C

LATIP VS CHUA

Facts:

Respondent Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located in Baclaran. A year
after the commencement of the lease, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding
payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so vacate the leased cubicles. When the spouses did
not heed, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them. Rosalie attached to the complaint
a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.

Spouses Latip asserted that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease
rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of
P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles. MeTC and RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Latip but CA reversed the
decision. CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the
alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.

Issue: WON Judicial notice was proper.

Held: No. Judicial notice does not meet the requisite of notoriety. SC reiterated the requisite of notoriety
for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which
cited State Prosecutors:

… Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

It is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite
of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill
money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in
favor of Rosalie found that the practice was of “common knowledge” or notoriously known. We note that
the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her
claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint
declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to
Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for
matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the
taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by
the parties. However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching
documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In
short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court – What need not be proved. Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be
ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both
parties – the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00

G HOLDINGS V. NATIONAL MINES

FACTS: The petitioner, “G” Holdings, Inc. (GHI), bought ninety percent (90%) of MMC’s shares and financial
claims. These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC secured by
mortgages over MMC’s properties. Later, GHI took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities,
and took full control of the management and operation of MMC.

Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU. Labor secretary
(Quisumbing) said that there was illegal dismissal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice which
was affirmed by the Courts. On motion of NAMAWU, the DOLE Secretary directed the issuance of writs
of execution and the properties of MMC. GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of a
Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage. The CA ruled, the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage
was sham, fictitious and fraudulent.

ISSUE: Whether the court must take judicial notice of previous decisions related to the matter?

YES.

Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo
D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its
labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of
the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. “G” Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was
recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery
of the company promissory notes accompanying the said purchase. These company notes, consisting of
three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC
by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations
“establishing and constituting in favor of GHI” mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties. The
stipulations were subsequently formalized in a separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and
Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was registered on February 4, 2000.

We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided
the courts below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions
respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial
and mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The
assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar.
Thus, we find it timely to reiterate that: “courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable
to the case under consideration.”

However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the challenged
writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third party’s (GHI’s) claim of ownership over the property
subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed
by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute,
whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.

In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases
aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid
ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban v. Espina, we held that
“in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely
connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly
interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.” The two cases that we have taken judicial notice
of are of such character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions
therein.

(REGARDING THE MERITS: Court ruled that the mortgage was valid, hence at that time, MMC had no more
properties to attach. Also, just because the GH bought majority of the shares of the MMC is not valid
reason per se to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.)
PEOPLE VS. MILLANO MUIT

FACTS: Muit et. al were charged with kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping in two
separate informations. The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by
the direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez.

During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and family
members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution
of the crimes. RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo guilty. The RTC held that mere denials
and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution’s witnesses. CA
affirmed.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and
Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them –NO!

Ratio: (i only included the relevant issue which is on extra judicial confessions)

The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against
them. There is nothing on record to support appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants’ extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the investigating
officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given
by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their
statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and
affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional rights.
Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial
confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother,
Dominador.Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial
confession. Nevertheless, in Muit’s case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the
one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the ground.

Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations
done on them. These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time
during trial; appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while they were
imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the
alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he was brought there. Claims of torture
are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and independent
corroborating evidence.

The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecution’s case
against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it
recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been
made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference
to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is
confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated
therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show
the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve
as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons had
participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as “interlocking
confessions.”

Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but
also on Ferraer’s testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they
were planning the kidnapping.

People v Muit

FACTS:

(background – kidnapping stage)

Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide,
and Carnapping. Muit is part of the kidnapping team;

Pancho Jr. was the backup for the kidnapping team;

Romeo was the trusted foreman of the victim, Engr. Ingnacio Ong. Jr. (Remeo is an insider);

Ferraer – one who was approached to use his house as safehouse.

One of the co-accused (Ferraer) was discharged from the cases because he served as a state witness.

Ferraer did not participate in the actual execution of the kidnapping.

They were to proceed in a rendezvous point with Pancho Jr.

On the way to their meeting point they were intercepted by the police.

A gun battle ensued which left all of the kidnappers dead including the victim, except for Muit.

Muit was arrested.

(actual case – filing of the criminal case)

During trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses.

The testimony of these witnesses were corroborated by the extrajudicial confessions of Pancho Jr. and
Dequillo.

Dequillo claimed that he was allegedly tortured when he claimed he did not have knowledge.

Pancho Jr. claimed that he was tortured and was forced to sign an extra-judicial confession.

