Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the
power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling
for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise
by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring
the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of
Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall
have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise
provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected
from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age
elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the
members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives
from each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by
law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not
exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and
selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions
until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the
Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang
Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution
and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall
be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The
President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many
Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall
have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions,
powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on
Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of
the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall
continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional
or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on
Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue;
the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power;
the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16,
Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by
RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming ReferendumPlebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders
the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and
Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature
Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct
injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential
Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The
interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that
discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated
may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside
the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in
the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After
that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars.
1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than
calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the
new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of
treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act.
Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom
of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended,
the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed
or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability,
that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of
the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their
sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they
ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has
been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who
exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a
posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the
preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process
as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor
General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino
people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore
"is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in
nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the validity
of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the
constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a
political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled
that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view,
said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents
therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on
January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or
not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political
nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical
unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the
Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21,
1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and
refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor
General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons
adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the
political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were
carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases
partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual
reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a

constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of

all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period
of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated
by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members
of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted
to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested
with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when
he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions
of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that
Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the
proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The
President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support
from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of
the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim
National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again,
in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National
Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress
and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the
I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973,
the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power
bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for
in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the

Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between

constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. 17Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition
or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis
government today are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he
concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the
crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has
generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out
among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to
be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of
power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the
Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms
a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it
may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its
independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all powers must
work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of
executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the
separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary
will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of
the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of
legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to
confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and
expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal
limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad
discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for
which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency
powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional
restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid
at. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the
Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall
have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under
the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the
President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the
interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime
Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this
Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or

done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the
ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim
National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a
vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking
powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing
Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends
over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution
presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive
power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the
problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which
involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater
than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our
political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same,
indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim
National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly
is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of
that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the
people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15
of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President
decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim
Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the
President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly,
there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative
power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National
Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges
of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution,
the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional
infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the
amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government
"to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to

reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of
the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973
and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly.
The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan
ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000
barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the
prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other
issues concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national
organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the
interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 . 28 The
Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in
session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted
proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the
proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the
people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the
Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that
particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest
power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional
legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the
Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional
prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all
experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that
one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution
is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their
sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed,
proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the
powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the
question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that
the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the
procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not

rendered nugatory by the

participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial
law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This
was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that
their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For
the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may
participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and
above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are
simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not
infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a
given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed
constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above)
is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing
the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots
of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years
of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and
above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be
separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is
merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given
issues submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or
within the totality of the executive power of the President. 39It is participated in by all citizens
from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or exconvicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy, property or any other substantive
requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the
Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main
the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the
observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State
imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on
certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite
on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President
himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on
the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment
of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public
forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even
(in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even
government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in
public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation

is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are
the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial
law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law.
That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in
previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case,
recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the
scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to
append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act
492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the
reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections,
20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No.
517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy
as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific
date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United
States Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great
variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and
not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time
within which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that
they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a
necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that
when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but
the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In
the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the
sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may
fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033
political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances
now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando,
Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and
Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices

Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is
political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee
and Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from
the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis,
thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore
beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA
774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's
lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above
stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure
intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of
Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate
opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J, in the result.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J.:, concurring:
From the challenge as formulated in the three petitions at bar and the grounds advanced be the
Solicitor General in opposition thereto, as well as the arguments adduced by the counsels of the
parties at the hearing had on October 7 and 8, 1976, three vital issues readily project themselves
as the centers of controversy, namely:
(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033
political or justiciable?
(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental circumstances
now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machineries and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper, submission"

I
First Issue
The threshold question is not at all one of first impression Specifically on the matter of proposals
to amend the Constitution, this Court, in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), inceptively
announced the dictum thatProposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charges by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason
for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.
In time, however, the validity of the said pronouncement was eroded. In the assessment of the
Court itselfThe force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino vs. Cuenco (L-2581, March 4 and 14, 1949), Tanada vs. Cuenco (L10520, February 28, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on Elections (L-18684, September 14,
1961).
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress-acting as a constituent assemblyviolates the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point." (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, et al, L-28196, November 9,
1967, 21 SCRA 774, 786-787).
The abandonment of the Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito doctrine appears to have been completed
when, in Javellana vs. Secretary, et al. (L-36142, March 3l, 1973, 50 SCRA 30), six members of
the Court concurred in the view that the question of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified
in accordance with the provisions of Article XV (Amendments) of the 1935 Constitution is
inherently and essentially justiciable.
As elucidated therein, with extensive quotations from Tanada vs. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051)... the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinarily parlance, namely, a question of policy in matters concerning the
government of a State, as a body politic. In other words, in the language of Corpus
Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.'
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue
on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity
of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught." (Javellana
vs. Executive Secretary, supra).

