Isa Access Control Specification v3.0a
Isa Access Control Specification v3.0a
Requirements Document
Version 3.0a
June 2019
https://www.us-cert.gov/essa
Record of Changes
Version Date Author Changes
2.0 December ESSA Portfolio • Incorporated major updates to Resource Attributes based on
16, 2014 Management the creation of the ISA implementation of SD-EDH.
Team • Made minor changes to user attributes based on resource
changes.
• Updated Use Cases in Section 5.
Updated Organizational values in Appendix A.
3.0a June 27, DHS CISA/CSD Updated CISAUSES on page 25 from: “The cybersecurity purposes
2019 allowed in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
(Reference 36).” To: “Indicates that the CTI must be granted
the protections spelled out in the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015 (Reference 36), including that the
government will only use the information for the
cybersecurity purposes spelled out in that document.”
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ISA Access Control Specification
ISA Access Control Specification
Executive Summary
The vision for the Information Sharing Architecture (ISA) in support of the Enhance Shared Situational
Awareness (ESSA) initiative is to create real-time cyber shared situational awareness based on
machineto-machine information sharing as described by the ISA Shared Situational Awareness (SSA)
Requirements. This cyber shared situational awareness supports both individual and integrated
response actions to prevent malicious cyber activity and, when that fails, to protect and recover quickly
from malicious cyber actions. At the core of that vision is automated, machine-to-machine information
sharing across the cybersecurity community. The foundational work done by ESSA to establish a Federal
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Community and the ISA provides an existing capability to support the
requirements outlined in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.
Information sharing across a Federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Community requires a capability
to protect and allow access to information in accordance with applicable information sharing
agreements, policies, and laws. Capabilities must be put in place to ensure that information is only
shared with those that should be allowed to see it, as determined by the information owner. As the
quantity of shared information, the number of information types, and the number of participants’
increase, the means of enforcing policies on information sharing and controlling access must be
automated and scalable to meet mission needs. The Federal Cybersecurity Centers and Stakeholders in
the ISA collaborated on a single, flexible approach to machine-based access control that builds upon
advancements made by individual communities (e.g. Intelligence Community, Defense, Law
Enforcement, etc.) and expands to meet the needs of the broad, cross-organizational cybersecurity
community.
This Access Control Specification (ACS) document, the result of that collaboration, specifies the data
elements required to implement automated access control systems based on the relevant policies
governing sharing between participants. Initially developed to support information sharing by the
Enhance Shared Situational Awareness (ESSA) initiative across the Federal Cyber Centers, the ACS
specifies a common set of elements for tagging information and related common attributes that indicate
characteristics of a person or system that allow automated decisions to be made regarding information
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sharing. The ACS provides a structure to support expansion of the ESSA Community to include all
Federal Entities in support of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 ISA Background ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Access Control Attributes ..................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Relationship to Other Access Control Efforts ....................................................................................... 7
1.4 Scope of Document ............................................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Definitions and Use of Terms ................................................................................................................ 9
1.5.1 Entities ........................................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.2 Entity Attributes ............................................................................................................................. 9
1.5.3 Policies and policy rules ................................................................................................................. 9
1.5.4 Resource ........................................................................................................................................ 9
1.6 Attribute Dependencies ........................................................................................................................ 9
2 ISA Resource Attributes ............................................................................................................................. 10
2.1 Resource Accounting Group ............................................................................................................... 19
2.1.1 Resource Identifier....................................................................................................................... 19
2.1.2 Resource Creation Date and Time ............................................................................................... 19
2.1.3 Responsible Entity........................................................................................................................ 20
2.1.3.1 Custodian .............................................................................................................................. 20
2.1.3.2 Originator .............................................................................................................................. 21
2.1.4 Authorization Reference .............................................................................................................. 21
2.2 Control Policy Group ........................................................................................................................... 22
2.2.1 Policy Reference........................................................................................................................... 22
2.2.2 Policy ............................................................................................................................................ 23
2.2.2.1 Access Privilege ..................................................................................................................... 24
2.2.2.2 Further Sharing ..................................................................................................................... 26
2.2.2.3 Original Classification ............................................................................................................ 26
2.2.2.4 Derivative Classification ........................................................................................................ 27
2.2.2.5 Declassification ..................................................................................................................... 27
2.2.2.6 Resource Disposition ............................................................................................................. 27
2.2.2.7 Public Release ....................................................................................................................... 28
2.2.3 Control Set ................................................................................................................................... 28
2.2.3.1 Classification ......................................................................................................................... 29
2.2.3.2 Sensitive Compartmented Information Control System ....................................................... 30
2.2.3.3 Logical Authority Category .................................................................................................... 30
2.2.3.4 Formal Determination ........................................................................................................... 31
2.2.3.5 Caveat.................................................................................................................................... 32
List of Figures
List of Tables
Table 1-1: Attribute Dependencies ........................................................................................................... 10
Table 4-1: Relationship between ISA Resource Attributes and ISA Entity Attributes .............................. 50
Table 5-1: Use Case One – Access Granted to Cybersecurity Data ........................................................... 52
Table 5-3: Use Case Three – PUBREL and Portion Marking ...................................................................... 55
Table 5-5: Use Case Five – Access to Law Enforcement Data Denied ...................................................... 57
1 Introduction
This Information Sharing Architecture (ISA) Access Control Specification (ACS) document specifies the
data elements required to implement access control mechanisms for exchanging cyber information
across the community that has adopted the specification. The ACS is prescribed for Federal Entities that
have signed the Enhance Shared Situational Awareness (ESSA) Multilateral Information Sharing
Agreement, referred to as the ESSA Community. As the requirements of the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015 are implemented, the ESSA Community will expand with additional signatories to
the MISA to include additional Federal Entities. Because the ESSA Information Sharing Participants
operate within all three classification domains (Top Secret, Secret, and Unclassified), the resource
markings (data tags) and entity attributes are specified on all three domains in order to facilitate cross
domain use of the information. Using a common set of resource markings and entity attributes and a
common approach to access control enables integration and potential software reuse in different
organizations.
This ISA ACS specifies resource markings and user entity attributes to support a collection of activities
that include an initial access decision and also includes the necessary controls to inform subsequent or
derivative activities, such as usage and further dissemination restrictions. Figure 1 illustrates the basic
steps in making the initial access control decisions based on access rules that reside at each ESSA
Information Sharing Participant (or their parent organization if the ESSA Information Sharing Participant
is using their organization’s enterprise services).
• Authentication – The process of verifying with a trusted identity provider the identity claimed by
or assumed of an entity, such as a user, process, or device (i.e., check that I am who I say I am)
• Authorization – The process of verifying the access privileges granted to an authenticated user,
program, or process, or the act of granting those privileges (i.e., check what I am allowed to see)
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) was selected by the ESSA Information Sharing Participants as the
most appropriate approach to ISA authorization. ABAC is based on attributes associated with and about
subjects, objects, targets, initiators, resources, or the environment. An access control rule set defines
the combination of attributes under which an access may take place. Because the ISA operates across a
federation of organizations within the Federal government, there is no central authority to define roles,
policies, or threat levels required for other approaches to authorization such as Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC), Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC), or Risk Adaptable Access Control (RAdAC).
ABAC provides the resource owners the most flexible level of control for making access decisions.
Under ABAC, access control policies can be created and managed without direct reference to potentially
numerous users and resources, and users and resources can be provisioned without reference to access
control policy. NIST Special Publication 800-162 “Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)
Definition and Considerations” provides additional information on establishing ABAC. (Reference 1)
Existing Policies as documented in sharing agreements, laws, Executive Orders, and other documents,
specify the restrictions that ESSA Information Producers place on their data. These Policies include
Executive Orders such as EO12333 and EO13556, the Multilateral Information Sharing Agreement
(MISA), and others. The intent of the Access Control Specification (ACS) is to outline a set of resource
and entity attributes that will allow ESSA Information Sharing Participants to tag data and entities so
that, across the ISA, the sharing and usage restrictions identified in governing Policies can be
communicated and enforced in an automated fashion. This document defines the access control
attributes for people (or non-person-entities like machines and applications) and the attributes for data
elements or resources.
enhance shared situational awareness, continued forward and has evolved to enable integrated
operational action under the name of Enhance Shared Situational Awareness (ESSA). To facilitate this
continuous and evolving mission, the ESSA Portfolio Management Team (PMT), co-led by DHS, FBI, and
NSA, was tasked by the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) to work with the Federal
Cybersecurity Centers and other key stakeholders to implement the Information Sharing Architecture
(ISA).
The foundational work done by ESSA to establish a Federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Community and the Information Sharing Architecture (ISA) provides an existing capability to support the
requirements outlined in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.
This document, the ISA Access Control Specification, is an element of the following collection of ISA
products:
• ISA Framework (Reference 2) – Defined the original ISA Framework, which provides the
common taxonomy and understanding of ISA Functions and Enduring Functional Exchanges
(EFEs) among cybersecurity partners and stakeholders
• ISA Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) Requirements Document (Reference 3) – Translates
the ISA framework into a set of enterprise requirements and community standards and includes
the maintained version of ISA Functions and EFEs o ISA Access Control Specification (ACS) – A
supplement to the ISA SSA Requirements Document that provides a common specification to
inform automated access control decisions at all classification levels
• ISA Technical Implementation Plan (Reference 4) – Describes how and when the capabilities
defined in the ISA SSA Requirements Document will be built. The plan defines an incremental
approach to ensure early mission benefit and support out-year flexibility
The ISA is not an end in and of itself. Each ESSA Information Sharing Participant agrees on commonly
provisioned standards and solutions and then implements, manages, and maintains the capabilities. An
ESSA Information Sharing Participant is defined as an organization that performs any of the ISA
Functions defined in the ISA Framework and has accepted that information sharing, as defined by the
ISA, is a part of the organization’s cybersecurity mission. The capabilities described in the ISA are
dependent upon machine processing of information and machine-level assurance that all policies and
controls are applied in a trusted manner.
