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How to Distinguish Simple Objectless Ideas

Jan Claas

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Philosophy of Logic, DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2022.2142462

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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC
https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2142462

How to Distinguish Simple Objectless Ideas

Jan Claas
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Bernard Bolzano offers a criterion of individuation for ideas, accord- Received 3 March 2022
ing to which ideas are distinct if and only if they represent differ- Accepted 28 October 2022
ent objects or are composed differently. It fails to individuate ideas KEYWORDS
that are both simple and fail to represent, in particular syncategore- Bolzano; concepts; ideas;
matic ideas and logical constants. However, Bolzano also provides individuation; logical
the means to close this gap. He suggests that we can distinguish constants
ideas if they are not substitutable for each other in propositions,
which we can, in turn, distinguish in terms of their truth-values. This
paper explicates this suggestion and develops it into an improved
individuation criterion for ideas: ideas also are distinct if we cannot
replace them for one another in propositions salva veritate.

1. Introduction
At least since the notion of ideas rose to prominence in early modern philosophy, philoso-
phers distinguish between simple and complex ideas (or, later, ‘concepts’). The simple ones
are in some sense fundamental and build up the complex ones. This picture was historically
influential (see Locke 1690, 292; Leibniz 1966, 52; Leibniz 1989, 99, 217; Hume 1739, 2). It
still is applied (Peacocke 1992, 160), attacked (Margolis and Laurence 1999, sect. 6), and
defended (Davis 2003, ch. 14). For adherents of this simple-complex divide, one important
task is to indicate the most important simple ideas and to provide the means to distin-
guish them from each other because they are the logical atoms of thought in their theories.
Especially since Peacocke 1992, the question of individuation is central to contemporary
theories of ideas (see, e.g. Davis 2005 vs. Peacocke 2005) and it plays an important role in
recent debates on conceptual engineering (Prinzing 2018). The individuation of simple ideas
has proven to be particularly difficult (Davis 2003, §21.6).
Bernard Bolzano offers a criterion of individuation for ideas, which raises an intriguing
puzzle about simple ideas. According to this criterion, we can distinguish ideas either in
terms of their components and internal structure or in terms of their extension (I §96,
446).1 Simple ideas lack components and, thereby, an internal structure. So we can only
distinguish them in terms of their extensions. However, Bolzano believes that several simple

CONTACT Jan Claas jan.claas@univie.ac.at Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße

7, Vienna 1010, Austria
1 References of this format are to Bolzano 1837, indicating volume, paragraph and page numbers. I follow the 2014 OUP
translation by Rusnock and George.

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
2 J. CLAAS

ideas have the same extension, namely, none at all. They are objectless, they do not apply to
any object. The puzzle is: how can we distinguish simple objectless ideas from each other?
Bolzano failed to see the puzzle. Nevertheless, he offers a solution. He sometimes relies
on a further condition in order to distinguish ideas, one that is not mentioned in his official
criterion: ideas are distinct if they are not interchangeable in propositions and other ideas.
The aim of this paper is to explicate this suggestion, to amend Bolzano’s criterion and to
defend it.
I will first explain why the significance of the puzzle is not limited to Bolzano scholarship
(Section 2). I then introduce ideas (Section 3) and criteria of individuation (Section 4)
before I present Bolzano’s official criterion for individuating ideas (Section 5). I present
the puzzle in Section 6 and develop Bolzano’s solution in Sections 7–9. Finally, I discuss
the relation of the novel condition achieved to the ones comprised in Bolzano’s official
criterion (Section 10) and deal with two objections (Section 11).

2. The Significance of the Puzzle

The puzzle is of interest to every philosopher who believes that there is more than one idea
that is simple and fails to represent. First of all, the puzzle is systematically important. It
is plausible that there indeed are several simple objectless ideas because several linguistic
expressions seem to have a meaning but neither seem to refer nor to be analyzable. Among
these expressions are adverbs such as ‘very’, some prepositions, and, most importantly,
logical constants: sentence- and prediate-negation, quantifiers, and logical connectives like
‘or’ and ‘and’.
Secondly, understanding the meanings of non-referential expressions was an impor-
tant task in the history of logic. Alluding to the distinction between categorematic and
syncategorematic terms in medieval philosophy (Kretzmann 1982), I will call ideas syn-
categorematic that modify and combine other ideas but that, at least prima facie, do not
represent on their own. Insightful discussions of syncategorematic terms can be found, for
example, in Peter of Spain and John Buridan (Spruyt and Novaes 2015, sect. 1). Explaining
the contribution of syncategorematic terms to the meaning of sentences is one of the most
important tasks in such theories. So Bolzano stands in a long tradition of accepting the
assumptions that lead to the puzzle and in offering a solution.
Thirdly, the intuitive candidates as well as the historical work directly bear on contempo-
rary debates on logical constants (MacFarlane 2017, sect. 1). The assumption that we should
not clarify the contribution of logical constants to sentence-meanings in terms of some pur-
ported referents is especially congenial to Dummett’s and Davidson’s approaches (David-
son 1977; Dummett 1991; cf. Spruyt and Novaes 2015, sect. 2). Both take, like Bolzano
and medieval logicians, logical constants not to refer, while in the Fregean tradition, they
indeed do refer, namely, to functions (Frege 1893/1903, §6, §12; Frege 1923–1926). Ryle
(1949), for example, harshly criticizes Carnap (1947), who stands in the Fregean tradition,
for treating logical constants and syncategorematic terms in general as if they were names.
Bolzano clearly sides with Ryle, Dummett, and Davidson on this issue and against Frege
and Carnap. If he can provide a way to distinguish unanalyzable ideas without assuming
that they represent, his discussion of idea-individuation would lend additional support to
the syncategorematic take on logical constants.
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 3

