G.R. No.

158995 September 26, 2006

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General

Manager, petitioners, vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents.

FACTS:
• On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino
Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and
driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a
result of the accident.
• An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the
driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Unfortunately, before the trial
could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30,
1998, dismissed the criminal case.
• On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that
as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees.
• Defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is
basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not
make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was
filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action.
which was already dismissed.
• In an Order dated September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack
of merit and set the case for pre-trial.
• Petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages. However, the
CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court.
o Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence
under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
• Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is civilly liable to respondent spouses.

RULING:
No.

Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners.

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the
negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for
the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident."

Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death
intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was,
therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency
of such employee.

Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover
damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus,
the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.

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G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010

ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, Petitioners, vs.

JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, Respondent.

FACTS:
• A gun was brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair. The gun, an AMT Automag
II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum, was left by defendant Morales in a drawer of a table located
inside the gun store.
• On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year student at the
Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up BS Computer Science was at the Top Gun
Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City.
• Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was
the regular caretaker of the gun store was also not around. He left earlier and requested
sales agents Matibag and Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and defendant
Morales were away.
• Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store which
included the key to the drawer where the defective gun was kept.
• It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed
it on top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got
hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
• A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before branch VII of this Court.
Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting
circumstance of "accident" under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
• On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners),
parents of Alfred, filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent
Jerome Jovanne Morales (respondent).
• On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners and ordering
respondents to pay petitioners.
o The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of Alfred under Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
o The trial court held that respondent failed to observe the required diligence when
he left the key to the drawer containing the loaded defective gun without instructing
his employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun.
• Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 11 May 2005, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
o The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there
was no employer-employee relationship between respondent and Matibag.

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 o Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case and respondent
cannot be held liable.
o Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if respondent is considered an
employer of Matibag, still respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can
be attributed to him.
o They rule that he exercised due diligence in keeping his loaded gun while he was
on a business trip in Manila. He placed it inside the drawer and locked it. It was
taken away without his knowledge and authority. Whatever happened to the
deceased was purely accidental.
• Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is civilly liable to petitioners.

RULING:
Yes.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store.1avvphi1 Under PNP
Circular No. 9, entitled the "Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a person
who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will
be suspended or canceled.

A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of
a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm
or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not
needed for ready-access defensive use.

With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because
they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should

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have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have
made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.

For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore,
it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to
repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of
a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as
would exempt him from liability in this case.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the
trial court’s Decision dated 8 April 1998.

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G.R. No. 171212 August 4, 2014

INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner, vs.

ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO, Respondents.

FACTS:
• Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing thread for weaving.
• On August 21, 1990, petitioner hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil
Engineer to maintain its facilities in Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan.
• On August 7, 2002, respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and
dizziness. Few days later, he was diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis, and thereafter,
with moderate, severe and persistent Allergic Rhinitis. Accordingly, respondent was
advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as it will transmute
into health problems.
• Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal dismissal and
for the payment of backwages, separation pay, actual damages and attorney’s fees.
• Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the
gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable
environment.
o Respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he conducts regular
maintenance check on petitioner’s facilities including its dye house area, which is
very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate safety measures introduced
by petitioner. According to respondent, the air washer dampers and all roof exhaust
vests are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto. Concerned, respondent
recommended to management to place roof insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate
the health hazards attendant in the work place. However, said recommendation was
turned down by management due to high cost.
o These health hazards have been the persistent complaints of most, if not all, workers
of petitioner. Nevertheless, said complaints fell on deaf ears as petitioner callously
ignored the health problems of its workers and even tended to be apathetic to their
plight, including respondent.
• Respondent averred that, being the only breadwinner in the family, he made several
attempts to apply for a new job, but to his dismay and frustration, employers who knew of
his present health condition discriminated against him and turned down his application.
• Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss. On December 29, 2003, the RTC issued a Resolution
denying the aforesaid Motion and sustaining its jurisdiction over the instant case.

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 o It held that petitioner’s alleged failure to provide its employees with a safe, healthy
and workable environment is an act of negligence, a case of quasi-delict. As such,
it is not within the jurisdiction of the LA under Article 217 of the Labor Code.
• Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, the CA rendered a
Decision dated May 30, 2005 dismissing petitioner’s Petition for lack of merit

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter (LA) under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code

RULING:
No.

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs
is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being
the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code.

Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor
Code, to be cognizable by the LA, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims
provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can a claim for
damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations. In the case at bench, we find
that such connection is nil.

It should be stressed that respondent’s claim for damages is specifically grounded on petitioner’s
gross negligence to provide a safe, healthy and workable environment for its employees −a case
of quasi-delict. This is easily ascertained from a plain and cursory reading of the Complaint, which
enumerates the acts and/or omissions of petitioner relative to the conditions in the workplace.

It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein,
which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial.48 Neither can jurisdiction of a court bemade
to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.49 In this case, a
perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages arising from
quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.

It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made
in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can
jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss. In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is

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one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's
jurisdiction.

To sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

In the case at bar, respondent alleges that due to the continued and prolonged exposure to textile
dust seriously inimical to his health, he suffered work-contracted disease which is now irreversible
and incurable, and deprived him of job opportunities. Clearly, injury and damages were allegedly
suffered by respondent, an element of quasi- delict. Secondly, the previous contract of employment
between petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the element of "no pre-existing
contractual relation" since petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in maintaining a hazardous work
environment cannot be considered a mere breach of such contract of employment, but falls
squarely within the elements of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code since the
negligence is direct, substantive and independent.

When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is with
the regular courts. Moreover, The cause of action herein pertains to the consequence of petitioner’s
omission which led to a work-related disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage to
his person. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the
controversy belongs to the regular courts.

