A Case Study on West Philippine Sea

In the seventeenth century, England, Spain and Portugal, the maritime superpowers of the day,
asserted responsibility for seas and oceans they found, and upheld their cases through the barrel
of the maritime gun. In 1609, Hugo Grotius, the dad of universal law, contended in his great
Mare Liberum (The Free Sea) that the seas and oceans had a place with all humanity and no
country could guarantee them as its own. After over a time of fight between the individuals who
demanded responsibility for seas and oceans and the individuals who battled for opportunity of
the seas and oceans for all humanity, Grotius' thought in the end won and turned out to be a piece
of worldwide law. It additionally established the framework for the law of the ocean.

In this the 21st century, China, Asia's rising territorial maritime force, is asserting possession by
recorded right to practically 90% of the South China Sea. China's case, spoke to by its 9-ran line
map, echoes the seventeenth century sea cases of the maritime superpowers of that period. China
is implementing its case through its quickly becoming maritime armada. Whenever left to stand,
China's case will take the world back to the violent sea time 400 years prior, when countries
asserted the seas and oceans and sea claims were settled through the maritime gun, not through
the Rule of Law.

What is the contest in the West Philippine Sea?

China claims "unquestionable power" over every one of the waters, islands, reefs, rocks, seabed,
minerals, and living and non-living assets falling inside its 9-ran line guarantee in the South
China Sea. The 9-ran line region contains practically 90% of the absolute territory of the South
China Sea. China's 9-ran line guarantee infringes on 80% of the Philippines' 200-nm select
financial zone (EEZ) and 100% of its 150-nm broadened mainland self (ECS) confronting the
South China Sea – what the Philippines calls the West Philippines Sea. China's 9-ran line
guarantee effectsly affects the EEZs and ECSs of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia
confronting the South China Sea. The nations most unfavorably influenced by China's 9-ran line
guarantee, as far as the size of the territory infringed by the 9-ran line guarantee, are the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, in a specific order.

Is there a worldwide law that oversees the goals of the West Philippine Sea question?

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, which went into
power in 1994, oversees the clashing oceanic cases in the South China Sea. All the petitioner
states in the South China Sea contest, including the Philippines and China, have approved
UNCLOS. UNCLOS is the Constitution for the world's seas and oceans. UNCLOS arranged the
then existing standard universal law of the ocean, made novel qualifications for beach front and
landlocked states, and received an obligatory contest settlement instrument to safeguard that
there is a last definitive body to decipher and apply its arrangements.
UNCLOS has been sanctioned by 165 states, involving a larger part of the individuals from the
United Nations. Thus, even the novel oceanic qualifications under UNCLOS for waterfront and
land-bolted states, which sea privileges have been reliably insisted by worldwide councils since
1994, presently structure some portion of standard universal law. Indeed, even non-signatory
states, just as signatory expresses that later pull back from UNCLOS, are bound by these oceanic
privileges.

UNCLOS administers just oceanic qualifications, sea space and sea questions. The oceanic
qualifications of states – the regional ocean, EEZ and ECS and their assets – radiate and are
drawn uniquely from baselines on mainland land or islands. UNCLOS accommodates a
mandatory question settlement instrument, subject to particular kinds of debates that states are
permitted to bar from necessary discretion. All expresses that approved UNCLOS bound
themselves ahead of time to this obligatory question settlement instrument. The Philippines and
China, having endorsed UNCLOS, are bound by this mandatory contest settlement component.

UNCLOS doesn't oversee regional power arguments about land or land includes in the seas and
oceans. Regional power disagreements regarding area or land highlights – that is, islands, reefs
and shakes above water at elevated tide – are administered by the standards and standards of
general worldwide law. A global court can procure purview over regional power debates just
with the assent of the states that are gatherings to the specific contest, without a settlement
restricting them ahead of time to the locale of such council. There is no such arrangement
between the Philippines and China.

So, any sea contest between the Philippines and China is dependent upon mandatory assertion
under UNCLOS, aside from the debates that China has rejected from necessary mediation as per
UNCLOS. Interestingly, the regional sway contest between the Philippines and China over land
and land highlights isn't dependent upon obligatory intervention.

What is the privilege or qualification of the Philippines under worldwide law that is being
abused by China?