As the quantity of shared information increases, the mechanism of controlling access must be
automated to be scalable. Attributes provide a consistent and automated approach to sharing the
details about people, non-person entities (e.g., machine analytics), and information resources.
Figure 2 is a refinement of Figure 1 that shows how pre-scripted access rules are applied to entity and
resource attributes to make informed, automated access control decisions.
Automated access control depends on standardized attribute names and values among ESSA
Information Sharing Participants. This document defines two types of attributes:
• ISA Resource Attributes – Characteristics of the resource being requested (e.g., classification of
data). Resources include data, applications, and services.
• ISA Entity Attributes – Characteristics about the person or non-person entity (NPE) requesting
access. These characteristics are used to make authorization decisions (e.g., clearance level).
The third major component of attribute based access control, the policies or rules, will be defined by the
ESSA Information Sharing Participants. The ISA ACS provides the tools to express these policies
consistently; however the policies are not comprehensively defined in this document. The intended
relationships between the resource markings and the entity attributes are outlined in Section 4.
Appendix E also includes an example access control rule set that may serve as a starting point for policy
application. However, different ABAC implementations will dictate the specific language required to
encode the policies.
Access control decisions can be logged to support subsequent auditing processes. For example, if
remediation steps must be taken in the case of an unauthorized release, the logged access control
decision and associated attributes assist with the remediation process.
• Enterprise Data Header (EDH) o EDH Abstract Data Definition (ADD) (Reference 12) - Defines
at an abstract level the minimum set of data elements that could apply generically to any type of
data in order to meet enterprise data management requirements.
o Smart Data EDH Data Encoding Specification (DES) (Reference 14) – Specifies encoding
guidance for the common set of fields defined in the EDH ADD.
• Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation
Guidance (Reference 5) – Provides common segment architecture and implementation guidance
for use by federal agencies as they continue to invest in ICAM programs.
• IC Enterprise Attribute Exchange Between IC Attribute Services Unified Identity Attribute Set
(UIAS) (Reference 6) – Governs the set of Intelligence Community (IC) enterprise identity
attributes and associated values that must be supported by an Attribute Service participating in
the IC’s Unified Authorization and Attribute Service (UAAS) capability.
• DoD Enterprise Identity Attribute Service (EIAS) (Reference 7) – Provides Department of
Defense (DoD) affiliation data on person and personnel-based attributes for authentication and
authorization.
• Department of Justice Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management (GFIPM)
(Reference 8) – Defines common syntax and semantics for metadata based on a well-grounded
knowledge of the needs of real-world law enforcement information sharing systems.
• Intelligence Community Enterprise Data Header (IC-EDH) (Reference 9) – Defines a structured,
verifiable representation of security metadata bound to intelligence data.
The intended audience for this document is an organizational entity implementing access control
solutions where there is an expectation of sharing information with or accessing information from other
ESSA Information Sharing Participants. This document does not prescribe all access control attributes
that an organization may need internal to their enterprise systems or within a community other than the
ESSA Information Sharing Participants; the focus is on access control for cyber information shared
outside of an organization.
This document expands upon access control requirements in the ISA SSA Requirements Document
(Reference 3). While this document does not add new requirements, it provides derived requirements
that give details on how to meet the parent ISA SSA Requirements. Derived requirements are included in
tables with the parent requirement throughout the document and summarized in Appendix B: Summary
of Derived ISA Requirements.
Entities are persons or non-person systems and are referred to as person entities and non-person
entities (NPEs) in this ACS.
Policies, as a broad term of reference, are those documents that outline the general principles and
acceptable procedures of a governmental organization. The ESSA Information Sharing Participants are
governed by a large set of policies and the ACS will distinguish this high level Policy by capitalizing
references. Many of these Policies relate to and specify restrictions regarding the access to, and sharing
and handling of resources and data. Examples of high level Policies include EO12333, the Privacy Act,
and the Multilateral Information Sharing Agreement.
Specific restrictions or requirements contained within these Policies may also be referred to as policies.
The ACS will refer to these specific restrictions and requirements as “policies” with a small “p”. Of
particular importance within the ACS are policies that govern the specific restrictions related to the
management and control of resources. For example, the Department of Defense Policy governing
control of classified information, DoD Manual 5200.01, details the specific policy that a person must
have a clearance of Secret or higher in order to access Secret information.
Within access control systems, and in accordance with FICAM, policies are the rules and relationships
between an entity requiring access and the resource that is being requested. When these policies are
encoded, the ACS will use the term “policy rules” to differentiate these encoded statements from high
level Policies and their specific restrictions and requirements (policies).
1.5.4 Resource
A resource is any data, information, document, application, analytic or service to be shared to requires
tagging in order to allow controlled access.
Smart Data Enterprise Data Header The SD-EDH Cyber Profile provides The versioning of the ACS
Implementation Profile for the Cyber the encoding modification and and the Cyber Profile are
Community (Reference 15) extensions in order to implement maintained in alignment.
this ACS.
Enterprise Data Header Abstract The ADD and DES provide the ACS v3.0 is aligned with
Data Definition (ADD) (Reference 12) higher level definition and EDH ADD Version 1.0 and
and Data Encoding specification on which this ACS is DES Version 2.0
Specification(DES) (Reference 13) based.
NSA Master Data Registry Values for some of the Control Set The Master Data Registry
resource attributes (SCI, LAC) in will serve as the
this ACS are dependent upon the authoritative source for the
Master Data Registry. specified values.
IC Enterprise Attribute Exchange The Entity Attributes in this ACS There is no direct
Between IC Attribute Services are based on UIAS. In particular, dependency. ACS Entity
Unified Identity Attribute Set, Entity values are aligned. attributes and values are
Version 3 (Reference 6) specified for use. However,
as the UIAS is updated,
modifications to the ACS to
maintain alignment are
recommended.
GENC Specification Version 1.0 The GENC Standard specifies a ACS v3.0 specifies GENC
(Reference 31) profile of ISO 3166, Codes for the Edition 1.0.
representation of names of
countries and their subdivisions,
that conforms to US Policy.
ISO8601 Date and Time Specification ISO 8601 describes an ACSv3.0 specifies ISO8601
(Reference 34) internationally accepted way to extended format with time
represent dates and times using zone designator Z.
numbers.
Controlled Vocabulary Enumeration Used for Admin Org ACs v3.0 specifies
for USAgency (Reference 29) USAgency-CVEnum Feb
2015
This ACS document specifies those resource attributes that an organization uses to tag information or
resources shared with other ESSA Information Sharing Participants. As stated before, many
organizations require additional attributes to meet other community or their own internal enterprise
needs. For example, the IC commonly uses additional attributes beyond those listed here, but the
addition of those attributes restricts those resources to the IC. Using additional access control resource
attributes indicates that the resource is not a shared ISA information resource. If a participating
organization wants to have a particular attribute associated with their shared ISA information, that
attribute must be listed in this document or upon establishment of a registry, the attribute must be
listed in the appropriate registry. This restriction promotes interoperability and facilitates integration.
The ESSA Community created the Smart Data - Enterprise Data Header (SD-EDH) Cyber profile schema to
facilitate applying ACS specified resource attributes to a resource. In addition, two Structured Threat
Information eXchange (STIX) marking extension schemas were created to apply the markings to STIX
documents. Additional information on the schemas is available on the ESSA Max.gov site (Reference
22).
TR-18 “All data objects exposed for sharing shall have the Information Control metadata listed in
Table 12: Summary of ISA Resource Attributes. “ (Reference 3)
TR-18.1 Upon sharing via ISA capabilities, ISA data producers shall limit access control resource
attributes to those listed in the ISA ACS.
TR-18.2 ISA access control mechanisms shall make access control decisions using only ISA Resource
Attributes
Note that several of the ESSA Information Sharing Participants store their information in a tagged
fashion, using similar/identical resource tags to those found in this document. Others store their
information in repositories and tag on data transfer. This document specifies how information is tagged
when transferred or shared, and the format for internal storage of information is at the discretion of
each participant. While the ACS requires data be tagged, the ACS does not specify a particular resource
attribute management capability that an ESSA Information Sharing Participant must use to establish and
bind attributes to resources.
TR-31 “The access control business rules shall protect each ISA Participant’s shared resources to the
degree required by that Participant’s information control tags.” (Reference 3)
TR-31.1 ISA information consumers shall maintain the data producer’s access control constraints.
Resource
• A single unique identifier associated with the data
Identifier
Resource Creation
• The creation date and time of the resource Date and
Time
• The information owner responsible for the resource
Responsible
Entity • The source of the resource, which may differ from the
custodian
• A particular documented legal basis for activities
Authorization associated with the creation, retention, and auditing
Reference of the resource
Table 2-1 summarizes the ISA ACS Resource Attributes, an indicator of whether the attribute is used in
access control decisions, how policy rules are intended to be applied to the attribute, the multiplicity
and allowable values, and an indicator as to whether the attribute (or its components) is required, as
needed, or Not Applicable (N/A) at each network classification level.
Access Control decisions will be based on the specific attributes within the Control Set. Access control
policy rules should be applied logically as AND across the set of all control set attributes. If a Control Set
attribute is included, an entity requiring access to the data must have a corresponding attribute. The
exceptions to this rule are the FD and CVT attributes which are not used in access control decisions. They
remain in the control set to align with the Smart Data Enterprise Data Header (SD-EDH) Data Encoding
Specification (Reference 13).
The Policy Rule Application column in the table describes the logic in the event that more than one value
exists for a specific control set attribute. For example if the resource is marked with a Sensitivity of TEI
and a Sensitivity of LES, an entity requesting access must have attributes corresponding to both
sensitivities as indicated by an “AND” in the Policy Application column. If more than one Country
restriction attribute is included (e.g. CTRY:USA CTRY:GBR) then an entity requesting access must have
one or the other corresponding attributes, as indicated by an “OR” in the Policy Rule Application
column. Additional examples are included in the Use Cases in Section 5.