Guided by the afore quoted doctrines, we find no reason to reverse the findings of the CA. The
RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's complaint praying for moral damages,
exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner's alleged gross negligence in
failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 30,
2005, and its Resolution dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83099 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

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G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
• On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, plaintiff was
riding on his pony over said bridge.
• Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction
in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
• The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach,
he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side.
• As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side.
• The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile
to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward
the horse without diminution of speed.
• When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across
to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
• In so doing, it struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
• From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free
space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was
probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

RULING:
Yes.

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.

In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance
away; and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run
down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to
the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there
were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse.

He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.
But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions
which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was,
in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.

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Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under
these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of
the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the
plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.

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G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009

CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ,

Petitioners,
vs.
ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS,
Respondents.

FACTS:
• On June 27, 1995, respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children, namely, John
Arnel Ramos and Khristine Camille Ramos, filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint
for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code against petitioners Cresencia Achevara,
Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira
Ramos and father of her two children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April 22,
1995 at the national highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur.
• Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep which was involved
in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the operator
and as the administrator of the conjugal partnership properties of the Spouses Achevara.
• In their Complaint, respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno
Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national highway in Barangay
Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to
overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and
bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo
Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance.
• Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.
• Petitioners denied respondents’ allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and
bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on April 22, 1995,
Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type
jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and
encroaching on the west lane of the road.
• To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road,
west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep.
• Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a
motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had
no cause of action against petitioners.
• During trial on the merits, respondents presented three witnesses: Alfredo Gamera, Dr.
Emilio Joven and Elvira Ramos.

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• Alfredo Gamera testified that at about 10:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he and his wife were
seated at the waiting shed along the national highway in Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur,
waiting for a ride to the town proper of Candon. He saw a motorcycle, driven by Police
Officer 3 (PO3) Baltazar de Peralta, coming from the interior part of Tablac and proceeding
south toward the town proper. He also saw a southbound passenger jeep, driven by Benigno
Valdez, that wanted to overtake the motorcycle of PO3 De Peralta. As it tried to overtake
the motorcycle, the passenger jeep encroached on the lane of the northbound owner-type
jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos, which resulted in the collision. Gamera stated that the point
of impact was on the lane of the vehicle of Arnulfo Ramos.
• On cross-examination, it was found that Gamera went to the Police Station in Candon,
Ilocos Sur to execute his sworn statement only on May 30, 1992, one month after the
incident and after respondent Elvira Ramos talked to him.
• Moreover, at the preliminary investigation, Gamera did not mention in his sworn statement
that his wife was present during the incident, which fact was admitted by respondent’s
counsel. Further, at that time, Gamera was working as a jueteng collector at the same joint
where the deceased Arnulfo Ramos was also employed, and he had known Ramos for five
years.
• Dr. Emilio Joven, a surgeon of the Lorma Medical Center, San Fernando, La Union,
testified that Arnulfo Ramos was admitted at the Lorma Hospital at about 12:50 p.m. on
April 22, 1995. The latter sustained external injuries, mostly on the left side of the body,
which could have been caused by a vehicular accident.
• Petitioners presented six witnesses, namely, PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, Special Police
Officer 2 (SPO2) Marvin Valdez, Herminigildo Pagaduan, Benigno Valdez, Emilia
Achevara and Alfredo Achevara.
• PO3 Baltazar de Peralta stated that he was assigned to Santiago, Ilocos Sur. He testified
that at about 9:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he was on board his motorcycle at the waiting
shed erected on the eastern side of the national highway in Tablac, Ilocos Sur. He was
about to go southward, but waited a while to let a southbound passenger jeep pass by. Then
he followed behind the passenger jeep.
• When the passenger jeep was about 75 meters away from him on the western lane of the
national highway, PO3 De Peralta spotted an owner-type jeep coming from the south on
the eastern lane of the road. He observed that the owner-type jeep was running in a zigzag
manner as it went over the many holes on the road. It did not slacken speed, causing the
jeep’s front wheels to wiggle, before it bumped the passenger jeep coming from the north.
• The collision occurred on the lane of the passenger jeep, about two feet away from the
center line of the road, causing the owner-type jeep to turn around and return to its former
position, with its right wheel removed; while the passenger jeep veered to the right lane
• PO3 De Peralta testified that the accident happened on a straight part of the highway, but
there were many holes on the eastern lane. He stated that nothing impeded his view of the
incident.

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• PO3 De Peralta also testified that he had known respondents’ witness, Alfredo Gamera,
who was his barangay mate for 20 years. He declared that he never saw Gamera at the
waiting shed or at the scene of the incident on the morning of April 22, 1995.
• Herminigildo Pagaduan testified that at 7:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he was at the house of
Barangay Captain Victorino Gacusan of San Antonio, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Gacusan was
then the overall monitor of the jueteng joint operation in Candon, Ilocos Sur. Pagaduan and
Gacusan had earlier agreed to attend the wake of an army captain at Tamorong, Candon,
Ilocos Sur that morning. While Pagaduan was waiting for Barangay Captain Gacusan, the
latter made a phone call requesting for a vehicle to take them to Tamorong. Not long after,
a yellow owner-type jeep arrived, which was driven by Arnulfo Ramos, an employee of
the jueteng joint. All of them rode the jeep
• Barangay Captain Gacusan was on the driver’s seat, Pagaduan sat beside Gacusan, while
Arnulfo Ramos and the others sat on the rear seat.
• Pagaduan further testified that the group headed west to Tamorong via Darapidap. When
they reached a bridge, Barangay Captain Gacusan tried to increase the speed of the jeep,
but it suddenly wiggled. Gacusan stopped the jeep, and they all alighted from it. Gacusan
told Arnulfo Ramos to have the mechanical defect repaired at the auto shop. Hence, they
did not proceed to Tamorong, but returned to the house of Gacusan by tricycle.
• Valdez branded as false the testimony of respondents’ witness, Alfredo Gamera, that the
former tried to overtake the motorcycle of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on the
lane of the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Valdez testified that before the
vehicular accident, he saw a policeman following him, but there was a tricycle between
them. He denied that he was driving fast and stated that his speed at that time registered
only 20 on the speedometer.
• Alfredo Achevara declared that before they employed Benigno Valdez to drive the
passenger jeep, the former exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting,
training and supervising the latter. They required Valdez to show them his professional
driver’s license, and investigated his personal background and training/experience as a
driver. For his apprenticeship, they required him to drive from Metro Manila to Tagaytay
City, and then back to Metro Manila for a day.
• Achevara stated that he knew Benigno Valdez since 1988. As their driver since 1992,
Valdez never committed any traffic violation.
• On February 14, 2000, the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, rendered a Decision
in Civil Case No. 1431-N in favor of respondents.
o The trial court found that the testimony of respondents’ witness, Alfredo Gamera,
was controverted by the testimony of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and the finding of
police investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez.
o The trial court concluded that the passenger jeep did not encroach on the lane of
the owner-type jeep on the left side of the road to allegedly overtake the motorcycle.