Under UNCLOS, each beach front state is entitled as an issue of worldwide law to a 200-nm
EEZ, in addition to an extra 150-nm ECS where appropriate, drawn from baselines on mainland
land or islands. In lieu of this extra 150-nm ECS, a seaside state may receive an ECS of up to
100-nm offshore from the 2,500 meter isobath. This lawful oceanic qualification is one of the
most significant reasons why creating waterfront states affirmed UNCLOS. Without this
significant legitimate sea qualification there may have been no UNCLOS. If there should arise an
occurrence of covering EEZs or ECSs, the restricting or contiguous beach front states will haggle
in compliance with common decency a fair sea limit.

Likewise, land-bolted states joined UNCLOS for two reasons: first, the region of the ocean past
the EEZ of a beach front state, called the high oceans, is available to angling for all states,
regardless of whether waterfront or land-bolted; and second, the seabed and its minerals past the
ECS of a seaside state is pronounced the normal legacy of humanity – having a place with all
states, whether waterfront or land-bolted.

China's 9-ran line guarantee invalidates, and in this way damages, the Philippines' lawful
privilege under UNCLOS to an EEZ and ECS. China's 9-ran line guarantee likewise refutes, and
along these lines disregards, the privilege of all states on this planet, including the Philippines, to
angle in the high oceans or the zone past the EEZ of a waterfront state. China's 9-ran line
guarantee besides invalidates, and accordingly damages, the privilege of all states on this planet,
including the Philippines, to the seabed and its mineral assets past the ECS of a seaside state. At
long last, China's case of "undeniable power" to regions of the South China Sea past the EEZs of
beach front states disregards the denial under UNCLOS against states exposing the high oceans
to their sway.

What is the basis of China’s 9-dashed line claim?

China grapples its 9-dashed line guarantee on alleged "authentic rights." However, China
concedes that its 9-ran line guarantee was first remembered for an official Chinese guide just in
1947 during the Kuomintang Government. In 1998, China established its Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf Law to assert its sovereign rights and purview over its EEZ and ECS
under UNCLOS. An arrangement in this 1998 law expresses, "this Act will not influence the
verifiable privileges of the People's Republic of China." This 1998 law is the principal official
reference in a Chinese law to China's "chronicled rights" to oceanic territories outside its EEZ
and ECS. In any case, the privileges of a state under universal law can't be expanded by its
household enactment, however just by standard global law or by a show like UNCLOS.

China's 9-dashed line guarantee was initially spoken to by 11 runs in the 1947 Chinese guide, at
that point decreased singularly in 1950 to 9 runs without clarification after the Communists
removed the Kuomintang from the terrain. In January this year China discharged another official
guide including a tenth scramble the eastern side of Taiwan. China's case was equivocal from the
beginning as China neglected to clarify its extension until January this year. Additionally, as of
not long ago China has never uncovered the careful directions of its 9 or 10-ran line guarantee,
and neither has China clarified the premise under global law for its case.

China officially reported to the universal network its case just in 2009 when it submitted to the
United Nations a guide delineating its 9-dashed line guarantee. This guide, demonstrating no
directions of the 9 runs, was affixed to a note verbale China stopped to fight Vietnam and
Malaysia's joint accommodation of their ECSs. With this guide, China guaranteed
"unquestionable sway" over the islands and "neighboring waters" inside the encased zone, just as
sovereign right and ward over the "applicable waters," seabed and subsoil inside the encased
region. China didn't clarify the importance of the words "neighboring waters" and "significant
waters," which are not utilized in UNCLOS. China hence neglected to explain the equivocalness
of its 9-dashed line guarantee. China's accommodation of its 9-dashed line guarantee to the
United Nations was, obviously, quickly fought by other petitioner states.
China has consistently been equivocal about the extent of its 9-ran line guarantee – regardless of
whether it is asserting just the islands inside the 9-ran line zone, or whether it is likewise
asserting every one of the waters and assets inside the 9-ran line region past the pertinent oceanic
zones. Indeed, even Chinese researchers on the law of the ocean are isolated about whether the 9-
ran line guarantee incorporates every one of the waters inside the zone, involving practically
90% of the South China Sea. China's officeholder judge in the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, Zhiguo Gao, wrote in 1994 that the 9 runs only distinguish the islands possessed by
China inside the encased territory and don't speak to a case to every one of the waters and assets
inside the encased zone.

