1.

    Which changes in armed conflicts point at the decline of large-scale conventional

war between states? Why have major inter-state wars declined in the 21st century? 

Basically the changes in the typology of armed conflicts:

 
The fact that in 2015–2018, the world faced roughly the same peak number of state-based
conflicts as 30 years earlier, during the collapse of the bipolar system, does not mean it faced
the same conflict patterns. In the early 21st century, the main patterns of armed conflicts
evolved significantly, to the point that it is fair to claim: the war of the industrial age – large-
scale, direct confrontation between conventional armies of two or more states – all but faded
away
 
On the basis of analysis of lead academic datasets on conflicts and other types of violence
linked to and widespread in conflict areas, a typology of contemporary conflicts is formulated
and several main trends are identified. To a varying extent, these trends affect and permeate
all three main types of conflict of the early 21 century.
st

 
·      The first, widespread type is comprised by localized state-based conflicts of limited
intensity, mostly on the periphery of functional states that keep overall control of the
national territory. 3/4 of such conflicts are not internationalized; most respective states
are strong enough to contain escalation of violence, but often not enough to afford a
decisive crackdown, which leaves such peripheral violence hovering at a low level. 
·      In contrast, the second type is comprised by very few larger, more intense, heavily
transnationalized civil wars, mostly in weak, failed, dysfunctional or proxy states,
with major external interventions (such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, or
Yemen). These conflicts produce a lion’s share of battle-related deaths worldwide.
The same conflict areas also account for the bulk of terrorist attacks and fatalities. 
·      In a 30-year period since 1989, conflicts of the third type fought between non-state
actors comprised almost half of all armed conflicts. While shorter, less intense and
often linked to and co-located with the type two conflicts, non-state conflicts started
to systematically outnumber state-based conflicts in the 2010s.
 
 
12 key factors identified as the primary drivers of the incidence of conflict: 

 capacity of state institutions 

 degree of ethnic and sectarian polarization 
 prevalence of consolidated democracies 
 rate of economic growth 
 extent of economic interdependence 
 capabilities of international organizations 
 degree of U.S. preeminence 
 strength of international norms
 diffusion of lethal technology 
 degree of resource stress because of population pressures 
 degree of regional hegemony 
 degree of territorial contestation. 
 
 o   A quick review of these factors suggests why conflict has declined over the past
decades. The world has experienced a dramatic expansion in economic growth and
international trade over the past several decades, which has elevated hundreds of
millions of people out of poverty in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and has given
them a stake in a stable environment conducive to further development and the
accumulation of wealth. 

o   These trends have been accompanied by the development of many stronger and more-
democratic states, allowing for conflict resolution mechanisms that defuse or resolve
conflicts peacefully. 

o   Similarly, the emergence of international organizations and norms that aim to promote
peaceful relations between states, along with the growth of active peacekeeping and
peace enforcement by international actors, has clamped down on some of the conflicts
and perhaps deterred others. 

o   As these factors have become more prevalent throughout the international system, the
incidence of deadly political conflict has generally declined alongside them. These
positive trends have not been evenly distributed, and many states or regions continue
to be plagued by frequent armed conflict. 

o   However, the long-term global trends in these key factors help to explain why deadly
political conflicts have generally become less frequent, the wars of the past few years
notwithstanding. Moreover, the potential for these trends to continue into the future
supports the belief that the observed long-term decline in armed conflict may persist. 

 
 
2.     What are the advantages and shortcomings of datasets on organized armed violence
used in this course (Uppsala Conflict Data program datasets, Global Terrorism
Dataset)? 
 
 
-       (GTD) documents more than 190,000 international and domestic terrorist attacks that
occurred worldwide since 1970  
-       The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded ongoing violent conflicts
since the 1970
-       Difference in their scope: GTD is focused in terrorist attacks, while UCDP is focused on
violent conflicts 
 
-        
Advantages:
UCDP

·      One of the principal aims of UCDP is to ‘conduct theoretically and empirically based
analyses of armed conflict: its causes, escalation, spread, prevention and resolution’ –
deep analysis of a conflict

·      A ‘conflict’ is defined by the general UCDP codebooks as ‘a contested

incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results
 in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.’ UCDP often specifies that
what the project aims at observing, thus, are armed conflicts – ‘minor’ ones if involve
at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, proper ‘wars’ if they involve more than 1000
battle-related deaths per year. In this sense, UCDP is using the traditional threshold of
quantitative researches on warfare (1000 battle-related deaths per year as main
theoretical boundary for claiming that we are in presence of a war) and applies a
further subdivision within the range of conflicts that feature less than 1000. The
category of ‘intermediate’ conflicts – featuring a number of battle-related deaths
comprised between 25 and 1000 per year but passing on aggregate the 1000-
threshold – was used up to 2005, but has been eliminated afterwards – thus, includes
a narrower range of conflicts
·      Source evaluation: Both the independence and transparency of the origins of the
sources is crucial. Each source is judged according to the context in which it was
published, that is, according to the potential interests of the source in misrepresenting
violent events. Since most information comes from secondary sources, the project
attempts to trace reports back to the primary source (e.g. witness, warring party,
journalist, etc.) in order to assess its reliability.
·      The sources are coded by staff which have extensive case knowledge, and vetted by
project leaders with decades of experience working with the UCDP.

·      Contains information on three types of organized violence: violence between two

organized actors of which at least one is the government of a state, violence between
actors of which neither party is the government of a state, and lastly, violence against
unarmed civilians perpetrated by organized non-state groups or governments

·      Each event comes complete with several spatial and temporal locators, such as place
name, administrative division, and geographic coordinates, as well as start and end
dates, to allow for fine grained spatial and temporal analysis. 

·      Each event is also given a unique ID for easy reference, as well as conflict, dyad, and
actor IDs. These IDs for conflicts, dyads, and actors correspond with identifying
information found in other UCDP datasets and allow ample possibilities for dataset
integration.

 
 
GTD
·      Some general findings derived from the GTD involve the nature and distribution of
terrorist attacks – also provides certain analysis of the roots and trends of the attacks
( For example, about half of all terrorist attacks in the GTD are non-lethal, and
although approximately one percent of attacks involve 25 or more fatalities, these
highly lethal attacks killed more than 140,000 people in total between 1970 and 2018)
·      a pool of more than two million open-source media reports published each day –
wide range of sources
·      The GTD team combines automated and human workflows, leveraging the strengths
and mitigating the limitations of each, to produce rich and reliable data.
 ·      The evolving open source terrorist event databases have allowed for more rigorous
analysis of terrorism and terrorist activity – big contribution to the studying of the
terrorism 
·      Includes both domestic and international attacks
·      There is certain criteria: at least two of the following three criteria must be present
for an incident to be included in the GTD: 

-        Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic,

religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of
profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more
profound, systemic economic change. 

-       Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or

convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered,
irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of
this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the
attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is
met. 

-       Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare

activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by
international humanitarian law, insofar as it targets non-combatants 

·      You can make a search narrower/wider by choosing the criteria – easy to adjust the
search to your needs - Users of the GTD can further govern the parameters of their
search results by employing an additional terrorism definitional filter.  

