Republic of the Philippines PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA SO ORDERED.

9
SUPREME COURT STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA,
Manila NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate
ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA court, in its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction
THIRD DIVISION MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the
TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG publication of the libelous article. The fallo of the Decision reads –
SINTENSIYA SA KANYA"
G.R. No. 157643               March 28, 2008
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are
CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN, Petitioner, entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose
vs. than to expose said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation 1. The appealed decision as against the accused-appellant
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a fugitive from justice and a BOGS C. TUGAS is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the another is entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged
DECISION person of the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of the said and ABSOLVING him from any civil liability; and
ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
NACHURA, J.: 2. The same appealed decision as against accused-appellant
CONTRARY TO LAW.7 CRISTENELLI S. FERMIN is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
Before us is a petition1 for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the REDUCED to ₱300,000.00 for EACH offended party, and the
Rules of Court, of the Decision 2 dated September 3, 2002 and the Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas (Tugas) award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.
Resolution3 dated March 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- both pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
G.R. CR No. 20890 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Cristenelli S.
Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas." Costs against the appellant FERMIN.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its
Joint Decision8 dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo guilty of libel. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads – SO ORDERED.10
(Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel 4 were filed
against Cristinelli5 S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused, The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218. Except for the name of judgment is hereby rendered finding CRISTENELLI S. FERMIN and in the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition, raising the
the complainant,6 the informations uniformly read – BOGS C. TUGAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of libel, following arguments:
punishable under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences them
That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days I.
the above-named accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and
publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum, for each THE RULING IN U.S. VS. TAYLOR, PEOPLE VS.
with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon case. TOPACIO AND SANTIAGO, U.S. VS. MADRIGAL AND
City, and circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila and U.S. VS. SANTOS AND THE HOLDING IN U.S. VS.
the whole country, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually Likewise, accused Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs Tugas are sentenced to OCAMPO AS CLARIFIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
helping each other, publicly and acting with malice, did then and there pay jointly and solidarily: IN PEOPLE VS. BELTRAN AND SOLIVEN REQUIRING
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously print and circulate in the headline KNOWLEDGE, PARTICIPATION AND COMPLICITY BY
and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 the THE PUBLISHER IN THE PREPARATION AND
following material, to wit: a) moral damages of:
APPROVAL OF THE LIBELOUS ARTICLE TO SUSTAIN
THE LATTER’S CONVICTION FOR LIBEL ARE
"MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA 1. ₱500,000.00 to Annabelle Rama in Criminal Case APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON No. Q-95-62823; and
SI ANNABELLE" II.
2. ₱500,000.00 to Eddie Gutierrez in Criminal Case
"IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI No. Q-95-62824;
ART. 360 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH
ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO MAKES A PUBLISHER LIABLE FOR LIBEL TO THE
NILA DU’N, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY b) attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00. SAME EXTENT AS IF HE WERE THE AUTHOR
NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING
 THEREOF MERELY CREATES A DISPUTABLE words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper no defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or
PRESUMPTION WHICH MAY BE REBUTTED BY or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same." However, proof consent, x x x
CONTRARY EVIDENCE. adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the
publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was "One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a
III. directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom
contained in the said libelous article.18 he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS NOT LIBELOUS. actually appears, and should be held responsible therefore, whether he
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish was individually concerned in the publication or not, x x x. Criminal
text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in the course of his
IV. "publicar." Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the employment necessarily implies some degree of guilt or delinquency on
author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but the part of the publisher; x x x.
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS PROTECTED BY THE also the person who prints or publishes it.
MANTLE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND IS "We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published
WITHIN THE REALM OF FAIR AND HONEST Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor or
COMMENT.11 in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor
has been specifically identified as "author, editor, or proprietor" or or manager."
Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and the second issues "printer/publisher" of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this
jointly, then the third and the fourth issues together. case. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same
question was considered and the court held that in the criminal
Petitioner posits that, to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is
of the Revised Penal Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code 19 was enunciated in U.S. v. prima facie presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion
participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the Ocampo,20 to wit: of an offer by the defendant to prove that he never saw the libel and was
libelous article. This principle is, allegedly, based on our ruling in U.S. not aware of its publication until it was pointed out to him and that an
v. Taylor,12 People v. Topacio and Santiago,13 U.S. v. Madrigal,14 U.S. v. "According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, apology and retraction were afterwards published in the same paper,
Abad Santos,15 and U.S. v. Ocampo,16 as purportedly clarified in People the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the gave him no ground for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt,
v. Beltran and Soliven. 17 She submits that these cases were applied by same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of speaking for the court, said:
the CA in acquitting her co-accused Tugas, and being similarly situated the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is
with him, she is also entitled to an acquittal. She claims that she had printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons who in any "It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for
adduced ample evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable the publication of improper communications, to use reasonable caution
and publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing, as publishers." in the conduct of his business that no libels be published." (Wharton’s
examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishop’s Criminal Law, secs. 219,
xxxx 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136
The arguments are too simplistic and the cited jurisprudence are either Mass., 441.)
misplaced or, in fact, damning.
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am.
St. Rep., 629), the question of the responsibility of the manager or The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts.
Foremost, U.S. v. Madrigal and U.S. v. Abad Santos are not applicable proprietor of a newspaper was discussed. The court said, among other In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was
to the present case. U.S. v. Madrigal pertains to a criminal prosecution things (pp. 782, 783): "clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable
under Section 30 of Act No. 1519 for fraudulently representing the criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for
weight or measure of anything to be greater or less than it is, whereas misconduct in the management of the paper."
U.S. v. Abad Santos refers to criminal responsibility under the Internal "The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a
Revenue Law (Act. No. 2339). newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that
the libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent. This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr.
When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient Justice Foster.
The other cases are more in point, but they serve to reinforce the evidence prima facie to charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt
conviction of, rather than absolve, petitioner. of its publication. Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:

In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. "The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held "An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a paper,
277 which provides that: "Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should be although he did not know of its being put into the paper and stopped the
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any sale as soon as he discovered it."
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that – v. Ocampo; to modify it would amount to judicial legislation. Article which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was
360 is clear and unambiguous, and to apply People v. Beltran and confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles
"A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a Soliven, which requires specific knowledge, participation, and approval City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending
newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally, and his on the part of the publisher to be liable for the publication of a libelous physician that Tugas’ medical condition did not prevent him
liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in publishing it." article, would be reading into the law an additional requirement that was from performing his work, thus –
not intended by it.
It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the "publisher," as shown Q: How would you describe the condition of the patient on
by the editorial box of Gossip Tabloid, 21 but also its "president" and In the same vein, we note that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. Tugas June 13, 1995?
"chairperson" as she herself admitted on the witness stand. 22 She also cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned
testified that she handled the business aspect of the publication, and article as was evident from his and petitioner’s Joint Counter- A: He is in stable condition.
assigns editors to take charge of everything. 23 Obviously, petitioner had Affidavit,26 and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to
full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse wit:
Q: You said he was in severe pain, from your opinion, was that
of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the condition sufficient to enable him to work?
libelous article fails to persuade. Following our ruling in Ocampo, WITNESS: As editor-in-chief, I have no participation in the
petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had writing of the questioned article and my only participation in
actual knowledge and participation, having furnished the means of the publication is the handling of the physical lay-outing, A: Yes, in my opinion.28
carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the indication and allocation of type-size of the body of the article,
members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees under before the same was printed and published in GOSSIP Q: You said your impression of the patient was urethral colic
her control and supervision. Tabloid. and this was caused by spasm?

Petitioner argues that Ocampo has been clarified by the CA in People v. Q: You do not deny the statements in this publication as A: Yes, sir.
Beltran and Soliven such that Maximo V. Soliven, as publisher of The executed by you in the counter-affidavit and sworn in before
Philippine Star, was acquitted by the appellate court in view of the lack the City Prosecutor, is this correct? Q: When you say spasm, it is not sustained, it comes every
of evidence that he knew and approved the article written by Luis D. now and then and [intermittently], it is not sustained?
Beltran about then President Corazon C. Aquino in the newspaper’s A: Yes, that is correct.
October 12, 1987 issue. Petitioner submits that People v. Beltran and
Soliven serves as a guide to this Court regarding the criminal liability of A: Yes, sir.
the publisher of the newspaper where a libelous article is published. Put ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
differently, it appears that petitioner wants this Court to follow the CA Q: Now you said he was in stable condition?
decision and adopt it as judicial precedent under the principle of stare That is all for the witness, your Honor.
decisis.
A: Yes, sir.
COURT: Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as
The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8 24 of the Civil Code, you were, you will not allow the said publication of this same Q: That means that his ailment is not life-threatening?
is enunciated, thus: article or same stories?

A: Correct.
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It A: If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will
requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of because if you can see the article, your Honor, it is according
the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to our source, it is not a direct comment. Q: In fact, visitors were allowed to see him?
to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has COURT: So whether you are there or not, [the] same article A: Yes, sir.
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to leading to them (sic) will still find its way to come out?
further argument.25 (Emphasis supplied)
Q: He can also write?
A: Yes, your honor.27
Unfortunately, the Beltran decision attained finality at the level of the
A: Yes, sir.
CA. Thus, if the CA seemingly made a new pronouncement regarding
the criminal liability of a publisher under Article 360 of the Revised Tugas’ testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in
Penal Code, that ruling cannot bind this Court unless we purposely adopt the preparation and publication of the controversial article and Q: He was allowed to [receive] friends?
the same. Be that as it may, we find no compelling reason to revisit U.S. his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his alibi,
A: Yes, sir. Q: How did you know that he is working on his paper works in Mainit na pinag-uusapan ngayon ang iba’t ibang posibilidad na maaaring
Quezon City? Did you see him do that? gawin ni Annabelle Rama Gutierrez para lang hindi matuloy ang pag-
Q: According to you, he was able to work also, he is not totally aresto at pagkukulong sa kanya ng mga awtoridad kaugnay ng
incapacitated in performing certain chores in the hospital A: I only know he goes to Manila everyday. sintensiyang ipinapataw sa kanya ni Manila-RTC Judge Rodolfo
room? Palattao.
Q: In your boarding house, you saw him read and write?
A: No, sir. Mula noong June 8, nabatid ng Gossip Tabloid, ay wala pang sinumang
nakapagtuturo kung saan talaga naroon ang ina ni Ruffa Gutierrez na
A: Probably yes.29 hindi pinayagang makapagpiyansa ng Branch 33 para sa pansamantala
Q: Now, prior to 7:10 o’clock in the morning of June 13, 1995, niyang kalayaan.
you did not see Mr. Bogs Tugas? But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting
Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of May mga nagpapalagay na sa pamamagitan ng tinatawag na back-door
A: I saw him, he was admitted at 7:00 o’clock but I saw him his constitutional right against double jeopardy. exit, ang pag-alis ng bansa sa paraang hindi na kailangan pang dumaan
before. sa NAIA, ay nakaalis na si Annabelle noon pang nakaraang Biyernes,
Anent the third and fourth issues, petitioner argues that the subject article June 9, patungong Amerika.
Q: How long before 7:10 were you able to see him? in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered
by the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and Pero isang mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip Tabloid ang
A: That is about 2 hours. honest comment. We disagree. nagsabing napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika nagtungo si Annabelle dahil
doon man ay may mga nakahanda nang awtoridad na handang
Q: About 5:00 o’clock in the morning? The banner headlines of the offending article read: magkulong kay Annabelle, sakaling mapatunayang naroon nga siya.

