SIPRI

YEARBOOK
2025
Armaments,
Disarmament and
International
Security
Summary
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict,

armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data,
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers,
media and the interested public.

THE SIPRI YEARBOOK

SIPRI Yearbook 2025 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts
and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms
control, peace and international security.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2025 and provides samples of the
data and analysis that it contains.

CONTENTS

Part I. International security and armed conflict, 2024

1. International stability, human security and the nuclear challenge 1

2. Armed conflict and conflict management 2

Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2024

3. Military expenditure 4
4. Arms production and military services 5
5. International arms transfers 6
6. World nuclear forces 8
7. Proliferation and use of missiles and armed uncrewed aerial vehicles 10

Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2024

8. Nuclear disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and security 12

9. Chemical weapons and security threats 14
10. Biological weapons and security threats 15
11. Conventional arms control and the regulation of inhumane weapons 16
12. Artificial intelligence and international peace and security 17
13. Cyber and digital threats 18
14. Space security governance 19
15. Dual-use and arms trade controls 20

Annexes 22

www.sipriyearbook.org © SIPRI 2025

1. INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, and the old largely numerical formulas of
HUMAN SECURITY AND THE arms control will no longer suffice.
NUCLEAR CHALLENGE
Facing the challenge
dan smith, sipri director
With President Trump’s return to the
White House, there is a repeat of the para­
Global security continued to deteriorate
doxical situation experienced during his
throughout 2024. Markers of this persistent
first administration, in which none of the
deterioration included major armed
three great powers is committed to defend­
conflicts in Ethiopia, Gaza, Myanmar,
ing and upholding the world order. China,
Sudan and Ukraine. Military spending,
as a rising power, Russia, as a declining
meanwhile, rose for the 10th successive
power, and the USA, as a profoundly dis­
year and exceeded $2.7 trillion in 2024.
affected power under Trump, all seek free­
Ecological disruption also continued, with
dom from the constraints of agreed rules
2024 being the first year on record in which
whenever they are inconvenient. One way
the average global temperature was clearly
forward is for medium and small powers to
more than 1.5°C above the pre-industrial
work together in coalitions with like-
average. New uncertainties arose in the
minded governments on specific goals.
first quarter of 2025 following the election
Cooperation is of value even when it is not
of Donald J. Trump as president of the
comprehensive. It is a pragmatic, viable
United States, which prompted a significant
approach: the new realism.
departure from previous US policy and
A return to an era of reductions to the
assumptions about global security and
global nuclear arsenal, however, requires
relations with allies.
agreement among the three great powers.
A new nuclear arms race? A new, general understanding is needed
that nuclear weapons do not buy security
The era of nuclear weapons reductions
and that their existence demands balanced
appears to have ended. Bilateral nuclear
behaviour by political leaders. Initial small
arms control between Russia and the USA
steps towards reducing risk could form
entered crisis some years ago and is now
guardrails against disaster. Together with
almost over. Revitalized national debates in
the voices of an informed public, they could
Europe, the Middle East and East Asia
also be part of building pressure on the
about nuclear status and strategy suggest
three great powers to take the next steps in
•
there is some potential for more states to
reducing their nuclear arsenals.
join the nuclear club. The signs are that a
new qualitative nuclear arms race is gear­
ing up and, compared with the last one, the
risks are likely to be more diverse and more
serious. Among the key points of com­
petition will be technological cap­acities in
cyberspace, outer space and ocean space.
Thus, the idea of who is ahead in the race
will be even more elusive and intangible,

international security and armed conflict 1

2. ARMED CONFLICT AND conflicts, with 1000–9999 estimated
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT conflict-related fatalities, fell from 20 in
2023 to 19 in 2024. Outside of Europe,
In 2024 the global armed conflict land­
most wars continued to take place within
scape continued to deteriorate, with large-
states—or in clusters of states with porous
scale violence across multiple regions.
borders—and to involve non-state armed
Perhaps the most pronounced change in
groups. The international dimension
armed conflict since 2021 has been the
remains key to many armed conflicts, with
return of extensive conventional interstate
military intervention or substantial support
warfare in Europe and cross-border, state-
often being provided to one or more of the
led military aggression in the Middle East.
warring parties by outside powers.
Although the number of locations of
armed conflict fell slightly, from 51 states Europe
in 2023 to 49 in 2024, the estimated
overall number of fatalities rose from Europe had the highest level of conflict-
188 000 in 2023 to 239 000 in 2024. related fatalities in 2024 (77 771), having
This was the highest annual total in the been the region with the lowest annual
period 2018–24 (the years for which level during 2018–21. Estimated conflict-
consis­tent data is available). There were related fatalities in Europe doubled
five major armed conflicts involving over between 2023 and 2024 as the Russia–
10 000 estimated conflict-related fatalities Ukraine war increased in intensity. This
in 2024 (one more than in 2023): the included more clashes inside Russia and
Israel–Hamas and Russia–Ukraine wars, expansion beyond the supply of arms and
the civil wars in Myanmar and Sudan, assistance to each side by supporting
and the subnational armed conflicts in states to the direct deployment of troops
Ethiopia. The number of high-intensity to Russia from the Democratic People’s

armed conflicts by number of estimated conflict-related fatalities, 2024

Major armed conflicts with High-intensity armed conflicts Low-intensity armed conflicts
10 000 or more conflict-related with 1000 to 9999 conflict- with 25 to 999 conflict-related
fatalities in 2024 related fatalities in 2024 fatalities in 2024

Note: The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement or acceptance by SIPRI.

2 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

Republic of Korea (North Korea). At the fatalities in some countries experi­encing
end of 2024, Russia controlled just under high-intensity armed conflict, includ­ing
one fifth of Ukrainian territory. Russian Burkina Faso (–12 per cent), Mali (–7.0 per
air attacks continued through the year, cent), Somalia (–35 per cent) and South
and Ukraine replied in kind, although Sudan (–16 per cent). Other armed conflicts
not on the same scale. There were no escalated, with increases in fatality rates in
formal Russia–Ukraine peace talks in the Ethiopia (+152 per cent) and Niger (+48 per
course of 2024, but the re-election of cent). The civil war in Sudan accounted for
Donald J. Trump as president of the nearly 24 per cent of all conflict-related
United States was expected to lead to a fatalities in sub-Saharan Africa in 2024,
re-evaluation of US policy towards the despite a small year-on-year decline in the
war in 2025. number of fatalities related to the war.

The Middle East and North Africa The Americas and Asia and Oceania

The human toll of the ongoing war in The Americas was the only region not
Gaza rose substantially in 2024, with over to have had a major armed conflict in
45 500 Palestinians dead, 90 per cent of 2018–24. The two countries that suffered
the population displaced and much of the the highest number of fatalities in 2024—
area reduced to rubble by the end of the Brazil and Mexico—largely faced criminal
year. The war also spilled over on multiple rather than political violence. Gang
fronts: violence in the West Bank rose to violence escalated in Haiti during the year,
record levels; Israel launched a ground despite the long-delayed arrival of inter­
campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon; national security assistance in June. The
the Iran–Israel conflict escalated beyond conflict-related fatality rate for Asia and
a proxy war to a series of direct exchanges Oceania has more than halved since 2021,
of fire; and Israel’s actions also inadvert­ notwithstanding the civil war in Myanmar.
ently contributed to the unexpected and
Peace processes
rapid collapse of the government of Presi­
dent Bashar al-Assad in Syria, taking the In 2024 there were a few noteworthy
13-year Syrian civil war into an uncertain developments in peace processes designed
endgame. The region’s other armed to prevent the occurrence (or reoccurrence)
conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Türkiye and of armed violence: China and India defused
Yemen have reduced in intensity in tensions along their disputed border;
recent years without reaching any China and the Philippines set up a dispute-
sustainable resolutions. resolution process to improve their handling
of maritime disputes; and Kyrgyzstan and
Sub-Saharan Africa
Tajikistan resolved a long-standing border
Sub-Saharan Africa remained the region dispute. However, few peace processes
with the most armed conflicts (21), linked to ongoing armed conflict advanced
although many involved fewer than in 2024. While there was some further
1000 conflict-related fatalities over the progress in South Sudan, there were set­
year and levels of violence fluctuated con­ backs for peace processes in Colombia,
sider­ably. Between 2023 and 2024, there Ethiopia, the Philippines and Yemen. •
were notable decreases in conflict-related

