Lecture Series-II

Principles of Legislation and

Interpretation of Statutes

Course Instructor
Ms. Neha Tripathi
 METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND
UTILITY OF RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION
• Even Ancient Hindu Law has a provision probable conflicts between sruti,
smriti and customs; Jaimini’s Mimansa around 600 BC. Though it was there for
providing rules for interpreting Vedas, it was even applied to smritis.

• In our country we had developed from very early times a scientific system of
interpretation known as the Mimansa Principles and these were regularly
followed by our renowned jurists like Vijnaneshwara (author of Mitakshara),
Jimutvahana (author of Dayabhag), Nanda Pandit (author of Dattak
Mimansa) etc. 
• The Mimansa Principles distinguish between obligatory statements and non-obligatory
statements. The main obligatory rule is called a Vidhi (or a Pratishedh, if it is in negative form).
The main non-obligatory statement is known as an Arthavada. An Arthavada is a statement of
praise or explanation.

(1) The Sarthakyata axiom, which means that every word and sentence must have some meaning.

(2) The Laghava axiom (Gauravah doshah), which states that that construction which makes the
meaning simpler and shorter is to be preferred.

(3) The Arthaikatva axiom, which states that a double meaning should not be attached to a word
or sentence occurring at one and the same place. Such a double meaning is known as a Vakyabheda,
and is a fault (dosh).

(4) The Gunapradhan axiom, which states that if a word or sentence purporting to express a
subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea the former must be adjusted to the latter, or must be
disregarded altogether.
(5) The Samanjasya axiom which states that all attempts should be made at
reconciliation of apparently conflicting texts. Jimutvahana has applied this
principle for reconciling conflicting texts of Manu and Yajnavalkya on the right
of succession

(6) The Vikalpa axiom, which states that if there is a real and irreconcilable
contradiction between two legal rules having equal force, the rule more in
accordance with equity and usage should be adopted at one's option. Thus where
one of the rules is a higher legal norm as compared to the other, e.g. a Shruti in
relation to Smriti, by the Badha principle the former prevails.

(7) Anarthakeya; An interpretation which makes a word or phrase meaningless

should be avoided.
• Apart from the above mentioned axioms of interpretation there are the four well-
known general principles of interpretation in Mimansa, viz.:

(1) the Shruti Principle, or the literal rule.

(2) the Linga principle (also called Lakshana artha) or the suggestive power of words
or expressions. This principle can be illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court
in U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, where the words "landless person"
were held to refer to landless peasants only and not to landless businessmen

(3) the Vakya Principle, or syntactical arrangement, and

(4) Prakarana, which permits construction by referring to some other text in order to
make the meaning clear.
• In S.S. Kalra v. Union of India, wherein it has observed that sometimes
courts can supply words which have been accidentally omitted.

• The Laghava Principle has been used in Vinay Khare v. State of U.P. The

controversy in this case was that if in a competitive examination two candidates
got equal marks whether the candidate who got more marks in the oral
interview should be placed higher in the select list or the candidate who got
more marks in the written test. It was held in this case that the candidate who
got more marks in the written test should be placed higher because to interpret
general suitability on the basis of marks in the written test is a short and simple
interpretation and provides a clear objective test, whereas the criteria in the oral
interview involves consideration of the candidate's personality, dress, physique,
etc. which is complicated and in which there are more chances of favouritism
and arbitrariness.
• In Tribhuwan Misra v. D.I.O.S. the Samanjasya principle was used to reconcile
2 apparently conflicting Division Bench rulings, it was done on the authority of
the maxim of the lost horse; and burnt chariot (Nasrhtashva Dagdharatha
Nyaya). This is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective
chariots. One of them lost his horses and the other's chariot was burnt through
the out break of fire inn the in where they were spending the night. The horses
that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot, and the two men pursued
their journey together. Its teaching is union for mutual advantage, which has
been quoted in the 16th Vartika to Panini, and is explained by Patanjali. It is
referred to in Kumarila Bhatta’s ‘Tantravartika.’
• In U.P Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore, (1988) 4 SCC 274