 
Disadvantages:
UCDP:
-       UCDP has not coded non-violent events such as troop movements
-       The fatality numbers given here are based on publicly accessible sources. Due to the
lack of available information in many conflict zones, it is quite likely that there are
more fatalities than given in the best estimate – no exact number of casualties
-       UCDP can only include events which are reported publicly – not all the conflicts
included. Ultimately, it is impossible to know how many conflict events go
undocumented and are therefore missing from conflict datasets. Note, however, that
the risk set for this uncertainty is circumscribed to conflict zones: we have high
confidence that most countries truly have no or few violent events (e.g. Sweden,
Norway), but in countries with ongoing armed conflict there is uncertainty regarding
coverage.

 
 
GTD:
 
-       The attacks in the GTD are attributed to more than 2,000 named perpetrator
organizations and more than 700 additional generic groupings such as "Tamil
 separatists." However, two-thirds of these groups are active for less than a year and
carry out fewer than four total attacks. Likewise, only 20 perpetrator groups are
responsible for half of all attacks from 1970 to 2018 for which a perpetrator was
identified. In general, patterns of terrorist attacks are very diverse across time and
place and the GTD supports in-depth analysis of these patterns.
-       Regarding the sources: Event databases have serious limitations. The media may
report inaccuracies and lies; there may be conflicting information or false, multiple or
no claims of responsibility. Government censorship and disinformation may also
affect results. But despite these limitations, compared to more traditional criminology
data, they also have important advantages. In particular, because of the compelling
interest that non-state terrorist groups have in media attention, open source
information may be uniquely useful in the study of terrorism
 
 
 
3.     What are the main types of armed conflict in the 21st century? Which type of armed
conflict is the most widespread? Which one is the most intense, deadly and
problematic for international security? Please explain. 

On the basis of analysis of lead academic datasets on conflicts and other types of violence
linked to and widespread in conflict areas, a typology of contemporary conflicts is formulated
and several main trends are identified. To a varying extent, these trends affect and permeate
all three main types of conflict of the early 21 century.
st

 
·      The first, widespread type is comprised by localized state-based conflicts of limited
intensity, mostly on the periphery of functional states that keep overall control of the
national territory. 3/4 of such conflicts are not internationalized; most respective states
are strong enough to contain escalation of violence, but often not enough to afford a
decisive crackdown, which leaves such peripheral violence hovering at a low level. 
·      In contrast, the second type is comprised by very few larger, more intense, heavily
transnationalized civil wars, mostly in weak, failed, dysfunctional or proxy states,
with major external interventions (such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, or
Yemen). These conflicts produce a lion’s share of battle-related deaths worldwide.
The same conflict areas also account for the bulk of terrorist attacks and fatalities. 
·      In a 30-year period since 1989, conflicts of the third type fought between non-state
actors comprised almost half of all armed conflicts. While shorter, less intense and
often linked to and co-located with the type two conflicts, non-state conflicts started
to systematically outnumber state-based conflicts in the 2010s.

4.What are the main manifestations of the growing role of armed non-state actors in armed
conflicts and in other forms of organized violence? 
 
The main manifestations include:
1.     Since 2011 non-state conflicts outnumber state-based conflicts
2.     Since 2001 non-state actors become main perpetrators of one-sided violence against
civilians
3.     New types of conflict involving non-state actors emerge
 
 -       the challenges posed by new non-state armed groups go far beyond the threat of
physical harm. Whether in their more criminal, insurgent or ideologically extremist
manfiestations, these groups often provide informal and generally illiberal systems of
governance. 

-       Although there are major flaws in their provision of services or representation of

community interests, and despite their conflicts and uneasy co-existence with formal
state institutions and security forces, these groups nevertheless aspire to some sort of
elective bond with their local citizens. The bond may be a shared political goal, as has
been the case for certain national liberation movements and guerrilla causes
throughout history; but it may also be about providing odd jobs or a bit of money; it
may revolve around the claim to have “restored peace” after eliminating other armed
factions; or it may be because the group represents the only opportunity for
advancement for young unemployed men in highly stratified societies. 

-       Non-state armed groups have not just multiplied in number over the past decade, but
have also assumed greater levels of internal differentiation.  there is evidence that
non-state armed groups are adopting more networked and combinatorial
organisational structures in response to the various requirements for survival and
growth. Groups as diverse as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and certain militia in Syria or Libya rely on
paramilitary control of civilians, rudimentary governance (especially in security and
justice), illicit trade and occasional acts of selective terrorism. This multifunctionality
renders these groups more durable and predictable as alternative providers of
governance, but may also account for their tendency to fragment, their confusion over
political and economic goals, and the difficulty of negotiating any sort of integral
peace treaty with each group 

 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Non-conventional%20armed%20violence
%20and%20non-state%20actors,%20challenges%20for%20mediation%20and
%20humanitarian%20action.pdf

5. How do you understand fragmentation of violence in contemporary armed conflicts?

Please list the main forms (directions) of fragmentation. Provide examples. 

·       Fragmentation is one of 4 directions in transformation of violence in armed conflicts

·       refers to several interconnected forms of violence 

Fragmentation include:
-       multiple conflicts in same location, but over different incompatibilities
-       multiple pairs (dyads) of militant actors contesting the same issues
-       rivalry and fighting among non-state actors splintering of rebel groups
-       governments’ increasing reliance on paramilitary groups
-       violence by local power-brokers and militias (fighting for power and influence
at the local level)
-       overlap with communal violence
 
 ·       fragmentation makes conflict more violent, longer lasting and harder to resolve
·       accompanied by the diversification of armed groups and the further erosion of the
boundaries between different forms of violence 
·       fragmented violence often acquires its own dynamics and becomes self-perpetuating 
·       While it is generally carried out on a lower scale in terms of battle-related deaths, it
has high costs for civilians in terms of casualties, displacement and less direct
impacts. 

·       the
mix of forms of violence in the context of a major armed conflict in Iraq; in the
Darfur region of Sudan, where the fighting in 2007 fell short of a major armed
conflict; and in Pakistan, which in 2007 suffered multiple forms of violence and
instability—only some linked to local armed conflicts—that threatened human,
national, regional and inter- national security. The first two cases demonstrate a
general fragmentation of armed violence, while all three show the diversification of
armed actors and the erosion of boundaries between forms of violence. 

 
 
 
 

6. How do you understand transnationalization of violence in

contemporary armed conflicts? Please list the main forms and
levels of transnationalization of armed conflicts and terrorism.
Provide examples.

                                   

Over the last few decades, the structure, character and dynamics of the
organized collective armed violence has changed quite significantly, in
comparison to a typical conventional war of the 20 century. First of all, a
th

typical armed conflict in the 21 century does not usually imply a clear
st

structure of an armed confrontation; next, the previously leading role of

the government has moved to the background; and lastly, regular armies
and intense fighting are also not a vital element of an armed conflict
anymore.

However, most importantly, armed conflicts have been transnationalized.

