Communication in conflict and peace

Reviewing peace theory in the frames of a network society

Julie Arnfred Bojesen

Communication for Development

One-year master
15 Credits
Autumn 2018
Supervisor: Anders Høg Hansen
Abstract

The digital revolution has changed how we interact and organize ourselves, how wars
are fought and how peace is restored. The nature of conflicts has changed, and so should
the theories with which we try to understand conflicts. Communication is power, and
understanding power relations in the information era is fundamental to address
peacebuilding. In this paper I investigate which communication plays in power relations
and how this can be applied to classical peace theory. I do this by discussing the
elements of Galtung’s classical conflict cycle in light of the network theory. I define
power in the networks as communicative power which it is exercised within, between
and behind the different networks. The widely distributed internet access and
possibilities to influence others has not only skewed the power relations within the
political sphere, but also created effective ways to damage democratic principles and
structures through communication. In my discussion, I argue that communication as
discursive power can be seen as the source of conflict, because the one dominating the
discourse dominates the network. Based on Galtung’s framework, I show how
communicative violence can be structural, cultural and direct. Communication can be
used violently to harm infrastructure, mislead and create mistrust, and marginalize
actors. Because communication plays a pivotal role in everyday life, I further argue that
it can also be seen as a basic human need. To create a sustainable peace, we have to
think about peacebuilding across the different networks of society, ensuring access and
aiming for a more constructive discourse.

Word count: 13312

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Abstract 1

1. Introduction 4
1.2. Methodology 5
1.2.1. Research problem 6
1.2.2. Motivation 6
1.2.3. Theoretical framework 7
1.2.4. Research design 9
1.2.5. Method and structure 10
1.2.6. Ontology 11
1.2.7. Definitions 12
1.2.8. Limitations 13
1.2.9. Reservations 14

2. Peacebuilding and communication 14

2.1. Peace theory 15
2.2. Power 17
2.3. Communication 20
2.4. Actors 22
2.4.1. Power over the networks 22
2.4.2. Power within the networks 23
2.3.4. Power between networks 24

3. The network landscape 24

3.1. Goals from communication 25
3.1.1. Nature - basic needs 25
3.1.2. Culture - values 26
3.1.5. Structure - interests 26
3.2. Incompatible goals 28
3.2.1. Conflicting goals within the networks 29
3.2.2. Conflicting goals between the networks 30
3.2.3. A fundamental political crisis 31

4. Conflicts and violence in the networks 32

4.1. Communicative violence 33
4.1.1. Structural violence 34
4.1.2. Cultural violence 35
4.1.3. Direct violence 36

5. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the networks 37

5.1. Communicative peace 37
5.2. Tolerant networks 38
5.2. Constructive discourses 40
5.3. Beyond politics and media 41

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6. Adding communication power to peacebuilding theory 42

7. Conclusion 43

8. Reflections and perspectivation 46

Reference list 47

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1. Introduction
Communication can cause immense harm and communication can stall conflicts. "The pen is
mightier than the sword," the English author Edward Bulwer-Lytton wrote in 1839. A present-
day interpretation of the classical saying is: “The internet can be used to disrupt democracies as
surely as it can destabilize dictatorships” (Freedom House, 2018, p. 1).

Digital communication has paved the way for revolutions, the rise of oppressed groups and
social changes. Simultaneously, the same mechanisms are (ab)used as means of domination
and weapons in conflicts, information war being the most extreme example of communication
directed to destabilize societies by augmenting potential tensions, threatening to eventually
undermine the structures of trust that hold society together.

In this paper, I will investigate how to combine existing theories to better address conflict and
peacebuilding within the frames of the digitalized information society. The complexity of social
interaction has increased massively in the globalized world, also regarding conflicts, so to
understand dynamics of peace and conflicts today we must be aware of this complexity, but try
to identify the basic elements of conflicts in the information era.

Although instant communication has been possible for over a century, the information
revolution is characterized by the sudden drop in costs and increase of capacity when it comes
to communication (Nye and Welch, 2014, p. 299). The result is a highly interconnected world,
free flow of information and immense possibilities to influence others. This quickly saturated
the ways we think and act, and the ways in which we organize ourselves. The information
revolution gave us new tools for communication as well as new interrelational conditions for
how these tools can be used – challenging the traditional power hierarchies.

In 2014, political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. stated that although possible, it costs states too much
to maintain a central surveillance, the result being that a lot of other actors now have power to
influence politics (Nye and Welch, 2014, p. 301). It seems like the tides have changed, and that

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the diffusion of power has reached a point where the price of increased internet control is
worth paying - or that the neoliberal theories (once again) turned out to have insufficient
explanatory power. For the eighth year in a row, internet freedom has gone down, as states,
politicians and companies increasingly interfere in the digital public sphere, shaping and
controlling it to their own benefit (Freedom House, 2018).

In February 2019, a report from Pew Research Center stated that in the 26 countries
investigated, a median of 61% see cyberattacks as a major concern (Poushter and Huang, 2019),
and the trust in media (both social and mass) is steadily declining over the years (Edelman,
2019).

Insecurity and instability do not create fruitful environment for social prosperity and protection
of rights and freedoms. Peace (or active peacebuilding and -keeping) is crucial for any social
development; and in times of information warfare, ‘fake news’, increasing social and
international tensions, limitations of rights, governments using restrictive measures to counter
information warfare and cyber threats, and overall declining trust in systems and media, the de-
escalation and prevention of conflicts should be addressed through communication.

To understand the background for conflicts to aim for a peaceful coexistence, we have to try to
understand conflict and peacebuilding theory in a network reality. This will be my aim in this
theoretically driven paper, where I will discuss the basic concepts of power, network, peace and
conflict to develop a contemporary take on peacebuilding.

1.2. Methodology
In the following I will go through the methodological framework for my paper.

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1.2.1. Research problem

In the information age, communication is everything and everywhere. It takes the form of
identity or politics, it is about infrastructure or social relations. Communication is used as a
weapon and as peaceful mediation, for domination and for participation. Investigating
peacebuilding and conflict in the light of communication saturation requires an understanding
of the power structures at play.

To be more specific, my research problem is the following:

How can we theoretically assess conflict and peacebuilding in the information age?

The question springs from the fact that all social theory develops in a certain historical context.
When Johan Galtung first developed his peace theory, it was against the backdrop of the
Second World War, whereas information warfare and cyber-armament, propagandic discourse
and increasing limitations of freedom of speech are political means of today. My point of
departure is that communication saturates all spheres of society, and that some actors benefit
from more power over the communication than others. The aim is to add communication as an
element to peace theory.

My question falls into the category of the “‘Third Wave’ [of peace studies] in which key
concepts of peace can be used to delineate important operative distinctions across a vastly
diversified range of fields, in recognition of the diffuse and networked configurations of power”
(Lynch, 2015, p. 21f).

1.2.2. Motivation

The overall condition for social development is peace. The lack of connection between
academic fields addressing social and political issues which, in my view, are dependent on and
constituted by each other, has been the main motivation for choosing this topic. In

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Communication for Development, I sometimes miss the discussion of political power, just as
political science lacks a sensitivity of human interaction. But “peace studies is about the human
condition in general [...]regardless of how the causal chains or circles and spirals, or what not,
spin or weave their ways through the human manifold. The consequence of this broader
systemic view is that we must aim for transdisciplinarity across all the levels of the human
condition“ (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 132), so I will try to make my argumentation fit for
more than one aspect of life in the light of the present-day context.

There is still development to achieve across the world. I find it interesting to investigate the
processes and challenges of development and social change that also need to be addressed in
the Global North. Putting one’s own house in order is important to also maintain the legitimacy
of being a role-model (or soft imperialist, depending on which perspective one takes) in regard
to implementing development processes in the Global South.

1.2.3. Theoretical framework

To theoretically inspect how to view communication and peace in the interconnected society, I
will have to combine several theories. Often, research within Communication for Development
touches too lightly upon questions of more political character, but discussing peacebuilding is
highly a matter of power. Political science is the study of power, and political structures are
defining the frames for what can be done how, and which social change can take place.