Throughout this document, references are made to the multiplicity of attributes and parameters.
Multiplicity defines the allowed number of occurrences of an attribute, and whether the attribute is
required or optional. The following definitions are used to indicate whether specific attributes are
required for resources on the three network fabrics:
• Required – This attribute must be provided for all data shared with ESSA Information Sharing
Participants
• As Needed – This attribute is only supplied, at the discretion of the data producer, if it is
applicable to the resource. The consumer shall be able to handle the attribute appropriately if
present and respond gracefully if not present.
• N/A – The attribute is not valid for the indicated network classification level and should not be
included.
ResourceAccountingGroup
ControlPolicyGroup
1
The ISA has been assigned a GUIDE (Globally Unique Identifier for Everything) prefix of 19001 for production and 999191 for test use. CIA is the Executive Agent for GUIDE
on behalf of the Intelligence Community.
2
Originators must ensure that Policy References do not provide conflicting policy.
3
For classified documents, either an OriginalClassification or DerivativeClassification Authority is required.
4
Disposition of Federal Records: A Record’s Management Handbook 2000 Web Edition <http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/publications/disposition-of-
federalrecords/chapter-4.html#DispInstructions>
DoDDirective 5015.2, “DoD Records Management Program,” March 6, 2000
SCI Controls (SCI) Yes AND Min=0 MDM SCI Control List As N/A N/A
needed
Logical Authority Category Yes AND Min=0 NSA Master Data Registry As N/A N/A
(LAC) Logical Authority Categories needed
Formal Determination (FD) No Min=0 PUBREL, NF, AIS, PII-NECESSARY-TO- As As As needed
UNDERSTAND-THREAT, PII-NOT-PRESENT, FOUO needed needed
Caveat (CVT) No Min=0 FISA 5, POSSIBLEPII, CISAPROPRIETARY As As As needed
needed needed
Sensitivity (SENS) Yes AND Min=0 NTOC_DHS_ECYBER_SVC_SHARE.NSA.NSA, As As As needed
PCII, LES, INT, PII, PR, TEI needed needed
Shareability (SHAR) Yes OR Min=0 NCC, EM, LE, IC As As As needed
needed needed
Country (CTRY) Yes OR Min=0 GENC Specification As As As needed
needed needed
Organization (ORG) Yes OR Min=0 Appendix A As As As needed
needed needed
Entity (ENTITY) Yes OR Min=0 MIL, GOV, CTR, SVR, SVC, DEV, NET 6 As As As needed
needed needed
5
Based on DoD Information Security Manual, (Reference 17).
6
Based on Unified Identity Attribute Set (Reference 6).
This required element holds a single unique identifier associated with the resource. This value can be
used for tracking data provenance, executing data retraction, and enforcing auditing requirements. The
Resource Identifier will use a format that includes a prefix and an RFC4122 suffix. The prefix used will
include the ISA common prefix (GUIDE prefix). The ISA has been assigned a GUIDE 7 (Globally Unique
Identifier for Everything) prefix of 19001 for production and 999191 for test use. It is recommended that
RFC 4122 Version 4 UUIDs be used for the suffix; however, other versions are permitted.
TR-18.3 Data producers shall provide a unique resource identifier for each shared resource.
Name: Identifier TS 8 S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:identifier
Definition: Attribute to hold the identifier of the data object. Required Required Required
This required element provides the creation date and time of the associated resource as identified by
the Identifier. This value supports a number of functions including enforcing data retention policies and
auditing requirements.
TR-18.4 Data producers shall provide a resource creation date and time for each shared resource.
7
CIA, the Executive Agent for GUIDE on behalf of the Intelligence Community, provided these prefixes to ISA. 8
In each resource marking table, the TS, S and U refer to the network on which the resource resides, not the
classification of the resource.
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Definition: The created date and time of the associated resource. Required Required Required
The Responsible Entity data field can be used by the data producer to indicate two types of responsible
entities, a custodian and an originator, because they may not always be the same. For example, a data
producer may desire to share information from a private organization, such as an internet service
provider. In this case, the government organization may create the data tags to allow sharing across the
ISA of the resource, but it is not the original source of the information.
Name: Responsible Entity TS S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:responsibleentity
Definition: The responsible entity for the associated resource. This Required Required Required
element allows for multiple tokens.
2.1.3.1 Custodian
This required sub-element represents the data producer that is responsible for providing the associated
resource to be shared. It is represented as an organization token. This value is necessary for auditing and
enforcing data retention and provenance policies.
TR-18.5 Data producers shall provide a custodian for each shared resource.
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2.1.3.2 Originator
This optional sub-element represents the originating organization for the associated resource. If not
present then the origin of the information is unspecified. It is represented as an organization token. It is
recommended that the organizations in Appendix A be used. However, additional tokens may be
created to specify the originator.
Certain Originators may require anonymity to protect their identity. This is common when dealing with
a cybersecurity threat or incident where the originator is an entity in the Private Sector. Cover terms
(e.g., USENERGY01) assigned to an entity should be carried through anytime the resource is shared or a
Privilege Action (Section 2.2.2.1) denying identification of the source should be used.
Name: Originator (ORIG) TS S U
Definition: Specifies the source of the resource, which may differ from As As As
the custodian. Note that if a source entity requires anonymity for further Needed Needed Needed
dissemination then a Privilege Action (Section 2.2.2.1) denying
identification of the source should be used.
This optional element provides a means of indicating a particular documented legal basis for mission
activities associated with the creation, retention, use, and auditing of the associated resource. Initially,
the list of referenced authorizations will be provided as text files on the ESSA Max.gov site (Reference
22). In the long term, it is intended that a shared service be hosted by the ISA Shared Capability Provider
for necessary policy and authorization references.
This field captures the legal authority under which the content was created, not the limitation on sharing
the content. This field is used for auditing and records management, not for access control decisions. In
some cases, the Authority Reference is needed by ESSA Participants to be included in the Control Policy
Group as well as the Resource Accounting Group.
Name: Authorization Reference urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:authref TS S U
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Format: URI
Example: urn:isa:authority:CFR2013_32_2_236 Example
Values: Values listed on Max.gov.
https://community.max.gov/download/attachments/695866673/ISA%20AuthRef%20Table.txt?api=v2
There should normally be at most one reference to an authority but if multiple authorities are
referenced, they are provided as multiple space delimited values of a single instance of AuthRef.
At a minimum, ISA resources will include a reference to the ISA Access Control Specification (ACS) 8 at the
document level. The ACS PolicyRef expressed as a urn will also include a query component field. There
are two parts of the query component: privdefault that will indicate the Access Privilege default for all
ACS-listed privilege actions (See Section 2.2.2.1) and sharedefault that will indicate the scope of further
sharing that is permitted once an entity has been granted access (See Section 2.2.2.2). For a urn such as
the PolicyRef, the query component represents some operation applied to the object. In this case, it is
used to refer to the default value for all of the actions defined by Access Privilege and the sharing
restrictions defined by Further Sharing.
A single PolicyRef element may be included in a marking structure but multiple values are permitted as
space separated urn for the single PolicyRef element. If more than one reference is supplied, care must
be taken by the originator that the policies specified do not conflict.
Name: Policy Reference urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:policyref TS S U
8
Although the ACS is not a encoded access control policy, the ACS is a technical “policy” document and is an
appropriate reference in this section.
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Definition: A means of indicating a particular Required (for Required (for Required (for
documented policy related to the sharing of a ACS; others as ACS; others as ACS; others as
resource. needed) needed) needed)
2.2.2 Policy
While the Policy Reference (previous section) is the preferred method of referencing policy information
about a resource, there are certain situations where actual policy information is required to be
embedded in the resource. For example, CAPCO policy specifies that classified data must be marked
with a classification authority block that has changeable values based on the content of the resource.
The values for the classification authority block are obtained from PolicyRule substitutions allowed in
this Policy section. Note that the Policy section is not used directly to inform access control decisions.
Those attributes necessary for access control are included in the Control Set.
The available substitution groups and their components are shown in Figure 4.
Classification Declassification
Rule Effect Derived From
Reason Date
Compilation Declassification
Reason Event
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privilegeAction Single value xsd:NMTOKEN DSPLY, IDSRC, TENOT, NETDEF, LEGAL, INTEL,
TEARLINE, OPACTION, REQUEST,
ANONYMOUSACCESS, CISAUSES, ALL
The defined access privilege actions are based on the ISA Phase 1 document (for Network Defense and
Operational Action) (Reference 2), the NSS Security Manual (to support Display Only) (Reference 17),
and existing Policies that specify usage restrictions or permissions. These include:
• DSPLY: display – The action of displaying, either in a hard copy document or a visual presentation, the
resource. See the Use Case below. DSPLY should be used to permit display when there is generally a
global deny for all actions.
• IDSRC: identify source – The action of identifying the source of the resource further than the entity
receiving the resource. When set to deny, attributes or elements in the resource that identify the
source and custodian must be removed or replaced prior to additional actions being taken. This
restriction applies not only to the elements in the header of the resource but may also apply to
elements within the body of the document being shared. The use of IDSRC does not authorize any
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changes to markings on the resource. For example, the removal of the source information will not
change the classification of the resource.
• TENOT: targeted entity notification – The action of notifying a targeted entity of a cybersecurity
incident based on the resource.
• NETDEF: computer network defense action – The action of taking network defense actions including
detection and mitigation, remediation, and local analysis and signature development, based on the
resource.
• LEGAL: legal proceedings – The action of using the resource in legal proceedings.
• INTEL: intelligence analysis – The action of conducting additional intelligence analysis based on the
resource.
• TEARLINE: The action of removing and taking further action on components of a resource based on
their component markings. To be tear-lineable indicates that marked components of a document may
be removed and treated as individually marked components. When set to deny, even though there
may be components with fewer restrictions than the overall document, they may not be removed.
