the past, but as an ongoing struggle that we might resume. nialism are sometimes necessary. To Gandhi, this vision of
The Indian struggle for independence from British rule history discounted the sustaining force of love that routinely
had begun much earlier, but tactics of nonviolent protest defuses would-be conflicts in a manner illegible to history.
burst on the scene under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi Nonviolence embraced such quotidian practices of love, cre-
from the 1920s to 1940s. Gandhi’s approach built on earlier ating new possibilities for the future by calling on humans
struggles in India and South Africa and was the product to be morally accountable exclusively in the present. Insofar
of a global intellectual history, including Jainism and Leo as it was about being ethical—and thus civilized—now, non-
Tolstoy’s Christian pacifism. In a series of mass movements, violence was the end in itself, not a means to some political
protesters engaged in tax resistance, marching, and boycot- end. It was self-rule (“swaraj”) in the most substantive form.
ting British educational institutions and British-manufac- “It is swaraj when we learn to rule ourselves,” Gandhi
tured cloth (in favor of local hand-spun cloth). Autonomy explained in 1909. “It is, therefore, in the palm of our hands.”
was achieved and proved through the very act of nonviolent Freedom might be attained instantly, entailing only refusal
refusal of British rule, whatever its consequences. In this to be ruled by another. Each person would thus “become
sense, it was fundamentally about redemption of the self. his own ruler,” he wrote in 1939; government itself would be
Among the movement’s actions that seized global atten- redundant. Such utopianism was necessary to meaningful
tion was the Salt March of 1930, when Gandhi and dozens of decolonization, he insisted: “To believe that what has not
followers set out on a 25-day, 240-mile march to protest the occurred in history will not occur at all is to argue disbelief in
British salt monopoly and extortionate salt tax. Tens of thou- the dignity of man.” Straining after the ideal mattered more
sands joined as Gandhi spoke to crowds along the way. On than arriving at it: “Let India live for this true picture, though
reaching Dandi on the Arabian Sea coast, Gandhi picked up never realizable in its completeness,” he affirmed in 1946.
a lump of salt-rich mud on the shore and declared the British For Gandhi, then, moral transformation at the level of the
law breached. Over the next several weeks, masses around self, more than the departure of the British, was the move-
the country violated the salt laws and other repressive laws. ment’s real goal. It meant recovery from the values of colo-
Hundreds of nonviolent protesters were beaten; more intense nialism: that material attainments (rather than ethical being)
British violence was checked by extensive international press were a measure of civilization, that evil might be justified by
coverage. Gandhi was among the 60,000 arrested by the end some future vindicating effect, that society thrived through
of 1930—but the following year, the British conceded his individual self-interest rather than the reciprocity of interests.
demand to participate in negotiations about India’s future. Such values were incompatible with planetary habitation:
The British departed India in 1947, but, to many, the strug- “God forbid that India should ever take to industrialism after
gle for decolonization remained unfulfilled, as the institu- the manner of the West,” Gandhi warned in 1928. “If an entire
tions and values the British had established remained intact. nation of 300 millions took to similar economic exploitation,
In the Gandhian vision, the mere transfer of power was not it would strip the world bare like locusts.”
decolonization, for the enemy was not the British but Brit- Given these goals, Gandhian noncooperation, or
ish civilization’s centering of material desire as the key to satyagraha, relied on boycotts and strikes against British
prosperity and progress. A regime in which white rulers economic dominance and unjust laws but also everyday
were simply replaced by brown ones would also have to be practices aimed at redeeming the mind and soul—walking,
resisted. It would remain, in Gandhi’s words, “foreign rule.” singing, fasting, and spinning yarn. Sacrifice, of conveniences
This warning that the struggle for decolonization had to or even life, for the sake of ethical action demanded by the
be permanent is the movement’s most compelling legacy present—as opposed to instrumental sacrifice in the name of
for our time. It emerged from an understanding, shared by some future purpose—was at its core. Satyagrahis’ willingness
other anti-colonial groups, that liberation—in the sense of a to endure deprivations, violent punishment, imprisonment,
recovery of our full humanity, not just political freedom—is and even death sought to awaken the suppressed humanity
something experienced in the course of common struggle. of their oppressors. The point was not to punish but to open
Man’s purpose, Gandhi’s contemporary the philosopher and themselves up to punishment to instigate the conversion, or
poet Muhammad Iqbal argued, is to remake oneself ethically decolonization, of their oppressors’ minds. As Faisal Devji, a
rather than to remake the world. historian at the University of Oxford, recently put it, Gandhian

50
 1960s
1930
Gandhi during
Black civil rights leaders in the United States,
including Martin Luther King Jr., draw inspiration
the Salt March in India. from Gandhi’s noncooperation movement.

noncooperation was “motivated by love for the opponent’s so that we don’t mistake our predicament as exceptional and
humanity, no matter how residual it might have become.” lose sight of it as part of a continual quarrel in which our life’s
Gandhi recognized that challenging the entrenched val- meaning is at stake. The Indian anti-colonial movement is
ues of colonialism was a formidable task. Though moral not an analogy from the past offering lessons but where we
transformation of the self was in the palm of one’s hand, actually are in history—trying to recover our humanity in
the power of colonial educational institutions propagating the face of state oppression and destructive materialism.
instrumental views of evil and centering consumption as Nor is it a story about another place, and so, irrelevant
the key to civilization meant that it would take time for to the United States. Descendants of the Indian and other
each individual to realize the need for it. anti-colonial struggles are there—U.S. Rep. Ro Khanna, for
one, frequently refers to his ancestors’ participation in the
MANY ANTICOLONIAL THINKERS perceived that empire’s Gandhian movement. Moreover, early Indian anti-colonial
shape-shifting capacity meant permanent anti-colo- activists drew inspiration from contemporary American
nial struggle, rather than a moment of decisive victory. anti-racist struggles. And precisely because the redemp-
Satyagraha—literally, insistence on truth—was necessary tive power of love is a universal value, the Gandhian move-
precisely because of the way empire was so easily normalized ment’s ideas and tactics also watered American struggles.
and obscured. Liberation would be experienced in, rather Black civil rights leaders met with Gandhi in the 1930s, and
than as a result of, that unresolved struggle. Colonialism Gandhian tactics profoundly influenced the postwar civil
valorized “a society of individuals where each person shuts rights struggle led by Martin Luther King Jr. and the anti-
himself up in his own subjectivity,” the Martiniquan phi- war and pro-environment movements that followed—whose
losopher Frantz Fanon wrote in The Wretched of the Earth descendants are among us, too. These movements are all
(1961), but human nature is essentially intersubjective, ours. The collective heritage of global struggles against
and the very forms of collective organization necessary to oppression is an American strength.
anti-colonial struggle allow the colonized to recover the kin- The past is not a series of self-contained moments behind
ship and solidarities that are integral to lived experience: us—pearls that we might squint at to find a reflection of our
“[T]he community triumphs and … spreads its own light.” times—but something everlasting in the way it structures the
In the wake of such anti-colonial movements and the world we inhabit. It’s time to join the salt march, to go beyond
horrors of World War II, many European philosophers, too, single-day rallies and endure the deprivations needed to seri-
recognized that history was not a narrative moving in a par- ously confront the military-industrial structures causing exis-
ticular direction but the unceasing flux of life through which tential climate crisis and rampant violence. As Americans
individuals strive to redemptively transcend their human- despair at their political institutions’ failure to alleviate the
ity—a continual quarrel between ethics and circumstances epidemic of mass shootings, it’s time to ask: What would hap-
that shapes the ends of each of our lives. pen if, during the school year, teachers launched a monthlong
This is a way of living in a state of constant aspiration, march to their state capitols to demand gun regulations and
aware that fulfillment of struggle lies in the struggle itself. Americans joined in their thousands along the way? Q
The search for analogies with this understanding of history is
not about tracing history’s direction or lamenting our failure PRIYA SATIA is the Raymond A. Spruance professor of
to learn from the past; it is about grasping human capacities international history at Stanford University.

SUMMER 2022 51
 THE
INTELLECTUAL
CATASTROPHE
OF
VLADIMIR
PUTIN
NONCOMISSIONED OR SECONDARY CREDIT TK

T H E M E A N I N G O F R U S S I A’ S WA R I N
U K R A I N E I S I T S O W N N AT I O N A L W E A K N E S S .
BY PAUL BERMAN

52 52
 V
ladimir Putin may have gone out Then it collapsed again. The second collapse, in the era of
of his mind, but it’s also possi- Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, was not as calamitous.
ble that he has merely gazed at Yet the empire disappeared, wars broke out along Russia’s
events through a peculiar and southern borders, the economy disintegrated, and life expec-
historical Russian lens and has tancy fell. This time, Putin led the recovery. In Chechnya, he
acted accordingly. To invade did it with a degree of thuggishness that qualifies him alone,
one’s neighbors is not, after among the belligerents in the current war, for an accusation
all, a novel thing for a Russian of something like genocide.
leader to do. It is a customary Yet Putin was no more able than Khrushchev or Brezhnev
thing. It is common sense. It is hoary tradition. But when to achieve the ultimate success, which would be the creation
Putin looks for an up-to-date rhetoric capable of explaining of a Russian state sufficiently sturdy and resilient to avoid
the whys of hoary tradition to himself or the world, he has any further collapses. He worries about this. Evidently, he
trouble coming up with anything. panics. And his worries have brought him to a version of the
He grasps at political rhetoric from times long gone. It dis- same fundamental view of the problem that one after another
integrates in his hands. He delivers speeches and discovers of his predecessors arrived at in times past.
that he is speechless or nearly so. This may have been the The view amounts to a species of climate paranoia. This
original setback, well before the military setbacks that have is a fear that the warm principles of liberal philosophy and
afflicted his army. It is not a psychological failure, then. It is a republican practices from the West, drifting eastward, will
philosophical failure. A suitable language of analysis eludes collide with the icy clouds of the Russian winter and vio-
him; therefore, lucidity eludes him. lent storms will break out and nothing will survive. It is, in
The problem that he is trying to solve is the eternal Rus- short, a belief that dangers to the Russian state are external
sian conundrum, the actual “riddle, wrapped in a mystery, and ideological, instead of internal and structural. The fear
inside an enigma” that Winston Churchill ascribed to Russia has a basis, too, and such collisions have taken place. The
(and could never define, though he considered that “national earliest example took a very crude form and was not at all
interest” offered a key). This is the conundrum of what to do characteristic of subsequent collisions. But it was traumatic.
about a very odd and dangerous imbalance in Russian life. Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Russia in 1812 crashed the
The imbalance consists of, on one side, the grandeur of French Revolution in a debased and dictatorial form into the
Russia’s civilization and its geography, which are massive frozen medievalism of the tsars. The collision of the French
strengths, and, on the other side, a strange and persistent Revolution and the tsars brought the French army to the
inability to construct a resilient and reliable state, which is embers of Moscow and the tsarist army to Paris.
a massive weakness. Russian leaders across the centuries But the characteristic collisions, the ones that have taken
have tried to cope with the imbalance by constructing the place repeatedly over the centuries, have always been philo-
most thuggish of tyrannies, in the hope that brutality would sophical, with military aspects confined to a Russian response.
compensate for the lack of resilience. And they have com- A decade after the tsarist army’s entrance into Paris, a circle
plemented the brutishness with a foreign policy not like any of Russian aristocrats adopted liberal ideas under influences
other country’s, which has seemed to do the trick. from the French Revolution and the American Revolution.