In classical peacebuilding theory, power is only mentioned in passing, divided into four types:
military, economic, cultural and political (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p.17). How power is
enacted in these different manners is not explored. Because I see the use of power as the
foundation for conflict and peace, as well as for every other social state, I choose to focus on
how power can be understood at a more abstract level, as opposed to Galtung and Fischers’
instrumental categories of power.

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Communication is crucial to the distribution of power and thus long-term influence and
peacebuilding; therefore, it is timely to try and incorporate power and communication into
peace theory.

Simultaneously, in political questions there is not sufficient focus on the role of communication
as the background for conflict and peacebuilding, which is problematic when communication
and digitalization has changed the relationship across the political as well as social spheres. The
role of media in conflicts and conflict-resolution has gained increasing attention since the
1990s, with approaches such as conflict-sensitive and constructive journalism as a tool within
the area of media for peacebuilding (Betz, 2012).

Mediation, peace journalism are key tools in conflict transformation and rebuilding
communities, but the same mechanism is used negatively in information warfare through
misinformation and trolling, with different intentions. Can we see the information society as
such under the conceptual arch of conflict and peace?

In peace theory, peacebuilding can be seen as negative or minimalist peacebuilding (avoiding

violence) or positive or maximalist peacebuilding (preventing violence by solving the deeper
issues behind the conflict). To investigate peace by peaceful means, I will let Johan Galtung's
outline of the conflict cycle be the starting point. Within peace studies, one must understand
the underlying (potential) conflicts to be able to address them. As conflict is in reality a
measurement or test of power, it is also important to discuss the power mechanisms at work.

To go in depth with the investigation of the context of the phenomena, I will base my analysis
on Manuel Castells’ network theory, which sees power as communication and discourse - a
relational capacity to influence others through “construction of meaning on the basis of the
discourses through which social actors guide their action” (Castells, 2009, p. 9). I assess his
model critically, also touching the concept of a public sphere and the role of communication in
democratic deliberation and social change. This will add a layer of constructive approach,

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working as a theoretical basis for the argumentation that active civil participation is the better
solution for a society.

In my discussion, I will look at social mechanisms from different fields of communication,

including marketing theory. As peace deals with not only politics, but also sociology,
communication and cultural studies, we have to look at it in a broader light. “Rather than risk
failure, we may not even attempt complex responses to complex problems at all, thereby
reinforcing the tendency toward minimalist peacebuilding, which does not address underlying
causes and conditions” (Sandole, 2010, p. 10f). Therefore, I take the risk, using theories from
different fields: communication (communication studies), power (political science, sociology),
and peacebuilding (development studies) - in my view, exactly what is the strength of
Communication for Development as an academic field.

1.2.4. Research design

To see how we can think about peace and conflict in an interconnected society, I am doing the
daring move of writing an inductive analysis. I will investigate the basic dynamics at play in
societies - power and communication - and discuss how the concepts interact in a digitalized
network society, as well as how they constitute conflict and peacebuilding.

Based on a framework of network theory, I will investigate how communication has created
new power relations. The struggles to position oneself in the networks can give us a theoretical
approach to conflict understanding in the digital age. I am taking an inductive approach to
identify how different theories can be linked to understand the social processes underlying
escalation and violence, and further to see how this can add to the classical peace theory. My
discussion will, following the nature of an inductive study, draw on actual examples to place my
arguments in the present context. I will focus on the collective actors instead of on the
individual level, seen from a political perspective.

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This is an interdisciplinary approach, as I draw on theories from sociology, social sciences,
political science, communication, and marketing. In the SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative
Research, interdisciplinary research is defined as an approach that “integrates perspectives and
methods from two or more disciplines to investigate a topic or an issue” (Skinner, 2008, p. 448).
The classical interdisciplinary research is done in teams of experts from different fields, which is
expedient for complex social questions, and would be the optimal method for investigating a
subject like information warfare, which touches upon military studies, politics, IT,
communication, sociology, anthropology etc.

Due to the limitations of this project, I can only use my own different skills and implement
relevant theories to an extent that is meaningful.

I will divide my theoretical argumentation into sections according to Galtung’s critical-

constructivism which divides peace research into the sections “‘Why did it happen?’ ‘what is it
about?’ and ‘how can it be better?’ (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 129). On the other hand, I
take into account that the “obsession with causality” in researching public communication
(Hamelink, 2015, p. 40) is not necessarily applicable to such a complex process including several
. Therefore, I will not set up a causal model - because in reality, questions about communication
and peace are fluid or, at best, cyclical. Using the conflict cycle as a skeleton for developing my
argumentation, I will try to inspect each element and focus on how they interact.

1.2.5. Method and structure

My intention is to develop a model for thinking peacebuilding that considers the power
structures in network society. To get there, I will outline the classical peace theory to identify
the main elements of a conflict. I will discuss the concept of power in a network society, and
how communication can be seen as defining the society, as well as how the information
revolution changed social and political structures. This will be followed by a discussion applying
the results of my argumentation the peacebuilding model, and finally I will discuss how we can
understand the implications of the theoretical arguments in the real world.

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As this is an investigation of a social phenomenon (conflict) unique to the present context,
generalizability is not a goal as such. I try to make some general statements about the concepts
I am discussing, but seeing that they are defined by the present-day context, my definitions
might change over the next few years. “Notions such as trustworthiness, credibility,
authenticity, transferability, and plausibility are often cited as parallel criteria for quality
research” (Miller, 2008, p. 449), and I will put emphasis on thorough argumentation throughout
the whole text, to make my analytical points clear. I will not keep myself out of the analysis to
appear more objective, as I want to be transparent and credible, and the arguments are
influenced by my own bias.

My discussion is based on the ideological viewpoint that in a society, people should have equal
rights and possibilities. As democracy is the best model we have to ensure that people have a
say in what representatives do with the power they have been given, my analysis will be based
on the presumption that ensuring democratic rights for everyone will create a peaceful system.
This requires the rights for everyone, including the “enemy”, where Human rights is the best
internationally applicable tool for creating basis for peace. The Westphalian state model is not
necessarily the most adequate system of political power we have for a society that is not
limited to geopolitical boundaries, but it is still the model we are using, and therefore it is not
meaningful to discuss other and potential systems of power distribution.

1.2.6. Ontology

The ontological point of departure, in this paper, is (post)constructivist. Social constructions are
being discussed as power, communication, democracy and social change. In this paper, it is
even arguably said that power relations have changed with the information revolution. Thus,
my perception is that hard military, political or economic power is not the only type of
dominance, but that discourse and social relations can be equally influential on the world we
live in.

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On the other hand, I do not fully support the constructivist premise that everything is relative.
“Reality cannot solely exist in social – that is human - interaction. [...] We are actually able to
follow processes of construction, and to look into the different elements and materials that are
part of these construction works. It would make no sense to explain the construction of a
building when only looking into the social interactions.” (Knol, 2011, p.4). I assume that there
are some objective truths out there - for instance that military power is a real threat and not a
matter of perception, and that humans are built in a certain way which allows for generalized
assumptions of values, reactions and social processes.

This project - along with the whole field of development and peace studies - is based on a
normative framework. Instead of only focusing on what Galtung calls the diagnosis or the “is”, I
also focus on the “ought” (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 15).

Thus, I put myself in the post-constructivist category, as I believe that society is an objective
result of constructed truths - and that research and discourse is also part of a bigger picture.

1.2.7. Definitions

‘Information revolution’ is another term for the digital revolution, starting in the late 1990s
when access to the internet was becoming more common. It encompasses the ‘Web 2.0’ which
is the interactive internet with social platforms and networks, where participation is key
(Trester and Tannen, 2013).

I use the term ‘network’ interchangeably about the digital communication infrastructure
(internet, social platforms) and in terms of the social relations and how actors relate to each
other (Castells, 2009).

‘Democracy’ and ‘democratic’ are disputed concepts, and I do not refer solely to electoral
democracy, which is not a fulfilling measurement of the possibilities to participate in the

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society. I refer to ‘democracy’ as a societal model where there is the possibility to utter one's
point of view publicly towards the ones in power or for public deliberation - and to be heard.