• OPACTION: operational action – The action of conducting cyber-based operations applied to adversary
capabilities based on the resource.
• REQUEST: accessPrivilege waiver request – The action of requesting a waiver to an accessPrivilege
restriction. When set to deny, the originator will not consider specific requests to take actions based
on the resource.
• ANONYMOUSACCESS: The action of allowing anonymous access to the resource. This action is
included to support the restrictions placed on the indicators shared with the US government from the
DHS Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program.
• CISAUSES: Indicates that the CTI must be granted the protections spelled out in the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Reference 36), including that the government will only use the
information for the cybersecurity purposes spelled out in that document.
To support a Display Only Use Case, the PolicyRef level default would be set to deny, privilegeAction
would include DSPLY; privilegeScope would include ORG:ALL; ruleEffect would be set to permit.
To allow actions with non-attribution, the PolicyRef level rule would be set to permit, privilegeAction
would include IDSRC, privilegeScope would include ORG:ALL, ruleEffect would be set to deny. In such a
case, all references to the source and custodian of the data must be replaced or removed. In the
markings, the CUST must be replaced and AddlReference and ORIG must be removed by the data
resource recipient prior to any further action regardless of additional markings. Additional references
within the resource may also need to be removed.
To deny one specific further action that may be taken by one specific organization upon access to
resource, the PolicyRef level rule would be set to permit, privilegeAction would include ACTION (one of
the defined), privilegeScope would include ORG (one of the defined), and ruleEffect would be set to
deny. For example <privilegeAction> TENOT, <privilegeScope> USA.FBI, <ruleEffect> deny would
restrict FBI from conducting targeted entity notification.
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In a broader case, to limit all organizations from conducting an action, the PolicyRef level rule would be
set to permit, privilegeAction would include ACTION (one of the defined), privilegeScope would include
ORG:ALL, and ruleEffect would be set to deny.
The defined further sharing scopes are based on the need to support policies in support of the
Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program implemented in conformance with Executive Order (EO)
13691. (Reference 30) A sharingScope of FOREIGNGOV indicates to a resource consumer that the
resource may be further shared with foreign governments under the authorities of the consumer. A
sharingScope of SECTOR indicates to a resource consumer that the resource may only be shared with
the sector for which the consumer is the Sector Specific Agency as defined in Presidential Policy
Directive-21. (Reference 35)
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Profile for the Cyber Community (Reference 15). The following sub-fields are used to capture the details
for original classification:
• Classified By: The person with the original classification authority who made a classification
determination.
• Classified On: The date an original classification determination was made.
• Classification Reason: The rationale for an original classification determination.
• Compilation Reason: The rationale for assigning a higher classification level than a simple roll-up
of its portions would indicate.
2.2.2.5 Declassification
This data tag provides the declassification instructions associated with an original or derived
classification for generating a classification authority block for presentation of a classified resource to an
operator. Details regarding the basic encoding specification detail for Declassification are included in the
Smart Data – Enterprise Data Header (EDH) Implementation Profile for the Cyber Community (Reference
15). The following sub-fields are used to capture the details for declassification:
• Declassification Exemption: A basis for a resource not being subject to standard automatic
declassification processes.
• Declassification Period: A duration of time in years for calculating from a create date or
classification date when a resource will be automatically declassified if not exempt.
• Declassification Date: A date upon which a resource will be automatically declassified if not
exempt.
• Declassification Event: A future occurrence upon which a resource will be automatically
declassified if not exempt.
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Header (EDH) Implementation Profile for the Cyber Community (Reference 15). The following sub-fields
are used to capture the details for resource disposition:
• Disposition Date: The time that the declared disposition process type is to be initiated.
• Disposition Process: The allowed disposition process to be performed (e.g., destruction).
The Control Set is the group of data tags that are used to inform automated access control decisions as
represented in Figure 5.
Entity
(ENTITY)
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Data-Oriented Attributes characterize the sensitivity of the data. If any of these controls are used then
an entity would be required to meet every single sensitivity criterion in order to access the resource.
This may be characterized as a Boolean “And” both within each attribute and across them. For example,
if a resource is Top Secret, requires two different SCI restrictions, and has a particular Sensitivity, then to
gain access to that resource the entity must have a TS clearance, must have both SCI accesses, and also
must be a member of the Access Group that is permitted to access data of that Sensitivity.
User-Oriented Attributes characterize the group of people or entities that should be able to access the
data. If multiple values are listed for an attribute, then the entity would need to be able to satisfy one of
the restrictions. This may be characterized as a Boolean “Or” within each attribute and an “And” across
them. For example, if the data is limited to citizens of two possible countries and tagged with three
Shareability attributes, then to gain access the entity must be a citizen of one of those two countries and
is in at least one of the Access Groups.
The implementation of the Control Set using the SD-EDH Cyber Profile uses tokens to express the
subelements of the Control Set. For example, the classification of an unclassified resource is represented
as CLS:U. The entire control set is a set of tokens. Access Control policy rules are applied across the set
of control set tokens.
Much of the structure of the Control Set is based on requirements related to support for Executive Order
13526, Classified National Security Information (Reference 23). Where possible, alignment with the
Information Security Manual (ISM) (Reference 17) marking system and its implementation in Intelligence
Community Technical Specifications was maintained. Appendix D: Deltas between ISA ACS Resource
Attributes and IC Security Marking Encodings details some of the differences and justifications for
changes in order to support ISA requirements.
2.2.3.1 Classification
The Classification token contains the classification of the data based on the Executive Order 13526,
Classified National Security Information (Reference 23) and the Information Security Manual (ISM)
(Reference 17) marking system. Unclassified information will include a classification marking.
TR-18.6 Data producers shall provide the classification for each shared resource.
TR-83 “The access control mechanism shall authenticate and authorize the consumer.” (Reference
3)
TR-83.1 The access control mechanism shall only grant access to consumers that hold an equivalent
or higher clearance than the classification of the resource.
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Because this attribute is characterizing the sensitivity of the data, an entity must meet all of the
restrictions defined in this attribute in order to gain access.
TR-83.2 If a resource has special control restrictions, then the access control mechanism shall only
grant access to consumers that hold all of the corresponding special control permissions.
Because this attribute is characterizing the sensitivity of the data, an entity must meet all of the LAC
restrictions associated with the resource to gain access.
TR-83.8 If a resource has LAC restrictions, then the access control mechanism shall only grant access
to consumers that hold all of the corresponding LAC permissions.
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TR-18.8 If a resource has sensitivity or shareability restrictions, then Formal Determination shall not
include Public Releaseable.
PUBREL: PUBREL is an indication that the resource has been through a formal process that has
determined that the resource is releasable to the public. Resources that are approved for public release
do not have access restrictions. This also implies that authentication is not necessary for access control
purposes. Resources marked with a formal determination of PUBREL will also include a PublicRelease
attribute that includes the release authority and date. (See Section 2.2.2.7) Classified resources will not
be marked as publically releasable.
NOFORN, is specified in the DoD Information Security Manual (Reference 17) and further specified in
Intelligence Community Directive 710 (Reference 19) for the marking of classified information. NOFORN
is a dissemination control marking that indicates that the resource is releasable to U.S. citizens and not
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releasable to foreign nationals without the permission of the originator. If NOFORN is marked, the
resource shall also be marked with a Country Determination of USA. (See Section 2.2.3.8.1)
AIS is a marking indicating that a formal determination has been made by the resource custodian that
the resource may be shared via the Department of Homeland Security Automated Information Sharing
(AIS) Initiative.
NO-PII-PRESENT is also required by the AIS Initiative. Use of this marking indicates that the resource
custodian has made a formal determination that there is no personal information of a specific individual
or information that identifies a specific individual contained in the resource.
Generally, For Official Use Only (FOUO) is a term used to identify unclassified information of a sensitive
nature. For the Department of Defense, FOUO is a dissemination control applied to unclassified
information when disclosure to the public of that particular record, or portion thereof, would reasonably
be expected to cause a foreseeable harm to an interest protected by one or more of FOIA Exemptions 2
through 9 (Reference 17). It is addressed here for consistency with the Intelligence Community
specifications and during the transition to the CUI program. FOUO disseminated Outside of the
Department of Defense requires notice (front cover, first page, or at the beginning of the text): This
document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act. For the Department of Homeland Security, the application of “FOUO” is governed by
DHS Management Directive Number 11042.1 (Reference 24). FOUO is not used for Access Control
decisions within the ESSA Community.
For an NPE, in order to receive FOUO information, the NPE must have an ATOStatus value of “ATO” and
LIfeCycleStatus of “DEV”,” TEST” or “PROD”. Information system owners and authorized users have final
responsibility for the Unclassified FOUO information. Enforcement of the authorization process and
compliance with cybersecurity controls is necessary to safeguard Unclassified FOUO information
exchanged between NPE's. Proper implementation will contain the Unclassified FOUO information
within US government control, and allow access only to authorized users with need to know.
2.2.3.5 Caveat
This element represents specific restrictions placed on resources that are not used in access control
decisions.
Name: Caveat (CVT) TS S U
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The FISA control marking denotes the presence of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Reference
18) or FISA-derived information in the document. This is an informational marking only to highlight such
information. Recipients of resources with the FISA control marking are responsible for ensuring that the
resource is protected in conformance with the legal requirements of the FISA for limitations on use and
warning displays.
The POSSIBLEPII caveat marking indicates to the recipient that the resource may contain Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). Recipients are responsible for ensuring that the resource is protected
according to their agencies policies related to PII. This value was included in support of the DHS
Automated Information Sharing program.
The CISAPROPRIETARY caveat marking indicates that the resource must observe appropriate restrictions
as requested by the originator in accordance with the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
(Reference 36).