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 o The trial court stated that it was undeniable that the collision took place on the
western lane of the national highway, which was the passenger jeep’s lane.
o The trial court held that the driver of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez, having
seen the risk exhibited by the wiggling of the front wheels of the owner-type jeep,
causing it to run in a zigzag manner, should have parked his vehicle on the right
shoulder of the road so that the mishap could have been prevented. Since he ignored
to take this reasonable precaution, the omission and/or breach of this duty on his
part was the constitutive legal cause of the mishap.
o The trial court stated that the doctrine of last clear chance, as applied to this case,
implied a contributory negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew
of the mechanical defect of his vehicle.
o Further, the trial court held that the evidence of the Spouses Achevara failed to
show that they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno
Valdez as driver of their passenger jeep.
o Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez appealed the trial court’s Decision to the
Court of Appeals. However, in a Decision dated April 25, 2009, the Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the trial court
• Petitioners contend that:
o The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable to this case, because the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the late Arnulfo Ramos in
knowingly driving the defective owner-type jeep.
o Arnulfo Ramos’ negligence in driving the owner-type jeep − despite knowledge of
its mechanical defect, and his failure to have it repaired first before driving, to
prevent damage to life and property − did not only constitute contributory
negligence. Ramos’ negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident, which resulted in his untimely demise.
o Benigno Valdez should not be made to suffer the unlawful and negligent acts of
Ramos. Since forseeability is the fundamental basis of negligence, Valdez could
not have foreseen that an accident might happen due to the mechanical defect in the
vehicle of Ramos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a result of the
vehicular accident.

RULING:
No.

Ramos was advised to have the mechanical defect repaired. Yet, later in the morning, Ramos was
driving the owner-type jeep on the national highway in Candon. Benigno Valdez testified that the

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owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner when its right front wheel got
detached, and the owner-type jeep suddenly bumped the passenger jeep he was driving, hitting the
left side of the passenger jeep opposite his seat. Although Valdez swerved the passenger jeep to
the western edge of the road, it was still hit by the owner-type jeep.

Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted
or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain
interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.

Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled
on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he
met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to
the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road
and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by
neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have
done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.

On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly
driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be
putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a
mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man would have had the
owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired. Ramos was,
therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to drive on the highway the mechanically defective jeep,
which later encroached on the opposite lane and bumped the passenger jeep driven by Benigno
Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard
of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it
was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to
avoid the collision. The Answer of petitioners stated that when the owner-type jeep encroached on
the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the western
shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos continued to
move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert
in their Petition that considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez
to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the
collision. Although the records are bereft of evidence showing the exact distance between the two

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vehicles when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have been
near enough, because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision.
Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case.

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

“When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.”

In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since
the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were
the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67027, dated April 25, 2006, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2006, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
• Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila
for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
• On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
• From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager
of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
• When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave
his "first class" seat in the plane.
• The Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate,
from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees;
and the costs of suit.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's
plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
• Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it.
• Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim
is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award
for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; and that the decision
of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages to respondent Carrascoso.

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RULING:
Yes.

First, there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, Said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated"
and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific
mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be
drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein.

The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to
the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a
corresponding "first class" ticket. If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of
the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; and, under the circumstances, the Court is
constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class"
seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the "white man".

The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation
of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or
for ulterior purpose."

There is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus: “The
evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith,
with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of
threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane
to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto
G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class"
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class"
ticket was issued by the defendant to him.”

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Moreover, the responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner,
his employer, must answer. Based from Article 21 of the Civil Code, “Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So
it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier.

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Hence, exemplary damages are well awarded, right to attorney's fees is fully established.
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as
attorneys' fees are sustained.

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007

DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO, Respondents.