3. Ideas
As the puzzle arises in a variety of frameworks, I will limit myself to the Bolzanian
background assumptions that lead to it. Bolzano uses ‘idea in itself’ or simply ‘idea’ for
sub-propositional parts of propositions (I §48.2, 216; II §128, 18; Bolzano and Exner 2004,
145).2 Nowadays, it is more common to use ‘concept’ for these entities, which Bolzano
uses for a subclass of ideas, namely, those that are free of intuitions, which form the
other subclass (I §73, 330). Intuitions are direct singular representations that are expressed
by demonstratives like ‘this’ (I §72, 325ff). As, according to Bolzano, intuitions always
represent, they are not immediately affected by the puzzle.
The two features of ideas that are relevant for the puzzle are their extension and
their composition. Concerning extension: many ideas represent things, they are objec-
tual (‘gegenständlich’), others fail to represent, they are objectless (‘gegenstandlos’) (I §66,
297). The idea [donkey],3 for example, represents donkeys. Concerning their composition:
Bolzano believes in mereological atomism in general and for ideas in particular. There are
simple and complex ideas such that the former ultimately compose, as partless mereolog-
ical parts, the latter (I §61, 263f; see Schnieder 2020). Since propositions are composed of
ideas, they are also ultimately composed of simple ideas. Bolzano realizes the importance
of simple ideas as ultimate building blocks of thought (I §78, 354). The following ideas are
under suspicion to be simple:

• [actuality], which is identical to [being] (II §143, 66, §197, 335; Bolzano 2004b, §3.2);
• [compositeness] (I §82.1, 394; Bolzano 1975, 74v);
• [not] (I §89, 415; Bolzano 2004b, §3.2);
• the sense of ‘grasps’ as it is used figuratively in ‘grasps an idea’ (Bolzano and Exner 2004,
162);
• [has] or, but less likely, [attribute] (I §80, 380; Bolzano 2004b, §3.2);
• the sense of ‘is the object of’ as applied to ideas and what they represent (Bolzano 2004a,
183);
• [something] (I §73.1, 330; Bolzano 2004b, §3.2) which is identical to [thing] and [object]
(I §99, 459; Bolzano and Exner 2004, 109);
• pure intuitions (I §72, 325ff; Bolzano 2004b, §6.4);
• [being a ground] (I §202, 351);
• either [obligation] (II §127.2, 12f) or the ethical [should] (II §144, 69);

Some of these ideas, the syncategorematic ideas [not] and [has], fail to represent.4 Contrary
to objectless ideas that still purport to represent, for example, self-contradictory ideas such
as [round square] or contingently objectless ones such as [golden mountain], they lack
the form to represent objects (I §55, 239). Their task is to modify or combine other ideas.
So while usually the most important features of a given idea are that it has its particular

2 Concerning the nature of Bolzanian propositions and ideas, which anticipated Fregean senses in several respects, see
Morscher 1973; Textor 1996, ch. 1; Künne 1997; Künne 2001.
3 As is customary in Bolzano scholarship, I will use square brackets in order to talk about ideas and propositions
(Morscher 2003, LXV–LXX). [Savonarola was wrathful] is the proposition that Savonarola was wrathful, ‘wrath’ expresses
the idea [wrath], the idea of wrath.
4 Bolzano explicitly claims that [and] and [has] are objectless (I §78, 360). It is reasonable to assume that ideas which structure
ideas and propositions in a similar way are in the same boat.
4 J. CLAAS

extension and its particular composition, some ideas lack both: they are simple objectless
ideas.

4. Criteria of Individuation
Before I present Bolzano’s criterion of individuation for ideas, let me explain what I take
such a criterion to achieve. A criterion serves as an informative necessary and sufficient
condition.5 An identity criterion is an informative necessary and sufficient condition for
things being identical, while a criterion of individuation is an informative necessary and
sufficient condition for things being distinct. I prefer to talk about the criterion of indi-
viduation because Bolzano explicitly tells us when ideas are distinct. Not every necessary
and sufficient condition is informative. Not being identical to Bolzano trivially is necessary
and sufficient for something to be distinct from Bolzano. What we need is a necessary and
sufficient condition that helps us to decide whether things are distinct. So a criterion for
something must have some epistemic value: it appeals to features that are accessible to us.
Bolzano is an adherent of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), according
to which distinct things differ in some of their attributes. The PII is not, as its name suggests,
an epistemic principle. It concerns the question of whether things have different attributes,
not whether we are in a position to discern them.6 We can formalize this principle with a
second-order quantifier in predicate position:

PII ∀x∀y(∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x = y)

According to the PII, two distinct objects differ in at least one of their attributes. When we
want to use it in order to distinguish things from one another, we face two questions: which
kinds of objects does it apply to? And which kinds of attributes can we appeal to? Leibniz
often limits the applicability of the PII, namely, to internal differences between substances
(Leibniz 1989, 32, 41f, 214). For Bolzano, it is not limited to actual objects. It concerns
presumably all things, often explicitly including ideas (I §72, 328; cf. Bolzano 1978, 148f;
Bolzano 1979, 69, 79).
Bolzano notices that objects always differ in some of their relational attributes, among
them some which trivialize the PII: of any two objects a and b, a but not b has the attribute
of being a and not being b (I §114.4, 532f, §64.2.g, 276). The class of permissible attributes
must be restricted in some way for the PII to be non-trivial and helpful for individuating
things, which is why Bolzano limits the PII to differences in internal attributes (I §114.4,
532f).7 In order to figure out whether ideas are distinct, we have to consider ‘nothing

5 For Bolzano, a criterion might be a positive or a negative indicator, i.e. a sufficient condition for the presence or the absence
of something. It does not have to be both necessary and sufficient. Bolzano stresses that it has to be informative, that it
‘helps us to recognise the presence or absence of a thing’ (I §45, 203f).
6 The converse of the PII is the Principle of the Indiscernibility of the Identical. According to this principle, things that differ in
at least one of their attributes are not identical. Sometimes the PII, sometimes its converse, sometimes the conjunction of
both is called ‘Leibniz’s Law’. Allegedly (Forrest 2012), the PII has been explicitly formulated first by Leibniz in his Discours de
métaphysique from 1686 (Leibniz 1989, 41f). Bolzano knew better: he notes that we can already find it in Cicero’s writings
(see Bolzano 1980, 111 on Cicero 1853, 2nd book, XVII, 48f; see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2014, 1, 56 for a later re-discovery of the
PII in Cicero).
7 How exactly trivializing attributes, which need to be excluded from the PII, should be characterized is a matter of an ongo-
ing debate. See, e.g. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006 and Wörner 2021, both of which argue that relational attributes are not per se
trivializing.
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 5