In January this year China seems to have explained in any event the extent of its case by giving
another official guide portraying 10 runs on the guide as its "national limits." By utilizing the
expression "national limits," China is evidently asserting everything inside these limits as a
component of its national domain. Assuming this is the case, China has explained just this year
that it is guaranteeing every one of the waters, islands, reefs, rocks, living and non-living assets,
the seabed and the minerals found inside the past 9, presently 10-ran line region. This is steady
with the forceful activities of Chinese reconnaissance transports in irritating review vessels of
Vietnam and the Philippines investigating for oil and gas in their own EEZs that cover the waters
encased by the 9-ran lines, regardless of whether the waters are outside the sea zones of any
contested island and outside the EEZ or ECS of China.

All things considered, China has not clarified the premise under global law of its "chronicled
rights" to the 9-ran line guarantee. China has not discharged an official paper or archive
clarifying such "chronicled rights," and the legitimization for such "verifiable rights" under
universal law. China has wouldn't protect its 9-ran line guarantee before a universal court on the
law of the ocean. Be that as it may, all over alone the 9-ran line guarantee has positively no
premise under worldwide law.

In the first place, UNCLOS stifled every single verifiable right of different states inside the 200-
nm EEZ of the contiguous waterfront state. That is the reason this 200-nm zone is designated
"selective" – no state other than the contiguous seaside state can misuse monetarily its assets.
Angling rights that different states verifiably appreciated inside the EEZ of the adjoining beach
front state consequently ended upon the effectivity of UNCLOS. In addition, UNCLOS denies
states from reserving any spot or special case to UNCLOS except if explicitly permitted by
UNCLOS. Any booking of cases to "verifiable rights" over the EEZ or ECS of another beach
front state is denied on the grounds that UNCLOS doesn't explicitly enable a state to guarantee
"authentic rights" to the EEZ or ECS of another state. To put it plainly, UNCLOS doesn't
perceive "recorded rights" as reason for asserting the EEZs or ECSs of different states.

The couple of situations where the waters past the regional ocean were as yet treated as inside
waters due to "verifiable rights" all occurred before the approach of UNCLOS, when the
broadness of the regional ocean was as yet three miles. These cases included profoundly
indented straights, similar to the Chesapeake Bay flanking Maryland and Virginia in the United
States, or profoundly indented inlets like the Gulf of Fonseca in Central America circumscribing
Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These sounds and bays are contiguous the drift and have
for some time been acknowledged by different states as inside waters. With UNCLOS, the
regional ocean has been stretched out to 12-nm, and a 200-nm EEZ has been allowed to beach
front states, evacuating the requirement for a waterfront state to summon "chronicled rights" to
avoid different states from its profoundly indented straights or bays. In none of these couple of
cases has "authentic rights" been conjured to guarantee a non-nearby territory past 200-nm from
the coast, or to guarantee a whole or almost whole ocean flanking a few states.

Second, under UNCLOS the expression "noteworthy inlets" alludes to inward waters, and the
expression "memorable titles" alludes to regional oceans. A state can guarantee "verifiable
rights" over waters just as a feature of its interior waters or regional ocean. There is no
opportunity of route and no opportunity of over-trip in inward waters or regional ocean. There is
a privilege of honest section for ships in the regional ocean.

The South China Sea, past the 12-nm regional ocean of seaside states, has never been considered
as the inner waters or regional ocean of any state. Since days of yore, boats of all countries have
practiced opportunity of route in the South China Sea. Moreover, since the time planes flew over
the oceans, airplane of all countries have practiced opportunity of over-trip over the South China
Sea. On the off chance that the South China were the interior waters or regional ocean of China,
at that point no state could have practiced opportunity of route and opportunity of over-trip over
the South China Sea. In reality, China has expressed that there is opportunity of route and
opportunity of over-trip in the South China Sea, a confirmation that the South China Sea doesn't
comprise its inner waters or regional ocean.