2.2.3.6 Sensitivity
This element represents categories of data with an inherent sensitivity which requires specific
restrictions in access or handling and that must be disseminated only to individuals who require the
information for an authorized mission purpose. Sensitivities can apply to both classified and unclassified
resources.
Executive Order 13566 (Reference 16) establishes the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) program
to unify the current system of ad hoc categories that mark and safeguard such sensitive unclassified
information. Existing practices for sensitive unclassified information remain in effect until the
implementation of the CUI marking program. However, the ISA values specified below align with existing
practices and the preliminary CUI marking list.
Because this attribute is characterizing the sensitivity of the data, an entity must meet all of the
Sensitivity restrictions associated with the resource to gain access.
In order to restrict access based on the SENS marking, a user community must be established and
governed and the custodian of the data must define the appropriate policies and determine the
necessary entity attributes for access. For the Sensitivity values allowed by the ISA, some of those user
communities are established. For others, they will need to be established in order to be implemented.
Additional information on the organizations responsible for the governance of the community listings is
included in Section 3.3 Access Groups.
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In the long term, as governance processes are put in place, it is intended that this attribute be
dynamically established to allow communities to be established and disestablished in support of cyber
operations.
TR-83.3 If a resource has Sensitivity restrictions, then the access control mechanism shall only grant
access to consumers that hold all of the corresponding entity attributes as defined by the
Access Group policies.
Value Description
NTOC_DHS_ECYBER_SVC_SHARE.NSA.NSA Enhanced Cybersecurity Services
PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
LES Law Enforcement Sensitive Information
INT Intelligence Information
PII Personally Identifiable Information
TEI Cybersecurity Targeted Entity Information PR
Commercial Proprietary Information
Relevant values were taken from the NSA Master registry and from the Controlled Unclassified
Information (CUI) List (http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list.html) Only those values
specified in this ACS are permitted.
“Law Enforcement Sensitive” is a marking sometimes applied, separately or in addition to the marking
“FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,” by the Department of Justice and other activities in the law enforcement
community, including those within the DoD. It indicates that the information was compiled for law
enforcement purposes and should be afforded security in order to protect certain legitimate
government interests. (Reference 17)
For more information on the DHS Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program, visit:
http://www.dhs.gov/protected-critical-infrastructure-information-pcii-program.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is defined in OMB Memorandum 07-16 as information which can
be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity such as their name, social security number, or
biometric records, alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is
linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother’s maiden name.
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OMB Memorandum 10-22 further states that “the definition of PII is not anchored to any single category
of information or technology. Rather, it demands a case-by-case assessment of the specific risk that an
individual can be identified. In performing this assessment, it is important for an agency to recognize
that non-PII can become PII whenever additional information is made publicly available, in any medium
and from any source that, when combined with other available information, could be used to identify an
individual.” To the maximum extent possible, PII that is not relevant to the cybersecurity threat or
incident should be redacted before any information is shared.
2.2.3.7 Shareability
The Shareability attribute allows for including flexible user-oriented access restrictions that characterize
a necessary role or group that should be able to access the information. This element identifies a
characteristic of the resource based on the need to share the information to a specific group within the
ESSA Community. Access to the resource requires membership in a corresponding Shareability Access
Group. While this may seem similar to the Sensitivity (Section 2.2.3.6) the Sensitivity marking is a
dataoriented attribute that requires an entity to have permission for all Sensitivities for access to that
resource. The Shareability is a user-oriented attribute that requires that an entity only need to be
assigned to one of the specified Shareability Access Groups related to a resource.
If specified, an entity must meet one of the restrictions identified in this attribute to access the data.
The use of a Shareability marking and Access Groups requires that a user community within the ESSA
Community be established and governed. Some of those user communities are established. For others,
they will need to be established in order to be implemented. Additional information on the
organizations responsible for the governance of the community listings is included in Section 3.3 Access
Groups.
This attribute applies to access control decisions within the ESSA Community. In order for a data
producer to place limits on ESSA Participants further sharing with other communities (for example, the
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) or the Financial Industry), data producers should use the Further Sharing
Attribute. If a data producer wishes to indicate that data originated from a particular group such as the
DIB, the producer should use the Originator attribute and the values specified in Appendix A.
TR-83.7 If a resource has Shareability restrictions, then the access control mechanism shall only grant
access to consumers that are affiliated with at least one of the Access Groups identified.
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o EM Emergency Management
o LE Law Enforcement
o IC Intelligence Community
2.2.3.8 Affiliation
The Affiliation element (Figure 6) identifies the limitations on the distribution of the resource based on
the affiliation of the user. Use of affiliation markings will limit access to the resource.
Affiliation
Country (CTRY)
Organization
(ORG)
Entity
(ENTITY )
Figure 6: Affiliation
2.2.3.8.1 Country
This element identifies the country or countries to which the resource may be released based on the
determination of an originator in accordance with established foreign disclosure procedures.
If specified, in order to access the resource, an entity must be a citizen of (for people) or represent (for
an NPE) one of the countries listed in this attribute.
TR-83.4 If a resource has Country Disclosure restrictions, then the access control mechanism shall
only grant access to consumers that are affiliated with at least one of the countries
identified.
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2.2.3.8.2 Organization
This element identifies the limitation on the distribution of the resource based on organization.
If specified, in order to access the resource, an entity must be in or assigned to (for a person) or be
affiliated with (for an NPE) one of the organizations listed in this attribute.
Any limitations on access based on ORG should be made at the highest level allowable by the sharing
agreements in place between organizations since the organizational values specified in Appendix A: List
of Organizations are hierarchical. Access control capabilities shall understand the hierarchical nature of
the ORG attribute. Access will be granted to resources marked with a higher level ORG to entities that
include the high level DUTYORG and lower level organizations. For example, for a resource marked
ORG:USA.DOD, access shall be granted to users with the DUTYORG:USA.DOD.DC3. The reverse is not
true. Resources marked with ORG:USA.DOD.DC3 will only be allowed access to entities with
DUTYORG:USA.DOD.DC3 or subordinate in the hierarchy.
TR-83.5 If a resource has Organizational Dissemination restrictions, then the access control
mechanism shall only grant access to consumers that are affiliated with at least one of the
organizations identified.
2.2.3.8.3 Entity
This element identifies the expansions or limitations on the distribution of the resource based on entity
affiliation.
If specified, in order to access the resource, an entity must be in or assigned to (for a person) or be
affiliated with (for an NPE) one of the entity values listed in this attribute.
TR-83.6 If a resource has Entity Dissemination restrictions, then the access control mechanism shall
only grant access to consumers that are affiliated with at least one of the Entity values
identified.
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Attributes are indicated as Required, Optional, or Ignored in Table 3-1 for the applicable network
classification level. As stated before, this document does not prescribe all access control attributes that
an organization needs internal to their enterprise systems. Additionally, this section does not specify an
Entity Attribute Management Capability. ESSA Information Sharing Participants and Shared Capability
Providers must establish capabilities that support the use of ISA Entity Attributes for access control.
In cases where attribute names and values differ in internal implementations, they must be transformed
or derived to match this specification. For each ISA entity attribute, likely mappings are identified for this
type of transformation from the IC Enterprise Attribute Set (Reference 6), the DoD EIAS (Reference 7),
and the DoJ GFIPM (Reference 8) in Appendix C: Deltas between ISA ACS Entity Attributes and
UIAS/EIAS/GFIPM .
The following definitions are used in Table 3-1 for Required, Optional, and Ignored:
• Required – Entities seeking access to a resource must provide the attribute. Therefore, the
authors of access rules can expect to have that minimum set of information for use in the
decision. “Required” does not mean that the attribute must be used in making the access
decision.
• Optional – Entities seeking access to a resource may provide the attribute, but it can also be left
empty. Therefore, the access rules may require that information for use in the decision. If the
attribute is considered necessary to gain access to a resource but is not provided, then access is
denied.
• Ignored – The attribute is explicitly not used in making access decisions at that classification
level.
Table 3-1: Summary of ISA Entity Attributes
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SAML v2.0
ISA Entity Attribute Top
Attribute Identifier Multiplicity Person Secret Secret Unclassified
Name urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0: or NPE Network Network Network
Digital subjectDN single Both Required Required Required
Identifier
Admin organization single Both Required Required Required
Organization
Authority authority multiple Both Optional Optional Optional
Category
Access Group assignment multiple Both Optional Optional Optional
ATO Status certification single NPE Required Required Required
Authorized IC attribute single Person Required Ignored Ignored
Person*
Clearance clearance single Both Required Required Ignored
Country of country multiple Both Required Required Required
Affiliation
Duty dutyStation single Both Required Required Required
Organization
Entity Type category single Both Required Required Required
Fine Access clearance:control multiple Both Required Ignored Ignored
Controls
Is IC Member* memberOf single Both Required Ignored Ignored
Life Cycle position single NPE Required Required Required
Status
* These entity attributes are specifically designed for the IC and are not applicable outside of that community.
Definition: There must be a value that reflects the home Required Required Required
organization of the entity
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Definition: Specifies the authority under which the entity is authorized to access a Optional N/A N/A
resource.
The set of values for the Access Group attribute assumes that the policy rule application will compare
Access Group values directly to Sensitivity and Shareability restrictions. If the Access Group assignment
capability is not available, other policy rules may be required to support access to resources tagged with
Sensitivity and Shareability restrictions. A discussion of possible interim policy applications for Sensitivity
and Shareability restrictions is included in Section 4.
The Protected Critical Infrastructure Information program specifies controls for PCII resources. However,
there is not currently an entity attribute management system in place to assign this attribute to PE and
NPEs. If PCII resources are required to be shared by ESSA Information Sharing Participants prior to the
assignment of entity attributes, DHS will need to establish the policy rules under which these resources
can be accessed.
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There is an ongoing effort to provide governance for unclassified information that requires additional
controls as required by Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information (Reference 16) Some
of the groups named below are named to align with the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) List
(http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list.html) where the data described by the CUI type
require membership in a particular group in order to permit access.