international security and armed conflict 3

3. MILITARY EXPENDITURE wor l d m i l i ta r y s p e n di ng , 2 0 2 4

Estimated global military expenditure rose Spending Change (%)

for the 10th consecutive year in 2024, to Region (US$ b.) 2023–24

reach $2.7 trillion, driven by the Russia– Africa 52.1 3.0

Ukraine war and other armed conflicts and North Africa 30.2 8.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 21.9 –3.2
geopolitical tensions. The 9.4 per cent
Americas 1 100 5.8
increase in total military spending in 2024
Central America 19.8 31
pushed estimated world spending to the
and the Caribbean
highest level recorded by SIPRI. As a result, North America 1 027 5.7
the global military burden—world military South America 53.6 –0.1
expenditure as a share of world gross Asia and Oceania 629 6.3
domestic product (GDP)—rose to 2.5 per Central Asia 1.9 –5.5
cent. For countries with major or high- East Asia 433 7.8
Oceania 37.0 1.5
intensity armed conflicts in 2024 the
South Asia 102 1.0
average military burden was 4.4 per cent, South East Asia 54.9 7.5
com­pared with 1.9 per cent in countries Europe 693 17
with no such conflict. Central and 472 14
Between 2015 and 2024, world military Western Europe
expenditure rose by 37 per cent and Eastern Europe 221 24
increased across all five geographic Middle East (243) 15
regions. The biggest increase was in World total 2 718 9.4

Europe (+83 per cent), followed by Asia ( ) = uncertain estimate.

and Oceania (+46 per cent), the Americas Note: Spending figures are in billions of US
(+19 per cent), the Middle East (+19 per cent) dollars, at current (2024) prices and exchange
and Africa (+11 per cent). rates. Changes are in real terms, based on
constant (2023) US dollars.
The United States remained by far the
largest military spender in the world. Its
In Asia and Oceania estimated military
expenditure of $997 billion in 2024 was
expenditure rose for the 35th consecutive
3.2 times more than the next biggest
year. Spending by China, which grew by
spender, China.
7.0 per cent to reach $314 billion in 2024,
In 2024 military spending rose in all
accounted for half of the regional total.
countries in Europe other than Malta as
Countries’ tensions with China influenced
total European spending increased by 17 per
spending decisions across the region in
cent. Spending went up in Russia (+38 per
2024: in Japan, for example, spending went
cent) and Ukraine (+2.9 per cent) during the
up by 21 per cent, the largest year-on-year
year, while 17 of the 30 European members
spending increase since 1952.
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Estimated military spending in the
(NATO) reached or surpassed the alliance’s
Middle East grew by 15 per cent in 2024,
2.0 per cent of GDP spending guideline, with
with increases in all three of the biggest
notable spending increases recorded by
spenders in the region: Saudi Arabia
Romania (+43 per cent), the Netherlands
(+1.5 per cent), Israel (+65 per cent) and
(+35 per cent), Sweden (+34 per cent), Poland
(+31 per cent) and Germany (+28 per cent).
Türkiye (+12 per cent). •
4 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary
4. ARMS PRODUCTION AND t h e t o p 1 0 a r m s - p r o duc i ng
MILITARY SERVICES a n d m i l i ta r y s e r v ic e s
c o m pa n i e s i n t h e w o r l d,
The SIPRI Top 100 by a r ms r e v en u e s, 2023
The arms revenues of the 100 largest arms- Arms
producing and military services companies revenues
(the SIPRI Top 100) totalled $632 billion in Company Country (US$ m.)
2023 (the most recent year for which data is 1 Lockheed Martin USA 60 810
available). This was 2.8 per cent higher than 2 RTX USA 40 660
3 Northrop Grumman USA 35 570
the revenues of the Top 100 for 2022. The
4 Boeing USA 31 100
year-on-year increase reflected the demand 5 General Dynamics USA 30 200
for military equip­ment and services driven 6 BAE Systems UK 29 810
by heightened global security concerns, 7 Rostec Russia 21 730
ongoing conflicts and rising military 8 AVIC China 20 850
9 NORINCO China 20 560
budgets. Seventy-three of the companies in
10 CETC China 16 050
the Top 100 increased their arms revenues
Note: Arms revenues are in millions of US
in 2023, including 39 that achieved double-
dollars, at constant (2023) prices and
digit annual growth. Given the persistence
exchange rates.
of demand and the size of companies’ ‘Country’ refers to the country in which
backlogs, there are likely to be further the ownership and control structures of the
increases in global arms revenues in the company are located, i.e. the location of a
coming years. company’s headquarters.
The United States continued to domin-
ate the Top 100 ranking, with 41 com- Mergers and acquisition trends

panies listed with total arms revenues of One of the defining trends of the North
$317 billion. They accounted for half of total American and West European arms indus­
Top 100 arms revenues in 2023. The world’s tries in recent years has been a growing
top five arms companies in 2023—whose wave of mergers and acquisitions among
arms revenues made up nearly one third companies, facilitated by low borrowing
of the Top 100 total—were all based in costs and increasing military procurement.
the USA. The trend has been particularly pro­
Nine Chinese companies were ranked in nounced in high-technology sectors,
the Top 100 for 2023, with three among the including those covering uncrewed aerial
top 10. Chinese companies’ combined arms vehicles, electronic warfare and cyber
revenues of $103 billion placed China capabilities powered by artificial intelli­
second among countries with companies in gence. This reflects the Western arms
the ranking, behind only the USA. industry’s shift towards advanced tech­
Due to a lack of available data, only two nologies in response to the require­ments of
Russian companies were included in the
Top 100 for 2023. Their combined arms
modern warfare and military priorities. •
revenues of $25.5 billion were 40 per cent
higher than in 2022.

military spending and armaments 5

5. INTERNATIONAL However, the stable overall trend masks a
ARMS TRANSFERS far more complex regional picture and
there are indications, which became more
The volume of international transfers of
visible in 2020–24, that the volume of
major arms has remained relatively stable
international arms transfers will grow in
over the past 15 years. The volume of
the coming years.
transfers in the five-year period 2020–24
was 0.6 per cent lower than in 2015–19 and Conflicts, tensions and arms transfers
3.9 per cent higher than in 2010–14. The
volume of transfers in 2020–24 was the Armed conflicts and increasing interstate
second highest of any five-year period since tensions are the main drivers of arms
the end of the cold war, but still around acquisitions for many states. Most of
35 per cent lower than the peak years the largest recipients of major arms in
during the cold war (1980–84). 2020–24 used imported arms in military
The global trend since 2010–14 perhaps combat operations in that period. Many
goes against expectations, coming at a time arms suppliers are direct stakeholders in
when armed conflicts and threat percep­ at least some of the conflicts or are
tions in many parts of the world have affected by related tensions. This partly
intensified, resulting in widespread explains why they are willing to supply
increases in arms procurement. Three key arms, even when the transfers seem to
factors, among many others, have kept contradict their stated arms export
international arms transfers at around the policies. Three non-state armed groups
same level over the past 15 years: long were identified as recipients of major arms
procurement cycles, expanding domestic in 2020–24, located in Lebanon/Palestine,
arms production and economic constraints. Libya and Yemen.

t h e t r e n d i n t r a n s f e r s o f m a jo r a r m s , 19 5 0 –2 0 2 4
50

40
(billions of trend-indicator values)
Volume of arms transfers

30

20

10

0
54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94 99 04 09 14 19 24
50– 55– 60– 65– 70– 75– 80– 85– 90– 95– –20 –20 10– 15– 20–
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 000 005 20 20 20
2 2

Note: The bar graph shows the average annual volume of arms transfers for 5-year periods and the line
graph shows the annual totals.