FACTS:
• Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr.
Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S.
Go, who was admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992.
• At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However,
at around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of
the placenta which were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery.
• Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure
to "40" over "0." Petitioner and the assisting resident physician performed various medical
procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood pressure. Her blood pressure
was frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmomanometer.
• While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she
ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until she
recovered.
• While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh
gaping wound two and a half (2 1⁄2) by three and a half (3 1⁄2) inches in the inner portion
of her left arm, close to the armpit.
• He asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was informed it was a burn.
• Forthwith, on April 22, 1992, John David filed a request for investigation. In response, Dr.
Rainerio S. Abad, the medical director of the hospital, called petitioner and the assisting
resident physician to explain what happened. Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff caused
the injury.
• On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora to the National Bureau of Investigation for a
physical examination, which was conducted by medico-legal officer Dr. Floresto Arizala,
Jr. The medico-legal officer later testified that Nora’s injury appeared to be a burn and that
a droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn.He
dismissed the likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood pressure cuff as the scar
was not around the arm, but just on one side of the arm.
• On May 22, 1992, Nora’s injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the Dr. Jesus Delgado
Memorial Hospital for skin grafting. Her wound was covered with skin sourced from her
abdomen, which consequently bore a scar as well.
• About a year after, on April 30, 1993, scar revision had to be performed at the same
hospital. The surgical operation left a healed linear scar in Nora’s left arm about three
inches in length, the thickest portion rising about one-fourth (1/4) of an inch from the

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 surface of the skin. The costs of the skin grafting and the scar revision were shouldered by
the hospital.
• Unfortunately, Nora’s arm would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the
pain in her left arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her
movements now are also restricted. Her children cannot play with the left side of her body
as they might accidentally bump the injured arm, which aches at the slightest touch.
• Thus, on June 21, 1993, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner, Dr. Abad, and the hospital.
• The trial court decreed in favor of respondent spouses
• Petitioner, Dr. Abad, and the hospital all appealed to the Court of Appeals, however the
CA affirmed with modification the trial court decision
• Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
instant petition assigning errors and issues:
o Petitioner insists the droplight could not have touched Nora’s body. She maintains
the injury was due to the constant taking of Nora’s blood pressure.
o Petitioner also insinuates the Court of Appeals was misled by the testimony of the
medico-legal officer who never saw the original injury before plastic surgery was
performed.
• Respondents counter that:
o Petitioner’s blood pressure cuff theory is highly improbable, being unprecedented
in medical history and that the injury was definitely caused by the droplight.
o At any rate, they argue, even if the injury was brought about by the blood pressure
cuff, petitioner was still negligent in her duties as Nora’s attending physician.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora Go.

RULING:
Yes.

The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of
their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This
notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because
physicians are not guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their
patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and
is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused.

In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence
of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur:

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1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants;
and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.

As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Nora’s arm is certainly not an ordinary
occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in
the process of giving birth. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in
somewhere.

Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no
moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge
under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation
liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the
surgeon’s control. In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior
consultant in charge during the delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control over the assistants
assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. Hence, the use
of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s exclusive control.

Third, the gaping wound on Nora’s left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition,
could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious
while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have
contributed to her own injury.

Petitioner’s defense that Nora’s wound was caused not by the droplight but by the constant taking
of her blood pressure, even if the latter was necessary given her condition, does not absolve her
from liability. As testified to by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is
to deflate the blood pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can
cause injury to the patient similar to what could have happened in this case. Thus, if Nora’s wound
was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of Nora’s blood pressure must have been
done so negligently as to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm, for which petitioner cannot
escape liability under the "captain of the ship" doctrine.

Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter
as a proximate result of petitioner’s negligence.

We note, however, that petitioner has served well as Nora’s obstetrician for her past three
successful deliveries. This is the first time petitioner is being held liable for damages due to

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negligence in the practice of her profession. The fact that petitioner promptly took care of Nora’s
wound before infection and other complications set in is also indicative of petitioner’s good
intentions. We also take note of the fact that Nora was suffering from a critical condition when the
injury happened, such that saving her life became petitioner’s elemental concern. Nonetheless, it
should be stressed that all these could not justify negligence on the part of petitioner.

Hence, considering the specific circumstances in the instant case, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Further, we rule that the
Court of Appeals’ award of Two

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution dated
November 19, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58184 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 242328, April 26, 2021

UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., INC., PETITIONER,

VS.
PASCUAL LINER, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
• On September 21, 2005, petitioner UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (petitioner) issued
Comprehensive Car Insurance Policy No. DLS05MD-MNP111436 to its assured, Rommel
B. Lojo (Lojo), over the latter's vehicle, a 1997 BMW A/T 2000 four-door sedan
• On December 09, 2005, at around 3:30 p.m., the insured vehicle was cruising northbound
along the South Luzon Expressway in front of Concepcion Bldg. Sucat, Parañaque City
when it was bumped at the rear portion by respondent Pascual Liner, Inc.'s (respondent)
bus driven by Leopoldo L. Cadavido (Cadavido).
• As a result of the impact, the insured vehicle was pushed forward, causing it to hit another
vehicle, an aluminum van driven by Nilo L. Nuñez.
• The vehicular accident was investigated by the Traffic Management and Security
Department of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) Skyway
Corporation, for which Solomon Tatlonghari (Tatlonghari) prepared a Traffic Accident
Sketch.
• Under the Traffic Accident Report
o Prior to the incident, all involved vehicles were travelling along SLEX heading
north direction. Vehicle 1 (aluminum closed van) ahead of vehicle 2 (BMW) and
vehicle 3 (Pascual bus) respectively.
o Upon reaching the place of occurrence, vehicle 2 was hit on the right rear end by
the left front end of vehicle 3. Due to the impact vehicle 2 was pushed and its front
rammed into the rear end of vehicle 1.
o Driver of vehicle 3 claimed that allegedly vehicle 2, from the rightmost lane veered
to the left and stopped momentarily, thus, a collision.
• With serious damage caused to the rear and front portions of the insured vehicle, Lojo filed
a claim with petitioner under his insurance policy. Upon examination, the insured vehicle
was determined to be beyond economical repair, and after proper evaluation, the claim was
found to be compensable by petitioner.
• In turn, petitioner paid Lojo the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P520,000.00), while Lojo issued a Release of Claim in petitioner's favor, including a
waiver of all his rights over the insured vehicle.
• On November 12, 2009, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money before the RTC
against respondent and Cadavido alleging that as a result of Lojo's receipt of the insurance
indemnity it paid arising from the damage caused on the insured vehicle, it was subrogated
to the rights of Lojo.