It means that a typical contemporary armed conflict now represents a
complicated combination of violence at different levels, with middle to
low intensity, which has moved far beyond the main line of confrontation
between the main combatants. It is more fragmented, has blurred
geographic boundaries, and can shift smoothly from local to
transnational. Such a conflict usually has a large number of armed
players, both state and - and increasingly often - non-state ones. Such
armed conflicts have many various motives; therefore, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to strictly refer to any one type (ethnic, religious,
socio-political, etc.). Many of them are exclusively engaged in the
struggle for domination at the local level or practice armed violence of a
criminal rather than a traditional military-political type. And most
importantly, although not all of the participants operating in the conflict
zone are fighting against each other, most of them are actively using
armed force against the civilian population. This can be clearly seen in
the conflicts that involve different terrorist groups.

Let us now consider as a striking example of a typical 21 century conflict

st

– the conflict in Syria. The civil war in Syria is a multilateral, multi-level

armed conflict in Syria, which began in the spring of 2011 as a local civil
confrontation and gradually grew into an uprising against the Bashar al-
Assad regime, in which over time not only the main states of the region,
but also international organizations were involved, military-political
groupings and world powers. Hence, we can see various levels of the
conflict: inside the state, and outside the state. There are generally two
sides: Syrian government and its allies; and Syrian opposition and allies.
These two sides have allies inside the country as well as outside. There
is also a terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) involved, that kills both civilians and soldiers, and has very unclear
goals.

Why Syrian conflict can be considered as a prime example of a

transnationalization of violence in contemporary armed conflicts?
Because it fits all the criteria: it began as a civil war in 2011 and then
transformed into a proxy-war with a huge number of states involved,
each with their own goals; it also involves a terrorist organization that
has very ambiguous aims and kills a lot of civilians; the motives of the
Syrian conflict nowadays are blurred and unclear, as well as the borders;
there is no clear strategy and structure of the conflict and no
conventional armies; and lastly, there are many non-state actors
involved in the conflict.

To sum up, transnationalization of violence in armed conflicts is a

modern phenomenon. It means that the typical conflicts of the 20 th

century have changed into conflicts with unclear borders and structure,
that involve a lot of sides and combine civil and international conflicts at
once.

 
 

7. What are the main forms of and trends in direct human deaths
from armed conflicts (battle-related deaths) in the 21st century?
Are armed conflicts becoming more deadly or less deadly
(compared to the 20th century)? Explain why.

Overall, the total number of armed conflicts has declined significantly

over the two decades since the end of the Cold War. The number of
states involving states has decreased by 40%, from 52 conflicts in 1991–
1992 to only 29 in 2003. The number of especially large and intense
conflicts and wars has decreased even more.

Tendencies such as the withdrawal from major conventional interstate

wars, the predominance of intrastate conflicts, the erosion of their
borders, the growing role of armed non-state players, the emergence of
new types of confrontations, affected the dynamics and structure of
human losses during hostilities. Over the past twenty years, the total
number of military and civilian casualties incurred directly as a result of
clashes between combatants has dropped significantly. This was a
continuation of a longer-term trend: although the dynamics of combat
losses during the entire period after the end of World War II was
extremely contradictory, their total number has been declining unevenly
since the 1950s. So, if in 1950 during military operations in the world
were killed 700 thousand people, then in 2002 - 20 thousand.

Such a significant decrease in the scale of human losses during military

operations is explained, on the one hand, by the fact that the very nature
of the armed struggle has changed. Medium-intensity conventional wars,
often fought with the support of one or both superpowers in a bipolar
system, have largely been replaced by internal conflicts in countries and
regions with weak or dysfunctional state power. In such conflicts, the
armed forces are usually not opposed to rebel armies, but rather to
relatively small armed groups, which, however, can be well trained and
armed. Ambushes, minor skirmishes and attacks on civilians dominate
the classic clashes of combatants.

 
On the other hand, for every relatively clearly expressed positive trend in
the dynamics of conflicts and other forms of armed violence, there are
negative changes that partially counterbalance its effect. Thus, the
downward trend in armed conflicts exhausted itself by the mid-2000s:
their total number stopped decreasing, having stabilized at the level of
32 incidents per year in 2004-2006. (in 2007 it even insignificantly
increased to 34) [Harbom, Melander, Wallensteen, 2008]. Despite the
decline since the beginning of the 1990s. the total number of armed
conflicts, the number of states involved in them increased, which
indicates their growing internationalization. The downward trend in
casualties among military and civilians directly in the course of hostilities
between armed combatants is offset by a high level of violence on their
part, and not so much against each other as against unarmed civilians.

Consequently, the reduction in the total number of conflicts and combat

losses in them is partly "compensated" by the growth of other forms and
methods of violence. Unlike conventional wars with the participation of
the state, the number of which has decreased since the early 1990s, no
pronounced decline has been observed in the dynamics of non-state
armed violence. Naturally, conflicts between non-state groups are
usually less intense and deadly than conflicts with the participation of the
state, but the target of violence in them is increasingly not only and not
so much armed opponents (combatants), but civilians. It is against him
that terrorism, ethnocide, intercommunal violence, etc., are ultimately
directed.

8. How is one-sided violence against civilians different from armed

conflict? How can it relate to an armed conflict? What are the main
forms of, and global trends in, one-sided violence against civilians?

 
Collective armed violence in the context of a conflict is not limited to
confrontation between its direct participants. One of its most deadly
forms is the direct and deliberate use of force by an armed player (be it a
government army, rebels, warlords, etc.) against civilians, the so-called
unilateral violence. Its main difference from the conflict “in its pure form”
is that it, going beyond the framework of the armed confrontation of the
combatants proper, attacks civilians. Civilians killed deliberately (during
a terrorist attack in a public place; ethnic cleansing; internally displaced
persons attacked in refugee camps; victims of genocide and other mass
crimes against humanity) cannot be considered combatants, that is,
parties to the conflict.

Acts of unilateral violence (the same terrorist attacks) can also be

committed in peacetime, and then their deliberate targeting against
civilians, as a rule, does not raise any special doubts. However, at
present, the overwhelming majority of manifestations of unilateral
violence in the world are associated with armed confrontation and occur
in conflict zones. Under these conditions, the main difficulty in identifying
acts of unilateral violence is to distinguish them from unintentional,
indiscriminate attacks by armed players on each other's positions, during
which civilians can also be killed (such victims are classified in military
reports as “collateral damage”).

In contrast to the dynamics of armed conflicts, which have shown a

stable downward trend over the past 20 years, the dynamics of unilateral
violence is extremely uneven, and its level fluctuates greatly from year to
year. More importantly, the analysis of all its indicators does not allow us
to identify a downward trend. On the one hand, since the late 1990s. the
number of actors unleashing campaigns of unilateral violence against
the civilian population increased slightly, hovering at around 30 per year
(their peak was in 2002 and 2004, when this number reached 40). On
the other hand, the average number of acts of unilateral violence in the
2000s. was higher than in the previous decade, although the lethality in
them was, on the contrary, somewhat lower. It follows from this that the
scale and intensity of unilateral violence can vary dramatically depending
on its type and purpose (from the complete destruction of a particular
group of the population, for example, an entire ethnic group, to
intimidation by inflicting limited damage on civilians or the so-called
collective punishment).
 