Definition: Specifies a particular group of which the entity is a member Optional Optional Optional
which, through the application of policy rules, may allow access to
sensitive or shared resources. Nothing is returned when an entity has no
LogicalAccessGroups.
Name: ATOStatus TS S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:certification
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Definition: The formal status of a NPE related to its operation as Required Required Required
declared by a Designated Approving Authority (DAA)..
P or NPE: NPE Multiplicity: Single value permitted.
UIAS Field: ATOStatus
EIAS Field: N/A
GFIPM Field: None
Format: Boolean
Allowable Values: True or False
“A U.S. person employed by, assigned to, or acting on behalf of an IC element who,
through the course of their duties and employment, has a mission need and an
appropriate security clearance for information collected or analysis produced.
Authorized IC personnel shall be identified by their IC element head and shall have
discovery rights to information collected and analysis produced by all elements of
the IC. The term may include contractor personnel.”
This attribute reflects whether a person has been identified by their IC element head to act as an AICP.
Under ICD 501, only users employed by, assigned to, or acting on behalf of an IC element may be AICPs.
Note that there are many IC members but relatively few are designated as AICPs.
Note: This attribute is dependent upon ‘Is IC Member’ (Section 3.12). ‘Authorized IC Person’ can only be
applied to persons that are members of the IC as defined in the ‘Is IC Member’.
TR-20.5 Each person entity shall have an Authorized IC Person (AICP) Status attribute at the TS
network level accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
Name: AICP TS S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:attribute
Definition: The value is returned when the person is an Authorized IC Required Ignored Ignored
Person (AICP) as described in ICD 501.
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3.6 Clearance
The Clearance attribute specifies the entity’s security clearance level for a person entity, or the highest
security classification of information that can be handled by an NPE as specified in the accredited System
Security Plan. Clearance is used for access control decisions to classified resources. This attribute does
not indicate that an entity holds an "interim" clearance. If there is no value for Clearance then the entity
can only access unclassified resources.
TR-20.6 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE ) shall have a Clearance attribute on classified
network levels accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
Name: Clearance TS S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:clearance
Definition: Reflects the clearance level of the entity in accordance with Required Required Ignored
the US control system.
Country of Affiliation is multi-valued, since an entity could possibly have multiple citizenships (e.g., “dual
citizenship”) relevant for access control decisions.
TR-20.7 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Country of Affiliation attribute
accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
Name: CountryOfAffiliation TS S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:country
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Definition: Reflects the citizenship of the person or the citizenship Required Required Required
of the administrator(s) and/or the organization(s) in control of the
NPE.
Definition: A representation that uniquely identifies a persona entity or Required Required Required
non-person entity persona. Acceptable sources include the
Distinguished Name (DN) from the entity’s Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) Certificate.
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The Duty Organization may differ from the Admin Organization for a person entity in cases where the
entity is detailed from their home or administrative agency to another agency for a Joint Duty
assignment or other rotation.
TR-20.9 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Duty Organization attribute
accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
Definition: Reflects the assigned organization of the entity (entity may Required Required Required
be detailed from their home agency to another agency for a Joint
Duty assignment).
Name: EntityType TS S U
urn:isa:acs:ns:v3.0:category
Definition: Reflects the type affiliation with the administrative Required Required Required
organization of the entity.
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Definition: Reflects the fine grain access control permissions granted to Required Ignored Ignored
the entity.
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3.12 Is IC Member
The Is IC Member attribute is a flag that reflects whether the entity (person or non-person) is a member
of the Intelligence Community as defined by EO 12333 (Reference 28) , where an IC member is “a person
employed by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for an element within the IC.”
TR-20.12 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have an Is IC Member attribute at the
TS network level accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
Definition: Reflects whether or not the entity is a member of the Required Ignored Ignored
Intelligence Community as defined by EO12333.
TR-20.13 Each non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Life Cycle Status attribute accessible by ISA access
control mechanisms.
Definition: Indicates the life cycle phase in which the entity is Required Required Required
operating.
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Table 4-1: Relationship between ISA Resource Attributes and ISA Entity Attributes
ISA Resource ISA Entity Attributes Policy Rule Policy Rule
Attributes Application
SCI Controls Fine Access Controls All values from Resource Attributes must be found AND
in Entity Attribute list
Logical Authority Authority Category All values from Resource Attributes must be found AND
Category in Entity Attribute list
Sensitivity Access Group All values from Resource Attributes must be found AND
in Entity Attribute list
Shareability Access Group One of the values from the Resource Attributes OR
must be found in the Entity Attribute list
Country Country of Affiliation One of the values from the Resource Attributes OR
must be found in the Entity Attribute list
Organization Duty Organization One of the values from the Resource Attributes OR
must be found in the Entity Attribute Duty list
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Entity Entity Type One of the values from the Resource Attributes OR
must be found in the Entity Attribute list
N/A 9 ATO Status All non-person entities (NPEs) shall have an May be applied for
Authority to Operate (ATO) Status attribute of access to all
“true”. resources
N/A Life Cycle Status All non-person entities (NPEs) shall have a Life May be applied for
Cycle Status attribute accessible by ISA access access to all
control mechanisms. resources
Until an Access Group management capability is available, the following policies address the presence of
several Shareability and Sensitivity resource attributes:
The following Sensitivity and Shareability restrictions cannot be enforced and should not be used
without the establishment of the Access Group capability:
• SENS:PCII
• SENS:LES
• SENS:PII
• SENS:TEI
• SENS:PR
• SHAR:EM
• SHAR:LE
Please note that access control capabilities must be able to understand the hierarchical nature of the
ORG attribute.
9
While there are no direct parallels to ATO Status and Life Cycle Status when tagging at the individual pieces of data,
it is expected that access rules will check these attributes at a system level before interfacing with the NPE
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requesting access.
5 ISA Access Control Use Cases
5.1 Use Case 1: Access Granted to Cybersecurity Data
A civilian employee of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works within the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which is an ISA Participant. This person is
requesting access to classified information about malware held by the National Security Agency (NSA).
NSA has determined that this information is releasable to civilian, federal contractors, and military
personnel at the six Federal Cybersecurity Centers, which are members of the NCC Access Group.
Furthermore, classified data will only be shared on the TS network if the entity requesting access
presents a valid PKI certificate.
The access decision in this scenario is represented in Table 5-1. After the entity has been authenticated
by presenting a valid PKI certificate, the NSA authorization service requests the attributes of the NCCIC
employee. The DHS attribute service returns the values associated with the particular NCCIC employee.
The NSA authorization service checks the following rules:
a) Data classified as Top Secret can only be shared with entities with a Top Secret Clearance.
b) This data can only be shared with entities in the National Cyber Centers (NCC) Access Group.
c) Data marked for dissemination to GOV, CTR, or MIL can only be shared with person entities of
the GOV, CTR, or MIL Entity Type.
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Sensitivity (SENS)
Country of Affiliation USA Country (CTRY)
Duty Organization USA.DHS.NCCIC Organization (ORG)
Entity Type GOV, CTR, Entity (ENTITY)
GOV - Rule (c) or MIL
Based on this scenario, the entity should be granted access to the specific information. Note that a
similar exchange would also authenticate and authorize the system that the DHS employee is using to
verify that it, as an NPE, is also allowed to access the classified data.
The following rules are applied and the initial access decision in this scenario is represented in Table 5-2.
a) Data classified as Unclassified can be shared with entities with or without a Clearance.
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Based on this scenario, the entity should be granted access to the specific information. Note that a
similar exchange may also authenticate and authorize the system that the user is using to verify that it,
as an NPE, is also allowed to access the data.
Following the access control decision, the following rules are levied to limit action based on access to the
resource:
Restrictions following access are specified with Access Privilege markings. In this use case, the markings
would set the default AccessPrivilege to “deny” and include specific permissions for all user entities to
conduct intelligence activities. In addition, the privilegeAction of REQUEST would indicate that a special
request may be made by the receiver to conduct additional actions. The markings would include:
• <PolicyRef>urn:isa:policy:acs:ns:v3.0?privdefault=deny&sharedefault=permit
• <privilegeAction>INTEL
• <privilegeScope>ALL
• <ruleEffect>permit
• <privilegeAction>DSPLY
• <privilegeScope>ALL
• <ruleEffect>permit
• <privilegeAction>REQUEST
• <privilegeScope>ALL
• <ruleEffect>permit
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The following rules are applied and the access decision in this scenario is represented in Table 5-3.
a) Data classified as Secret can be shared with entities with a clearance of Secret or Top Secret.
Table 5-3: Use Case Three – PUBREL and Portion Marking
Application of Resource
ISA Entity Attributes Requestor Policy Rules Information ISA Resource Attributes
Digital Identifier Valid
Clearance TS - Rule (a) S Classification (CLS)
Fine Access Controls SCI Controls (SCI)
Authority Category Logical Authority Categories
(LAC)
Access Group NCC Shareability (SHAR)
Sensitivity (SENS)
Based on this scenario, the entity should be granted access to the specific information.
Upon access, review of the document would show that sub-components of the document may be
marked with less restrictive markings. In this case, the Control Set for the resource would be marked:
<ControlSet>CLS:S
Sub-components that were publically releaseable would include the following elements:
<ControlSet>CLS:U
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<FormalDetermination> PUBREL
<ReleasedBy>Authority
<ReleaseDate>YYYY-MM-DD
The access decision in this scenario is represented in Table 5-4. After the entity has been authenticated
by presenting a valid PKI certificate, DC3 leverages the DoD authorization service to request the
attributes of the USCYBERCOM NPE. The DoD authorization service returns the values associated with
the particular USCYBERCOM NPE. The DoD authorization service checks the following rules:
a) Data marked for dissemination to USA.USG can only be shared with entities with a Duty
Organization that is a member of the US Government.
b) Data marked for dissemination to MIL, CTR, GOV, SVR, SVC, DEV, and NET can only be shared
with entities with an Entity Type of MIL, CTR, GOV, SVR, SVC, DEV, or NET.
c) Production DC3 systems will only share with NPEs with an ATO Status of True.
d) Production DC3 systems will only share with NPEs with a Life Cycle Status of PROD.