1.2.8. Limitations

Books have been written about each of the topics I will combine in this brief assignment, and a
clear aim and limitation is therefore necessary. I will focus on the relations between collective
actors from a political perspective. This means a focus on (political) authorities and the
population/civil society as a unity, generalizing the concepts of states, people and democratic
dynamics.

I am aware of the huge differences between the level of information saturation, political crises
and the implementation of digital networks across the world. I will not go into specificities
about models of government, culture, resources and so on, albeit all these aspects are still
crucial to the overall problem. Thus, I will not dive into the discussion of the threat of a
neoliberal globalized economy and market powers towards democratic and peaceful thought
and practice - and thus also on social change and peaceful transformation. The digital divide
and the challenge of equal access to communication tools and media literacy will also not be
discussed, even though that is a very important factor in discussing active participation and
legitimization.

These choices are made to be able to develop a theoretical discussion, where basic
assumptions must be in place and generalized. Topics such as history, economy, technology,
social movements, religion, to mention some, are highly relevant in the discussion, and could
very well be included in more extensive research of this topic, which I only lay out the basics for
here.

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1.2.9. Reservations

My own background is from political science, civil society, the Danish foreign ministry, and
working in media. My discussion - and reluctance to focus only on social change without
addressing the political structures behind - is based on reflections and observations of use of
power that I have made. The insistence of connecting different disciplines comes from my
diverse experience, and the realization that no social phenomena can be understood solely
from a sociological or political view.

Further, I am writing this from my perspective as a Scandinavian based in one of the most
digitalized countries in the world. This means that my take on the network society might be
different than if it is assessed from other places.

Knowing that the different topics I am writing about are big areas of study, I cannot possibly
have gone through and included all relevant literature. I accept the possibility of having
overlooked something or reaching arguments similar to those already stated by others.

2. Peacebuilding and communication

“The strongest word in the world is ‘no’,” is a line in a Danish song from 1971 by Jesper Jensen.
In this song about resistance towards the oppressors, the message is clear: one single word can
make a change against injustice. You just have to say it, embody it. Communication is powerful
and consequential in the sense that it can influence and change situations and entire
structures.

Indeed, communication is crucial to ending social injustice. In fact, it is crucial to peacebuilding,

to conflict, to politics - to all social interaction. Couldry writes that “media [...] install the world
as ‘fact’ into everyday routines, and in ever-changing ways” (2012, p. 1). Communication
between actors - including the media - has always shaped the society we live in.

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The information revolution has moved much of our life from the physical to the non-physical
domain (Knol, 2011). Most things that shapes and constitutes society takes place in the digital
sphere, and in this domain, we are connected with more actors than what has ever been
possible before. This creates a very different context for understanding conflicts than when
peace theory was first developed by Johan Galtung in the 1960s.

In times of a ‘democratic crisis’ (Freedom House, 2019) resonating across all spheres of society,
it is time to review how we can understand conflict cycles and peacebuilding in a context of
communication and interconnection.

2.1. Peace theory

To address the matter of peacebuilding in a communicated world, we need a brief outline of
the classical theory as a point of departure.

In peace studies, there are two perceptions of peace: Negative peace as the absence of
(intended) physical or psychological violence, and positive peace is a constructive state of being
that deals “with the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of a conflict which might
develop, or has developed, into manifest violence.” (Sandole, 2010, p. 9). Thus, positive peace
is when structures and cultures support and reinforce peace through justice and equality
(Sandole, 2010; Galtung and Fischer, 2013; Hoffmann and Hawkins, 2015).

Conflict arises when two (or more) actors have incompatible goals. Blocked goals lead to
othering and polarization between the actors, and if this problematic relation to the other
remains an untransformed conflict, the frustration will lead to polarization and ‘othering’,
eventually leading to intended harm to other human beings (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 15ff).
The goals are defined by the conditions that actors exist and operate within: “Nature is in us,
and around us; Culture is in us as internalized values and norms; and Structure is around us as
institutionalized, positive and negative, sanctions” (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 16). When the

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goals are incompatible, and/or you have violent cultures or structures that allow for harm to be
done, you will have outbreaks of violence. An example of actuality is the ‘Yellow jackets’-
movement in France, where the goals of the government (impose new taxes) are incompatible
with the goals of the people (paying less taxes). The structures of inequality are allowing for
(economic) ‘violence’ towards the working class’ basic needs, and combined with a culture of
popular resistance it lead to physical confrontations.

The definition of violence is the use, or threat, of power upon someone to cause sentient
beings “any avoidable insult to basic human needs” (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 35), these
basic needs being defined as survival, wellness, freedom and identity. The intended harm,
physical or psychological, is the violent outcome of untransformed conflicts. Violence, and not
conflict, is the opposite of peace. Violence exists in three types: direct violence, executed by
violent actors, structural violence indirectly or directly imposed by violent structures, or cultural
violence when a violent culture legitimizes direct and structural violence (Galtung and Fischer,
2013, p. 35).

To get from a violent situation to a state of positive peace, conflict transformation has to take
place. Conflict transformation should be peaceful, as violence breeds violence, and forcefully
suppressing violence will probably not resolve any conflict in the long run. This is, obviously,
unique to each type of conflict, and the more complex and institutionalized a conflict is, the
more extensive a model for peacebuilding becomes.

Peaceful conflict transformation should focus on the roots and causes of violent behaviour; the
conflict itself, the culture, the structures and the actors. The main way of creating peace is
mainly through means of communication: through mediation, through journalism and media
that promotes a peaceful culture and through an extensive work to reconcile, forgive, rebuild
stability and together create a “new reality accommodating all parties in the sense that they
find that outcome preferable to the alternatives (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 71). Working for

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positive peace is only manageable in the long run to avoid future violence if negative peace
through absence of violence is present.

For positive peace, one has to work actively, because “genuine pacifism is transformative and
activist, employing nonviolent means of social and personal change to resist oppression, war,
and injustice and to promote personal and social moral integrity and radical, peaceful means of
transforming conflicts and actors.” (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 8). Peacebuilding can be
defined as a long-term approach to avoid future violence. This can be reactive and proactive -
although often reactive, as situations develop and the contexts prevailing conflicts are never
the same - and is a comprehensive and complex process involving many fields of expertise
(Sandole, 2010).

In summary, nature, culture and structure lay the background for an actor’s goal. A conflict
develops when actors’ goals are incompatible, and if it is not transformed, polarization and
othering will take place until violence breaks out in the shape of insult to the basic needs.
Transformation takes place through peacefully establishing negative peace (absence of
violence) and working with the roots of violence to create a more sustainable, peaceful society.

Having the means to start a conflict as well as working with conflict transformation requires an
ability to both act and influence. In the next section, I will review the definition of power in an
interconnected society.

2.2. Power
Conflicts, hot or cold, are a struggle of power and domination. So is peacebuilding, where the
peaceful ways and approaches have to conquer the violent ones.

Manuel Castells defines power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to
influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the

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empowered actor’s will, interests, and values.” (Castells, 2009, p. 10). This mechanism takes
place across all social spheres.

Power cannot exist in isolation, as it is implicit in the concept that it is exercised over someone
or something. Further, social structures cannot exist without some sort of power relations.
Everyone is connected to others in social systems as well as a part of some bigger structural
organization or hierarchy. This means that we are all bound to be involved in power
relationships. Interconnectivity and communicative structures constitute networks with
“patterns of contact” or “flows of information” (Castells, 2009, p. 20), and in a digitalized world,
everyone with a smartphone is a (potential) node in a network. The internet connects people,
and from your phone, you can hypothetically connect with and influence/be influenced by
anyone anywhere in the world.

“The most fundamental form of power lies in the ability to shape the human mind. The way we
feel and think determines the way we act, both individually and collectively” (Castells, 2009, p.
3). To shape people’s minds, you have to change what they believe and think. In discourse
theory, knowledge and communication are intertwined, and discourse is to “look beyond the
commu-nication of intentional meaning to all those practices that shape our social behaviours
and beliefs” (Nunan et al., 2014, p. 1). Therefore, communication is not only about language
transporting information, but discourse takes place within a given context and is shaped by and
shapes the context it takes place in, influencing practices and how we perceive the world. It is
the discourses that frame the limits and possibilities of action within the networks, and
discourses are communication - thus power is discursive, and discourse is power (Castells,
2009).