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• The complaint was initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the amount claimed by
petitioner falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MeTC. Thereafter, the case was then
raffled to the MeTC
• On February 9, 2011, respondent filed its Answer (with Affirmative Defense), denying
petitioner's allegations.
• The parties were later directed to attend the mediation and the judicial dispute resolution,
which, however, failed to produce a settlement between the parties.
• In its Decision dated January 26, 2015, the MeTC found that the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident was the negligence of Cadavido in driving respondent's bus.
• On Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner on April 27, 2015, the MeTC set aside
its Decision and rendered an Order dated November 17, 2015, this time finding respondent
liable to pay petitioner the amount of P350,000.00, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum
and attorney's fees of 25% of the recoverable amount, plus cost of suit.
o In rendering judgment in favor of petitioner, the MeTC applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor, which creates a presumption of negligence on the part of Cadavido
who was in control of the bus, without which, the insured vehicle would not have
been bumped.
o Such negligence gave rise to the obligation to pay the insured. Since the assured
owner decided to file an insurance claim with petitioner, which the latter paid,
petitioner was subrogated to the rights of the assured in claiming for the damages
incurred by the assured in accordance with Article 2207 of the New Civil Code.
• Respondent appealed the MeTC Order before the RTC. After due proceedings, the RTC
rendered a Decision dated September 22, 2016 affirming in toto, the assailed Order.
• Thereafter, respondent elevated the RTC Decision and Order before the CA, which
rendered the assailed Decision that reversed the RTC Decision
o In its Decision, the CA held that the Traffic Accident Sketch and the Traffic
Accident Report were inadmissible in evidence as they failed to comply with the
requisites of Entries in Official Records as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
o It found that since neither the police officer who prepared the report nor the traffic
enforcer who prepared the sketch gave a testimony in support thereof, these
documents were not exempted from the Hearsay Rule.
o It opined that the vehicular incident was investigated by the Traffic Management
and Security Department of Department of the PNCC Skyway Corporation, which
prepared a Traffic Accident Sketch. The incident was only endorsed to the PNP,
which in turn prepared a Traffic Accident Report.
o Thus, the matters indicated in the Traffic Accident Report were not personally
known to the investigating officer. Rather, it was Solomon Tatlonghari, of the
PNCC, who had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the Traffic Accident
Report. Yet, no affidavit of his testimony was submitted before the MeTC.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in the case

RULING:
Yes.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is an exception to the rule that hearsay evidence is devoid of
probative value. This is because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor establishes a rule on negligence,
whether the evidence is subjected to cross-examination or not. It is a rule that can stand on its own
independently of the character of the evidence presented as hearsay.

Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The
doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." It is
simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the
very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of
the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation
by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary
human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.

As such, the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor establishes a presumption of
negligence based on the occurrence of the incident in itself. In cases involving vehicular accidents,
it is sufficient that the accident itself be established, and once established through the admission
of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitor already starts to apply.

In the case at bar, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor established the negligence of Cadavido

The elements of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference
that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

In the instant case, the Traffic Accident Report of PO3 Quila and the Traffic Accident Sketch
prepared by Tatlonghari showed that all the three vehicles involved in the accident were traversing
the same traffic direction. The aluminum van was in front of the insured vehicle of Lojo, while the
Pascual Liner bus driven by Cadavido was at the rear of the insured vehicle. Being at the rear end

Jagolino (3LM2)
of the vehicles, it was Cadavido who had a clear view of the traffic direction and the presence of
the vehicles in front of him. It was him who had the responsibility to observe the proper distance
between vehicles and had the last opportunity to take the needed maneuvers to avoid a collision.
Based on the Traffic Accident Sketch, the insured vehicle was hit at the right side of its rear because
of the impact of collision from the right side of the front of the bus of respondent. This caused it
to be pushed toward the left lane, and in turn hit an aluminum van that was in front. As he failed
to take the necessary precautions, it was Cadavido who set into motion the vehicles that caused
the vehicular accident, hitting the insured vehicle in the rear and the latter vehicle in turn hitting
the rear of the aluminum van that was in front. There was also no evidence adduced to show
contributory negligence on the part of the insured vehicle.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioner, the Traffic Accident Sketch bore the signature of Cadavido
as the driver of the Pascual Liner bus. There was nothing from the pleadings made available before
this Court, that would show that respondent made a denial of this fact. Cadavido's signature on the
said sketch served as an admission of the location of the damage caused by the collision to the
vehicles involved. It was also an affirmation that the Traffic Accident Sketch was able to accurately
reflect the respective positions of the vehicles involved in the accident. As explained, the positions
of these vehicles as they appeared on the sketch showed that respondent's driver was negligent.

The rule is when an employee causes damage due to their own negligence while performing their
own duties, there arises a presumption that their employer is negligent. This presumption can be
rebutted only by proof of observance by the employer of the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees. In this case, respondent did not adduce proof to
show that it observed the required diligence of a good father of a family. Thus, it is liable for the
negligence committed by its employee.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 13, 2018 and its Resolution dated September 28, 2018 are SET ASIDE. Pascual Liner Inc. is
liable to pay UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc. the amount of P350,000.00, plus interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until its full payment.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 218344 March 21, 2022