A: Yes, sir. KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE "Hindi siya makapupunta sa Amerika dahil napakarami rin
RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA! niyang asuntong iniwan doon noon pa!

Q: Who was his companion when you saw him?

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA "Nag-abroad man siya, e pihadong hindi siya sa Amerika
SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DU’N nagtuloy dahil nakaabang na rin ang sangkatutak niyang
A: He was boarding in my place. SI ANNABELLE! maniningil du’n ngayon!

Q: So, you brought him to the hospital? On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller "Sa Amerika pa kaya siya magtatago, samantalang ilang taon
but bold letters, are: na rin siyang inaabangan du’n ng mga kababayan nating
A: Both of us went to the hospital. niloko niya, in one way or another?" simula ng source ng
HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL Gossip Tabloid.
Q: Which boarding house are you referring [to]? In Angeles NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN
City? DU’N NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, Niliwanag ng naturang source na ang dahilan ng biglaang pag-uwi ng
PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA pamilya Gutierrez sa bansa ilang taon na ang nakararaan ay may
AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG kinalaman sa malaking halagang hindi nabayaran nina Eddie at
A: Yes, sir.
TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DU’N NG NGA Annabelle sa ilang kababayan natin sa Amerika.
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY
Q: Do you know that Mr. Bogs Tugas works here in Quezon OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO ‘YUNG "Naaalala pa ba ninyo ‘yung mga kalderong ibinebenta noon
City as editor-in-chief of a newspaper tabloid? MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA nina Eddie at Annabelle sa States?
NOON SA AMERIKA, DU’N SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA,
A: Yes, sir. MILYON-MILYON ANG INVOLVED, KAYA
KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA PILIPINAS NOON! "Mga mamahaling kaldero ‘yun, hindi basta-basta kaldero ang
ibinebenta nila du’n, kaya talagang ang ganda-ganda na sana
Q: And some of his work is done in your boarding house? ng buhay nilang mag-anak du’n hanggang sa dumating ‘yung
The rest of the article, which continued to the entire second page of the point na sinisingil na sila nu’ng mismong kompanya ng
tabloid, follows – kaldero!
A: I do not know about it.
 "Malaki ang halagang involved, milyon-milyon, kaya nu’ng "Kaso ‘yung pinagbebentahan nila, ‘yung halagang dapat sana, "Naghahanap ng sakit ng katawan si Annabelle kung sa States
kinasuhan na sila, e kinailangan nilang umalis sa Amerika para e, ibigay nila sa kompanya dahil porsiyentuhan lang naman nga niya maisipang pumunta ngayon para lang malusutan si
bumalik na dito. sila du’n, nagastos nila! Ligaya Santos at ang sintensiya sa kanya ni Judge Palattao!"
madiin pang pahayag ng mapagkakatiwalaang source ng
"Isa si Bert Leroy, Jr. sa mga Pilipinong nagkaroon ng "Nawala ang pera, at ang balita nga sa States, e, si Annabelle Gossip Tabloid.30
malaking problema kina Eddie at Annabelle, alam ba n’yo ang dahilan kung bakit nalubog sila noon sa utang sa States!
yun? A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
"Nag-casino pala si Annabelle! Grabe raw kung magpatalo vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status,
"Ang ganda-ganda ng samahan nila nu’ng una sa Amerika, siya, kaya pati ‘yung kinita nila sa pagbebenta ng mamahaling or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of
yumaman sila nang dahil sa mga mamahaling kaldero na kaldero, e, natunaw!" sabi uli ng source ng Gossip Tabloid. a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
ibinebenta nila, kaso, sumabit sina Eddie at Annabelle du’n sa dead.31 In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
mismong company na pinagkukunan nila ng produkto! used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their
Maraming Pilipino ang sinabitan doon ng mag-asawa, ayon pa sa source plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
ng Gossip Tabloid, kaya ngayong may asunto naman si Annabelle dito persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
"Bukod sa napakarami na nilang isinabit na Pinoy sa Amerika sa Pilipinas ay napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika pa rin siya tatakbo. understood in another sense.32
dahil sa mga kalderong ‘yun, e sumabit pa sila nang malaking
halaga sa mismong manufacturer nu’ng mga ibinebenta nilang "Paano siya magpupunta du’n para tuluyan nang manirahan, e,
mamahaling kaldero! To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs one’s
ang dami-dami ring Pinoy na naghihintay sa kanya du’n para sensibilities; it would certainly prick one’s conscience. There is evident
maningil sa kanya? imputation of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted
"Yun ang dahilan kung bakit bigla-biglang umuwi sa Pilipinas for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in
ang pamilya ni Eddie! "Alam n’yo ba, bukod sa galit na galit na sa kanila ang mga America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or
Pinoy na nandu’n, e, may mga nakaabang na ring asunto para defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their
"Ang ikinakatwiran nilang mag-asawa noon, e gusto raw kasi kay Annabelle. family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and
nilang lumaking Pilipinong-Pilipino ang kanilang mga anak, of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from
pero ang totoo, e, napakalaki ng problemang iniwan nila sa "So, malabong sa Amerika pa siya tumuloy ngayong their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution
Amerika!" mahabang simula ng source ng Gossip Tabloid. napapabalitang nasa abroad siya dahil sa mga naghihintay na was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide
kaso sa kanya du’n. circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More
Masamang-masama diumano ang loob ng mga Pilipinong kinatalo roon importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor,
nina Eddie at Annabelle, lalo na si Annabelle, na bukod sa mataray na ay discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
"Ang alam namin, e, sa Europe nagbabalak pumunta ang
may kayabangan pa. pamilya ni Eddie.
Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because, allegedly,
"Dati nang ganyan si Annabelle! Mataray siya na wala sa the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that
"Di ba’t ilang beses nang nagpapabalik-balik du’n sina Ruffa. Annabelle Rama Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her
lugar. Nu’ng nasa Amerika pa silang mag-anak, e, ‘yun din Noon pa, e, pinag-aralan na nina Eddie at Annabelle ang
ang madalas nilang pag-awayan du’n ni Eddie! conviction for estafa before then Judge Palattao’s court. She even cited
posibilidad ng mga gagawin nila! as proof of her lack of malice the purported absence of any ill will
against complainants, as shown by the article she wrote about
"Madalas silang magkagalit, kaya si Eddie, para lang "Alam nila na hindi sila puwedeng mag-stay sa States dahil complainants’ daughter Sharmaine Ruffa Gutierrez in the June 15, 1995
makapagpalipas ng mga sama niya ng loob, e, du’n nag-i-stay kalat din ang asunto nila du’n, bukod pa sa napakaraming issue of the same tabloid where she expressed her sympathy and
sa bahay ng mga kaibigan niyang Pinoy! Pinoy na huma-hunting sa kanila! admiration for the latter.