Castells identifies four different types of power in networks: Networking power, which is the
power to include and/or exclude people in the global networks. Network power is the power
setting the standards of the network, or the ‘protocols of communication’. Networked power is
the power within each network - which is different according to which network we look at, as it

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is defined by the networks. Network-making power is the power to constitute and (re)program
networks, as well as connecting different networks (Castells, 2009, p. 42ff). If we move this to
the non-physical sphere, this is all applicable to the online communication networks.

In network theory, “power in the network society is communication power” (Castells, 2009, p.
53), and this power is distributed across the “entire realm of human action” (Castells, 2009, p.
15). As societies are organized through social (or structural) relations, institutional power
makes us organize and interact according to common, shared perceptions and values. There are
concentrations of power in some relational structures based on the enforcement of domination
- such as the state. The political organization of societies into states is founded on the
acceptance of other actors that states should have monopoly on violence as one type of power.
“Power is relational, domination is institutional” (Castells, 2009, p. 15). The internet constitutes
the backdrop to the whole network society in shape of the infrastructure for all
communications, and therefore it also constitutes the whole global network, underlying
everything. Political institutions are also networks within the global network, and they are now
less isolated, as geography and hierarchy is - in theory -not limiting the network.

Because domination by coercion only creates an unstable power relationship, Castells claims
that there is mutuality in stable power relations. This suggests that the subject is accepting the
situation and has some possibility or option to resist, and if this resistance develops to be
stronger than the acceptance and compliance, the whole power relationship will change and
shift (Castells, 2009, p. 3, p. 11).

In political theory it is common to separate the concept of power into soft and hard power.
Hard power is the influence on actions through coercion by the threat or use of violence or
sanctions (physical, psychological, economical, structural). Soft power is to influence actions
through attraction. This power comes from creating a positive image of the actor or persuasive,
non-violent measures, which makes others want to collaborate, copy or change (Nye and
Welch, 2014; Hayden, 2012), appealing to cultural and value-based elements through public

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diplomacy, culture etc. This distinction is useful also in the definition of power in networks, as
the communication power can be defined as “hard” in the case of technically excluding actors
from a network such as censorship, or simply the control over the networks such as the social
platform companies. “Soft” network power with attraction as influence on other actors also is
highly important and is what lays the foundation for polarization (“this is better than the
other”) but also the foundation of the existence and general function of media, or the common
acceptance of ‘protocol of communication’ in any society.

In an interconnected society, power can be seen as influence between, within and behind a
network. Hard power - the capacity to coerce through violence or sanctions - and soft power -
the capacity to influence through attraction and persuasion - are mostly implemented through
communication.

2.3. Communication
Power is the relation between actors. Yet, the power relation is based on communication. In
this view, it is almost impossible to separate the two concepts, as they constitute each other.
Communication exist in the shape of social media, digital systems, mass media, culture, the
internet as well as the interpersonal communication.

In a networked world where everything is based on, deriving from and constituting
communication, we have the same concept - communication - as structure, process, tool, cause
and effect. We have defined power as influential capacity, but communication is what
constitutes this capacity. Therefore I find it meaningful to operationalize the concept of
communication into two overall categories:

The instrumental aspect of communication is what constitutes the act of communicating. It is

the concrete elements that makes distribution of information and messages between two or
more actors. Discourse is the backdrop to social and political behaviour - not only the linguistic

20
discourse, but also how communication creates social and cultural structures. This is the frames
for the “space of action” (Couldry, 2012) in which communication - and politics and social
interaction - takes place.

Instrumental (concrete) Discursive (abstract)

● Infrastructure (Networks and technical equipment) ● Norms

● Process (flow of information between A and B) ● Culture and language
● Tool (distribution of messages and information) ● Relations
● Language ● Influence on others

Table 1.1. Operationalization of communication.

The instrumental communication is what gives actors the possibility to use power, and the
discursive communication is the use of power and the socially constructed effects hereof. The
latter shapes the former and vice versa, and they are not mutually exclusive, but overlapping,
as they are aspects of the same phenomenon. The instrumental aspect is necessary for the
discursive aspect to take place. This distinction can be linked to direct and indirect use of
power.

In the light of the power definition, both aspects of communication are necessary to
understand the effects. The weight on each of the communication aspects varies in the
different uses of power. Excluding someone from the network addresses the instrumental
communication - either if it is to speak another language or disconnecting them from the
internet. When it comes to network power, the objective is to influence actors, potentially to
change the discourse of the network. In social media campaigns (e.g. #MeToo), the message,
the platform and the language are the instrumental aspect, and the normative change in
addressing sexual harassment is the discursive aspect of communication. It should be noted
that the aspects are not exclusive, and they are both always present.

21
In conclusion, we can see communication as the basis for any power relationship. The
instrumental communication and the discursive communication are two aspects of the same
phenomenon, but can shed light on how power is used.

2.4. Actors
In network theory, every node in a network is an actor. In the communication perspective, one
can regard everyone with instrumental communicative power as an actor, but as power
relations are defined by reciprocity, the ones receiving communication or subject to discourse
are also actors. In the communication networks, actors do not need to be factual, but can be
constructed and still have power - artificial intelligence is for instance taking up place as
fictitious actors with a very real power to influence, such as chatbots.

Actors can be individual or collective, institutional or actually networks themselves, depending

on which type of communication power you look at. Anyone taking part in communication can
be considered an actor. Social issues, though, should keep the focus on human actors, as they
are (so far still) the ones who control the non-human actors.

Actors can be individuals, but also people organized in groups or communities where they
represent one ‘voice’. Actors are those who influence the networks, either in the sense of
influencing the overall discourse and way of communicating, or through legal framework or
concrete digital infrastructure.

2.4.1. Power over the networks

In the communicative network society, the power is concentrated on those who control the
networks (Castells, 2009), because they have the influence to manage both the instrumental
and the discursive communication. States and political entities (such as international
collaboration and conventions) control the legal framework within which the infrastructure
(e.g. Facebook) exists. The political structures and laws are defining the frames for what can be

22
done, how and which social change takes place. It is worth noting the circularity in the fact that
companies owning the networks also have strong influence on politics - and thus the legal
framework. This very important discussion will not be addressed here.

2.4.2. Power within the networks

Within the communication networks, there is hypothetically complete freedom in the space of
action. But this is only hypothetically, because the networks also create a hierarchical or inequal
structure in the sense that some actors have more power than others.

In regards of the online networks, conceptualized as social media platforms, there are two
overall capitalistic mechanisms which give actors power: The model in which the ones that ‘sell’
most [content adapted to the trends and discourses online], ‘get’ most [hits, likes, visibility,
influential capacity]. As well as the psychological bias that you as an information consumer
always wants more of the same, or the information that confirms your position/pleases you.
This – the internet algorithms and the social network culture - creates a positive feedback loop
which reinforces the power to influence actors with strong capital. That gives actors most able
to adapt to the network reality in terms of the instrumental communication, most discursive
impact.

This communicative capital, in the Bourdieusian terms of power, is thus the power to influence.
In a network society, the ones who better communicate and take their turn changing or
reinforcing the discourse, are the ones making an impact. The operationalization of this capital
is visibility. Without audience, no one can hear you scream.

New tools will reproduce the existing social divides (Eimhjellen and Ljunggren, 2017) - or create
new ones. Therefore, digitalization has not created more equality - now there are other factors
that give power and social capital. All in all, the communicative capital is what positions some
actors above others within the networks, and this capital is not equal to or defined by political
power.

