SCH Wager
SCH Wager
I argue that individual concepts are not directly denoted by common nouns or intensions of definite descriptions, but enter semantic computation because quantification is
sensitive to how we individuate the entities in the world.
Problem: In subject position of a verb like rise or change, a noun phrase like the
temperature has to contribute not just its actual value, but also values for neighbouring
indices. Hence, Montague (1974) proposes that, at an index, common nouns denote sets
of individual concepts hhs, ei, ti instead of individuals he, ti. But this doubles the index
dependence for the ultimate type e values, failing to account for intuitively valid inferences (cf. Dowty, Wall, Peters 1976, Romero 2006). Lasersohn (2005) avoids this by
assuming that nouns denote sets of individuals. In intensional argument positions, he
derives individual concepts by using the intension of the Fregean definite description:
(1)
Romero (2006) points out that the solution cannot be applied when more than one
object of the given type is under consideration (e.g. (2a)). Moreover, we want to account
for Nathans (2006) observation that (2a) can be true if the mayors of three cities have
exchanged jobs among the three of them (pointwise change, PC), whereas for (2b), the
set of bodyguards needs to change (set-change, SC).
(2)
a.
b.
Proposal: Lasersohns solution can be extended to (2a), if we take into account the
implicit arguments and quantify over the set of functions M = {wt.the unique mayor
of x at hw, ti | x among the contextually salient cities}. This works for functional nouns
like temperature or mayor, but fails for properly relational ones. (3) can only be true if
Smith has more than one more than one critical value, but exactly in such a scenario the
description the unique critical value of Smith is undefined, rendering an analysis along
the lines of (1) inapplicable.
(3)
For (3), uniqueness could be forced by sticking in particular roles they play with respect
to the one patient. For (2b), this can fail because bodyguards need not come with such
individuating roles. At this point we should reconsider the status of individual concepts.
Aloni (2000) claims that quantification, questioning and belief attribution proceed with
respect to a conxtually salient way of how we individuate the individuals in the discourse
domain. These perspectives are captured as conceptual covers:
(4)
of that subset (cf. (6), where F [w, t] := {fi (w, t) | fi F }). The difference between
PC and SC follows from the kinds of CC contained in . For nouns like mayor that
invoke individuating subproperties, these are likely to constitute the most salient cover
({the mayor of NY, the mayor of Berlin,. . . }). Bodyguards lack comparable roles; if we
want to talk about change, we have to supervaluate over equally salient ways of covering
the set of bodyguards throughout the relevant interval. Unless the set itself changes, a
cover consisting only of individual concepts that pick the same individual at t and t+
is considered as well, falsifying (2b).
(5)
(6)
The pragmatic solution also accounts for: (i) Context dependence (e.g. for (2b), some
informants come up with scenarios where the bodyguards are distinguished with respect
to what exactly they have to guard, giving then rise to a PC interpretation); (ii) The
ambiguity of (7a), without lexcial ambiguities: = {{the highest temperature,. . . , the
lowest temperature}} gives rise to the reading: in a series of measuring events, the lowest
value measured increases (can be true if at different indices (different) sets of falling
temperatures are considered). The preferred reading arises with = {{the temperature
of NY, . . . , the temperature of Berlin}} where the actually lowest one is observed to be
rising (and thus might cease to be lowest); (iii) Variable readings with names (cf. (7b)).
(7)
a.
b.
Conclusion: Individual concepts in the nominal domain are neither lexical denotations
nor intensions of Fregean definite descriptions, but part of the perspective taken on individuals in the context. This accounts for quantificational examples with functional as
well as with properly relational nouns. The predicted context dependence fits speaker
intuitions, and allows for variable readings of putatively rigid expressions. Of course, it
has to be investigated in more detail how CC are rendered salient (cf. Aloni 2000). (7a) is
surprisingly similar to Heims (1979) problematic ambiguities with concealed questions;
it would be interesting to extend the under cover analysis to this related phenomenon.
References: Aloni (2000) Quantification under Conceptual Covers. Amsterdam. Dowty, Wall & Peters (1981) Introduction to Montague Semantics. Dordrecht. Heim (1979)
Concealed Questions. In: Bauerle, Egli & v. Stechow (Eds.) Semantics from Different
Points of View. Berlin, 51-60. Lasersohn (2005) The temperature paradox as evidence
for a presuppositional analysis of definite descriptions. LI 36, 127-144. Montague (1974)
The proper treatment of quantification in English. In: Thomason (Ed.) Formal Philosophy. Selected Papers of Richard Montague. New Haven/London, 247-365. Nathan (2006)
On the Interpretation of Concealed Questions. PhDthesis, MIT. Romero (2006) Some
paradoxes about individual concepts. Invited Talk at Sinn & Bedeutung 11, Barcelona.
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