"Grabe ang naging problema nila du’n, kaya wala silang "Kaya kung totoong nakalusot na nga si Annabelle ngayon Notably, however, the complainants successfully refuted the imputations
choice that time kung di ang umuwi na lang sa Pilipinas! para makatakas siya sa pagkakulong, imposibleng sa States during the trial. Complainants proved that they could return anytime to
siya nagpunta! the United States of America after the publication of the article, 33 and
"Ang halagang involved sa pagbebenta nila ng kaldero, e, that they remained on good terms with the manufacturing company of
hindi basta-basta, milyunan ‘yon! the cookware.34 To the contrary, both petitioner and Tugas failed to
"Mas malaking problema ang kailangan niyang harapin sa
adduce evidence to show the truth of the allegations in the article despite
States dahil sa perang nadispalko nila, bukod pa sa asuntong
the opportunity to do so.
iniwan nilang nakatiwangwang du’n!
Further worthy of mention is the admission of petitioner before the trial Q: Of course, the tandem of Joey Marquez was working hard We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media
court that she had very close association with then Congressman Golez to win over their opponent, is it not? practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by
and mayoralty candidate Joey Marquez, and that she would use her skills their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of
as a writer to campaign for them. Complainant Eddie Gutierrez ran A: Whatever their problems were, I am out. the right of free speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights
against then incumbent Golez for the congressional seat in Parañaque of others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities
City. Petitioner testified in this wise – inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the
Q: As a hard campaigner, you wanted your team to win over regression of human society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature
the other, is this correct? where life is short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there
Q: When you acted as writer during the campaign, as you said,
for Joey Marquez and Golez, of course you did not give your can be no absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly comprehend the
services for free to these candidates, were you paid? A: Yes, Sir. quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action,
genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of others. If
Q: Of course you understand what PRO work is, it includes there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the
A: I was not paid, Sir. press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-
propaganda, is that correct?
censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
Q: You just wanted to help them, am I correct? warned, "[W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press
A: I am sorry I don’t accept PR work, Sir. may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice.
A: Yes, because they are my friends, Sir.
Q: Do you understand PRO work? Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space
Q: And you wanted them to win the election, thru your being a in which expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always
writer, is that correct? A: Yes, Sir, I know. strongly maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is man’s
birthright – constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has
become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor fidei" in a
A: Yes, Sir. Q: In propaganda, for your side, you promote it as against the
democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that
other, right?
the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom
Q: You were campaigning hard for Golez and Marquez, right? does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the
A: Yes, Sir.35 ordinary citizen.38
A: Right, Sir.
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for
make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner libel should be upheld.
Q: When you say hard, you wanted your candidates to win, is cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no
it not? malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article
With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note
being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was
that on January 25, 2008, the Court issued Administrative Circular No.
A: Yes, Sir. motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.
08-2008, entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference
in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The Circular expresses a
Q: Who was the opponent of Joey Marquez at that time? Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of preference for the imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment, given
freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to the circumstances attendant in the cases 39 cited therein in which only a
A: The former Mayor Olivares, Sir. critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of fine was imposed by this Court on those convicted of libel. It also states
their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public that, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to
interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of pay the same, the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
Q: How about the opponent of Congressman Golez? constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or imprisonment should apply.
unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties or irrelevant to
A: One of them is Eddie Gutierrez, Sir. matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give
However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound
rise to criminal and civil liability. 36 While complainants are considered
discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the
Q: And the tandem of Marquez and Golez versus the tandem public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business,
imposition of a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the
of Olivares and Eddie Gutierrez, am I correct? media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to
such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their
the imperatives of justice.
honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious
A: Actually, that was the situation at that time, Sir. comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal
lives.37 In the case at bench, the Court considers the public’s speculations as to
the whereabouts of Annabelle Rama Gutierrez with the issuance of the
warrant of arrest after her initial conviction for estafa. Petitioner fueled
these speculations through her article. However, her article went
overboard and exceeded the bounds of fair comment. This warrants her
conviction. Nonetheless, in light of the relatively wide latitude given to
utterances against public figures such as private complainants, and
consonant with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the Court deems it
proper to modify the penalty of imprisonment to a fine in the amount of
₱6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each
case. But the award of moral damages for each of the private
complainants in the amount of ₱500,000.00, as ordered by the trial court,
should be restored on account of the serious anxiety and the wounded
feelings suffered by complainants from the libelous article, particularly
taking into account the fact that petitioner and the private complainants
were on relatively good terms with each other, and complainants gave no
cause or offense which could have provoked the malicious publication.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 3, 2002 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20890 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in lieu of imprisonment, petitioner Cristinelli S.
Fermin is sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of ₱6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each case. The award
of moral damages, in the amount of ₱300,000.00 each in favor of
complainants Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo Gutierrez, is
increased to ₱500,000.00. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 as a passageway to second floor unit 963 which was used as staff room Remington a longer extension period of five years for second floor unit
for its Manila sales force. 963 and ordering YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway between
units 964 and 966.
On February 27, 1997, YMCA formally terminated the lease over second
floor unit 963 and gave Remington until March 31, 1997 to vacate the Dissatisfied, YMCA filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
premises. On March 24, 1997, Remington filed with the Metropolitan SP No. 58957. On September 19, 2003, the CA held that the lower
Trial Court (MeTC), Manila a case for the Fixing of Lease Period over courts had authority to fix an extension of the lease period. It found that
unit 963, docketed as Civil Case No. 154969-CV. On April 8, 1997, although the lease contract had expired, Remington's continued
YMCA filed in the same court an action for Unlawful Detainer involving occupation of unit 963 resulted in a new lease on a month-to-month
the same unit 963 against Remington, docketed as Civil Case No. basis, which subsisted for over a year; thus, while YMCA had the right
155083-CV. The two cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of to seek its termination, Remington was entitled to a judicial lengthening
MeTC-Manila (MeTC-Branch 26). of its period based on equity. Nonetheless, the CA ordered Remington to
vacate the premises, as the continuation of the lease was no longer
During the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV, tenable after the lapse of six years, since the parties' formal contract had
Remington filed a Petition for Consignation of Rentals on the ground expired. It also noted that since Remington had already transferred to its
that YMCA refused to receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and own building, there was no more reason to continue the lease.
966, docketed as Civil Case No. 155897 and assigned to Branch 24 of Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA considered
MeTC-Manila (MeTC-Branch 24). On June 23, 1998, Remington filed a as moot, for Remington had vacated the premises.
[G.R. NO. 159422 : March 28, 2008] Formal Surrender of the Leased Premises,4 opting to surrender
possession of units 964 and 966 effective July 1, 1998 and tendering two In the meantime that CA-G.R. SP No. 58957 was pending, YMCA filed
checks to cover all past rentals due on the two units. On June 25, 1998, in MeTC-Manila two separate complaints for unlawful detainer to evict
CHINESE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE
YMCA filed a No Objection to the Turn Over of the Leased Premises at Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966,8 docketed as Civil Case
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, doing business under the name of
#964 and 966 Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. 5 On July 9, 1998, MeTC Nos. 168629-CV and 168628-CV, respectively. Civil Case No. 168629-
MANILA DOWNTOWN YMCA, Petitioner, v. REMINGTON
- Branch 24 issued an Order6 declaring the consignation case closed. CV was raffled to Branch 20, while Civil Case No. 168628-CV was
STEEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
raffled to Branch 17. Upon Remington's motion, the two cases were
Remington, however, continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966 as consolidated. However, when YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration,
DECISION the consolidation of cases was reversed and canceled. Thus, the cases
passageway to second floor unit 963. It kept the premises padlocked and
failed to give YMCA the keys to the premises. were tried separately.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On August 11, 1998, MeTC-Branch 26 rendered a Decision in Civil YMCA contended in both cases that Remington did not surrender the
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV extending for three years from ground floor units but padlocked the doors, refused to surrender the
the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated January 16, 2003 of finality of the decision the lease period on second floor unit 963 and keys, and failed to pay rent therefor demand.
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 which dismissed dismissed YMCA's complaint for ejectment.
outright petitioner's Petition for Review for failure to show proof of Remington countered that it vacated and surrendered ground floor units
authority of the signatory to the Verification and Certification of Non- 964 and 966 on July 1, 1998; that although it had the doors of the units
On August 21, 1998, Remington filed in MeTC-Branch 26 a Motion to
Forum Shopping, and locked, it did so only as an act of self-preservation, since it had a valid
Constitute Passageway alleging that it had no means of ingress or egress
to second floor unit 963. MeTC-Branch 26 assigned a Commissioner to lease on second floor unit 963, and YMCA refused to heed the order of
the CA Resolution2 dated July 29, 2003 which denied petitioner's Motion conduct an ocular inspection. He reported that Remington was still in the court to provide a passageway to the second floor; that, if it were true
for Reconsideration thereof. possession of the keys to ground floor units 964 and 966 because YMCA that no turnover of ground floor units 964 and 966 was made, YMCA
failed to provide an adequate passageway to second floor unit 963. The had the remedy of filing the appropriate motion in the consignation case,
issue on the passageway, however, was not resolved by MeTC-Branch where the parties agreed on such turnover; and that the fact that it did not
The antecedent facts of the petition are as follows:
26, for it had to forward the records of the case to Branch 30, Regional complain shows completion of such turnover.9
Trial Court, Manila (RTC-Branch 30) in connection with the appeals
Remington Steel Corporation3 (Remington) leased ground floor units
taken by the parties from its decision, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 99- Both branches of MeTC-Manila separately ordered Remington to vacate
964 and 966 and second floor unit 963 of a building owned by the
93836 and 99-93837. the premises and to pay reasonable rent and attorney's fees to YMCA. 10
Manila Downtown YMCA (YMCA) in Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila.
Remington used the combined areas of ground floor units 964 and 966 as
hardware store, offices, and display shops for its steel products, as well On March 15, 2000, RTC-Branch 30, acting as an appellate court, Remington separately appealed both decisions to the Regional Trial
rendered a Decision7 in Civil Case Nos. 99-93836 and 99-93837 granting Court, Manila (RTC-Manila). Its appeal from MeTC-Manila, Branch 20
was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-102435 and assigned to Branch 40, that recent cases of this Court, while upholding the need to present the like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons
while the appeal from MeTC-Manila Branch 17 was docketed as Civil authority of the person signing the Verification and Certification of Non- duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act
Case No. 03-107655 and assigned to Branch 25. Branches 40 and 25 of Forum Shopping in case the party litigant is not a natural person, of the board of directors.25
RTC-Manila separately reversed the respective decisions of MeTC- emphasize that its late submission is not fatal.
Manila and dismissed the two complaints for unlawful The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
detainer.11 YMCA filed separate motions for Remington, on the other hand, contends that YMCA is required at the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
time of the filing of its petition to show that the person signing the correct, not merely speculative. 26 On the other hand, the rule against