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2.3.4. Power between networks

There are actors that connect or create bridges between different networks. They are often
defined as gatekeepers (Castells, 2009; Sandholm, 2015), as they have the power to create
networks and open doors of connection. These are per definition actors that represent
different networks. An example is influencers (bloggers, instagrammers, youtubers) who
represent themselves as individuals within a network of like-minded people, but also represent
the commercial interests of companies (Sandholm, 2015). Politicians online are another
example, as they represent the political interests of the authorities, but they are also individuals
and citizens, thus connecting different networks. The same goes for NGOs who represent the
interests of some people and talk on behalf of others in the public and political spheres. Most
actors are gatekeepers as they all take up a position in several networks. The media is key here,
because they are the main gatekeepers communicating between networks.

In the following I will focus on the collective actors, and not discuss the individual aspect as
such.

3. The network landscape

Communication happens in a 'space of action' (Couldry, 2014). This space is publicly accessible,
and the space where interactions take place. Earlier, the capacity to influence - the
communication power - was concentrated on political and economic actors who could control
which information and what messages were distributed to the wide audience.

With the expansion of the internet, this power is diffused through the network structures, as so
many more actors have the possibility to take an influential position and use their relational
capacity actively (Weiss et al., 2013). This creates a whole new reality for many aspects of civic

24
life. As far as the question of power and politics is concerned, it brings up new problems to
investigate, theoretically and practically.

3.1. Goals from communication

Actors’ goals come from “basic needs derived from Nature, values from Culture and interests
from Structure” (Galtung, 2007, p. 16), so we have three aspects from which conflict could
potentially derive from.

In the following I will investigate the role of communication in the framework of nature, culture
and structure and the potential conflicting goals.

3.1.1. Nature - basic needs

In peace theory, Nature is defined as the basic needs or drives that we as humans have. In the
network society, the traditional naturalistic perception of survival does not necessarily apply.

For instance, many vital functions have been digitalized (and increasingly so). Banks, healthcare,
jobs are now more than ever relying on communication and interconnection. The information
revolution has made it possible to live off of communication (selling information, handling and
managing information, producing information, distributing information). It is also a way to
obtain vital remedies - for instance through apps used in agriculture. In this view, it is in many
ways crucial to survival. Important information and warnings, as well as keeping in touch with
family and loved ones, is an elementary need for most people.

Raising the level of abstraction from Galtung’s original model, I have argued that actors can also
be political entities in a network society, and for a political entity (or even system, taking the
discursive viewpoint), to survive, influence is vital. Any socially constructed part of society relies
on communication to keep existing.

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3.1.2. Culture - values

The goals can also derive from Culture, which defines the values of actors. With the information
revolution, values have somehow been challenged, as actors suddenly were exposed to so
many more different positions through extensive communication.

In one way, this has paved the way for much more interaction and collaboration than possible
before in very many spheres - culture, travelling, trade - creating acceptance and tolerance.

On the other hand, political tensions are increasing across the world, and polarization,
nationalism and populism is on the rise. This can be seen as a counter-reaction to the increased
globalization and interconnection. Excluding concepts of nation, territory, nations and
culture/religion are growing stronger, identity politics and geopolitics - and increasing conflicts -
being a reaction to increased fluidity, interconnection and globalization (Hylland Eriksen, 2014).

Specifically related to value is the question of how to communicate in an global network. There
are strong positions on freedom of speech conflicting with rights to integrity. A good example is
the Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005, when the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten
published satirical drawings of the Prophet, creating a diplomatic crisis with several Muslim
countries (Wikipedia, 2019). Another point related to this is the criticism of the Western bias in
the communication networks as well as in the international politics.

3.1.5. Structure - interests

The Structure defines actors’ interests. The internet dominates all spheres of communication
and is now where everything goes on, challenging classical structural divisions such as time,
place, status and power. Many theories about power and communication are based on the
premise that there is a civil body of citizens responding to the political powers as separate
entities (and in functional democracies, the political powers respond to their citizens). Seeing
the power of communication from this perspective, the mass media is entirely dominating

26
these power relations, and the audience is a passive recipient who can be influenced by
whoever is in the dominant position.

The information revolution, the technology and accessibility has made instant communication
possible, giving each person possibility the power to communicate with the rest of the world.
Everyone is trying to find their place in the new communicated network-based reality, relating
to each other as active consumers of information. The key word in the ‘Web 2.0’ is participation
(Trester and Tannen, 2013). With the internet, the communication is no longer a one-way
process, as we actively participate and contribute with our own information as well as select
content on a much more specified level than with the classical media. We are constantly
presented to information from the internet, and we constantly participate in what Castells calls
“mass self-communication” (2009).

In marketing theory, the change in how people relate to communicated content has long been
the central topic. ”Consumers are turning away from the traditional sources of advertising:
radio, television, magazines, and newspapers. Consumers also consistently demand more
control over the media consumption” (Mangold and Faulds, 2009, p. 360). People actively
chose to consume information by people they identify with online (Kenvold, 2014). The result is
that in the constructed networks such as social media, users who possess a high level of
credibility through the acknowledgement of other users (for instance through likes and
followers or peers), have the power to shape opinion (Sandholm, 2015). We consume
information based on preferences, and we communicate with whom we choose to include in
our network.

The increased possibilities of interaction, the possibilities to engage - and make a bigger
resistance to power as well as disengage - in the society has skewed the power balance. Going
from being mostly passive recipients of communication to being more selective and outspoken,
citizens take a more powerful position vis-a-vis the communicator/authority, as well as use
their own influential capacity towards other consumers.

27
The goals deriving from the structure are interests related to connectivity and ability to
communicate. For political actors, the interest is to have support, either through
communicating with citizens or through shaping the structures - and excluding others. The
overarching interest in a network society is communication through connection.

The structure is defined by the communicative networks themselves as well as the legal
framework - and discursive elements. This construction is favourable to networks such as the
neoliberal market, but it is not suitable for political hierarchies nor for geographical limitations.

3.2. Incompatible goals

What we can draw from the above discussed is that in the information age, the power to
communicate and influence is fundamental to the nature, structure and culture from which
goals derive. Because communication plays a crucial role across all three categories, it
drastically increases the chance of incompatible goals. Conflicting goals of any origin can play
out within the networks, between networks and behind networks. Within networks there will
either be interests in being connected, disconnected or to participate and influence.

The communicative power is the core means of policy-making and society. All social interaction
happens through some sort of communication. We act according to discourses that majority
agrees on, and social change happens when someone (successfully) challenges the discourse.
That means that the overarching goal is the power to communicate - for whichever objective
that might be. This can be compatible with other actors wanting the same, but if the goal is to
dominate the discourse (and thus the structures of the network), this can only be achieved by
one actor at a time1.

1
Assuming that the wanted outcomes are diverse, so collaboration is not an option.

28
There can only be one dominating discourse within the networks. Influence on the discourse is
connected to the instrumental aspect of communication, and anyone with the necessary
equipment and skills to distribute and receive information can potentially have goals conflicting
with others.
Societies are always organized with some sort of political power distribution, in general states
with a type of representative power, who have an influence on the other types of power
(cultural, economic, social). Because we are dealing with different types of power in the
different types of networks, we have conflicting goals across many spheres.

3.2.1. Conflicting goals within the networks

In regard to politics, the premise of classical understandings of power - as well as about media
and communication - is that there is a hierarchical relationship between the actors. Noam
Chomsky’s classic Manufacturing Content critically questions the role of media, based on
discourse theory: “The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols
to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate
individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the
institutional structures of the larger society” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988/1994, p. 1). This
deterministic view building on marxist perceptions of people as a mass and not as individuals,
sees the capacity to influence in the hands of mass media, and whoever ruling over it. The
government (or the moneymakers) will decide what and how to tell the people, thus shaping
the general discourse. If you were of a different opinion, you would be subject to the general
discourse and may have to adapt to it.

In political theory, the public sphere is the communicative space where public deliberation
takes place - and ideally is listened to by politicians. This is what ensures the sovereign power
the “normative legitimacy [along with the] political efficacy of public opinion” (Fraser, 2007,
p.1). The political legitimacy comes through the possibility to participate in the debate, and
shape an informed opinion based on media-made deliberation. Because the power-holders are
given their power by the people, they should respond to their requirements. Many points of

29
critique have been shared of this theory since Habermas first presented his ideas in the 1960s.
Among others that the model is discriminatory and not applicable to the modern, international
societies, where politics as well as political subjects are not defined by nation states (Fraser,
2007). Yet the concept is still in use, and that is because it is a useful ideal. If people are not
heard, the powerholders lose credibility, and thus trust in that they deserve to hold their
position of power crumbles. The public sphere is also a space for citizens to exchange ideas,
organize and enact their political rights.