China's 1992 Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone announces a 12-nm regional ocean
estimated from its baselines. Since China's own law restrains its regional ocean to 12-nm from its
baselines, China can't guarantee the waters inside the 9-ran line map as its regional ocean. The
waters inside the 9-ran line guarantee can't likewise be viewed as interior waters of any state
since they are in the untamed ocean flanking seven waterfront states. The South China Sea falls
under the UNCLOS meaning of a semi-encased ocean since it comprises "altogether or
principally of the regional oceans and EEZs of at least two States."

Since the time that Grotius' concept of the free ocean turned out to be a piece of global law, no
country could fitting or case "unquestionable sway" to any piece of the seas and oceans past its
regional ocean or past what different states perceive as its interior waters. This is reflected in
UNCLOS, which just awards a beach front state indicated sovereign rights and ward over its
EEZ and ECS, and explicitly restricts any waterfront state from exposing the high oceans to its
sway.

In this manner, the waters encased by China's 9-ran line guarantee are neither inward waters nor
regional ocean of China. The waters can't likewise frame some portion of China's EEZ or ECS
since they are not drawn from China's baselines and are past the cutoff points of China's EEZ and
ECS as drawn from China's baselines. So, China's case to the waters encased by the 9-ran line
guarantee doesn't fall under any of the oceanic zones perceived by global law or UNCLOS – to
be specific, inside waters, regional ocean, EEZ, and ECS – that could be asserted by a seaside
state. Just China appears to know under what sea zone the 9-ran line waters fall, yet China isn't
advising the world but to guarantee "unquestionable power" over such waters by "chronicled
rights."
Third, under the general standards and rules of universal law, a case of "verifiable rights" to
inward waters or regional ocean must fulfill four conditions. One, the state should officially
report to the worldwide network such case to interior waters or regional ocean, unmistakably
determining the nature and extent of such case. Two, the state must exercise viable position, that
is, sway, over the waters it asserts as its own inner waters or regional ocean. Three, such exercise
of viable power must be persistent over a generous timeframe. Four, different states must
perceive, endure or submit in to the activity of such power.

China neglects to agree to any of these four conditions. China formally informed the universe of
its 9-ran line guarantee just in 2009. Not a solitary nation on the planet perceives, regards,
endures or assents in to China's 9-ran line guarantee. China has never viably implemented its 9-
ran line guarantee from 1947 to 1994 when UNCLOS produced results, and considerably after
1994 up to the present. Subsequently, under the general standards and rules of universal law,
China can't guarantee "recorded rights" that pre-dated UNCLOS. In any event, accepting, for
contention, that China has such "chronicled rights," the section into power of UNCLOS in 1994
stifled such rights. Under UNCLOS, a state can't guarantee any "chronicled right" to the EEZ or
ECS of another state.

In the 2002 Asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, China
concurred that all inquirer states will settle their debates "as per all around perceived standards of
universal law, remembering the 1982 UN Convention for the Law of the Sea." China didn't
express that "chronicled rights," or some other situation, ought to be a factor in settling the
questions. China hence concurred that lone worldwide law, specifically UNCLOS, ought to
administer the goals of the debates in the South China Sea.

Obviously, there is not all that much or "right" about China's 9-ran line guarantee since it is
genuinely later, without fixed directions, equivocal even to its very own lawful researchers,
conflicting with its very own national law, as opposed to the general standards and rules of
universal law, as opposed to UNCLOS, in spite of the Asean-China DOC, and as yet developing
as of late as this year. Not a solitary state on the planet perceives, endures or submits in to
China's 9-ran line guarantee. By attesting their own cases to parts of the waters encased by
China's 9-ran line guarantee, the other petitioner states really restrict and challenge China's 9-ran
line guarantee.

What is China's idea to together build up the contested territories?

China has been dangling to the Philippines and other petitioner expresses its idea to mutually
build up the contested zones while racking the power issues. This joint improvement offer began
from Deng Xiaoping's three-section rule: power has a place with China, hold the questions, and
seek after joint advancement. There are in any event three issues to this offer.

To start with, China needs to together build up the EEZ of the Philippines however declines to
mutually build up China's own EEZ. As a result, China is stating to the Philippines, what is only
your financial zone has a place with the two of us, however what is only our monetary zone is
our own alone, and in the event that you don't concur, our warships will be there to keep you
from building up your selective monetary zone.