BRUTISHNESS AND AN UNUSUAL FOREIGN POLICY helped the Russian

state make it through the 19th century without collapsing,
which was an achievement. But twice in the 20th century, the
state collapsed. The first time, in 1917, led to the rise to power
of extremists and madmen and some of the worst disasters
of world history. Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev
returned the state to a stable condition.
NONCOMISSIONED OR SECONDARY CREDIT TK

SUMMER 2022 53
They conspired together on behalf of a new and liberal Rus- be a Nicholas I. In 1956, when communist Hungary decided
sia. They were arrested and exiled, and their enterprise was to explore some faintly liberal possibilities, Khrushchev
crushed. But the tsar at the time, Nicholas I, felt less than con- detected a mortal danger to the Russian state, and he did
fident of his victory over them. And he reacted by adopting what Nicholas I had done. He invaded Hungary. Brezhnev
a policy that would forever more protect the Russian state came to power. He turned out to be the same. A liberalizing
against such subversive danger. impulse took hold among the communist leaders of Czecho-
A new French revolution broke out in 1830, which sparked slovakia. And Brezhnev invaded. Those were the precedents
sympathetic and liberal stirrings here and there in Europe, for Putin’s small-scale invasion of a newly liberal and revolu-
notably in Poland. Nicholas I recognized that an upsurge of tionary Georgia in 2008 and his invasion of Crimea in revolu-
liberalism on the borders of his own country was destined tionary Ukraine in 2014. Every one of those invasions in the
to revive the conspiracies of the arrested and exiled liberal 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries was intended to preserve the
aristocrats. He responded by invading Poland, and for good Russian state by preventing a purely philosophical breeze of
measure he swallowed the Polish state into the tsarist empire. liberal thoughts and social experiments from wafting across
Still another revolution broke out in France in 1848, which the border. And the same reasoning has led to the most fero-
led to liberal and republican uprisings in yet more parts of cious invasion of all: the one going on right now in Ukraine.
Europe—very nearly a continental revolution, in plain indi-
cation that a new civilization was struggling to emerge in ONLY, PUTIN HAS RUN INTO A PROBLEM of language or rhetoric that
Europe, no longer royalist and feudal, no longer obedient to afflicted none of his predecessors. Nicholas I in the 1830s and
the dictates of whatever church might be locally in power, a ’40s knew exactly how to describe his own wars against the
new civilization of human rights and rational thought. But liberal ideas and movements of Central Europe. This was by
the new civilization was precisely what Nicholas I feared. He invoking the principles of a mystical and Orthodox royalism.
responded by invading Hungary. Those two invasions of his— He knew what he was for and what he was against. He was
the invasions of Poland and Hungary—were, from Nicholas I’s the champion of the true Christianity and sacred tradition,
point of view, wars of defense, which took the form of wars of and he was the enemy of satanic atheism, heresy, and rev-
aggression. They were “special military operations” designed olutionary disorder.
to inhibit the spread of subversive ideas into Russia by crushing His principles aroused a loathing among friends of the French
the revolutionary neighbors, with the added hope of stamp- and American revolutions. But they aroused respect and admi-
ing out the revolutionary inspiration in broader regions, too. ration among friends of royalism and order, who were, with
The wars were successful. The continental revolution of help from Nicholas I himself, dominant in Europe. His princi-
1848 went down to defeat continentally, and Nicholas I had ples were noble, solemn, grand, and deep. They were universal
a lot to do with it. He was dubbed the “gendarme of Europe.” principles of a sort, which made them worthy of the grandeur
And the tsarist state endured for another two or three gener- that is Russia—principles for the whole of humanity, with the
ations, until everything that he had feared finally did occur Russian monarchy and the Orthodox Church in the lead. They
and inspirations from the German Social Democrats and were living principles, grounded in realities of the era, even if
other liberal and revolutionary currents in the West pen- hidden behind smoke and incense, and they put the tsar and
etrated fatefully into his own Russia. That was in 1917. His his advisors in a position to think lucidly and strategically.
great-grandson, Nicholas II, was tsar. Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev likewise knew how
Down went the fragile Russian state. It reemerged as a com- to describe their wars against the liberals and subversives.
munist dictatorship. But the basic dynamic remained the same. This was by invoking the principles of communism. Those
Joseph Stalin’s view of liberal or liberalizing currents from the principles, too, were majestic and universal. They were prin-
West was identical to Nicholas I’s, even if Stalin’s vocabulary ciples of human progress, with Russia still in the lead—prin-
for expressing his worries was not a tsarist one. Stalin set out ciples for the entire world. The principles aroused support
to crush liberal or liberalizing inspirations in the Soviet Union. and admiration in every country where communist par-
But he set out to crush them also in Germany—which was ties were strong and sometimes among non-communists
an early goal of his Germany policy, aimed at destroying the who accepted the argument that Soviet invasions were anti-
Social Democrats more than the Nazis—and in Spain during fascist. In those ways, the communist principles were likewise
the Civil War there, where his policy aimed at destroying the grounded in the realities of their own era, and the grounding
non-communists of the Spanish left as much as or more than put the communist leaders in a position to make their own
the fascists. When World War II came to an end, Stalin set about strategic calculations in a spirt of lucidity and self-confidence.
crushing those same inspirations in every part of Europe that But what sort of philosophical doctrine can Putin claim? The
had fallen under his control. It is true that he was cracked. pro-Putin theoreticians ought to have worked up one for him,
But Khrushchev, who was not cracked, also turned out to something superb, capable of generating a language useful

54
Putin’s nationalism is a emerges as a national struggle of the Russians, who, in his
interpretation, include the Ukrainians, against the Poles. He
nationalism with an oddly tiny invokes the heroic 17th-century Cossack rebellion of Hetman
voice. It is a voice of resentment, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, though he discreetly chooses to leave
directed at the victors in the Cold unmentioned Khmelnytsky’s additional role as the leader of
War. It is the voice of a man whose some of the worst pogroms in history.
But there is nothing grand or noble in Putin’s nationalist
dignity has been offended. reading of the past. His invocation of church history implies
the greatness of Orthodox spirituality but does not seem to
for thinking about Russia’s situation in our own moment and reflect it, quite as if Orthodoxy were, for him, merely an after-
the eternal conundrum of the Russian state. But the theoreti- thought or an ornament. His nationalism resembles only in
cians have let him down. Perhaps the failure is not really their a surface way the sundry Romantic nationalisms of Europe
fault; a philosophical doctrine cannot be worked up at will, in the 19th century and the years leading up to World War
the way speechwriters work up speeches. Powerful doctrines I. Those nationalisms, the ones from the past, tended to be
exist or do not exist. The Eurasianist doctrine among Russian versions of universality in which each separate nationalism,
intellectuals, which purports to be powerful, has turned out in rebelling against the universalism of the Jacobin dicta-
to be, instead, a soup of anti-liberal inspirations of every kind tors or the multiethnic empires, claimed a special mission
from across the centuries, unto a nostalgic appreciation for for the whole of humanity.
Genghis Khan and the Mongol horde. And so Putin has had to But Putin’s nationalism claims no such special mission.
make do with whatever ideas are floating about, grabbing one It is a small nationalism instead of a grandiose one. It is a
idea and another and compiling them into a soup of his own. nationalism for a tiny country—a nationalism with an oddly
He has drawn almost nothing from communism, except for tiny voice, like the voice of Serbian nationalism in the 1990s
the hatred for Nazism that remains from World War II. He has ranting about events of the 14th century. It is, to be sure, an
put a lot of emphasis on his anti-Nazism, too, and his empha- angry voice but not in the deep and thunderous fashion of
sis accounts for a good deal of the support he has succeeded the communists. It is a voice of resentment, directed at the
in arousing among his Russian compatriots. But anti-Nazism victors in the Cold War. It is the voice of a man whose dig-
is not, in other respects, a strength of his doctrine. The role of nity has been offended. The aggressive encroachments of a
neo-Nazis in Ukraine in recent years has been a visible one, if triumphant NATO enrage him. He simmers.
only in the form of graffiti and occasional street demonstra- But his resentment, too, lacks grandeur. It lacks, in any
tions. But it has not been a major role or even a minor role. It case, an explanatory power. The tsars could explain why
has been minuscule, which means that Putin’s emphasis on Russia had aroused the enmity of the liberal and republi-
Ukrainian neo-Nazis, which is helpful for his popularity in can revolutionaries: It was because Russia stood for the true
Russia, also introduces a major distortion into his thinking. faith and the liberals and republicans were the enemies of
Here is a source of his deluded belief that large numbers of God. The communist leaders could likewise explain why the
Ukrainians, frightened by the neo-Nazis, would be grateful to Soviet Union had aroused its own enemies: It was because
see Russian tanks rolling through the streets. But nothing else the enemies of Soviet communism were the defenders of the
of communism survives in his thinking. On the contrary, he has capitalist class, and communism was capitalism’s undoing.
recalled with regret that official communist doctrines of the But Putin speaks of “Russophobia,” which means an irra-
past were encouraging of the autonomy of Ukraine instead of tional hatred, something inexplicable. Nor does he identify
encouraging a Ukrainian submission into the greater Russian an ultimate virtue in his resentment. The tsars believed that if
nation. Vladimir Lenin’s position on what used to be called only they could defeat the subversives and atheists, they could
the “national question” is not his own position. offer the true faith to humanity. The communists believed that
after defeating the capitalists and capitalism’s tool, the fas-
FROM THE MYSTICAL ROYALISM OF THE TSARS he has drawn, by con- cists, the liberation of the world was going to be at hand. But
trast, rather a lot. He has drawn a sense of ancient tradition, Putin’s resentment does not point to a shining future. It is a
which leads him to invoke the role of Kyiv in the founding backward-looking resentment without a forward-looking face.
of the Russian nation in the ninth century and the religious Here, then, is a Russian nationalism without anything in
wars of the 17th century between the Orthodox Church (the it to attract support from anyone else. I realize that here and
good guys) and the Roman Catholic Church (the bad guys). there around the world, people do support Putin in the pres-
Royalism is not a nationalism, but Putin has given to his own ent war. They do so because they harbor their own resent-
reading of the royal and religious past a nationalist interpre- ments of the United States and the wealthy countries. Or
tation, such that Orthodoxy’s struggle against Catholicism they do so because they retain a gratitude for Cold War help

