STRATEGY AND WAR

(NINE COURSE THEMES)

MAJ ALIMUDDIN U POLA PN(M) (GSC)

19 JULY 2018
CAPT OPINIANO M JAYME JR PN(GSC)
AC of NS for Plans, N-5
Learning Objectives
1. Teach students to think strategically.
2. To sharpen the student’s ability to assess how
alternative operational courses of action best achieve
overall strategic and national objectives.
3. Teach students to think in a disciplined, critical, and
original manner about the international strategic
environment, about a range of potential strategies,
and about the strategic effects of joint, interagency,
and multinational operations.
4. To be able to distinguish between policy and strategy.
5. Understand the role the military play in making policy.
6. Understand the relationship between national interest,
policy, and strategy.
  The Course Themes draws upon:

 the academic disciplines of:

 history,
 political science, and
 international relations.

 military factors, such as:

 doctrine,
 technological change, and
Philosophies of:
 logistics. 1. Clauswitz
2. Sun Tzu

 Integrated by a frame of reference, which can

be used to analyze complex political and military
situations and formulate military strategies to
address them.
 Prominent theorists Carl von Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu provided a foundation upon which
an analytical framework can be built, from which
analysis can proceed.

 The historical cases provide a means to

evaluate and debate the ways in which political
and military leaders have successfully (or
unsuccessfully) addressed the problems.

Apply the learning to more contemporary

conflicts, and to strategic problems that may
arise in the future.
Course Themes

 They do not form a template

 They are not a check-list or an exclusive
framework for analysis.
 They are, however, very helpful as a basis for
analysis and we will use them regularly.
 They constitute a way to focus some of the
elements that must be considered in sound
strategic thinking.
 When you are planning how to win a war, they
will help suggest what to look for in your
strategy, and in your ally’s, and in your foe’s.
The questions listed under the themes are examples of
some departure points for lines of inquiry.

 It is through such questions that critical analysis

proceeds. Who is this
Strategist?
YOU!!
What will constitute a successful, or unsuccessful,
military strategy will be created by the strategist’s
judgment in dealing with such questions in relation to the
circumstance of the time.

Two broad categories:

1. Process of strategy making

2. Environment in which that process takes place.
 STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (THE PROCESS)

1.THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND
OPERATIONS
2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS
5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT
6. WAR TERMINATION

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (THE ENVIRONMENT)

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA
8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
9. CULTURES AND SOCIETY
QUESTIONS ?

10 Minutes Break 8
THE PROCESS OF MATCHING

STRATEGY AND POLICY

 1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY,
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
- What were the most important political interest and
objectives of the protagonist?
- Did these interests and objectives emerge from a sound
understanding of geopolitics and geo-strategy?
- To what extent were objectives driven by a threat to the
homeland?
- Were these interest shaped by culture, ideology and/or
religion? If so, how?
- Were these interest and objectives clearly articulated and
understood?
- If a country or a belligerent possessed coherent long-term
political objectives, as well as medium-term and short-term
ones, were these sets of objectives compatible or in
conflict?
 1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY,
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
• If the objectives were pursued by peaceful means, what
instruments of national power did the country choose to
employ?
• Were the correct instruments selected? If not, how might a
country have performed better?
• Were the problems that gave rise to the war susceptible to
military resolution?
• If leaders decided to employ armed forces in pursuit of
their political objectives, did they also plan to use
instruments of power other than military ones in support of
their strategy? Were these plans appropriate?
• If war was chosen, did the military component of strategy
tend to “crowd out” non-military components or
considerations?
 1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY,
STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