It was claimed that it was only after they signed that Atty. Mallare came.

Muit also executed 2 extra-judicial confessions. He was assisted by 2 different lawyers on both occasions.

RTC – Makati: all guilty of the crime charged.

their claims of torture were belied because the medical certificates did not indicate that such happened.

Also, assuming they did not have those extra-judicial confessions, there was enough evidence to still
convict them.

On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC.

the extra-judicial confessions detailing their participation were executed with the assistance of a counsel.

Muit, aside from his extra-judicial confession, was positively identified to have participated.

Hence this appeal to the SC.

Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho Jr. and
Dequillo?

The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them.

There is nothing on record to support appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured into executing
their extra judicial confessions.

One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants’ extra judicial statements is that each
contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have
supplied, without the knowledge and information given by appellants.
Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their statements. Atty.
Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and affixed their
signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional rights.

Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial
confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother,
Dominador.

Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession.
Nevertheless, in Muit’s case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez (witnesses presented
by the prosecution, they were there when the kidnapping happened) as the one who pointed a gun at
them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the ground.

Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations
done on them.

These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during trial;
appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while they were imprisoned about
the alleged tortures.

Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the alleged torture done to him to the
Department of Justice when he was brought there. Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be
given credence unless substantiated by competent and independent corroborating evidence.

The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecution’s case
against Romeo.

The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various
exceptions.

One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons charged
with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the
fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-
defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.

They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the
probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as
corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons had
participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved.

These are known as “interlocking confessions.” Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only
on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraer’s testimony that Romeo was introduced to
him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
PEOPLE VS SATORRE

Facts: Herminiano Satorre was charged with the Murder of Romero Pantilgan. Rufino Abayata, a
baranggay kagawad, testified that they went they went to the Pantilgan residence to verify a report
regarding a dead person. Rufino testified that Abraham Satorre, the accused’s father, admitted that it was
his son who shot Pantilgan.

Satorre denies the charges and alleges that he was asleep at his home at the time of the incident.
He also denied his confession. The father corroborated his son’s story and denied accompanying him to
the baranggay captain. Note that these alleged confessions were not in writing.

Issue: Whether Satorre was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt? NO

Held: Satorre’s alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a confession.
Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial confession.

The basic test for the validity of a confession is – was it voluntarily and freely made. Plainly, the
admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness.

On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. The intelligence of the accused or
want of it must also be taken into account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of
his act. In this case, Satorre was a 19 yr old farmer who did not even finish 1st grade. Even if he did confess
to the barangay captain, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its consequences.

Of course, it’s entirely possible that he did admit to the act, but the problem is that the voluntariness of
such oral confession is not definitively appraised or evaluated. At any rate, an extrajudicial confession
forms only a prima facia case. They are not conclusive proof.

A confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or
informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while
not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by
video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession and
helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made.

Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There
must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a
confession.

On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based Satorre’s conviction on the testimonial
evidence of prosecution witnesses. SC cannot affirm the conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established because of
Satorre’s personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into
writing. [note: testimony of prosec witnesses had some discrepancies with regard to the establish facts of
the case ie. Location of gunshot wound...etc)

CUENCO V TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX

FACTS: Cuenco leased from Talisay the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex for 2 years to be used as cockpit
arena. Cuenco made a deposit equivalent to 6 months rental or five hundred thousand pesos.

Upon expiration of the contract, the lease was awarded to another lessee. This promted Cuenco to
demand the return of the deposit. After 4 demands which were all unheeded, Cuenco instituted an action
for the collection of a sum of money with the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Cuenco.

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC judgment. On appeal, the SC reinstated the RTC judgment
modifying it by ordering Talisay to deduct 2 months worth of rental from the deposit after finding that
Cuenco overstayed for 2 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cuenco in fact overstayed for 2 months – YES

HELD: It is elementary that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts especially if appeal has been taken by
way of petition for review on certiorari under rule 45. However, as an exception, the SC may review
findings of facts of the findings of the RTC differ from that of the CA

Borne out by the records of the case is the testimony of Ateniso Coronado that Cuenco continued to hold
cockfights for two months beyond the expiration of the lease contract. Such declaration was neither
questioned nor denied by petitioner during the trial of the case in the RTC and on appeal before the CA.
Neither was it contested by petitioner in his Memorandum filed with this Court. In effect, such declaration
constitutes a judicial admission and may not be refuted anymore.

JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INC. and MATIAS B. AZNAR III
FACTS: Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the
contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner
participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter, petitioner
formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the sum of P500,
000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad faith in
withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer, respondents
countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the cost of repair and
replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.

The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of damages. The
respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court. The RTC ruled favorably
for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.

ISSUES: Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.

HELD: Yes. Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an
alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount
of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount
of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel which should
have been binding on the respondents. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at
the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further
proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through
palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial,
as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.

Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was
made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied
upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be
brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial
would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the
scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in
estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making
it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the
CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' evidence contradictory to
the judicial admission.
TOSHIBA V CIR

FACTS: Toshiba is registered with PEZA as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise. It is also
registered with BIR as a VAT-taxpayer. As a tax-exempt entity and with its export sales VAT-exempt,
Toshiba wants to claim for credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT payments attributable to its export
sales. CIR opposes this claim, stating that Toshiba failed to show that the total amount claimed as VAT
input taxes are properly substantiated by official receipts and invoices, and have been offset against any
output tax. It also said that Toshiba is not entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT payments because,
being a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba is not subject to VAT. Well-established is
the rule that claims for refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer as it
partakes the nature of exemption from tax. During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented
documentary evidence in support of its claim for tax credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any
evidence at all.

Issue: Is Toshiba VAT-registered and are its export sales subject to zero-rated VAT? – Yes.

Held: The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba is VAT-exempt and the latter’s export sales are VAT-exempt
transactions are inconsistent with the explicit admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba is a registered VAT entity and that it is subject to zero percent (0%)
VAT on its export sales. The CIR is bound by these admissions, which it could not eventually contradict in
its MR.

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Section 4, Rule 129 provides that a judicial admission requires no proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when the
opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already
admitted.

PEOPLE V VILLACORTA GIL

FACTS: Gil was convicted of the crime of Destructive Arson with Homicide. On March 1, 1998, Gil set fire
the residential house owned by Angge Arguelles and that the same resulted into the burning of other
adjacent houses causing damage and the death of a certain Rodolfo Cabrera.

The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following:

• the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo about the behavior and remarks of Gil at the time
she caused a public disturbance and threatened to cause chaos and arson and to drag her
neighbors into this turmoil, two days prior to the conflagration;
• the testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he saw the burning mattress in the room of the
Gil, the latter said to him in the vernacular: "Pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo.";
 • the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at the time he tried to chase the Gil during
the fire incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant remark: "Damay-damay na tayo diyan,
huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog."; and
• the testimony of Kagawad William Lim that the Gil approached and admitted to him
immediately after the incident that she was the person responsible for the conflagration.

On the other hand, the Gil relied on her lone testimony in her defense. While she admitted the
authenticity of her written confession (the one made before William Lim), she denied on the witness stand
that she voluntarily wrote the confession. According to Gil, the fire resulted from her defective gas stove
which suddenly caught fire while she was boiling water. When the stove caught fire, she got flustered and
poured water on the stove. To her surprise, the fire got bigger. Ronnie, who was also renting a room next
to her with his mother, came and they helped each other to put off the fire. When their efforts seemed
unsuccessful, she told Ronnie: "xxx hindi na natin kayang patayin ang apoy, baba na lang po kami para
humingi ng tulong". When they went out, people were already helping each other to contain the fire. She
then left the place passing through an alley. According to her, it was William Lim who took custody of him
for reasons unknown to her. Thereafter, they gave her a paper with something written on it and they
instructed her to copy the same in another paper. Confused, she did what was told of her because they
told her that it would be good for her.

ISSUE:

1. WON the CA erred in finding Gil guilty based on circumstantial evidence – NO [WON Gil was positively
identified by the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution – YES]

2. WON the CA erred in considering as evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession Gil made before
William Lim - NO

HELD: Gil contends that the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution failed to produce the required
quantum of proof to hold her criminally liable for the charge. She explained that prosecution witness
Ronnie Gallardo saw her mattress already on fire but never saw her deliberately burn her mattress. Ronnie
Gallardo neither saw nor identified any overt act which would suggest that the she intentionally put her
mattress on fire. She claimed that Ronnie Gallardo might have gotten anxious after he saw the raging fire
and misunderstood her remark "pabayaan mo na yan, damay-damay na tayo" when what she meant to
say after all was "pabayaan mo na yan, madadamay tayo." She would not have pulled out Ronnie Gallardo
from the burning house had her intention been to cause injury to others. She also disputed the TC’s
reliance on the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that she intentionally burned her residential house
because of personal problems. She rhetorically questioned the credibility of the said prosecution witness
when, as a person in authority, he failed to report to the police his supposed knowledge of what she was
planning to do two days prior to the fire that occurred in their neighborhood.