reconsideration12 which were denied.13 Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping on its behalf had forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
proper authority to do so; that subsequent compliance would encourage allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this
YMCA then filed separate petitions for review 14 in the CA, docketed as parties to make light of the requirements of petitions for review. practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. 27
CA-G.R SP Nos. 74292 and 88599.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court require that a Petition for A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
15
On January 16, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution  dismissing outright Review filed with the CA should be verified and should contain a requirements for Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 involving unit 964 on certificate of non-forum shopping, to wit: As to Verification, non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render
the ground that William Golangco, the signatory to the Verification and the pleading fatally defective; hence, the court may order its correction if
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping, failed to show his proof of SEC. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified,
authority to file the Petition for Review . from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
Court of Appeals x x x. thereby be served.28 On the other hand, the lack of certification of non-
On February 10, 2003, YMCA filed a Motion for forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after
Reconsideration16 therein, appending thereto a Secretary's the filing of the petition. 29 The submission of a certificate against forum
Certificate17 dated December 26, 2002 executed by YMCA's Corporate SEC. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.30 However,
Secretary attesting to a December 13, 2002 Resolution of the Board of legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being jurisprudence instructs that the rule on certification against forum
Directors authorizing William Golangco to prepare and file the Petition indicated as such by the petitioner, x x x. shopping may be relaxed on grounds of "substantial compliance" or
for Review . "special circumstance or compelling reasons." 31
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
On July 29, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution18 denying YMCA's motion under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,32 the petitioner had not
for reconsideration. Citing Spouses Melo v. Court of Appeals,19 the CA involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or attached any proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the
underscored the mandatory nature of the requirement that the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, as a
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should be annexed to, or such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and consequence of which, the petition was dismissed by the CA.
simultaneously filed with the petition and that subsequent compliance if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been Subsequent to the dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a motion for
therewith cannot excuse a party's failure to comply in the first instance. filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or reconsideration, to which was attached a Certificate issued by its board
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes secretary who stated that, prior to the filing of the petition, the resident
Hence, the present petition involving only unit 964 anchored on the to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency manager had been authorized by the board of directors to file the
following ground: thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary petition. The Court recognized therein the abundance of cases excusing
non-compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is shopping and held that with more reason should a petition be given due
THE PETITION RAISED BEFORE IT WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. 21 The requirement that course when it incorporates a certification of non-forum shopping
PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT THE AUTHORITY OF THE the petitioner should sign the Verification and Certification of Non- without evidence that the person signing the certification was an
AFFIANT WHO SIGNED FOR THE PETITIONER CORPORATION Forum Shopping applies even to corporations, considering that the authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits a
AND THE SUBSEQUENT SUBMISSION OF THE SECRETARY'S mandatory directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction between secretary's certificate attesting to the signatory's authority in its motion
CERTIFICATE DID NOT CURE SAID DEFECT IN THE natural and juridical persons.22 for reconsideration.
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.20
Except for the powers which are expressly conferred on it by the Similarly, in Havtor Management Philippines Inc. v. National Labor
YMCA argues that the rules do not require that the filing of the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its Relations Commission,33 the Court acknowledged substantial compliance
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should include existence, a corporation has no powers. It exercises its powers through when the lacking secretary's certificate was submitted by the petitioners
therewith the authorization of the person signing the same; its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of
that Melo does not apply, since it involves the total failure to append to agents.23 Thus, its power to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to
the petition a Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. 24 Physical acts, submit such requirement.
Likewise, in General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Ordinarily, the Court would remand the case to the CA for proper can enter the premises without exposing the property to security risks.
Commission,34 the CA dismissed the petition, which was not disposition of the petition on the merits.44 The particular surrounding Prudence dictates the delivery of the keys to [YMCA] to dispel any
accompanied by any board resolution or certification by the corporate facts and circumstances in the present case, however, prevent the Court doubt that [Remington] is using the premises other than as a mere
secretary that the person who signed the Certification of Non-Forum from doing so. In the meantime that the present petition was pending, the passageway and that it has never withheld possession of the same to the
Shopping was duly authorized to represent the petitioner corporation. In CA rendered a Decision dated October 17, 2005 in CA-G.R SP No. [YMCA]. [Remington] had several opportunities to give [YMCA] access
the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the petitioner attached a board 88599, involving ground floor unit 966 reversing the Decision of RTC- to the premises starting from the time it sent its first demand to pay back
resolution stating that the signatory of the Certification had been duly Branch 25 and reinstating the Decision of MeTC-Branch 17 on YMCA's rentals until the complaint for ejectment was filed but it never availed of
authorized to do so. The Court deemed as substantial compliance the complaint for unlawful detainer. When Remington's motion for these opportunities.chanrobles virtual law library
belated attachment to the motion for reconsideration the board resolution reconsideration was denied, it filed a Petition for Review
or the secretary's certificate, stating that there was no attempt on the part on Certiorari with this Court, entitiled "Remington Industrial Sales From the foregoing, it is apparent that [Remington's] constructive
of the petitioner to ignore the prescribed procedural requirements. Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the delivery did not effectively transfer possession of the leased premises
Philippine Islands, doing business under the name Manila Downtown to [YMCA]. From the time the lease was terminated, [Remington]
The ruling in these cases has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent YMCA," docketed as G.R. No. 171858. 45 On January 22, 2007, the Court unlawfully withheld possession of the leased premises from
cases: Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas rendered a Decision46 granting the petition and dismissing the unlawful [YMCA]. However, it appears that [Remington] had moved out from
Neighborhood Association,35 Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. detainer case involving ground floor unit 966. However, upon YMCA's [YMCA's] building on March 12, 2004, as stated in its Manifestation
National Labor Relations Commission,36 Vicar International motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a Resolution dated August before Branch 25 of the RTC-Manila. [YMCA] is entitled to a
Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation, 37 Ateneo De 31, 2007 setting aside its January 22, 2007 Decision and reinstating the reasonable compensation for [Remington's] continued occupancy of the
Naga University v. Manalo,38 China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon Decision of MeTC-Branch 17 with the modification that Remington was premises despite termination of the lease from July 1, 1998 to March 12,
International Philippines, Inc., 39 LDP Marketing, Inc. v. ordered to pay YMCA P11,000.00 a month from July 1, 1998 until 2004.
Monter,40 Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations March 12, 2004 as reasonable compensation for the use of the
Commission,41 and most recently in Cana v. Evangelical Free Church of premises.47 The Court held therein:
Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may
the Philippines,42 and continues to be the controlling doctrine. award reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
The filing of the Formal Surrender of Leased Premises and the actual premises after the same is duly proved. In Asian Transmission
As in the aforementioned cases, YMCA rectified its failure to submit emptying of the premises constitute constructive delivery of possession. Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates, the Court ruled that the
proof of Golangco's authority to sign the Verification and Certification Hence, the contract of lease was terminated on July 1, 1998 and it is reasonable compensation contemplated under said Rule partakes of the
on Non-Forum Shopping on its behalf when it attached in its Motion for incumbent upon petitioner, as lessee, to comply with its obligation to nature of actual damages based on the evidence adduced by the parties.
Reconsideration a Secretary's Certificate issued by its Corporate return the thing leased to the lessor and vacate the premises. The Court also ruled that "fair rental value is defined as the amount at
Secretary stating that on December 13, 2002, or prior to the filing of the which a willing lessee would pay and a willing lessor would receive for
petition on December 27, 2002, Golangco had been authorized by However, [Remington] failed to comply with its obligation to return the use of a certain property, neither being under compulsion and both
YMCA's Board of Directors to file the petition before the CA. the premises to [YMCA]. In order to return the thing leased to the parties having a reasonable knowledge of all facts, such as the extent,
lessor, it is not enough that the lessee vacates it. It is necessary that he character and utility of the property, sales and holding prices of similar
Thus, the CA's reliance on Melo was misplaced. That case involved a places the thing at the disposal of the lessor, so that the latter can receive land and the highest and best use of the property."
total failure to append to the petition a verification and certification of it without any obstacle. He must return the keys and leave no sub-lessees
non-forum shopping, unlike the present case in which YMCA timely or other persons in the property; otherwise he shall continue to be liable The reasonable compensation for the leased premises fixed by the trial
filed a Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, but for rents. court based on the stipulated rent under the lease contract which
merely failed to submit proof of authority of the signatory to sign the is P22,531.00, must be equitably reduced in view of the circumstances
same. [Remington's] constructive delivery of the premises did not produce attendant in the case at bar. First, it should be noted that the premises
the effect of actual delivery to the [YMCA]. To be effective, it is was used only as a means of passageway caused by [YMCA's] failure to
While the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is necessary that the person to whom the delivery is made must be able to provide sufficient passageway towards the second floor unit it also
mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too take control of it without impediment especially from the person who occupies. Second, [YMCA] was negligent because it waited for more
literally as to defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice supposedly made such delivery. In the case at bar, records show that than a year before it actually demanded payment for back rentals as
of forum shopping.43 despite the termination of the lease, [YMCA] was never in possession of reflected in its Statement of Accounts dated September 7, 1999. When
the premises because it was padlocked. [YMCA] was not given the key both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of
to the premises hence it was deprived to use the same as it pleases. their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and,
Accordingly, the CA committed an error in dismissing outright YMCA's as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably
Petition for Review for failure to attach a proof of authority of the under the law proscribing unjust enrichment. From the foregoing, we
signatory to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Although the use of the premises as passageway was justified,
[Remington] cannot deprive [YMCA] the use of the said premises by find the amount of P11,000.00 a month equitable and reasonable
having it padlocked. Other than simply repudiating the demand for compensation for petitioner's continued use of the premises. 48 (Emphasis
back rentals, [Remington] should have given [YMCA] a set of keys so it supplied)cralawlibrary
Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration therein but it was denied same point at issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same
with finality in a Resolution dated November 12, 2007. Remington manner.53
subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS herein petition insofar as the
February 6, 2008, ordering entry of judgment. Thus, the resolution in outright dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 is concerned. The
that case has become final and executory. Resolutions dated January 16, 2003 and July 29, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The final Resolution dated
The final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 is August 31, 2007 of the Court in G.R. No. 171858 shall likewise govern
binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine the rights of the parties insofar as unit 964 is concerned.
of stare decisis et non quieta movere which means "to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established." 49 Under the SO ORDERED.
doctrine, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same.50 The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or
rule involved and not upon judgment which results therefrom. In this
particular sense stare decisis differs from res judicata which is based
upon the judgment.51