SUMMER 2022 55
from the Soviet Union. There are Serbs who feel a brotherly obvious as not to need an explanation. Putin himself points to
connection. There are people who share Putin’s revulsion NATO’s eastward encroachments, slams his fist on the table,
at modern feminism and at the modern tolerance for sexual and leaves it at that, without laying out the basis of his objec-
minorities. Yet no one at all shares the idea that Ukraine’s tion. We are supposed to infer that NATO’s expansion poses
destruction will usher in a new and better era. a danger to Russia because someday, out of the blue, NATO
The doctrine does not offer hope. It offers hysteria. Putin armies might pour across the border into Russian territory
believes that under the supposed neo-Nazi leadership just as, in 1812, Napoleon’s army poured across the border.
that has taken over Ukraine, millions of Russians within Yet if we are to restrict the analysis to hard facts, as realism
Ukraine’s borders have become victims of a genocide. By advises us to do, we might recall that during its more than 70
“genocide,” he sometimes appears to mean that Russian years in existence, NATO has given not a single indication
speakers with an ethnic Russian identity are being forced that it is anything but a defensive alliance. There is no reason
to speak Ukrainian, which will deprive them of their iden- at all to suppose that one day NATO, which is anti-Napole-
tity—which is an implication in his 2021 essay “On the His- onic in principle, will turn Napoleonic in practice. NATO’s
torical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” Other times, he purpose in expanding eastward has been, instead, to stabi-
is content to leave intact the implication of mass slaughter. lize Europe and put an end to border disputes, which ought
Either way, he appears to have been singularly unpersua- to be in Russia’s interest, too.
sive on this important point. Nowhere on Earth has any- Still, it is unquestionable that NATO’s expansion has, even
one held a protest to denounce the genocide of millions of so, infuriated Putin, and it has frightened him. Only, why?
Russians in Ukraine. Why not? It is because Putin speaks in I think the answer is obvious. And it is obvious why no one
the tone of a man who does not even aspire to be believed, wants to say it aloud. The European revolutions that fright-
except by people who require no convincing. ened Nicholas I eventually did take place, in spite of his best
Still, he clings to his ideas. It suits him. He considers himself efforts. The liberal republics arose. And in 1949, the liberal
to be a cultured person who thinks in the loftiest manner— republics joined together quite as if they earnestly believed
someone who could not possibly invade another country with- that liberal and republican principles do make for a new civi-
out being able to invoke a magnificent philosophy. He does lization. And they protected their civilization with a military
seem to crave reassurance on this point, which is why, I imag- alliance, which was NATO. In that manner, the liberal repub-
ine, he has spent so many hours on the phone with Emman- lics produced a military alliance that contained within it a
uel Macron, the president of the motherland of intellectual spiritual idea, which was the beautifulness of the liberal and
prestige, which has always been France. But his attachment republican project. Here was the continental revolution of
to magnificent philosophies is the heart of the disaster. For 1848, successful at last and protected by a formidable shield.
how can a man think lucidly if he is awash in ideas as small And Putin sees the problem.
and ridiculous as those? He knows that real-world problems NATO’s eastward expansion infuriates and frightens him
and challenges beset him, but his imagination bubbles with because it stands in the way of the sound and conservative
resentments over medieval history, the religious wars and Russian foreign-policy tradition established by Nicholas I:
Cossack glories of the 17th century, the parallels between Pol- the policy of invading neighbors. Where NATO expands, Rus-
ish Catholicism of the past and NATO’s “Russophobia” today, sia can no longer invade, and the achievements of the liberal
and the dreadful fate of the Ukrainian Russians at the hands and republican revolution can no longer be undone—not by
of Western-encouraged neo-Nazis. And amid the bubbling the Russian army, anyway. Opposition to NATO expansion
resentments, the best that he can come up with is the foreign amounts, then, to an acceptance of Russian expansion. It
policy of Nicholas I from the 1830s and ’40s. is an acceptance of the very strange Russian expansionism
whose purpose has always been to impede the eastward
NOW, IT IS TRUE THAT FROM THE STANDPOINT of a traditional foreign- spread of the revolutionary concept.
policy realism, everything I have just recounted ought to be
dismissed as irrelevant. Realism is an ideology that stipulates
the insignificance of ideologies in favor of attending strictly
to power relations. This can mean only that Putin’s nation- NATO’s eastward expansion
alist maunderings are pretty much meaningless, except for infuriates and frightens Putin
the complaint about NATO and its aggressions, which is because it stands in the way of the
deemed not to be ideological. That one part should attract
the whole of our attention.
Russian foreign-policy tradition
But should it really? People who take seriously the complaint established by Nicholas I: the
about NATO always treat the danger to Russia as something so policy of invading neighbors.

56
The COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. The looming climate crisis. In a world
upended by disruptive international events,
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 But Putin does not say this, and neither does anyone else. appeal. Putin poisoned Navalny and then imprisoned him.
It is unsayable. Anyone who acknowledged an acceptance of Even so, a new revolution broke out, this time in Belarus.
the Russian policy of invading neighbors would be saying, Still more revolutionary leaders stepped forward. One of
in effect, that tens of millions of people on Russia’s borders them was Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in Minsk, who ran for
or in nearby countries should be subject to the most violent president in 2020 against Aleksandr Lukashenko, the old-
and murderous of oppressions for the simplest of reasons, school thug. She won—though Lukashenko succeeded in a
which is to spare the Russian people from contact with ideas “Stop the Steal” maneuver and declared himself the winner.
and beliefs that we ourselves believe to be the foundations Putin racked up another victory in his unending counter-
of a good society. So no one says it. Instead, the supposi- revolution, on a small scale. Tsikhanouskaya’s success at the
tion is allowed to linger that Russia is endangered by NATO polls terrified him, nonetheless.
because it faces the prospect of a Napoleonic invasion. Real- And Putin was terrified by the emergence of Zelensky,
ism, in short, is a principle of intellectual fog that claims to who might have seemed, at first glance, a nonentity, a mere
be a principle of intellectual lucidity. television comedian, a politician with a reassuringly accom-
modationist program. But the transcript of Zelensky’s phone
WHY, FINALLY, HAS PUTIN INVADED UKRAINE? It is not because of call with then-U.S. President Donald Trump showed that
NATO aggression. And it is not because of events in ninth- Zelensky was not, in fact, a pushover. Putin saw that Zelen-
century Kyiv and the Orthodox-Catholic wars of the 17th sky was pleading for arms. The transcript of that phone call
century. It is not because Ukraine under President Volody- might even have given him the sense that Zelensky was one
myr Zelensky has gone neo-Nazi. Putin has invaded because more heroic figure in the mold of the people he had already
of Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan Revolution. The Maidan Revolu- assassinated, poisoned, imprisoned, or overthrown—some-
tion was a facsimile of the revolutions of 1848 precisely—a one unyielding, therefore dangerous.
classic European uprising animated by the same liberal and He concluded that Ukraine’s revolution was destined to
republican ideas as in 1848, with the same student idealism spread to Moscow and St. Petersburg, if not this year, then next
and the same romantic flourishes and even the same street year. So he consulted with the ghosts of Brezhnev, Khrushchev,
barricades, except made of rubber tires instead of wood. and Stalin, who referred him to the master thinker, Nicholas
I know this because I am a student of revolutions and I I. And Nicholas I told Putin that if he failed to invade Ukraine,
have seen revolutionary uprisings repeatedly on different the Russian state would collapse. It was life or death.
continents. I saw the Maidan Revolution and felt the revo- Putin might have responded to this advice by coming up
lutionary electricity in the air—and so did Putin from afar. with a project to move Russia in a democratic direction and
The Maidan Revolution was everything that Nicholas I set preserve the stability of Russia at the same time. He might
out to oppose back in 1848. It was dynamic, passionate, and have chosen to see in Ukraine the proof that Russian peo-
capable of arousing the sympathies of vast numbers of peo- ple are, in fact, capable of creating a liberal republic—given
ple. Ultimately, the Maidan Revolution was superior to the that he believes Ukrainians are a subset of the Russian peo-
revolutions of 1848. It did not result in outbreaks of crazy ple. He might have taken Ukraine as a model, instead of an
utopias, demagogy, programs of extermination, or chaos. enemy—a model for how to construct the resilient state that
It was a moderate revolution in favor of a moderate Russia has always needed.
Ukraine—a revolution that offered a viable future for the But he lacks the categories of analysis that might allow
country and, in doing so, offered new possibilities to Ukraine’s him to think along those lines. His nationalist doctrine does
neighbors, too. And it did not fail, unlike the revolutions not look into the future, except to see disasters looming.
of 1848. So Putin was terrified. He responded by annexing His doctrine looks into the past. So he gazed into the 19th
Crimea and stirring up his wars in the breakaway territories century, and he yielded to its allure, the way that someone
of eastern Ukraine, in the hope that he could inflict a few might yield to the allure of the bottle or the tomb. Down
dents on the country’s revolutionary success. into the wildest depths of tsarist reaction he plunged. The
He had some victories, too, and Ukrainians may have calamity that has taken place has been, then, an intellec-
joined him in inflicting a few dents of their own. But he saw tual calamity first of all. It is a monstrous failure of the Rus-
that, even so, the revolutionary spirit went on spreading. sian imagination. And that monstrous failure has brought
He saw the popularity in Russia of Boris Nemtsov, his own about the very collapse into barbarism and the danger to
opponent. He found it terrifying. Nemtsov was duly assas- the ever fragile Russian state that Putin thought he was
sinated in 2015 on a bridge in Moscow. Putin saw Alexey trying to avoid. 1
Navalny step forward to offer still more opposition. He saw
that Navalny, too, turned out to be popular, quite as if there PAUL BERMAN is the author of The Flight of the Intellectuals,
was no end to these reforming zealots and their popular Power and the Idealists, and other books.

58
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 REVIEW
Happily Ever After
Fairy tales are where the West and China
find common ground. By Maria Tatar

Illustration by XINMEI LIU SUMMER 2022 79

 translator, are trying to change that. Lin Lan, Zhang believes,
should be recognized, for two reasons, as the “Brothers Grimm
of Modern China.” Lin Lan urged contributors to record sto-
ries drawn from indigenous oral traditions (just as the famed
German scholars had done) but also welcomed the idea of
adding a European touch to the tales. The result is almost
unprecedented in mixing tropes from multiple cultures in
pleasantly disorienting ways to a Western reader. A Chinese