6 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

 the m ain suppliers and i m p o r t s o f m a jo r a r m s ,
r e c i p i e n t s o f m a jo r a r m s , b y r e gio n
2 0 2 0 –2 4
Global Change (%) in volume
Global share Global share Recipient share (%), of imports from
Supplier exports (%) Recipient imports (%) region 2020–24 2015–19 to 2020–24
1 USA 43 1 Ukraine 8.8 Africa 4.5 –44
2 France 9.6 2 India 8.3 Americas 6.2 13
3 Russia 7.8 3 Qatar 6.8 Asia and 33 –21
4 China 5.9 4 Saudi Arabia 6.8 Oceania
5 Germany 5.6 5 Pakistan 4.6 Europe 28 155
6 Italy 4.8 6 Japan 3.9 Middle East 27 –20
7 UK 3.6 7 Australia 3.5
8 Israel 3.1 8 Egypt 3.3 Recipients of major arms
9 Spain 3.0 9 USA 3.1
10 South Korea 2.2 10 Kuwait 2.9 SIPRI has identified 162 states as recipients
of major arms in 2020–24. The five largest
Suppliers of major arms arms recipients were Ukraine, India, Qatar,
SIPRI has identified 64 states as suppliers Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which together
of major arms in 2020–24, but most are accounted for 35 per cent of total arms
minor suppliers. The 25 largest suppliers imports. Ukraine’s arms imports increased
accounted for 98 per cent of the total nearly 100 times over compared with
volume of exports, and the top five—the 2015–19, with at least 35 states delivering
United States, France, Russia, China and major arms, mostly as aid.
Germany—accounted for 71 per cent. China, for decades among the top arms
The USA’s arms exports grew by 21 per recipients, saw arms imports fall by two
cent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, thirds between 2015–19 and 2020–24 as it
increas­ing its share of global arms exports continued to expand its domestic arms
from 35 to 43 per cent. Known plans for production capabilities.
deliveries of major arms over the next few The region that received the largest
years strongly indicate that the USA will volume of transfers of major arms in
remain unchallenged as the world’s largest 2020–24 was Asia and Oceania. States in
arms supplier for the foreseeable future— Asia and Oceania accounted for 33 per cent
a position leading to anxieties of depend­ of all global arms transfers, followed by
ence for some of its main clients and allies. those in Europe (28 per cent), the Middle
In contrast, Russia’s arms exports halved East (27 per cent), the Americas (6.2 per
between 2015–19 and 2020–24 to a level far cent) and finally Africa (4.5 per cent).
below any previous five-year period in its Between 2015–19 and 2020–24, the flow of
history (or in any previous five-year period arms to Europe increased by 155 per cent,
since 1950 for its predecessor, the Soviet reaching a level far higher than in any of the
Union). Exports by France rose by 11 per six preceding five-year periods. The flow to
cent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, the Americas also increased (+13 per cent),
making France the second largest supplier while flows to Africa (−44 per cent), Asia
of major arms in 2020–24. and Oceania (−21 per cent) and the Middle
East (−20 per cent) decreased. •

military spending and armaments 7

6. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES Nuclear weapon modernization trends

All the nine nuclear-armed states con­

At the start of 2025, nine states—the United
tinued to strengthen their nuclear arsenals
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
in 2024 and some deployed new nuclear-
China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic
armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
during the year. The USA and Russia
and Israel—together possessed approx­
together possess almost 90 per cent of all
imately 12 241 nuclear weapons, of which
nuclear warheads, and both have extensive
9614 were considered to be potentially
programmes under way to modernize and
oper­ationally available. An estimated
replace their nuclear warheads as well as
3912 of these warheads were deployed
their delivery systems and nuclear weapon
with operational forces, including about
production facilities. China is in the middle
2100 that were kept in a state of high oper­ of a significant modernization and
ational alert on ballistic missiles. expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is
Overall, the number of nuclear warheads estimated to have increased from 500 to up
in the world continues to decline, due to the to 600 warheads during the year. The
USA and Russia dismantling retired war­ nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear-
heads. However, the number of warheads armed states are smaller, but all are either
being dismantled annually appears to be developing or deploying new weapon
decreasing and it seems likely that the rate systems or have announced their intention
at which retired warheads are dismantled to do so.
will soon be outpaced by the rate at which Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North
new warheads enter global stockpiles. Low Korea deploy dual-capable missiles and all
levels of transparency hinder assessments are believed to be modernizing these
of the status of states’ nuclear arsenals. capabil­ities. Up until the mid 2000s, only

g l o b a l n u c l e a r w e a p o n i n v e n t o r i e s , ja n ua r y 2 0 2 5

UK
225 RUSSIA
5 459

FRANCE
290

USA NORTH
5 177 ISRAEL
90 KOREA
50

PAKISTAN
170

CHINA
600

INDIA
180

10 warheads Deployed warheads Stored warheads Retired warheads

Note: The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement or acceptance by SIPRI.

8 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

 w o r l d n u c l e a r f o r c e s , ja n u a r y 2 0 2 5
Military stockpilea
Deployed Stored Retired Total
warheadsb warheadsc Total warheadsd inventory e
USA 1 770 1 930 3 700 1 477 5 177
Russia 1 718 2 591 4 309 1 150 5 459
UK 120 105 225 – 225
France 280 10 290 .. 290
China 24 576 600 – 600
India – 180 180 .. 180
Pakistan – 170 170 .. 170
North Korea – 50 50 .. 50
Israel – 90 90 .. 90
Total 3 912 5 702 9 614 2 627 12 241
. . = not applicable or not available; – = nil or a negligible value.
Notes: All figures are approximate and are estimates based on public information or assessments by
the authors. SIPRI revises its world nuclear forces data each year based on new infor­mation and
updates to earlier assessments. Countries are ordered by date of first known nuclear test; however,
there is no conclusive open-source evidence that Israel has tested its nuclear weapons.
a ‘Military stockpile’ refers to all deployed warheads as well as warheads in central storage that

could potentially be deployed after some preparation.

b ‘Deployed warheads’ are warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with oper­ational forces.
c ‘Stored warheads’ are warheads in central storage that would require some preparation (e.g. the

instal­lation of certain components, transport and loading on to launchers) before they could be
deployed.
d ‘Retired warheads’ have been retired from the military stockpile but have not yet been dismantled.
e ‘Total inventory’ includes stockpiled warheads as well as retired warheads awaiting dismantlement.