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity

for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. 52

It bears stressing that the facts of the present case and those of G.R. No.
171858 are substantially the same. The only difference is the unit
involved; G.R. No. 171858 involves unit 966 while the present case
involves unit 964. The opposing parties are likewise the same. Clearly,
in the light of the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No.
171858, which the Court follows as precedent, Remington unlawfully
withheld possession of the leased premises because its constructive
delivery did not amount to an effective transfer of possession to YMCA.
It is the Court's duty to apply the previous ruling in the final Resolution
dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 to the instant case. Once a
case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the
 That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon
Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other one another and grouping themselves together, with others not present
victims.9 Robert was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, 10 a during the actual kidnapping but performing some other peculiarly
manufacturing company of foams and mattresses. 11 contributory roles, did, then and there, by force and intimidation, with
the use of long firearms and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully
On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. and feloniously take, carry away and thereafter detain at some
Torres (Torres), and her driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing undisclosed place, after having blocked their car in front of Malcolm
by the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Hall, Osmena Avenue, UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, MARY
Quezon City when a vehicle blocked their way. 12 Another group of GRACE CHENG-ROSAGAS, her driver DIONISIO F. BURCA and her
suspects helped as lookouts.13 bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES, against their will and consent
thereby depriving them of their liberty for more than twelve (12) hours
Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, for the purpose of extorting ransom for their release in the amount of
and Torres inside the vehicle. 14 The incident happened in broad daylight. FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), and which amount was
in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr. Robert Cheng, owner of Uratex
Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at E. Rodriguez
suspects then travelled and detained Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the
an undisclosed location in Batangas.15 Afterwards, the group headed to kidnap victims somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of
Club Solvento, a resort16 in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar, 17 who the same day all to the damage and prejudice of the three (3) victims and
personally served them food.18 their families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their
families under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Some of the accused19 stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the
others, namely, Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy CONTRARY TO LAW.35
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release. 20 Cheng paid
Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008. 36
the ransom of P15,000,000.00.21
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MANUEL
ESCOBAR, Respondent. On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional
At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club
Trial Court.37 During the hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas
Solvento,22 followed by co-accused brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo
testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers. 38
DECISION (the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers of Villaver. 23 The
group then locked themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the
In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
ransom money.24 Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's
LEONEN, J.: 25 denied39 Escobar's First Bail Petition. The dispositive portion
driver,  confessed to have received a total of P1,250,000.00 for the
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
kidnapping operation.26
The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the
of merit considering that state witness Cancio Cubillas positively
accused's second petition for bail. Res judicata applies only in a final At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were
identified said accused as the owner of Club Solvento located in
judgment in a civil case, 1 not in an interlocutory order in a criminal finally released.27 They were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna,
Calamba, Laguna; that he was the one who served food to the group of
case.2 An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory. 3 This order more than 12 hours since they were abducted. 28
Rolando Villaver, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny
does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a second look on the
Velasquez, Cholo, Cesar Olimpiada, Mike, Alan Celebre, Biboy
application for bail. Cubillas became a state witness. 29 On June 3, 2002, he executed an
Lugnasin and witness himself, Cancio Cubillas; that it was also in said
extrajudicial confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser
Club Solvento where Cancio Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning
Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail for Villaver.30 Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw
Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan Celebre rested and slept after
Petition), which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in the Escobar talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento. 31 In his
Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and Cesar Olimpiada left to
Order4 dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the extrajudicial confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar received a
negotiate for the ransom of kidnap victim Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas,
Decision5 dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the portion of the ransom money from Villaver. 32
and that on the night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw accused Rolando
accused's case6 compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second
Villaver gave part of the ransom money to him.
Bail Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied 7 this On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the
on the ground of res judicata. In the Decision8 dated March 24, 2014, the Regional Trial Court charging Escobar as a co-conspirator 33 in the
SO ORDERED.40
Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and granted kidnapping for ransom.34 The charging portion stated:
the Second Bail Petition.
Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals. 41 On March 8, 2011, the (Second Bail Petition) before the Regional Trial Court. 59 He noted that temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision; 76 rather, in
Court of Appeals affirmed42 the denial of the First Bail Petition. It Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised assailing the grant of Escobar's Second Bail Petition, the prosecution
recognized that Cubillas' extrajudicial confession was generally Villaver and that both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, avers that the doctrine of res judicata must be respected.77
incompetent evidence against his co-accused and was admissible against and after the kidnapping. 60 Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was
himself only43 for being hearsay and for violating the res inter alios granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar
acta rule.44 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him provisional On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment, 78 arguing that res
this rule and held that the Regional Trial Court "did not rely solely on release.61 judicata did not apply here,79 that there was no strong evidence of his
the extrajudicial confession of Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied guilt,80 and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of judgment in
on Cubillas' testimony during the bail hearing. 45 On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied 62 Escobar's Second the greater interest of justice. 81 According to
Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata,63 reasoning thus: "[i]n Escobar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals March 8, 2011 deference to the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has already 13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-
Decision.46 attained finality, accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second accused, [Rolando], and considering that both [Rolando] and [Escobar]'s
petition for bail[,] must be necessarily denied." 64 alleged participation in the crime are based on the same court-declared
Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of unreliable "speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even
the co-accused Fajardo brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando), 47 who Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional admitted he was lying when questioned during [Escobar]'s own bail
applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court. 48 As in Escobar's bail Trial Court.65 On January 14, 2013, he appealed before the Court of hearings, it was in the interest of justice and fairness to re-open the
hearing, the prosecution relied solely on Cubillas' statements to establish Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse matter of bail with respect to [Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And
the strength of Fajardo's guilt. 49 In an Order dated September 13, 2011, of discretion in denying his Second Bail Petition. 66 the Honorable Court of Appeals agreed.82
the Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's petition for bail. 50
This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden
In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted 67 the
Randel H. Latoza (City Jail Warden Latoza) to review Escobar's
However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court petition for certiorari and ordered the Regional Trial Court to determine
case.83 In his manifestation dated August 18, 2016, City Jail Warden
reversed its previous order and granted Rolando's bail application. 51 The the appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty. The dispositive
Latoza informed this Court that there was no temporary restraining order
Regional Trial Court stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary portion read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
against the Regional Trial Court April 4, 2014 Order, which fixed
To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012,
Escobar's provisional liberty at P300,000.00. He also acknowledged the
accused Rolando Fajardo participated during the actual abduction of September 14, 2012, September 17, 2012 and November 6, 2012 Orders,
Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar the right to
Rosagas, Burca and Torres or that during the actual abduction, accused are SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to determine the appropriate
bail.84 He mentioned that Escobar had posted the P300,000.00 bail, as
Rolando Fajardo gave advice or instruction to the other accused herein. bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with
ordered by the trial court. 85 Thus, he moved to allow Escobar's
The evidence for the prosecution likewise does not establish that accused dispatch.
provisional release on bail.86
Rolando Fajardo acted as adviser to accused Rolando Villaver and his
group in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is SO ORDERED.68
City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary
no testimony as to what advice or instructions were made by accused
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for surety bond87 and attached a copy of Traveller's Insurance Surety
Rolando Fajardo in connection with the kidnapping of the victims
Reconsideration.69 According to the Court of Appeals, Escobar's Second Corporation's surety bond undertaking to his manifestation. 88 However,
herein. There is thus a paucity of evidence establishing the participation
Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the the attached surety bond undertaking was neither notarized nor approved
of accused Rolando Fajardo in the kidnapping of Rosagas, Burca and
former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory by the Regional Trial Court judge. 89
Torres.52 (Emphasis supplied)
order.70 An order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature. 71
The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote
Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not present before, during and after the On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed72 Escobar's bail at to Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio to ask for the speedy resolution
kidnapping."53 There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged P300,000.00. The dispositive portion read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of the case as Escobar was already 78 years old. 90
participation.54 In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March
2014, the bail for the provisional liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is For resolution are the following issues:
Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's hereby fixed at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).
motion for reconsideration.55 He no longer appealed before this Court. 56 First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res
SO ORDERED.73 judicata; and
By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final
In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals
judgment on the merits of the case as all the other accused who had Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.
denied74 the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.
active participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail. 57 Escobar
saw Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] I
On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the
a different view" on his own bail application. 58
Solicitor General, filed a Petition for Review 75 via Rule 45 before this
Court. In its Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance of a Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has
Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail been arrested and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in
court beyond reasonable doubt. 91 The right to bail is cognate to the parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of criminal proceedings.
fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:92 judgement.103 It "exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness,
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity." 104 But even if petitioner's arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate
presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law "res judicata in prison grey" or the criminal law concept of double
who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan105 held that "[t]he doctrine of res jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation
be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39" 106 of the Revised Rules of conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. 113 (Emphasis supplied,
[or her] appearance before any court, as required under specified Civil Procedure, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary citations omitted).
conditions.93 (Citations omitted) Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad,
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
right to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to
perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same
....
Court.94 However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty will still not apply.114 Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been
of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment—"regardless convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been
(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
of the stage of the criminal prosecution"—and when evidence of one's dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 115 Here, while there
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
discretion of the trial court. 95 been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil
the same capacity; and
death,96 reduced to reclusion perpetua.97 Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter cases, Escobar's Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no
of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not final judgment on the merits.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
strong.98
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
elements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this 1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings. 107 be final;
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the
2. The decision must have been rendered by a court
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest. 108Trinidad v.
having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) Marcelo109 declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of
matter;
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. criminal proceedings."110 Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on
.... Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal the merits; and
cases. - The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original 4. There must be between the first and second actions,
or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. action.116
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or
applied in criminal cases,111 Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is
The Regional Trial Court denied 99 Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal an interlocutory order. A final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done"
ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals overturned 100 this and Procedure. In Trinidad:112 because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has
correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res Petitioner's arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the already ruled on the case. 117 In contrast, an order is considered
judicata. Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the
cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." 101 This supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the entire controversy.118
doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also same set of facts and circumstances — do not lie.
known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. 102 It likewise bars An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or
the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on collateral matter arising in an action"; 119 in other words, something else
still needs to be done in the primary case—the rendition of the final
judgment.120Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on Decision denying Escobar's First Bail Petition did not have the effect
the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition.
if this order is not appealed.121 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:122 Since res judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Meanwhile, City Jail Warden Latoza has informed this Court of the
Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court should have taken absence of any temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals
September 17, 1997 [interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength Decision granting the Second Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial
No. 3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. of the evidence of guilt against him. Court Order fixing his bail at P300,000.00.137 Thus, the Court of Appeals
She insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar's provisional liberty can be
Magalit did not appeal it. In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision, executed upon the approval of his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the
notwithstanding its denial of the First Bail Petition on March 8, 2011. surety bond.
We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in
Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of
sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to and deprive him or her of fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment additional evidence for the prosecution to prove Escobar's guilt in the
do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest or order may be modified where executing it in its present form is main case. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from
possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances: 128 making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the
that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is [W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution merits."138 As the Court of Appeals correctly
interlocutory. The phrase refers to a. final determination as opposed to a [of a judgment] impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize [T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without
collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a the disposition with the prevailing circumstances."129 (Emphasis prejudice for the prosecution to submit additional evidence to prove
trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that supplied, citation omitted) [Escobar]'s guilt in the course of the proceedings in the primary case. 139
give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to
Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
those falling under the second category.
adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would Decision dated March 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128189
involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality." 130 Thus, an accused may is AFFIRMED.
....
file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden
developments or a "new matter or fact which warrants a different Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety
For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise
view."131 bond that must be contained in a public document and approved by the
to res adjudicata [sic] that will bar a subsequent action, because such
Regional Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.
order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the
Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case. 132 The
rendition of the final judgment.123 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Court of Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged co-conspirators SO ORDERED.
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter 124— are already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because
whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and is not a final Cubillas' testimony against him was weak. 133 "[Escobar] and [Rolando]
judgment on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a participated in the same way, but [Escobar]'s bail was
hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] denied."134 Escobar's fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in
unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the the meantime.
case.125 Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such conviction, be bailable . . . (Emphasis supplied)
evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and
not used similarly in Escobar's favor. As the Court of Appeals found:135
reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused
particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
were all granted bail except him. Specifically, [Rolando] was granted
hearing.126 (Emphasis in the original)
bail due to the weakness of Cubillas' testimony against him. 136
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order
In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail
denying bail is an interlocutory order."127 The merits of the case for
Petition, his Second Bail Petition should have been given due course. It
kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.
should not be denied on the technical ground of res judicata.
Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals
II
 Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food eventually dismissed against them without prejudice. 13 The other co-
Authority (NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than signor, Reguine, was declared in default for failure to file her answer. 14
30,000 sacks of palay valued at ₱5,250,000.00 in his warehouse at
Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the On 21 September 1998, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
General Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, 3 the approval for said Reguine and Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers
license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by the amount of ₱2,400,499.87.15 The dispositive portion of the RTC
real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company, the Decision16 reads:
amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less
than thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of
the maximum quantity of rice to be received. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
ordering defendants Rhomesita [sic] Reguine and Antonio Lagman,
jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiff, Country Bankers Assurance
Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) Corporation, the amount of ₱2,400,499.87, with 12% interest from the
issued Warehouse Bond No. 03304 4 for ₱1,749,825.00 on 5 November date the complaint was filed until fully satisfied plus 20% of the amount
1989 and Warehouse Bond No. 023555 for ₱749,925.00 on 13 December due plaintiff as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the costs.
1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman).
Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic
of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of As the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants
these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements6 were executed by Nelson Santos and Ban Lee Lim Santos, let the case against them be
Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee DISMISSED. Defendant Antonio Lagman’s counterclaim is likewise
Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The DISMISSED, for lack of merit.17
latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers
for any damages, prejudice, losses, costs, payments, advances and In holding Lagman and Reguine solidarily liable to Country Bankers, the
expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorney’s fees and trial court relied on the express terms of the Indemnity Agreement that
legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond; to they jointly and severally bound themselves to indemnify and make good
reimburse Country Bankers of whatever amount it may pay or cause to to Country Bankers any liability which the latter may incur on account of
be paid or become liable to pay thereunder; and to pay interest at the rate or arising from the execution of the bonds.18
of 12% per annum computed and compounded monthly, as well as to
pay attorney’s fees of 20% of the amount due it.7 The trial court rationalized that the bonds remain in force unless
cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA and cannot be unilaterally
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as cancelled by Lagman. The trial court emphasized that for the failure of
collateral.8 When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The Lagman to comply with his obligation under the Indemnity Agreements,
G.R. No. 165487               July 13, 2011 sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found he is likewise liable for damages as a consequence of the breach.
in the bonded warehouse.9 By virtue of the surety bonds, Country
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, Bankers was compelled to pay ₱1,166,750.37.10 Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R.
vs. CV No. 61797. He insisted that the lifetime of the 1989 Bonds, as well
ANTONIO LAGMAN, Respondent. Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money as the corresponding Indemnity Agreements was only 12 months.
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73048 before the Regional Trial Court According to Lagman, the 1990 Bond was not pleaded in the complaint
DECISION (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds because it was not covered by an Indemnity Agreement and it
were valid only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced superseded the two prior bonds.19
PEREZ, J.: by receipts; that the bonds were never renewed and revived by payment
of premiums; that on 5 November 1990, Country Bankers issued On 21 June 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose;
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the dismissal of the complaint filed against Lagman. 20
and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and
Court of Appeals dated 21 June 2004 and 24 September 2004, effect the 1989 Bonds.11
respectively. The appellate court held that the 1990 Bond superseded the 1989 Bonds.
The appellate court observed that the 1990 Bond covers 33.3% of the
The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with market value of the palay, thereby manifesting the intention of the
These are the undisputed facts. summons because they could no longer be found. 12 The case was parties to make the latter bond more comprehensive. Lagman was also
exonerated by the appellate court from liability because he was not a
signatory to the alleged Indemnity Agreement of 5 November 1990 explains that the receipts only represent the transactions between the NOW, THEREFORE, if the above-bounded Principal shall well and
covering the 1990 Bond. The appellate court rejected the argument of bond principal and the surety, and does not involve the NFA as bond truly deliver to the depositors PALAY received by him for STORAGE at
Country Bankers that the 1989 bonds were continuing, finding, as reason obligee. any time that demand therefore is made, or shall pay the market value
therefor, that the receipts issued for the bonds indicate that they were therefore in case he is unable to return the same, then this obligation
effective for only one-year. Country Bankers calls this Court’s attention to the incontestability clause shall be null and void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect
contained in the Indemnity Agreements which prohibits Lagman from and may be enforced in the manner provided by said Act No. 3893 as
Country Bankers sought reconsideration which was denied in a questioning his liability therein. amended by Republic Act No. 247 and P.D. No. 4. This bond shall
Resolution dated 24 September 2004.21 remain in force until cancelled by the Administrator of National Food
Authority.23
In his Comment, Lagman raises the issue of novation by asserting that
Expectedly, Country Bankers filed the instant petition attributing two (2) the 1989 Bonds were superseded by the 1990 Bond, which did not
errors to the Court of Appeals, to wit: include Lagman as party. Therefore, Lagman argues, Country Bankers This provision in the bonds is but in compliance with the second
has no cause of action against him. Lagman also reiterates that because paragraph of Section 177 of the Insurance Code, which specifies that a
of novation, the 1989 bonds are neither perpetual nor continuing. continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration date,
A. may be cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the
Insurance Commissioner, and by the court. Thus:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS seriously erred in Lagman anchors his defense on two (2) arguments: 1) the 1989 Bonds
disregarding the express provisions of Section 177 of the have expired and 2) the 1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds.
In case of a continuing bond, the obligor shall pay the subsequent annual
insurance code when it held that the subject surety bonds were premium as it falls due until the contract of suretyship is cancelled by the
superseded by a subsequent bond notwithstanding the non- The Court of Appeals held that the 1989 bonds were effective only for obligee or by the Commissioner or by a court of competent jurisdiction,
cancellation thereof by the bond obligee. one (1) year, as evidenced by the receipts on the payment of premiums. as the case may be.