but the idea in itself; and hence we cannot say that they are equal except when all their
recognizable properties (components, mode of composition, etc.) are identical’ (I §91.1,
429).
It then seems that we first have to achieve a basic understanding of the distinction
between internal and relational attributes in Bolzano. Unfortunately, his way of drawing the
distinction (I §80, 378–389) is unlikely to help. First of all, it has its problems (Textor 1996,
70–73). Secondly, Bolzano himself doubts that it is correct (I §80, 384). The attempt to clar-
ify the distinction in the Theory of Science was, however, not Bolzano’s last word on this
topic. The last set of entries in Bolzano’s last philosophical notebook (Miscallanea Philo-
sophica 5, Bolzano 1979, henceforth ‘MP’) approaches the distinction again, repeatedly and
in tandem with the PII. Let me draw attention to two general ideas that appear repeatedly
and that will help us to find a viable Bolzanian criterion for individuating ideas.
First of all, Bolzano considers several ways to rely on the ideas of objects and logical
features of the proposition that the object has a feature in order to figure out whether it
is internal or relational. Let me summarize one attempt to draw the distinction, which
strongly resembles a fairly recent one (MP 76, 78; cf. Rosen 2010). Bolzano assumes that
we consider objects under a specific, non-redundant basic idea (‘Grundvorstellung’, MP
74). Let us suppose that [A] is such a basic idea of an object A and [M] represents one of
its attributes M. Then [A is M] is a truth. In order to find out whether M is an internal or
relational attribute, we have to investigate the objective grounds of said truth.8 If [A is M]
is grounded in a truth about an object B that differs from A, say, in [B is K], then M is a
relational attribute of A. If it is not, it is an internal attribute.9 If M is an internal attribute,
there are two further options. Either [A is M] is grounded in another truth about A, say [A
is L], or it is not. In the latter case, M is not merely an internal but even an essential attribute
of A.
What is important for my purposes is the departure in spirit from Bolzano’s earlier
attempt, which he then presumably has abandoned. Since we cannot pin down what we
should consider to be Bolzano’s considered opinion on the distinction, I will depart a bit
from Bolzano’s suggestions, both in the WL and in the notebook. For the sake of famil-
iarity and simplicity, I follow Morscher’s suggestion that Bolzano’s distinction ‘matches
the nowadays common distinction between monadic and polyadic attributes to a large
extent’ (Morscher 1999, 224, my translation). We indeed can be a bit lenient concerning
the distinction because it is not as crucial as expected for individuating ideas.
Let us then briefly turn to the PII in the notebook. While distinct objects still have to dif-
fer internally, we can nevertheless rely on certain relational differences because they reveal
such internal differences. Since relational differences are, for Bolzano, always grounded in
internal ones (MP 78–80), there are no relational differences without internal ones. We then
can treat relational differences as reliable symptoms of internal ones, the former allow us
to identify and characterize the latter. We can avoid relational attributes that would render
the PII trivial, if we only rely on ones that reveal internal qualitative differences.

8 For the notion of grounding in Bolzano, see Morscher 2016 and Roski 2017 for booklong treatments, Roski 2020 and Roski
and Schnieder 2022 for survey articles.
9 Rosen develops a refined version of this idea (Rosen 2010, 112): ‘property F is intrinsic iff whether or not X is F depends
entirely on how things stand with X and its parts, and not on X’s relations to things distinct from X’, where ‘depends’ is used
to express grounding. The proviso about the parts of X, which is missing in Bolzano’s version, is needed because otherwise
some, prima facie internal, properties that concern X’s parts might come out as relational.
6 J. CLAAS

5. Bolzano’s Official Criterion

Developing what I will call Bolzano’s ‘official criterion’, he begins with his commitment to
the PII and proceeds to tell us that three attributes are presumably the only ones that serve
as difference-makers for ideas (I §96.3, 446; see also I §91, 428f):
[I]n order to distinguish two things one must be able to state different things about them. But
it seems at least that all statements about an idea concern one of two things: either the objects it
represents, or the idea itself; and with respect to the latter, whether it is simple or complex, and
if complex, what parts it is composed of, etc. Now mutually inclusive ideas [‘Wechselvorstel-
lungen’, ideas with the same extension] cannot be distinguished with respect to their objects,
since they apply to the same ones. Thus it seems that one can only distinguish them either by
declaring one of them to be simple and the other complex, or declaring them to be composed
of different parts, or, finally, declaring them to be composed of the same parts, but combined
in different ways.10
The first way to distinguish ideas is to distinguish them by their extension:

The Extension Condition For all ideas y and z:

∃x1 ¬(y represents x1 ↔ z represents x1 ) → y = z

Now, considering the constraint that a principle of individuation has to reveal differences in
internal attributes it seems strange that Bolzano here appeals to the extension of an idea. He
even talks about distinguishing ideas ‘with respect to their objects’, which clearly involves
differences in their relational attributes. Surprisingly, Bolzano indeed claims that the exten-
sion is an internal attribute (I §66.4, 299f). This, as has been pointed out in Textor 1996,
49–55, is an exegetical puzzle. Bolzano’s reasoning for this claim is that ‘the extension of
an idea does not vary depending on whether we consider it in relation to one object or
another’, ‘there is only one extension for any given idea’ (I §66.4, 299). However, as Textor
has argued, that the extension is stable in this sense, does mean that it is not relational.
Another exegetical puzzle is that Bolzano uses ‘extension’ for two different kinds of things.
Most of the time he uses it for the mereological collection of things that are represented
by an idea. But when he officially introduces extensions, he describes them as attributes of
ideas (I §66.2, 298). Now, a collection of, say, donkeys is clearly not an attribute of an idea,
having this collection as its extension is one, namely, a relation to the collection of donkeys.
Apparently, Bolzano wants to classify the extension of an idea as internal in some sense.
One reason for this might be that he demands an internal difference for distinguishing
them. Now, if we take the two different understandings of ‘extension’ seriously, they open a
way to understand extensions as internal attributes. When Bolzano talks about the exten-
sion as an attribute, he takes it to be ‘that particular attribute of an idea by virtue of which
it represents only those and no other objects’ (I §66.2, 298). The attribute in virtue of which
an idea represents certain things, of course, can be an internal one, even if the attribute of
representing these things is a relational one. In the attribute-sense of ‘extension’, the exten-
sion of [green] then is a certain representational function, namely, to represent all and only
things that are green. In the collection-sense of ‘extension’, having as an extension the col-
lection of all things that actually are green, representing, e.g. broccoli, clearly is a relation. It