Second, as clarified by Chinese authorities and researchers, China's idea of joint advancement is
dependent upon the precondition that partaking waterfront states should first explicitly perceive
China's "undeniable sway" under its 9-ran line guarantee. This precondition adequately implies
that once a state consents to joint improvement, it must not just abandon any island it has in the
Spratlys and surrender the equivalent to China, it should likewise revoke any oceanic case inside
the 9-ran line region. This precondition requested by China is clearly conflicting with its idea to
hold the power issue.

Third, if the Philippines consents to China's joint improvement offer, the Philippines will as a
result surrender its select "sovereign right and purview" to misuse all the living and non-living
assets in its very own EEZ. The Philippines will likewise surrender its restrictive right to abuse
the mineral assets in its very own ECS. Basically China's joint improvement offer will refute the
oceanic qualifications of the Philippines under UNCLOS. This is unavoidably impermissible in
light of the fact that our 1987 Constitution orders, "The State will secure the country's marine
riches in its archipelagic waters, regional ocean and elite financial zone, and save its utilization
and pleasure solely to Filipino residents."

Normally, not a solitary inquirer state has consented to China's joint advancement offer. China's
reaction to the negative response of other petitioner states to its joint improvement offer is to
annoy the boats of other inquirer states investigating for oil and gas inside their own EEZs. In
May 2011, Vietnam fought that Chinese observation vessels remove the links of a Vietnamese
ship reviewing inside Vietnam's very own EEZ. In December 2012, the Vietnamese again fought
another link cutting act submitted by two Chinese vessels on a Vietnamese ship studying inside
Vietnam's EEZ. In March 2011, the Philippines likewise fought that Chinese observation vessels
menacingly surrounded a Philippine-dispatched deliver looking over in the Reed Bank, which is
inside the Philippines' EEZ.

These provocation strategies by the Chinese have kept Vietnam and the Philippines from
misusing the assets inside their very own EEZs, a selective right ensured to them under
UNCLOS. These provocation strategies just affirm that practically speaking China is
guaranteeing every one of the waters and assets inside its 9-ran line map, regardless of whether
the waters and assets fall inside the EEZ of other beach front expresses that have no covering
EEZs with China.

The main joint improvement that is plausible in the Spratlys is for all inquirer states to regard
every others' EEZs as ensured by UNCLOS, and to mutually build up the contested regions past
these EEZs. Without covering EEZs in the Spratlys, the EEZ of a seaside state can never be a
contested region in light of the fact that UNCLOS, to which all inquirer states in the Spratlys are
parties, ensures such EEZ to each beach front state. Past the EEZs, the all-inclusive mainland
racks of inquirer states in the Spratlys cover and can be viewed as contested territories, and in
this manner open to joint improvement. This sort of joint improvement, without any
preconditions, is amicable, reasonable, down to earth and tough since it is as per UNCLOS.
There is no tormenting in this sort of joint advancement, and no state illicitly appropriates the
EEZ of another state.

For what reason did the Philippines record an assertion body of evidence against China?

Following the strained standoff in April and May 2012 among Chinese and Philippines vessels in
Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines pulled back in June 2012 its vessels from Scarborough Shoal
on the comprehension of a common withdrawal of vessels by both China and the Philippines.
The Chinese, be that as it may, reneged on their dedication and would not pull back their vessels.
At that point in November 2012, China educated the Philippines that the Chinese reconnaissance
vessels would remain for all time positioned in Scarborough Shoal. China was currently in
changeless control of Scarborough Shoal.

Scarborough Shoal is a submerged reef with the exception of six little shakes that project not
multiple meters above water at elevated tide. The width of the biggest stone above water at
elevated tide is just a couple of meters. The Philippines assembled a beacon on one of the stones
in 1965, and another beacon in 1991. From the 1960s to the 1980s Scarborough Shoal was a
shelling scope of American and Philippine Air power planes working on bombarding runs.
Preceding such practice bombings, American and Philippine specialists would give overall
notification to sailors to keep away from Scarborough Shoal. No dissent was ever gotten
notification from China.