Sensitivity (SENS)
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Life Cycle Status PROD - Rule (d) PROD Required by DC3 Policy
Is IC Member No
Based on this scenario, the entity should be granted access to the specific information.
The access decision in this scenario is represented in Table 5-5. After the entity has been authenticated
by presenting a valid PKI certificate, the FBI leverages the FBI authorization service to request the
attributes of the JOC employee from the DoD authorization service. The DoD authorization service
returns the values associated with the particular JOC employee. The FBI authorization service checks the
following rules:
a) Law Enforcement data can only be shared with entities in the LES Access Group.
b) Data marked for dissemination to USG or SLTT can only be shared with entities with a Duty
Organization that is either SLTT or a member of the USG
c) Data marked for dissemination to MIL, CTR, and GOV can only be shared with entities with an
Entity Type of MIL, CTR, or GOV
Table 5-5: Use Case Five – Access to Law Enforcement Data Denied
Application
of Access
ISA Entity Attributes Rules ISA Resource Attributes
Digital Identifier Valid
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Is IC Member No
Based on this scenario, the entity should not be granted access to the specific information because
Access Rule (a) was not satisfied.
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6 Open Issues
The following access control issues remain to be resolved:
• Authentication – Will the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE)
negotiated trust relationship be available for all ISA Participants to leverage (at the TS level)? Do
all IC organizations utilize the complete list of trusted CAs or do they cherry pick who they want
to share with?
• Authentication – Will the DoD Interoperability Root allow two way authentications with the
Federal Bridge CA? Will the authentication be extended to the staff of the National Security
Council (NSC) hardware certificates in addition to software certificates?
• Cross-organizational Agreements – What cross-organizational agreements must be in place to
establish a Access Group that is not based on a legal authority? There is limited existing
capability to implement Access group restrictions. The User Attributes services will need to
provide the correct user attributes/entitlements. Is there a plan for an entitlement service? The
service needs to be flexible to support the establishment of ad hoc establishment and
disestablishment of communities.
• Cross-organizational Agreements – What cross-organizational agreements are needed to enable
subsequent sharing? Is there a common use of handling instructions (or minimum tagging) for
subsequent sharing of formal vs. interim vs. advisories vs. unreviewed data? Are there
agreements in place today and does ABAC technology change them?
• Cross-organizational Agreements – What coordination needs to be done regarding retention
policies?
• Implementation – Can a back-end attribute exchange also support machine-to-machine addition
and removal of attribute values? For example, DHS would manage the Critical Infrastructure
Access Group and may want someone whose attributes are managed by another organization to
have that attribute. In this example, how would DHS drive that change?
• Ad hoc Cross-Organizational Communities of Interest (CCOI) – Is there a need for a flexible CCOI
implementation that can create and end CCOIs based on active events?
• Implementation – Since the values for the Access Groups come from multiple sources, what
additional coordination is needed to fully develop and deconflict the allowable values
vocabulary for cyber information sharing?
• Implementation – How will the ACS address evolution in marking standards? As specifications
are updated, it will be possible to have two or more versions of acceptable markings active in
shared data at any one point in time. Policies must accommodate such evolution.
• Implementation - Analysts within each organization must be appropriately trained to ensure
they are implementing the policies outlined in the ACS correctly. How will training be handled to
ensure analysts within each organization fully understand how to implement the policies and
requirements outlined in this document?
7 Conclusion
This ISA Access Control Specification supplements the Information Requirements in the ISA SSA
Requirements Document by providing a common set of entity and resource attributes that meet the
needs of the ESSA Information Sharing Participant Community. With continued investments in tactical,
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operational, and strategic implementations of the ISA, the initiative continues to engage stakeholders in
identifying requirements in aligning current doctrine, operational engagement plans, and/or policy of
their organizations to facilitate executing the set of capabilities necessary for Enhanced Shared
Situational Awareness (ESSA) to enable Integrated Operational Action (IOA).
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References
1. NIST Special Publication 800-162 “Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and
Considerations”, January 2014.
2. ISA Framework, September 30, 2011
3. ISA SSA Requirements Document, Oct 21, 2013
https://max.omb.gov/community/x/MRV6KQ
4. ISA Technical Implementation Plan, July 18, 2013
https://max.omb.gov/community/x/MRV6KQ
5. Federal Identity Credential and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation
Guidance
http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/ficam-roadmap-and-
implementationguidance
6. IC Enterprise Attribute Exchange Between IC Attribute Services Unified Identity Attribute Set,
Version 3 (September 6, 2013)
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/chief-information-
officer/idamauthorization-attribute-set
7. Enterprise Identity Attribute Service (EIAS) User Integration Guide (November 15, 2011)
https://www.intelink.gov/go/YCKQa0r (Note: Intelink-U account required)
8. DoJ Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management
http://gfipm.net/standards/metadata/2.0/user.html
9. Intelligence Community Enterprise Data Header (IC-EDH) (July 17, 2012)
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/CIO/ICEA/IC-EDHPublic.zip
10. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63-1, Electronic
Authentication Guideline, December 2011
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63-1/SP-800-63-1.pdf
11. Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)
http://stix.mitre.org/
12. Enterprise Data Header Abstract Data Definition (ADD) version 1.0, 20 June 2014.
https://community.max.gov/download/attachments/699566316/EDH_ADD.pdf?version
=1&modificationDate=1413902608344&api=v2
13. Smart Data Enterprise Data Header Data Encoding Specification (DES) Version 2.0, July 2014.
https://community.max.gov/download/attachments/699566316/SDEDH_DES.txt?version
=1&modificationDate=1405517925189&api=v2
14. Smart Data Enterprise Data Header (EDH) Implementation Profile for the U.S. Intelligence
Community
15. Smart Data Enterprise Data Header (EDH) Implementation Profile for the Cyber Community
https://community.max.gov/download/attachments/699566316/SD-
EDH_Profile_Cyber.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1427737507998&api=v2
16. Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, November 4, 2010
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf
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17. DoD Information Security Manual, DoDM 5200.01, Volumes 1-4. February 24, 2012 (Formerly
CAPCO Manual)
18. Sections 1801, et seq. of title 50, United States Code (also known as “The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended”)
19. Intelligence Community Directive 710, “Classification and Control Markings System,” September
11, 2009
20. The US Government Manual
http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov
21. ISA STIX™ Profile Report v1-1,
https://community.max.gov/download/attachments/699566316/ISA%20STIX%20Profile
%20Report%20v1.docx?version=1&modificationDate=1395857509190&api=v2
22. ESSA Max.gov site
https://community.max.gov/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=695866673
23. Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, December 29, 2009
24. Department of Homeland Security Management Directive Number 11042.1, Safeguarding
Sensitive but Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information, January 6, 2005.
25. Intelligence Community Directive 501, Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information
within the Intelligence Community
26. Intelligence Community Technical Specification XML Data Encoding Specifications for
Information Security Markings, Version 2014-DEC
http://purl.org/ic/standards/ISM (Requires Intellink-U to access)
27. Controlled Vocabulary Enumeration Values for FAC (FAC-CVEnums), December 22, 2014
http://purl.org/ic/standards/ISM (Requires Intellink-U to access)
28. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities
29. Controlled Vocabulary Enumeration Values for USAgency (USAgency-CVEnums), February 2,
2015
http://purl.org/ic/standards/ISM (Requires Intellink-U to access)
30. Executive Order 13691 Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-
promotingprivate-sector-cybersecurity-information-sharing
31. Geopolitical Entities, Names, and Codes (GENC) Standard Edition 1
http://www.fgdc.gov/standards/organization/FGDC-SWG/meetings/2013-01-
30_SWGmaterials/GENC/at_download/file
32. ISO 3166-1 International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Codes for the representation of
names of countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: Country codes. ISO 3166-1:2006
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=3
9719
33. Intelligence Community Technical Specification Access Control Encoding Specification for
Information Security Markings, Version 2014-DEC
http://purl.org/ic/standards/ISM (Requires Intellink-U to access)
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34. ISO 8601 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Date and time format
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso8601
35. Presidential Policy Directive-21 “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directivecritical-infrastructure-security-and-resil
36. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/754
Acronyms
ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control
AICP Authorized IC Person
AOI Areas of Interest
AOR Areas of Responsibility
ATO Authority to Operate
CA Certification Agent
CCOI Cross-organizational Communities of Interest
CIKR Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources
CNCI-5 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative Five
CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information
CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information
COI Community of Interest
CUI Controlled Unclassified Information
DAA Designated Approving Authority
DC3 Defense Cyber Crime Center
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIB Defense Industrial Base
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DN Distinguished Name
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DoD Department of Defense
DoJ Department of Justice
ECS Enhanced Cybersecurity Services
EFE Enduring Functional Exchanges
EIAS DoD Enterprise Identity Attribute Service
EO Executive Order
ESSA Enhance Shared Situational Awareness
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FGI Foreign Government Information
FICAM Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management
FVEY Five Eyes
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TR Technology Requirement
TS Top Secret
U Unclassified
UAAS Unified Authorization and Attribute Service
UIAS Unified Identity Attribute Set
USG United States Government
Glossary
Attribute Provider A trusted authoritative source that provides the attributes associated with a person or NPE.
or Store
Authentication The process of verifying the identity claimed by or assumed of an entity (i.e., check that I am
who I say I am).
Authorization Access privileges granted to an authenticated user, program or process, or the act of granting
those privileges (i.e., check what I am allowed to see).
Entity (or Subject) Characteristics about the person or non-person entity (NPE) who is requesting access that is
Attribute used to make authorization decisions (e.g., clearance level).
