TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS

A. ​Violation of Civil and Political Rights (A32)

MHP GARMENTS VS CA

FACTS:
Petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded of the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute
official
Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. In
their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or
cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies."

Later on, the corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz,
Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia
without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of the corporation, was tasked to undertake the
necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

De Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction
Force Battalion went to the stores of private respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without
any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner
corporation for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. The
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents and he
also ordered the return of the seized items. However, the seized items were not immediately
returned despite demands.

Private respondents then filed a civil case against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents, and held the corporation and
De Guzman jointly and severally liable for damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court by applying the provisions of Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners tried to avoid their liability by arguing that it was the Philippine Constabulary that
conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private
respondents.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners violated the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure
of the private respondents.

HELD: Yes.
The SC held that evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid
of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC
raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for
a warrant and seized the
goods of private respondents.

The SC held that the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents by
applying the provisions of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides that a person whose
constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from
the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also
be awarded.

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in
the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In
the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

It is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party.

In this case, petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. Because ​first,​ they instigated the raid pursuant to the
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies. ​Second,​ the letter of instruction No. 1299 directs all law enforcement agencies to
apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia,
upon proper application for judicial warrant, which the petitioners failed to do so despite
sufficiency of time.

B. ​Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (A33)

MARCIA VS CA (1983)

FACTS:
In the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent
Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by
Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners,
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence
was filed against Felardo Paje in RTC of Pampanga.

An action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was also filed in the RTC of Rizal by Edgar Marcia
and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents against the Victory Liner, Inc. and bus
driver, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter
in driving the passenger bus.

While said Civil Case was in progress, the criminal action proceeded. The bus driver was
convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the CA, he was acquitted based on the
ruling that there was no criminal negligence and he is not even guilty of civil negligence because
the collision was a pure accident.

As a consequence, the bus company and bus driver moved for the dismissal of the complaint
invoking the decision of the CA acquitting the bus driver. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, After trial, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against the bus company and
bus driver.

Petitioners appealed the case to the CA alleging that the instant civil action is entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this
civil action; that sec. 2, Rule 111 is applicable.

The CA held that the bus company and its driver cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in
the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure
accident.

(In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who died as a result of the collision, instituted a
separate civil action in the RTC of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on the
alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was
dismissed by
the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to the SC which, however, affirmed the
order for the reason, among others, that "The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the
Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident,
was a bar to the civil action
for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the bus driver was acquitted in the criminal action.")
ISSUE: W/N the civil action filed by the petitioners is an independent civil action under sec. 2,
Rule
111.

HELD: No.
Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without
waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of
evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in
criminal cases.

Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article
33 of the Civil Code. Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The
charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and
physical injuries suffered by Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution.

The SC court affirmed the decision of the CA as to the dismissal of the civil action for damages
based on the ruling that the bus company and bus driver cannot be held civilly liable after it was
ruled in the criminal action that the collision between the bus and jeepney was a pure accident,
which accident resulted in the death of jeepney driver and physical injuries of the petitioners.

MADEJA VS CARO (1983)

FACTS:
In a Criminal Case against DR. EVA A. JAPZON, she is accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is
the widow of the deceased, Carmen Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party
Carmen Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."

While the criminal case is pending, Carmen Madeja filed a civil case for damages against Dr.
Eva A. Japzon. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr.
Japzon. The trial court dismissed the civil case granting the motion to dismiss filed by Dr. Eva
and ruled that "under Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the civil action may be instituted
only after final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action."

Petitioner filed a petition to the SC to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N an independent civil action may proceed against Dr. Eva while the criminal case is
pending.

HELD: Yes.
The SC held that the applicable provisions in this case are Sec. 2, Rule 111 and Sec. 32 of the
Civil Code. The term "physical injuries" under Article 32 is used in a generic sense. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. In other words, the term 'physical
injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because
the terms used with the latter are
general terms.

It has been held that Defamation and fraud under Article 32 are also used in their ordinary
sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have
been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their
generic sense.

In the case of Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is
not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Thus, it is apparent that the civil
action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.

C. ​Fraud

SALTA VS DE VEYRA

FACTS:
Petitioner Almario Salta was a Manager of PNB Malolos' branch. As Manager, his duty was to
grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan
applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care and
prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner
indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner
characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not
commensurate with the amount of the loans. The respondent bank found petitioner to have
discharged his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of
Manila ​(Civil Case No. 79583​, Branch XIV) and another case ​(Civil Case No. 88343,​ Branch
VII) to recover losses the bank suffered.

At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case with the
Circuit Criminal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In the criminal case, the Court dismissed the complaint and acquitted Salta of the crime as
charged. With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss in each of the
two civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule 111.

In the first civil case, the motion to dismiss was denied but in the second civil case, the motion
to dismiss was granted.
The Judge in the first civil case ruled that the motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason
that acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in
the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly the accused would not be liable,
there is no such a finding. ​Apart from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case bases its case
either on fraud or negligence​, which requires only a preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: W/N the civil actions filed against Salta should be dismissed because of the judgment
of acquittal in the criminal case.

HELD: No.
The SC held that the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully
warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the
prosecution of an offense the main element of which is​ fraud,​ which is one of the kinds of crime
mentioned in Article 33.

The SC hold that the allegations in the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud. The
complaint also show that there was negligence on the part of Salta when it extended a number
of credit accommodations without exercising prudence.

Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be
filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
"regardless of the result of the latter." This must be so because the offenses specified in Article
33 are of such a nature that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of
the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly
illustrated in the case of ​swindling​, a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud, where
the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case,
regardless of the result of the latter.

Thus, the acquittal of Salta in the criminal case will in no manner affects the civil actions filed
against him to proceed independently of the criminal action. The civil actions being based on
fraud, may be filed separately and independently based on Article 32 of the Civil Code.

The SC affirmed the order denying the motion to dismiss in the first civil case and reversed the
order ranting the motion to dismiss in the second civil case.

D. ​Physical Injuries
DULAY VS CA

FACTS:
Benigno Torzuela, an employee of Safeguard Investigation and Security Inc. and/or Supersafeguard
Security Corporation, while he was on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," shot and
killed Napoleon Dulay.

The spouse of the deceased filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and his employers
who are the private respondents in this case.

Defense of SAFEGUARD:
​ ince the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
a. S
governed by Article 100; that A2176 does not apply since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only
to quasi-offenses under Article 365, RPC;

b. The action is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition
sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability under A103, RPC.

c. Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to
the ruling in Marcia v. CA and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto.

SC:​ The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.
It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide
(Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal
negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged
with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.