Padilla v CA (Torts) ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay
PADILLA v CA G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS: RULING:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and 1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal
Contentions: action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action
Vergara Family or reserves his right to institute it separately.
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal
mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the
of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. act as a crime.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes
Roy Padilla, et al a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
the market stall was a nuisance per se Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
hours to vacate the market premise damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or
omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to
suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the for the same act or omission may be instituted."
accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The petitioners What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal
were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted for the same criminal act or omission.
some petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they
properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil
action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only
Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered
by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this
1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil
liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be
imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the
criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

Page 1 of 17
Cruz v CA (Torts)
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed
CRUZ v CA (1988) to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently
G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988 F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for
GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE MABLE and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME, ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE,
respondents. Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
FACTS: insurance company is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the who violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the
residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
the shop and private respondents' residence.
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private
The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.
6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried
to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both
the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never
discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned structures
negative for the presence of inflammable substances.

Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the
contents thereof.

On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for
a judgment in their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) CFI - renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the defendant.
(2) CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages

ISSUE:
Whether the of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable

RULING:
Yes. Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing itself speaks”)

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The
Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the
residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been
caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the
shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop.

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

Page 2 of 17
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. PEOPLE To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 Subsidiary Liability nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them
to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result
FACTS: in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
Accused Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer
not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
The accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the
judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the
civil liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.

Hence, this Petition filed by the employer of the accused.

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends
that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. Petitioner
insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant Appeal filed by the Employer is proper.

RULING:
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:

“Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy.”

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

“A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected.”

xxx

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against
him has become final and executory.

The subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency.

Page 3 of 17
FAR EAST v CA application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith.
FACTS: Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly
Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) issued a credit card to Luis Luna at its Pasig branch. Upon his must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the
request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna. When Clarita’s card was lost, he grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
informed FEBTC. Later, Luis tendered a despedida lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay
for the lunch, Luis presented his credit card. Unfortunately, it was dishonored and he was forced to The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for
pay the bill in cash and felt embarrassed by this incident. Luis demanded the payment of damages breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even
from FEBTC. where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court
of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carrascoso,
Festejo, vice-president of FEBTC, expressed the bank’s apologies to Luis and explained that in cases 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly
when a card is reported as lost, FEBTC undertakes necessary action to avert its unauthorized use such govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
as tagging the card as hotlisted. Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the restaurant to assure independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the
that the Lunas were “very valued clients” of FEBTC. Nevertheless, the Lunas filed a complaint for breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two
damages. parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the
parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
The trial court ordered FEBTC to pay the Lunas moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship;
The appellate court affirmed the ruling. Hence, this petition for review. without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a
separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.
ISSUE:
Whether FEBTC is liable for the said damages. The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo , affirmed by the
appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
RULING:
Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages and not to moral and exemplary damages. The
court explained that in culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant
is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract and that bad faith,
in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Article 2219 states that, “Moral damages
may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

The Court found that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own
card's cancellation, but there was nothing to sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of
FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

Nominal damages were awarded because of the simple fact that the bank failed to notify Mr. Luna,
thus entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code
providing thus:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

In applying Article 21, in relation to Article 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code, to a contractual breach
the Court said:

Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus,
even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its

Page 4 of 17
Air France vs. Carrascoso Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is attended with public duty. Though based on breach of
contract, the stress of Carrascoso’s action is put on wrongful expulsion. Moreover, an act that breaks
FACTS: a contract is a tort. Thus, being a violation of public duty, it is a quasi-delict.
Air France, through Philippine Airlines (PAL), issued Carrascoso a first-class round trip ticket from Manila
to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in first class but in Bangkok, PAL manager forced him The wrongful expulsion is independent of the breach. Two sources of obligations are implicated in this
to vacate his seat because there was a white man who the manager alleged had a “better right” to case— contract and quasi-delict. Petitioner is still be liable for moral damages.
the seat. Carrascoso refused to vacate his seat, but was later convinced by some Filipino passengers
to give up his seat.