“upkramop sanharo abhyaso uppurwata falam arthwadoppatti ch lingam

tatparya nirnaye”

This in short means that when you have to draw the conclusion from a writing
you have to read it from beginning till end. As without doing it, it is difficult to
understand the purpose, if there is any repetition or emphasis its meaning must
be understood. If there is any curiosity or a curious problem tackled it
should be noticed and the result thereof must be understood. If there is any
new innovation (Uppurwatta) or something new it should be taken note of.
Then one must notice the result of such innovation. Then it is necessary to find
what the author intends to convey and in what context.
 INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE
• Statute is an edict of the legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or
construing a statute is to seek the “intention” of its maker.

• A statute has to be thus, interpreted in the context of the intent of those who make it.

• It is the duty of the judicature to act upon the true intention of the Legislature- the
mens or sententia legis.

• If there are two interpretations possible, one which furthers the true intention of the
legislature has to be chosen; in other words “legal meaning” or “true meaning”.
 Types of Interpretation

1) Beneficial interpretation 8) Jurisprudential interpretation

2) Contextual interpretation 9) Liberal interpretation
3) Equitable interpretation 10) Logical interpretation
11) Purposive interpretation
4) Grammatical interpretation
12) Restrictive or extensive
5) Harmonious interpretation interpretation
6) Historical interpretation 13) Sociological interpretation
7) Interpretation by legal organs 14) Strict interpretation
CERTAIN IMPORTANT RULES TO BE KEPT
IN MIND
1) The ordinary grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to,
unless that would lead to an absurdity or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as
to avoid such absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. (Grey v.
Pearson, 1857) – Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule
2) It is presumed that the legislature does not deprive the state of its
prerogative powers unless it expresses its intention to do so in
express terms or by necessary implication. (Director of Rationing &
Distribution v. Corpn. Of Calcutta, AIR 1960 SC 1355)
3) The law will not allow alteration of a statute by construction when the words
may be capable of proper operation without it. (Director of Rationing &
Distribution v. Corpn. Of Calcutta, AIR 1960 SC 1355)

4) It cannot be assumes that the Constitution has given with one hand what it has
taken away with another. (Director of Rationing & Distribution v. Corpn. Of
Calcutta, AIR 1960 SC 1355)

5) If two sections are repugnant, the known rule is that last must prevail. (Director
of Rationing & Distribution v. Corpn. Of Calcutta, AIR 1960 SC 1355)

6) General words and phrases therefore, however, wide and comprehensive they
may be in their literal sense, must usually be construed as being limited to the
actual objects of the Act. (Central India Spg. Wvg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal
Committee, AIR 1958 SC 341)
• Merely because a statute causes hardship it may not be declared ultra vires

• The Court has to construe a statute justly (lex injuste non est lex: an unjust
law is not a law)

• Parliament must be presumed to have enacted a reasonable law.

(Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Maddula Ratnavalli, (2007) 6

SCC 81)
• In the words of Krishna Iyer, J., the interpretation effort “must be illumined by the
goal though guided by the word”. For ascertaining the purpose of the statute, one
is not restricted to the internal ais furnished by the statute itself, although the text
of the statute taken as a whole is the most important material for ascertaining both
the aspects of ‘intention’.
• Without intending to lay down a precise and exhaustive list of external aids, Lord
Somervell, stated the “mischief against which the statute is directed and, perhaps
though to an undefined extent the surrounding circumstances can be considered.
Other statute in pari materia and the state of the law at the time are admissible.”
• In the words of Chinapppa Reddy, J., “interpretation must depend on the text and
context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the
texture, context is what gives it colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
That interpretation is best which makes textual interpretation match the contextual.
A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted - Reserve Bank of
India v. Pearless General Finance and Investment Co. (1987) 1 SCC 424
• The rules of interpretation should be first to find out the object of the enactment and
then, language permitting, choose that interpretation which achieved the object-all other
interpretation being ‘absurd’ because, they do no achieve this object. (Mischief rule in
Heydon’s Case). To determine this, four things have to be kept in mind :