B. We do not agree. By law and by the specific contract involved in this case, the effectivity
of the bond required for the obtention of a license to engage in the
The honorable court of appeals seriously erred in holding that The official receipts in question serve as proof of payment of the business of receiving rice for storage is determined not alone by the
receipts for the payment of premiums prevail over the express premium for one year on each surety bond. It does not, however, payment of premiums but principally by the Administrator of the NFA.
provision of the surety bond that fixes the term thereof. 22 automatically mean that the surety bond is effective for only one (1) From beginning to end, the Administrator’s brief is the enabling or
year. In fact, the effectivity of the bond is not wholly dependent on the disabling document.
Country Bankers maintains that by the express terms of the 1989 Bonds, payment of premium. Section 177 of the Insurance Code expresses:
they shall remain in full force until cancelled by the Administrator of the The clear import of these provisions is that the surety bonds in question
NFA. As continuing bonds, Country Bankers avers that Section 177 of Sec. 177. The surety is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The same conclusion was
the Insurance Code applies, in that the bond may only be cancelled by contract of suretyship or bond is perfected and delivered to the obligor. reached by the trial court and we quote:
the obligee, by the Insurance Commissioner or by a competent court. No contract of suretyship or bonding shall be valid and binding unless
and until the premium therefor has been paid, except where the obligee As there appears no record of cancellation of the Warehouse Bonds No.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, has accepted the bond, in which case the bond becomes valid and 03304 and No. 02355 either by the administrator of the NFA or by the
which allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: enforceable irrespective of whether or not the premium has been Insurance Commissioner or by the Court, the Warehouse Bonds are valid
First, Lagman failed to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no paid by the obligor to the surety: Provided, That if the contract of and binding and cannot be unilaterally cancelled by defendant Lagman
basis has been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence; Second, suretyship or bond is not accepted by, or filed with the obligee, the as general agent of the plaintiff.24
the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and processed by surety shall collect only reasonable amount, not exceeding fifty per
Country Bankers; Third, the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession centum of the premium due thereon as service fee plus the cost of stamps
or other taxes imposed for the issuance of the contract or While the trial court did not directly rule on the existence and validity of
of the 1990 Bond. Country Bankers stresses that the cancellation of the the 1990 Bond, it upheld the 1989 Bonds as valid and binding, which
1989 Bonds requires the participation of the bond obligee. Ergo, the bond: Provided, however, That if the non-acceptance of the bond be due
to the fault or negligence of the surety, no such service fee, stamps or could not be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The Court of Appeals, on
bonds remain subsisting until cancelled by the bond obligee. Country the other hand, acknowledged the 1990 Bond as having cancelled the
Bankers further assert that Lagman also failed to prove that the NFA taxes shall be collected. (Emphasis supplied)
two previous bonds by novation. Both courts however failed to discuss
accepted the 1990 Bond in replacement of the 1989 Bonds. their basis for rejecting or admitting the 1990 Bond, which, as we
The 1989 Bonds have identical provisions and they state in very clear indicated, is bone to pick in this case.
Country Bankers notes that the receipts issued for the 1989 Bonds are terms the effectivity of these bonds, viz:
mere evidence of premium payments and should not be relied on to Lagman’s insistence on novation depends on the validity, nay, existence
determine the period of effectivity of the bonds. Country Bankers of the allegedly novating 1990 Bond. Country Bankers understandably
impugns both. We see the point. Lagman presented a mere photocopy of In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that replacing them (absence of the same) to escape liability clearly manifests
the 1990 Bond. We rule as inadmissible such copy. there are actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first bad faith on his part.32 (Emphasis supplied.)
is kept by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in
Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his Having discounted the existence and/or validity of the 1990 Bond, there
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. 25 The rule is possession.29 A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other can be no novation to speak of. Novation is the extinguishment of an
encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as follow: satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the original obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a
instrument.30 When more than one original copy exists, it must appear subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by
that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court changing the object or principal conditions, or by substituting another in
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may
subject of inquiry is the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the
not be used without accounting for the other originals. 31 creditor. For novation to take place, the following requisites must
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases: concur: 1) There must be a previous valid obligation; 2) The parties
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate concerned must agree to a new contract; 3) The old contract must be
originals, Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he extinguished; and 4) There must be a valid new contract. 33
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; he had already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did In this case, only the first element of novation exists. Indeed, there is a
not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non- previous valid obligation, i.e., the 1989 Bonds. There is however neither
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from a valid new contract nor a clear agreement between the parties to a new
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman contract since the very existence of the 1990 Bond has been rendered
fails to produce it after reasonable notice; explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the three other dubious. Without the new contract, the old contract is not extinguished.
custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other to find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented
with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent Implied novation necessitates a new obligation with which the old is in
documents which cannot be examined in court without great total incompatibility such that the old obligation is completely
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is efforts to produce the original.
superseded by the new one. 34 Quite obviously, neither can there be
only the general result of the whole; and implied novation. In this case, there is no new obligation.
Fueling further suspicion regarding the existence of the 1990 Bond is the
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a absence of an Indemnity Agreement. While Lagman argued that a 1990
Bond novates the 1989 Bonds, he raises the defense of "non-existence of The liability of Lagman is expressed in Indemnity Agreements executed
public officer or is recorded in a public office. 26 in consideration of the 1989 Bonds which we have considered as
an indemnity agreement" which would conveniently exempt him from
liability. The trial court deemed this defense as indicia of bad faith, thus: continuing contracts. Under both Indemnity Agreements, Lagman, as co-
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless signor, together with Santos, Ban Lee Lim and Reguine, bound
it is shown that the original is unavailable. 27 Section 5, Rule 130 of the themselves jointly and severally to Country Bankers to indemnify it for
Rules of Court states: To the observation of the Court, defendant Lagman contended that being any damage or loss sustained on the account of the execution of the
a general agent (which requires a much higher qualification than an bond, among others. The pertinent identical stipulations of the Indemnity
ordinary agent), he is expected to have attended seminars and workshops Agreements state:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. — When the original on general insurance wherein he is supposed to have acquired sufficient
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the knowledge of the general principles of insurance which he had fully
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its practised or implemented from experience. It somehow appears to the INDEMNITY: ─ To indemnify and make good to the COMPANY
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a Court’s assessment of his reneging liability of the bonds in question, that jointly and severally, any damages, prejudice, loss, costs, payments
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by he is still short of having really understood the principle of suretyship advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorney’s
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. with reference to the transaction of indemnity in which he is a signatory. fees and legal costs, which the COMPANY may, at any time, sustain or
If, as he alleged, that he is well-versed in insurance, the Court finds no incur, as well as to reimburse to said COMPANY all sums and amounts
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the excuse for him to stand firm in denying his liability over the claim of money which the COMPANY or its representatives shall or may pay
contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the against the bonds with indemnity provision. If he insists in not or cause to be paid or become liable to pay, on account of or arising from
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of recognizing that liability, the more that this Court is convinced that his the execution of the above-mentioned BOND or any extension, renewal,
the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the knowledge that insurance operates under the principle of good faith is alteration or substitution thereof made at the instance of the undersigned
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of inadequate. He missed the exception provided by Section 177 of the or anyone of them.35
the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: Insurance Code, as amended, wherein non-payment of premium would
existence, execution, loss, and contents.28 not have the same essence in his mind that the agreements entered into Moreover, the Indemnity Agreements also contained identical
would not have full force or effect. It could be glimpsed, therefore, that Incontestability Clauses which provide:
the mere fact of cancelling bonds with indemnity agreements and
INCONTESTABILITY OF PAYMENTS MADE BY THE COMPANY: DEL CASTILLO, J.: representing ocean freight, documentation fee and terminal handling
─ Any payment or disbursement made by the COMPANY on account of charges as well as damages and attorney's fees.
the above-mentioned Bond, its renewals, extensions, alterations or The necessity of proving lies with the person who sues.
substitutions either in the belief that the COMPANY was obligated to Claiming that it is merely a consolidator/forwarder and that Bill of
make such payment or in the belief that said payment was necessary or Lading No. HJSCPUSI14168303 was not endorsed to it by the ultimate
expedient in order to avoid greater losses or obligations for which the The refusal of the consignee named in the bill of lading to pay the
freightage on the claim that it is not privy to the contract of consignee, Shin Yang denied any involvement in shipping the goods or
COMPANY might be liable by virtue of the terms of the above- in promising to shoulder the freightage. It asserted that it never
mentioned Bond, its renewals, extensions, alterations, or substitutions, affreightment propelled the shipper to sue for collection of money,
stressing that its sole evidence, the bill of lading, suffices to prove that authorized Halla Trading Co. to ship the articles or to have its name
shall be final and shall not be disputed by the undersigned, who hereby included in the bill of lading. Shin Yang also alleged that MOF failed to
jointly and severally bind themselves to indemnify [Country Bankers] of the consignee is bound to pay. Petitioner now comes to us by way of
Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 praying for the reversal present supporting documents to prove that it was Shin Yang that caused
any and all such payments, as stated in the preceding clauses. the importation or the one that assured payment of the shipping charges
of the Court of Appeals' (CA) judgment that dismissed its action for sum
of money for insufficiency of evidence. upon arrival of the goods in Manila.
In case the COMPANY shall have paid[,] settled or compromised any
liability, loss, costs, damages, attorney’s fees, expenses, claims[,] Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
demands, suits, or judgments as above-stated, arising out of or in Factual Antecedents
connection with said bond, an itemized statement thereof, signed by an
officer of the COMPANY and other evidence to show said payment, On October 25, 2001, Halla Trading Co., a company based in Korea, On June 16, 2004, the MeTC of Pasay City, Branch 48 rendered its
settlement or compromise, shall be prima facie evidence of said shipped to Manila secondhand cars and other articles on board the vessel Decision4 in favor of MOF. It ruled that Shin Yang cannot disclaim
payment, settlement or compromise, as well as the liability of the Hanjin Busan 0238W. The bill of lading covering the shipment, i.e., Bill being a party to the contract of affreightment because:
undersigned in any and all suits and claims against the undersigned of Lading No. HJSCPUSI14168303,2 which was prepared by the carrier
arising out of said bond or this bond application.361awphil Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. (Hanjin), named respondent Shin Yang x x x it would appear that defendant has business transactions with
Brokerage Corp. (Shin Yang) as the consignee and indicated that plaintiff. This is evident from defendant's letters dated 09 May 2002 and
Lagman is bound by these Indemnity Agreements. Payments made by payment was on a "Freight Collect" basis, i.e., that the 13 May 2002 (Exhibits "1" and "2", defendant's Position Paper) where it
Country Bankers by virtue of the 1989 Bonds gave rise to Lagman’s consignee/receiver of the goods would be the one to pay for the freight requested for the release of refund of container deposits x x x. [In] the
obligation to reimburse it under the Indemnity Agreements. Lagman, and other charges in the total amount of P57,646.00.3 mind of the Court, by analogy, a written contract need not be necessary;
being a solidary debtor, is liable for the entire obligation. a mutual understanding [would suffice]. Further, plaintiff would have
The shipment arrived in Manila on October 29, 2001. Thereafter, not included the name of the defendant in the bill of lading, had there
petitioner MOF Company, Inc. (MOF), Hanjin's exclusive general agent been no prior agreement to that effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61797 are SET in the Philippines, repeatedly demanded the payment of ocean freight,
ASIDE and the Decision dated 21 September 1998 of the RTC is hereby documentation fee and terminal handling charges from Shin Yang. The In sum, plaintiff has sufficiently proved its cause of action against the
REINSTATED. latter, however, failed and refused to pay contending that it did not cause defendant and the latter is obliged to honor its agreement with plaintiff
the importation of the goods, that it is only the Consolidator of the said despite the absence of a written contract.5
shipment, that the ultimate consignee did not endorse in its favor the
SO ORDERED. original bill of lading and that the bill of lading was prepared without its The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:
consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