The audience has not always had the possibility to engage in the public debate, nor to choose
which networks to be a part of. Couldry uses the metaphor “supersaturation” about media in
society, which “would mean the unstable, non-equilibrium state when social life is filled with
media contents at every level owing to [spatial and temporal] pressures” (Couldry, 2012, p. 5-
6). This statement is also true when applied to the participatory media which spreads the
power out through the network society, moving it away from the conventional media. In the
information age, the public sphere is not traditional newspapers, but one can call the whole
internet a public sphere, as it is information accessible by everyone. It is harder for the
authorities to influence the citizens and maintain control over the networks of relations - and it
remains now easier for outsiders to challenge the established structures.

As a consequence, there are underlying struggles conflict within the networks to shape the
discourse, creating an unstable situation in established political systems.

3.2.2. Conflicting goals between the networks

International relations have traditionally been based on the separation between states and
between authorities and citizens. Today, the lines are blurred by the interconnectivity, as
networks are not limited to political borders. The goals of one state is bound to be incompatible
to the goal of other states as well as their civil society - and vice versa. Many of the interests of
one state - for instance geopolitical or economic - have an impact on others in the bigger
network of international politics.

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In Fraser’s discussion of the problem of the public sphere in a transnational political reality, she
argues that the traditional power theories do not suffice, as they are based on the concept of
isolated (and homogenous) nation-states: “The challenge [is] to create new, transnational
public powers [and] to make them accountable to new, transnational public spheres” (Fraser,
2007, p. 16). When it comes to structural questions such as political models, there are
conflicting discourses between the people and their authorities, but also across between
international actors. Because power is relational, and all actors are included in different
networks, it is advantageous for a state to influence others to follow their discourse. This way,
there is less risk of being challenged from within or externally through civil or political foreign
actors.

Based on the nature of the nation-states, international political goals can be more easily
achieved from within the enemy’s network. If there is a possibility to intervene with the
electorate or create political unrest. In hybrid warfare, “the essence of information
confrontation focuses on this constant information struggle between adversaries,” (Iasiello,
2017, p. 52) with the goal to dominate people outside one’s political borders.

There are also examples of where international conventions conflict with the local interests and
create new issues (e.g. the Danish debate about withdrawing from the Human Rights’
conventions (Ingvorsen, 2018)).

3.2.3. A fundamental political crisis

I propose that in an interconnected network society, the power divisions have shifted: There
are no longer geographical borders for civil participation and/or political influence, and there is
no clear division between the actors: civil society, governments, companies and organizations.
All the lines are blurred, as the fluidity that came with the postmodern society and information
revolution (see Bauman, 2000) also saturate the spheres of power. There are different
discourses ruling each network, and within each of them there is a dominating discourse, but

31
the discourses controlling the networks and gatekeepers have the possibility to influence the
discourse across networks.

There is a struggle of who has the dominating discourse - and thus it is a question of power.
When several actors have as the goal to hold the power in the communicative networks, the
tensions cut across different networks and constellations. Power of communication as a goal is
incompatible if there is more than one actor holding it - and in a digitalized network society,
very many actors claim it.

Thus, there is a fundamentally existential conflict for power in the political sphere between
authorities and political subjects, where the power-holders are challenged by the sudden
access to influence by other actors. Simultaneously, the borderless communication networks
connect everyone and thus - on a philosophical, but also existential level - challenges the
nation-state. This is used in international conflict between states and other political actors. This
is some sort of circular, multidimensional issue, where communication and discourse are being
used for violent means which potentially damage a lot of people in the long run.

4. Conflicts and violence in the networks

The result of the power diffusion is a crisis of positioning within the states. Political actors are
trying to reclaim their control over their subjects, either by adapting to the new network
realities (“Twitter politics”, and the ‘personification’ of political and public figures), or trying to
take over the public sphere by coercive means, limiting the free flow of communication through
censorship and increased control of the internet.

Simultaneously, more traditional struggles for power take place in the shape of geopolitical
conflicts. The contemporary geopolitical conflicts are (mostly) rooted in identity politics
(religion, soft imperialism, history, ethnicity), which is a question of culture and values – and
therefore a question of discourse.

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4.1. Communicative violence
Any tool can be a weapon in the wrong hands. The digital revolution and all the possibilities it
gave for giving a voice to the oppressed, for facilitating civil engagement and activism, and for
the spreading of knowledge, are also being used for other, anti-democratic, “anti-dialogue” and
less progressive goals.

Communication is a double-edged sword, just like the networks are. Terrorism is the example
of communication and networks used for the worst kind of violence: The threat of violence
(Webel and Galtung, 2015, p. 8).

Recalling the four types of power in networks (networking power, network power, networked
power, network-making power (see p. 18-19)) in light of Galtung’s definition of violence as
unnecessary harm to people’s basic needs, one could argue that abuse of these communicative
powers is violence. Power is omnipresent and not necessarily oppressive, so the distinction
between power and violence are the words unnecessary and abuse. This is a wide (and, one
could argue, not objective) definition, as it spans from psychological torture to cyber-bullying
and terror.

If we also include the right to communicate on the list of basic needs, violence can be for
instance using network power or networking power to create a violent discourse and culture,
network-making power to program networks to do harm to people’s integrity or individual
freedoms, or abusing networking power to keep certain actors out against their will.

In a study of Russian warfare, following tools were identified:

“[P]ropaganda (black, gray, and white); intelligence (specifically information collection);

analysis (media monitoring and situation analysis); organization (coordinating and
steering channels and influencing media to shape the opinion of politicians and mass
media); and other combined channels. In terms of influence operations, Panarin
identified information warfare vehicles such as social control; social maneuvering;

33
 information manipulation; disinformation; purposeful fabrication of information; and
lobbying, blackmail, and extortion” (Iasiello, 2017, p. 52).

These means of communicative violence play with the different network powers, especially
attempting to influence the discourse within networks. It is difficult to separate the three
categories of violence in communication, because they constitute each other, but let’s give it a
try:

4.1.1. Structural violence

In terms of violent structures, this is relatable to the network itself as well as the discourse.
Critical deliberation can be limited because of algorithms building on positive feedback
combined with the self-selective behaviour when we as consumers of information choose what
we take in. This is creating so-called echo-chambers of communication where our opinions gets
reaffirmed, which in the end radicalize and polarize (Bauman, 2016). The positive feedback
mechanism is abused by powerholders, because politicians get their support from the people,
and more radical politicians get their votes from feeding into these echo-chambers (and/or
extracting knowledge about the voters as in the case of Cambridge Analytica).

It is also one of the mechanisms that is abused internationally in information warfare. As an

example, Russia is trying to enhance political divisions through the use of trolls and
misinformation with the goal to destabilize countries within the EU (e.g. Ukraine) (Lucas and
Pomerantsev, 2016). This is a way to use the structures of networks to undermine networks
from within.

As it is written in an analysis of information warfare, “the broad nature of these activities views
offensive information campaigns more as influencing agents than as destructive actions, though
the two are not mutually exclusive. Simply put, the information space lends information
resources, including “weapons” or other informational means, to affect both internal and

34
external audiences through tailored messaging, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns”
(Iasello, 2017, p. 51).

4.1.2. Cultural violence

A violent culture is a culture that allows for structural and direct violence. It refers to the
subconscious attitudes, values and norms of actors, which in the network reality are based on
the underlying discourse shaping behaviour. The self-selective participation and information
consumption in many networks reinforces the actor’s original point of view and attitudes
(Kenvold, 2014). This can support polarization and othering if one is not exposed to different
positions and perspectives.