1) What was the common law before the making of the Act
2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide
3) What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth
4) True reason of the remedy

Then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall supress the
mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of mischief, and pro-private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and the remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
• In Mazdoor Sangh v. Usha Breco Ltd., the Supreme Court held that it may not
be a correct approach for a superior court to proceed on the premise that an
Act is a beneficent legislation in favour of management or the workmen. The
provisions of the statute must be construed having regard to the tenor of the
terms used by the Parliament. The Court must construe the statutory provision
with a view to uphold the object and the purpose of the Parliament. It is only
in a case where there exists a grey area and the court feels a difficulty in
interpreting or in construing and applying the statute, the doctrine of
beneficent construction can be taken recourse to. Even where such a case is
resorted to, the same would not mean that the statute should be interpreted in
a manner which would take it beyond the object and purpose thereof.
• In Karnataka State Financial Corpn. v. N. Narasimahaiah, the court laid
down the following rules of interpretation:
a) for interpreting a statute in a reasonable manner the Court must place itself
in the chair of a reasonable legislature and attempt to pose questions as to (i)
why one provision has been amended and not other; (ii) why one terminology
has been used while inserting a statutory provision and a different clause in
another;
b) a statute must be interpreted having regard to the constitutional provision as
also human rights; and
c) Supplying casus omissus is not permissible.
Construction to avoid absurdity is permissible
S R Batra v. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169
1. While construing an exemption notification, not only a pragmatic view is
required to be taken but also its practical aspect must be considered. [UOI v.
Ranbaxy Laboratories, (2008) 7 SCC 502]
2. Court must avoid such constructions which would render a party of the
statutory provision otiose or meaningless. [R & B Falcon v. CIT, (2008) 12
SCC 466]
3. If the language of a statute if clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted
in its ordinary sense, even though it may lead to manifest absurdity,
repugnancy, mischief or injustice. [S R Batra v. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC
169]
4. Where two interpretations are possible out of which one as per the court is
reasonable and the other unreasonable, the former interpretation must be
accepted by the Court. In other words, the more reasonable interpretation
should be adopted.

5. In case the language of the statute is general, doubtful or obscure, the Court
can modify it or vary it in order to avoid any manifest absurdity, mischief,
injustice or repugnance.

6. It should not be supposed that the legislature intended to do some evident or

clear injustice.

7. Where inconvenience is pleaded, the same should not be lightly brushed

aside without considering the circumstances.
 ROLE OF JUDGES IN INTERPRETATION
• Words in any language are not scientific symbols, having any definite and
precise meaning and language is an imperfect vehicle of conveying one’s
thoughts. It is therefore, not possible to foresee and provide exhaustively for
situations that might come up in future. Function of the court is to interpret the
statute to ascertain the legislative intent, i.e., its function is to only expound law
and not legislate

• Here, the role of judges begin. He has to extract the intention of the legislature.

• However, judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and not jus
dare- to interpret law and not to make the law.
 VIEWS EXPRESSED BY DENNING, L.J.

• The Courts are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the guise of
interpretation and they must avoid the danger of determining the meaning of a
provision based on their own preconceived notion of ideological structure or
scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted.
• Denning L.J., “We sit here to find out the intention of the Parliament and of
the ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and
making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis”
• This above view was approved in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board
v. A Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213
JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING AND PERMISSIBLE LIMITS

• Illustrations in form of Rylands v. Fletcher, UOI v. Assn. for Democratic

Reforms [(2002) 5 SCC 294] and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [(1997) 6
SCC 241].

• In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [(2002) 4 SCC 388], the Court
observed that the role of judiciary is no more confined to merely
interpret and declare law.

• Even take example of liberal interpretation of Arts. 21 and 32 amongst

others.