Thus, on March 19, 2003, MOF filed a case for sum of money before the favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC Pasay) which was plaintiff as follows:
docketed as Civil Case No. 206-03 and raffled to Branch 48. MOF
[G.R. NO. 172822 : December18, 2009] alleged that Shin Yang, a regular client, caused the importation and
shipment of the goods and assured it that ocean freight and other charges 1. P57,646.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully
would be paid upon arrival of the goods in Manila. Yet, after Hanjin's paid,
MOF COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. SHIN YANG BROKERAGE compliance, Shin Yang unjustly breached its obligation to pay. MOF
CORPORATION Respondent. argued that Shin Yang, as the named consignee in the bill of lading, 2. P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and
entered itself as a party to the contract and bound itself to the "Freight
DECISION Collect" arrangement. MOF thus prayed for the payment of P57,646.00 3. the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.6 consent to be a consignee of the subject goods. In its March 22, 2006 "He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
Decision,8 the CA said: is not evidence" (Luxuria Homes Inc. v. CA, 302 SCRA 315).
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
This Court is persuaded [that except] for the Bill of Lading, respondent The 40-footer van contains goods of substantial value. It is highly
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirmed in has not presented any other evidence to bolster its claim that petitioner improbable for petitioner not to pay the charges, which is very minimal
toto the Decision of the MeTC. It held that: has entered [into] an agreement of affreightment with respondent, be it compared with the value of the goods, in order that it could work on the
verbal or written. It is noted that the Bill of Lading was prepared by release thereof.
Hanjin Shipping, not the petitioner. Hanjin is the principal while
MOF and Shin Yang entered into a contract of affreightment which respondent is the former's agent. (p. 43, rollo)
Black's Law Dictionary defined as a contract with the ship owner to hire For failure to substantiate its claim by preponderance of evidence,
his ship or part of it, for the carriage of goods and generally take the respondent has not established its case against petitioner.9
form either of a charter party or a bill of lading. The conclusion of the court a quo, which was upheld by the RTC Pasay
City, Branch 108 xxx is purely speculative and conjectural. A court Petitionersfiled a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a
cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend Resolution10 dated May 25, 2006. Hence, this Petition for Review on
The bill of lading contain[s] the information embodied in the contract. upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable Certiorari .
under the circumstances. Litigation cannot be properly resolved by
Article 652 of the Code of Commerce provides that the charter party suppositions, deductions or even presumptions, with no basis in
must be in writing; however, Article 653 says: "If the cargo should be evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the hard rules of Petitioner's Arguments
received without charter party having been signed, the contract shall be admissibility and proof (Lagon v. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc. 349
understood as executed in accordance with what appears in the bill of SCRA 363). In assailing the CA's Decision, MOF argues that the factual findings of
lading, the sole evidence of title with regard to the cargo for determining both the MeTC and RTC are entitled to great weight and respect and
the rights and obligations of the ship agent, of the captain and of the While it is true that a bill of lading serves two (2) functions: first, it is a should have bound the CA. It stresses that the appellate court has no
charterer". Thus, the Supreme Court opined in the Market Developers, receipt for the goods shipped; second, it is a contract by which three justifiable reason to disturb the lower courts' judgments because their
Inc. (MADE) v. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Gaudioso parties, namely, the shipper, the carrier and the consignee who undertake conclusions are well-supported by the evidence on record.
Uy, G.R. No. 74978, September 8, 1989, this kind of contract may be specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations (Belgian
oral. In another case, Compania Maritima v. Insurance Company of Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. v. Phil. First Insurance Co., Inc., MOF further argues that the CA erred in labeling the findings of the
North America, 12 SCRA 213 the contract of affreightment by telephone 383 SCRA 23), x x x if the same is not accepted, it is as if one party does lower courts as purely 'speculative and conjectural'. According to MOF,
was recognized where the oral agreement was later confirmed by a not accept the contract. Said the Supreme Court: the bill of lading, which expressly stated Shin Yang as the consignee, is
formal booking. the best evidence of the latter's actual participation in the transportation
"A bill of lading delivered and accepted constitutes the contract of of the goods. Such document, validly entered, stands as the law among
xxx carriage[,] even though not signed, because the acceptance of a paper the shipper, carrier and the consignee, who are all bound by the terms
containing the terms of a proposed contract generally constitutes an stated therein. Besides, a carrier's valid claim after it fulfilled its
Defendant is liable to pay the sum of P57,646.00, with interest until fully acceptance of the contract and of all its terms and conditions of which obligation cannot just be rejected by the named consignee upon a simple
paid, attorney's fees of P10,000.00 [and] cost of suit. the acceptor has actual or constructive notice" (Keng Hua Paper denial that it ever consented to be a party in a contract of affreightment,
Products Co., Inc. v. CA, 286 SCRA 257). or that it ever participated in the preparation of the bill of lading. As
against Shin Yang's bare denials, the bill of lading is the sufficient
Considering all the foregoing, this Court affirms in toto the decision of preponderance of evidence required to prove MOF's claim. MOF
the Court a quo. In the present case, petitioner did not only [refuse to] accept the bill of maintains that Shin Yang was the one that supplied all the details in the
lading, but it likewise disown[ed] the shipment x x x. [Neither did it] bill of lading and acquiesced to be named consignee of the shipment on a
authorize Halla Trading Company or anyone to ship or export the same 'Freight Collect' basis.
on its behalf.