Scarborough Shoal showed up in the principal guide of the Philippines gave under the American
system in 1899. Prior during the Spanish system, Scarborough Shoal, around then called
Panacot, showed up in a few Spanish maps of the Philippines beginning in any event in the 1734
Murillo map. While Scarborough Shoal was outside the lines attracted the 1898 Treaty of Paris,
Spain and the United States two years after the fact went into the 1900 Treaty of Washington
explaining that islands to which Spain had "title or guarantee of title" were likewise surrendered
to the United States despite the fact that outside the lines attracted the Treaty of Paris. In this
way, Spain surrendered Scarborough Shoal to the United States under the 1900 Treaty of
Washington. Under the 1935 Constitution, the regions surrendered by Spain to the United States
under the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Washington structure some portion of the Philippine
national domain. Under the 2009 correction to the Philippine Baselines Law, Scarborough Shoal
is proclaimed as a Regime of Islands for reasons for deciding its baselines.

The Philippines had five alternatives in reacting to the Chinese control of Scarborough Shoal.
First was to send maritime vessels and marines to retake Scarborough Shoal. This was not
achievable as a result of the predominant Chinese maritime powers. Second was to document a
strategic dissent with China. This was futile in light of the fact that China would just disregard
the dissent – as it overlooked the dissent of the Philippines after China held onto Mischief Reef
17 years sooner in 1995. Third was to request that Asean hall China to pull back from
Scarborough Shoal. This was not sensible in light of the fact that some Asean nations are
reluctant to outrage China. In addition, Asean nations don't favor one side on regional debates.
Fourth was to take the issue to the United Nations Security Council. This was additionally
pointless since China has a veto power in the Security Council. The fifth and just suitable choice
was to carry the issue to a worldwide council for discretion, where the playing field would be
level and military force would not tally, however just the standard of law would oversee.
Unexpectedly, the Philippines could likewise not conjure the Phil-U.S. Shared Defense Treaty
since the U.S. has clarified that the islands, reefs and shakes in the South China Sea are outside
the extent of the bargain.

With China's control of Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines had no other plan of action yet to go
to an Annex VII arbitral court under UNCLOS. It was the main reasonable and viable reaction
that the Philippines could offer. Something else, nothing would prevent China from possessing
another stone, reef, or shore inside its 9-ran line guarantee regardless of whether inside the EEZ
of the Philippines.

The Chinese control of Scarborough Shoal is an attack of A philippine area, offering ascend to a
regional power debate. In any case, the Philippines couldn't expedite China to mandatory
intervention a regional sway debate without China's assent. That is the reason the Philippines
chose to do the following best thing – expedite China to mandatory assertion the oceanic part of
China's 9-ran line guarantee. In the event that China's 9-ran line guarantee is nullified, at that
point China will lose its unnecessary case to the waters of the South China Sea. All the more
essentially, China's reason for asserting regional power over the islands inside its 9-ran line
guarantee will debilitate impressively since the 9-ran line guarantee is vital to China's verifiable
case to regional sway over the islands inside the encased region.

Is China's assent required for the necessary discretion?

At the point when a state endorses UNCLOS, the state agrees ahead of time to be bound by the
mandatory question settlement component under UNCLOS on "any debate concerning the
understanding or application" of the arrangements of UNCLOS. Be that as it may, a state is
permitted to quit necessary discretion for specific issues, similar to questions on sea limit
delimitation. In 1996, ten years in the wake of confirming UNCLOS, China quit obligatory
mediation for specific sorts of questions, remembering any debate for sea limit delimitation. A
state stays bound to necessary discretion as for the translation or utilization of UNCLOS on
debates that the state has not avoided, or can't prohibit, from obligatory mediation.

Hence, when a real question emerges including the translation or use of UNCLOS, a signatory
state is as of now regarded to have given its agree to mandatory intervention, except if the
contest is one that is appropriately rejected from necessary mediation under UNCLOS.

The Philippines' mediation body of evidence against China includes the translation or utilization
of UNCLOS on three primary issues. The main issue is whether China's 9-ran line guarantee can
nullify the award under UNCLOS of an EEZ to the Philippines. This issue doesn't include any
oceanic limit delimitation on the grounds that there are no covering EEZs among China and the
Philippines, absolutely not in the island of Luzon confronting the West Philippine Sea.
Scarborough Shoal, whatever state may have power over it, doesn't create an EEZ in light of the
fact that lone little shakes are found there. Honestly, those stones are not islands equipped for
supporting human home or financial existence of their own, which is the condition for an island
to have an EEZ.