W
Cinderella is ordered to sort buckwheat hulls, wheat, and
mung beans. Steamed buns substitute for porridge; flutes are
made of bamboo. A jujube tree stands in for what is usually a
juniper tree in European folklore. We are in a fairy-tale uni-
verse animated by silkworms and snake spirits rather than
by enchanted frogs or cats sporting boots.
Instead of thinking in terms of a cultural heritage cap-
tured by 19th-century philologists and antiquarians, it may
be time to investigate how fairy tales form what William
Wells Newell, founder of the American Folklore Society,
once casually referred to as a “golden net-work of oral tra-
ith their cannibal- dition.” Rather than dividing us along national lines, fairy
istic witches lurking in spooky forests, beanstalks leading tales show exactly how connected we all are in the sto-
to real castles in the air, and disagreeable gnomes bent on ries we share about what it means to be part of a family, to
making treacherous bargains, fairy tales have a coefficient of leave home, to face down villains, and to secure a happily
weirdness so high that they can seem like one-offs, singular ever after, reminding us of just how porous the boundaries
inventions rooted in one specific time and place. There’s the between East and West have long been.
classic French “Sleeping Beauty,” the British “Jack the Giant
Killer,” and the German “Snow White.” Then along comes the MUCH AS WE EMBRACE DIVERSITY and difference today, there has
translation of a collection of Chinese fairy tales written down always been a tug in the direction of finding what the French
nearly a hundred years ago. And, presto, it becomes clear that anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss called “unsuspected har-
Little Red Riding Hood is not a French or a German invention monies” in our collective belief systems around the world. In
but a universal child wearing different disguises as she makes the mid-20th century, Lévi-Strauss urged us to consider how
her way through a wilderness, always the innocent target of a bards, griots, and other storytellers made sense of the world by
monster with an outsized appetite for young flesh. turning abstract binaries (raw vs. cooked, herbivores vs. beasts
The publication of The Dragon Daughter and Other Lin of prey, nature vs. nurture) into human actors battling it out
Lan Fairy Tales marks a seismic shift in the English-speak- in symbolic worlds that resemble each other across cultures.
ing world’s understanding of the fairy-tale repertoire. It For the American writer Joseph Campbell, who worked in
features 42 tonghua, or fairy tales—most translated into
English for the first time—chosen from more than a thou-
sand stories published under the pseudonym “Lin Lan,” a
name first used in 1924 by Li Xiaofeng, a writer who recruited
colleagues to collect fairy tales from across China.
Although Chinese fairy tales have trickled into the West over
the past century, they have yet to receive much scholarly atten-
tion. And stories by the Brothers Grimm, along with those by
Hans Christian Andersen, are still among the most widely read
fairy tales in both the East and West. This is a direct product
of European, British, and Russian scholars publishing mon-
ster anthologies of folklore in a push to consolidate national
The Dragon Daughter and Other
identity in the 19th century, collecting everything they could Lin Lan Fairy Tales
get their hands on, and thereby establishing the fairy-tale
ED. AND TRANSL. BY JUWEN ZHANG,
canon as we know it today, with all its geographical limitations. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 240 PP.,
Scholars such as Juwen Zhang, the collection’s editor and $19.95, MARCH 2022

80
 REVIEW

Illustrations from Lin Lan’s “The Golden Frog and the Three
Wishes,” “Stories of Birds,” and “The Weird Story” (1929-1931)
from a collection at the Beijing Normal University Library.

comparative mythology, the search for a “shape-shifting yet In the sensational Lin Lan collection, the domestic turmoil
marvelously constant story” would yield a bond connecting at the heart of tales known in the West is configured some-
what he called the “mumbo-jumbo of some red-eyed witch what differently, but sibling rivalry and child-parent conflict
doctor of the Congo” and the “sonnets of the mystic Lao-tse” fuel many of the plots, as do poverty, famine, and the loss of
with an “argument of Aquinas” or a “bizarre Eskimo fairy tale.” parents. In “The Toad Son,” a woman longs for a child, even
The underlying racism that seeped into Campbell’s inventory if it looks like the creature in the story’s title, and—as in some
is undeniable, but his assertion reminds us of the powerful European tales—she gives birth to exactly what she wished for.
drive to find kinship and affinity in mythical confabulations. There are tales of two brothers, one a cruel skinflint, the other
Today, our use of the terms “meme” and “trope” reflects an generous and kind, harking back to an ancient Egyptian story.
understanding of how the narrative world is knit together by And we find stories of boys who, like Aladdin of The Thousand
what were once referred to as themes, archetypes, and motifs. and One Nights, have lost their fathers and are lazy, refusing to
It never dawned on either Lévi-Strauss or Campbell to earn a living, much to their mothers’ exasperation. Through-
turn to the repertoire of so-called old wives’ tales rather out the tales, we learn about tables that set themselves, magi-
than grand epics as a source for understanding the sym- cal pursuits, and impossible tasks. Sound familiar?
bolic worlds we construct to manage the cultural contra- “The Shedding Winter Plum,” like many of the stories in
dictions in the human world. Yet fairy tales, told around this collection, upends our understanding of a tale type like
the fireside, in spinning rooms, and in sewing circles, are as “Cinderella” even as it reminds us that, for women, labor and
much a part of the fabric of civilization as the epics, myths, good looks are what it once took to succeed. Its heroine spins
and fables of times past. They pass on ancestral wisdom, cotton, swings from trees, herds cows, and plays tricks on
entertain adults, socialize children, and do the heavy-lifting people. A free spirit, the pockmarked girl with sparse yellow
cultural work of helping us to process and navigate the real. hair and raggedy clothes turns at last into a beautiful woman
When the German Sinologist Wolfram Eberhard published with hair that is “thick and black,” a face that “shines,” and
Folktales of China in 1937, his work was a precursor of multi- “splendid” clothes. “With people surrounding her, she gave
culturalism, an effort to acknowledge non-Western tradi- [her] horse a kick and went on her way.” Save for the fairy-tale
tions and celebrate their distinctive cultural value. Other transformation, Winter Plum resembles Pippi Longstocking
volumes followed, with titles such as Chinese Fairy Tales and as much as she feels like a Cinderella figure.
COURTESY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Legends and Chinese Fairy Tales and Fantasies, suggesting

that, although Chinese folklore is still “virgin soil” for West-
ern researchers, as Eberhard insisted, China possessed a rich Rather than dividing us along
repertoire of tales taken from oral storytelling traditions. The
Lin Lan fairy tales expand that repertoire in unexpected new
national lines, fairy tales show
ways. That previous Western collectors neglected to document exactly how connected we all
most of the collection’s stories is nothing short of astonishing. are in the stories we share.

SUMMER 2022 81
 A story akin to the French “Beauty and the Beast” tells of The Lin Lan fairy tales, like
a snake who marries a woodcutter’s youngest daughter. By their European counterparts,
the end of the story, there are echoes of the Grimms’ “The
Juniper Tree” when the snake’s wife returns from the dead
remind us that the domestic
as a bird that haunts her duplicitous sister. sphere matters, and it
Readers will discover in this collection displays of violence matters deeply.
in its most unforgiving forms as well as repeated tributes
to beauty and its seductive power. In “The Flute Player,” a
we learn, are “taboo,” and a hands-off policy when it comes
boy named Abo plays his instrument with such charm that
to editing appears to be strictly enforced. These stories may,
everyone stops to contemplate the music. “The Human-
then, be closer to the unvarnished truths of oral storytell-
Bear’s Death for Love” unfolds scenes of such heartbreaking
ing than Western fairy tales, which were famously diluted
beauty that the hero forgets about everything, “even eat-
when they were repurposed for middle-class children with
ing.” Bookending these moments are scenes of grotesque
the advent of print culture.
violence, with monkeys dumping a bag containing a boy
An appendix to the collection makes important points
named Gege and “all the pee and poop” he has released.
about how the stories were collected, even if it leaves us long-
“The Weird Brothers” (based on the same tale retold in
ing for more information about the principles guiding the
Claire Huchet Bishop’s now controversial 1938 The Five
work of the Lin Lan network in the 1920s. We learn about an
Chinese Brothers) stages 10 failed executions, in contrast to
“ailing mother” who tells a story called “The Garden Snake”
the many scenes of swift, successful reprisals in other tales.
and how it is recorded “in her tone”—an anecdote that makes
These tales enact revenge in its most unforgiving form,
us wonder if the informants for these stories were predomi-
with what the Dutch German critic André Jolles called a
nantly women, as they were in the European tradition.
naive form of morality—one that relies on our instinctive
Are these tales indeed capturing the voices of those working
sense of justice, showing us the world as we want it to be
in the domestic sphere, the women who told stories to chil-
rather than as it is, with its complex social arrangements
dren and to each other while carrying out repetitive household
and protracted judicial procedures. In the world of Lin Lan
chores? If all local variants of a story belong to a global “myth,”
tales, a traumatized blacksmith’s wife steps forward and
as Lévi-Strauss told us, it is all the more important to unearth
stabs a tyrant to death. A vengeful ghost is dispatched with
these tales (which have long been overshadowed by the sacred
glee by the ruler of a land. “Little Bald” manages to conjure
literature so well documented in Chinese studies in the West)
a spell and kill the wife planning to murder him.
and let the voices of women and the common folk be heard.
These stories do what fairy tales do supremely well: signal-
Despite all that remains unknown, the Lin Lan fairy tales,
ing virtue with alluring markers and staging punishments
like their European counterparts, remind us that the domes-
as a strategy for purging the world of evil. Like European
tic sphere matters, and it matters deeply. Family life car-
tales in their unbowdlerized form, they promote a cult of
ries an urgency that finds outlets in gossip, storytelling,
radiant beauty and indulge in displays of stylized, theat-
chatter, and a range of expressive tools to help process and
rical violence. The aesthetics of the fairy tale are as primal
heal trauma. If happy families are all alike, as Leo Tolstoy
and problematic as its ethics, always giving us something
wrote, and unhappy families are all unhappy in their own
to contest, debate, and talk about.
way, then fairy tales enact that unhappiness with an ago-
nizing bite of the real.
THE QUESTION REMAINS of the extent to which the tropes in
Much as fairy tales are wired for weirdness with idiosyn-
these stories belong to indigenous lore or are drawn from
cratic twists and turns added when new raconteurs tell an
other traditions. In the introduction, Zhang, a Chinese stud-
old story, giving it their own particular spin, there is clearly
ies professor at Willamette University, writes that many of
something at the core of these tales—whether it takes the
the tales are hybrids of European folklore and Chinese oral
form of navigating the perils of family conflicts, searching
tradition. Yet we are faced with something of a chicken-
for romance, or using your wits to turn the tables on the
and-egg problem, never quite clear about who borrowed
rich and powerful—that resonates with us all. Q
from whom, especially since it is impossible to source an
original version of a tale from oral storytelling traditions
MARIA TATAR is a research professor emerita at Harvard
that predate print and visual culture.
University, where she focuses on Germanic languages
In a letter to a collaborator, the original editor of the Lin
and literatures and folklore and mythology, and the
Lan volumes affirms that the tales must be “loyal,” presum-
author of books including The Heroine With 1,001 Faces
ably to the words of each teller. “Polishing” and “editing,”
and The Fairest of Them All.