10 I have altered the translation of ‘Wechselvorstellungen’, which does not derive from ‘auswechselbar’ but from ‘wechsel-
seitiges Umfassen’ (I §96.1, 445).
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 7

is a relation in which [green] stands to green things in virtue of its internal representational
function. We clearly should keep these attributes apart: if broccoli were red, then [green]
would not represent it but no internal attribute of [green] would have changed. It would still
have the same representational function. As noted in the previous section, we can distin-
guish things by appeal to relational attributes because they are always grounded in internal
ones. Since [green] represents broccoli while [red] fails to do so, [green] and [red] have to
differ internally and can be distinguished from one another. The internal difference is one
in their representational function (and presumably further internal attributes that account
for it, such as a different buildup).
The second way in which ideas may differ are their contents, the mereological sums of
their simple constituents (I §56, 244):11

The Content Condition For all ideas y and z:

∃x2 ¬(x2 is a simple constituent of y ↔ x2 is a simple constituent of z) → y = z

The two conditions discussed so far are independent sufficient conditions. Some ideas dif-
fer in content without differing in extension and vice versa: [earthling with earlobes] (I
§112, 523) and [something which combines a rational mind with an organic body] (I §75,
337) may both represent humans but they clearly differ in content. [Learned son of an igno-
rant father] and [ignorant son of a learned father] differ in extension but not in content (I
§56, 244). This example also shows that sameness of simple constituents is not a sufficient
condition of identity for ideas. For Bolzano, complex ideas are structured compounds (I
§58.7, 255f) such that one can meaningfully speak of a simple idea having a certain posi-
tion in a complex idea. Ideas with the same content then also can differ in how their simple
constituents are arranged:

The Arrangement Condition For all ideas y and z:

(∀x2 (x2 is a simple constituent of y ↔ x2 is a simple constituent of z) ∧
∃x3 (x3 is a constituent of y ∧ x3 appears in a position in y in which it does not appear
in z)) → y = z

Spelled out in this way, the condition is only applicable to ideas that have the same content,
which is also indicated by Bolzano in the last sentence of the quoted passage.
If two ideas have the same arrangement, they also have the same content and extension,
they are identical. Two ideas that differ in their arrangement can differ in their extension,
but they do not have to, [24 ] and [42 ] only differ in their respective arrangements (I §96,
446). Since Bolzano claims that extension, content, and arrangement are presumably the

11 As has already been noted in Casari 2016, 21, there is a tension between passages in which Bolzano takes the content of
an idea to be the collection of all its parts, simple or complex (I §92.1, 433f; II §123, 5), or only its simple parts (I §96.2,
446). For my purposes, the choice seems mostly terminological, especially since simple objectless ideas differ neither in
content nor in arrangement. Let me explain why I choose contents to contain only simple ideas. When Bolzano states the
criterion, he explicitly appeals to the arrangement of parts as an additional difference-maker. However, it would not be
one if we could consider all parts of the idea, including complex ones, to be included in its content. When he introduces
contents of ideas, he takes [learned son of an ignorant father] and [ignorant son of a learned father] to have ‘obviously’
the same content but different ways of combination (I §56, 244; cf. I §92.1, 434). However, the former but not the latter
contains the bigger constituent [learned son]. So if we allowed complex ideas to be part of the content, these ideas would
differ in content.
8 J. CLAAS

only ways in which ideas can differ, we can tentatively strengthen the disjunction of these
three sufficient conditions into a biconditional. The resulting criterion is

The Individuation Criterion For all ideas y and z: y = z ↔

∃x1 ¬(y represents x1 ↔ z represents x1 ) ∨
∃x2 ¬(x2 is a simple constituent of y ↔ x2 is a simple constituent of z ) ∨
∃x3 (x3 is a simple constituent of y and z ∧ x3 appears in a position in y in which it
does not appear in z)

6. The Puzzle
The most worrisome shortcoming of Bolzano’s official criterion has been pointed out by
Rusnock and George (2004, 188): it fails to individuate simple ideas finely enough. This
is especially troublesome because the criterion in the end boils down to the distinctness
of simple ideas. But the only way to distinguish simple ideas is by their extension. Sim-
ple ideas that lack an extension, in particular the syncategorematic ideas [not], [has], and
[which], then cannot be distinguished by Bolzano’s official criterion. Extension, content,
and arrangement are not the only ways in which ideas can differ.
So we cannot assume that the disjunction of the three sufficient conditions is neces-
sary for the distinctness of ideas. If The Individuation Criterion were correct, Bolzano
would have to claim that there can be only one simple objectless idea. The ideas [not],
[has], and [which] would have to be identical. But if [has] were the same idea as [not],
then [Socrates has wisdom] would have to be identical to [Socrates not wisdom], assum-
ing that propositions are identical if they share their parts and arrangement (IV §558, 338).
The former is a truth, the latter is not even a proposition, arguably not even an idea, but an
awkward sequence of ideas, it is sense-garbage.12 Fortunately, this example already points to
a solution to the problem it illustrates. The absurdity arises because distinct simple object-
less ideas play different roles in propositions. I will show that in order to distinguish simple
objectless ideas we can exploit these roles.
But is the puzzle really a serious problem for Bolzano? As has been argued in
Casari 2016, ch. 4 Bolzano’s conjecture, according to which all propositions have the form
[A has b], is justifiable. A reduction of syncategorematic ideas then seems possible. If
Casari is correct, the only ones we need are the copula [has] and the negation [not]. Do we
really need an individuation criterion to distinguish them from one another?13 First of all,
Bolzano himself does not assume that we only need [has] and [not]. While connectors like
[and] and [or] might be reduced to talk about collections within Bolzano’s own theory (III
§135), he also assumes that many ideas are typically structured in a certain way, in which
the idea [which] plays an important role (I §58). Secondly, even if Bolzano assumed that
the only simple objectless ideas were [has] and [not], we would still need a criterion to dis-
tinguish them. After all, Bolzano subscribes to the PII. Recall that he starts his discussion
of idea individuation with the demand that ‘in order to distinguish two things one must
be able to state different things about them’ (I §96.3, 446). Since he is explicitly concerned
with distinguishing simple ideas in a principled way, focusing on objectual ones, it is hard

12 See Siebel 1996, ch. 1.5 on differences between strict and liberal conceptions of propositions, and consequently ideas, we
can find in Bolzano. Bolzano explicitly states that ideas are not freely combinable into more complex ones (I §78, 355).
13 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 9

to believe that he would not demand a criterion that also covers simple objectless ones,
even if there were only two of them. Thirdly, even if Bolzano did not assume additional
simple objectless ideas and even if he abandoned the PII and simply stipulated that they
are distinct, it still would be preferable to be able to distinguish them in a principled way.