Carrascoso filed a case for damages against Air France. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila
ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral and exemplary damages as well as the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the refund of the ticket, but otherwise affirmed the
CFI decision.

Petitioner Air France now claims that the first class ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties. It asserts that Carrascoso knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class though he had tourist class protection. Thus, the ticket was no guarantee that
he would have a first class seat since such would depend on the availability of first class seats.

ISSUES:
Was Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat? – YES.
Can he claim moral damages? – YES.

RATIO:
There is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso.

He is entitled to first-class seat by the mere fact that he paid for and was issued a first-class ticket. Also,
if, as petitioner claims, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first-class seat, stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier as well as the passenger’s security would be adversely affected.
Petitioner also failed to establish whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man, so he
had no claim to the seat.

Carrascoso can claim moral damages.

Air France argues that Carrascoso’s action is based on breach of contract. Thus, to authorize an
award for moral damages, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith as per Art. 2220.

The Court established that:

There was a contract

The contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok
There was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class seat,
causing him mental anguish, humiliation and wounded feelings resulting in moral damages.

Though there was no specific claim of bad faith in the complaint, inference of bad faith may be drawn
from the facts of the case. Also, during the trial, evidence of bad faith was presented without
objection from the petitioner. Thus, the deficiency in the complaint was cured by evidence.

Page 5 of 17
PSBA v CA

FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration. Assailants,
who were not members of the school’s academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed
Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate
officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action against
them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed
by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis.
Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part,
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes
ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation
only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Page 6 of 17
Jarco Marketing V. CA (1999) an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages) happens
occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
FACTS: person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence
May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department negligence
Store, Makati City. While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a sudden gust omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
of wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. reasonable man would not do
the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center injury
where she was operated on. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other
Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender age and
Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing on a magic slate. in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. W
Without doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed
14 days after: She died on the hospital bed. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure
sustained. the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due
After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of diligence required of a good father of a family.
the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. But, they Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
refused to pay. Criselda filed a complaint for damages. Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person
and denied any liability, alleging that Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that
eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with he has acted with discernment.
a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. It maintained Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over the
that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable
its employees. and sturdy.
Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim: proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Initially, Zhieneth held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only momentarily released the child's hand from her
Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it. clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
her to let go of her child.
CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her
dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top wider than the base. It was mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just 4 meters away - time and distance were both
top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its significant.
narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the
overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees
of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the management the danger the
counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern.

ISSUE:
W/N Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident

HELD: YES. CA affirmed

accident
pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant
a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening

Page 7 of 17
BPI V. CA GR: forged signature = "wholly inoperative" and payment made "through or under such signature" =
ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument
FACTS: EX: when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority
October 9, 1981 afternoon: Eligia G. Fernando called Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's - negligence of the party invoking forgery
Money Market Department to preterminate her placement. Later that afternoon, Eustaquio
conveyed the request for pretermination to Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the BPI as drawee bank and CBC as representing/collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the
pretermination process. Later, Eligia followed up with Eustaquio. encashment of the forged checks

Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of (Philamlife) since he was handling BPI:
Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled
Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to  Not verifying the phone call
verify the request for pretermination.  officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's account did not do anything about the
account's pre-termination
Despite being informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value, Eligia still insisted.  No verification on Eligia's signature on the letter requesting the pre-termination and the letter
When the checks were to be dispatched for delivery, the same caller changed the delivery authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature was in BPI's file
instructions to pick up by her or her niece.  Failure to ask for the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market
placement that was supposedly pre-terminated
In CBC, A woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando applied for a current account.
She was accompanied and introduced by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened,
CBC
earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a long-standing "valued client" of
China Banking Corp. (CBC)  the opening of the impostor's current account in the name of Eligia G. Fernando
 the deposit of account of the 2 checks in controversy
The final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of  the withdrawal of their proceeds
Regina G. Dy, Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application
form after reviewing it. The woman, then, deposited the 2 checks in controversy. CBC's guaranty of
prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped. Several withdrawals were made Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: negligent acts of the 2 parties were not contemporaneous, since the
by check on said Current Account amounting in total to around 1.4 M negligence of the one succeeded the negligence of the another by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
November 11, 1981 (maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI): the real harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated negligence of the other party
her placement on October 12, 1981. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note
evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued her a new promissory note to evidence It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the
a roll-over of the placement. BPI returned the 2 checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged
endorsement forged." CBC returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time" checks. There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the
forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI.
CA afformed RTC: favored BPI
Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
BPI: present clearing guarantee requirement imposed on the representing or collecting bank under the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter
the PCHC rules and regulations is independent of the Negotiable Instruments Law withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. The opening of the account itself was
accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence.
ISSUE: W/N BPI should be liable for the forged check because of the doctrine of last clear chance while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still the CBC employees
had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip
HELD: NO. Modified. BPI 60% CBC 40% of the loss by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it.
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: When signature is forged or made without the authority
of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative and no right to retain the While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, CBC's
instrument, or to give discharge therefore, or to enforce payment thereof, against any party thereto, negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the
can be acquired through or under such forged signature, unless the party against whom it is sought forged checks.
to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. 2 parts of the
provision: Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks by an impostor.

Page 8 of 17
Wright V. Manila Electric (1914) US V. Baggay (1911)
Lessons Applicable: Intoxication (Torts and Damages) Lessons Applicable: Insanity (Torts and Damages)

FACTS: FACTS:
August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa and as his horse leap forward October 14, 1909: During the holding a song service called "buni", the non-Christian Baggay Jr.
along the rails of the Manila Electric company and it fell. Wright was thrown and got injured. attacked a woman Bil-liingan with a bolo inflicting a serious wound on her head causing her to die
This was caused by the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their immediately. He inflicted the same to the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini,
depth out of the ground making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the and on his own mother, named Dioalan.
street.
February 15: provincial fiscal filed a complaint for murder (This cause was instituted separately from
RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's the other for lesiones)
and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and
awarded Wright a judgment of P1,000 RTC: Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt from criminal liability but obliged
to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the
ISSUE: case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.
W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his own injury (NOT
contributory) thereby he cannot recover Counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a writ be issued directing judge
Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same time annulling all action taken for execution
HELD: NO. Affirmed of the judgments rendered in the causes for murder and for lesiones.

Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other Attorney-General: writ inappropriate and that it should be remedy of mandamus
evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree ISSUE:
of care is required than by a sober one. W/N Baggay was exempt from criminal liability making him exempt from civil liability as well

Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties HELD: NO.
uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of travel Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable
conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he
received Article 18 of the same code says:
Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages, although the Wright, in The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include
the judgment of the court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following:
no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was negligent
It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions (1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile,
described or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise
It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question of judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they
presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part.
G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict
than the one found. Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person
be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that
part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.
even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons
charged with watching over and caring for him or the liability of the demented person himself with his
property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm done
UNLESS: the offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly renounce such reparation
or indemnification

Page 9 of 17
 respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by
Layugan vs. IAC his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to
Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck instruct him to be careful in driving.

Facts: We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear that the
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was
cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moreover, to our
driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and mind, the fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that
hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the
Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court
income. given the facts established at the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be
competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows drive it.
his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the
proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the
occupied a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning sign. diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him
from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of
Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision
claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his
and subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good
arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his
only liable for the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no claim was mechanic, if any, in order to ensure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others.
made to it. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil
Code has not ceased.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the petitioners
who were negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is
parked on the shoulder of the highway.

Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Ruling:
Yes!

