Chapter – IV

JUDICIAL APPROACH ON “CONTEMPT”

4.1 A powerful judicial system is a condition precedent sine que

non for a healthy democracy. If browbeating the court, flagrant
violation of professional ethics and uncultured conduct is
tolerated that would result in ultimate destruction of a system
without which no democracy can survive 63 . When there is
deliberate attempt to scandalise the court, it shakes the
confidence of the litigant public in the system, the damage is
caused to the fair name of the judiciary64. If a litigant or a lawyer
is permitted to malign a Judge with a view to get a favourable
order, administration of justice would become a casualty and the
rule of law could receive a setback. The judge has to act without
any fear thus no one can be allowed to terrorise or intimidate the
judges with a view to secure orders of one’s choice. In no civilised
system of administration of justice, this can be permitted.65

4.2 The power vested in the High Courts as well as Supreme

Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available
under the Constitution as well as the Act. It is a drastic power
which, if misdirected, could result in curbing the liberty of the
individual charged with commission of an act amounting to
contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty on
the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest care and
circumspection. This is also necessary as, more often than not,
adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-

63 R. K. Garg v. State of H.P., AIR 1981 SC 1382; and Mahipal Singh Rana v.
State of U.P., AIR 2016 SC 3302.
64 M. B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1991 SC

1834.
65 L. D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374; Chetak Construction Ltd.

M/s. v. Om Prakash & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 185; Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan
High Court, AIR 2003 SC 1467; and Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P.,
(2013) 14 SCC 127.

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determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in
respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not,
therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is
alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not
been dealt with or decided in the judgment or order, violation of
which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a
judgment or order or are plainly self-evident, ought to be taken
into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there
has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same.
Decided issues cannot be reopened nor can the plea of equities
be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a
contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective
jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order
or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed
should be issued by the Court while exercising contempt
jurisdiction; such an exercise will be appropriate in other
jurisdictions vested in the Court.66

4.3 That being so, a refusal to obey the final order of a court
and/or attempt to overreach the same has been held by the
Supreme Court to be a contempt of court with legal malice and
arbitrariness as it is not permissible to scrutinise the order of
court which has attained finality.67

4.4 The Supreme Court, considering punishment for

established contempt of Court, in Supreme Court Bar
Association (supra), held as under:

66Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, AIR 2002 SC 2215; V.M.
Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610; Bihar Finance Service
H.C. Co-op. Soc. Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1975; Union of
India & Ors. v. Subedar Devassy PV, AIR 2006 SC 909; and Sudhir Vasudeva
& Ors. v. M. George Ravishekaran & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 950.
67Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147.

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 The power that courts of record enjoy to punish for
contempt is a part of their inherent jurisdiction and is
essential to enable the courts to administer justice
according to law in a regular, orderly and effective
manner…. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to
uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law.
[Emphasis added]

4.5 In Leila David v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2009 SC

3272 the Supreme Court observed that the basis of law of
contempt does not lie exclusively on Common law principles but
is also regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The
Court observed that “apart from the power conferred on it under
the said Act, it has inherent power under Article 129 of the
Constitution to punish for contempt of itself.” The Court further
said that it had the power to punish a contemnor under Article
142 also. [See also: C. K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta & Ors, AIR 1971
SC 1132]

4.6 In Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P., AIR 2011

SC 2275, the Supreme Court reiterated that the contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts as
majesty and image of the courts cannot be allowed to be
disdained. The Court observed:

“The superior courts have a duty to protect the reputation

of judicial officers of subordinate courts, taking note of
the growing tendency of maligning the reputation of
judicial officers by unscrupulous practising advocates
who either fail to secure desired orders or do not succeed
in browbeating for achieving ulterior purpose. Such an
issue touches upon the independence of not only the
judicial officers but brings the question of protecting the
reputation of the Institution as a whole.”

4.7 In Rustom Cowasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC

1318, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed:

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 “We are constrained to say also that while fair and
temperate criticism of this Court or any other Court even
if strong, may be actionable, attributing improper motives,
or tending to bring Judges or courts into hatred and
contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the
functioning of Courts is serious contempt of which notice
must and will be taken. Respect is expected not only from
those to whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable but
also from those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in
their criticism by indulging in vilification of the institution
of Courts, administration of justice and the instruments
through which the administration acts, should take heed
for they will act at their own peril.”

4.8 The power to punish for contempt is a rare species of

judicial power which by the very nature calls for its exercise with
great care and caution. Such power ought to be exercised only
where “silence is no longer an option.”

4.9 Scurrilous abuse of a judge or court, or attacks on the

personal character of a Judge, are punishable contempt.
Punishment is inflicted to prevent mischief which undermines or
impairs the authority of the court. That is why the court regards
with particular seriousness the allegations of partiality or bias on
the part of the Judge or a court68.