JESSICA P. MAITIM a.k.a “JEAN GARCIA”, petitioner

vs.
MARIA THERESA P. AGUILA

FACTS:
• Petitioner Jessica Maitim (Maitim) and respondent Maria Theresa P. Aguila (Aguila) were
residents of Grand Pacific Manor Townhouse. Their respective townhouse units are
approximately nine meters apart, separated only by a driveway jointly used by the
townhouse unit owners.
• On April 25, 2006, Maitim was on board her vehicle, a Ford W-150 Chateau Wagon
registered under her name, which was being driven by Restituto Santos (Santos), her driver
for 12 years. While they were driving along the common driveway, Angela Aserehet P.
Aguila (Angela), the six-year old daughter of Aguila, was sideswiped by Maitim's vehicle.
• Angela was dragged for about three meters resulting to her right leg being fractured.
• Maitim and Santos did not immediately take Angela to the hospital after the incident; she
was only brought to St. Luke's Medical Center after the insistence of Angela's grandmother,
Lirio Aguila.
• Angela was diagnosed to have suffered swelling, hematoma, multiple abrasions, and
displaced, complete fracture on the right leg. Thus, she underwent operation at Asian
Hospital and was in a wheelchair from April 25, 2006 to July 18, 2006.
• The incident was referred to the barangay for conciliation but only Aguila appeared. At
this point, Aguila's actual expenses amounted to P169,187.32.12
• Aguila then sent demand letters to Maitim and Santos to no avail. Thus, Aguila filed the
instant action for damages based on quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
• In Maitim’s defense, she denied Aguila’s accusations and claimed that while she was in
her vehicle being driven slowly by Santos, Angela suddenly came running and due to this,
the latter’s right leg was sideswiped and got fractured
• Furthermore, Maitim maintained that Santos, who was her driver for 12 years, was driving
with care at the time of the incident, and thus, Maitim should not be made liable for
vicarious liability because she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
her employee
• In its Decision dated July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Aguila
o RTC held that Santos was presumed to be negligent, applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, and that Maitim was vicariously liable for her failure to prove that
she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee
• On June 30, 2014 the CA denied Maitim’s appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto
o The CA ruled that Maitim and Santos are solidarily liable for damages, and that
there was no contributory negligence on the part of Aguila and her daughter

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 o Aguila did not commit any negligence in allowing Angela to exit their door towards
the car garage since they were still within the premises of their residence, and not
on the street where vehicles ordinarily drive by
o The CA also cited the case of Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
which established that children under nine years of age are conclusively presumed
in our jurisdiction to be incapable of contributory negligence
• Maitim moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on May 19, 2015

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Maitim is liable to respondent.

RULING:
Yes.

The RTC correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when it ruled that Santos should be
presumed negligent, and thus, had the burden of proving such presumption otherwise.

In UPCB General Insurance Co. v. Pascual Liner, Inc., this Court reiterated the applicability of
res ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be
established, and once established through the admission of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the
rule on res ipsa loquitur already starts to apply.

As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim
and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation
Report dated April 25, 2005. The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's
vehicle is also not in question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular
accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of
negligence on the part of Santos, the person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the
injury, arises, and he has the burden of presenting proof to the contrary.

Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses would not result to
children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a reasonably prudent man, especially
an alleged experienced driver, would have foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit
towards the common driveway anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly
run across or along said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with utmost
caution when traversing the said driveway, even if given a "clear" signal by a guard.

There is nothing natural about a child getting dragged for three meters and her leg being completely
fractured by a slow-moving vehicle, especially if a reasonably prudent man was driving the vehicle
with care. Thus, both the RTC and CA were right in finding negligence on the part of Santos.

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Moreover, Maitim failed to prove that she was not vicariously liable in this case. Applying Article
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Codeto the present case, the finding of negligence against Santos gave
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of Maitim in the latter's selection and/or
supervision of the former. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Maitim to prove that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employee, Santos.
However, she presented no evidence to corroborate or support her bare, self-serving allegations.
This Court has constantly held that bare allegations cannot be considered as proof, especially
when, such as in this case, the records are barren of any evidence that would support such
allegations.

Also, there was no contributory negligence on the part of Aguila. The evidence on record shows
that the driveway was a common area to both parties' townhouse units, which meant that the
driveway is as much a part of Aguila's residence as it is of Maitim's. It was also found that Angela
was not just running or loitering around but was actually on her way to board their car. Given these
circumstances, this Court sees no negligence on the part of Aguila when she allowed Angela to
exit their door and walk towards their garage. There is a reasonable expectation of safety,
considering that the driveway is still within the premises of their residence and not on the street
where vehicles ordinarily drive by.

Finally, all monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decisio lated June 30, 2014, and
Resolution dated May 19, 2015 of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 100354 are AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION in that all monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON
RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA
and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS:
• The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the health
and welfare of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is made
accountable for his acts. A mistake, through gross negligence or incompetence or plain
human error, may spell the difference between life and death. In this sense, the doctor plays
God on his patient's fate.
• Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old robust
woman. Except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by
the presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as normal as any other woman.
• Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought
professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in
her gall bladder
• She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka on June 10, 1985.
They agreed that their date at the operating table at the Delos Santos Medical Center
(another defendant), would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.
• Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation after
examining the documents (findings from the Capitol Medical Center, FEU Hospital and
DLSMC) presented to him
• Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr.
Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist.
• On the day of her operation, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was there for moral support
• At the operating room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez,
the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia.
• At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone to look for Dr. Hosaka who
was not yet in. Dr. Gutierrez thereafter informed Herminda Cruz about the prospect of a
delay in the arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
• At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient,
heard somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." She then saw people inside the
operating room "moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the operation"

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• As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless
patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan”. Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she
focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing.
• She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless
Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for
someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the
operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The patient's
nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position — a position
where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an
indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. Dr. Calderon was
then able to intubate the patient
• At almost 3:00 P.M. of that day, the patient was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
• About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter
informed the former that something went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what
was told to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have
happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for a good anesthesiologist
• Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened
to the patient. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm
• Since that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose condition. She
cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her body. She cannot see or hear. She is
living on mechanical means. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen
in her brain for four to five minutes. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse
cerebral parenchymal damage"
• On 8 January 1986, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management
and care of Erlinda Ramos.
o Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino
to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused
by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the
anesthesia phase.
o Private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora,
a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda's allergic
reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
• The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Defendants are liable
to plaintiffs for damages and were guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the performance
of their duty to plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos.
• Private respondents seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court rendered a Decision, dated 29 May 1995, reversing the findings of the trial court.