The bubble-mentality can eliminate the trust towards other actors. This has been pointed out
as a key factor in the Brexit referendum (Allen, 2016). In the case of decreased trust in
institutions, it can ultimately allow for violent outbreaks. Polarization makes dialogue difficult.
Public deliberation and disagreement is positive in a democratic society, as it is where change
and progress takes place (see Mouffe, 2013). Debating and disagreeing also makes people feel
ownership over politics and societal issues (Mouffe in Evans et al., 2001), as long as it doesn’t
break the foundations of the system. “This is the basis of my distinction between the
‘adversary’ and the ‘enemy’. The adversary – with whom one has an agonistic relationship – is
someone with whom one agrees about the principles underpinning the organization of society,
but with whom one disagrees about their Interpretation” (Mouffe in Evans et al., 2001, p. 12).
Othering and polarization exist in all social areas, but only exposing oneself to like-minded
people and opinions, and rejecting different arguments, can reinforce the divisions.

As for the question of the elementary discourse in the network society, there is also a challenge
in the anonymity of the communication networks. The information revolution blurs the line
between war and politics and who is actually exercising power over whom, not only
theoretically, but also in practical terms. It is hard to identify violators and abusers, and this
makes it hard to hold people accountable. War is not necessarily a major costly investment

35
anymore, and one cannot assume that it will be the ‘last resort’ for actors to position
themselves - either internationally and nationally. In addition, actors do not always know who is
being violent towards them, and politically this is difficult when trying to avoid conflict (or fight
back, if that is the intention), and for citizens one does not know who is violating one’s rights or
needs.

4.1.3. Direct violence

Cyberattacks can damage infrastructure or destroy, distort and abuse information, with very
severe consequences. Censorship is another use of hard communication power, controlling the
access to information as well as the sharing of opinions. An example is the Ukrainian
government’s prohibition of the Russian social network vKontakte within Ukraine after Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Coynash, 2018). Instrumental use of communication as direct
violence always has a discursive aspect as well: When attacking or impeding vital
communicative infrastructure, the abstract effect is damaged trust in other actors - challenging
the basic premise for any relation, and thus the network society itself.

There are also other kinds of violence that are not instrumental, but still used directly towards
other nodes in the network. “As information is generally regarded as a soft power, it may be
most effectively implemented in times other than force-on-force military conflict where,
depending on its intent and objectives, information can be used to inform, persuade, threaten,
or confuse audiences.” (Iasiello, 2017, p. 60). Whilst these words are written specifically about
information warfare, it might as well be true in other situations of exercising power, such as
politics in general. Castells does not address the illegitimate intrusion into a network, although
this falls under direct violence.

There is a ‘grey zone’ in use of non-coercive communicative measures, such as means of

attraction (Hayden, 2012) that influence subjects negatively in the long run. Negative media
coverage could be a suggestion, because it might change the behaviour and mind of the
audience into something that is less constructive for society.

36
We have to be clear on our moral philosophy on the discussion of violence. Ignorance - for
instance unwillingly spreading untrue information, or lack of capacity to identify it - can be as
damaging as intentional dissemination of lies and mistrust. Addressing human actors, who per
definition will err, I think it is meaningful to let the intention be defining for what is violent
behaviour.

5. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the networks

Conflict is composed by two elements: Crisis and opportunity (Galtung, 2013). Now it is time to
return to the opportunities for peaceful change.

Just like the network and communication power can be used for damage, it can also be used for
good, and it is shaped by the actors using the power. Because social relations and discourse are
fluid and non-linear concepts, the peacebuilding elements should not be seen as separate
initiatives.

5.1. Communicative peace

Positive peace is achieved through peaceful conflict transformation which deals with the causes
and conditions that could pave the way to unproductive confrontations. We have now seen
how power in the communication networks can be the root and means to exercise violence.
The underlying causes for conflict is a struggle for power in the form of influence. To create
positive peace and a society that promotes “social and moral integrity” (Webel and Galtung,
2007), we have to think across structures, cultures and actors in the network.

Galtung identifies three categories of peace: Direct Peace is the combination of positive and
negative

37
peace, the absence of violence and the presence of cooperation; Structural peace is the
absence of exploitation and a structure and presence of equity and equality; Cultural peace is
the absence of justification and violent culture, and the presence of a culture of peace and
dialogue (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 30f). Depending on the specific situation, the initiatives
regarding mediation, dialogue and reconciliation from classical peacebuilding theory are useful
to apply.

To get to the point of conflict transformation, Mitchell suggests the following: Change leaders;
change leaders’ and followers’ minds; changing strategies, policies and behaviour; or changing
parties’ environments (Mitchell, 2005, p. 16). In terms of avoiding direct violence such as cyber-
attacks and misinformation, this has to be solved on a political level.

“Goals are positively coupled (harmonious, compatible), negatively coupled (disharmonious,

incompatible), or decoupled, if pursuit of one is productive, counterproductive or indifferent to
pursuit of others” (Galtung, 2007, p. 16). The overall objective of peacebuilding would be then
to make actors see that their goals can be modified into compatible - through changing the
context and, in the end, the discourse.

Peaceful transformation requires a change of behaviour for all the actors involved in conflicts.
As networks are made up of actors, these actors should influence the structures and cultures,
also within the communicative sphere. The reason is that one cannot count on political powers
(decision-makers) to be working in people’s best interest - and there are reasons to maintain
such skepticism. Structures are based on an underlying discourse, and they will slowly adapt if
the discourse persistently changes.

5.2. Tolerant networks

Nothing indicates that the complexity of social interaction will decrease; therefore, the overall
focus in peacebuilding should be on the balance of communication power. In Mouffe’s agonistic

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democracy, conflict and disagreement is the bearer of development and progress. That means
that we do not go so far as to disagree with the common rules. Adding this to a network
perspective, this implies that we can challenge the use of power relations (and rightfully so),
but we should not disrupt the trust they are built on.
Every person is a gatekeeper between networks, and to maintain a balanced distribution of the
network-powers, a democratic model should be the basis for all networks. Ensuring equal
access to the networks, the protection of rights to participate and communicate, as well as to a
healthy digital public sphere is indeed key to stability.

In terms of institutionalized power structures, this corresponds to a democratically organized

society. In representative systems, the subjects have voluntarily given someone else the
permission to exercise power and thus shape society on their behalf. If communication is
power, and this power distributed across all actors in the network, the general objective must
to be a society in which people have equal possibility to engage with others.

Dialogue and mediation are key to any conflict transformation. The communicative polarization
is a challenge to peacebuilding, when dialogue is the main tool for settling conflicts and creating
a new, common reality. In terms of instrumentality, this requires that we challenge the social
media bubbles and create platforms where we are exposed to differences. There is a need to
diversify the public debate and address the dissimilarities and conflicting opinions through
dialogue. There is a fine line of intentional power use such as manipulation, and then the use of
attraction to make actors do something that is used violently in the longer run (e.g. giving up
your privacy to get access to online features, and then in the long run, abuses can be observed).
The impact of misinformation and decreasing trust can be reduced by improved media literacy,
so consumers critically assess information.

For a ‘culture of collaboration’ (Galtung and Fischer, 2013) we need relationships (albeit
defined by power) built on trust. One of the key effects of the power struggle in the network

39
reality - and basic for the political crises in the West - is the crumbling of the trust that is the
very foundation of a functional, peaceful society.

5.2. Constructive discourses

The defining factor in the process of communication is, no matter the distribution of power,
that there is a communicator and a recipient. For the message communicated to have an
impact here has to be credibility in it. If it is power enacted through threats of violence, the
message will only have effects if the recipient believes in the capacity of the communicator to
actually do some harm. The effect of attraction in soft power is also only real when the
recipient believes in what is communicated and believes that the image of the communicator is
honest and credible (Dinesen, 2008).

What information we consume highly influence our general standpoint in society, as “people
who consume negative news regularly also tend to have less trust in political leaders, lower
evaluations of other people and communities, and more psychological problems”(Suttie, 2018).
This is part of the motivation behind constructive journalism (McIntyre and Gyldensted, 2018),
which addresses issues in a solution-oriented way instead of only catastrophe coverage.