4.10 In E. M. Sankaran Namboodiripad (supra), the Court laid

down that expressions like ‘description of judiciary as an
instrument of oppression, the judges as guided and dominated
by class hatred’ and ‘instinctively favouring the rich against the
poor’ are expressions amounting to contempt of court.

68C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A. M. Bhattacharjee & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC

457; In Re : Vinay Chandra Mishra, AIR 1995 SC 2348; In Re: Arundhari Roy,
(2002) 3 SCC 343.

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4.11 In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421
the Supreme Court observed that “if recourse to falsehood is taken
with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or
impede even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from
performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.”

4.12 In re : Bineet Kumar Singh (supra), a forged/fabricated order

of Supreme Court was used for the purpose of conferring some
benefits on a group of persons. Supreme Court took a strict view
of the matter and observed that “the law of contempt of court is
essentially meant for keeping the administration of justice pure
and undefiled”.

4.13 The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of

courts cannot be allowed to be marred by errant behaviour by
any counsel or litigant 69 . The Supreme Court in In re: Sanjiv
Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, (1995) 3
SCC 619, dealing with the issue of errant behavior by a counsel
in terms of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings, held as under:

“Some members of the profession have been adopting

perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the
profession as is evident from their absence when the
matters are called out, the filing of incomplete and
inaccurate pleadings - many times even illegible and
without personal check and verification, the non-
payment of court fees and process fees, the failure to
remove office objections, the failure to take steps to
serve the parties, et. al. They do not realise the
seriousness of these acts and omissions. They not only
amount to the contempt of the court but do positive dis-
service to the litigants and create embarrassing
situation in the court leading to avoidable
unpleasantness and delay in the disposal of matters.
This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system.”

69Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh Thru Distt. Judge, (2013) 7
SCALE 542.

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4.14 Access to justice is a valuable fundamental and human
right. And, expeditious disposal of criminal cases is an integral
part of fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has persistently, consistently
and repeatedly held that advocates resorting to strike for any
reason whatsoever violate the aforesaid rights of the citizens, and
such strikes are always illegal. (vide M. H. Hosket v. State of
Maharastra, AIR 1978 SC 1548; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home
Secretary., State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360; State of
Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675;
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1983 SC 1086; Kishore
Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 2140; Moses
Wilson & Ors. v. Kasturiba & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 379; L.I.C. of
India v. R. Suresh (2008) 11 SCC 319; Vakil Prasad Singh v. State
of Bihar, AIR 2009 SC 1822; Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share
Holders Welfare Association (7) v. S. C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2
SCC 784; and Babubhai Bhimabai Bokharia v. State of Gujrat,
AIR 2013 SC 3648)

4.15 On similar lines, in the case of Hussain & Anr. v. Union of

India & Ors., AIR 2017 SC 1362, looking into the issue of
interference with justice, the Supreme Court directed the high
courts to take stringent measures against the erring advocates
who violate the directions issued by the Courts to the lawyers,
from time to time, not to proceed on strike, as “…denial of speedy
justice is a threat to public confidence in the administration of
justice.”

4.16 Very recently on March 28, 2018, the Supreme Court in

Criminal Appeal No. 470 of 2018, Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, addressing the issue of violation of the right

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of access to justice, observed that every resolution of advocates
to go on strike and abstain from work is per se contempt, and
that the matter is therefore included within the contempt or
inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The Court held that in such a
case, the court may direct that the office bearers of the Bar
Association/Bar Council who passed such resolution for strikes
etc. to be restrained from appearing before any court for a
specified period or till they purge themselves of contempt to the
satisfaction of the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court
based on an appropriate undertaking/conditions. The Court in
its order also made reference to the 266th Report of The Law
Commission of India on ‘The Advocates Act, 1961 (Regulation of
the Legal Profession)’, noting from the report that such conduct
of the advocates affects functioning of courts and particularly it
contributes to pendency of cases.

4.17 That being said, it may be noted that the Supreme Court
made a distinction between a mere libel or defamation of a Judge
and a contempt of court or ‘scandalising of a judge in relation his
office’, and laid down a test of “whether the wrong is done to the
judge personally or it is done to the public.”70. Expounding on it
further, in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar of Orissa
High Court & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 710, the Court observed:

“…the key word is "justice", not "judge"; the key-note

thought is unobstructed public justice, not the self-
defence of a judge; the corner-stone of the contempt
law is the accommodation of two Constitutional
values-the right of free speech and the right to
independent justice. The ignition of contempt action
should be substantial and mala fide interference
with fearless judicial action, not fair comment or

70Perspective Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221;

and Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra, AIR1972 SC 989.

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 trivial reflections on the judicial process and
personnel.”

4.18 Even internationally, the distinction between libel /

defamation of a Judge and a contempt of court has been well
recognized. For instance, in the United States, the Supreme
Court in Craig v. Harney, 331 US 367 (1947), observed that “the
law of contempt is not made for the protection of Judges who may
be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed
to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.”

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