• What value did each participant in the conflict place on its

political objectives?
• Were the costs and risks of the war anticipated?
• How did political and military leaders propose to manage
these risks?
• Were the risks commensurate with the benefits and
rewards to be achieved?
• What strategic guidance did the political leadership provide
to the military?
• What was the quality of that guidance?
• Did the strategic guidance place restraints of how force
could be used?
 2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
• How reliable and complete was the intelligence collected
before the war?
• How accurately was it interpreted, and how well were its
limits understood?
• Was a serious effort made to analyze the “lessons” of
previous wars, and if so how did it affect planning for the
war both at the strategic and operational levels?
• How successful were each belligerent’s efforts to deny the
enemy information about its own capabilities and intentions?
• How well did each belligerent know both itself and its
enemy? Were plans for the war based on an objective net
assessment of friendly and enemy strengths and
weaknesses?
• How well did each belligerent understand the culture,
values, political system, and military traditions of its enemy?
 2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
• How was that understanding reflected in the plans for the
war?
• Was account taken of the possibility of non-rational or
unpredictable behavior on the part of the enemy?
• Was there consideration of the enemy’s potential
employment of asymmetric warfare or, if they existed,
weapons of mass destruction?
• To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly
predict the nature of the war upon which they were
embarking?
• Did each belligerent have a formal operational planning
process, and, if so, was it both flexible and thorough?
• Were allies included in that process, and, if so, with what
results?
 2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
• Did the plans correctly identify the enemy’s center or
centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities?
• Were the strategic and operational plans informed by a
sound grasp of the relationship between political ends and
military means?
• To what extent did the plans rely upon deception, surprise,
and/or psychological operations?
• Did planning make adequate allowances for the fog, friction,
uncertainty, and chance of war?
• What assumptions, if any, did plans make about the
contribution that other instruments of power—diplomatic,
informational, and economic—would or could make to the
achievement of the overall political objectives?
 2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
• Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would
be terminated and what the requirements of the anticipated
postwar settlement would be?
 3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
• Did political and military leaders understand the strategic
and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the
different forms of military power at their disposal?
• Did military leaders properly take into account operational,
logistical, or other physical constraints on the deployment
and employment of the available instruments of war?
• How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives, and
information policy coordinated with combat operations?
• Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the
different forms of power at its disposal for the maximal
operational and strategic effectiveness?
• Did those in command of the different instruments of war
share a common set of assumptions about how the use of
force would translate into the realization of the political
objective?
 3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
• What limitations prevented one side or the other from
achieving an optimal integration of the different forms of
military power?
• Did operational plans and strategy exploit opportunities
created by technological innovation?
• Did any military or political disadvantages result from
technological innovation?
• How did a belligerent successfully translate asymmetries in
technology into a strategic advantage?
• Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or
during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational
consequences produce lasting strategic results?
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF
OPERATIONS
• Was the design of operations informed by a lucid and
coherent vision of the desired end state?
• Was the operational design based upon an accurate
estimate of the situation in theater as well as a sound
appreciation of the enemy’s critical strengths and
weaknesses?
• Did the design of operations provide for a main focus of
effort against an enemy’s center or centers of gravity?
• If a center of gravity was attacked, was the attack direct or
indirect?
• If a belligerent attacked an enemy target other than a center
of gravity or attacked an enemy who lacked such a center,
what operational concept guided such an attack?
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF
OPERATIONS
• Did operational design provide for synchronized,
sequenced, and phased operations for maximum
advantage?
• Did operational plans seek deception and/or surprise?
• Did they aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly
psychological effects? Did the design of operations take into
account a wide range of possible enemy responses and
• countermeasures?
• What precautions did the belligerents take to protect their
own centers of gravity?
• What steps did the belligerents contemplate to manage
political and military risks?
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF
OPERATIONS
• Was unity of effort achieved? Were the operations
conducted with their ultimate strategic and political purposes
continually and clearly in view?
• To what extent did the execution of the operation or
operations reflect the commander’s intent?
• Were promising opportunities exploited?
• Were unexpected enemy operations effectively parried or
• countered?
• How timely and accurate was the information available to a
belligerent about the changing dispositions and actions of
the enemy?
• How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent’s
system of command and control?
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF
OPERATIONS
• Was unity of effort achieved?
• Were the operations conducted with their ultimate strategic
and political purposes continually and clearly in view?
• To what extent did the execution of the operation or
operations reflect the commander’s intent?
• Were promising opportunities exploited?
• Were unexpected enemy operations effectively parried or
• countered?
• How timely and accurate was the information available to a
belligerent about the changing dispositions and actions of
the enemy?
• How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent’s
system of command and control?
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF
OPERATIONS
• What effects did key campaigns and operations have on the
enemy’s material capabilities, command structure, morale,
and will to fight?
• What synergistic and/or cumulative effects did the
synchronizing, sequencing, and phasing of operations
produce?
• Were these effects accurately foreseen and intended? Did
the mix of operations maximize the strategic effects of the
campaign?
• If one side was conspicuously more “joint” than the other,
how important was this “jointness” for the outcome of the
• campaign?
• If a belligerent was combating an insurgency, did it
understand the dangers of an excessive reliance on military
force?
 5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND
REASSESSMENT
• How accurately were the consequences of interaction with
the enemy predicted and anticipated by the belligerents?
• Was the initial strategy implemented as planned, or
were the prewar strategic plans disrupted by unexpected
enemy action?
• What effects did interaction with the enemy have on the
nature (and perceived nature) of the war?
• Was the interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and
if so, in what sense and with what consequences?
• Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own
preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and
commanders adapt to enemy actions?
• How skillfully did a belligerent reapportion its forces in
reaction to enemy operations or as an adjustment to the fog
and friction of war?
 5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND
REASSESSMENT
• If a belligerent chose to open a new theater of war, did this
signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, or merely an
extension of previous operations?
• Was this decision a response to failure or stalemate in the
original theater?
• Alternatively, was it an effort to seize a previously
unanticipated opportunity created by the evolution of the
war?
• What role did maritime power play in opening the theater
and supporting its operations?
• Did it make operational and strategic sense to open the new
theater?
• Was the new theater opened at the correct time?
 5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND
REASSESSMENT
• Was the environment of the new theater favorable to
• operational success? If so, did that success have strategic
spillover effects in the larger war?
• Did the success or failure of key operations produce
adjustments or radical changes in strategy and/or policy?
• If an additional state or other third parties intervened
• on behalf of one side in the conflict, did this force the other
side to reshape its policy and/or strategy, and, if so, how?
• If there were changes in policy and/or strategy, were
• these based on a rational and timely reassessment of the
relationship between the political objective and the available
military means?
 6. WAR TERMINATION