The she also argues that her written confession is inadmissible in evidence. She claims that she
was not assisted by counsel at the time she executed the same; and that she was merely led to believe,
without apprising her of its legal significance, that it would help her.
1. NO. [YES] This court agrees with the CA that the RTC has passed upon enough circumstantial evidence
to hold Gil guilty. As cited, People v. Gallarde, provides: Positive identification pertains essentially to proof
of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There
are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as
the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons
last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.
If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to
the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is
basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified.
Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort
to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct
evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. [Emphasis
supplied]

The aforementioned circumstantial evidence would constitute positive identification of Gil as the
perpetrator of the crime charged, to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had the motive to
commit the crime, and the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her
neighborhood -- the fire that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as
immediately before and after the fire-- sufficiently points to the accused-appellant as the author of the
said crime.

We are not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the Gil that the fire was
accidental, and that she was arrested and forced by Kagawad William Lim to copy the contents of her
written confession from a piece of paper handed to her by the said barangay official.

To quote a well-entrenched legal precept, the "factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if
not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case" and the said trial
court "is in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through
its actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior while in the witness
box."

The Gil failed to show any "misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance" that could alter the outcome of the case. She also did not show any credible
motive why the prosecution witnesses testified against her. Thus, this Court finds conclusive the findings
and observation of the TC that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were candid and trustworthy,
and that the testimony of the accused-appellant was not impressed with candor and honesty.
2. No. Regarding her extrajudicial confession, Gil made the confessions not only toKagawad William Lim
but also to Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in progress. Moreover, as correctly held by the
CA, even if the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the evidence presented by the prosecution
is more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the Gil beyond reasonable doubt.

SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP. VS AUTOCORP GROUP

FACTS: SEAOIL bought an excavator from AUTOCORP, where the original cost was P2.5M but was
increased to P3.1M because payment was in installments. This agreement was embodied in a sales
invoice, and included an agreement that ownership will remain with AUTOCORP until full payment. SEAOIL
then stopped payment hence, AUTOCORP filed a complaint for recovery of personal property.

SEAOIL contended that this is not what happened as it was really RODRIGUEZ the director of AUTOCORP
who owed YU the President of SEAOIL in another transaction involving their other companies. SEAOIL said
RODRIGUEZ stopped payment so it also stopped payment!

RTC: against SEAOIL, ordered it to pay balance to AUTOCORP.

ISSUE: W/N SEAOIL’s parol evidence is admissible because it falls under one of the exceptions [failure to
express true agreement of parties] – NO.)

RATIO: The SC invalidated SEAOIL’s contention that the written agreement failed to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. It reasoned that although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.

SEAOIL’s contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol evidence rule is untenable.
Only in cases where "the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument would the exception
apply.
MARQUEZ v. ESPEJO

Facts: The Espejos were the original registered owners of 2 parcels of agricultural land: the Lantap
property and the Murong property. The Murong property was tenanted by the petitioners while the
Lantap property was tenanted by Nemi.
Espejos mortgaged both lands to a Bank. They failed to pay and the bank foreclosed and bought
the properties. Espejos bought back one of their lots. However, the Deed of Sale did not mention the
barangay where the property was located.

Meanwhile, Rural Bank executed Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of the tenants
of the Murong property. DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs). Esepjos filed
complaint after more than 10 years before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), praying
for the cancellation of the CLOAs. The RARAD gave precedence to the TCT appearing in the Deed of Sale.
Upon appeal, the DARAB reversed. Which was again reversed by The CA.

Issue: Whether the Best Evidence Rule should apply – NO (NOTE: CA actually applied the Parol Evidence
Rule)

Ratio: In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is
no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it
appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule, which is still improper in this case. In
the first place, the Espejos are not parties to the VLTs, they are strangers to these contracts. Rule 130,
sec. 9 provides that parol evidence rule is exclusively between the parties and their successors-in-interest.

Moreover, the case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule: 1) intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; and 2) failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. The resolution of the case necessitates an examination of the
parties’ respective parol evidence to determine their true intent. In case of doubt, it is the intention of
the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM

Facts: Salvador Golimlim was charged of raping Evelyn Canchela. Evelyn, a mental retardate, stays with
her aunt Jovita and uncle Salvador Golimlim. When Jovita left the house, Salvador instructed evelyn to
sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an
object, which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. Later on, Evelyn’s
half-sister, Lorna, allowed her to stay with her (Lorna). Lorna noticed Evelyn’s growing belly when checked,
it turns out that Evelyn was pregnant. Evelyn told Lorna that she had sexual intercourse with Salvador
while the latter was holding a knife. The sisters filed a complaint for rape against Salvador. The trial court
convicted Salvador of rape.