France, Russia, the UK and the USA nuclear weapons. Both Russia and Belarus
deployed missiles with multiple warheads. continued to make claims in 2024 that
Since then, China has developed two mis­ Russia had deployed nuclear weapons on
siles to carry multiple warheads, while Belarusian territory, although there was no
India, Pakistan and North Korea are all conclusive evidence of this deployment.
currently pursuing this capability. The Extended nuclear deterrence has been
USA, Russia, the UK and France were early a key component of the North Atlantic
adopters of sea-based nuclear weapons, but Treaty Organ­ization’s collective security
in recent years these have been proliferat­ arrange­ments since the alliance’s incep­
ing, especially in the four nuclear-armed tion. Dis­cussions about the future of these
states in the Indo-Pacific. arrange­ments, largely triggered by Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,
Nuclear doctrines and nuclear sharing continued in 2024. In early 2025 the USA
In November 2024 Russia updated its confirmed that it had replaced its nuclear
official nuclear weapons doctrine, which gravity bombs stationed at military bases
appeared to expand the range of contin­ outside the USA with upgraded versions. •
gencies under which Russia could use

military spending and armaments 9

7. PROLIFERATION AND USE United States authorized Ukraine to use
OF MISSILES AND ARMED US-supplied systems to strike targets
UNCREWED AERIAL VEHICLES deeper inside Russian territory. This
enabled Ukraine to hold Russian infra­
Developments in 2024 again confirmed the structure, logistics and military assets
high-profile role of missiles and armed at risk.
uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) in modern
security and military strategies. The A build-up of missile arsenals in Europe
develop­ments during the year were shaped There is a growing demand for missiles in
both by the continued and extensive use of Europe to replace those supplied to Ukraine
such weapons in conflict—especially in the as well as to expand stockpiles in line with
Russia–Ukraine war and in Iran’s missile the prevailing threat environment and to
attacks on Israel linked to the Israel– address perceived gaps in capabil­ities
Hamas war—and by the underlying and through the development of new offen­sive
explicit use of missiles for signalling and and defensive systems. This, in turn, risks
leverage in these conflicts and elsewhere. triggering a new missile arms race in
Together with the need to replenish stock­ Europe, especially in the class of missiles
piles, states’ perceptions of the military previously banned by the now defunct
value and utility of missiles, air and missile 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
defence systems and armed UAVs are (INF) Treaty. Evidence for a ‘missile
contributing to growing demand for renaissance’ in Europe came in two separ­
current missile and UAV types and the ate but related developments in July 2024.
development of a new generation of both During that month, Germany and the USA
technologies. agreed on the stationing in Germany from
Use of missiles and armed UAVs
2026 of various US ground-launched mis­
in the Russia–Ukraine war
siles, while France, Germany, Italy and
Poland signed a letter of intent, later
Russia continued to use conventionally joined by Sweden and the United Kingdom,
armed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and on joint production of medium-range
one-way attack UAVs in large numbers missiles under a new European Long-
against Ukrainian forces, critical infra­ range Strike Approach.
structure and civilians in 2024. Between
January and September 2024, Ukraine Use of missiles and armed UAVs
reported that almost 5500 such systems in the Middle East
were launched at Ukraine, averaging more The spillover of the war in Gaza in 2024 to
than 20 launches every day. In November involve Iran and several of its allied
2024 Russia tested the new dual-capable militias, including Hezbollah in Lebanon
intermediate-range Oreshnik missile with and the Houthis in Yemen, saw the con­
multiple independently targetable re-entry tinued use of rockets, UAVs and—to a lesser
vehicles in a strike against Dnipro. Even extent—missiles. Such weapons were used
though Ukraine struggled to acquire the in attacks on Israel and on shipping in the
desired quantities of missiles, its use of Red Sea, while Israel used them in its
missiles and long-range UAVs also shaped bombardment of Gaza and attacks against
the conflict. In November 2024 the

10 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

 s h a r e o f s tat e s s u b s c r i b i n g t o t h e h ag u e c o de o f c o n duc t
ag a i n s t b a l l i s t ic m i s s i l e p r o l i f e r at io n , b y r e gio n , ja n ua r y 2 0 2 4
No. of states No. of subscribing
Region in region states Share of region (%)
Africa 53 42 79
Americas 35 23 66
Asia and Oceania 44 28 64
Europe 48 48 100
Middle East 15 4 27
Total 195 145 74
Note: States in each region refer to United Nations member states along with the Cook Islands and
the Holy See (which have both subscribed to the code).
Source: Hague Code of Conduct, ‘Subscribing states’, Jan. 2024.

Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and other Treaty in 2019, the remaining missile arms
non-state armed groups in Iraq and Syria. control instruments are trans­parency and
confidence-building mechanisms, such as
Escalating use of UAVs
the Hague Code of Conduct against
in sub-Saharan Africa
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC),
The use of armed UAVs has been and non-proliferation measures, including
confirmed in at least six conflicts in strategic trade controls. In January 2024
sub-Saharan Africa—in Burkina Faso, Qatar became the 145th state to subscribe
Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and to the HCOC, making it only the fourth
Sudan—leading to more than 940 civilians state to do so in the Middle East.
being killed between November 2021 and There is no dedicated multilateral
November 2024. Use of UAVs by non-state process on the regulation of armed UAVs.
armed groups in the region is still at an To address some of the concerns over
early stage, but is reportedly increasing in increasing use of UAVs, in March 2024
both frequency and geographical scope, a group of 21 states published a joint
especially in armed conflict settings in statement on the issue. The statement
border regions in West Africa, such as the reiterated the need to intensify the debate
Liptako–Gourma region (Burkina Faso, about ways to improve transparency,
Mali and Niger) and the Lake Chad Basin oversight and accountability in the
(Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria), as acquisition, transfer and use of armed
well as the Central African Republic, UAVs, and proposed a multilateral
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, exchange of views. •
Mozambique and Somalia.

Transparency and confidence-

building mechanisms

Global regimes and norms governing

missiles and armed UAVs remain under­
developed. Since the collapse of the INF

military spending and armaments 11

8. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, demonstrated that reaching consensus in
ARMS CONTROL, NON- this review cycle will remain difficult.
PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY
The Comprehensive
Nuclear disarmament, arms control and Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
non-proliferation are replete with chal­ When, and if, the 1996 Comprehensive
lenges. By the end of 2024 nuclear dis­ Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters
armament appeared more elusive than at into force, it will ban nuclear weapon tests,
any point since the end of the cold war, and all other nuclear explosions, every­
especially since strategic dialogue between where. Papua New Guinea ratified the
Russia and the United States has effectively CTBT in 2024, bringing the total number of
ceased. There were more positive develop­ ratifying states to 178. After revoking its
ments in the engagement between China ratification of the CTBT in 2023, Russia
and the USA, but dialogue on nuclear signalled its readiness to resume nuclear
weapon-related issues was undermined tests if the USA were to do so. From its side,
by tensions over the USA’s support for the USA, which has signed but not ratified
Taiwan as well as its economic sanctions the treaty, continued with its policy of
against China. The looming expiry of the increasing transparency by organizing a
2010 Russia–USA Treaty on Measures for visit by a delegation of international
the Further Reduction and Limitation of officials to its nuclear test site facilities.
Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) in
2026, combined with arguments in the USA The Treaty on the Prohibition
for strengthening deterrence to counter of Nuclear Weapons
China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, raise The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of
the prospect of an unregulated nuclear Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) aims to com­
arms build-up in the future. The growing pletely eliminate nuclear weapons. It con­
nuclear risks and ten­sions between great tinued to garner international support from
powers also continued to cast a shadow non-nuclear weapon states in 2024, with
over key multi­lateral nuclear arms control, ratifications by Indonesia, São Tomé and
disarmament and non-proliferation frame­ Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Solomon
works in 2024. Islands bringing the number of states
parties to 73. A further 25 states had signed
The NPT review cycle
but not yet ratified the treaty as of the end
The abbreviated review cycle of the of the year.
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of In prep­a ration for the third Meeting of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continued with States Parties of the TPNW in 2025,
the second preparatory committee meeting informal working groups continued the
held in Geneva in advance of the 2026 NPT inter­sessional process. Some of the focus
Review Conference. Dissatisfaction with areas of the process were reflected in
the pace of nuclear disarmament, concerns resolutions adopted by the United Nations
over the increased salience of nuclear General Assembly, including a resolution
weapons in international politics, and establish­ing an independent scientific panel
disagreements over a slew of other issues to study the effects of nuclear war. The
resolution was approved with the support