In the Spratlys there is no island equipped for continuing human residence or financial existence
of its own. This is the situation of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Subsequently,
there are likewise no covering EEZs between the Philippines and other inquirer states in the
Spratlys. In any case, since China asserts that islands in the Spratlys produce EEZs, the
subsequent issue is whether an island in the Spratlys really creates an EEZ. The goals of this
issue doesn't include any oceanic limit delimitation. This issue is an investigation into whether an
island in the Spratlys fulfills the UNCLOS prerequisite of having the option to "continue human
residence or financial existence of [its] claim." If none of the islands fulfills this necessity, at that
point there are no covering EEZs in the Spratlys and henceforth no sea limit delimitation is
included. In the event that an island fulfills this necessity, and accordingly creates an EEZ, at that
point the council will so announce however will continue no further without the assent of China
on the grounds that the issue will at that point include covering EEZs requiring oceanic limit
delimitation for its goals.

If the arbitral court decides that an island in the Spratlys creates an EEZ, the Philippines can
carry China to mandatory mollification under an UNCLOS pacification commission. Under
UNCLOS, an express that quits mandatory intervention including sea limit delimitation will in
any case submit to obligatory pacification. The placation commission will alter the middle line of
the covering EEZs, considering Palawan's more than 600-nm coastline as against the under 1-nm
coastline of the greatest island in the Spratlys. Under winning law of the ocean statute, such
immense imbalance in the restricting coastlines will entitle the island in the Spratlys to an EEZ
either just offshore away from Palawan, or to a relatively infinitesimal EEZ confronting
Palawan, if by any means. Despite the fact that the report of the assuagement commission isn't
official on China, China is committed under UNCLOS to haggle in compliance with common
decency with the Philippines dependent on the report of the appeasement commission.

The third issue is whether China can proper and build fake islands on low-tide heights (LTEs)
inside the Philippines' EEZ, similar to the monstrous structure China based on Mischief Reef,
which China authoritatively portrays as a safe house for Chinese anglers. LTEs are shakes above
water at low tide however submerged at elevated tide. LTEs past the regional ocean of a
waterfront state don't create any sea zone, not by any means a regional ocean. LTEs past the
regional ocean are not dependent upon allotment and to cases of regional power since they are
not land however part of the sea zone. Under UNCLOS, just the neighboring beach front state
can fabricate fake islands inside its EEZ.

An end product issue raised by the Philippines is whether China can subject the high oceans in
the South China Sea to its sway. The high oceans allude to the zone past the EEZs of beach front
states. China's 9-ran line guarantee subjects the high oceans in the South China Sea to China's
"undeniable sway." UNCLOS explicitly gives that no state will expose the high oceans to its
power. This UNCLOS arrangement is a codification of hundreds of years' old standard universal
law.
Under UNCLOS, the refusal of a gathering to take an interest in a question settlement
procedures, where such cooperation is obligatory, "will not comprise a bar to the procedures"
and the council can even now choose the case on the benefits.

To what extent will it take for the arbitral court to choose the case?

The 5-man Annex VII arbitral council met just because last July 11, 2013 and assigned The
Hague as seat of the mediation and the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the Registry of the
procedures. In spite of the fact that China has would avoid the procedures, it is as yet being
advised, and mentioned to remark, at each phase of the procedures. Last Tuesday, August 27,
2013, the Tribunal gave an Order supporting its Rules of Procedure and guiding the Philippines
to present its Memorial not later than March 30, 2014. The Order expresses that the Memorial
will "completely address all issues, including matters identifying with the locale of the Arbitral
Tribunal, the suitability of the Philippines' case, just as the benefits of the contest." The Order
further expresses, "The Arbitral Tribunal will decide the further course of the procedures,
including the requirement for and booking of some other composed entries and hearings, at a
fitting later stage, in the wake of looking for the perspectives on the Parties." Based on the
Tribunal's Order requiring all issues to be tended to in the Memorial of the Philippines, it is
conceivable that the Tribunal may choose the jurisdictional issue together with benefits of the
debate. Discretions under Annex VII may take a few years before a choice is come to.

What are the implications of this case on universal law?

