CID Vs
CID Vs
Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of prescription. Also Registration of the Immovable without the
registration of the easement extinguishes the easement.
FACTS: The easement in dispute here is an easement of light and view, which is a negative easement. The respondents
Javier, et al are the owners of the building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot. Respondents
have claimed that they had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal
prohibition to obstruct such view and light. The lower courts have ruled in their favor.
Note: easement of light and view is continuous and apparent so it is subject to prescription.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a
verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon petitioners predecessor-in-interest
as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.
RULING: NO. Art538s requirement is a formal act and not just any verbal or written act. Formal act contemplated in
art538 in the OLD Civil Code pertains to an instrument acknowledged before a notary public. Prescription for a negative
easement only begins when there is a notarial prohibition by the dominant estate. Respondents could have not acquired
the easement by prescription because they have not fulfilled this requirement. Even assuming they have acquired it, the
easement no longer exists because the properties were registered under the Torrens system without any annotation or
registration of the said easement.
FACTS: The plaintiff claims a right of way, upon payment of indemnity, across defendant Paez's land; that the latter
recognize the plaintiff's ownership of a piece of land of 23.46 square meters, that he vacate it, and that the defendant
indemnify him for the damages arising from said occupation. Defendant Paez answered with a general denial and set up
the special defense of prescription. Defendant Jabson, in turn, also answered with a general denial, and by way of
special defense denied that the plaintiff has any right of way over his land, because outside of it there is another
possible way to the street, which is shorter and less prejudicial.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff's right of way over defendant Paez's land has prescribed or is imprescriptible.
HELD: NO. The mere fact that the plaintiff and his predecessors refrained from claiming the easement, without any
positive act to imply a real waiver, does not bring the case within the provision of the article 546, No. 5, of the Civil
Code. such a right of way, provided by the law for the benefit of private individuals, may be waived FOR Legal easements
established in the interest of private individuals may be waived, but not so those of public utility. But the court holds,
for the reasons stated above, that said article 546, No. 5, Civil Code, is not applicable to the instant case, with reference
to waiver, nor is No. 2 of the same article, regarding non-user; and therefore, the plaintiff's right of way cannot be
deemed extinguished. THUS, the plaintiff is entitled to a right of way through the shortest and least prejudicial portion
of the servient estate, from plaintiff's through defendant Timoteo Paez's.
BENEDICTO V. CA
FACTS: Hendrick was the owner of a property which half of it was sold to Recto. An easement of way was annotated in
the certificates of title. Subsequently, the remaining half of the property was sold to Herras who then closed and walled
the part of land serving as easement of way.
HELD: NO. The easement is perpetual in character and was annotated in all the certificates of title. Absence of anything
that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists. here is no indubitable proof of
nonuser. Benedicto merely assumes that the passageway in question had not been in use since 1941 because the
property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino street with the demolition of his house. For another,
even if we assume that the period of prescription based on nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the petitioner
Benedicto shows that it was only in 1946 that he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence, and since the
present action was filed in 1955, granting that article 631 of the Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has not
yet elapsed.