82
 REVIEW

Liberalism, More or Less

Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama
set out to cure an ailing patient.
By James Traub

R
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine has played out like a terribly
grim but, so far at least, profoundly ennobling laboratory
experiment in the relative virtues of autocracy and lib-
eral democracy. Yet evidence that a (more or less) liberal
democracy can defeat or withstand an autocracy even in
war—the one sphere that so obviously favors the latter
—hasn’t meaningfully diminished the forces that have
undermined liberalism in the West and around the world.
JOHANNES EISELE/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Indeed, the sharp division between Western democ-

racies that regard the invasion as an intolerable violation of moral principle and
non-Western and barely liberal ones, such as India and South Africa, that have
treated it as geopolitics as usual only reinforces the idea that liberal democracy
occupies a diminishing space in the world.
It is possible that liberal democracy was a historically contingent experi-
ment that depended on underlying conditions that no longer obtain. In his
2018 book, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to

SUMMER 2022 83
Save It, Yascha Mounk describes those limiting conditions divided between Catholics and Protestants, but very badly
as broadly shared prosperity, relative demographic homo- in Lebanon, where power-sharing among different religious
geneity, and sources of information that encompass the factions has produced a vacuum of governance very close
whole population. That was the last century, not this one. to anarchy. This April, slightly over 40 percent of French
Yet if you believe that all alternatives to liberal democ- voters cast ballots for a presidential candidate who prom-
racy are much worse—indeed, unbearable—then you must ised to restore the primacy of natives over newcomers
proceed as if the illness it suffers from is curable. That is and, not coincidentally, white people over people of color.
the premise of Mounk’s new work, the more optimistically The first wave of rise-of-illiberalism books—including
titled The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Mounk’s and Fukuyama’s earlier books as well as Steven
Apart and How They Can Endure, as well as Liberalism and Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die and my
Its Discontents by Francis Fukuyama, also a long-standing own What Was Liberalism?: The Past, Present, and Prom-
combatant in the liberalism wars. ise of a Noble Idea—focused almost entirely on the right-
Liberalism, as Fukuyama describes it, functions as a polit- wing nationalism of former U.S. President Donald Trump,
ical technology for the management of otherwise irreconcil- French politician Marine Le Pen, Indian Prime Minister
able differences. Liberals since the time of Thomas Hobbes Narendra Modi, and others. That’s old news by now. One
in the 17th century have erected a series of procedural rules of the features of the new generation of liberalism-in-peril
and normative principles—above all, the rule of law and books is worry over the rise of an identitarian left that is
the rights of individuals to pursue their own preferences— equally contemptuous of liberal restraints.
to limit the reach of absolutist doctrines. Liberal rules and Fukuyama writes of a species of identity politics that “sees
norms allow people of different views not only to get along the lived experiences of different groups as fundamentally
but to subscribe to the implicit “contract” on which demo- incommensurate.” White people cannot understand what
cratic government rests. Liberalism is endangered when the it means to be Black; racism is not an individual attitude
“factions,” to use James Madison’s term, that arise naturally but is rather imprinted in the structures of power and thus
in society cease to respect the rules and norms. in collective consciousness. Mounk describes the “strategic
But liberalism has a problem when those factions con- essentialism” of those who insist that we treat race or gen-
sist not of like-minded individuals but of tribes: ethnic or der as ineradicable essences. This is the new groupishness
religious groups bound together less by changeable beliefs of the left. Anyone who has spent time in the advanced insti-
than by immutable characteristics. A “diverse democracy,” tutions of American culture—universities, art museums,
in Mounk’s sense, is a heterogeneous one. In such states foundations, newspapers—will recognize this mentality.
where “virtually everyone votes along ethnic or religious It is, however, striking that while right-wing nationalism
lines,” Mounk observes, “a large portion of the popula- has circled the globe, the so-called woke left is an almost
tion forms a permanent minority,” locked out of power, entirely U.S. phenomenon. It explains nothing about illib-
while majorities use their power to dominate or margin- eralism in India or Poland and very little about France or
alize minorities, as white people did to Black people in the Germany. Why is it that the most advanced progressive
American antebellum and Jim Crow South and as Hindus thinking in the United States, but not elsewhere, is obsessed
now do to Muslims in India. with the policing of group boundaries and the honoring of
Liberalism addresses people as equal, free-standing cit- group rights? Perhaps because of the unique role that racial
izens, but Mounk has concluded that the wish to stand anger and racial shame play in the United States.
apart from kin, culture, and state is less primordial than The effect, in any case, is to set up a kind of reciprocal
we think. Both experience and social science research tribalism, where the left and right goad each other to greater
show us that people are by nature “groupish.” The chief extremes. Both agree on the need to weed out evil books from
threat to liberalism over the last decade has been major- libraries but disagree violently over the books in question;
itarian nationalism provoked by real or alleged threats to
collective identity—whiteness in the United States and
Europe, Hinduism in India, Judaism in Israel, Islam in
Turkey. Against this rage, liberal universalism, the idea If you believe that all
that we all have equal rights based in our common human- alternatives to liberal
ity, has steadily retreated. democracy are much worse
No one has developed an entirely convincing answer to
the problem of diverse democracy. The “consociational”
—indeed, unbearable—then
model, where power is allocated among groups that enjoy you must proceed as if the illness
formal status, has worked out well in the Netherlands, it suffers from is curable.

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 REVIEW
problem than at offering solutions. Another way of put-
ting it, though, is that illiberalism is the kind of problem
to which solutions inevitably feel inadequate because the
problem is not a failure of policy but of collective belief.
How do you create conditions that will favor a restoration
of a vanished consensus?
For Mounk, that comes down to the question of mecha-
nisms to contain and channel the tribalism that one can-
not wish away. Ranked choice voting, for example, would
help gain representation for minorities, he argues. Much
The Great Experiment: Why Diverse of Mounk’s agenda resembles the current Democratic
Democracies Fall Apart and Party platform in the United States: broad-based eco-
How They Can Endure
nomic growth, progressive taxation, and opportunities
YASCHA MOUNK, PENGUIN PRESS, 368 PP., for social mobility—all designed to create a sense of col-
$28, APRIL 2022
lective rather than tribal good. In that vein, he argues—
against the progressive left—for universal rather than
Liberalism and Its Discontents
race-conscious policies and for limits on immigration, a
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, FARRAR, flash point for the nativist right.
STRAUS AND GIROUX, 192 PP., $26, MAY 2022
These are good solutions, but I do not see how they will
cure the patient. (For the record, I was not entirely con-
vinced by the solutions I offered in What Was Liberalism?)
meanwhile, what the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called Mounk doesn’t entirely disagree: He writes that liberalism
the “vital center” recedes to an ever more distant horizon. ultimately must be defended at the level of private and
What is to be done? Fukuyama’s answer is to defend the social behavior. He advises all of us to think for ourselves
citadel. In this slim volume (a euphemism for a long maga- and be prepared to criticize our own side and restrain the
zine article by a famous author that publishers are eager to impulse to vilify the other. I am guessing that most read-
issue in book form), Fukuyama, in the manner of the phi- ers of his book will not need that advice, whereas the trib-
losopher Isaiah Berlin, traces the evolutionary path of the alists of left and right would sneer at it.
new illiberal ideologies, locating their origin in the post- I read The Great Experiment while thinking about India,
modern critique of rationality of the philosophers Jacques the biggest and most diverse of the world’s democracies.
Derrida and Michel Foucault, a doctrine of the radical left India is also among the sickest patients in the liberal democ-
later picked up by the right. racy ward. Born under the star of secularism and tolerance,
And then, like a stout crusader of liberalism, he smites India under Modi has increasingly become a theistic and
them one and all. Fukuyama first refutes what might be intolerant society that advances the cause of Hindu nation-
called the neoliberal or free market heresy of liberalism, alism at the expense of its more than 200 million Muslims.
noting that while humans are indeed self-seeking, “they I asked myself whether Mounk had anything to offer the
are also intensely social creatures who cannot be individ- many Indians who believe in the nation’s secular values
ually happy without the support and recognition provided and deeply fear their demise. The answer is: not much.
by their peers.” But neoliberalism is a heresy, or a perver- Some diseases prove fatal; others can be cured only very
sion, for liberal societies created the redistributionist state slowly, as the patient’s own defenses finally rally. I am in
that promoted equality in the 20th century. favor of everything Mounk suggests; I am even more in favor
Fukuyama goes on to note that liberalism is not so of Fukuyama’s rousing call to truth. Only liberalism, as both
obsessed with the individual as to inevitably atomize soci- authors argue, can allow us to live safely and prosperously in
ety, as many Catholic conservatives claim: “Private associ- a diverse world. But I recognize that the restraints imposed
ational life has grown enormously” in the liberal societies by liberal rules and norms ask a great deal of citizens, far
of the West. Nor must liberal states plead guilty to colo- more than nativism, nationalism, or majoritarian tyranny
nialism. How, after all, should we explain the rise of lib- does. We need to keep fighting for what is right even as we
eral East Asian states innocent of that charge? Fukuyama recognize that the road will be long. Q
reminds liberals of what they stand for and why they are
right to stand for it. JAMES TRAUB is a nonresident fellow at New York
Of course, that’s not a solution. Mounk writes that big University’s Center on International Cooperation and
books about ideas tend to be far better at explaining the columnist at FOREIGN POLICY.

SUMMER 2022 85
 The Art Thieves
Fifty years after African governments
began asking for the return of looted objects
from Europe, few have been returned.
By Nosmot Gbadamosi

A
s a result of violent plunder over the centuries,
Europe—more than any other region in the world,
including Africa—holds the largest collection of
ancient African artifacts. The total number of African
objects in museums across the United States barely
reaches 50,000. Yet Belgium’s Royal Museum for Cen-
tral Africa alone has 180,000 objects,
Germany’s Ethnological Museum has Visitors view the Benin
Bronzes exhibit at the
75,000, France’s Quai Branly Museum
DAVID CLIFF/LIGHTROCKET VIA GETTY IMAGES

British Museum in
has almost 70,000, the British Museum has 73,000, and the Neth- London on Feb. 13, 2020.
erlands’ National Museum of World Cultures has 66,000.
It has been 50 years since African governments, against a backdrop of hard-
fought independence, started asking for the return of looted objects. Despite
celebratory press coverage on returns and Western curators’ recent commit-
ments to decolonize museums, very few items have been physically repatri-
ated. In February, Nigeria welcomed back to Benin City just two statues out of
more than 3,000 Benin Bronzes—a collection of sacred works made from ivory,