The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the petitioner
placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The
existence of this warning sign was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated
that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function.
Thus despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro
bumped the truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code.
In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises
a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private

Page 10 of 17
RAMOS v. CA incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally
occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was experiencing occasional pains allegedly caused by stones in her gall Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while
bladder. She was told to undergo an operation and after some tests and exams, she was indicated the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold
fit for surgery. that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur.

Dr. Orlino Hozaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. (2a) With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, the court find her negligent during the anesthesia phase. As borne
Rogelio, husband of Erlinda, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient which she admitted.

Around 7:30 AM of June 17, 1985, Herminda (sister-in-law of Erlinda) accompanied Erlinda to the During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the
operating room and saw Dr. Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Dr. esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause
Hosaka only arrived around 12:15 PM, three hours late. Nonetheless, the operation continued and some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place.
Herminda then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard her saying “and hirap ma-intubate
nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish discoloration of the nailbeds appeared on the Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too
patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka issued an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. late.
The patient was placed in a trendelenburg position for decrease of blood supply in her brain. At 3:00
PM, the patient was taken to the ICU. An experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would
have had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding teeth.
Four months after, the patient was released from the hospital. However, the patient has been in a
comatose condition. Hence, she was negligent.

Hence, the petition filed a civil case for damages against herein private respondents alleging (2b) For Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as the head of the surgical team and as the so-called captain of the ship,
negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. it is the surgeons responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner

Petitioners contended that the faulty management of her airway casused the lack of oxygen in the Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as
patient’s brain. On the respondent’s part, they contended that the brain damage was Erlinda's the captain of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified
if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape the court
ISSUES: that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time
(1) Will the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply in this case? and as Erlinda's operation, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this,
(2) Did the negligence of the respondents cause the unfortunate comatose condition of petitioner he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This
Erlinda Ramos? indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.

RULING: Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas condition.
(1) Yes. The Court finds the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar.
(2c) As for the hospital (employer) itself, the Court ruled that for the purpose of allocating responsibility
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary and their attending and visiting physicians.
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over
arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last
its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. paragraph of Article 2180.

Erlinda submitted herself soundly and fit for surgery. However, during the administration of anesthesia Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for
and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, Erlindas condition.
without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally

Page 11 of 17
DM Consunji vs CA Case Digest 2. No.
The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from
FACTS: the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies
Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form.
Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of before the ECC was filed.
one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy
chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where
a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he
opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance
of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the company is liable
2. Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil Code
pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

1. YES..
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a
rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence. One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that
necessary evidence is absent or not available.

Under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the
defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s
negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.

It must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of
the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity
for explanation of the accident.

As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all
the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain

Page 12 of 17
Manila Electric v Remoquillo Bernal v House

FACTS: FACTS:
Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media agua,” (downspout). He On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata
climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3rd floor window and stood on it to receive Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the religious
a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around celebration. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along a public
and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother
Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua, and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile
electrocuting him and killing him. appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the
result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming
His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child,
rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which affirmed the they found her face downward in the hot water.
judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal.
The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There she was attended by the resident physician. Despite
ISSUE: his efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40 o'clock. Dr. Benitez certified that the cause of death
WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain
cause of the death and visceras of the chest & abdomen".

HELD: No. RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: That the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran
It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities, the cause of death was other than the
to occur). hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.

Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by The trial judge dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct, successive, unrelated
and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. If no ISSUE:
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not Whether the respondent is absolved from liability because of the contributory negligence of the
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation plaintiffs.
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause. HELD:
NO, the death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot
Reasoning, We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were
in due diligence. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not unfortunately enough to fall into it.
the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking We are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of the trial judge to the effect
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter's that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due principally to the nervous shock and
length of 6 feet.-The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns from the hot water. On the contributory
himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story negligence, the mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing
he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he could the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence
not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot
unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he water.
was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking,
and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery,
motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. DispositionCA decision reversed. but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. The death of the child
Complaint against company dismissed Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the
public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it

DISPOSITIVE: the judgment appealed partly reversed.