• Were realistic opportunities for a successful end to the war

squandered?
• If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy’s
political leadership from power, did that commitment result
in a longer war and heavier casualties?
• If negotiations began before the end of formal hostilities,
how well did each side’s operations support its
• diplomacy?
• Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go
militarily at the end of the war?
• In an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary,
did it overstep the culminating point of victory?
 6. WAR TERMINATION
• Alternatively, did the winning side not go far enough
militarily to give the political result of the war a good chance
to endure?
• Did the winning side carefully consider what specific
demands to make on the enemy in fulfillment of its
general political objectives?
• How and why did the losing side stop fighting? Was there a
• truce, and if so, did the terms of the truce crucially shape the
postwar settlement?
• Did the post-war settlement meet the political objectives of
the winning state or states?
• Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a
strong position to enforce the peace?
 6. WAR TERMINATION
• To what extent did the stability or instability of the settlement
stem from the nature of the settlement itself?
• To what extent did the pattern of civil-military relations
on the victorious side contribute to the stability or instability
of the settlement?
• What were the implications, if any, of the nature of the war
for the durability of the settlement?
• Did the winning side maintain the strength and will to
enforce the peace?
• Did the victor make appropriate postwar deployments for
stability operations if necessary?
10 Minutes Break
30
MATCHING STRATEGY AND
OPERATIONS
THE ENVIRONMENT
 7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA
• Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to
isolate their adversaries from potential allies?If so, how
successful were these efforts and why?
• Did the belligerents seize opportunities to create coalitions?
If so, what common interests and/or policies unified the
coalition partners?
• Was there effective strategic and operational coordination
and burden sharing within a coalition, and what were the
consequences? If not, how freely did information,
intelligence, and material resources pass among the
members of a coalition?
• Did the strategies and operations of the coalition have the
effect of solidifying it or splitting it apart?
 7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA
• Did the strategies and operations have the effect of
strengthening an opposing coalition or weakening it?
• To what extent did allies act to support, restrain, or
• control one another within the same coalition? If a coalition
disintegrated, was this chiefly the result of internal stress,
external pressure, or a combination of both?
• Did coalition dynamics promote or hinder efforts to match
operations to strategy, and strategy to policy?
• How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to
operational success or failure?
• What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of
war termination?
• Did the winning coalition fall apart at the end of the war?
 8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
• How were the military forces of each belligerent organized?
• How well did that system of organization facilitate planning,
executing, and training for joint and combined operations?
• Did a regular process exist to coordinate the employment of
military power with the use of the other instruments of
national power in pursuit of a belligerent’s political
objectives? If so, how effective was that process?
• How might that process have been improved?
• How well was information shared among military and civil
agencies?
• If there was rivalry among the military services, how did this
affect the design and execution of operations and strategy?
 8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
• Were the relations among military and political leaders
functional or dysfunctional? If dysfunctional, why was this so
and what were the consequences?
• How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aims
affect the wartime civil-military relationship?
• If the political leaders demanded of the military instrument
something that it could not effectively deliver, or if they
imposed overly stringent political restraints on the use of
force, how did the military leadership respond?
• If political leaders insisted on operations that promised to be
politically useful but militarily costly, how did the military
leaders respond?
 8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
• If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be
militarily effective but entailed significant political risk,
• what was the reaction of the civilian leadership?
• How attuned were military leaders to the need to manage
risk?
 9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES
• How did the culture, ideologies, values, social
arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents
influence the design and execution of operations and
strategies?
• Did a belligerent possess a discernible strategic culture or
way of war? If so, did this allow its adversary to predict and
exploit its behavior?
• If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or in
part, how did the character of military action affect its course
and its outcome?
• If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance,
did culture or values give either belligerent a clear
advantage?
 9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES
• Was the relationship among a belligerent’s government,
people, and the military able to withstand the shock of
battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If not,
why not?
• If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious
side in weakening its adversary from within?
• Did the victorious side conduct information operations, and
were they founded on a solid grasp of the psychology and
culture of the enemy and of its own side?
• Did the belligerent’s military strategy deliver sufficient
incremental dividends—periodic successes or tokens of
success—to maintain support for the war?
 9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES
• Alternatively, did the strategy and operations have the effect
of diminishing domestic support for the war?
• Did belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public
opinion, and if so with what success?
• Did the passions of the people make it difficult for political
and military leaders to maintain the proper relationship
between policy and strategy and to conduct operations
necessary for victory?
END OF PRESENTATION