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 REVIEW
bronze, and wood—still held mostly in Europe. take up the fight for restitution was Ekpo Eyo, a renowned
Western institutions’ rebuttal against timely restitution Nigerian archaeologist and the head of Nigeria’s Federal
has essentially boiled down to two components: Western Department of Antiquities. In 1972, Eyo sent a circular to
museums, they claim, must both conduct lengthy prov- several European embassies requesting “some” permanent
enance research to prove items were indeed stolen and loans of Benin Bronzes. Even such a “modest loan request,”
determine whether African museums can preserve their Savoy writes, sparked panic among officials who feared a
own artifacts—notwithstanding the fact that those relics “radical emptying” of Western museums.
survived for centuries in Africa before they were looted. In response, Hans-Georg Wormit, the president of the
But what if these claims, first put forward by museum Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation and a former Nazi,
officials in the 1970s and leaned on even more vehemently said Berlin’s holdings were legally bought, failing to men-
today, are part of a troubling historical approach to bury tion that they had originally been violently looted during
demands, delay the process, and lead to Africans’ capitula- the sacking of the Benin Kingdom by British soldiers in 1897.
tion? This is the argument French art historian Bénédicte Despite claims to the contrary, Savoy writes, Europe’s
Savoy puts forth in her newly translated book, Africa’s museum administrators “knew perfectly well that the
Struggle for Its Art: History of a Postcolonial Defeat—first great majority of the African objects in their collections
published in German last year and now in English—a fas- stemmed from the colonial era.” After all, most European
cinating account of lies and disinformation from European institutions, especially in Germany, have long held detailed
institutions in the debate against restitution. catalogues and inventory lists. (And, as German explorer
In examining old correspondence between government Richard Kandt wrote to the director of Berlin’s Ethnological
officials and museum administrators and the minutes of Museum in 1897, it was “quite difficult to obtain an object
museum meetings, Savoy uncovers a discourse around without using at least a little bit of force.”)
restitution that is frozen in time. Scenes like the infamous The Museum of Ethnology in Vienna followed suit,
opening sequence of Marvel’s Black Panther, and recent with the Viennese Ministry of Economics and Research
popular videos of Congolese activist Mwazulu Diyabanza responding that the museum’s collection had been “acquired
unsuccessfully attempting to take back looted African art- entirely legally,” Savoy writes, and that a return was out of
works from European museums, “had already been scripted the question: “It would be better if Nigerian scholars came
in many minds by the mid-1970s,” Savoy writes. “Nearly to Vienna to do research directly in the museum; related
every conversation today about the restitution of cultural costs, however, would need to be borne by international
property to Africa already happened forty years ago.” scholarships.” Stephan Waetzoldt, then-director general of
the Berlin State Museums, later wrote that “it is indeed dif-
IN OCTOBER 2021, ABUJA SENT AN OFFICIAL REQUEST to the Brit- ficult to adopt rational arguments to confront, in my view,
ish Museum for the return of all Nigerian artifacts looted the absurd demand for the return of practically the entire
during colonial rule. This was nothing groundbreaking— collection holdings which come from the Third World.”
Nigeria alone has sent many requests to Western muse- After West Germany’s Foreign Office decided it would
ums over the years, all received with silent indifference. not support Nigeria’s loan request, Wormit noted with sat-
The first representative of an African government to isfaction to Waetzoldt, “We can probably regard this mat-
ter as closed.”
A year later, in 1973, Mobutu Sese Seko, then-president of
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), spoke on
the floor of the United Nations and denounced the “barba-
rous, systematic pillaging” of Africa’s artistic heritage. A draft
resolution put forward by Mobutu and signed by 12 African
countries was rejected by Western countries at the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly on the grounds that it used the term “restitu-
tion,” which had “strong moral connotations,” Savoy writes.
Despite this, the General Assembly subsequently adopted
a resolution on restitution that attempted to set a blueprint
for how governments should respond to restitution claims.
Africa’s Struggle for Its Art:
History of a Postcolonial Defeat The resolution, which stated that restitution should be han-
dled by countries that gained access to cultural property
BÉNÉDICTE SAVOY, TRANSL. BY SUSANNE
MEYER ABICH, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY “only as a result of colonial or foreign occupation,” trig-
PRESS, $29.95, APRIL 2022 gered a heated global debate.

SUMMER 2022 87
 Congo and Ghana then followed Nigeria’s lead in mak- Even the most basic information flyer carried an emblem of
ing official claims to former colonial powers—although the mask, the event’s official logo, accompanied by a note
Ghana, in contrast, demanded full restitution of objects describing Nigeria’s iconic stolen object. “[O]ne of the fin-
from Britain instead of a loan. Its demands were debated in est examples of known African and black art … now rests
the House of Lords, where Scottish Labour Party member in the British Museum,” the text stated.
Baroness Lee of Asheridge warned that “returning booty” to Around the same time, Eyo wrote many letters—recently
Ghana could turn into a “striptease” of British institutions. released by Britain’s foreign office—asking for loans from
European museum officials’ response to those requests, the British Museum. As negotiations proved increasingly
Savoy shows, was “shameful.” Friedrich Kussmaul, the direc- futile, Nigeria started to purchase back its own objects at
tor of Stuttgart’s Linden Museum, was a particularly brazen auction. In June 1980, Eyo bought several Benin objects
offender. Following the passing of the U.N. resolution on at Sotheby’s in London for half a million pounds, caus-
restitution, he wrote that African staff were “hardly suffi- ing a stir in London and in Lagos; in response, journalist
ciently educated” to upkeep a modern museum “and unfor- and actor Gordon Tialobi wrote in the Nigerian newspaper
tunately in many cases rather susceptible to corruption.” Punch that the descendants of British soldiers still lived on
Kussmaul, who had never been to Africa, waged a success- “the proceeds of their fathers’ shameless acts of terrorism.”
ful offensive based on rumors and fabricated intelligence. In the early 1980s, Eyo organized an impressive exhibi-
He claimed that he had been in contact with a dealer who tion called “Treasures of Ancient Nigeria,” which toured
wanted to sell him West African artworks originally in the Europe and the United States. The exhibition, New York
Dresden Museum of Ethnology that were now in Bamako, Times art critic John Russell wrote, had “peculiar poi-
Mali, implying that restituted objects were being sold back gnancy from the fact that Nigeria here speaks for itself.”
to Europe via the underground market. It served as an undeniable answer to the racialized narra-
Throughout the book, Savoy subtly debunks the idea, tive of whether Nigeria could manage its own cultural her-
often repeated by commentators, that Africans cannot look itage, even if the West wouldn’t listen.
after their own art. For instance, in citing research that
shows no restitution took place from Germany to Mali in SAVOY’S DEEPLY RESEARCHED BOOK marks a shift in tone from
the 1970s, she effectively proves that the pieces offered to the many articles written recently on the African restitu-
Kussmaul must have come from within Germany. tion debate, and particularly on Nigeria, that erase African
Among other things, Kussmaul also accused the Nige- voices, focusing instead on the efforts of European intel-
rian government of having resold a Benin mask for a lectuals in making a case for restitution and the question
“multimillion sum,” prompting an angry response from of whether Europe will act.
Lagos (then Nigeria’s capital), which called the statement In Africa’s Struggle for Its Art, Savoy chooses to focus,
a “complete fabrication” and urged Kussmaul to practice as the title suggests, on African scholars detailing with
better museum ethics through a “more scholarly approach painstaking historical accuracy the near-forgotten essays,
to provenance information.” speeches, and unanswered letters of African governments
Despite this, African claims had “hardly any legal or moral in their fight for the return of stolen heritage. Savoy’s book
foundation,” Kussmaul contended, and in his words, the inde- is particularly relevant to the 70 percent of Africans who
pendence movement had created among Africans a “some- were born decades after those initial efforts. In her telling,
times exaggerated sense of one’s own dignity, achievements, Africans were—and still are—at the forefront of their own
tradition.” Even as museum directors believed in the pro- fight for restitution.
gressive role their collections played toward showcasing a As they did in the past, museum curators today pro-
“universal” heritage, Savoy writes, ideas of racial and civili- fess an enthusiastic willingness to engage in dialogue
zational hierarchy clearly permeated their thinking. while simultaneously blocking the demands of African
Years of fruitless diplomatic exchanges made African
leaders ever more determined to make their demands pub-
lic. In 1977, oil-rich Nigeria staged the Second World Black
and African Festival of Arts and Culture in Lagos, head- As they did in the past, museum
lined by some of the world’s biggest musicians, including curators today profess an
Stevie Wonder. For the festival, Nigeria requested to show- enthusiastic willingness to
case the Queen Idia mask, an ivory pendant from the 16th-
century Benin Kingdom held at the British Museum, but
engage in dialogue while
Britain refused, claiming the piece was too fragile to travel. simultaneously blocking the
Festival pamphlets served as a direct public statement: demands of African countries.
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 REVIEW

Ewuare II (center),
the Oba of Benin, the
traditional ruler of the
Edo people, receives
repatriated artifacts
that were looted from
Nigeria more than
125 years ago by the
British military in
Benin City, Nigeria,
on Feb. 19.

countries. The University of Oxford’s Pitt Rivers Museum, 1977 to 1992, put it firmly: “Everything we own we received
for example, presents itself as a world leader in the res- legally.” Similarly, in September 2021, then-British Culture
titution debate, since it’s engaged in deep provenance Secretary Oliver Dowden, a stalwart of British nationalism-
research and hosts the Action for Restitution to Africa turned-culture warrior, said the Benin Bronzes “properly
program. But it has yet to return any Benin Bronzes or reside in the British Museum.”
other prized African objects from its own collection. The Amid this resistance, the international community needs
British Museum has offered to loan back stolen goods but to pressure museums worldwide to publish full inventory lists
continues to ignore Nigerian letters. of collections, often hidden in storerooms—something Ger-
There are small signs of change. One of the world’s larg- many did last year for all the Benin Bronzes in its museums.
est cultural organizations, the U.S. government’s Smith- Importantly, African countries should also step up indepen-
sonian Institution, has agreed to unconditionally return dent provenance research, like that being done in Ghana,
some of its collection of 39 Benin Bronzes. and create autonomous bodies dedicated to their restitution
Germany, at least, has moved on from the days when efforts, like those established in Nigeria, because these enti-
museum directors vowed that “all objects in the Prussian ties need to be free of European influence and meddling.
Heritage Collection had been acquired legally,” as Savoy There is an urgent need to break away from mechanisms
writes. In April 2021, German politicians agreed to return a historically deployed by museum officials to keep illegally
“substantive” number of Benin Bronzes beginning this year. obtained colonial loot in their collections. Past directors who
Together with Senegalese economist and writer Felwine defended their position, Savoy writes, did so due to scholarly
Sarr, Savoy penned the seminal 2018 restitution report com- nationalism and racial prejudice. As she puts it, on restitu-
missioned by French President Emmanuel Macron, which tion, “[W]e must not shift the responsibility again to our chil-
urged European museums to return their collections taken dren and grandchildren.” The stories of influential African
“without consent” in the colonial period. That report had figures who worked and died longing for restitution should
groundbreaking repercussions and is partly responsible stir the global conscience. For decades, museum adminis-
for some of the returns we are seeing today; the French trators have succeeded in thwarting African claims, and
KOLA SULAIMON/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

parliament subsequently passed a bill in December 2020 artifacts from Nigeria alone remain not just in large muse-
to return 27 African objects to Senegal and Benin, though ums but also in private galleries and homes from Mexico to
Paris has yet to take further action. Russia to Thailand. Now, more than ever, museums need to
Other European governments remain doggedly wed- repatriate their ill-gotten African treasures. Q
ded to their colonial loot. Current British officials con-
tinue to deploy anti-restitution rhetoric from the 1970s. NOSMOT GBADAMOSI is a multimedia journalist and the
David M. Wilson, the director of the British Museum from writer of FOREIGN POLICY’s weekly Africa Brief.

SUMMER 2022 89
 Who Got China Wrong?
Two books take very different approaches
on the past and future of engagement.
By Bob Davis

L
ooking to win congressional approval to bring China
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), then-U.S.
President Bill Clinton rhapsodized how closer economic
ties would mean greater freedom for Chinese citizens.
“The more China liberalizes its economy, the more
fully it will liberate the potential of its people,” the pres-
ident argued in a speech in March 2000. “And when
individuals have the power
not just to dream but to realize A guard is covered by a flag during a
ceremony for Gen. Martin Dempsey, the
their dreams, they will demand a greater say.” chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The growth of the internet would help ensure that hope- and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Fang
ful outcome. “Now there’s no question China has been Fenghui, in Beijing on April 22, 2013.
trying to crack down on the internet. Good luck!” Clin-
ton said to gales of laughter. “That’s sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.”
Clinton’s comments now seem not only naive but cringeworthy. China, it
turns out, perfected Jell-O nailing and destroyed its own nascent online civil
AFP/GETTY IMAGES

society. China has become more repressive, less open to Western ideas, and far
more hostile to Washington’s global leadership, as Beijing’s recent “no limits”
embrace of Moscow shows.