7. Variatio Delectat
According to my solution, simple objectless ideas can be distinguished from each other
because when they are substituted for each other in propositions, the resulting variant of
the proposition clearly differs from it. This solution of the puzzle is Bolzanian in three
respects. First of all, it can be modeled in Bolzano’s variation logic, which I will introduce in
this section. Secondly, Bolzano himself uses his method of variation in order to extend the
applicability of certain distinctions and comparisons (I §69.4, 311f, §108, 513ff).14 Thirdly,
my solution can claim textual evidence, which I will present and develop into a further
condition in the next two sections.
The basic idea of Bolzano’s variation logic is that we can define logical relations
between propositions by investigating how their truth-values change when we systemat-
ically replace15 ideas in them. The central notion is that of a variant, which is the result
of such a replacement. The proposition [Bolzano likes Bohemian dumplings] is a variant
of the proposition [Frege likes Bohemian dumplings] with respect to the idea [Frege]; the
latter proposition is a variant of the proposition [Frege likes Thuringian dumplings] with
respect to the idea [Thuringian]. While Bolzano does not formally define what the variant
of a proposition is, we can find proposals in the literature (cf. Berg 1962, 92f; Siebel 1996,
ch. 2; Morscher 1997, 141; Künne 2006, 187f; Casari 2016, ch. 1.5, 3.5ff; Roski 2017, 38).
What I formulate differs from these formulations in two respects, which is why I will call
it ‘variant*’:

Variant* A sequence of ideas φ is a variant* of a proposition φ with respect to the idea

v ↔df φ contains v and φ differs from φ at most in that it contains an idea v instead
of v in each position in which v occurs in φ.

I will also write that φ is the v/v -variant* of φ with v being the substitute and v being
the substituted. [Kenney Jones is a member of The Who], for instance, is the [Keith
Moon]/[Kenney Jones]-variant* of [Keith Moon is a member of The Who], [Kenney Jones]
is the substitute for the substituted [Keith Moon]. Propositions are variant*s of them-
selves.16 The substitute can be identical to the substituted, possibly considered under a
more revealing guise (i.e. way in which the proposition is presented to us by means of the

14 As discussed in Casari 2016, ch. 3.5–3.7, we face certain complications when we extend the applicability of certain dis-
tinctions to objectless ideas in this way. He is sympathetic to the idea that, for reasons of simplicity, we should restrict
ourselves to their objectual variants. In any case, in my proposal we do not replace parts of objectless ideas but we
replace the objectless ideas themselves. So these particular complications do not arise.
15 Bolzano uses ‘vary’ and ‘replace’ figuratively in these contexts (I §69, 314f): we consider distinct ones that have certain
ideas where the original ones have others.
16 To Berg it appears that Bolzano never considers this case (Berg 1962, 93). It is, however, at least suggested when Bolzano
claims that ‘all truths are compatible since they are already true by virtue of the ideas of which they originally consist’ (II
§154.6, 102).
10 J. CLAAS

way it is expressed). [Donald is a drake] is the same proposition as [Donald is a male duck];
nevertheless, the latter proposition is the [drake]/[male duck]-variant* of the former.
As I said, there are two differences to the definitions in the literature. Firstly, for Bolzano,
something can be a variant of a proposition with respect to several ideas considered vari-
able. I only need the less complicated special case in which one idea, which can be complex,
is substituted. Since the variation of multiple ideas can be reduced to multiple monadic
variations, this is merely a matter of presentation. Secondly, Roski, Siebel and Künne focus
for their purposes on what it takes for a proposition to be the variant of a proposition. For
Casari and Morscher, the variant of a proposition is a proposition and the variant of an idea
is an idea. According to my definition, sequences of ideas can be variant*s, even if they are
neither propositions nor ideas but sense-garbage.17
The notion of a variant* is crucial for the further condition that I will propose: ideas A
and B also are to be distinguished if there is at least one proposition P such that P contains A
and the A/B-variant* of P differs from P. The proposition [Donkeys have floppy ears], for
instance, differs from its [donkey]/[duck]-variant* [Ducks have floppy ears]. Therefore,
[donkey] is not identical to [duck]. Concerning simple objectless ideas, we can distin-
guish [has] and [not] because some propositions that contain [has] clearly differ from their
[has]/[not]-variant*s.

8. Textual Evidence for a Further Condition

Before I will make this condition more precise, let me argue that Bolzano agrees with the
basic idea. The exegetical worry is that Bolzano suggests, though cautiously, that the only
ways in which ideas can differ are extension, content, and arrangement. However, he him-
self does not limit himself to such differences. He introduces a test: in order to determine
whether ideas are identical we have to investigate whether they are interchangeable for each
other. In this passage, Bolzano is concerned with conceptual analysis as well as of thinking
concepts. Both go for him hand in hand as he believes that the structure of thought mirrors
the structure of its contents (I §65, 283; III §281, 39). He describes heuristics for how we
can come up with a candidate for the analysans. The final test in order to make sure that
the analysans M is in fact identical to the analysandum A is the following (III §350, 399):
Further examination will be aimed principally at determining whether M and A can be inter-
changed in every case where one of them is combined with other ideas to form new ideas and
entire propositions without any difference coming to light. If we notice no such difference, we
may conclude that the idea M [. . . ] is nothing other than the idea A resolved into its parts,
and we will have succeeded in indicating the parts of A and the way they are combined. Thus
we may believe that the idea of the word ‘nothing’ is exactly the same as that expressed by the
words ‘not something’, since the latter may be substituted for the former in any proposition
[‘Satz’] without altering the sense.
What is a bit strange is that in the end Bolzano seems to talk about altering the sense of
a proposition. Propositions, however, do not have senses, they are senses (II §156, 140;
cf. Berg 1962, 46). For this reason, it is not entirely clear what Bolzano means by ‘Satz’,