In terms of the scale and intensity of unilateral violence, two main forms
can be distinguished. The first is extremely intense and large-scale
massacres of the civilian population, up to and including genocide. They
are distinguished by their high lethality, but they are quite rare: tragedies
of the scale of genocide in Rwanda, Cambodia or the Holocaust occur
once every few decades. These beatings are carried out by fairly large
political players, half of whom have been states over the past 20 years.
The initiators of such actions are usually not difficult to identify: the
governments of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC); the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Until now, the lion's share of attention
from the world media and international organizations falls on such
extremely rare but large-scale campaigns to destroy civilians (largely
under the influence of the resonance from the genocide in Rwanda,
which the world community not only failed, but even failed tried to
prevent).

Nevertheless, the modern picture of unilateral violence is determined not

by these rare one-time acts of mass extermination of people, but by its
second form - the more widespread, regular and systematic attacks
against the civilian population, undertaken on an almost routine basis by
the majority of armed players of various types in virtually all conflict and
post-conflict zones.

9. Formulate and explain the main definitional criteria for terrorism.

How is terrorism different from ordinary crime, insurgency
(guerrilla) warfare and repressive actions against civilians by
states?

The vagueness and vagueness of this concept, the absence of a

universal international legal definition is largely a consequence of its
political, rather than academic nature and origin. The sharply politicized
nature of the term “terrorism” gives a wide scope for different
interpretations of the latter, depending on the goals of the interpreter and
the political situation.

In defining terrorism, three criteria can be distinguished that distinguish

terrorism of all kinds from other forms of violence, with which terrorism is
often confused, especially in the context of broader armed confrontation.
If an act or threat of violence meets all three criteria, it can be confidently
considered a terrorist act.

The first criterion - a political goal - distinguishes terrorism from ordinary

crime and criminal violence for the sake of achieving material goals,
including from organized criminal activity. In this case, the “political goal”
can be interpreted very broadly and be both extremely specific and very
abstract. It can include ideological or religious motivation and be
formulated not only in political, but also in political-ideological or religious
categories. Nevertheless, this goal always has a political dimension. At
the same time, terrorism is a way to achieve a political goal, which is of a
primary and intrinsic nature, and is not simply used as a cover or a tool
for promoting other interests (for example, obtaining illegal economic
profit). Terrorists can borrow criminal fundraising methods for self-
financing and to do this they can interact with organized crime.

The second criterion — the civilian population and targets as the primary
target of terrorist violence or the threat of such violence — distinguishes
terrorism from a number of other forms of politically motivated violence,
especially those used during armed conflict. Of these, terrorism is most
often confused with actions of the guerrilla-insurgent type - the use of
armed force against military units and other forces and security facilities
of the state by rebels, who, as a rule, enjoy some support from a part of
the local population and claim that they are acting in its interests. Unlike
guerrilla-insurgency tactics, terrorism is directly and deliberately targeted
specifically at the civilian population and other non-combatants, as well
as at civilian targets. The problem, however, is complicated by the fact
that one and the same group can wage an armed struggle to achieve its
political goals by different methods, using guerrilla and terrorist tactics at
the same time or switching from one of them to another (depending on
the political context, area or conditions of operations etc.)

 
 The third criterion is a pronounced asymmetric aspect. Terrorism is a
specific weapon of the “weak” against the “strong”. Moreover, terrorism
is a side tactic that is not only weaker militarily and technically, but also
has a lower formal status. In other words, a group that uses terrorist
methods in an armed confrontation is characterized not only by
asymmetry of the potentials (capabilities) of the parties, but also by
status asymmetry. it is what distinguishes terrorist activity among various
forms of politically motivated violence against civilians (for example,
oppression by the state)

It is the asymmetric nature of terrorism that explains why terrorists target

civilians and non-combatants as prime targets. Armed violence against
civilians or the threat of such violence serves as a kind of force multiplier
for terrorists, which compensates for their military weakness, and as a
communication and PR tool in order to put pressure on the state and
society as a whole. It is precisely strikes against unarmed victims and
civilian targets that allow even a small group to create a
disproportionately strong destabilizing effect with relatively limited means
- an effect that it could not achieve with conventional military methods.
This effect allows terrorists to put pressure on an incomparably stronger
adversary - the state, including provoking its inadequate and
disproportionate response, and in terms of influencing the mass
consciousness - even “catch up” with it. By endangering civilians and
infrastructure, the terrorist organization is trying to strike at the weakest,
weakest point, at the “Achilles heel” of its otherwise stronger adversary -
at its civilian targets.

10. Provide explanations of the global rise in terrorism, its

increased lethality and highly uneven distribution by region in the
21st century?

Among the main tendencies of modern terrorism, the following have the
greatest importance:

-        the general rise in terrorist activity in the world, especially sharply in the
last few years;
-        increased lethality from terrorism;

-        extremely uneven distribution of terrorist activity across countries and

regions of the world: concentration of most of the terrorist activity in the
world in two regions, which are leading by a wide margin from the rest,
and only in 2-3 zones of the most intense and widely internationalized
conflicts;

-        coming to the fore of the motivations, goals and ideologies of a religious

and nationalist persuasion with the persisting level of terrorism of other
motivational and ideological types (right, left, etc.). The growth of
terrorism of mixed ideological and motivational types, especially religious
and nationalistic;

-        the domination of radical Islamist organizations among the most

dangerous terrorist groups;

-        absolute domination of terrorism as a tactic in armed local-regional

conflicts both over peacetime terrorism (in the absence of an armed
conflict) and over terrorism that sets global, universalist goals;

-        transnationalization of terrorism at different levels of world politics and

blurring the line between domestic political and international terrorism;

-        opposing, but interconnected tendencies of transnationalization and

fragmentation of modern terrorism;

-        the spread of network and various hybrid structures in the organizational

systems of terrorist organizations;

-        the growing link between terrorism and the shadow economy and the
transition of many terrorist groups to self-financing;

-        development of tactics, means and methods of technical, financial, and,

most importantly, information and communication support of terrorism.

According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the level of terrorist

activity in the world since the beginning of the XXI century has grown
significantly in all parameters and indicators. The most significant growth
is demonstrated by the number of terrorist attacks - more than 6.3 times,
from 1880 terrorist attacks in 2001 to 11952 terrorist attacks in 2013, the
last for which statistics on terrorism was available at the time of
publication of the article. It is especially alarming that it is the first three
years of the current decade that are leading in terms of the number of
terrorist attacks, and the dynamics are developing on an increasing
basis. If in 2011 there were 5,007 terrorist attacks, in 2012 - 8,480, and
in 2013 - almost 12 thousand terrorist attacks, which is an absolute
record not only since the beginning of the XXI century, but also for the
entire historical period (since 1970) for which statistics on terrorism are
available.

The reasons for the rise in terrorism in the 21st century are:

- The growing crisis in the world, the inability of society to regulate

complex socio-political processes; rapid change of human and political
ideals and values, involvement in political life of broad masses of the
population who have no political experience.