12 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

 globa l stocks of fissile ing the challenge of nuclear disarmament
m at e r i a l s , 2 0 2 4 in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (North Korea). It also contributed to
The explosive material utilized in nuclear
proliferation concerns by fuelling the
weapons is fissile material, either highly
enriched uranium (HEU) or separated pluto­ debate within the Republic of Korea (South
nium. China, France, Pakistan, Russia, the Korea) on the possibility of acquiring
United Kingdom and the United States have nuclear weapons in response to the per­
pro­duced both HEU and pluto­nium for use in ceived threat from North Korea.
their nuclear weapons; and India and Israel In the Middle East, Iran’s political calcu­
have produced mainly pluto­nium. North lus regarding its nuclear status was increas­
Korea has produced plutonium for use in
ingly affected by its escalating con­flict with
nuclear weapons but is believed to be pro­
ducing HEU for nuclear weapons as well.
Israel during 2024. Domestic debates con­
All states with a civilian nuclear indus­t ry sidered the potential benefits of a nuclear
are capable of producing fissile materials. deterrent in addressing military vulner­
In 2024 a cross-regional group of 12 states, ability, while the Iranian govern­ment con­
led by Japan, was established to build tinued to signal readiness for nuclear
political momentum for negotiating a fissile restraint through negotiations on reviving
material cut-off treaty.
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
The International Panel on Fissile
from which the USA withdrew in 2018.
Materials compiles information on global
stocks of fissile materials. Arab states and Iran also reiterated their
commitment to the norm against nuclear
Global stocks (tonnes), 2024
weapons at the fifth UN Conference on the
Highly enriched uranium 1 240
Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free
In or available for weapons 1 100
Not directly available for weapons of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which
Unsafeguarded 130 took place in November 2024. As in previ­
Safeguarded/monitored 10 ous years, Israel—the region’s only nuclear-
Separated plutonium 565 armed state—was invited but did not
In or available for weapons 140 partici­pate. The participants (22 Middle
Not directly available for weapons Eastern and African states) identified
Unsafeguarded 265
Israel’s absence as a key challenge.
Safeguarded/monitored 160
Attacks on Ukrainian nuclear sites

of 144 states, including nuclear-armed The repeated attacks on Ukrainian nuclear

China, with only three states voting against power plants in 2024 underscored the
(France, Russia and the United Kingdom). absence of normative frameworks to
The last such UN-mandated study on this address challenges to nuclear security and
topic was issued in 1988. nuclear safety in conditions of a major
armed conflict. Russia’s continued target­
Regional disarmament and
ing of critical infrastructure in Ukraine
non-proliferation dynamics
added to the nuclear safety, security and
The tense security situation on the Korean safeguards challenges in 2024. The Inter­
peninsula highlighted escalation risks amid national Atomic Energy Agency maintained
continuing diplomatic deadlock in address­ a consistent presence in Ukraine through­
out 2024. •
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 13
9. CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND a l l e g e d u s e o f r io t c o n t r o l
SECURITY THREATS ag e n t s a n d t ox ic c h e m ic a l s
in ukr aine
Chemical weapons are prohibited by the
In late 2024 the Organisation for the Prohib­
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention ition of Chemical Weapons confirmed the
(CWC), which entered into force in 1997 presence of a riot control agent on battle­field
and had 193 states parties as of December sites in Ukraine. This fuelled concerns that
2024. The Organisation for the Prohibition Russia may be using riot control agents as
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) oversees the a method of warfare, which would consti­t ute
implementation of the CWC and is respons­ a serious violation of the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention.
ible for verifying chemical weapon dis­
armament and helping to ensure that toxic
Chemical weapon control
chemicals are used only for purposes not
and disarmament
prohibited by the CWC. Since the last of the
chemical weapon stockpiles declared by The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have
CWC states parties were destroyed in 2023, affected the functioning of the OPCW in
under OPCW verification, the focus has several ways. First, its policymaking
shifted further to the prevention of the organs are highly polarized and have been
re-emergence of chemical weapons. unable to make consensus decisions on
compliance-related topics or the organ­
Allegations of and reactions to ization’s budget for several years. Second,
chemical weapon use the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat has been
While the CWC is one of the most the subject of disinformation campaigns—
successful disarmament treaties, it has related to the allegations of chemical
faced significant challenges and com­ weapon use by Russia and Syria—aimed at
pliance concerns, and these continued to undermining its credibility and trust in its
affect chemical disarmament in 2024. impartiality and technical expertise. At the
Syria, which acceded to the CWC in 2013 in same time, the OPCW continues to carry
the wake of a major chemical weapon out many international activities geared
attack in Ghouta and subsequently towards, among other things, verifying the
eliminated its declared chemical weapon peaceful use of toxic chemicals in industry,
programme, is suspected to have been in enhancing chemical safety and security,
non-compliance with its obligations under keeping abreast of relevant scientific and
the CWC since 2014. Independent OPCW technological developments, providing
investigations have proven that Syria has international cooperation and assistance
used chemical weapons on several to its member states in various areas,
occasions. As of December 2024, Syria had and contributing to the prevention of
not restored its compliance with the CWC chemical terrorism. •
and it remained subject to the convention’s
compliance measures. However, the
unexpected fall of the government of
President Bashar al-Assad in December
2024 may enable the complete elimination
of Syria’s chemical weapon programme.

14 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

10. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND national architecture against biological
SECURITY THREATS weapons.

Biological weapons comprise bacteria, Biological weapon disarmament

viruses or toxins disseminated through a and non-proliferation
delivery mechanism to inflict harm and are Key biological disarmament and non-
prohibited under international law. The proliferation activities in 2024 were carried
princi­pal legal instrument banning bio­ out in connection with the working group
logical warfare is the 1972 Biological and on the strengthening of the BWC, the 2024
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The Meeting of States Parties of the BWC, and
BWC is moving towards universality, with the First Committee of the UN General
Tuvalu and Micronesia acceding to the Assembly. In 2024 the General Assembly
convention in 2024, taking the number of also adopted the Pact for the Future, in
states parties to 188. A further four states which states committed, among other
have signed but not ratified the convention. things, to pursuing a world free of bio­
The wider biological warfare regime logical weapons and to ensuring that those
includes the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which responsible for any use of these weapons
prohibits the use of chemical and biological are identified and held accountable.
weapons in war, and a growing array of The working group on the strengthening
other measures, including export control of the BWC reached the halfway mark in
regimes like the Australia Group, the 2024 and has made some progress, largely
United Nations secretary-general’s mech­ due to states parties focusing on pragmatic
anism for investigation of alleged use of and incremental approaches. Two new
chemical and biological weapons, and UN mechanisms are being proposed: one for
Security Council Resolution 1540, which International Cooperation and Assistance
marked its 20th anniversary in 2024. These (ICA) and another for Science and Tech­
broader measures all serve to bolster nology (S&T) Review. The ICA mechanism
aspects of the prohibition and prevention would facilitate the implementation of
of biological weapons. Article X of the BWC, which promotes
Allegations of non-compliance
peaceful uses of biological agents, while the
with the BWC
S&T mechanism would review and assess
scientific developments relevant to the
Current geopolitical tensions continue to BWC, providing advice to states parties.
affect biological weapon disarmament and There is broad support for the two mech­
non-proliferation efforts. Russia’s long- anisms in the working group, but there was
standing and strategic disinformation no final agreement by the end of 2024, and
campaign about what it alleges to be the 10th BWC Review Conference in 2027
nefarious activities at Western ‘biolabs’ will still have significant work to do to over­
signifi­cantly escalated following its full-
scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
come divisions. •
Russia continued this campaign in 2024,
using every opportunity and international
forum available to undermine the inter­