17 Casari (2016, 76f) points out that for the applications Bolzano is concerned with, it is reasonable to only consider variants
of ideas and propositions that are themselves ideas and propositions, respectively. However, this does not mean that we
cannot consider sense-garbage for other applications. Talk about a certain sequence of ideas is comprehensible, even if
this sequence is neither a proposition nor an idea.
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 11

which can be a sentence (‘sprachlicher Satz’) or a proposition (‘Satz an sich’). Taken in iso-
lation, the example might be understood as being concerned with substituting expressions.
However, this interpretation only works if we assume an error in the German original.18
Furthermore, the example is one for the test Bolzano describes right before, which clearly
concerns the substitutability of ideas rather than expressions. One can maintain an under-
standing of ‘Satz’ here as referring to propositions if one understands Bolzano’s ‘without
altering the sense’ not as referring to the sense of the proposition but the sense which is
the proposition.
The last obstacle for formulating a criterion is to make more precise what Bolzano
means by ‘without any difference coming to light’ and ‘without altering the sense’, which I
interpreted as ‘without altering the proposition’. I propose to cash them out in terms of vari-
ant*s. The example then is: every proposition in which [nothing] occurs is identical to its
[nothing]/[not something]-variant*; so [nothing] is identical to [not something]. If some
proposition differed from its [nothing]/[not something]-variant*, then the ideas would be
distinct. Generalizing, Bolzano then suggests

The Substitutability Criterion For all ideas y and z: y = z ↔

∃x(x is a proposition ∧ x contains y ∧ the y/z-variant* of x is not identical with x)

9. A Further Condition
The Substitutability Criterion allows us to decide whether ideas are identical or dis-
tinct, but only if we are able to decide whether certain propositions and their variant*s are
identical or distinct. So now we have to find a way to distinguish propositions from each
other.
Similarly to the paragraph that there are no indistinguishable ideas, II §150.1, 92 tells us
that there are no indistinguishable propositions. Bolzano here does not explicitly propose
a criterion we can rely on. However, elsewhere he claims that two propositions can differ
in content and that they can have the same content while differing in their arrangement
(II §148, 89, §151, 93f; IV §558, 338). Since these two attributes appear to provide us with
a necessary and sufficient condition, propositions seem to be identical if and only if they
have the same parts in the same order. Now, if these were the only ways to distinguish
propositions, The Substitutability Criterion would face a problem: we would already
have to know whether ideas in propositions are distinct before we can decide whether the
propositions are distinct. But then we cannot appeal to the distinctness of a proposition
and its variant*s in order to distinguish ideas contained in them. The Substitutability
Criterion would not be informative because it would be circular. This problem still is of
vital interest in contemporary debates on idea-individuation (Davis 2003, 575f).
Once more Bolzano offers a solution elsewhere. He notes that one way to show that two
propositions differ without having to investigate their composition is to show that they
differ in their inferential potential: ‘something is deducible from one of them but not from
the other’ (IV §558, 338f). Propositions that differ in their truth-values obviously differ in

18 The pronoun ‘jene’, which refers back to ‘die Vorstellung des Wortes Nichts’ (‘the idea of the word Nothing’), would have
to be ‘jenes’ in order to refer back to ‘das Wort Nichts’ (‘the word nothing’).
12 J. CLAAS

their inferential potential. I propose to appeal to truth-values in order to formulate a fur-

ther sufficient condition for the distinctness of ideas. There is no difference in truth-value
without a difference in sense (II §125, 7, §147, 77). So if a proposition differs in truth-value
from one of its variant*s, we can distinguish the propositions and trace this difference back
to the distinctness of the ideas we substituted. We then can formulate a further sufficient
condition for the distinctness of ideas:

The Variation Condition For all ideas y and z:

∃x4 (x4 is a proposition ∧ y is a constituent of x4 ∧ the y/z-variant* of x4 differs from
x4 in truth-value) → y = z

The Variation Condition can distinguish simple objectless ideas. Recall that a variant* of
a proposition is not necessarily a proposition and truth-evaluable, it also can be an idea or
sense-garbage. The [has]/[not]-variant* of [Socrates has wisdom], for example, is [Socrates
not wisdom]. The latter does not have the same truth-value as the former because it lacks
one while the former is true. In the same way, we can distinguish [has] from every other
simple objectless idea. According to Bolzano, only [has], when it is flanked by two ideas of
the right kind, makes the resulting whole truth-evaluable. Another example is that [not] is
not identical to [which]. [A prudent being which is virtuous deserves happiness] is true,
the [which]/[not]-variant* of this proposition is, again, not truth-evaluable.
Three remarks. Firstly, the condition concerns the substitutability of ideas in propo-
sitions, which does not always coincide with the substitutability of their expressions in
sentences. Language is only an imperfect guide for the contents we express. As Bolzano
was aware (III §285, 67–84, §387, 542–555; cf. Centrone and Künne 2011), more often than
not sentences require to be interpreted properly in order to figure out which propositions
they express in a given context. Take the following two sentences and the propositions they
prima facie express:

S1 ‘Donald is a drake because Donald is a male duck.’

S2 ‘Donald is a drake because Donald is a drake.’

P1 [Donald is a drake because Donald is a male duck.]

P2 [Donald is a drake because Donald is a drake.]

S1 is a true analytic explanation while S2 is false because ‘because’ is an asymmetrical con-

nective (Schnieder 2010). So we cannot substitute the expressions ‘drake’ and ‘male duck’ in
every context salva veritate. If S1 and S2 express P1 and P2, respectively, then we also can-
not substitute the ideas [drake] and [male duck]. The Variation Condition then would
incorrectly distinguish them. However, the proposition that S1 expresses under the natu-
ral reading under which it is true is plausibly not P1. In interpreting S1 we have to keep in
mind that ‘because’ is hyper-sensitive: it can operate on more than the bare contents of the
expressions in ‘because’-sentences. Here we have to take the structure of the expressions
into account in order to find the proposition that it expresses. One plausible candidate for
what S1 expresses is

P3 [Donald is a drake because Donald is male and Donald is a duck.]

