ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al.

L-69866; April 15, 1988 The question became moot and academic since the suspension of
the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of
Facts: Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as Task
Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian (2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were
Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) merely responding to their duties, as they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with
disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided several Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive
Petitioners were arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But this cannot be construed as
Allegedly, they were arrested without visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated a blanket license or roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional
in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through threats, torture and restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual
other forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory information. citizen enshrined and protected by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or
against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Respondents, in their employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the
motion to dismiss, claimed that the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, thus constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents
giving credence to petitioners’ detention and they were immune from liability from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
for acts done in the performance of their official duties. The RTC granted the provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Revised
motion to dismiss. Penal Code or other penal statute.

Issue: This is not say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their
(1) Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to protect the Philippines
a civil action for damages for illegal searches and other violations of rights and from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without,
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very
existence. What is meant is that in carrying out their task and mission,
Held: constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed; otherwise, the very
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (PWHC) does not fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the
destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ
of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. (3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case.
It has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
Moreover, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly master and servant relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the
recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding military and their subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the
the following text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or employee or
plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional
any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer
martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer
must be brought within one year. for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the
persons who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgression
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends petitioners’ joint tortfeasors.
right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and
cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because
of respondents’ confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their
right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, 4. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to
G.R. No. 135306, Jan. 28, 2003 advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member
Facts: of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under
70 Muslim religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages against MVRS the Bill of Rights.
Publications, Inc., arising from an article, which reads:
5. The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC: where the defamation is
"ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual
isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class
magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him,
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung- so that he can bring the action separately.
lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
6. The SC cited some US cases wherein the rule on libel has been restrictive. It
MVRS PUBLICATIONS. INC. in their defense contended that the article did not was held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in
reference respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not common law. With regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious
entitled to amends and that the article was simply a belief or sentiment and groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of
was published without malice nor purpose to do harm. the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie.

Issue: 7. "Emotional distress" tort action has no application in this case because no
W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action particular individual was identified in the Bulgar article. "Emotional distress"
means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
Held: humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental
The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. This kind of tort action
of Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC was is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the
reinstated. injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.

1. There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar 8. "Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in
article. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
distinct in the community. Each has a varying interest and a divergent political decency.
and religious view. There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims
who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. 9. Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere
Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from
do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other
general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. trivialities. Intentional tort causing emotional distress must necessarily give way
to the fundamental right to free speech.
2. Defamation, which includes libel (in general, written) and slander (in general,
oral), means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation 10. Respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class
through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation suit. An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. Islamic
or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not
excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well.
Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such
3. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity.
which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words
which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and
mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.
Dulay, Et Al., vs. CA Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995 committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court
Facts: already held that: ". . . Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal in character, whether
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751. liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
(1) RTC: the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." The
(sic) it is hereby dismissed. same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held: "Article 2176, whenever it
Issue: refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
Whether Superguard is liable also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
Held: or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is cases vary." [Citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay
resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is
duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption
and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either
defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate;
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners
opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil
action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-
delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.