Issue: W/N the court should have given weight and credence to the contradictory and implausible
testimony of Evelyn, a mental retardate. – YES.

Held: A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long
as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s
credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.

The psychiatrist who examined Evelyn said that although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental
retardation with an IQ of 46,she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions
under conditions which do not inhibit her from answering.
Salvador’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as
her rapist.

LEJANO V. PEOPLE

Facts: Estrellita, Carmela, and Jennifer Vizconde were murdered in their home in BF Homes, Paranaque.
Among the accused in this case is Hubert Webb. He was convicted by the trial court and the appellate
court based on the testimony of a “star witness”, Jessica Alfaro.

In her testimony, Alfaro stated that she was there when Webb and his companions raped and
killed Carmela Vizconde. Her testimony also matched the physical evidence found the next day (such as
the unscrewed lightbulb, the broken glass at the front door, the scattered contents of the bag, etc…)
 In his defense of an alibi, Webb presented evidence (photocopies of his passport, letters to a
friend, US certification of immigration, printout of his arrival and departure, etc…) to show that he was in
the US when the crime was committed.

The trial court and CA ruled against Webb stating that Webb was actually in Parañaque when the
Vizconde killings took place. They stated that he was not in the U.S. and if he did leave, he actually
returned, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the
U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned
the normal way.

They also stated that Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as
the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister.

Issue: Did Webb have a valid alibi? YES.

Decision: To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a)
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The lower courts were wrong in theorizing that Webb used his influence in fixing such records.
This is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides,
how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the
airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record
system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in
secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there?

Webb’s documents were also authenticated by various departments (such as the DFA, and the US
Immigration). Lastly, if the SC were to subscribe to the lower courts’ extremely skeptical view, it might as
well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as
reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of
what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence.
Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s
passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the
U.S. and back.

As for Alfaro, she was not a credible witness. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw
the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do
it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can
also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

The positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positive identification of the
offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually
based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.
A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering
claims.
Alfaro’s statements fail because she had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for some time as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them.

As such, she took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were trying to
slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. This also applied to the other
physical evidence found at the scene of the crime (such as the bag, the light bulb, etc…) She also failed to
corroborate facts on the “sweetheart theory” between Webb and Vizconde.

Thus, Webb and the others were acquitted.

PEOPLE v. ERGUIZA

FACTS: Erguiza was found guilty of 1 count of rape, with a 13-y.o. minor as victim. At the back of a public
school in Pangasinan, Erugiza, armed with a kitchen knife, forced AAA, a 1st year high school student, to
have sexual intercourse with him. Erguiza ordered AAA to not tell anyone, otherwise he’d kill all her family.

The mother of the victim, BBB, had her daughter examined when she missed her period. It was
only at this time that the mother discovered the rape incident, after prodding her daughter to confess.
The mother and the victim then filed the criminal case.
 CCC, the vicitm’s father, testified that the family of Erguiza went to their house after the case was
filed, and offered 50k, later increased to 150k. Albina, the mother of the accused admitted that she did
talk with BBB and CCC, but according to her, it was the spouses who asked for 1M, later reduced to 250k,
to settle the case. She said her counter-offer was 5k only.

Issue: Can the offer of compromise given by the mother of the accused be used as evidence of his guilt?
– No.

Ruling: The alleged offer of the parents of accused to settle the case cannot be used against him as
evidence of his guilt. Accused testified that he never asked his parents to settle the case. It was his
parents’ initiative because they and the parents of the victim are actually in-laws and they did not want
their relations to turn sour. Moreover, accused was not present when the offer to settle was allegedly
made.

An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party
himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle
the case is an implied admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to
amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the
proposed compromise.

Moreover, it has been held in other decisions of the court that where the accused was not present
at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the
day for the prosecution.

Accused acquitted, no proof beyond reasonable doubt (also on other grounds).

BOSTON BANK (FORMERLY BANK OF COMMERCE) V. PERLA MANALO AND CARLOS MANALO.