So it is in the situation here presented. The basic issue is the constitutional validity of the
presidential acts of proposing amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendumplebiscite for the ratification of the proposals made. Evidently, the question does not concern
itself with the wisdom of the exercise of the authority claimed or of the specific amendments
proposed. Instead the inquiry vel non is focused solely on the existence of the said power in the
President - a question purely of legality determinable thru interpretation and construction of the
letter and spirit of the Constitution by the Court as the final arbiter in the delineation of
constitutional boundaries and the allocation of constitutional powers.
For the Court to shun cognizance of the challenge herein presented, especially in these parlous
years, would be to abdicate its constitutional powers, shirk its constitutional responsibility, and
deny the people their ultimate recourse for judicial determination.
I have thus no hesitancy in concluding that the question here presented is well within the
periphery of judicial inquiry.
II
Second Issue
The main question stands on a different footing; it appears unprecedented both here and
elsewhere. Its solution, I believe, can be found and unraveled only by a critical assessment of the
existing legal order in the light of the prevailing political and factual milieu.
To be sure, there is an impressive array of consistent jurisprudence on the proposition that,
normally or under normal conditions, a Constitution may be amended only in accord with the
procedure set forth therein. Hence, if there be any such prescription for the amendatory process
as invariable there is because one of the essential parts of a Constitution is the so-called
"constitution of sovereignty" which comprises the provision or provisions on the modes in
accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be effected the same would
ordinarily be the controlling criterion for the validity of the amendments sought.
Unfortunately, however, during the present transition period of our political development, no
express provision is extant in the Constitution regarding the agency or agent by whom and the
procedure by which amendments thereto may be proposed and ratified fact overlooked by those
who challenge the validity of the presidential acts in the premises. This is so because there are at
least two distinctly in the transition from the old system of government under the 1935
Constitution to the new one established by the 1973 Constitution.
The first stage comprises the period from the effectivity of the Constitution on January 17, 1973
to the time the National Assembly is convened by the incumbent President and the interim
President and the interim Prime Minister are chosen Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3[1]. The
existence of this stage as an obvious fact of the nation's political life was recognized by the Court
in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275), when it
rejected the claim that, under the 1973 Constitution, the President was in duty bound to convene
the interim National Assembly soon after the Constitution took effect.
The second stage embraces the period from the date the interim National Assembly is convened
to the date the Government described in Articles VII to IX of the Constitution is inaugurated,
following the election of the members of the regular National Assembly (Article XVII, Section 1)
and the election of the regular President and Prime Minister,. This is as it should be because it is
recognized that the President has been accorded the discretion to determine when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, and his decision to defer the convocation thereof
has found overwhelming support by the sovereign people in two previous referenda, therein
giving reality to an interregnum between the effectivity of the Constitution and the initial

convocation of the interim National Assembly, which interregnum, as aforesaid, constitutes the
first stage in the transition period.
Against this factual backdrop, it is readily discernible that neither of the two sets of provisions
embodied in the Constitution on the amendatory process applied during the said first stage.
Thus, Section 15, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) provides"Sec. 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by
a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
Patently, the reference to the "interim National Assembly" and the "interim Prime Minister" limits
the application thereof to the second stage of the transition period, i.e.,., after the interim?
National Assembly shall have been convened and the interim Prime Minister shall have been
chosen.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Article XVI (Amendments), to witSECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of ceiling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
unequivocally contemplate amendments after the regular Government shall have become fully
operative, referring as they do to the National Assembly which will come into being only at that
time.
In the face of this constitutional hiatus, we are confronted with the dilemma whether
amendments to the Constitution may be effected during the aforesaid first stage and, if in the
affirmative, by whom and in what manner such amendments may be proposed and ratified.
Susceptibility to change is one of the hallmarks of an Ideal Constitution. Not being a mere
declaration of the traditions of a nation but more the embodiment of a people's hopes and
aspirations, its strictures are not unalterable. They are, instead, dynamic precepts intended to
keep in stride with and attuned to the living social organism they seek to fashion and govern. If it
is conceded that "the political or philosophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next
and entirely discarded by the third," then a Constitution must be able to adjust to the changing
needs and demands of society so that the latter may survive, progress and endure. On these
verities, there can be no debate.
During the first stage of the transition period in which the Government is at present - which is
understandably the most critical - the need for change may be most pressing and imperative,
and to disavow the existence of the right to amend the Constitution would be sheer political
heresy. Such view would deny the people a mechanism for effecting peaceful change, and belie
the organic conception of the Constitution by depriving it of its means of growth. Such a result
obviously could not have been intended by the framers of the fundamental law.