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 15

11. CONVENTIONAL ARMS pag e r a n d wa l k i e - ta l k i e
CONTROL AND THE REGULATION at tac k s i n l e b a n o n a n d s y r i a
OF INHUMANE WEAPONS In two attacks in September 2024 widely
attributed to Israel, pagers used by hundreds
The main multilateral treaty for regulating of members of the paramilitary group
inhumane weapons is the 1981 Certain Hezbollah exploded almost simultaneously
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention. in Lebanon and Syria, killing at least
There are also separate conventions on 12 people and wounding thousands more.
anti-personnel mines (APMs) and cluster A day later, thousands of walkie-talkies used
munitions. A small number of states that by Hezbollah members in Lebanon exploded,
killing at least 20 and wounding hundreds.
have chosen to retain, develop or use
United Nations human rights experts called
weapons seen as inhumane by others have
the attacks a ‘terrifying violation of inter­
repeatedly vetoed or stalled progress on national law’.
strengthening the CCW regime. Other
categories of conventional weapons that but also by Ukraine. The United States
raise humanitarian concerns, such as small supplied Ukraine with an unspecified
arms and light weapons, are dealt with by quantity of cluster munitions in 2024, and
other legal and political processes. in November 2024 broke a de facto global
Cluster munitions and ban on the international transfer of APMs
anti-personnel mines in effect since the mid 1990s by supplying
US-made APMs to Ukraine.
The humanitarian consequences of cluster
munitions—which scatter submunitions Explosive weapons in populated areas
over a wide and irregular area, not all of The use of explosive weapons in populated
which immediately detonate—and the areas (EWIPA) continued to be widespread
harm that such weapons cause to civilians in major armed conflicts in 2024, with
are addressed by the 2008 Convention on particularly devastating effects in the
Cluster Munitions (CCM). No new states Demo­cratic Republic of the Congo,
joined the CCM in 2024, but one of the Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine
112 states parties (Lithuania) started the (Gaza), Sudan, Syria and Ukraine.
process to withdraw. This decision was A political declaration that was adopted
unprecedented: no state has ever with­ in 2022 by 83 states seeks to address the
drawn from any of the five key global humani­tarian consequences of the use of
treaties that ban an entire category of EWIPA. The first follow-up conference
weapons—the CCM, the 1997 APM Con­ in 2024 reaffirmed the declaration’s
vention, the 1972 Biological and Toxin importance and aimed to strengthen
Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention and the 2017 Treaty
its implementation. •
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—or
from the landmark 1949 Geneva Con­
ventions or their 1977 Additional Protocols.
Ukraine was the only country in the
world where cluster munitions were used
extensively in 2024, principally by Russia

16 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

12. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE k e y a i g ov e r n a nc e d o c u m e n t s
AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE a dop ted in 2024
AND SECURITY Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act): the first
binding regulation specifically about AI
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are adopted by the European Union (EU) in
poised to bring enormous benefits but they March.
could also create, or exacerbate existing, Seoul ministerial statement for advancing AI
threats to international peace and security. safety, innovation and inclusivity: jointly
In recent years, many states have increas­ affirmed by 27 states and the EU at the Seoul
ingly acknowledged the need to manage AI Safety Summit in May.
these complex risks—stemming from both ‘Blueprint for Action’ for responsible AI in the
civilian and military AI—through the military: adopted by 63 states at the second
establishment of new forums and initia­ international Summit on Responsible
tives. These states deepened their engage­ Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain
(REAIM 2024) in Seoul in September.
ment with ongoing initiatives in 2024. The
extent to which the various initiatives will Pact for the Future and Global Digital
Compact: adopted at the United Nations
evolve as complementary or competing
Summit of the Future in September. Both
processes remains an open question.
documents include several commitments
related to AI governance.
Military AI
UN General Assembly resolution on the
For the past decade, the international implications of AI in the military domain for
policy conversation on military uses of AI international peace and security: adopted in
has mostly focused on autonomous weapon the First Committee in December.
systems (AWS), commonly characterized as
weapon systems that, once activated, can Civilian AI
select and engage targets without human Civilian AI developments could also pose
intervention. Since 2023, however, the risks to peace and security. Some AI models
conversation has expanded to other mili­ could help malicious actors to access crit­
tary applications of AI, in areas such as ical knowledge to develop and use pro­
target­ing, planning and intelligence hibited weapons. AI provides, moreover,
analysis, through what are commonly a capability uplift and lowers the barrier
referred to as AI-enabled decision support for cybercriminals and hackers to carry
systems. Reported uses of AI in current out harmful operations. In addition,
armed conflicts, especially in Gaza and generative AI tools can be misused to
Ukraine, illustrate that military AI is a spread dis­information. States sought to
pressing matter for policymakers. mitigate these risks across various forums
Three topics were at the centre of dis­ in 2024. Notable multilateral efforts
cussions at the 2024 meetings of the group included United Nations-led processes
of governmental experts on ‘lethal autono­ on tech­nology governance and the AI
mous weapon systems’ (LAWS): character­
istics and definitions of LAWS, application
Safety Summit. •
of international humanitarian law (IHL),
and measures to ensure compliance with
IHL and mitigate risks.

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17

13. CYBER AND t h e u n c o n v e n t io n
DIGITAL THREATS ag a i n s t c y b e r c r i m e
In December 2024 the United Nations
The cyber domain is constantly evolving
General Assembly adopted by consensus the
and so too is its impact on broader geo­
UN Convention Against Cybercrime. It is
politics. It was a pivotal year for cyber and the first legally binding UN instrument
digital governance, with several multi­ addressing cyber issues and the first inter­
lateral diplomatic processes culmin­ating in national criminal justice treaty to have been
the adoption of new instruments and negotiated in over 20 years. It establishes a
frameworks. Other governance efforts framework for international cooperation in
focused on addressing specific cyber the prevention, investigation and prosecution
of cybercrimes. Critics are concerned that
threats or improving regional cooperation.
some of the treaty’s broad provisions could
Cyber trends undermine privacy and freedom of expression
and could be used for political repression.
Cyber threats evolved across multiple
fronts and in diverse ways during 2024. involving multiple actors. The year
Conflict zones in Israel–Gaza, Sudan and witnessed significant developments in
Ukraine, for example, witnessed cyber United Nations-led efforts with the
oper­ations in varying forms, ranging from adoption of the UN Convention Against
attacks on critical infrastructure to Cybercrime and the UN Pact for the Future
influence campaigns. Ransomware with its annexed Global Digital Compact.
incidents escalated globally, with health­ The open-ended working group (OEWG) on
care systems targeted. Unprecedented information and communication tech­
rates of cybercrime scam operations nologies produced a third consensus report
emerged from ‘scam compounds’ in the but fundamental divisions persist between
Indo-Pacific region. Major espionage states advocating for new legally binding
campaigns exposed critical vulnerabilities agreements and those emphasizing
in tele­communications and government implementation of existing law and norms.
networks, while multiple incidents involv­ These differences are likely to affect
ing damage to undersea cables high­lighted decisions about the future of UN cyber­
the fragility of global connect­ivity. The security governance in 2025, when the
year’s numerous elections faced wide­ OEWG’s mandate expires.
spread interference through distri­buted Beyond formal institutional frameworks,
denial of service (DDoS) attacks and regional or like-minded coalitions have
influence operations. Artificial intelligence emerged to address specific challenges and
technologies transformed the cyber­ contexts. The Pall Mall Process was
security landscape, enhancing both offen­ launched in 2024 with a focus on com­
sive and defensive capabilities, and became mercial cyber intrusion tools, while the
a focus of policy and governance efforts. International Counter Ransomware
Cyber governance Initiative expanded its membership