Environmental Attributes about the current environment at the time of the transaction itself (e.g., time of
Attribute day, threat level, and physical location of entity requesting access).
FICAM Attribute Central location for interested parties to identify the types of attributes that can be
Registry leveraged across the Federal Government and external partners. The FICAM Attribute
Registry specifies attribute names, syntax, and semantics.
Note: The FICAM Attribute Registry is a governance process for maintaining the
definitions of attributes only. It is not a common storage for attributes associated
with specific people.
Ignored Entity The attribute is explicitly not used in making access decisions at that classification level.
Attribute
ISA STIX Profiles A set of business rules specific to the ISA community to guide the implementation of STIX
(Reference 11) to ensure interoperability.
Non-Person Entity [A]n entity with a digital identity that acts in cyberspace, but is not a human actor. This can
(NPE) include analytics or automated decision engines.
Optional Entity Someone seeking access to a resource may provide the attribute, but that it can also be left
Attribute empty. Therefore, the access rules may require that information for use in the decision. If the
attribute is considered necessary to gain access to a resource but is not provided, then access
is denied.
Policy Those documents that outline the general principles and acceptable procedures of a
governmental organization. Individual components of those documents are also known as
policies.
Policy Rules Rules that specify how to use the above attributes (along with other things) to render an
access decision.
Required Entity Anyone seeking access to a resource must provide the attribute. Therefore, the access rules
Attribute can expect to have that information for use in the decision. “Required” does not mean that
the attribute must be used in making the access decision.
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Resource Information about the resource being requested (e.g., classification of data). Resources
Attribute include data, applications, and services.
The values were derived based on the schema in Table A1. The second level of the Federal Government
organization value is based on the US Government Manual (Reference 20) with some changes made
based on ISA Use Cases. The third level organizational value will be controlled by the second level
organization. However, until those values are maintained under organizational governance, the
following list will be the required values for CUST and ORG. It is recommended that the schema in Table
A1 be used if additional values for the attribute ORIG are needed.
This list allows the inclusion of the Cyber Centers and separation into hierarchical categories. Access
control capabilities shall understand the hierarchical nature of the ORG attribute. Access will be granted
to resources marked with a higher level ORG to entities that include the high level DUTYORG and lower
level organizations. For example, for a resource marked ORG:USA.DOD, access shall be granted to users
with the DUTYORG:USA.DOD.DC3. The reverse is not true. Resources marked with ORG:USA.DOD.DC3
will only be allowed access to entities with DUTYORG:USA.DOD.DC3 or lower.
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The following organizational groupings can be used for dissemination purposes with the FurtherSharing
attribute and Originator attribute:
USA.SLTT All State, Local, Tribal and Territorial government civilian employee
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Non-governmental Organizations
There are currently no non-governmental organizations that will be custodians (CUST) of ISA data.
The following non-government organizational groupings are FurtherSharing and
Originator values. If additional non-governmental values for the attribute ORIG are needed the schema
in Table A1 should be used.
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Appendix
TR-20.2 ISA access control mechanisms shall make access control decisions using only the
entity attributes defined in the ISA ACS.
TR-20.3 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have an AdminOrganization
attribute accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.4 Each non-person entity (NPE) shall have an Authority to Operate (ATO) Status
attribute accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.5 Each person entity shall have an Authorized IC Person (AICP) Status attribute at
the TS network level accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.6 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Clearance attribute
on classified network levels accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.7 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Country of Affiliation
attribute accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.8 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Digital Identifier
accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.9 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Duty Organization
attribute accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.10 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have an Entity Type
attribute accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.11 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Fine Access Controls
attribute at the TS network level accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.12 Each person entity and non-person entity (NPE) shall have an Is IC Member
attribute at the TS network level accessible by ISA access control mechanisms.
TR-20.13 Each non-person entity (NPE) shall have a Life Cycle Status attribute accessible by
ISA access control mechanisms.
The goal was to make as few modifications to the UIAS Version 3 as possible. However, modifications were made,
mainly to the allowable values for the attributes as specified in Section 3, to address the needs of the cybersecurity
community beyond the Intelligence Community and to align with the SD-EDH Resource Attributes. Significant
differences include:
• The UIAS Version 3 includes several new attributes which should be considered for future addition to the ACS
Entity Attributes, including:
o Entity Security Mark to specify the shareability of the entity information beyond the network on which it
is hosted o IC Network to specify the network to which the NPE is connected
Appendix
• UIAS contains attributes Region, Role, and Topic which were not needed based on the ESSA Information
Sharing Participant Use Cases and were, therefore, not included in the ACS.
• The ACS Access Groups provides a broader set of groups to which a person can be assigned than the UIAS
Authority Category. For the Authority Category, the allowable values are included in the Logical Authority
Categories in the NSA Master Registry and in future versions of UIAS will be encoded in an XML CVE Encoding
Specification for Authority Categories. The ACS Access Groups includes the broader set to support the
assignment of Shareability and Sensitivity permissions. The Entity Standards Tiger Team (ESTT), responsible for
updates to the UIAS, is considering changes to UIAS to incorporate some of the concepts related to groups
but, at this time, these attributes are not aligned.
• The allowable values for the Clearance attribute are more limited in this ACS than specified in UIAS. The ACS
limits the number of values to a single value and to the US government marking system clearances. This ACS
does not support the use of interim clearances, Department of Energy clearances, or Foreign Government
clearances.
• For Country of Affiliation, the ACS specifies the GENC Country Codes (Reference 31) while the UIAS specifies
ISO 3166-1 (Reference 32). The GENC Standard Edition 1.0 is the US Government implementation of ISO 3166-
1 that conforms to US Board on Geographic Names and US Government recognition policy.
• For Digital Identifier, the ACS and UIAS are in alignment. However, future review should consider the use of
FASCN or a UUID as a key to retrieve entity attributes in lieu of the DN in order to prevent any concerns
regarding the DN and privacy and to align more closely with FICAM specification (Reference 5).
• For Duty Organization, the ACS specifies the allowable values in Appendix A which differs from the UIAS
allowable values from the Controlled Vocabulary Enumeration for USAgency (Reference 29). ESSA Information
Sharing Participants agreed that the US Agency acronym list did not provide sufficient granularity or a
hierarchy to support ISA Use Cases.
As ISA capabilities are implemented and UIAS continues to change to meet the needs of the Intelligence Community,
ESSA should consider aligning the ACS Entity Attributes completely with UIAS and work with the IC change process to
make modifications to support ESSA’s requirements.
10
Rights and responsibilities of Originator and Custodian ORIG: responsible to: check that they can share data; meet legislative
obligations; ensure their own equities are protected; set mandatory and optional data handling requirements on custodian; liaise
with CUST in incident handling; capture origin of data. CUST: responsible to: check that they are legally allowed to access data; check
that they meet legislative obligations; respect and protect the equities of the ORIG; respect data handling obligations; carry out
incident procedures.
Appendix
No mapping ICEDH-OwnerProducer Example: IC specifies which organization is the
USA OwnerProducer of the security
marking system. ISA Participants
agreed to use the ACS markings
limiting the security markings to the
US marking system.
Formal Determination (FD) ICEDH-disseminationControls The ACS indicates that the FD values
Values: PUBREL, NF, AIS, (ism) are not used for Access Control
PIINECESSARY-TO-UNDERSTAND- Some of the DissemControls map to decisions.
THREAT, PII-NOT-PRESENT, FOUO SENSGRP and CUI The ACS links NF to limitations placed
DissemControl= NF maps to CTRY=USA using CTRY.
ism:disseminationControls The ACS uses AccessPrivilege to limit
The following values are not used the further actions instead of OC. The ACS
SD-EDH Cyber profile: RS, OC, OC-USG, uses PUBREL in coordination with a
IMC, RELIDO, EYES, DSEN, PublicRelease Policy.
DISPLAYONLY, LIMDIS, EXDIS, NODIS,
SBU, SBU-NF, LES-NF, SSI, NNPI, ACCM There are also differences in ORG
The following values are assigned listings. ICEDH used USAgency CVE.
differently: RS – not used in SD-EDH ACS uses Appendix A List.
Cyber profile
FOUO – assigned as Formal The ACS has added a value of AIS to
Determination the FD attribute in support of the DHS
NF – considered a Formal Automated Indicator Sharing
Determination Initiative.
PR – assigned as a Sensitivity (PROPIN)
REL – not used – can be specified as
CTRY restriction
FISA – assigned as Caveat
LES – assigned as Sensitivity
Organization (ORG) (restriction) (ntk) only US Federal organizations The allowed values for ORG do not
align with the IC’s definition of
USAgency. The USAgency CVE does
not support the ISA requirements
related to restriction to sub
organizations.
ICEDH-Issue (aka Topic) ICEDH- SD-EDH Cyber does not include Issues,
SubRegion Topics or Subregions.
CHECK SHAREABILITY
// Assumption: Since this is an OR, there is no need to check that each value of SHAR is in the allowable
values list. If this assumption is correct, it may still be useful to make sure at least one value is acceptable,
which this pseudo-code does not do.
CHECK SENSITIVITY
CHECK COUNTRY
// Assumption: Since this is an OR, there is no need to check that each value of Country is in the allowable
values list. If this assumption is correct, it may still be useful to make sure at least one value is acceptable,
which this pseudo-code does not do.
CHECK ORGANIZATION
// Assumption: User only has 1 duty organization
// Assumption: Since this is an OR, there is no need to check that each value of Organization is in the
allowable values list. If this assumption is correct, it may still be useful to make sure at least one value is
acceptable, which this pseudo-code does not do.
IF (Passed != TRUE)
RETURN 'ACCESS DENIED'
CHECK ENTITY
// Assumption: User only has 1 Entity Type
// Assumption: Since this is an OR, there is no need to check that each value of Entity is in the allowable
values list. If this assumption is correct, it may still be useful to make sure at least one value is acceptable,
which this pseudo-code does not do.