It seems, however, that the happenstance that the first period would come to pass before the
convocation of the interim National Assembly was not anticipated, hence, the omission of an
express mandate to govern the said situation in so far as amendments are concerned. But such
omission through inadvertence should not, because it cannot, negate the sovereign power of the
people to amend the fundamental charter that governs their lives and their future and perhaps
even the very survival of the nation.
Upon the other hand, it is clear from the afore-quoted provisions on the amendatory process that
the intent was, instead, to provide a simpler and more expeditious mode of amending the
Constitution during the transition period. For, while under Article XVI thereof, proposals for
amendment may be made directly by the regular National Assembly by a vote of at least threefourths of all its members, under Section 15 of Article XVII, a bare majority vote of all the
members of the National Assembly would suffice for the purpose. The relaxation and the
disparity in the vote requirement are revealing. The can only signify a recognition of the need to
facilitate the adoption of amendments during the second stage of the transition period so that
the interim National Assembly will be able, in a manner of speaking, to iron out the kinks in the
new Constitution, remove imperfections therein, and provide for changed or changing
circumstances before the establishment of the regular Government. In this contest, therefore, it
is inutile speculation to assume that the Constitution was intended to render impotent or ar the
effectuation of needful change at an even more critical period - the first stage. With greater
reason, therefore, must the right and power to amend the Constitution during the first stage of te
transition period be upheld, albeit within its express and implied constraints.
Neither can it be successfully argued, in the same context and in the present posture, that the
Constitution may be amended during the said first stage only by convening the interim National
Assembly. That is to say and require that he said stage must first be brought to an end before
any amendment may be proposed and ratified. Settled jurisprudence does not square with such
a proposition. As aptly noted in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al., supra, the framers of
the Constitution set no deadline for the convening of the interim National Assembly because they
could not have foreseen how long the crises which impelled the proclamation and justify the
continued state of martial law would last. Indeed, the framers committed to the sound judgment
is not subject to judicial review, save possibly to determine whether arbitrariness has infected
such exercise; absent such a taint, the matter is solely in the keeping of the President. To thus
content that only by convening the interim National Assembly may the Constitution be amended
at this time would effectively override the judgement vested in the President, even in default of
any he has acted arbitrarily or gravely abuse his discretion. Furthermore, to sustain such a
contention would not only negate the mandate so resoundingly expressed by the people in two
national referenda against the immediate convening of the interim National Assembly, but as
well deride their overwhelming approval of the manner in which the President has exercised the
legislative power to issue proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions having the stature and
force of law.
Given the constitutional stalemate or impasse spawned by these supervening developments, the
logical query that compels itself for resolution is: By whom, then, may proposals for the
amendment of the Constitution be made and in what manner may said proposals be ratified by
the people?
It is conventional wisdom that, conceptually, the constituent power is not to be confuse with
legislative power in general because the prerogative to propose amendments to the Constitution
is not in any sense embraced within the ambit of ordinary law-making. Hence, there is much to
recommend the proposition that, in default of an express grant thereof, the legislature traditionally the delegated repository thereof - may not claim it under a general grant of
legislative authority. In the same vein, neither would it be altogether unassailable to say that
because by constitutional tradition and express allocation the constituent power under the
Constitution is locate in the law-making agency and at this stage of the transition period the law-