When operating in a network that is based on capitalist structures, such as the internet and
media market, one can be certain that the liberal market will respond to the consumers’
requests. Constructive initiatives are gaining position in the news media (Suttie, 2018), because
it fills a hole in a market of negative media coverage. Negative (and polarizing) information also
decreases trust in the media, so outlets similarly have to adapt to a less pessimistic tone to
maintain or preserve the audience’s trust.

When it comes to actual conflict areas, such as the front in Eastern Ukraine, media consumers
request more constructive content (Orlova and Shutov, 2017). Conflict-sensitive journalism is
also an extensively implemented practice, trying to “define media practice that contributes to a
community’s conflict resolution while adhering to the media’s core role of providing accurate,

40
unbiased information” (Howard, 2004). Conflict-sensitive journalism is based on the principles
of objectivity and to not reproduce biased narratives in warzones and has, according to
International Media Support-consultant Henrik Grunnet, made an impact in the conflict areas in
Yemen and Syria. “Independent media adopting CSJ has had increasing audience the past few
years. We can’t work with the government, because they are not credible. Without credibility,
you have nothing” (H. Grunnet, personal communication, January 18, 2019).

5.3. Beyond politics and media

In complex situations, complex means are needed. Each actor in society is a part of many
different groupings and networks. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a constructive,
inclusive discourse across all spheres. While I believe media and politics play an important role
in shaping people’s minds, we have to think across the networks.

Culture, as one example, is important in shaping discourse and should also be seen as
influential to shape actors’ values. Cultural representations (see Hall and Nixon, 2013) and
fictitious views on reality (Hemer, 2012) helps widening our perspectives and create more
inclusive approaches. There is an ongoing change in for instance the (Western) popular culture,
as seen in Hollywood-movies (diversity in gender and race) as well as on Netflix (with Korean,
Japanese and Indian content as well as categories such as “Strong female lead”). Being exposed
to and engaged in differences reduces the distance between actors and facilitates dialogue.

The overall ways to (re-)establish social and moral integrity in an interconnected society is to
develop a constructive discourse and ensure trust and credibility in the network and between
the actors. We cannot eliminate violent urges or lust for power. We can try to minimize it, and
the more we get used to thinking peacefully and constructively, the better. Each actor has a
possibility of operating within the structures set by the network to take a critical position
towards consumption of information as well as communication.

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6. Adding communication power to peacebuilding theory
Getting this far, it is time to return to the starting point.

In the network reality, communication is power, so it is all a question of communication power,

from conflict to peacekeeping: “Violence takes place between perpetrator and victim, war
between belligerents, conflict between goals held by actors and by implication between actors,
peace between actors, as a peace structure, with a peace culture” (Galtung and Fischer, 2013,
p. 142). Adding communication in the abovementioned definition of discursive and
instrumental, to the conflict model is to add an extra dimension to the model.

The argument for implementing communication as an own concept in peacebuilding is that

society is ‘oversaturated’ by media, and communication is a process influencing all aspects of
society, including power relations. We also see that communication can be the reason for
conflict, either through the instrumental or discursive aspect, runs through all three categories
of society that constitutes goals. Because use of communication is to exercise power in (or
over) the networks, communication as a weapon can be as damaging to people as results of
classical warfare. Simultaneously, it is also dominating the process up to a potential outbreak of
physical violence - or facilitating classical warfare.

Communication can be used violently as an avoidable insult to the basic needs (survival,
wellness, freedom and identity). As communication is basic to all of basic, communication
power is distributed across all human action, and we are all positioned in a network with each
other where politics, economy, rights and social interaction is digitalized, then the logic must be
that communication is a matter of survival (asking for help), a matter of wellness (freedom from
psychological torture), a matter of freedom (freedom from marginalization) or a matter of
identity (affiliation to a group).

Returning to Galtung’s conflict model, we can sum it up as follows:

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The goals are based on communication, and incompatible if they search for having the single
discursive power over someone within a network.
The conflict itself is communication, and the violence is information as a result of
untransformed conflicts of discourse. It is fundamentally a fight over control over people or
over the political legitimacy.
The transformation is also communication and thus takes place in the communication
space/public sphere/networks. It is a matter of social change, a change of discourse.
The active peacekeeping is communicative and should rely heavily on peaceful, constructive
information and communication, education, digital human rights, and transparency.

Based on this, one could argue that communication is another basic need, as it constitutes the
others. In line with the belief in human rights, participatory democracy and human dignity, I
hold that the right to access information, the right to be heard and the right to communicate
are also needs that can be harmed. Constructive communication across the social sphere,
including culture, media, institutions, and politics, can lay a foundation for social and political
interaction that leads to positive peace.

7. Conclusion
The information revolution has moved the core activities of our society into the non-physical
sphere. We are now interconnected in communicative networks, making the society ever more
complex. Complex power relations call for complex views on conflict and peacebuilding.

In an attempt to view peace theory in the light of the information age, I have tried to fuse
network theory and communication power and apply it to Johan Galtung’s peace theory.
Through my discussion, I have shown how we can use the key concepts of peace theory in a
framework of network power and communication. Communication can be seen as having an
instrumental and discursive side, and the different network-related powers can be used
violently. Communication is involved in all steps of a conflict cycle, and we can understand all

43
types of interactions between actors as a power-relation trying to dominate the networks.
Conflicts are a result of the same actors trying to influence and “reign” over the general
discourse in the system.

I argue that in the actual context, communication can be regarded a basic need, because it is
fundamental to human dignity. From this follows that deprivation of communication is a violent
action in a digitalized society. Communication can also be used violently on all levels.

Communication has always been the main ingredient in mediation, and still is when it comes to
establishing a non-violent environment. To create a sustainable state of positive peace, it is
necessary to make sure the networks are inclusive and balanced in terms of access and power
to participate. As the overall frame is the discourse in the network, it is important to try to
establish a constructive discourse across all spheres. Media is already taking the lead on this,
but if the general approach is constructive, we will have networks where trust can thrive and
actors are guaranteed a position where constructive debate can take place.

What I have lined out could very well be tested on empirical cases in the future to identify the
different dynamics at play within conflicts. It is difficult to dissect a concept such as
communication power when it is the cause of the problem as well as the solution.
Communication is a very fluid term, and trying to hold on to it and conceptualize it has been
quite a challenge. Especially when there are no natural limitations to the use of communication
in the network reality, and social phenomena playing out locally are results of global
tendencies.

Even so, I think it is important to try and understand the mechanics and extend the classical
theories. Just as the world gets more complex, we should keep trying to understand it, in order
to improve it. Seeing classics in a new light can help shedding light on elements that are pivotal
in present-day context.

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I allow myself to finish with that elegantly sum up the timeless essence of peacebuilding:

Finishing touches
If we want Peace,
The things we must
Accomplish
To preserve it
Are, first,
To win each other’s trust;
and, second,
To deserve it.

Piet Hein

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8. Reflections and perspectivation
This paper is just the initial outline of thoughts I had whilst reading about peacebuilding. It is an
attempt to connect interlinked disciplines to get a more actual holistic view on peace theory,
and would serve as the basis for further theoretical elaboration as well as thorough case
studies.

Discussing power and violence in a communication framework indeed brings up some

challenges. Being an all-encompassing phenomenon and an endless “power relationship” to
others, communication is truly hard to operationalize and categorize. Regarding communication
networks, the oversaturation poses a challenge to any lasting change of mind. We consume as
we please, and if someone does not agree with taking a different approach, there is always
some more radicalizing content to engage with. The networks could be more politically
controlled, but that would go against the freedoms of communication.

It also raises questions on the (even) more abstract level. One is the question of free will and
discourse (see Yuval Harari in Anthony, 2018). How do we philosophically perceive concepts like
equality, identity and justice, if it is all a result of the dominant discourse in the network we are
part of? If the power over and through communication shapes the world we live in, we can only
act upon this that we have available. Staying in the cave, one can only maneuver one’s life
according to the shadows on the wall. While constructivism is a great tool for self-reflection and
humility in one’s argumentation, it is also impossible to say anything definitive.

46
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