Facts: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) some residential lots in
Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent
of OBM. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in
the Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI,
through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the
reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of the lots at P348,060 with a 20%
downpayment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 (less the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos),
payable as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale
would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter agreement.
Thereafter, the spouses constructed a house on the property. The spouses were notified of XEI’s
resumption of selling operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment because
XEI failed to prepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI also billed them for
unpaid interests which they also refused to pay.

XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM. Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM)
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction
on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction.

Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the
property. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint
because of theissues raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.

Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the bank before
the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always been ready and willing to pay the installments on the
lots sold to them but no contract was forthcoming. The spouses further alleged that upon their partial
payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of
Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residential
lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots.

The trial court ordered the petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses
upon the payment of the spouses of the balance of the purchase price. It ruled that under the August
22,1972 letter agreement of XEI and the spouses, the parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the
lots, and that they had already partially consummated the same.

The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed amounts on a monthly basis for 120 months, based
on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion
for the Reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was no perfected contract to sell the two lots,
as there was no agreement between XEI and the respondents on the manner of payment as well as the
other terms and conditions of the sale. Boston Bank also asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA
ruling that the terms and conditions relating to the payment of thebalance of the purchase price of the
property (as agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the
contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondents.

CA denied the MR.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by
XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly
installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and
timeline of payment. (Evidence, Disputable Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section 34) – NO.
HELD: The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed
to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit,
custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. The offering party must establish
the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to
act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege
and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in
evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of
systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion. In determining whether the examples
are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity
of response. It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous
enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible.

Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of
conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120
months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to
adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced
in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove
that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to
prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to
pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months.

EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. et al. v. BF CORPORATION

FACTS: These are 2 consolidated petitions where the 1st petition is Edsa Shang, Colayco, Samaniego,
Chen, and Tsen. The petitioner in the 2nd petition is Cynthia Del Castillo.

EDHRI entered into a constraction contract with BF, where BF was to construct the EDSA Shanri-
la Hotel. Among other things, the contract stipulate for the payment of the contract price on the basis of
monthly progress billing to ESHRI, which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a
Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress billing.

The procedure for BF to collect was it should submit a PROGRESS BILLING to ESHRI’s Engineering
dept. first, and then ESHRI should prepare a Progress Payment Certificate after re-measuring the progress
done, so BF should follow up release of its payment. From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF adhered to
this process. It submitted a total of 19 progress billings. Based on PB Nos. 1-13, ESHRI paid P86.5 million.

However, for PB Nos. 14-19, BF alleges that ESHRI did not re-measure the work done and did not
remit payment. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by
the assurance of ESHRI that it is processing its progress payment certificates.

After futile attempts to collect unpaid billings, BF filed a suit for a sum of money and damages.
ESHRI in its defense, asked BF to refund excess payments overpaid supposedly for PB Nos. 1-13. They also
alleged incurring delay and inferior work accomplishment.

RTC ruled in favor of BF. It the dispositive portion it held Colayco, Samaniego, Dean Del, Chan and
Tsen solidarily liable to pay P24.7 million, retention sum of P5.8 million, interest, P1M moral and P1M
exemplary damages and P1M attys fees. RTC held that ESHRI’s refusal to pay BF’s claims is evident of bad
faith. MR denied.

Appeal to the CA. Meanwhile, the RTC granted BF’s motion for execution pending appeal and
ESHRI’s PNB bank account was garnished for the amount of P35M. CA issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the RTC to lift the garnishment. The CA later on set aside the garnishment order. But
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA held that ESHRI was remiss in its obligation to re-measure BF's
later work accomplishments and pay the same. On the other hand, ESHRI had failed to prove the basis of
its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the defective work accomplished by BF.

ISSUE: W/N the lower courts erred in allowing the admission in evidence of PHOTOCOPIES of Progress
Billings Nos. 14-19, as well as the complementing PMIs and WVOs. ESHRI alleges that BF failed to lay the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence
rule. BF however claims that said documents were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them
over to BF despite requests.

HELD/RATIO: ADMISSIBLE

The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a
writing must, as a general proposition, be produced17 and secondary evidence of its contents is not
admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates
the best evidence rule:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in the custody
or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of loss.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than
the original instrument or document itself.18 A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of
a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a
party can resort to secondary evidence.

Four factual premises are readily deducible from the exchanges between the lawyers of the respective
parties, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request
was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them;
and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In
other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the
original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original
document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original document's
unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.

Mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody of the party against whom it is offered does not
warrant submission of secondary evidence. It must be proven that the offeror has done everything in his
power to secure the best evidence but the other party refuses to produce it