making authority is firmly recognized as being lodged in the President, the said constituent
power should now logically be in the hands of te President who may thus exercise it in place of
the interim National Assembly. Instead,, as pointed out in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,
et al., supra, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
... is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours - t o make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law.
As such, it is undoubtedly a power that only the sovereign people, either directly by themselves
or through their chosen delegate, can wield. Since it has been shown that the people,
inadvertently or otherwise, have not delegated that power to inadvertently or otherwise, have
not delegated that power to any instrumentality during the current stage of our hegira from crisis
to normalcy, it follows of necessity that the same remains with them for them to exercise in the
manner they see fit and through the agency they choose. And, even if it were conceded that - as
it is reputedly the rule in some jurisdictions - a delegation of the constituent authority amounts to
a complete divestiture from the people of the power delegated which they may not thereafter
unilaterally reclaim from the delegate, there would be no violence donde to such rule, assuming
it to be applicable here, inasmuch as that power, under the environmental circumstance
adverted to, has not been delegated to anyone in the first place. The constituent power during
the first stage of the transition period belongs to and remains with the people, and accordingly
may be exercised by them - how and when - at their pleasure.
At this juncture, a flashback to the recent and contemporary political ferment in the country
proves revelatory. The people, shocked and revolted by the "obvious immorality" of the
unabashed manner by which the delegates to the Constitutional Convention virtually legislated
themselves into office as ipso facto members of the interim National Assembly by the mere fiat
of voting for the transitory provisions of the Constitution. and the stark reality that the unwieldy
political monstrosity that the interim Assembly portended to be would have proven to be a
veritable drain on the meager financial resources of a nation struggling for survival, have
unequivocally put their foot down, as it were, on the convocation thereof. But this patently
salutary decision of the people proved to be double-edged. It likewise bound the political
machinery of the Government in a virtual straight-jacket and consigned the political evolution of
the nation into a state of suspended animation. Faced with the ensuing dilemma, the people
understandably agitated for a solution. Through consultations in the barangays and sanggunian
assemblies, the instrumentalities through which the people's voice is articulated in the unique
system of participatory democracy in the country today, the underpinnings for the hastening of
the return to constitutional normalcy quickly evolved into an overwhelming sentiment to amend
the Constitution in order to replace the discredited interim National Assembly with what the
people believe will be an appropriate agency to eventually take over the law-making power and
thus pave the way for the early lifting of martial rule. In pursuit of this sentiment, and to
translate its constraints into concrete action, the Pambansang Katipunan ng Barangay, the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay, the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the
Katipunan ng mga Barangay, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, and finally the Batasang Bayan,
to a man and as one voice, have come forward with definitive proposals for the amendment of
the Constitution, and, choosing the President the only political arm of the State at this time
through which that decision could be implemented and the end in view attained as their
spokesman, proposed the amendments under challenge in the cases at bar.
In the light of this milieu and its imperatives, one thing is inescapable: the proposals now
submitted to the people for their ratification in the forthcoming referendum-plebiscite are
factually not of the President; they are directly those of the people themselves speaking thru
their authorized instrumentalities. The President merely formalized the said proposals in
Presidential Decree No. 1033. It being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the

people and it having been demonstrated that their constituent power to amend the Constitution
has not been delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government during the present
stage of the transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable that their
exertion of that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as being
ultra vires. Accordingly, without venturing to rule on whether or not the President is vested with
constituent power as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises the proposals here
challenged, being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said to be afflicted with
unconstitutionality. A fortiori, the concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to appropriate
funds therefor is even less vulnerable not only because the President, in exercising said authority
has acted as a mere alter ego of the people who made the proposals, but likewise because the
said authority is legislative in nature rather than constituent.
III
Third Issue
Little need be said of the claimed insufficiency and impropriety of the submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification from the standpoint of time. The thesis cannot be disputed that a
fair submission presupposes an adequate time lapse to enable the people to be sufficiently
enlightened on the merits or demerits of the amendments presented for their ratification or
rejection. However, circumstances there are which unmistakably demonstrated that the is met.
Even if the proposal appear to have been formalized only upon the promulgation of Presidential
Decree No. 1033 on September 22, 1976, they are actually the crystallization of sentiments that
for so long have preoccupied the minds of the people and their authorized representatives, from
the very lowest level of the political hierarchy. Hence, unlike proposals emanating from a
legislative body, the same cannot but be said to have been mulled over, pondered upon,
debated, discussed and sufficiently understood by the great masses of the nation long before
they ripened into formal proposals.
Besides. it is a fact of which judicial notice may well be taken that in the not so distant past when
the 1973 Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, an all-out campaign, in which
all the delegates of the Constitutional Convention reportedly participated, was launched to
acquaint the people with the ramifications and working of the new system of government sought
to be inaugurated thereunder. It may thus well be assumed that the people in general have since
acquired, in the least, a working knowledge of the entirety of the Constitution. The changes now
proposed the most substantial of which being merely the replacement of the interim National
assembly with another legislative arm for the Government during the transition period until the
regular National Assembly shall have been constituted do not appear to be of such complexity as
to require considerable time to be brought home to the full understanding of the people. And, in
fact, the massive and wide-ranging informational and educational campaign to this end has been
and still is in full swing, with all the media the barangay, the civic and sectoral groups, and even
the religious all over the land in acting and often enthusiastic if not frenetic involvement.
Indeed, when the people cast their votes on October 16, a negative vote could very well mean an
understanding of the proposals which they reject; while an affirmative vote could equally be
indicative Of such understanding and/or an abiding credence in the fidelity with which the
President has kept the trust they have confided to him as President and administrator of martial
rule
IV
Conclusion
It is thus my considered view that no question viable for this court to pass judgment upon is
posed. Accordingly, I vote for the outright dismissal of the three petitions at bar.