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 REVIEW
But does disappointment with the turn in U.S.-China came to embrace engagement for ideological as well as
relations mean the strategy of engagement—wrapping commercial reasons. By 1989, liberal democracy was on
China more closely to the United States in a web of eco- the march. Students in China were protesting for democ-
nomic and political ties—is fundamentally flawed? Is any racy in Tiananmen Square by parading with a replica of the
engagement strategy doomed to fail because Beijing acts Statue of Liberty. The attraction of U.S. ideals and prosper-
in bad faith, or could it work in the future? Two new books ity seemed irresistible.
explore engagement’s record—with an eye toward influ- Of course, China’s leadership opened fire on the Tian-
encing the United States’ China policy. anmen protesters and violently squelched the democracy
In Getting China Wrong, the Princeton University politi- movement there. But that setback seemed temporary.
cal scientist Aaron L. Friedberg calls engagement a gamble “The forces of democracy” are so powerful, U.S. President
that didn’t pay off; the challenge now is how to reduce ties George H.W. Bush said at the time, that it would be impos-
to a Leninist regime. In The United States vs. China: The sible to “put the genie back in the bottle.” Within months,
Quest for Global Economic Leadership, the economist C. Fred Bush had patched up relations with China.
Bergsten not only argues that engagement was a success but The United States’ largest companies, chasing the old
proposes that China and the United States act as co-CEOs dream of a billion customers, also competed to win friends
of the global economy. in Beijing by lobbying for tighter U.S.-China relations. Boe-
Both authors have extensive experience with China policy ing, in particular, was in the thick of the fight, organizing its
—at least as made in Washington. Friedberg has warned many subcontractors to lobby Washington. Chinese officials
for years of China’s rising challenge and advocates what he rewarded its friends with orders worth billions of dollars.
calls partial disengagement. Bergsten, the founding direc- Corporate lobbying frustrated Clinton early in his presi-
tor of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a dency, when he sought to pressure China on human rights.
leading center for free trade economics, argued for a U.S.- But after he dropped that campaign and sought to engage
China free trade agreement in 2014. (He is silent on that with China, the same lobbyists came to his aid. Myron Bril-
proposal in this book, perhaps out of a sense of its politi- liant, the executive vice president of the U.S. Chamber of
cal implausibility.) Commerce, has estimated that business groups spent more
Both label China a “revisionist” power but use the term than $100 million lobbying Congress for Clinton’s WTO
very differently. For Friedberg, Beijing is revisionist in the deal—more than all the money they spent on trade lobby-
sense that it’s not the “responsible stakeholder” the United ing since then.
States has long hoped it would be—in other words, it is a Business officials and their allies in government were
threat. For Bergsten, Beijing is revisionist rather than “rev- almost Marxist in their belief that economic materialism
olutionary,” as it was under former leader Mao Zedong—in would lead to political change. Helping China to get richer
other words, it is more moderate and a potential partner. would increase the size of the Chinese middle class. That mid-
In a compact, well-argued critique of U.S. policy, Fried- dle class would then demand political change. Not coinciden-
berg traces how Democratic and Republican administrations tally, a lot of U.S. businesses would get richer, too—both by
adding customers in China and by slashing their manufac-
turing labor costs. The process had worked in South Korea
and Eastern Europe. Why wouldn’t it work in China, too?
Friedberg describes the reasoning this way: “[B]y encour-
aging the growth of a middle class, the spread of liberal
ideas, and strengthening the rule of law and the institu-
tions of civil society, engagement would lead eventually
to liberalizing political reforms.”
Except it didn’t. Instead, foreign investment in China
soared, as did imports from Chinese factories often work-
ing for U.S. bosses. Factory towns in the American Mid-
west and Southeast couldn’t keep up.
Getting China Wrong American elites didn’t recognize China for what it was:
AARON L. FRIEDBERG, POLITY, 246 PP., $29.95, JUNE 2022 a Leninist state looking to expand its power, as Friedberg
argues in the more polemical sections of his book. He por-
The United States vs. China: trays the Chinese leadership as a group of men who uni-
The Quest for Global Economic Leadership formly saw engagement as a threat to their power for exactly
C. FRED BERGSTEN, POLITY, 384 PP., $29.95, APRIL 2022 the same reasons that Americans embraced it.

SUMMER 2022 91
 “The purpose of reforming the system of Party and state is bound to surpass it as the No. 1 economy in the world.
leadership is precisely to maintain and further strengthen Bergsten usefully produces a series of statistics—including
Party leadership and discipline, not to weaken or relax on GDP growth, research and development spending, edu-
them,” he quotes former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping cation, and trade—to construct a score card for U.S.-China
as saying. Chinese officials who followed Deng took that rivalry. The bottom line: China eclipses the United States,
maxim as their marching orders, Friedberg writes. usually by the middle of the century.
Although it is certainly true that no Chinese leader sought “Time is not on America’s side as China advances,” he
to undermine the Chinese Communist Party, that doesn’t writes.
mean some weren’t willing to take big risks on economic By this reasoning, the United States needs to engage
reform, even if that weakened state control. Until recent with China to make sure it doesn’t dominate the global
years, for instance, the state was generally encouraging economy. Bergsten proposes what he calls a G-2, with
the private sector to grow, even though that diminished the United States and China acting as an informal steer-
the party’s ability to direct the economy. ing committee to handle global problems such as climate
Friedberg’s analysis leads him to argue that Chinese Pres- change, health, and economic development. Without
ident Xi Jinping isn’t a departure from his predecessors but their agreement, he writes, global progress is impos-
just one more in a long line of Leninists. That obscures the sible, and the world could descend into what he calls
radicalness of some of Xi’s actions, including ending the the “Kindleberger trap,” after the economist Charles P.
term limits on the presidency, which helped keep China Kindleberger, who blamed the Great Depression on the
from again falling under one-man rule, and asserting con- failure of the incumbent power (Britain) and the rising
trol over the technology, real estate, and other vibrant sec- power (the United States) to take necessary action.
tors of the Chinese economy, though that could undermine Bergsten isn’t explicit about why he believes such a group-
the country’s economic future. ing should include China instead of longtime U.S. allies such
as Europe and Japan. Although he doesn’t emphasize it,
BERGSTEN HAS A VERY DIFFERENT TAKE. To him, the Chinese his statistics show that the United States and its traditional
leadership is marked by three “schools of foreign policy allies, which he dubs the “hegemonic coalition,” are far more
thought”: conservatives, liberals, and those he calls “neo- powerful economically than China is alone and are likely to
comms” who “want to revert to the hard-line stances of remain so through the end of the century. Predictions of an
the past.” For Bergsten—as for U.S. treasury secretary after inevitable economic rise can also go wrong, from Western
U.S. treasury secretary, Democrat or Republican—the key fears in the 1960s that the Soviet Union would overtake the
is to identify the liberals and convince them that economic West economically to panic about Japan becoming the No.
reform is in the interest of China, not just in the interest of 1 economy—although in this case, China, with a population
U.S. companies that want to get a bigger market. four times the size of that of the United States, seems more
Bergsten recounts the genuine successes of engagement, likely to become the GDP champ.
to which Friedberg gives short shrift. They include boosting He seems to choose China out of fear that the United
Americans’ standard of living through cheaper and varied States is abdicating its role as global leader and growing
imports, curbing nuclear proliferation, and working closely more hostile to Beijing. His book is laced with criticism of
together to revive the global economy after the 2008 finan- former U.S. President Donald Trump, whom he mentions
cial crisis nearly produced a global depression. The absence 275 times by name, for taking that protectionist turn. In
of U.S.-China engagement is also evident in the weak global the case of a new global economic crisis, Bergsten wants
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. to make sure the United States and China, the world’s two
He proposes a new era of engagement. Once again, as in largest economies, work together.
the early Clinton years, Bergsten urges the United States
to decouple economic issues from disputes over human
rights and national security. Unlike Clinton and others in
the 1990s, Bergsten is not arguing that engagement can
In the early 1990s, engagement
make for better human rights in China but that Washing- meant the United States bolstering
ton can separate human rights concerns from economic a weak China. Now, engagement
policy. To do so, though, requires wishing away 20 years of would give the United States
disappointment with the results of engagement.
In the early 1990s, engagement meant the United States
a way to influence a China
bolstering a weak China. Now, Bergsten argues, engagement that is bound to surpass it as
would give the United States a way to influence a China that the No. 1 economy in the world.
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China has rebuffed previous calls to form a G-2 with the At the end of the Trump administration, then-U.S. Dep-
United States, Bergsten writes, because it believed Wash- uty National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger tried some-
ington sought to “co-opt, and indeed contain, its rise.” thing along these lines after China cut off some imports from
But now, he says, Chinese leaders may be more receptive Australia. Beijing was miffed that Canberra was pressing for
if the United States makes it clear that China would be an independent investigation into the origin of COVID-19.
“accorded a truly co-equal role.” He also says the United Pottinger wanted other countries to pledge to buy Austra-
States would need to make sure that China is faithfully lia’s stranded imports.
carrying out its assigned role, though it isn’t clear what But his plan went nowhere. The administration never pro-
Washington should do if it found that Beijing was shirk- duced a formal proposal, and Australia’s then-trade minis-
ing its responsibilities. Nor does he show evidence of the ter, Dan Tehan, expressed no interest in the idea when he
Chinese leadership being receptive to this. visited Washington last July. Tehan’s main goal was eas-
In the clearest sign that Bergsten understands the polit- ing commercial tensions with China, not looking to extend
ical difficulties both sides would face in acting as global the fight. Friedberg doesn’t suggest how to overcome such
co-CEOs, he suggests the arrangement somehow be kept reluctance, which other trading nations are bound to share.
largely quiet. “The G-2 should announce neither its forma- Although Friedberg considers the United States’ anti-
tion nor its continuing existence,” he writes. Good luck keep- Soviet alliance as a model, he also ignores the crucial role
ing that news from Congress and the U.S. media—or selling trade can play. Europe and Japan were wedded to the United
it in China, where anti-U.S. sentiments dominate the public States in good measure because America opened its markets
sphere and paranoia about U.S. spying helps drive internal to textile, electronic, and automobile imports, even though
political purges. that hurt workers in some U.S. industries. Similar trade open-
Friedberg would deal with China much differently, look- ings could help the United States recruit new allies in its com-
ing to shore up that “hegemonic coalition” so it could con- petition with China or strengthen ties with existing ones.
tain China’s rise or at least influence Beijing from the outside.
For inspiration, he cites former Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin, THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOW LAUNCHED its Indo-Pacific
of all people, who advised his disciples to “probe with bayo- Economic Framework to try to strengthen ties with Asian
nets” and withdraw if they encounter steel. “China’s current nations. At the moment, it’s mostly nice words. Some in
leaders have yet to fully encounter steel,” Friedberg writes. the Biden administration and Congress are hoping that the
To start, Friedberg would disengage from China econom- framework could become a full-fledged free trade agree-
ically. He doesn’t advocate full decoupling, which he recog- ment, perhaps even leading to the United States rejoin-
nizes would be ruinous given the interconnections between ing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the Obama
the two economies. His book was written too early to take administration negotiated but Trump—and former U.S.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine into account, but even discon- Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her presidential
necting the West from Russia’s relatively small economy campaign—rejected.
is proving difficult because of Moscow’s importance as an Winning congressional approval for a free trade deal would
energy supplier. Imagine trying to pull apart supply chains be tough, even if the United States renegotiated parts of the
that have China, the world’s factory floor, as a major hub. TPP. Congressional Democrats have long opposed such pacts,
For all the harshness of his criticism of China, most of and free trade became anathema to many Republicans who
Friedberg’s recommendations don’t go much beyond what followed Trump’s lead. But it’s probably essential to compete
U.S. President Joe Biden is already doing. Friedberg would economically and politically with China, as both Friedberg
restrict Chinese investment in the United States, limit U.S. and Bergsten want.
technology exports to China, use tax incentives and other At the very least, passage of a new trade deal would require
inducements to encourage companies to relocate their sup- helping those parts of the country that would be hurt by
ply chains away from China, and encourage allies to do the increased imports, including retraining workers there and
same. He would also boost U.S. Navy spending, refocus the relocating industries to depressed regions. The United States
U.S. military toward Asia, and “look for ways to pry Russia has done an awful job aiding workers hurt by trade (or by
away from China.” (Again, this is pre-Ukraine.) He doesn’t automation) since it started liberalizing trade after World
provide a road map or try to detail the costs. War II. But that is the true cost of engagement, whether the
He spends just a few sentences on one of his most provoc- target is China itself or potential allies against it. Q
ative recommendations: creating an economic alliance to
help democracies facing Chinese economic coercion. As BOB DAVIS is a freelance journalist and co-author of
with NATO, he writes, the alliance would operate on the Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump
principle that “an attack on one is an attack on all.” and Xi Threatens a New Cold War.