Jagolino (3LM2)
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Dr. Orlino Hosaka is liable
2. Whether or not res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the case
3. Whether or not private respondents were negligent in the care of Erlinda during the
anesthesia phase of the operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence
was the proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition.

RULING:
1ST ISSUE:
Yes.

As the so- called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under
him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in
his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on
record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly
intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was
in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss
in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events
which resulted in Erlinda's condition.

2ND ISSUE:
Yes.

The damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents
a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur.

In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general
surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to
the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control
over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor
discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of
anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her
brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate
and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which
does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation
does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the

Jagolino (3LM2)
use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate
as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed.
Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal
tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge.
Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she
was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.

Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed
while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians,
we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur.

3RD ISSUE:
Yes.

The Court hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on
their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous
condition.

With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia
phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient.

The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is universally

observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Pre-operative evaluation and preparation
for anesthesia begins when the anesthesiologist reviews the patient's medical records and visits
with the patient, traditionally, the day before elective surgery.

In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the
day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-
operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make- up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not
properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of
anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only
an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence
and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with
human lives lie at the core of the physician's centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow
this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.

Respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have
prevented this unfortunate incident. Had appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in

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the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been much more prepared to meet
the contingency brought about by the perceived anatomic variations in the patient's neck and oral
area, defects which would have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations
together with a change in technique. Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre-
operative management and intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez' negligence resulted in cerebral
anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.

Moreover, the Court are inclined to believe petitioners' stand that it was the faulty intubation which
was the proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition. Faulty intubation is undeniably the
proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and,
ultimately, her comatosed condition.

Private respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the first intubation was a failure.
This fact was likewise observed by witness Cruz when she heard respondent Dra. Gutierrez
remarked, "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan."
Thereafter, witness Cruz noticed abdominal distention on the body of Erlinda. The development
of abdominal distention, together with respiratory embarrassment indicates that the endotracheal
tube entered the esophagus instead of the respiratory tree. In other words, instead of the intended
endotracheal intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation,
such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus
instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some
delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place.
Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. 66 As
stated in the testimony of Dr. Hosaka, the lack of oxygen became apparent only after he noticed
that the nailbeds of Erlinda were already blue.

SUMMARY
Private respondents were unable to rebut the presumption of negligence. The Court hold that
private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby
modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this
decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires
or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate
damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the
suit.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.

FACTS:
• On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital
(Medical City Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be
suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
• On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital,
performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of
it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit
Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform hysterectomy on her.
• After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the
corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these
remarks:
o "sponge count lacking 2
o "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."
• After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She
consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the
natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an
oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation.
• On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to
seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the
Philippines.
• On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two
weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon
being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract
by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width.
• Thereafter, pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her
reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical
operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent
another surgery.

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 • On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon
City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for
concealing their acts of negligence.
• On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI,
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice
• PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On
September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision finding defendant-appellant
Dr. Miguel Ampil liable to reimburse defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc.,
whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs- appellees
• Consolidated petitions:
o In G.R. No. 126297, PSI alleged in its petition that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that: (1) it is estopped from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil is not its
employee; (2) it is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil; and (3) it is not entitled to its
counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that Dr. Ampil is not its employee,
but a mere consultant or independent contractor. As such, he alone should answer
for his negligence.
o In G.R. No. 126467, the Aganas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They contend that the pieces of gauze are prima facie
proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent.
o In G.R. No. 127590, Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in finding
him liable for negligence and malpractice sans evidence that he left the two pieces
of gauze in Natividad’s vagina. He pointed to other probable causes, such as: (1) it
was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing the hysterectomy; (2) the attending
nurses’ failure to properly count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical
intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad in the United States
of America.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil Liable for Negligence
and Malpractice (G.R. No. 127590)
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving Dr. Fuentes of any Liability (G.R.
No. 126467)
3. Whether or not PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil (G.R. No. 126297)

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RULING:
FOR G.R. No. 126467
No.

An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the
wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.
To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of
negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.

The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon
fails to remove a sponge he has placed in his patient’s body that should be removed as part of the
operation, he thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and creates a new condition which imposes
upon him the legal duty of calling the new condition to his patient’s attention, and endeavoring
with the means he has at hand to minimize and avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom.

Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even
misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had
he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy
to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr.
Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. Dr, Ampil,
as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s
body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad
about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating
her furtherexamination by American doctors and another surgery. Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the
proximate cause of Natividad’s injury which could be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing.
That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr.
Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate
concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.

FOR G.R. No. 126467

No.

The most instrumental requisite for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is the
"control and management of the thing which caused the injury." In the case at bar, the Court find

Jagolino (3LM2)
the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting.
Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.

It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He
requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found
that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the
surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and
finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then
resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the
misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this
entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.

Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the
surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As
stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship."
That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to
perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting
Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was
this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained
unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and management of
the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.

FOR G.R. No. 126297

Yes.

In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, it was stated that “Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While ‘consultants’ are not, technically
employees, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, the Court rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians."

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Moreover, PSI’s liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or
agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the
determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals.

In regard to the principle of apparent authority or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding
out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of
agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather
because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority exists. It is explained that: “"The principal is bound
by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to
assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing.”