Cyber governance continued to evolve and

during the year. •
exist through a patchwork of initiatives
implemented at multiple levels and

18 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

14. SPACE SECURITY c o n c e r n s a b ou t a r u s s i a n
GOVERNANCE n u c l e a r a n t i- s at e l l i t e
w e a pon
Outer space has been used for military
In February 2024 reports emerged from
purposes since the dawn of the space age.
the United States claiming that Russia is
However, in the current geopolitical con­ pursuing a new nuclear weapon that can
text, increased competition and heightened target satellites. The reports led to competing
tensions related to space activities pose resolutions at the United Nations Security
growing threats to space systems. In 2024, Council, which failed to be adopted. How­ever,
for example, several states continued to states later raised the issue at the UN General
Assembly, and a resolution reiterating obli­
show interest in developing ‘counterspace’
gations not to place such weapons in space
capabil­ities with the potential to attack
and urging states to refrain from developing
space systems. These new threats are them was successfully adopted.
deeply concerning, given the parallel
growth in civilian space activities and over­ Multilateral discussions on
all societal dependence on space systems. space security

Space for military purposes Stronger regulation of outer space is

needed to ensure stability, prevent
Numerous incidents of interference with
inadvert­ent escalation and protect civilian
space systems were reported in 2024
users. In a positive step forward, the most
during ongoing wars in Europe and the
recent United Nations space security
Middle East. Such interference signifi­
process, a group of government experts
cantly affected civilian end-users, particu­
(GGE) on further practical measures for
larly through disruption of space-enabled
the prevention of an arms race in outer
navigation services that led to diversion of
space (PAROS), adopted a report by con­
air traffic. The role of space for military
sensus. Two other UN processes proposed
purposes, including in contemporary
in 2023 that sought to establish simul­
warfare, has also become more prominent
taneous open-ended working groups
with SpaceX’s provision of Starlink com­
(OEWGs) were successfully merged into
munication satellites for civilian and mili­
one process through a decision at the UN
tary users in Ukraine, and Planet Lab’s
General Assembly in 2024.
satellite imagery portraying the extent of
At the sessions of the new OEWG in
the destruction caused by Israel’s bombard­
2025, states have the opportunity to
ment of Gaza. In addition, the North
elaborate on principles of space law
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
and seek definitions for—or at least aim
started to take steps to protect industry
to arrive at common understandings on—
partners that provide space services to the
terms in the space treaties. Exchanging
alliance and has indicated that an official
views on the role of space systems in
NATO commercial space strategy will be
critical infrastructure could be the
forthcoming in 2025.
first step to discussing how to make
such systems resilient to attacks
or interference. •

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19

15. DUAL-USE AND un a nd eu a r ms emba rgoes in
ARMS TRADE CONTROLS f orce , 2024

The set of global, multilateral and regional United Nations (13 embargoes)
instruments that seek to establish and pro­ • Afghanistan (NGF: Taliban) • Central
African Republic (partial; NGF) • Democratic
mote agreed standards for controls on the
Republic of the Congo (NGF) • Haiti (NGF)
trade in military and dual-use items
• Iraq (NGF) • ISIL (Da’esh), al-Qaeda and
remained under significant strain during associated individuals and entities (NGF)
2024 because of geopolitical tensions, • Korea, North • Lebanon (NGF) • Libya
armed conflicts and rapid advances in key (par­t ial; NGF) • Somalia (NGF) • South
technological areas. States are increasingly Sudan (partial; NGF) • Sudan (partial:
acting unilaterally or operating through Darfur) • Yemen (NGF)
alternative frameworks when creating new European Union (22 embargoes)
controls on transfers of items or restricting Implementations of UN embargoes (11):
transfers to destinations. However, there • Afghanistan (NGF: Taliban) • Central
were no significant efforts to dismantle the African Republic (partial; NGF) • Democratic
Republic of the Congo (partial; NGF) • Haiti
existing instruments, indicating that many
(NGF) • Iraq (NGF) • ISIL (Da’esh), al-Qaeda
states continue to value them.
and associ­ated individuals and entities (NGF)
The Arms Trade Treaty • Korea, North • Lebanon (NGF) • Libya (par­
tial; NGF) • Somalia (NGF) • Yemen (NGF)
Ten years after its entry into force, the EU arms embargoes with broader coverage
2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has yet to than their UN counterparts (2):
reach some of the goals that many states • South Sudan • Sudan
and non-governmental organizations Embargoes with no UN counterpart (9):
• Belarus • China • Egypt • Iran • Myanmar
hoped it would. Several key arms exporters
• Russia • Syria • Venezuela • Zimbabwe
and importers have still not joined the
ISIL = Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant;
treaty and there are notable gaps in terms
NGF = non-governmental forces; partial =
of the number of initial reports and annual embargo allows transfers of arms to the
reports states are submitting. However, the government of the target state provided that
substantive discussions held in 2024 about certain conditions have been met.
arms transfers to Israel indicated that the
ATT can provide space for in-depth dis­ Con­trol Coalition, a grouping of 39 states
cussions of how states are applying the estab­lished in 2022, sought to expand and
treaty when assessing arms exports to a implement its arms embargoes on Belarus
particular destination. In addition, the and Russia. No new multilateral arms
political declaration adopted to mark the embargoes were imposed. There continue
10-year anniversary of the treaty has the to be major divisions about imposing, main­
potential to initiate an important dis­ taining and complying with UN arms
cussion on the future focus of the ATT. embargoes. The United States and several
European states opposed the adoption of an
Multilateral arms embargoes
arms embargo on Israel called for by most
There were 13 United Nations embargoes states in the UN General Assembly. There
and 22 European Union (EU) embargoes was clear evidence of large volumes of arms
in force during 2024. The Global Export

20 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

 n u m b e r o f a r m s t r a de t r e at y s tat e s pa r t i e s s u b m i t t i ng a n n ua l
r e p o r t s , 2 0 1 8 –2 3
120 100%