SUMMER 2022 93
 Where ‘Protocol’ Is Anything But
In Ghana, special treatment has become
a way of life for the privileged few.

A
By Anakwa Dwamena

friend recently told me a story about his attempt to get

his first dose of COVID-19 vaccine in Accra, the capital
of Ghana. When he arrived at the distribution center,
he was instructed to join a line outside. An attendant
gave each person a number to ensure there were enough
doses for everyone. Then a familiar scene appeared: A
trickle of cars was ushered into the compound, one by
one. Soon afterward, the attendant informed my friend
that the facility had run out of shots.
In Ghana, the inside connection that likely allowed the people in the cars to
skip the vaccine line is called protocol, or “proto” for short. Paradoxically, proto-
col often means expedited access that circumvents established procedure. People
in Ghana do not follow protocol; they have it, through kinship or a social connec-
tion. One might use protocol to quickly access a public service, while applying
for a job, or to get into a good school. Its prevalence reflects how equal rights and
access are becoming a mirage in Ghana, fueling disillusionment with the govern-
ment and the country’s supposed meritocracy.
Although my friend was irritated that he couldn’t get a vaccine, the situation
wasn’t a surprise. Family group chats, church WhatsApp groups, and alumni

94 Illustration by NANA OPOKU AFROSCOPE

 DECODER
associations across Ghana are all buzzing with people asking

Analyze the
if anyone has protocol in one place or another. Insiders openly
advertise “protocol vacancies” in the government and mili-
tary. While waiting to renew a driver’s license or passport, it
is common to see a protocol group standing apart from the
regular line. They aren’t sure where they’re going, but they
world’s biggest
are secure in getting what they came for.
For those without protocol, routine bureaucratic interac-
events with leading
tions have become a point of stress. Its normalization means
that people seeking a service the normal way may feel like sec- foreign-policy
experts and
ond-class citizens—even if they came first. But though they
complain about it, many Ghanaians have largely accepted
the system. One Twitter user noted that without protocol,
it takes months to get a copy of one’s birth certificate. I’ve
seen another joke that the ubiquity of protocol means one
thinkers.
needs it to make new friends in Ghana.
Beyond individual concerns, the protocol system threatens
to undermine Ghana’s state institutions, which are already
perennially underperforming. It casts doubt on the merito-
cratic idea that government staff are recruited because of
their abilities and increases the likelihood of other proto-
col hires. After recent revelations that Ghanaian police offi-
cers were involved in the robbery of armored vehicles drew
attention to the police recruitment process, Modern Ghana
columnist Stephen Atta Owusu pointed out that protocol
hiring could even increase security risks.
However, the act of seeking protocol isn’t necessarily nefar-
ious if it lends clarity to systems that don’t function as they
should, said Audrey Gadzekpo, a professor of communica-
tion studies at the University of Ghana. It’s really asking:
“Does anybody know somebody that will make it easier for
me to access whatever service for whatever reason because
there’s a long line or I don’t see my way clearly to what exactly
I need to do?” she said. “What is insidious is that it is getting
into places where it didn’t use to be.”
E. Gyimah-Boadi, a co-founder of the research network
Afrobarometer, traces the term’s origins to the era after
Ghana’s independence in 1957. As a complement to their
low wages, public servants could take advantage of a quota
system for job or university openings for themselves or their
family members—known as a protocol list. Even then, the
system was prone to abuse, according to Gyimah-Boadi.
Some public servants expanded their list to bring in more
people, including in exchange for money. “There is an old
saying that one doesn’t lack the opportunity to lick one’s fin-
gers when grinding savory things,” he said.
Demand for protocol services has since expanded, with
JOIN THE CONVERSATION
those who consider themselves important almost always seek-
ing preferential access. Ghana’s poor job market for young
graduates, especially in the public sector, may contribute to
this shift. Youth unemployment has reached a record high, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM/FPLIVE
despite government job creation programs. Some friends have
 Q. How can you complained that it is not worth applying to a job without an
keep up with a world inside connection, even in private organizations. That sort

of foreign policy? of thinking bothers Gyimah-Boadi more than the existence

of protocol “because that means that we have imbibed it so
deeply that it has become an iron law,” he said.
Ghana’s protocol system could fuel inequality and further
erode trust in government; after all, people with backdoor
connections tend to come from the elite. In a 2019 Afrobarom-
eter survey, more than one-quarter of respondents said they
had paid bribes for their own identity documents. That’s not
to mention the cottage industry of scammers targeting the
poor or desperate. Last year, Ghana’s Information Ministry
flagged a fake recruitment portal collecting fees and prom-
ising jobs in the armed forces, the revenue authority, and the
immigration service, among others. In March, local media
reported that a government agency had charged its own
employees for interview preparation to receive promotions.
A system that grants elites coveted services or jobs is not
unique to Ghana. But it does reflect something specific about
Ghanaian culture: Giving leaders premium access to services
is one way of showing them respect. Now, the line between
who holds authority and who doesn’t has become blurred.
“Every village chief [and] even some pastors have church mem-
bers they can count on to provide protocol,” Gadzekpo said.
“Everybody is a little chief. There are so many ‘big’ men and
women. The sense of entitlement becomes so widespread.”
Some observers say they see the protocol phenomenon
reflected in the current national government, led by Ghana-
ian President Nana Akufo-Addo. Gyimah-Boadi pointed to
the large number of political appointees in deputy ministe-
rial roles or deputy ambassadorships as an apparent reward
for political support. Nineteen ministers have yet to comply
with the constitutional requirement to declare their assets.
The Afrobarometer survey found that a majority of Gha-
naians felt that corruption had increased since 2017, when
Akufo-Addo took office; distrust in government is rising.
Ghana’s protocol system has exacerbated the divide
between ordinary citizens and the government that suppos-
edly exists for their benefit. Among the younger generation,
there is a sense of resignation but also a desire to imagine a

A. This one’s easy. different future. Last year, frustration with inequality and
alleged corruption led to the #FixTheCountry protest move-

Be ahead of the curve with ment, which echoed a massive anti-government demonstra-
tion in 1995. (Ironically, Akufo-Addo emerged as a protest
FP newsletters, delivered to leader then.) The 2021 protests represented a surprising yet

your inbox every day of the week. significant pushback to the government. The conversation
has continued on social media, fostering new coalitions and
giving hope for a movement that can tilt the country back in
the right direction. Q

FOREIGNPOLICY.COM/BRIEFINGS
ANAKWA DWAMENA is a Ghanaian American journalist based
in Accra, Ghana.
 QUIZ

What in the World?

By Nina Goldman
The following is adapted from past editions of FP’s weekly online news quiz.
Test yourself every week at ForeignPolicy.com.

1. Who became the U.S. ambassador to 8. U.S. President Joe Biden met with
Ukraine in May? representatives from most members
of the Association of Southeast Asian
a. Kristina Kvien Nations in May. Which of the group’s
members was missing?
b. John J. Sullivan
c. Marie Yovanovitch a. Singapore

d. Bridget Brink b. Vietnam

c. Myanmar
d. Brunei

5. Which Caribbean nation announced

in March that it would seek to remove
Britain’s queen as its head of state?

a. Dominica b. Trinidad and Tobago

c. Bahamas d. Jamaica

2. In late March, South African 6. Colombia held presidential elections

President Cyril Ramaphosa avoided a in May and June. Who is the country’s
no-confidence vote over what issue? term-limited incumbent president?
9. Madeleine Albright, the first woman
a. A gas tax hike a. Gustavo Petro to serve as U.S. secretary of state, died
in March at age 84. How many women
b. Nepotism within the executive b. Sergio Fajardo have held the position after her?
c. His policy on Ukraine c. Íngrid Betancourt
a. 1 b. 2 c. 3 d. 4
d. Economic inequality d. Iván Duque
10. Reports emerged in April that an
3. The Taliban rescinded plans to allow Israeli nuclear research facility in the
Afghan girls to return to secondary Negev Desert was besieged by hordes
school in March. What is the female of what creatures?
literacy rate in Afghanistan?

a. 12 percent b. 30 percent
c. 55 percent d. 80 percent

4. In May, a commercial flight from a. Porcupines b. Camels

Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, became the first
to take off from the city since what year?

a. 2019 b. 2016 c. 2013 d. 2008

7. In recent months, Sri Lankans have

protested a massive economic crisis,
which is driven in part by high levels of
government debt. What was Sri Lanka’s
debt-to-GDP ratio in 2021? c. Polecats d. Vultures
GETTY IMAGES

a. 41 percent b. 87 percent
c. 119 percent d. 205 percent
ANSWERS: 1. d; 2. d; 3. b; 4. b; 5. d; 6. d; 7. c; 8. c; 9. b; 10. a

SUMMER 2022 97
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