Page 13 of 17
Philippine Bank Of Commerce V. CA (1997) Antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages) negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair
chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
FACTS:
May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it cannot be
totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its
accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). They were not credited to RMC's account client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.
but were instead deposited to Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas. Romeo Lipana never checked
their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on PBC. Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad : paragraph 2, shall apply.

 original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number - If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that
retained by the bank which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the
 duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary
account holder was left blank nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their
 After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the clients with the highest degree of care
duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number
2. YES.
This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge. Upon discovery
it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its
of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and later on filed in the RTC
monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series
of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have
RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall
mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by not
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
exercising the proper validation procedure-YES
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
1. YES.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should
not relieve the PBC of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked
one vital information (Name of the account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.

Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-
President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to
know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures
until 7 years later.

Last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril:

“where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that
of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to
the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to
do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof”

Page 14 of 17
Hernandez v COA G.R. No. 71871 (1989) Southeastern College Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: FACTS:
Teodoro Hernandez, the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project Private respondents are owners of a house near the petitioner’s four-story school building along the
of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite, was tasked to go to the main office in Manila on July 1, same road. During a typhoon, the roof of the petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown
1993. He was told to encash two (2) checks to pay for the wages and expenses of the said operation. away by strong winds, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house.
He estimated finishing at around 10:00 pm and getting back to Cavite at around 2:00pm. However,
because some processes got delayed, he knew he would be finishing at 3:00pm. Thinking that the In the aftermath, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was spearheaded by the city building
workers would be disappointed in having to wait for the salaries, as the next 3 days were non-working official. In his report, he imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building
days, he decided to encash the checks anyway. and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams which caused the roof be ripped off the
building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondents. Respondents filed an action before
Hernandez weighed his options – whether to return to Cavite and arrive in the evening, or to go home the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner contested that it had no
to Bulacan and leave for Cavite first thing in the morning. He decided to go to Bulacan, thinking it was liability, attributing the damage to a fortuitous event. RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was
quicker, safer, and less risky. En route to Cavite were dark roads, where chances of robberies were affirmed by the CA. Hence present petition.’
more prominent. Unluckily enough, while the jeep he rode was stuck in EDSA traffic, two men came
in and stole the money. Hernandez immediately ran after Alvarez, one of the thieves – who was later ISSUE:
on convicted for the crime; but was unable to catch up with the man who had the money. Whether or not the damage, in legal sense, can be attributed to a fortuitous event.

On July 5, Hernandez filed for a request of relief from accountability, in accordance to Section 638 on RULING:
the Revised Administrative Code. The General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority, the Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the damage being attributable to a fortuitous event.
Corporate Auditor, and later on the NCR Regional Trial Director of the COA all favorably indorsed the
said request. On January 17, 1984, Hernandez was absolved of negligence. However, on June 29, Art 1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
1984, the COA, through Chairman Tantuico, denied the request. otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though
Issues: foreseen, were inevitable”
1. Whether or not the Francisco Tantuico, in his capacity as the COA Chairman, acted in grave abuse
of discretion [amounting from excess jurisdiction] YES. To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent must prove that petitioners were negligent, with
2.Whether or not Hernandez should be held accountable for the stolen money. NO which they fall short, merely relying on the report of the city building official. This is the same official
that have approved the building plans of petitioner, who made clear that there were no prior
Held: complaints regarding the building. Since storms are common in the country, the part of the building
Hernandez should not be held liable for the stolen money. Pursuant to Section 638 of the RAC, the in question should have failed against stronger typhoons that preceded said storm, which it had not.
money lost during transit due to a casualty, given that a request of relief must be given to and Furthermore, petitioner was able to present evidence that regular maintenance was carried out.
approved by the Auditor General or provincial auditor. Because Hernandez complied with the said Respondents also failed to support the claim of the actual loss they suffered, merely relying on
requirements, the Chairman therefore acted outside of his jurisdiction. The petition is granted. estimates without considering that wear and tear of respondents’ home which may have had a
contributory effect to the damage. Petition is granted and challenged decision is reversed.
Ratio:
Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that:

When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire,
theft, or other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately
notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original
jurisdiction of the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or
provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with the
available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not
be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.