 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 13

P3 is true and so is its [drake]/[male duck]-variant* (which is identical to P3): the con-
junctive concept [drake] ( = [male duck]) applies to Donald because each of its conjuncts
applies to him. P1 can seem true because we mistake it for P3. However, P1 is as false as P2
(with which it is identical). It is false because the propositions on both sides of [because]
are identical and [because]-propositions are only true if the propositions conjoined by
[because] are distinct.19
Secondly, Rusnock and Šebestik briefly consider and ultimately reject a particular kind
of insubstitutability as a condition strong enough to individuate simple objectless ideas.
Their idea is to consider whether the ideas ‘fit into the same places in propositions’ (Rus-
nock and Šebestik 2019, 218). If they do not fit into the same places, they are distinct,
which suffices to distinguish [and] and [not]. As they note, this condition is insufficient
to distinguish ideas of the same semantic category such as the connectives [or] and [and].
Relying on the notion of truth rather than fit, we can easily distinguish them because some
disjunctions are true while their [or]/[and]-variant*s are false.
Thirdly, The Variation Condition also distinguishes ideas that we already were able
to distinguish. So it is not ad hoc tailored in order to distinguish simple objectless ideas. We
can distinguish [maleness] from [greenness] because [Donald has maleness] is true while
[Donald has greenness] is false. [Maleness] represents another attribute than [greenness],
so The Extension Condition already tells us that they are distinct. That they represent
different attributes is the reason why the initial proposition is true while its variant* is false.
This raises an important question: can we also find a reason for the insubstitutability of
simple objectless ideas? What is the internal difference between ideas that accounts for the
relational one? It certainly is neither their composition nor their representational function.
It has to be their logical function. It is hard to determine what exactly the function of an idea
is, especially an objectless idea, unless we consider their roles in a variety of propositions.
Considering truth-values of propositions and their variant*s, which is where differences
in function show, then seems to be the appropriate way to approach such functions. Sim-
ilar to the extension and the representational function of objectual ideas as discussed in
Section 5, we rely on a relational difference between ideas in order to reveal and charac-
terize an internal one. The function of logical constants like [and] and [or], for example,
is to serve as logical glue, to combine propositions, with distinct truth-functional features.
Since the suggestion is analogous to how The Extension Condition condition works, for
which we have to cross the border to the realm of all kinds of objects, we should not worry
about now also having to cross the border to the realm of propositions for The Variation
Condition. What we reveal are in both cases internal attributes.
So I take the following to be the proper Bolzanian criterion for distinguishing ideas:

The Individuation Criterion* For all ideas y and z: y = z ↔

∃x1 ¬(y represents x1 ↔ z represents x1 ) ∨
∃x2 ¬(x2 is a simple constituent of y ↔ x2 is a simple constituent of z) ∨
∃x3 (x3 is a simple constituent of y and z ∧ x3 appears in a position in y in which it
does not appear in z) ∨

19 The problem is inspired by Schnieder’s puzzle about ‘because’ (Schnieder 2010), opting for the solution presented on pp.
337-340.
14 J. CLAAS

∃x4 (x4 is a proposition ∧ y is a constituent of x4 ∧ the y/z-variant* of x4 differs from

x4 in truth-value)

The additional condition solves the puzzle with means provided within Bolzano’s theory,
it has some prima facie plausibility, and it is supported by at least one passage.

10. A Simpler Criterion

The amended criterion contains four sufficient conditions. I have already explained in
Section 5 to what extent the first three conditions are entangled with each other. Having
introduced The Variation Condition, we have to consider its relation to them as well.
Because of simple objectless ideas, the insubstitutability of ideas does not imply any of the
other three differences. I will argue now that a difference between ideas according to each
of them, however, implies their insubstitutability.
Distinctness according to The Extension Condition clearly implies insubstitutability.
Suppose that we have two ideas that differ in their extensions, for instance [duck] and
[donkey]. There is by assumption at least one object, let me call it ‘Donald’, that stands
under one idea but not under the other. The proposition [Donald is a duck] is true while
its [duck]/[donkey]-variant* is false. So the ideas [duck] and [donkey], and generally ideas
that differ in their extensions, can be distinguished using The Variation Condition.
Now consider The Content Condition. This condition may seem indispensable
because Bolzano wants to distinguish [something] from [not not something], even
though they appear to be substitutable for each other salva veritate. However, the pair of
propositions

(1) [The idea [something] contains the idea [not].]

(2) [The idea [not not something] contains the idea [not].]

apparently suffices to distinguish [something] and [not not something]. Similar remarks
apply to The Arrangement Condition. Let us assume that we live in a world in which
parts of birds happen to be blue if and only if they are small. The ideas [bird with small
wings and a blue beak] and [bird with blue wings and a small beak] then have the same
extension and content, which is why we apparently need The Arrangement Condition
in order to distinguish them.20 However, we can also distinguish them using The Vari-
ation Condition. Consider the following pair of propositions, the first of which is true
while the latter is false:

(3) [The idea [bird with small wings and a blue beak] contains [small wings] in this
combination.]
(4) [The idea [bird with blue wings and a small beak] contains [small wings] in this
combination.]

20 In principle, we could also distinguish them in terms of their representational functions, which are still different, even
though they contingently represent the same objects.
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 15

Two conditions must be met for this reasoning to be sound. Firstly, substitution into con-
texts in which ideas do not merely occur but that are about the ideas we want to distinguish
have to be permissible. So far we lack a reason to issue such a restriction. Secondly, the
propositions have to be variant*s of each other. This requires that they contain the ideas
they are about.21 (2), for instance, has to be the [something]/[not not something]-variant*
of (1). For this to be the case, (1) has to contain the idea [something] and not merely an idea
of this idea without containing the idea itself. This condition seems to follow from a plausi-
ble assumption Bolzano makes elsewhere: complex ideas and propositions contain all ideas
that one has to grasp in order to grasp them (I §65, 283). Plausibly, one has to grasp the
idea [something] in order to grasp [the idea [something]]. Since [the idea [something]]
then contains the idea [something], (2) is indeed the [something]/[not not something]-
variant* of (1) and mutatis mutandis for (3) and (4). So, at least for Bolzano, the pairs of
propositions (1) and (2) as well as (3) and (4) really are pairs of variant*s with respect to
the ideas we want to distinguish. The Variation Condition then suffices to distinguish
the ideas in question.22
A criterion based solely on substitutability then appears to be possible in Bolzano’s
framework:

The Variation Criterion For all ideas y and z: y = z ↔

∃x4 (x4 is a proposition ∧ y is a constituent of x4 ∧ the y/z-variant* of x4 differs from
x4 in truth-value)

Nevertheless, The Individuation Criterion* is more telling in two ways. First of all,
it presents different ways of establishing the distinctness of ideas. Secondly, as I have sug-
gested in Section 9, the other conditions reveal directly why certain ideas are distinct, which
is something we still have to figure out when we distinguish them relying only on their
insubstitutability.