- Economic and financial crises, an increase in military spending, a sharp

social stratification, unemployment, an increase in crime.

- Ambiguous, inconsistent behavior of the ruling class, half-hearted

measures against terrorism, the acquisition of political capital on this
problem by political leaders.

- Terrorism has become a convenient tool for combating progressive and

opposition forces, inconvenient political regimes

- the introduction of dictatorial regimes in a number of countries,

ostensibly to fight terrorism.

- Globalization of the world, building a unipolar world, uneven distribution

and distribution of world wealth and benefits among peoples, economic
monopoly, in which competitiveness and partnership are replaced by
division into a race of masters and a race of "untouchables", the concept
of a "golden billion" and powerless periphery.

 
 11. What are the main types and levels of causes of armed conflicts and
other forms of organized political violence? 

Political violence is violence which is perpetrated by people or governments in order to

achieve political goals. It can include violence which is used by a state against other states
(war) or it can describe violence which is used against non-state actors (most notably police
brutality or genocide). It can also describe politically-motivated violence which is used by
non-state actors against a state (rebellion, rioting, treason or coup d'etat) or it can describe
violence which is used against other non-state actors. Non-action on the part of a government
can also be characterized as a form of political violence, such as refusing to alleviate famine
or otherwise denying resources to politically identifiable groups within their territory.
Due to the imbalances of power which exist between state and non-state actors, political
violence often takes the form of asynchronous warfare where neither side is able to directly
assault the other, instead relying on tactics such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and it can
often include attacks on civilian or otherwise non-combatant targets that are perceived as
proxies for the opposing faction. Many groups and individuals believe that their political
systems will never respond to their demands and they thus believe that violence is not only
justified but also necessary in order to achieve their political objectives. Similarly, many
governments around the world believe that they need to use violence in order to intimidate
their populaces into acquiescence. At other times, governments use force in order to defend
their countries from outside invasions or other threats of force and coerce other governments
or conquer territory.
 
Political violence varies widely in form, severity, and practice. In political science, a common
organizing framework is to consider the types of violence which are used by the relevant
actors: violence between non-state actors, one-sided violence which is perpetrated by a state
actor against civilians, and violence between states.
Violence between non-state actors
Fighting between non-state actors without state security forces playing a direct role in the
conflict.
 
Ethnic conflicts
Main article: Ethnic conflict
An ethnic conflict is fought between ethnic groups. While at times a specific ethnic group may have the backing (whether formal
or informal) of the state (or conversely, a specific ethnic group may be targeted by the state), ethnic conflict can also take place
between two groups without the direct intervention of the state, or despite the state's attempts to mediate between groups.
 
One-sided violence by non-state actors
Terrorism
Main article: Terrorism
Terrorism can be directed by non-state actors against political targets other than the state (e.g. Stabbing attacks at gay pride
parades in Jerusalem, Charlie Hebdo shooting). Because terrorism is a tactic often used by the weaker side of a conflict, it may
also fall under violence between a state and non-state actor.
 
While there lacks a concrete definition of terrorism, the United States Department of Defense however defines terrorism as, "the
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." What is and is not
considered terrorism is itself a controversial political question, as states have often used the label of terrorism to exclusively
demonize the actions of their enemies while obscuring "legal" violence administered by the state (e.g. The Troubles, CPP–NPA–
NDF rebellion, 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict).
 
One-sided violence by the state
Further information: Mass murder § By states
The use of force by an organized armed group, be it a government or a non-state group, which results in the deaths of civilians is
considered one-sided. According to the Human Security Report Project, a campaign of one-sided violence is recorded whenever
violence against civilians committed by one group results in at least 25 reported deaths in a calendar year.
 
Genocide
Main article: Genocide
One form of political violence is genocide. Genocide is commonly defined as "the deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole
or in part, of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group", although what constitutes enough of a "part" to qualify as genocide
has been subject to much debate by legal scholars. Genocide is typically carried out with either the overt or covert support of the
governments of those countries where genocidal activities take place. The Holocaust is the most cited historical example of
genocide.
 
Torture
Main article: Torture
Torture is the act of inflicting severe pain (whether physical or psychological) as a means of punishment, revenge, forcing
information or confession, or simply as an act of cruelty. Torture is prohibited under international law and the domestic laws of
most countries in the 21st century. It is considered a human rights violation and is declared unacceptable by Article 5 of the UN
Declaration of Human Rights. Signatories of the Third Geneva Convention and Fourth Geneva Convention have officially agreed
not to torture prisoners in armed conflicts. National and international legal prohibitions on torture derive from a consensus that
torture and similar ill-treatment are immoral, as well as impractical. Despite international conventions, torture cases continue to
arise such as the 2004 Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal committed by military police personnel of the United States
Army. Organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims monitor
abuses of human rights and reports widespread violations of human torture by states in many regions of the world. Amnesty
International estimates that at least 81 world governments currently practice torture, some of them openly.
 
Capital punishment
Main article: Capital punishment
Capital punishment is the sentence of death upon a person by the state as a punishment for an offense. This does not include
extrajudicial killing, which is the killing of a person by governmental authorities without the sanction of any judicial proceeding
or legal process. The use of capital punishment by country varies, but according to Amnesty International 58 countries still
actively use the death penalty, and in 2010, 23 countries carried out executions and 67 imposed death sentences. Methods of
execution in 2010 included beheading, electrocution, hanging, lethal injection and shooting. In 2007 the United Nations General
Assembly passed the UN moratorium on the death penalty which called for worldwide abolition of the death penalty.
 
Police brutality
Main article: Police brutality
Police brutality is another form of political violence. It is most commonly described in juxtaposition with the term excessive
force. Police brutality can be defined as "a civil rights violation that occurs when a police officer acts with excessive force by
using an amount of force with regards to a civilian that is more than necessary". Police brutality and the use of excessive force
are present throughout the world and in the United States alone, 4,861 incidences of police misconduct were reported during
2010 (see also Police brutality (United States)). Of these, there were 6,826 victims involved and 247 fatalities.
 
Famine
Main article: Famine
Famine can be initiated or prolonged in order to deny resources, compel obedience, or to depopulate a region with a recalcitrant
or untrusted populace.
 
Violence between a state and a non-state actor
At least one of the warring parties involved is the government of a state.
 
Rebellion
Main article: Rebellion
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (May 2016)
Rioting
Main article: Riot
A riot can be described as a violent disturbance by a group of individuals formed to protest perceived wrongs and/or injustice.
These can range from poverty and inequality to unemployment and government oppression. They can manifest themselves in a
number of ways but most commonly in the form of property damage. Riots are characterized by their lack of predictability and
the anonymity of their participants. Both make it difficult for authorities to identify those participating.
 
Riots have been analyzed in a number of ways but most recently in the context of the frustration-aggression model theory,
expressing that the aggression seen in most riots is a direct result of a groups frustration with a particular aspect of their lives.
Widespread and prolonged rioting can lead to and/or produce rebellion or revolution. There are also a number of different types
of riots including but not limited to police riots, race riot, prison riots, and sport riot.
 