In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes. The Court concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it "is now estopped from
passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is
tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited
physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and
publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its
agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected, these
patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such
were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants. Corporate entities, like
PSI, are capable of acting only through other individuals, such as physicians. If these accredited
physicians do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its mission of offering quality medical
services and thus profits financially. Logically, where negligence mars the quality of its services,
the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for the acts of its ostensible agents.

In regard to the doctrine of corporate negligence, in the present case, it was duly established that
PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing
comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately,
PSI failed to perform such duty. PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation
of the matter reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSI’s part in
the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. Ethical considerations, if not
also legal, dictated the holding of an immediate inquiry into the events, if not for the benefit of the
patient to whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the interest of arriving at the truth. The Court
cannot accept that the medical and the healing professions, through their members like defendant
surgeons, and their institutions like PSI’s hospital facility, can callously turn their backs on and

Jagolino (3LM2)
disregard even a mere probability of mistake or negligence by refusing or failing to investigate a
report of such seriousness as the one in Natividad’s case.

It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of
the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is
reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive
knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the
two pieces of gauze were missing.

In Fridena v. Evans, it was held that a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice
given to its agents or officers within the scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to
which their authority extends. This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City
Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’
report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous
negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice
medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed.
This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.

In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs did plead that the operation was performed at the hospital
with its knowledge, aid, and assistance, and that the negligence of the defendants was the
proximate cause of the patient’s injuries. We find that such general allegations of negligence, along
with the evidence produced at the trial of this case, are sufficient to support the hospital’s liability
based on the theory of negligent supervision."

Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be
emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision of the latter. In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under
the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable
with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also directly liable to the Aganas.

WHEREFORE, we DENY all the petitions and AFFIRM the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198.
Costs against petitioners PSI and Dr. Miguel Ampil.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 200444
SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. and FELIX Q. RUZ, Petitioners
vs.
ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, Respondent

FACTS:
• On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto Belchez was driving a
passenger bus, Mabel Tours Bus owned by [respondent] Antonio San Andres, along
Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, going towards
the direction of Manila.
• While traversing Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it
was overtaking. The Mabel Tours Bus immediately swerved to the left lane but in the
process, it hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and registered in the name of [petitioner]
Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by [petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that was
negotiating in the opposite lane.
• Because of the strong impact of the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed to the side of
the road and the Mabel Tour Bus continuously moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that
was parked on the side of the road which later on fell on the canal.
• Nobody died but all the vehicles were damaged.
• Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged buses as well as the other
two (2) vehicles were conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of Candelaria,
Municipal Police Station.
• [Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and Body Builder
to have it repaired. The cost of repair was estimated in the amount of One Hundred Forty
Four Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (Php l44,500.00).
• On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was instituted by
[respondent] Antonio San Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel
Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it
underwent repairs in the amount of ₱144,500.00 and ₱150,000.00, respectively
• Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They alleged among
others that plaintiff has no cause of action against them; the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the [respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez
operated the Mabel Tours Bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in
negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle
occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction resulting to head on collision
on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of the accident, [respondent]
operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered plate.
• The parties failed to hammer out an amicable settlement.
• In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez, Assistant for Operations of [petitioner] Supreme
Transportation Liner, Inc and one of petitioner’s witnesses, stated that he filed a criminal

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 complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property against Ernesto
Belchez. The case was terminated and the accused was convicted because of his admission
of the crime charged.
• In the said criminal complaint, he did not reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the fiscal
to reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount of their counterclaim in the
present civil action filed by [respondent]. He added that they did not receive any
compensation for the civil aspect of the criminal case, and although the Supreme Bus was
covered by insurance, they did not claim for any reimbursement in connection with the
subject incident.
• On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the respondent's complaint
as well as the petitioners' counterclaim
o RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners' liability and
that the petitioners' counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
o RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate
civil action precluded their right to recover damages from the respondent through
their counterclaim.
• Petitioners appealed however, the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal
o Stating that the RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not prosper
because their recourse was limited to the enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary
liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code;
o That "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to double recovery
of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules;" and
o That their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant that their right to recover
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal
action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim was correctly denied by the RTC.

RULING:
No.

The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the
CA despite their failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they
had brought against respondent's driver. Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the
petitioners' cause of action was upon a quasi-delict. As such, their counterclaim against the
respondent was based on Article 2184, in relation to Article 2180 and Article 2176, all of the Civil
Code.

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Although the RTC itself acknowledged that the counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, the RTC
likewise erred on its outcome because its ratiocination was founded on the obsolete version of the
Rules of Court. By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008, the revised
relevant rule of procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect, and it had specifically
deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis the independent civil actions.

The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into consideration that the
omission of the driver in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could give rise not
only to the obligation ex delicto, but also to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on the
common element of negligence. Article 2177 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions simultaneously.

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is
only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted,"
and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.

Hence, the petitioners as the injured parties have to choose the remedy by which to enforce their
claim in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is because Article 2177 of the Civil
Code bars them from recovering damages twice upon the same act or omission. As ruled in
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco: “An act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., ( 1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities. Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or
under both causes.”

Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which is the applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit double recovery of damages arising
from the same act or omission. The petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered damages
from the respondent was not controlling considering that the criminal case against the respondent's
driver had already been concluded. It remains for the petitioners to still demonstrate that the RTC
as the trial court did not award civil damages in the criminal case. Consequently, Civil Case No.
T-2240 should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, if only to afford to the petitioners
the opportunity to present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the prohibition against double
recovery of damages.

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WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial
Court in Tabaco City for further proceedings to allow the petitioners to present evidence on their
counterclaim, subject to the foregoing clarifications.

Jagolino (3LM2)