11. Two Objections

Let me discuss two objections against The Variation Condition. Both are different ways
of articulating the worry that The Variation Condition gets priorities wrong. The first
objection is systematical and concerns epistemic priority, the second one is exegetical and
concerns explanatory priority.
The first objection is a continuation of the objection discussed in Section 9. It goes
as follows: The Variation Condition cannot complete Bolzano’s criterion because it
is not informative. In order to distinguish propositions, we cannot rely on differences in
truth-values without first distinguishing the propositions in terms of their components.

21 Bolzano often relies on a related assumption: higher-order ideas of the form [the idea A] contain the idea A; see, for
example, the arguments in I §64.2, 274–277.
22 One might believe that investigating differences in propositions that are about the composition of the ideas we want to
distinguish is more complicated than required. After all, for each pair of distinct ideas A and B, the proposition [A = B] is
false while [A = A] is true. However, in order to evaluate these propositions, we already would need to know whether A
and B are distinct. We would not appeal to any qualitative internal difference between A and B but rely on bare numerical
distinctness, which we are not entitled to (see Section 4). In the cases listed in this section, on the other hand, it is clear
which qualitative internal difference is responsible for their insubstitutability, namely, their representational function or
their composition.
16 J. CLAAS

But then, again, we would already need to know whether the ideas we aim to distinguish are
distinct.
This objection relies on a prima facie plausible epistemic principle: we distinguish
wholes in terms of their parts and not vice versa. However, this is not always the case.
Consider drug testing: let us assume that we are unable to distinguish cocaine and sugar by
investigating these substances and their composition alone. How could we then distinguish
them? In exactly the same way in which customs officers at airports actually distinguish
them. The powder is mixed with a liquid. The resulting whole of powder and liquid is col-
orless if the powder is sugar but blue if it is cocaine. Sometimes differences between wholes
are in fact exploited in order to distinguish parts.
Still, while the principle that we first need to identify parts fails in full generality, it might
be correct for propositions in particular. In order to distinguish propositions by their truth-
values, we need to know what the propositions state; and now one might think that in order
to know what propositions state, we first need to know their exact composition. But this
does not seem to be true either. Suppose that we have two propositions about the same
subject matter, which are presented to us under relatively coarse-grained guises.

[Capybaras are swimming rodents.]

[Capybaras are hairy pigs.]

Are these propositions identical? Certainly, we could analyze them into their simple com-
ponents in order to find out. But it would be very tedious to analyze [swimming] and
[rodent] as well as [hairy] and [pig] into simple ideas and then compare the two sets of
simple ideas. If we could distinguish propositions only in terms of their components, we
would have to do this in order to rule out that, for example, [rodent] is built up out of some
parts of [pig] and some parts of [hairy]. This certainly is not how we usually proceed. We
do not have to make such an effort because, even without knowing the exact composition
of the ideas involved, we can know that one of the propositions is true while the other
is false. We only need to know that capybaras are indeed swimming rodents and that no
rodent is a pig, which is not knowledge about the composition of the ideas involved but
about animals.
Finally, let me briefly address the worry that The Variation Condition might violate
the Bolzanian spirit. One might worry that it gets the relation between senses and truth-
values wrong. I have suggested that considerations of whether ideas can be interchanged
in propositions salva veritate help us to determine whether ideas are identical. One might
suspect that this gives truth priority over meaning, which appears to fit ill with Bolzano’s
framework. For Bolzano, meaning certainly comes first. Meanings are the building blocks
out of which truth-evaluable propositions are composed. A difference in truth-value is to
be explained by a difference in meaning, not vice versa. When Davidson, who indeed gives
truth priority over meaning, claims that ‘a characterization of a truth predicate describes
the kind of structure required [for a theory of meaning] and provides a clear and testable
criterion for an adequate semantics for natural language’ (Davidson 1988, 320), Bolzano
would disagree with the priority Davidson assigns to truth. Whoever is right on this issue,
an interpretation of Bolzano should give meaning priority over truth.
Fortunately, the criterion suggested does not give truth priority over meaning or deny
the priority of meaning over truth. It was merely intended to give us an additional
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 17

informative way to distinguish ideas, not to also explain why they are distinct. According to
the proposal, it is not the insubstitutability of ideas that is responsible for their distinctness.
It still is the distinctness of the ideas, in particular a difference in their functions, that is
responsible for their insubstitutability. We can compare the insubstitutability of the ideas
with a symptom and their distinctness with its cause. We always can infer the presence of
the cause from the presence of the symptom and presumably, see Section 10, we can also
infer the absence of the cause from the absence of the symptom. This does not change what
the cause is and what the symptom.

12. Conclusion
Some ideas seem to be both unanalyzable and objectless, among them syncategorematic
ideas and in particular logical constants. The puzzle, raised by Bolzano’s official criterion
of individuation for ideas, is: how can we distinguish these ideas from each other? Their
extension and their composition do not suffice because they have neither. Bolzano sug-
gests that we also can distinguish ideas if they are not substitutable in propositions, and he
suggests a way in which we can distinguish propositions without exact knowledge of their
components, namely, in terms of truth-values. Following these suggestions, I have pro-
posed The Variation Condition in order to amend Bolzano’s criterion. The solution is:
we can distinguish simple objectless ideas because substituting them for each other changes
the truth-values of at least some propositions in which they occur. The solution also hints
at the underlying reason: distinct simple objectless ideas cannot always be substituted for
each other because they differ in their logical functions. What the solution does not achieve
is to tell us in detail what these functions look like. So I have proposed an informative suffi-
cient condition for idea distinctness but merely hinted at the underlying explanation. Still,
now we know that distinct ideas have distinct functions among their internal attributes and
we know that we can, in principle, reveal such functions by considering the roles ideas play
in propositions. Discussing on this basis the kinds of functions we find in ideas remains a
topic for further research.

Acknowledgments
For helpful discussion of the material at various stages, the author would like to thank Edgar
Morscher, Stefan Roski and Benjamin Schnieder as well as the participants of the Language and
World research colloquium in Hamburg in summer 2021. The author is also grateful for detailed
comments by two anonymous referees of another journal, which helped me to greatly improve this
paper.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
The author would like to thank the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for their generous support of the research
project ‘Der Leibniz Böhmens’ – Die Leibniz’schen Elemente in Bernard Bolzanos philosophischem
System.
18 J. CLAAS

ORCID
Jan Claas http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4253-1796

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