Revolution
Main article: Revolution
In political science, a revolution is a fundamental and relatively sudden change in political power and political organization
which occurs when the population revolts against the government, typically due to perceived oppression (political, social,
economic) or political incompetence.
 
In a revolution political violence is usually common. The use of political violence is usually to fulfill a revolutionary objective,
and in times of civil strife to challenge the status quo. The goals of political violence can be varied such as to strengthen the
position of a group, or to weaken an opposing side.
 
Civil War
Main article: Civil war
Also known as an intrastate war, a civil war is a war fought within the same state or country between organized groups. Less
commonly, it can also be fought between two countries that have been created from one previously unified state. Often these
conflicts involve one group wishing to take control of a region or expressing dissatisfaction with the government. There is
typically a desire to overthrow the existing power or at least change some of their policies. In many cases, an outside power may
intervene on behalf of one side if they share their ideology or condemn the methods/motives of their opponents.
 
Counter-insurgency
Main article: Counter-insurgency
Counter-insurgency, another form of political violence, describes a spectrum of actions taken by the recognized government of a
state to contain or quell an insurgency taken up against it. There are many different doctrines, theories, and tactics espoused
regarding counter-insurgency that aim to protect the authority of the government and to reduce or eliminate the supplanting
authority of the insurgents. Because it may be difficult or impossible to distinguish between an insurgent, a supporter of an
insurgency who is a non-combatant, and entirely uninvolved members of the population, counter-insurgency operations have
often rested on a confused, relativistic, or otherwise situational distinction between insurgents and non-combatants. Counter-
insurgency operations are common during war, occupation and armed rebellions.
 
Electoral violence
Electoral violence includes any acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral
process or that arise in the context of electoral competition. It is used to influence the outcome of elections; to delay, disrupt or
derail polls; and to protest election results or suppress protests against election results. Electoral violence is used to influence the
 outcome of elections because parties cannot win through fraud alone  and because candidates cannot rely on fraud agents to
perpetuate fraud for them because fraud is hidden and violence is not.
 
War between states
Main article: War
War is a state of organized, armed, and often prolonged conflict carried on between states, nations, or other parties typified by
extreme aggression, social disruption, and usually high mortality. War should be understood as an actual, intentional and
widespread armed conflict between political communities, and therefore is defined as a form of political violence. Three of the
ten most costly wars, in terms of loss of life, have been waged in the last century: the death toll of World War II, estimated at
more than 60 million, surpasses all other war death tolls by a factor of two. It is estimated 

12. Does poverty drive terrorism? Explain. 

Research on poverty and terrorism has grown into a cottage industry since 9/11, but much of it claims
there is no connection between the two. Some studies of economic and demographic conditions—
such as income per capita, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, unemployment rates, and income
inequality—and their relationship to terrorist attacks go so far as to treat the link between poverty and
terrorism as a “myth,” to paraphrase one recent headline. In the view of former Princeton economist
Alan Krueger, now U.S. assistant secretary of the treasury for economic policy, “There is little reason
for optimism that a reduction in poverty or increase in educational attainment will lead to a
meaningful reduction in the amount of international terrorism.” This sentiment is widely echoed in
both academic and journalistic circles. Like Krueger, al Qaeda specialist and television journalist
Peter Bergen argues that economic deprivation inspires neither political nor terrorist violence. In
Yemen, for example, one official recently observed that “most young people have no prospects in
life” and “fanat- ics offer them the illusion that they can take power.” Substantial anecdotal evidence
from a broad swath of countries suggests that poverty does bear on terrorist activity and cannot be
overlooked.
Througout the Muslim world, violent extremists take refuge and gain support among the poor. From
Yemen to Kashmir, Chechnya, and across the Middle East, uneducated and often impoverished young
men with few employment prospects often are being recruited to join violent extremist groups in
exchange for financial rewards. From Mali to Yemen, Pakistan, and the Philippines, poverty
undermines government capacity and allows violent extremists to use ungoverned territories as
staging grounds for international attacks.
Even in wealthier Muslim-majority countries like Morocco and Lebanon, squalid slums or refugee
camps provide fertile grounds for terrorist recruiters.
The first step in answering this question is to recognize that the different explanations of violent
extremism may not be mutually exclusive. One common factor to emerge from various investigations
is that zealous religious leaders, Islamic fundamentalists, and particularly violent Salafi ideologues
have played a key role in mobilizing violent extremists throughout the Muslim world. There is also
the argument that foreign military occupation and authoritarian regimes are a strong predictor of
suicide attacks. In addition, it has been shown that individuals who join violent extremist groups
develop an overriding allegiance to the group that is manifested in suicide attacks. In this respect,
violent extremists operate like exclusive clubs that select and initiate members, encourag- ing them to
develop a fierce allegiance to each other. This may be why some of the most high-profile recruits are
alienated from their homeland: they joined violent extremist groups in their quest for social
integration. Members are highly skilled, not because less educated individuals do not volunteer to
become violent extremists, but because these groups select only the most skilled candidates.
All of these factors are compatible with poverty’s role. As counter- terrorism expert Daniel Byman
warns, the global financial crisis could “make many people around the world more willing to believe
that the current system is corrupt and more open to ideologies—first steps toward embracing violent
extremism.” Others would agree that “radicalism, separatism and other ideological motivations for
terrorism that appear to be intrinsically noneconomic may actually stem from underlying economic
conditions.” According to research on the background and status of Guantanamo Bay detainees,
terrorist activity in some cases was motivated by religious conviction or for political reasons and in
others by lack of opportunity. A Taliban driver held at Guantanamo explained: “I didn’t know the
Taliban was an enemy of the United States. I used to think the Taliban was an opportunity for me to
work, to avoid being with no money and to eat.”Clearly, violent extremists are motivated by a variety
of factors, a prominent one being poverty.
In the cross-country empirical literature, poverty and its relation- ship to terrorism are often too
narrowly conceived, and the longer-term impacts of household poverty and low national income on
societies overlooked. This research focuses almost exclusively on whether poverty directly motivates
individual terrorist recruits or popular support for terrorist leaders. Yet poverty can make governments
less responsive to their citizens, and less legitimate. The resulting vacuums tend to be filled by non-
state organizations. Moreover, while most Muslim charities have noble intentions and seek to provide
desperately needed welfare services, some have aided and abetted violent extremists—notably in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and around Pakistan’s refugee camps. Poverty also increases the likelihood of
conflict. War zones from Chechnya to Iraq, Bosnia, the Philippines, and Somalia have been exploited
by violent extremists seeking refuge from the law or easy recruits among a battle-hardened, idle
population of youths.
Once violent extremism has taken root in poor states, poverty further exacerbates the threat by
crippling states and hampering their ability to mount and implement effective counterterrorism
programs, as is the case in Yemen. Moreover, low national income may limit the reach of the state so
severely that its political regime may have no choice but to form an alliance with radicals or permit
jihadis into its midst in order to ensure its survival (as in Pakistan and Yemen). The few studies that
have explored the far-reaching consequences of poverty in weak and failed states find that a complex
brew of poverty-related conditions leave their citizens more prone to violent extremism. The
limitations of recent research on poverty and terrorism has important policy implications, as explained
in the following sections.