China's 9-ran line guarantee essentially can't exist together with UNCLOS. Maintaining one
methods slaughtering the other. In the event that China's 9-ran line guarantee is maintained or
permitted to stand, UNCLOS will stop to be the law of the ocean in the South China Sea. China
will fitting for itself not just the EEZs and ECSs of other beach front states yet in addition the
high oceans and all the living and non-living assets discovered there. This will be the start of the
end for UNCLOS. Other maritime forces will moreover guarantee different seas and oceans,
removing the EEZs and ECSs of powerless or exposed beach front states. The seas and oceans of
the planet will be represented by the standard of the maritime ordinance.

Without a doubt, the sea debate between the Philippines and China is a basic analysis to the very
endurance of UNCLOS – regardless of whether the Rule of Law will administer the seas and
oceans of our planet, or whether the standard of the maritime gun will win, as it did in the hour
of Grotius. Legitimate researchers on the law of the ocean everywhere throughout the world are
acutely viewing the result of the Philippines' mediation case.

What are the implications of this case on the Philippines?

The Philippines has shrewdly decided to carry its oceanic debate with China to a discussion
where warships, military aircraft and rockets don't check, wiping out the military preferred
position of China and guaranteeing that the result of the contest will be chosen uniquely as per
the Rule of Law. It was a savvy choice, however one borne out of need since it was really the
main suitable choice open to the Philippines.

We need to concede that as a country we have fail to keep up a trustworthy self-protection

power, especially in our maritime resources notwithstanding our being an archipelagic nation
with broad coastlines and a huge EEZ. We are paying the consequences for this disregard, by
losing Mischief Reef in 1995, Scarborough Shoal in 2012, and in all probability Ayungin Shoal
sooner rather than later. To stay a sovereign and autonomous country, to keep up our regional
uprightness, to evade further mortification, and to keep up our sense of pride as a country, we
should manufacture and keep up a tenable self-protection power. There is just no option in
contrast to this. No country can stay sovereign, autonomous and free for long without keeping up
a sound self-preservation power, regardless of whether worldwide law and world supposition are
its ally.

As a country we should likewise comprehend that the sea and regional question with China in the
West Philippine Sea is a between generational battle to keep up our sway and regional
trustworthiness. Our age may win the fight in court in the UNCLOS intervention case, yet
without a doubt China won't just surrender its enormous structure in Mischief Reef or pull back
its observation vessels in Scarborough Shoal.

Subsequent to verifying a great decision from the arbitral court, our age should at present win
over world conclusion and persuade the Chinese individuals that they will end up being a rebel
country if their Government keeps on disregarding worldwide law. he Chinese pioneers may not
endure strategically on the off chance that they just relinquish the 9-ran line guarantee without
the Chinese individuals being persuaded that their 9-ran line guarantee is against universal law.
The present age of Chinese have been educated from the time they entered school that the South
China Sea has a place with them. The up and coming age of Filipinos, and even the age after
them, must keep on pursuing an overall battle to persuade the Chinese individuals that the 9-ran
line guarantee has no premise in worldwide law.

UNCLOS doesn't accommodate a world police officer or sheriff to execute choices of global
arbitral councils. Part conditions of UNCLOS are required to willfully self-execute choices of
arbitral courts. For a losing party, this will happen just if the Government of the day can endure
politically regardless of whether it conforms to a ruling against its own state. A Government will
endure strategically if its kin comprehend that the choice is commanded by worldwide law. The
world must disclose to the Chinese individuals that the 9-ran line guarantee is in opposition to
global law. No country can guarantee the seas and oceans as its own. That is the reason it is
important for the Philippines to initially verify a decision from a global council that the 9-ran line
guarantee is in opposition to universal law.

The West Philippine Sea debate can, and should be settled, through the Rule of Law since it is
the not out of the question, just and strong answer for a circumstance where the contradicting
states are endlessly inconsistent as far as military, financial and political quality. Any goals of
the debate outside of the Rule of Law will just bring about inconsistent bargains and plant the
seeds of contention for people in the future.

The Rule of Law in the West Philippine Sea contest is UNCLOS. All the petitioner states to the
question are gatherings to UNCLOS and will undoubtedly agree to their bargain commitments
under UNCLOS in accordance with some basic honesty. On the off chance that the West
Philippine Sea contest is settled as per UNCLOS, at that point the world can be guaranteed that
there will be a simply, perpetual and enduring harmony in the West Philippine Sea.