Hernandez was able to complete request for relief from accountability within the given time period.
The Auditor was able to absolve Hernandez form accountability on January 27, 1984. Chairman
Tantuico was not in the position to revoke such decision. Even if he were, the facts were that
Hernandez had in mind, only the best interest for the workers. The events were fortuitous, and no one
could have known otherwise.

Page 15 of 17
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, v CA responsible municipal officials who could have disseminated the warning to the residents directly
affected.
FACTS:
Four separate complaints for damages were filed against the NPC. Plaintiffs sought to recover actual "TO ALL CONCERN (sic):
and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the flood of the 'Please be informed that at the present our reservoir (dam) is full and that we have been releasing
town of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the water intermittently for the past several days. 'With the coming of typhoon 'Rita' (Kading) we expect
defendants of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). to release greater (sic) volume of water, if it pass (sic) over our place. 'In view of this kindly advise
people residing along Angat River to keep alert and stay in safe places.
In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 'BENJAMIN L. CHAVEZ
'Power Plant Superintendent"
1) Defendant NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat
River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; ISSUE:
2) Defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question; WON petitioner should be held liable?
3) Despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of
typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the HELD: YES.
dam; In the Nakpil case, We held:
4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the
typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation
spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must
River; and be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable;
5) As a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral
drowned, and their properties were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
hours of 27 October 1978. creditor.
In their Answers, the defendants alleged that the damages incurred by the private respondents were
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as
absque injuria. Likewise, written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning
provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot
the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of
escape liability.
typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary precautions.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
RTC dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient and credible evidence.
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from
CA reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages based on the public respondent's
creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
conclusion that the petitioners were guilty of:
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and
". . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence . . . in the management
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways,
and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness,
Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing
slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flash flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1)
a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage
kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have been avoided had defendants-appellees
was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free
prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining in the first place, a water elevation which would allow room
from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been
for the expected torrential rains."
occasioned.
The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent "early warning written
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability
notices".
for the loss or damage sustained by the private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a
Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway gates
human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure
at midnight of October 26, 1978 and on October 27, 1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons so
in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus,
served, for the volume of water to be released, which turned out to be of such magnitude, that
the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to
residents near or along the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away, should have been advised
acts of God.
to evacuate. Said notice, addressed `TO ALL CONCERN (sic),' was delivered to a policeman (Civil
Case No. SM-950, TSN, Leonardo Nepomuceno, March 7, 1985, pp. 10-12 and Exhibit "2-A") for the
municipality of Norzagaray. Said notice was not thus addressed and delivered to the proper and
Page 16 of 17
Afialda v Hisole

Facts:
Loreto Afialda was employed by the Basilio Hisole and Francisco Hisole as caretaker of their carabaos
at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while tending the animals, without any fault from Afialda
or any force majeure, he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries.

Plaintiff herein, who is the sister of the deceased, filed an action a civil action for damages from injury
caused by the animal. Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under Article 1905 of the Civil Code,
which reads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the
damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
(Art. 2182 of the New Civil Code)

Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of
action, and the motion was granted by the lower court. The lower court ruled that in Art. 1905 of the
Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that
for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been
negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. (Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code).
Thus, plaintiff filed an appeal.

Issue:
Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that Art. 1905 of the Civil Code names the possessor or user of the animal as
the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor
or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it
from causing damage.

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which
he must take the consequences.

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578),
It is a veritable accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than under article
1905 of the Civil Code.

However, the present action is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the defendant's
liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable.
On the other hand, if action is to be based on Article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there
be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the
damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without
costs in view of the financial situation of the appellant.

Page 17 of 17