SO ORDERED.7 Lastly, MOF claims that even if Shin Yang never gave its consent, it
cannot avoid its obligation to pay, because it never objected to being
Ruling of the Court of Appeals named as the consignee in the bill of lading and that it only protested
It is settled that a contract is upheld as long as there is proof of consent, when the shipment arrived in the Philippines, presumably due to a
subject matter and cause (Sta. Clara Homeowner's Association v. botched transaction between it and Halla Trading Co. Furthermore, Shin
Seeing the matter in a different light, the CA dismissed MOF's complaint Gaston, 374 SCRA 396). In the case at bar, there is not even any iota of Yang's letters asking for the refund of container deposits highlight the
and refused to award any form of damages or attorney's fees. It opined evidence to show that petitioner had given its consent. fact that it was aware of the shipment and that it undertook preparations
that MOF failed to substantiate its claim that Shin Yang had a hand in for the intended release of the shipment.
the importation of the articles to the Philippines or that it gave its
Respondent's Arguments b) when the consignee demands fulfillment of the stipulation of the bill possibility of a conflict between the order of the shipper on the one hand
of lading which was drawn up in its favor.12 and the order of the consignee on the other, as when the shipper orders
Echoing the CA decision, Shin Yang insists that MOF has no evidence the shipping company to return or retain the goods shipped while the
to prove that it consented to take part in the contract of affreightment. In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 we held consignee demands their delivery, Malagarriga in his book Codigo de
Shin Yang argues that MOF miserably failed to present any evidence to that once the bill of lading is received by the consignee who does not Comercio Comentado, Vol. 1, p. 400, citing a decision of the Argentina
prove that it was the one that made preparations for the subject shipment, object to any terms or stipulations contained therein, it constitutes as an Court of Appeals on commercial matters, cited by Tolentino in Vol. II of
or that it is an 'actual shipping practice' that forwarders/consolidators as acceptance of the contract and of all of its terms and conditions, of which his book entitled 'Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial
consignees are the ones that provide carriers details and information on the acceptor has actual or constructive notice.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω Laws of the Philippines' p. 209, says that the right of the shipper to
the bills of lading. lιbrαrÿ countermand the shipment terminates when the consignee or legitimate
holder of the bill of lading appears with such bill of lading before the
carrier and makes himself a party to the contract. Prior to that time he is
Shin Yang contends that a bill of lading is essentially a contract between In Mendoza v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,14 the consignee sued the a stranger to the contract.
the shipper and the carrier and ordinarily, the shipper is the one liable for carrier for damages but nevertheless claimed that he was never a party to
the freight charges. A consignee, on the other hand, is initially a stranger the contract of transportation and was a complete stranger thereto. In
to the bill of lading and can be liable only when the bill of lading debunking Mendoza's contention, we held that: Still another view of this phase of the case is that contemplated in Art.
specifies that the charges are to be paid by the consignee. This liability 1257, paragraph 2, of the old Civil Code (now Art. 1311, second
arises from either a) the contract of agency between the paragraph) which reads thus:
x x x First, he insists that the articles of the Code of Commerce should
shipper/consignor and the consignee; or b) the consignee's availment of be applied; that he invokes the provisions of said Code governing the
the stipulation pour autrui drawn up by and between the shipper/ obligations of a common carrier to make prompt delivery of goods given 'Should the contract contain any stipulation in favor of a third person, he
consignor and carrier upon the consignee's demand that the goods be to it under a contract of transportation. Later, as already said, he says that may demand its fulfillment provided he has given notice of his
delivered to it. Shin Yang contends that the fact that its name was he was never a party to the contract of transportation and was a complete acceptance to the person bound before the stipulation has been revoked.'
mentioned as the consignee of the cargoes did not make it automatically stranger to it, and that he is now suing on a tort or a violation of his
liable for the freightage because it never benefited from the shipment. It rights as a stranger (culpa aquiliana). If he does not invoke the contract Here, the contract of carriage between the LVN Pictures Inc. and the
never claimed or accepted the goods, it was not the shipper's agent, it of carriage entered into with the defendant company, then he would defendant carrier contains the stipulations of delivery to Mendoza as
was not aware of its designation as consignee and the original bill of hardly have any leg to stand on. His right to prompt delivery of the can consignee. His demand for the delivery of the can of film to him at the
lading was never endorsed to it. of film at the Pili Air Port stems and is derived from the contract of Pili Air Port may be regarded as a notice of his acceptance of the
carriage under which contract, the PAL undertook to carry the can of stipulation of the delivery in his favor contained in the contract of
Issue film safely and to deliver it to him promptly. Take away or ignore that carriage and delivery. In this case he also made himself a party to the
contract and the obligation to carry and to deliver and right to prompt contract, or at least has come to court to enforce it. His cause of action
The issue for resolution is whether a consignee, who is not a signatory to delivery disappear. Common carriers are not obligated by law to carry must necessarily be founded on its breach.15 (Emphasis Ours)
the bill of lading, is bound by the stipulations thereof. Corollarily, and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to
whether respondent who was not an agent of the shipper and who did not prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the In sum, a consignee, although not a signatory to the contract of carriage
make any demand for the fulfillment of the stipulations of the bill of obligation. Said rights and obligations are created by a specific contract between the shipper and the carrier, becomes a party to the contract by
lading drawn in its favor is liable to pay the corresponding freight and entered into by the parties. In the present case, the findings of the trial reason of either a) the relationship of agency between the consignee and
handling charges. court which as already stated, are accepted by the parties and which we the shipper/ consignor; b) the unequivocal acceptance of the bill of
must accept are to the effect that the LVN Pictures Inc. and Jose lading delivered to the consignee, with full knowledge of its contents or
Mendoza on one side, and the defendant company on the other, entered c) availment of the stipulation pour autrui, i.e., when the consignee, a
Our Ruling into a contract of transportation (p. 29, Rec. on Appeal). One third person, demands before the carrier the fulfillment of the stipulation
interpretation of said finding is that the LVN Pictures Inc. through made by the consignor/shipper in the consignee's favor, specifically the
Since the CA and the trial courts arrived at different conclusions, we are previous agreement with Mendoza acted as the latter's agent. When he delivery of the goods/cargoes shipped.16
constrained to depart from the general rule that only errors of law may negotiated with the LVN Pictures Inc. to rent the film 'Himala ng Birhen'
be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the and show it during the Naga town fiesta, he most probably authorized
Rules of Court and will review the evidence presented.11 and enjoined the Picture Company to ship the film for him on the PAL In the instant case, Shin Yang consistently denied in all of its pleadings
on September 17th. Another interpretation is that even if the LVN that it authorized Halla Trading, Co. to ship the goods on its behalf; or
Pictures Inc. as consignor of its own initiative, and acting independently that it got hold of the bill of lading covering the shipment or that it
of Mendoza for the time being, made Mendoza a consignee. [Mendoza demanded the release of the cargo. Basic is the rule in evidence that the
made himself a party to the contract of transportaion when he appeared burden of proof lies upon him who asserts it, not upon him who denies,
The bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor and at the Pili Air Port armed with the copy of the Air Way Bill (Exh. 1) since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any
the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. However, the latter demanding the delivery of the shipment to him.] The very citation made proof of it.17 Thus, MOF has the burden to controvert all these denials,
can be bound by the stipulations of the bill of lading when a) there is a by appellant in his memorandum supports this view. Speaking of the it being insistent that Shin Yang asserted itself as the consignee and the
relation of agency between the shipper or consignor and the consignee or one that caused the shipment of the goods to the Philippines.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by preponderance of evidence,18 which means evidence which is of
greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.19 Here, MOF failed to meet the required quantum of
proof. Other than presenting the bill of lading, which, at most, proves
that the carrier acknowledged receipt of the subject cargo from the
shipper and that the consignee named is to shoulder the freightage, MOF
has not adduced any other credible evidence to strengthen its cause of
action. It did not even present any witness in support of its allegation that
it was Shin Yang which furnished all the details indicated in the bill of
lading and that Shin Yang consented to shoulder the shipment costs.
There is also nothing in the records which would indicate that Shin Yang
was an agent of Halla Trading Co. or that it exercised any act that would
bind it as a named consignee. Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the suit
for failure of petitioner to establish its cause against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2006 dismissing petitioner's
complaint and the Resolution dated May 25, 2006 denying the motion
for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.