13. Are democracies more or less vulnerable to terrorism? Explain. 

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-
221825 

14. What are the main comparative advantages of states and non-state
actors in asymmetrical armed conflict between these two types of actor?
15. How violent religious groups are different from (ethno)nationalist, left-
wing, right-wing and other insurgent-terrorist groups in ideological terms? 

16. What are the principal differences between organizational networks and
social
networks?
 

·      ‘organizational network’ theory 

According to this theory, a network is a specific, separate organizational form that

has gained force in an age of rapid development of information and communication
technologies. In this information age, network structures appear to have some
import- ant advantages over other organizational forms. Network organizations are
more flexible, more mobile, better adapt to changing circumstances and are more
stable during system shocks and at times of crisis. For a certain structure to function
as a network it is not sufficient for its main elements to be linked by horizontal ties
(as opposed to the prevalence of vertical ties in hierarchies). For it to be a network,
all of its elements must both view themselves as parts of a broader network and be
ready to act as a network. Main characteristic of any network is its non-hierarchical,
decentralized character, which explains the primary focus of this theory on the
conflicts, correlations and interactions between networks and hierarchies.

In contrast to organizational network theory, ‘social network’ theory explores all

sorts of interlinkages between social actors and the social structures that stem from
and are based on these interlinkages. For social network theorists, a more general
distinction between an informal network and a formal organization is more important
than the contrast between network and hierarchical organizational forms. Any
organization, especially a relatively large one, even if it is decentralized to a
significant extent, requires at least a minimal set of hierarchical features. In contrast,
a network in principle lacks a central leadership presiding over a strict hierarchy.
While the elements of a network are interconnected, they are autonomous and are
not subject to direct, formal orders ‘from above’.

(The basic distinctions between networks and hierarchies do not mean that there is
no space for a broad range of intermediate structures. In the spectrum of structural
models, most organizations—including terrorist groups—fit somewhere between the
two extremes of a pure network and a pure hierarchy. Most dis- play both network
and hierarchical elements, sometimes in combination with elements of other
organizational forms, such as clans)
_______________
 
This interconnects with what is called “netwar” (which is the lower-intensity, societal-
level counterpart to our earlier, mostly military concept of cyberwar). It is composed
of conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, and ethnonationalist
extremists; and by civil-society activists on the other. What distinguishes netwar as a
form of conflict is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners—with
many groups actually being leaderless—and the suppleness in their ability to come
together quickly in swarming attacks. The concepts of cyberwar and netwar
encompass a new spectrum of conflict that is emerging in the wake of the
information revolution. 
 
Netwar works very well. Whether the protagonists are civil-society activists or
“uncivil-society” criminals and terrorists, their netwars have generally been
successful. The network form of organization has re-enlivened old forms of licit and
illicit activity, posing serious challenges to those—mainly the militaries,
constabularies, and governing officials of nation states—whose duty is to cope with
the threats this new generation of largely nonstate actors poses.
 
But strategists and policymakers still have much work to do to harness the brighter,
civil-society-building potential of net- worked nonstate actors. Thus, a fundamental
challenge in the coming decade will be to focus on the opportunities that may arise
from closer cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other
nonstate actors.
 
Netwar, the emergent mode of conflict of choice for networked nonstate actors, has
two faces—and both matters very much.
 
despite the variety, all networks that have been built for waging netwar may be
analyzed in terms of a common analytic framework. There are five levels of theory
and practice that matter: the technological, social, narrative, organizational, and
doctrinal lev- els. A netwar actor must get all five right to be fully effective.
 
While a network’s level of technological sophistication does make a difference—and
people do tend to think that netwar depends heavily on technology—the other levels
have just as much, if not more, of an effect on the potential power of a given group.
One key level is the so- cial basis for cooperation among network members. When
social ties are strong, building mutual trust and identity, a network’s effective- ness is
greatly enhanced. This can be seen most clearly in ethnically based terror, crime,
and insurgent groups in which clan ties bind to- gether even the loosest, most
dispersed organization. 
 
it is important to assess the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses at the
technological, social, and narrative levels. To cope with a network, analysts must first
learn what kind of network it is and then draw on the best methods for analysis. In
the past, intelligence as- sessments of adversaries have tended to focus on their
hierarchical leadership structures. This is insufficient for analyzing netwar actors—
which, like some of today’s terrorist networks, may well consist of various small,
dispersed groups that are linked in odd ways and do not have a clear leadership
structure. Most networks—of both the civil and uncivil variety—will have a great
capacity for swarming. This does not mean that all will swarm all the time, or even
that all will swarm well. Moreover, few netwar actors have an explicit doctrine for
swarming. But most are moving in that direction. Swarming is the key doctrinal
approach for which to prepare. 
 
But even those networks that are weak on some levels (e.g., technological) may
pose stiff challenges to their nation-state adversaries. With this in mind, it is
necessary to go beyond just diagnosing the nature of the networked nonstate
opponent in a given conflict. It will become crucial for governments and their military
and law enforcement establishments to begin networking themselves. Perhaps this
will become the greatest challenge posed by the rise of netwar.
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. What are the main strengths and weaknesses of networks as
organizational forms for
militant (militant/terrorist) non-state actors?
 
one of the most striking features of VNSA (violent non-state actors) is their sheer
variety. This suggests that there is some danger in lumping them together under a
single rubric. they do have certain things in common: they all emerge in response to
inadequacies, deficiencies or shortcomings in many states and to one degree or
another seek to compensate for those shortcomings. At the same time, there are
important differences in motivation, purpose, power structures and the like. one of
the dangers, however, is that they will increasingly form alliances with one another.
There are certainly examples of linkages between organized crime and terrorist
networks, although these are based on temporary convenience rather than real
affinity. 
 
One surprising theme to emerge from the preceding review is that in some cases
there is a transformation of one kind of VNSA to another. Yet, even where there is
not a clear-cut transformation from one kind of VNSA into another the boundaries
between them are blurring. Part of the reason for this blurring is that criminal
activities have become the common denominator. To put it simply criminal activities
are no longer the exclusive prerogative of criminal organizations. terrorists,
insurgents, warlords, militias and paramilitary forces all engage to one degree or
another in criminal activities. 
 
The implication of both the relative and absolute decline of the state is that those
involved in national and international security in the 21st century will need to
understand the threats from Vnsas. it also seems likely that some states will seek
alliances with various Vnsas in an effort to advance their own interests – the links
between Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence and Daewood Ibrahim’s D-Company
(which was predominantly a criminal organization but was also involved in the
Mumbai bombings of 1993) or between Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and farc are
instances where this has already happened. This phenomenon is likely to increase in
frequency and significance over the next few decades. Vnsas will continue to
challenge some states but will increasingly align with others to create a complex and
confusing set of geopolitical and organizational rivalries that will often prove difficult
to disentangle.