100
77% 80%
75%
70% 69%
66%
80 62%

% of reports submitted
60%
No. of reports

60

40%
40

20%
20

0 0%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Required to submit a report Report submitted % of due reports submitted

transfers to Libya and Yemen in contra­ national cooper­ation on peaceful uses’

vention of multilateral embargoes, while adopted in 2024 also highlighted many
Russia openly violated the UN arms states’ criticism of both the regimes and
embargo on the Democratic People’s national export control measures. Despite
Republic of Korea (North Korea) and these challenges, the regimes were still able
vetoed the con­tinu­ation of the work of the to make incremental updates to the control
UN panel of experts charged with monitor­ lists and to advance technical discussions.
ing its implemen­tation. However, support
EU controls
from Russia and China for maintaining
the arms embargo on Sudan (Darfur) During 2024 the EU took steps to
indicated that there are cases where they strengthen its common legal framework
see these policy instruments as legitimate for controls on the export, brokering,
and necessary. transit and trans-shipment of military
items and dual-use items. The European
Export control regimes
Commission proposed a range of measures
The repercussions of Russia’s invasion of aimed at creating more harmonized
Ukraine continued to impact, to varying controls under the EU dual-use regulation
degrees, the work of the multilateral export and the EU foreign direct investment
control regimes—the Australia Group (on screening regulation, with a view to
chemical and biological weapons), the supporting the 2023 EU Economic Security
Mis­sile Technology Control Regime, Strategy and responding to the challenges
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the facing the work of the multilateral export
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Con­ control regimes. A review of the EU
trols for Conventional Arms and Dual-use common position on arms exports that
Goods and Technologies. The third UN was planned to finish by the end of 2024
General Assembly resolution on ‘inter­ continued into 2025. •
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21
ANNEXES 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes
Arms control and disarmament (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
agreements in force, 1 January 2025 PNET)
1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military
1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ­
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
mental Modification Techniques (Enmod
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Convention)
Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)
1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of
1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restric­
(Genocide Convention)
tions on the Use of Certain Conventional
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
Weapons which may be Deemed to be
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
Excessively Injurious or to have Indis­
War; and 1977 Protocols I and II Relating
criminate Effects (CCW Convention, or
to the Protection of Victims of Inter­
‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention)
national and Non‑International Armed
1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
Conflicts
(Treaty of Rarotonga)
1959 Antarctic Treaty
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
Europe (CFE Treaty)
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
1992 Treaty on Open Skies
Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty,
PTBT) 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stock­piling
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Activities of States in the Exploration and
their Destruction (Chemical Weapons
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
Convention, CWC)
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space
Treaty) 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms

Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Control (Florence Agreement)
Treaty, NPT) 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the
1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplace­ Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
ment of Nuclear Weapons and other Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Other Related Materials (CIFTA)
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty) Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Development, Production and Stockpiling Destruction (APM Convention)
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 1999 Inter-American Convention on Trans­
Weapons and on their Destruction parency in Conventional Weapons
(Biological and Toxin Weapons Acquisitions
Convention, BWC) 2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms,
1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Ammunition and other related Materials
Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test- in the Southern African Development
Ban Treaty, TTBT) Community (SADC) Region

22 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention,
ch ronology 2024 , selected
Control and Reduction of Small Arms and
events
Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region
and the Horn of Africa 11 Jan. The UK and the USA launch air­
2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and strikes against Iranian-backed
Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Houthis in Yemen in retaliation for
Other Related Materials attacks on vessels in the Red Sea.
2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in 17 Feb. Ukraine withdraws its troops from
Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) the key town of Avdiivka, blaming a
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions lack of Western-supplied weapons.
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further 28 Mar. Russia uses its UN Security
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Council veto to end the work of the
Offensive Arms (New START) panel of experts charged since
2009 with monitoring the UN arms
2010 Central African Convention for the
embargo on North Korea.
Control of Small Arms and Light
1 Apr. Seven aid workers are killed in an
Weapons, Their Ammunition and All
Israeli attack in Gaza, prompting
Parts and Components That Can Be Used
an apology from Israeli Prime
for Their Manufacture, Repair and
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)
16 May Russia launches a satellite into low
2011 Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence-
Earth orbit that the USA assesses is
and Security-Building Measures
probably a counterspace weapon.
2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Russia rejects the accusation.
2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
26 June Outgoing Dutch Prime Minister
Weapons (TPNW)
Mark Rutte is appointed as the next
NATO secretary general.
Agreements not yet in force,
22 July The hottest day on Earth occurs as
1 January 2025
the average global temperature of
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 17.16°C surpasses the previous
(CTBT) record set on 6 July 2023 (17.08°C).
1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE 10 Aug. An Israeli airstrike on a school and
Treaty mosque sheltering displaced people
in Gaza, alleged to be a Hamas com­
Security cooperation bodies mand post, kills at least 93 people.
6 Sep. Lithuania submits its instrument of
Developments in 2024 included the following:
withdrawal from the 2008 Con­
Cook Islands and Somalia joined the Inter­
vention on Cluster Munitions.
national Atomic Energy Agency; a record six
21 Oct. China and India agree to defuse
member countries remained suspended from
tensions along their disputed
participation in the African Union as a result of
border amid a four-year-long
military coups; Armenia suspended its partici­
military stand-off.
pation in the Collective Security Treaty Organ­
ization; Sweden formally joined the North 27 Nov. A ceasefire is agreed between
Atlantic Treaty Organization; Belarus joined the Israel and Hezbollah brokered by
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and Qatar France and the USA.
joined the Hague Code of Conduct against 8 Dec. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad

•
Ballistic Missile Proliferation. resigns and flees to Moscow after
rebel forces enter the capital city of
Damascus.

annexes 23
SIPRI DATABASES SIPRI National Reports Database

Provides links to all publicly accessible

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
national reports on arms exports and is
Gives the annual military spending of constantly updated to include links to
countries since 1949, allowing comparison newly published national reports on arms
of countries’ military spending in local exports.
currency at current prices; in US dollars at
current prices; in US dollars at constant SIPRI Multilateral Peace

prices and exchange rates; and as a share of Operations Database

gross domestic product. Offers information on all UN and non-UN

peace operations conducted since 2000,
SIPRI Arms Industry Database
including location, dates of deployment and
Contains annual data on total revenue and operation, mandate, participating coun­
revenue from arms sales and military tries, number of personnel, budgets and
services since 2002 for the 100 companies fatalities.
with the highest arms sales in the world.
Data for Chinese companies is included for The SIPRI databases can be accessed from
the years from 2015 onwards. the SIPRI website.•
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Shows all international transfers of major

conventional arms since 1950. It is the most
comprehensive publicly available source of
information on international arms
transfers.

SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database

Gives information on all arms embargoes

that have been implemented by an inter­
national organization, such as the Euro­
pean Union or the United Nations, or by a
group of nations. All embargoes that are in
force, or have been in force since 1998, are
included.

24 sipri yearbook 2025 , summary

HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2025

SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Published in print and online by Oxford University Press

ISBN 978–0–19–897979–1

More information is available at www.sipriyearbook.org

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI YEARBOOK 2025

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

The SIPRI Yearbook is an authoritative and independent source of data and analysis on
armaments, disarmament and international security. It provides an overview of
developments in military expenditure, arms production and the arms trade, weapons and
technology, and armed conflict and conflict management, along with efforts to control
conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
This booklet summarizes the 56th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which covers
developments during 2024, including:
• Armed conflict and conflict management, with an overview of global and regional
developments in armed conflicts and peace processes
• Military expenditure, international arms transfers and developments in arms production,
including the consequences of the expanded wars in Europe and the Middle East and
ongoing geopolitical tensions
• The proliferation of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles, with a focus on their use in the
Russia–Ukraine war
• World nuclear forces, highlighting the nuclear modernization trends within the nine
nuclear-armed states, as well as shifting nuclear doctrines and developments in
nuclear sharing
• Nuclear arms control, featuring dialogue involving China, Russia and the United States
and within multilateral treaties, as well as regional challenges to disarmament and
non-proliferation, and attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants
• Chemical and biological security threats, including the investigation of allegations of
chemical and biological weapon use and developments in the international legal
instruments against chemical and biological warfare
• Conventional arms control and regulation of inhumane weapons, including cluster
munitions, explosive weapons in populated areas, landmines and small arms and light
weapons
• International governance of artificial intelligence, cyberspace and space security, with a
focus on autonomous weapon systems
• Dual-use and arms trade controls, including developments in the Arms Trade Treaty,
multilateral arms embargoes and export control regimes, and the legal framework of
the European Union for such controls
It also contains updated annexes listing arms control and disarmament agreements,
international security cooperation bodies and key events in 2024.

www.sipriyearbook.org