18. What are the main differences and similarities between organized crime
groups and
militant-terrorist actors? What are the main types of link between organized
crime and
militant-terrorist actors?
 
Organized crime is characterized by both the nature of the criminal conduct and also
by the structure of the criminal group. Under the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, an "organized criminal group" is defined using four
criteria: 
1. A structured group of three or more persons (that was not randomly formed);
2. The group exists for a period of time;
3. It acts in concert with the aim of committing at least one serious crime
(punishable by at least four years of incarceration);
4. To obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.
The three categories of crimes committed by these groups include the provision of
illicit services, the provision of illicit goods, and the infiltration of legitimate business
or government. The infiltration of legitimate business and government is
distinguished from the provision of illicit goods and services most clearly by its
characteristic use of extortionate threats. To carry out these activities, organized
criminal groups are organized in different ways, often dependent on opportunities.
 
Terrorism is another form of "organized" criminal behaviour, but it is distinct from
organized crime. In general terms, terrorism involves crimes committed with the
objective of intimidating a population or compelling a government or international
organization with a view to achieving political or social objectives. Examples would
include hostage-taking in order to secure freedom for those seen as imprisoned
unjustly or acts of violence done in retribution for perceived past injustices. An act of
terrorism has a political objective. 
 
Organized crime, on the other hand, always seeks to obtain a financial or other
material benefit, whereas power and control can be secondary motives. Organized
crime can involve violence and coercion, but the objective in organized crime
remains profit.
In other words, while they generally pursue different objectives, activities of terrorists
and organized criminal groups can overlap (Bassiouni, 1990). A clear example is
when terrorist groups use organized crime activity to fund their political objectives.
Terrorist organizations can thus adopt the conventional tactics of organized criminal
groups, such as generating profits from drug trafficking, or other types of illicit trade.
In this context, UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25 adopting the Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime also calls upon States to recognize the link
between transnational organized criminal activities and acts of terrorism.
 
Another important element of distinction between these two crimes is that by
definition, organized crime cannot be committed by a single person (as spelled out in
the definition of organized criminal group provided by article 2(a) of the Organized
Crime Convention) while a terrorist act can be.
 
Organized criminal groups, however, may also adopt terrorist tactics of
indiscriminate violence and large-scale public intimidation to further criminal
objectives or fulfil special operational aims. Organized criminal groups and terrorist
organizations may build alliances with each other. The nature of these alliances
varies broadly and can include one-off, short-term, and long-term relationships. With
time, criminal and terrorist groups may develop a capacity to engage in both criminal
and terrorist activities, thus forming entities that display the characteristics of both
groups

19. Does any negotiation related to an armed conflict qualify as a peace

process? How does
violence affect a peace process and how can violence be reduced at the stage
of negotiations?
 
A peace process consists of all the meetings, agreements, and negotiations in which
people such as politicians are involved when they are trying to arrange peace
between countries or groups that are fighting with each other.
 
When parties to a conflict communicate with the aim of reaching an agreement that
will reconcile their respective interests, this process is called negotiation.
 
è Thus yes, it is qualified as a peace process
 
The success of peacebuilding not only depends on the effective negotiation of peace
agreements, but essentially also on how negotiations fare during the practical
implementation of peacebuilding policies on the ground. Negotiations are thus a
central part of the daily business of United Nations (UN) peacebuilding operations.
International actors play an important part in these negotiations, not only as
facilitators between conflict parties, but as an own party with the political agenda to
promote peace and democracy. Yet the impact of negotiations between international
actors and domestic elites on the success of peacebuilding has only received limited
attention so far. Given the mixed success of UN peacebuilding operations in
promoting peace and democracy in post-conflict contexts, this neglect is a missed
opportunity to search for avenues that could make peacebuilding more sustainable.
 
·      Peacebuilding is a constant negotiation process. Negotiations do not stop after
the conclusion of a peace agreement; peacebuilding goals and practice
continue to be negotiated at every step of policymaking. Thus, the success of
peacebuilding also depends on how negotiations fare during implementation.
·      During such negotiation processes particular challenges arise for international
actors vis-à-vis domestic actors: the reconciliation of the diverging goals of
peacebuilders and domestic elites; mutual dependencies on both sides; the
balance between flexibility and long-term strategies; and the selectivity of
international engagement.
 
violence and mistrust are obviously not the only explanations to the existence of a
crisis in peace negotiations. Negotiations may be frustrated for several reasons.
Most important, the parties to a negotiation process may not agree on how to solve
specific issues. The negotiations in Northern Ireland, for instance, have several times
been stalled over the issue of decommissioning. In the Middle East, the negotiations
between Israel and Palestine have been severely disrupted due to the incapacity of
the parties to solve central issues such as the future status of Jerusalem and the
return of Palestinian refugees.
 
It has been recognized in several studies that violence under certain circumstances
can serve as a catalyst for peace. For instance, in this analysis, the Xamán
massacre appeared to strengthen the peace process and moving the process closer
to a successful conclusion. As suggested in this paper, one potential explanation is
that violence can serve as an injection to negotiations because it serves as a
reminder of the cost of armed conflict. The point is, in the context of conflict
management, it is important that the disruptive effects of violence are understood, as
well as its catalytic role for a sustainable negotiation process.
 
____
Owing to the violence they involve, the multiplicity of their causes and the uncertainty
of their duration, armed conflicts impact on the operation of state institutions in
general and social dialogue in particular, with multifaceted dimensions which are
sometimes difficult to identify.
 
Generally speaking, armed conflicts bring about a deterioration or freezing of
institutional mechanisms and put a brake on the operation of democratic structures
in the countries affected. Exceptions to and suspensions of fundamental freedoms
such as the freedom of association (right to organize, bargain collectively) form part
of the provisions implemented when
there is armed conflict. Since social dialogue is one of the mechanisms for instigating
and sustaining the democratic process, any measure which violates rights and
restricts the freedoms of trade union and employers’ organizations constitutes a
restraint on social dialogue.
 
 
(Two quite different examples illustrate the challenges of peace negotiations. In
Rwanda and Palestine-Israel, as in several other cases, peace processes have
faltered or even failed completely after peace agreements were signed.
 
 The Rwandan peace process was designed in part to stop the civil war that had
erupted in late 1990 and prevent its further escalation while also creating a more
inclusive government and society. The Hutu-led government resisted regional
attempts for a ceasefire and its most hard line ministers instead created and armed
two extremist militias, the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi. Moderate Hutu
parties were secretly in touch with the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to
coordinate efforts to bring the ruling party to the negotiation table.
 
Peace processes are particularly vulnerable to violence at the early stages. Once the
peace process begins, violence often takes on new dimensions. 
The security forces, as well as factions within the opposition, frequently are
threatened by moves to peace. It is argued that violence will not disrupt the peace
process if those willing to deal are supported, provide opportunists with avenues to
become part of the process, work to isolate zealots and those out for personal gain
rather than political gain, and to begin to dismantle the state security apparatus to
reduce threat to militants. The beginning of peace processes can also lead to the
transformation of conflict such that there may be a rise in street demonstrations and
more conventional crime.)